BIBLIOTHECA INDICA.
| Worx No. 161.

TANTRAVARTTIKA..
ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

KUMARILA BHATTA

-TANTRAVARTTIKA .

A COMMENTARY ON SABARA’S BHASYA

ON THE PORVAMIMAMSA SOUTRAS OF JAIMINI.

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY

MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA GANGANATHA JHA. M.A

Principal, Sanskrit College, Benares,
Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad.

VoLumeE II.

GALGUTTS :!

PBINTED AST THE BAPTIST MISSION PRESS.

.. D.Litt

PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL

1924.

ADHYAYA III,
Cisya-LaAkSHANA.
PADA I.
ADHIKARANA (1). -
(Laying dotun the subject to be considered.)
Sttra (1). Now then, the Qésha-Adhyiaya.

ei The vermilion-complexioned, elephant-headed god, the Great Gana-
‘pati, embraced by Siddhi and Lakshmi, the destroyer of obstacles—in
Him I take my refuge !
“. ‘With this 5८१2, the author proceeds to explain whatever remains
to be explained, after all that has been said in the first two Adhydyas. `
‘We have seen that the Author of the Bhashya, while setting forth
all that is meant by the highly suggestive first s#tra, has fully ex-
plained, in the first two Adhydyas, the means of knowing Dharma, as well
` 88 its Form, all Wbout which is merely briefly hinted at in the second sitra ;
‘and then, in the remaining Adhydyas he has fully dealt with all other
‘ questions connected with Dharma that demand consideration—such as, what
are the means of accomplishing Dharma, that are the auxiliaries helping
~ 16 in its fruition P—what are not such means and hence no auxiliaries,
. not according it any help P—in what actions the Agent is the principal
factor, the actions bringing about results desired by him ?—in which of
- them he is only a secondary factor, the Actions not bringing about any
such results ?
< Thus then, we find that the word ‘ Césha-lukshana' means the ‘remaining
‘Adhyayas.’ Though the Adhydyas referred to are many, yet the word is in
the singular number, in view of. the singleness of the cluss ‘ Lakshana
{or ‘Adhyaya,’ to which all Adhyayaég belong)
| Though. in the next sttra we find ‘ Césha’ dofined as that which is
tustliary to. another (and assuch the word ‘Césha-lakshana’ in the first
-séttra should be taken as meaning the,‘ definition of Cesha ’), yet all that it
“ean be taken to show 18 that,"the Author begins with the explanation of
-“Auxilisay character,’ which is one of the many subjects to be dealt with
~an the ‘remaiuing Aghyayas
| 116

922° TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADM. W11,—PADA I—aDut, (1)

That 1s tosay, there being many things to be dealt with, he coul
begin with any one of them only, and consequently, in due course, h
begins, in the second si#tra, with an explanation of ‘Cesha’ or ° Auniliar
character, which is based upon the fact of tts beiwy for another's purpos
and which forms the subject of the third Adhydya ६

The compound ‘ Gésha-lakshanam’ may be expounded in two differen
ways, affording two distinct significations of the sentence: (1) As Karma
dadraya : ‘ Gésham’—remaining—lekshanam—Adhyaya; (2) As Genitir
Tuipurusha : ‘Céshasya lakshanam’—Definition of auxiliary character. O1
even if we accept this latter expounding only, then, too, there is no
much difference in the sense of the ‘s#tra. For, in that case, the wor

Césha-lakshanam' meaning ‘ the definition of auxiliary character,’ it is a
parts of this definition that the other subjects are dealt with in th
subsequent Adhyayas

That is tosay, all the subjects dealt with in the subsequent Adhyaya
--४५2., the question of the Instigator and the Instigated (iv), the six mean
of ascertaining the order of sequence (v), the capability or title to tli
performance of certain sacrifices (vi), etc., etc.—all are particular featured
relative to auxiliaries ; and as such, even though they happen to b
dealt with in other Adhydyas, they are spoken of as included in th
ˆ Definition of Césha or Auxiliary

For instance, (1) it is the Auxiliary that is the Instigator of it
Primary (and hence the subject of the Fourth Adhyaya is dependent upo
the definition of the Auxiliary)

(2) As for the Order of sequence (dealt with in the Fifth Adhyfiya)
that too is a ‘ Césha’ (Auxiliary), dependent upon the Pru yogavacana (th
collective Injunction laying down the performance of the Primary alon
with all its Auxiliaries). That is to say, when various Primaries, Cac;
bringing about an independent result, or various subsidiaries of a singt
Primary leading to a single result, happen to be enjoined by a 878 |
collective Injunction, it is found impossible for all of them to be performed
simultaneously ; and as such the order of their sequence becomes!
necessary auxiliary factor in their performance ; and this order i
ascertained by the six means of Direct Assertion, Implication, Sequence o
the Texts, Position, Order of the Primary, and Order of Actual Perfot
mauce

(3) It is only as auxiliary to the sacrifice that the Performer has hi
title to the performance (considered in the sixth Adhyfiya); as the Perfor
mer being the accomplisher of that which is to be accomplished (b
meaus of the Action), (itis he that is the real auxiliary to Actions) ;—wha
is a material to the Action P Specially so as the’ fact of the FRurforme
being auxiliary tu the Action is shown by the 5४८7५ atself, as based upo

SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE ADAYAYA.. - - 993

the fact of his being distinctly enjoined for the sake of the Action—vide

Sativa TII—i—5.

‘In the same manner, the latter six Adhydayas treat of the subjects of
the existence of auxiliaries, the forms, and extent, etc., with regard to
such Primaries as have no auxiliaries distinctly laid down.

For instance, Adh. VII having established the existence of auxiliaries
for sich Primaries, Adh, VIII serves to show what are the auxiliaries
of which actjon, and from where they are obtained ;—Adh. IX shows that
in the Veda, the principal factor being its meaning, the form of the auxili-
ary depends upon the due ascertainment of the meaning of texts bearing
wpon it ;—in Adh. X, we have the question of the Exclusion and [ला
sion of auxiliaries ;—Adh. XI deals with the extent of the performance,
as ascertained by Tantra (Contraction) and Avapa (Expansion);—and ^ त).
XII shows that, in the matter of auxiliaries, if the auxiliaries accomplished
in connection with one set of actions be accepted as helping in another
action also,-~then, this latter action having its purposes served by the
auxiliaries of another, it will be necessary for us to assume very few
auxiliaries ; while, on the contrary, it would be necessary to make a vast
number of assumptions,

Or, it may be that the third Adhyaya is the only ‘ Gésha-lakshana,’ and
it 18 this alone that is introduced by the sitra in question. As for the
other Adhydyasy we find each of them prefaced by an independent siitra.
Consequently it is the third Adhyaya alone that treats of the Auxiliary
character, together with all things related to it.

The word ‘atha' in the siitra may be taken inany one, or all together,
of its three senses of sequence, dependence on what has been explained before,
and introduction. The sense of the sittra thus comes to be that—‘ we proceed
with the Definition of Casha, which depends upon a due Differentiation of
Actions, that has been dealt with in the immediately preceding Adhyjya.”

In answer to the question as to why we proceed with the Césha-
lakshana,—we have the word ‘atak’ (‘ then’), which mentions the reason
the sense being—~Inasmuch as without the knowledge of one Action being
different from another, we could not understand what ‘ Gésha’ (or Auxili-
ary) means, we psoceed to explain this latter, immediately after the treat-
ment of the Difference of Actions. That is to say, the relationship of the
Auxiliary and the Primary isgpossible only between things that are distinct
from ong another ; for when two things are identical, neither of them could
be spoken of as auxiliary to the other

924. TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I11-~PADA --+ एषा, (1).

Then again, immodiately after the Difference of Actions, 1४ becomes
necessary to explain the Anxiliary character ; becanse the due consideration
of all other questions—relating to the Instigator, ete..—depends upon the
ascertainment of the Auxiliary character

In this alone lies the connection between the two Adhyayas (II and
IIL); aud as this is mentioned fully in the sitra itself, the Bhashya does
not take the trouble of explaining it over again. The case of Ath. II
was different; the first siira of that Adhydya did not pgint out any
connection with the preceding Adhydya; consequently, in that place, we
had the Bhashya explaining the connection in detail, in the sentences Pra-
thumé Adhy@yé, etc., etc. As a matter of fact, we find that the Adhyayas
are related in the subjects that they treat of, and not in the mere verbal
form of the texts; and hence the Bhashya took the tronble of explaining
the connection between Adhyayas [ and II, after having shown in brief
what had gone in the preceding Adhyd@ya, and what was coming in the one
just then begun. In the present instance however we find that the connec-
tion between the Adhyayas II and HI has been distinctly shown by the
words ‘ atha’ and ‘ afa&’ of the siira itself; and it is to that alone that
the Bhashya merely refers by the sentence—The Adhydya dealing with Dis-
tinct Actions has been jinished.

And in tlis sentence, the Bhadshya has spoken of ‘ Difference ’ alone,
as forming the principal factor in the question dealt with in Adh. IJ,—and
it does not make any mention of the other supplementary, matters therein
dealt with,——because 16 18 the Difference of Actions alone brat helps in the
explanation of Auxiliary character.

The reason why at the beginning of Adh, II the Bhashya bas spoken
of in detail of every question dealt with in the preceding Adhyfiya, is that
due ascertaimment of the Difference of Actions depends upon every one of the
details dealt with in the First Adhydya, which deals with the Means of
knowing Dharma, duly divided into (1) Injunctions, (2) Valedictory Pas-
sages, (3) Mantras, (4) Srorpti-regulations, (5) Injunctions of accessories,
(6) Names, (7) and (8) the Ascertainment of doubtful points by means of
subsequent sentences and the character of the purpose served

For instance, (1) in the ‘ Abhydsddhikarana,’ we have the assertion
‘avipéshadanarthakam hi 50/1४ ` (in Sittra 1-11-2), on the sole strength of
the previous definition of the Veda as the means of knowing Dharma. As
a matter of fact, we find that when there is nothing else to be enjoined the
Injunctive Word cannot but be taken as laying down the form of an Ac-
tion; and as such 1४ must point out an Actiow different from all that may
have been already laid down ; and thus we find that the differentiation of
Actions is wholly dependent upon the knowledge of the cha.acter of
Injunctions. ¢

SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE ADHYAYA, 92

(2) In the case of the three sentences—‘ Vishnurupincn yashtavych,
elc.” (dealt with in Satras II—ii—9, etc.), we find that it is only when they
are recognized as valedictory passages that they are not taken as laying
down three distinct sacrifices ; because of the fact of Valedictory Passages
having no injunctive potency (as shown in Adh. I, Pédaii), That is to
say, we find these sentences, occurring in the midst of the mention of
the anomaly of ‘ Jamz’ (interruption), having the character of valedictory
passages, on account of their forming part of the intermediate Injune-
tion; and as such having no independent injunctive potency, they are not
taken 88 laying down three distinct sacrifices with Vishnu, etc., as their
deities.

(3) Inasmuch as the mantras serve the purpose of indicating things
relative to what has been enjoined,—the ‘ Gadana’ and the ‘ Goyayra’ are
not taken as distinct actions, on the sole ground of repetition. That is to
say, the mantras have their injunctive potency suppressed by such causes
as the presence of the word ‘yat,’ words of address, the First Person,
and so forth; and hence even though they are spoken of as the means
of accomplishing Dharma, yet they do not serve to point out one action as
being different from another, even in the case of such mantras as ^ Dévdn¢ca
yabhiryajate dadati ca, etc., where we have various verbs.

(4) It is through the due ascertainment of the bearing of the
grammatical rules dealing with the significations of words, that we
come to accept the difference of ‘Homa’ from ‘ Yaga,’ on the ground
of the former idvolving a further action of throwing tn. Similarly also,
the Actions are not differentiated by such names as ‘ kathaka’ and the
like, simply because grammatical rules distinctly make these the names of
books, for certain reasons therein mentioned, Though the fact of such
names being coined ones has been urged by some people as an argument
against the eternality of words,—yet the Author admits ‘1 so far as
explaining it as based upon certain causes. That is to say, the word
‘kathaka’ means ‘ that which is taught by Katha,’ in accordance with the
rule‘ tna proktam’; and hence it is a book that is taught, and not the
matter, which latter is only performed; and thus, inasmuch as we have a
grammatical rule distinctly laying down the nominal affix in ‘ kathaka
ag signilying that which ts taught by Katha, wo must take it as the name of
a book, as itis a book alone that can be taught and explained.

($) Accessories with new relationships (II—ii—23), and (6) Names
also serve to differentiate Actions; and hence a due knowledge of the
character of the Accessory and the Name is necessary in the matter of the
differentiation of Actions. °

` (गप the case of*the Prajapatyas, there arises a question as to their
forming a single sacrifice, or so many distinct sacrifices ;—and this 18

926 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, पा.-- प्र) (फा, (1).

decided by the help of the supplementary sentence that ‘ The modificationa
of a sacrifice are to be performed in the same manner as that sacrifice
itself,’

(8) Inasmuch as the number ‘ seventeen ` could not be accomplished,
without a due knowledge of the extent of the sacrifice,.—-in this case, we
have the doubt settled by ‘ Purpose’ (or use),

Thus it is for these reasons that, at the beginning of Adh. H, the
Bhashya has briefly recalled all that has been explained in the preceding
Adhydya,—with a view to show the connection of the Adhydya in question.
In the present case, however, the Auxiliary character depending only upon
the Difference of Actions, there is no use of the other details explained in
Adh. IT; and hence itis this ‘ Difference’ alone that is spoken of in the
Bhashya,

But ४४8 is not the only reason for the very brief reference, in the
Bhishya, to the matter of the previous Adhydya ; because, just as at the
beginning of Adh. IT, so on the present occasion also, much useful purpose
would be served by such recapitulation of the conclusions previously
arrived at.

For instance, (1) the Auxiliary character of Actions is to be spoken
of by Jaimini (III—i—4), as based upon the fact of their being connected
with Results brought about by that which is signified by verbs, as shown
in the Introductory portion of Adh. II (Il—i—1) ;—(2) in IM1—i—7, he will
establish the restricted applications of the details of Ajyya, Aushadhi etc.,
in accordance with the difference in the Resultant Apérvas, which has
been shown (TI—i—5) to be based upon the Difference of Actions ;—(3) in
connection with the various subjects dealt with in Adh. II, we have found
therein the definition of ‘Rk,’ ‘ Yajush’ and ‘Saman’; and these defiui-
tions will be utilized in the Sara I1I—ni—l1 ef seg.

` Consequently we must conclude that, inasmuch as there are two ways

of dealing with a subject,—one that is brief, and another a detailed one,—

the Bhdshya makes use of one way in one place, and of the other at

another ; and hence there is nothing incongruous in its adopting the briefer
ethod on the present occasion

Thus then, the two meanings of the word ‘atha’ having been
explained, we have, thereby, also shown the connection between the two
Adhyayas (IT and ITT)

If, however, it be found that the Connection ig already implied by
other means, then, with a view to avoid the unnecessary repetition, we can
take the word ‘ atha’ as signifying Adhikdra (the propriety of considera-
tion or inquiry), (and as such referring to wh&t is to come in the Adhydaya,
and not to what has gone in the preceding Adhyfyas). +

In the first stitru of 4411. J, we have not taken the word ‘alka’ as

SUBJECT-MAITER OF THE ADHYAYA. 927

denoting Adhikftra ; because what 18 mentioned in the siitra is the ‘ desire
to know Dharma’; and this Desire is not what is found to be taken up
for consideration; consequently all that that sitra could be taken to
mean was that ‘we should now proceed to point out that which should
be done immediately after the study of the Veda’ (and after such study
what 18 necessary to do is to have a desire for knowing Dharma), Even
though,the knowledge of Dharma was also found mentioned therein, as
qualifying that Desire, yet that knowledge would come by itself to the
disciples, by the mere explanation of the meaning of the Veda; and
consequently, it could not be taken as a fit object to be mentioned, either
by the sitra or the Bhashya or the later commentators, as befitting of
consideration. Specially as that which, in the assertion of the speaker,
appears as an object deserving of consideration, cannot be expressed by
the expression ‘ desire to know ` for one who hears that assertion.

In the present case, on the other hand, we find that the ‘ Definition
of Auxiliary character ' 18 quite capable of being explained as deserving
of consideration, either in the shape of the Adhydya, or in that of what is
therein mentioned. The meaning of the stra thus comes to be this—
‘Henceforth the Definition of the Auxiliary should be regarded as the
object of consideration, and it should be carefully grasped and listened
to.’ Inasmuch as there is no room (after what has been dealt with in
Adh, II) for any other Adhydya, we can very reasonably speak of the
+ Definition of Auxiliary ' as the object of consideration.

Nor can there be any doubt as to the propriety of the consideration of
Auxiliary character, on this occasion, in preference to any other subject ;
because a due understanding of all that is said in the subsequent Adhyayas
depends upon a correct comprehension of the Auxiliary Character.
That 18 to say, the latter six Adhy@yas, dealing, as they do, of Implications
as preceded by Direct Injunction, stand in need of the completion of the
former six Adhydyas, which treat of Injunction. So also, the Capability
of Performance (dealt with in the sixth Adhydya) is ascertained as
existing in the Performer, in the shape of his power to perform the
Action in the way that it is enjoined; and as such, a treatment of this
could not but follow after a due comprehension of all Injunctions, up to
the order of sequence (of the actions to be performed) (dealt with in
Adh. V);.as it is only when the weight to be carried has been duly
ascertained beforehand, that we could ascertain whether a certain person
is capable of carrying it. Then, the order of sequence, both direct and
implied, is held to be depertdent upon the character of the Instigating
Action (treated of in Adh. IV); and it is for this reason that the order
of sequexce is treated df after Adh, LV. Then again, it is the Principal
Action that is the lustigator of the Auxiliaries, which are not instigated

128 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. HL-—-PADA 1—apu. (1).

by anything else; and hence it is only right that we should treat of the
character of the Instigator after that of the Auxiliary has been fully
dealt with.

Thus then, the propriety of the taking up of the Definition of
Auxiliary having been fully established, the Bhashya proceeds to show
that there are various ways in which the Auxiliary can be defined,—these
ways consisting of the due treatment of the Form, the Cause, and the
Relationship of the Auxiliaries, also with the comparative strength and
weakness of the means whereby they are recognized.

Objection : “It 18 as necessary to know the Principals as the
“ Auxiliaries; because so long as any one of these is unknown, there can
‘be no performance. '

Reply : It is true that both should be duly known; but it is not
necessary to speak of both in the sétra; because the definition of one
would necessarily imply that of the other.

Then there remains the question as-to whether the sitras should deal
directly with the Principals or with the Auxiliaries ; from the fact of the
treatment of both being equally difficult, and leading practically to the
same result, it would seem as if the matter were altogether optional ; in
fact at first sight, it would appear more reasonable that the treatment
should be of the Principals, because they form the chief factor; but still
this is not what is done; and the reason is that if the sitra began with
the definition of the Principal, 1४ would be necessary for if to mention
that of the Auxiliary also; because the Principal ( ‘ Gésii’) 18 explained
as that which has many Auxiliaries (26106) ; and hence the character of
the former could not be comprehended without a due comprehension of the
latter ; consequently even though the Auxiliary is the subordinate factor,
yet it 18 of this that the siitra gives the definition; specially as that of the
Principal follows from that (and does not require a separate mention).

Another reason for this is that Direct Assertion, Indicative Power and
the rest, all tend to ascertain the character of the Auxiliary; and it is as
a necessary concomitant of this that the Principal becomes indirectly
defined as that which has that Auxiliary. And the comparative strength
and weakness of these—Direct Assertion, etc., when they appear conjointly,
—that will be treated of later on, will be found to pertain to the Auxiliary ;
because there is no incompatibility amongst them with regard to the
Principal.

It is for these reasons that the present siitra lays down the subject
to be dealt with as the Definition of the Auxiliary, together with all the
various means of ascertaining that character.

The questions to be dealt with in this connection are thus enumera-
ted in the Bhashyu: (1) © Whal es an Auadidury ? ` This means that we shalt

SUBJECI-MATTER OF THE ADHYAYA. ९९2९

consider the form of the Auxiliary. (2) ‘ Why ds ४ ५) 4 वका? ' ™

18 to say, we shall explain that character of the Auxiliary whith toca. io:
to call it an duailiary. (3) ‘ Which ts the Ausiliary of which Prinedpal 2?
That is to suy, we shall explain the process of performance, by which the
Auxiliary is attached to one Principal and not to the other,—this
conclusion either involving, or not involving, the indicative power of one
or the other means of ascertaining such character ; and in this connection
we shall explain the form of these six means—Direct Assertion and the
rest,—as also their comparative strength and weakness.

Thus then, in the Hirst Pada, we shall treat of the applicability of
Auxiliaries as shown by Direct Assertion; as also of certain other
matters connected with it. In the Second Pada, we shall treat of the
applicability shown by the Indirect Indication of words. In the Third
Pada, we shall bring forward the aforesaid two Means (Direct Asse ttn
and Indicative Power), and proceed to arrive at the correct conclusion by
means of reconciling these two, by considering them from beginning to end;
and thus even without the explicit mention of ^ Syntactical Connection,”
we shall speak of the applicability of Auxiliaries based upon thus
Connection—in the ७८१८ ITI—iii—2; and after this we shall explain the
sitras dealing with the Applicability based upon the other three authorities,
of Context, Order and Name. After that will follow the Adhikarana
dealing with the comparative strength of these six authorities: Then we
shall consider the question of the contradiction and non-contradiction of
Context by Ditect Assertion and Indirect Indication,—this explanation
extending as far as the Sitra Il1I—vi—18. After that, up to the Sé#ira
Ilf—vii—18, we shall deal with the contradiction and non-contradiction of
Order by the former four Authorities. Then with a certain amount of
introductory matter, there will follow the consideration of the contradic:
tion and non-contradiction of the former five by Name; and with this the
Adhyaya will end.

It is these matters to be dealt with that are referred to iu the Bhashya
—‘Gtat tatparyéna, etc.’ The purpose served by this brief reference to
what is to follow makes it more easily comprehensible, And as all these
details were mentioned in a body in the first sit:a, it was not necessary
to have a stra for every one of them.

Il?

ADHIKARANA (2).
[The Definition of Auailiary.|

Siitra (2): That which is done for the sake of another is called
the Auxiliary ; because it is for the sake of another.

Inasmuch as the definition of the Principal would follow from that
of tho Auxiliary, we have in the si#ira a definition of the latter only.
And inasmuch as the‘ Gésha’ has many significations— That which
exceeds,’ etc., etc.,—the sitra distinctly mentions a reason ‘ because tt £5
for the sake of another’; which shows that the word is here used as
synonymous with such words as ‘ Anga,’ * Guna,’ ‹ Dharma’ and the like.
And this mention of the reason also serves to set aside the theories that
base the character of the Auxiliary upon luvariable Concomitance, etc.

Inasmuch as the 57८72 lays down two distinct facts,—one directly and
another by implication,—it is necessary to interpret 17 m such a way as to
avoid a syntactical split,—just as we did in the case of Sutra 1~1-—2.
That is to say, we must take the stra as meaning that— The Auxiliary is
nothing other than that which is done for the sake of another’ and ‘Its
character is not based upon any other cause’; and in this way the Conclu-
sion and the Premiss (embodied in the sitra) come to be taken us dovetailed
together (and hence there is no syntactical split).

There are five different theories as to the character of the Auxiliary ;
(1) some people explain it as that which is invariably concomitant; (2)
others as that which is dnstigated; (3) others as that which exceeds ; (4)
others as that which appears at the end of the Injunction; and (5) many
people explain it as that which helps.

(1) The sense of the first is this : “ That which does not appear with-
५४ out another, and which appears when that other appears, is its Auxiliary ;
‘‘e.g., the sprout does not appear without moisture, and the jar without
“the Clay, the Rod, the Wheel, etc., and hence these are known as Auxili-
“aries to those two | |

Against this we have the following reasons : [tis not propor to regard
the Auxthary as the Invariable Concomitant ; because this definition would
he too wide ; inasmuch as we find even such things to be so concomitant
as ure not Auxiliaries; as for instance, the qdalities of Colour, Touch, etc.,
are always Concomitant in Karth; and certainly none of these 18 Auxiliary
to any other, all of them being equally predominant. Then again, we find
that there aro no Slaves ox Houses without the Master ; and certainly the

DEFINITION OF AUXILIARY. 0.21

Master is never known 88 Auxiliary tothem. Then again, in certain cases
(as in that of the Darga and the Pirramasa; each of which is composed
of three independent sacrifices), we find a number of Principals to he
concomitant; and according to the above theory, they would become
Auxiliary to one another, Similarly Primaries and Subsidiaries, as also
a number of Subsidiaries, would become mutual Auxiliaries, if the charac-
ter ofthe Auxiliary consisted of Invariable Concomitance only, Then
again, Vedic Study, Laying of Fire, Agriculture, and: Marning of Wealth,
6९6.) would all have to be taken as Auxiliaries to Sacrifices, as no perfor-
mance of sacrifices is ever possible without these.

(2) In view of these objections, the upholder of the second theory
argues thus: “Irrespective of Invariable Concomitance, we must admit
“that to be the Auxiliary which is instigated by another. This saves us
‘‘ from the above objections, as neither the Master is instigated by the
‘Slaves, nor is there any mutual instigation among Colour, ete.”

But this too cannot be accepted as the correct detinition of the
Auxiliary; because the definition is too wide, as well as too narrow.
For instance, the Puroddcakapala is not instigated by the ‘ Removal of
the Chaff,’ because it is an established entity already; and yet 1b is
accepted as its Auxillary; and on the other hand, though the M/omas are
actually instigated by such causes as the breaking of the vessel, the des-
truction of the Cake, etc., yet they are not accepted as Auxiliames to these.

(3) Then we have tho third theory, as follows: ^^ That which is found
© to be enjoined! in excess of something already enjoined, is the Auxiliary
“to this latter; and thus the character of the Auxiliary consists of being
“an Hacess. For instance, in all cases we find that the Injunctions of the
८८ Subsidiaries are over and above those of the Fruitful Primary; and the
८५ Subsidiaries also are something over and above the Primaries; and in
“all these cases we find the character of the Auxiliary consisting in
° acess.”

Against this it may be argued that this definition also is too wide ;
as it applies to the Primaries also; because the Primaries are as much in
excess of the Subsidiaries, as the Subsidiaries are in excess of the Prima-
ries (and hence the definition is equally applicable to both).

(4) Then, we have the fourth theory, which is as follows: ^ Inas-
“much as we always. find the Injunctions of Auxiliaries appearing after
“those of the Primaries, we must conclude the Auxiliary character to
“consist in this fact of being enjoined at the end of the Injanction, In
‘connection with the declaration that ‘the modifications of sacrifices
“should be performed in the same way as their originals’ we find
" Jaimini also (later on} speaking of the Auxiliaries as being laid down

at the end of Injanctions, Consequently we must conclude thnt the

932 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, If~-PADA ^+ एका, (2),

“character of the Auxiliary, accepted .by Jaimini, consists in the fact of
“its being enjoined by the tail-end of an Injunction, as capable of supply-
“ing the details of procedure wanted in connection with the Primary
“ enjoined at the beginning of that Injunction.”

To this theory we make the following reply : we cannot admit this
to bea correct definition of Auxiliary character; because as a matter
of fact, we actually find that character belonging to Actions laid
down in the beginning, in the middle, as well 88 at .the end of
Injunctions, That is to say, if in all cases we invariably found the
Injunctions of Auxiliaries appearing at the tail-end of the Sentences and
the Context, then we could accept that as the universal mark of the
Auxiliary ; but asa matter of fact we find them laid down in the begin-
ning, the middle as well as the end. For instance, we find such details,
as the chopping of branches, etc., laid down at the very beginning of the
Primary Durga sacrifice; and hence, according to your definition, they
could not serve as the Auxiliaries of that sacrifice. Then, we find, in
many cases, the Material and the Deity laid down along with the sacrifice
itself, and these too would not be Auxiliaries, as not laid down at the end.
Tus then, we conclude that we cannot accept the fact of being laid down
at the tail-end of Injunctions as the sole definition of the Auxiliary ;
because we find that in many cases, where the sentence or the context
begins with the laying down of Subsidiaries, when we come to look for
the result to be accomplished by these subsidiaries, we come across the
Injunction of the Primary Sacrifice, which stands in need of the men-
tion of its method of procedure; and as this want of the Primary is
supplied by the former Subsidiaries, these come to be taken as its
Auxiliaries, even though they happen to be laid down at the beginning
of the Injunction.

(5) Then there remains the fifth theory, which may be thus summed
up: “That should be accepted as the Auxiliary of another which is
“found to help it; in this way the Homa cannot be the auxiliary of the
‘ Breaking of the Vessel, etc,; because the Homa does not help the Break-
“ang; in fact it is the latter that helps the former. In the Veda too we
_ ‘do not find any other cause of auxiliary character save this; because
^“ unless one thing helped another, it could not be auxiliary to it. Hence
“there is nothing incongruous in the definition we have given. And
“in fact, later on, in certain places, the anthor of the Bhashya also
‘‘makes such declarations as ‘that which helps another is its Auxiliary,
“the Auxihary character is characterised:by help,’ and so forth. And

n fact, the fact of being subordinate to axother’s purpose also is nothing
“different from Help. Consequently the helping of another must be
“accepted as the only mark of the Auxiliary.”

८

DERINITION OF AUXILIARY. O83

But even this definition is not quite correct; because in accordance
with this definition, the Auxiliary character wonld be hopelessly mixed
up among Primaries, among Subsidiaries, and also among the Subsi-
diaries of Subsidiaries

That is to say, just as the Subsidiaries help the Principals, so also do
the Principals help the Subsidiaries by bringing abont their performance,
as also by accepting their aid (and thereby justifying their performance).
Because no oge would perform the Subsidiaries, unless he were instigated
to it by the requirements of the Principals; and these Subsidiaries too
could not afford any help unless there were something to be helped (in
the shape of the Principals). And thus, on account of the help accorded
by them, the Principals would also become subsidiary (to the Subsidi-
aries); and thus by mutual help, they would become mutual auxiliaries,
Then again, in the case of sacrifices, whose performance consists of various
Principals, @ single Principal, without the others, could not accomplish
the Result ; and hence they would help each other, in the bringing about
of it; and hence by mutual help, they would become mutual auxiliaries;
specially as this help does not in any way differ from that accorded by the
Subsidiary to the Principal. In the same way we could show the
possibility of mutual help among the Subsidiaries themselves. And thus,
in the performance of the modifications of a single Principal, even if a
single Subsidiary should come to be performed, it would necessitate the
performance of all other Subsidiaries and Principals (as its auxiliaries),
and there could be no restriction in this matter.

Similarly, the Earning of Wealth, the Laying of Fire, and Vedic
Study, etc., would come to be the auxiliaries of all actions; because they
help all of them by their various effects; as certainly there 18 no action
that can be accomplished without the help of these. And these being
auxiliaries to sacrifices, all who would do these would become entitled to
the performance of sacrifices ; and as such, men of all castes would become
entitled to the performance of all sacrifices that are laid down with a
view to the obtaining of a certain result ; as the only restriction upon the
character of the performer would be that he should have a desire for that
Result; specially as in the case of the sentence ‘ The Brahmana should
lay the fire in Spring,’ the meaning would be that ‘if the performer happen
to be a Brahmana, the laying should be done in spring-time,’—which would
entitle the Gadra also to the laying of fire and the performance of
sacrifices

Then again, it is only when the Definition (or Character) has become
duly known that it can indicate the object to be defined. Consequently
the Aux:hary -character, based upon help, is possible only in such cases
where the help accorded is visible. In the case of the Purificatory

944 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. U1—PAbA 1—Aput. (2).

Rites, on the other hand, all of which help imperceptibly,—such, for
instance, as the Paryagnikarana and the like; as alyo in the case of such
subsidiaries as the Prayajas, which help the Principal Darga-Pirnamisa
indirectly through their Apérvas,—the auxiliary character of which
(Rites and Prayftjas) has not been cognized,—as we would perceive no
visible help accorded by them, they could never be known as Auxiliaries.
Nor can it be urged that the Auxiliary character of these would be
recognized, by means of the assumption of some visible help. Because
prior to the recognition of the fact of their being Subsidiaries, there
would be no ground for assuming any such helping. As in a case where a
certuin thing having been recognized as auxiliary to an Action, with or
without a Result, there arises the question as to the way in which it
would help that Action; and then alone can we, not finding a visible
help, assume some sort of an unseen help. And 80 long as the Auxiliary
character has not been cognized, on what ground could the help be
assumed ? And in this way there would be a mutual interdependence.
For instance, the auxiliary character would be cognized by means of the
Help, and the Help again would be cognized by that of the Auxillary
character ; and noue of the two would be cognized independently of the other.

For the matter of that, even in the case of actions according percep-
tible help,—e.g. the threshing of the corn,—we do not find any visible
help following from the Restriction that the chaff is to be removed by
threshing alone; and hence the Auxiliary character would not be
recognized as necessary. Nor does the Scripture speak of any help to be
accorded by chance actions ; and hence, according to you, the Auxiliary
character could be cognived only when the help accorded would be
cognized by Sense-perception, etc.; and in that case the siiras could not
speak of the Auxiliary character as pointed out by the six means of
Direct Assertion and the rest.

Theu again, even in the case of such subsidiaries as are performed
only by the way, and are not brought about directly by the Principal
concerned, and in fact are performed for the sake of something totally
different from it,—inasmuch as they would help the other, they would
become auxiliaries to that Principal also; exactly like that which insti-
gates the performance of that Action in the midst of which that Action
is performed. And this would be in direct contradiction to the Satras—
‘ Prasangikaiica notkarshét’ (Siitra V—i—28), ‘ Prasangiké prayagcittanna
vidyaté (Siltra [X—iv—28), ‘navd 17101041, ९८. (Siatra 1V—i-—-34),
‘Apt ४९ céshabhijdm syat’ (Sutra VI—iv—3), etc., etc.

Thus we find that even Definition No. 18 not quite compatible with
the Scriptures. And consequently we declare that ‘the Auxiliary is that
which ww fur the suke of another, etc’? And what we mean is that even

DERINITION OF AUSTLEARY, १.१;

without finding any help accorded by it, if we finda certain Action to be
done for the sake of another, we recognize it as its Auxiliary; and
after its auxiliary character has been recognized, it would naturally help it,

(Question ; “Is there any difference between he!ping and being for the
sake of a thing £

Answer : Certainly, there is a difference; because we often find that
something that hinders another is also spoken of as being for 1८5 sake;
while that whgch helps it is not spoken of as such, ‘T'hat 18 to say, the
mere fact of being done with reference to another is enough to make it
spoken of as being for 2/5" sake; and this is possible equally with that
which helps and that which hinders. For instance, we speak of smoke
as being done for the suke of mosquitoes (though what the smoke does is
to drive them away). So also, even when we find one thing helping
another, 1f it is found to be one that has come up by mere chance, and
which is not found to have been done for its sake, 16 18 not spoken of as
being for tts sake. Kor instance, when a man driuks water out of a canal
that has been dug out for the purpose of irrigating the fields of corn, he
does not speak of it as having been dug for his sake. Consequently we
conclude that being for another’s sake is something wholly different from
helping it,

Objection: “ Then in that case even that which hinders would come
to be an auxiliary.” `

Reply: It can be so in the ordinary life of the world; in the case
of the Veda, however, it could not be an auxiliary, as it would not be
something wanted. Thatis to say, whenever a certain thing would he
comnized as being for the sake of the sacrifice, there would be a doubt
as to whether it will help or hinder it; and then, inasmuch as the
Principals do not stand in need of a hindrance, we would reject the
possibility of the thing hindering the Action; and on the strength of the
suid requirement of the sacrifice, we would take it to be a helper.

Objection: ‘“‘We can never take a thing as being for the sake of
‘another, without knowing 10 as according some help toit. Because unless
“the Principal is found to be in need of a helper, even if something
“happens to be neur it, it 18 not accepted to be ifs auxiliary. For
instance, it 1s not on account of mere proximity, and independently of
‘the help that they accord, that the Praya@jas are taken as being for the
“sake of the Darga-Piirnamasa. Consequently, the being for another's sake
‘being based upon Helping, we must accept this latter as the sole hasis
‘of auxiliary character.”

Reply: This does not quite affect our position; because it is often that
we find the fact of something being for another's sake cognized by means of
Direct Assertion, cyen apart from all Helpers; aud im these cases it

०6 ` TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 1 0-षए7+ I—ADHI. (2).

is based upon the mere requirements of the Principal. For instance, in
the case of such sentences as ‘ Dagdpavitréna graham samméarshft, ‘ Vrihin
prokshati,’ and the like, the fact of the actions therein mentioned being
for the suke of the sacrifice is recognized beforehand, by the Direct
Assertion (of the sentences); and then follows their recognition as subsi-
diaries, which leads to the assumption of the help to be accorded by them.
Even in the case of the Prayajas, where there is no Direct Mention of
their being for the sake of the Darga-Pérnamdsa, though it appears as if the
recognition of the Auxiliary character depended upon some Help accorded
by them,—yet, in reality, there too, itis based upon the requirements of the
Principal ; as the Help is not accorded before the sacrifice is actually being
performed. As we have already shown, that until the Auxiliary character
of the Praydsas has been cognized, it is not possible either to perceive, or
assume, the help accorded by them. Hence in the case of these we must
adinit the fact to be that—the Darcu and the Parnamdasa being found to
stund in need of some help, and the Praydjas being found to be on the
look-out for something that they could help, the latter come to be
recognized by means of Context or Mutual Dependence, as being for the
sake of the former two sacrifices, long before the help is actually accorded
(during the performance of the sacrifices), And as for the help (it boing
not perceptible), it is assumed simply for the purpose of justifying the
recognition of their being for the sake of the sacrifices. And hence
even in this case we find that it is only the requirement of the sacrifices
that brings about the inference of the fact of the Pfayajas being for
their sake; and either this fact, or the Auxiliary character, does not quite
depend upon the help accorded by them. And thas there is no incongruity
in our theory.

Such being the case, inasmuch as it is Direct Assertion and the rest
alone that can establish the fact of something being for the sake of
another, 10 is these alone that could lay down the performability
of the Auxiliaries; and as such, for a due discrimination of these, it
becomes necessary to take up the present Adhy@ya, And as for several
Principals, and several Subsidiaries, as taken among themselves, even
though there 1s a mixture of mutual help, yet there is no mixing up of
the being for another's sake ; and so in our case there 18 no hopeless confu-
sion, 111४8 it 18 established that there is no flaw in the definition of the
Auxiliary, as ‘that which is for the sake of another

Then, as for the assertion of the Bhashya ‘that which he’ps another,
etc., ec, —in this we must take the word ^ help’ as indicating its cause,
the being for another's sake ; and the senterfte should not be mistaken for
४ definition of the Auxiliary; specially as this isemade qnite clear further
on, in the sentence—' those that are for the sake of ugother, etc., etc.’

DEFINITION OF THE AUXILIARY. es `

The opponent, however, takes the sentence of the Bhashya as laying
down the definition of Auxiliary as that which helps, and henco urges the
objection: “But we actually find the Teacher serving the ends of the
115८711९) ९६८, etc.”

Aud the reply is that ४८ ४७ quite true that he serves them ; but inas-
much as, in this case, we perceive a sort of help wholly distinct from
being for their sake, he is not regarded as their Auxiliary ;—the Bhashya
rejects the example of the Teacher, and cites one in which there is au
absolute being for another's sake, eg., the Born Slave, who, from his very
birth, is known as existing for the sake of his Master; and 80 50
the calf which is always known as being for the sake of carrying lvads ;
and certainly the Master is not kuown as being for the sake of these ; this
is what makes all the difference.

The opponent, however, thinks that even in the case of the Master
and the Slave, the idea of being for another's sake is based upon a certain
help that is accorded, and hence urges the objection: “Vha Master also
supports the Slave, and as such he would become subsidiary to him.”

The reply to this is that i thus supporting the Slave, the Muster is in
reality helping himself, That is to say, tho fact of being for another's
suke vs known by that in view of which that thing is done ; and certainly
the action of the Master is not with a view to help the Born Slave; the fact
being that he supports him, as this supporting is inseparably mixed up
with the due fulfilment of his own ends; and as such the Master is not
known as the Avxiliary of the Slave.

Then, there arises an objection based apon the idea that the present
57/72 18 a mere repetilion of what has already been said under the Sitra
WI—i—8, the objection being this: ^ Inasmuch as the definition of the
Auxiliary 18 already contained in the former siéra, it was not necessary
to mention it over again, in the present Adhyaya.”

Iu reply to this we have the Bhishya—Tatraptrvarthata vydvurtita.
[In the previous sutra we have simply shown that Accessorivs do not bring
about Apiirvas.}

Some people explain this reply as follows: In the previous sttra we
have explained the Auxiliary character of such Actions 98 serve
perceptible ends ; while on the present occasion, we explain that character
as belonging to all Substances and Actions,—those with porceptible results,
as well as those with results not perceptible.

But in this manner the present sééra may not be a repetition ; bnt
when the auxiliary character of ull is dealt with, on the present occasion,
the mention of that character of a particular kind on the previous oecasion
would be a mere useless repetition.

Consequently we must expliin the Bhashya as follows : The question

118

938 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. Ift—PADA I—ApHI. (2).

simply being as to what-has been said in the previous sitra,—we proceed
to explain that which has been said there. It is this: the Auxiliary
character of the threshing is based upon the definition given in the
present sitra; and all that was shown in the previous sitra was
that, inasmuch as that action serves a visible purpose, it cannot be
accepted as bringing about an Apiirva. That is to say, it is the univer-
sally applicable Auxiliary character defined in the present sitra that has
been attributed to the Action spoken of under the previoug siitra for the
purpose of showing that it does not lead to an Apiirva.

“Or, the sense of the question itself may be explained as follows :
“On the present occasion, the Auxiliary character being explained as
“something quite ‘new (not explained before), based upon the being for
`^ another's sake, independently of the definition of the Primary and Subsidi-
“ary character of Actions explained in the previous Adhydya,—this
^^ present definition appears to be contradictory to what has been said in the
“ Stitra —~i—8, which has distinctly explained the Auxiliary Character
^“ to consist in helping.”

In that case, the sense of the Reply would be this: In that sitra,
we have spoken of the perception of Help, simply for the purpose of
precluding all possibility of the assumption of distinct Apitrvas, and not
as a definition of the Auxiliary; while in the present 5४८10, we have the
real definition of all Auxiliaries ; and thus the subject-matter of the two
sutras being totally different, there can be no contradiction between
them, °

‘ADHIKARANA (3).

[The Puumeruting of Auxilvaries. ]
@

Sutra (3) :eAccording to Badari, the Auxiliary character belongs
to Substances, Properties and Sanctifications.

We now proceed to show the objects that have the character of the
Auxiliary. And on this we have Badari’s view as the

PURVAPAKSHA,

“here are only three Auxiliaries: (1) The subsfance—whose
“auxiliary character is inherent, as shown under the sétra, § dravyandam,
“ete.’ (VI—~-i—1). [Substances are related to actions, always in the
“ character of auxiliaries] ; and this character is denied only when it is
“found to haye no use whatever in connection with tho Action ;—(2) The
“ Property sach as ‘ Redness’ and the like, serving to qualify the substance
“that helps in the completion of the Action, is from its very nature an
“auxiliary ;—(3) The Sanctification also, like threshing, etc., becomes
“an auxiliary, by reason of its making the corn fit: for being made into
“ cakes that areGaid down as to be offered at sacrifices, and which could
“only be made of the threshed corn, and never out of the unthreshed one ;
“thus to this also the auxiliary character belongs by its very nature.

“To the sacrifice, etc., on the other hand, the auxiliary character
“does not belong by nature; nor is it laid down by Vedic words ag belong-
“ing to them. Specially, in tho case of the sacrifice, we find that it is
“itself performed by all agents ; and it itself never functions towards the
^ falfilment of anything else.

“Nor can it be urged that we do find the Sacrifice functioning
“towards the fulhlment of the Result. Because, the Result is found to
‘appear long after the Sacrifice has been finished.

* Objection : ‘In Siitra TI—i—1, ef seq., it has been declared that
‘sacrifices are possessed of the instrumental character.’

“ Reply: It is true that that declaration has been made; but no
‘reasons have been adduced in support of it. Specially as all that has
“been done in that Adhikarana (II—i—I et seq.), which depends for its
‘own fulfilment upon the Sturgakaimadhikarana (VI—i—1-3), is that
“no instrumentality belpngs to Nouns. Consequently, at present (before
“the Svargakdmadhikarana has been established), we could speak of the

94,0 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. WI—PADA ~^. (3).

‘instrumental character of sacrifices only tentatively (as something yet
‘to be proved ’’). |

“Then, as for the Resuli~inasmuch as it is something to be
“accomplished by the Sacrifice, it has the character-of the Principal in
“reference to the Sacrifice; and in reference to the Agent, its auxiliary
‘character has never been spoken of. In fact, being something desired,
“it must be accepted as the Principal ; while the Agent being ‘ sub-
“ stance could, at best, be regarded as an auxiliary to the Sacrifice.

“Tor theso reasons, we conclade that the auxiliary character belongs
“only to Substances, Properties and Sanctifications.’’

SIDDHANTA.
Sutra (4): According to Jaimini, (the auxiliary character

resides in) Actions also, as they are performed for the
sake of Results.

The meaning of this Sutra is quite clear.

Sutra (5): The Result also, as it is for the sake of the Agent.

rom the very fact of the Result being mentioned along with the
word ‘desire, it is clear that it is forthe sake of the Person (in whom
alone the Desire could be presont). For no intelligent person ever
desires the acquisition of Heaven by itsclf ; he always 1681168 it for the
sake of his own enjoyment. Then again, the Afmanépada ending in the
verbs (‘yajéia’ and the like, in the sentence ‘svargakimo yajéta’)
distinctly shows that the Result (Hoaven) is to be enjoyed by the Agent
performing the sacrifice, and not by anybody else. And thus there can be
no doubt as to the Result being auxiliary to its enjoyer.

Sutra (6): The Agent also, because he is for the sake of the
Action.

In the case of such sentences as ^ svargakamo yajéta,’ the anxiliary
character of the Agent is ¢mplied by the verb ‘yajéta’; while it is
directly laid down in sentences like the one that lays down the sacrificial
post of the Udumbara wood to be of the same height as the sacrificer.

And consequently the Agent also can be regarded as having the auxiliary
character.

Certain objections have been brought forward against the Bhashya
(of this Adhikarana) ; they may be thus summed up :

AUXILIARIES SPRCIFIED. ५.1

“The Bhashya गा sittra (8), having shown that the auxiliary
“character belongs to Substances, Properties and Sanctifications,-—and not
“to Sacrifices, Results and Agents,—has gone on to deny the Principal
“character of the Agent ; and this is altogether irrelevant,

“Then again, we find the Bhashyu asserting that the fact of the
५ Agent being auxiliary to the Action, on account of its being a substance
“is qhite perceptible. Unt this is a mere repetition of something
“ already mewtioned before and rejected as untenable. Nor is it quite proper
“to speak of the Agent along with the Sacrifice and the Result, the possi-
“bility of whose auxiliary character has heen deuicd; because the
“functioning of the Agent is not at all similar to that of these too.
“ Hence these assertions are most improper.

“ Thirdly, towards the end of the Adhikurana we find the Bhashya
“saying—‘ The conclusion finally arrived at by the author of the Vrtli is
“this, etc., etc. But inasmuch as it has already been declared by the
““sitras that the auxiliary character of Substances, Properties and
“ Sanctifications is independent of all other things, while the Sacrifice,
‘the Result and the Agent are Principals in reference to the Substance,
“etc.,--and then the sittras (4) to (6) themselves have spoken of the
“auxiliary character of these (Sacrifice, etc.) as depending upon ono
“another,—what the Bhdshya speaks of as the final conclusion arrived at
“by the Author of the Vritti is nothing more than a mere repetition of
“what has already been said before. ” |

In order to ‘meet these objections, we should explain the Adhikarana
as follows :

There are two interpretations of the present Adhikarana : (1) The
Auxiliary having been defined as ‘that which is for another's sake,’ the
Bhashya brings forward as the Pirrapaksha, Badavi’s theory of the
auxiliary character residing in Substances, Properties and Sanctifications
only, which is based upon the theory of the auxiliary character consisting
in Helping ; and then lays down the Siddhanta, in accordance with the th eory
of Jaimini. And as such it was only natural that, in the first instance,
the Bhashya should, while putting forward the Pérvapaksha, have taken his
stand upon the theory that the Auxiliary is that which helps. Thus then,
as for the Agent, inasmuch as he is a substance, he helps the fulfilment
of the Action; and as such he can always be accepted (both by Jaimini
and Badari) as an anxiliary. As for the Sacrifice and the Result, on the
other hand, they are never found to help in the fulfilmont of anything ;
and as such they cannot (according to Badari) be regarded as Auxiliaries.
Then, as for the sentence ‘ hagaphalapurushéshi, ’—which speaks of all
the three together,—it is not to be interpreted along with tho preceding
word ‘Cesha,’ as that ‘the auxiliary character does not belong to these

942 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, 111—PADA I—ADRI, (3).

three,’ —but only that ‘what the S¢ddhanti holds with regard to all these
three (having the auxiliary character) is ‘not possible. And this is
most natural; because what the Parvapaksht should deny is what the
Siddhdnti asserts, and not anything at random ; and as it 18 the auxiliary
character of these three that the Siddhaniz holds, it is only natural that
the Pirvapaksht should deny the auxiliary character of these, and not
the mere form of that character

(2) The position of the Siddhant: being that Sacrifices, Results and
Agents have a dual character, inasmuch as they are Auxiliaries. to
certain Actions, while Principals to others,—it is this dual character
of these that the Bahshya, in accordance with Badart’s theory, denies by
declaring that ‘7n Sacrifices, Resulis and Agents’ there is no dual character,
as held by the S¢ddh@nti; and his reasons are that Sacrifices and Results
are always Principals, while the Agent is always Auxiliary. And thus
inasmuch as it is only the presence of the dual character that is denied, in
the case of all the three, by the denial of the character of the Auxiliary (in
tho first two) and that of the Principal (in the last), there is nothing very
wrong in speaking of all the three conjointly, as all the three have the
similarity of having their dual character denied.

And the Siddhanta Sittras (4—6) also should be taken as establish-
ing the auxiliary character, including (hand in hand with) the dual
character (of the three),—basing this on the definition of the Auxiliary as
‘that which is for the sake of another.’

Objection : “Inasmuch as, with regard to the Agent, the Parvapakshi
“hag admitted his auxilisry character on the ground of his being a
“ substance, and has only denied his Principal character, it was necessary for
“the Stddhants to establish his Principal character, and there was no use of
‘astablishing the fact of ‘ the Agent being an auxiliary on account of being
“for the sake of the Action’ (because this is what has been already
“admitted by the opponent),’’

This does not affect our position; because what the Pérvapakshi has
done is to deny the Principal character of the Agent, on the ground of the
non-auxiliary character of the Sacrifice and the Result; and hence as soon
as the two Siitras (4 and 5) have established the auxiliary character of
the Sacrifice and the Result, the Agent would come to be recognised as
having only the character of the Principal, inasmuch as he would be Prin-
cipal with reference to the Sacrifice as also to its subservient, the Result ;
and thereby his dual character (of the Auxiliary and the Principal) being
in danger of disappearance, it was absolutely necessary to recall the fact
of his having the character of the Auxiliary also; and this is all that has
been done in the siitva in question (the sixth),

Or, it may be that the opponent has accepted the auxiliary character

AUXILIARIES SPECIFIED. 943

of the Agent, on the ground of his helping (the sacrifice) ; and taking
exception to this, and holdidg his auxiliary character also to consist, like
that of the Sacrifice and the Result, in the fact of his being for another's
sake, the author has declared—The Agent also ts an auailiary, because he
४6 for the sake of the Action, and not because he helps it.

With a view to explain the four sitras (3—6) in accordance with the
interpretation of the Vriti, the Bhadshya says—‘ Athatrabhagaviin, ete.

In this case, the theory of Badari is not the Parvapaksha. As all the
four siitras are taken as a subsequent expansion of the veneral definition of
the Auxiliary, given in sitra (2), as showing the objects possessing that
character.

In the previous interpretation, the sitra (3), as declaring the auxili-
ary character to rest in Substauces, Properties and Sanctifications only, has
been taken as embodying the Pirvapaksha, But now, it is as representing
the Siddhanta that the author brings forward Badari’s theory, simply
by way of corroboration, and then proceeds to show further applications of
the said definition(of the Auxiliary). And as for the declaration that the
auxiliary character resides in Substances, Properties and Sanctifications
only, it is taken in the sense that it is these alone that have always the
auailiary character only, and never the character of the Principal.

And then the other three sittras (4-6) are brought forward to show
that the auxiliary character not being absolute, it resides in Sacrifices,
Results and Agents also; and thus what is established by these siiras 18
only the relative? Auxiliary and Principal character of these three, And
this 18 just what has beon shown in the Bhishya also.

Thus then, the upshot of the whole comes to be that thore are two
kinds of substrates of the said auxiliary character—the Absolute (those that
are always Auxiliaries) and the Relative (those that are at times Auxili-
aries and at times Principals).

00१ ९८८00 : ^“ Inasmuch as we find that Substances, Properties and
‘‘ Sanctifications also are Principals, with reference to their subsidiaries,
“as well as auxiliaries with reference to Sacrifices,—the auxiliary
‘character of these also should be accepted as only Relative (and not
“absolute). (1) For instance, we find that the Corn is the Principal with
‘reference to its Threshing, and that this Threshing also is Principal in
^" reference to the Pestle aud other Implements (used in the threshiny) ; and
“then, while hoing Principals with reference to the Threshing, the Corn is
‘found to be auxiliary to the Preparation of the cake. (2) Then as for Pro-
nerties,—such as Number and the like,—we find them to be aupilriary to
“that which they qnalify; wile in reference to those properties that bring
““abont the Number, itis Principal. (8) Similarly Sanctifieatious also,—
“such as the Preparing and the Lhreshing,—are found to he anailiaries to

V4 TANTRA-VARTLKA, ADH. 1Uf——vADA I—ADHI. (8).

“the Fire and the Corn respectively; while, with reference to their own
“accessories, the fucl and the pestle, etc., they are Principals. Conse-
“ quently even these three cannot rightly be spoken of as always having
“the auxiliary character only

Reply : In the case of Substances, Properties and Sanctificationa, we
find that they can never be the Principal with regard to which they are
Auxiliaries ; while 17 the case of the Sacrifices, Results and Agent,.on the
other hand, we find that they have the two characters with regard to ono
another. P :

That is to say, Substances, Properties and Sanctifications always bear
the auxiliary character towards the Sacrifice leading to some desirable re-
sult,—even though towards their own subsidiaries they may bear the char-
acter of the Principal; and with regard to the Sacrifice, the Principal char. `
acter of these is as good as non-oxistent. It is with a view to this that we
have the declaration in the Bhashya—‘ with regard to the Sacrifice they always
bear the augiltary character’ ; and not that, ‘ they have always the auatliary
character only.’ Then again, the Bhishyw adds—‘ The auxiliary character
of others is relative’ (‘others ’=Sacrifices, Results and Agents); and the
qualifying clause ‘ yagim prati’—‘ with regard to the Sacrifice '—pertains to
this sontence also. That is to say, in the case of these latter, we find
that each of them bears the character of the Principal and the Auxihary
to the two others. For instance, the Sacrifice is Principal with regard to
the Agent, who, as a substance, accomplishes it; while with regard to the
Result it bears the auxiliary character ; and then again, that (Sacrifice)
which is auxiliary to the Hesulé can very well be said to be auxiliary to
the Possessor of the Result, the Agent; and that (Sacrifice) which 18 the
Principal with regard to the Agent, can certainly be called the Principal
with regard to the Result, which is subordinate to the Agent. [Thus the
Sacrifice is both Auxiliary and Principal to the Agent, and to the Result. |
So also the 1857८, which is Principal with regard to the Sacrifice, is Prin-
cipal also with regard to the Agen, who 18 an accessory of the Sacrifice ,
and while it 18 auxiliary to the Agent, it is auxiliary also to the Saert-
fice that is performed by him. Similarly tho Agent, being the Principal
with regard to the Result, is Principal also with regard to the Sacrzfice
which brings about that Result; and while he is auxiliary to the Sacri-
fice, he is auxiliary also to the Result brought about by that Sacrifice
Such mutual double relationship is not found in the case of Substances,
Properties and Sanctifications. And in this lies the difference between
these on the one hand, and the Sacritice, etc., on the other.

Then the Bhashya has spoken of the Auxiliary aud the Principat
characters subsisting indirectly (through intervening agencies). But this
must be taken as referring to cases where these relationships are only

AUXILIARIES SPECIFIED. 945

implied by the existing state of things (and not spoken of in any texts) ;
and they should not be taken as mentioned for purposes of observance
at the performance of sacrifices; as in that case, inasmuch as the Agent
and the Result would be indirect auxiliaries to the modifications of ori-
ginal Sacrifices, they would also have to be imported into the per-
formance of these ; and this would be a flagrant contradiction of the Sid-
dhanta*bearing on that subjéct.

For thesg reasons, it must be admitted that the above are the only
ways in which the auxiliary character—to be explained in detail below—
can exist.

[ अ +) क iia itn nile at ati ait, atti ale क क te dn ae

119

ADHIKARANA (4).

[The Nirvapana, etc., are applicable to definite objects, according to the use
of each. |

Sitra (7): They are connected with a definite purpose,

We have explained the marks and tho objects of the auxiliary
character. And we now proceed to consider the way in which the Auxili-
aries become applied to actual practice; and in the next three Adkzka-
ranas we shall treat of the practical applications of Sanctifications, Sub-
stances and Properties, respectively.

Some people hold that the practical application of the Sanctification
is pointed ont by the suggestive Power of words; that of Substances,
by Syntactical Connection ; and that of Properties, by Direct Assertion.

But this view is not countenanced by our teachers. Because though
we do actually come across the operation of various authorities (for
practical application), yet, in the present Pada, we are concerned,
pre-eminently, only with such applications as are based upon Direct Asser-
tion ; while those based upon the suggestiveness of words, and the other
authorities, will be dealt with in Pdda II et seg., as we have already
said above, |

[In regard to the Darga Pirnamasa, we find the Injunction ‘ Dar¢apir-
namadsabhyam svargakdmo yajéta’; and in counection with these two
Sacrifices, we have various texts laying down such details as the nirva-
pana (pouring out), the prokshana (washing), avahanana (thresh-
ing), and so forth, as relating to vegetables, and ufpavana (sprink-
ling), wilapana (boiling), grahana (holding), asddana (procuring), and
the like, relating to the butter; and again CQakha-harana (fetching of
the twigs), Gavaimprasthipana (fetching of the cows), Gavampras-
nadvana (making the cow yield milk), and so forth, relating to the
Sdnnayya (the mixture of Curd and Butter). And with regard to these
details, there arises a question as to whether all these three classes of
details are to be performed in connection with all three kind of materials—
Vegetables, Butter and Curd-Butter mixture, alike, or should their
performance be restricted to only those materials, in which they are
found to serve some useful purpose.)

Though the fact of the Details applyixz to the vegetables, etc., has yot
to be established in the Adhikarana, yet, it is in accordance with the
‘Siddhanta that the Bhashya speaks of them as so differentiated.

SPRINKLING, ETC., APPLY TO PARTICULAR OBJECTS. O49 `

The Siddhanti objects to the doubt, by saying that the details are
distinctly mentioned wn connection with certain definite materials.

But the opponent thinking that the connection of the details (Thresh-
ing f. 1.) with a definite material (the Oors) is indicated by Syntac-
tical Connection (in the sentence ‘ Vrihkinavahanti’), while it is by
Direct Assertion that the word ‘avahanti’ enjoins the Threshing pure
and sittple; (and as such the general applicability of the threshing is
more authoritgtive than its special application to the Corn only; and
with this in view, he replies by saying— ^ 116 Threshing and the rest,
as denoted by the single word, are enjoined by Direct Assertion.”

But this way of justifying the Doubt appears very improper. Be-
cause 8 word 18 never used without another word; and the remedy for
the contradiction by Direct Assertion, we have already explained in the
Vakyaidhikarana. As a matter of fact, by becoming connected with
the Corn, the Threshing does not cease to he Threshing. And if this
were the case, then alone could the Syntactical Connection be contrary to
Direct Assertion, and thereby rejected. On the contrary, we find that
the Threshing cannot be performed by itself; and as such it could not
but be performed in connection with another object (such as the Corn).
In accordance with your theory also, the threshing is not performed by
itself’; and then if you reject the object pointed out by Syntactical
Connection, you take upon yourself the much greater trouble of connect-
ing its performance with every one of the objects spoken of in the
Context. If you were to base its connection with something outside the
Context, the words relative to which you would supply from without,
—that too would involve a deal of trouble. Then if you hold it to be
connected with the Principal sacrifice, by aiding it indirectly,—that would
mean a remotely involved connection. If, lastly, you do not hold it to
be connected with anything, then its injunction becomes wholly pur-
poseless. Consequently the aforesaid way of justifying the Doubt is highly
objectionable.

“Then we explain it as follows:—The Doubt in the present case
“is not based upon the fact of the various sentences being taken
५ separately, or all together ; but upon the fact of the various Details apper-
“taming to the single Final Apirva, or to distinct Intermediate Apirvas.

“ That is to say, the reasouing of the Pérvapaksha is not this: That
“‘the Threshing, being denoted by the word, is enjoined independently
“by itself, by Direct Assertion; while it is by Syntactical Connection
‘that it is connected with the Oorn; and this connection therefore is
“ set aside by the former Direct Assertion; consequently, being enjoined
“independeutly, it is dnly natural that there should be a doubt as to
^ whether all the details—Threshing and the like—are to be connected

948 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. WI--PADA I—~ADAI. (4),

‘with all sorts of materials, or only with those objects in connection with
“whom they are found to bring about certain visible effects.’ Bud
‘what is meant by it is that the Threshing is enjoined by Direct Asser-
“tion, as connected with the Qorn; but we cannot admit it to apply to
“the class ‘Corn’ (¢.e., Corn in general) ; as such au application would
८ 06 absolutely useless.

“That is to say, if the Threshing were taken to be connected
“with the Qorn just as it is denoted by the word “ Vrihi® (४.९. the class
““Qorn’), then, on account of this connection, it could not apply to
“all the materials, As a matter of fact, we find that, m accordance
“with the first Adhikarana of Adhydya IX, the Threshing passes over the
“directly denoted class ‘Corn,’ and becomes connected with ‘ that
“which brings about the Apirva’; and there can be no doubt that this
“connection, being pointed out by the indication of the element of the
“capability of bringing about the Apirva which depends upon the Con-
“text, 18 based upon Syntactical Connection ; and it 18 this that is meant
“ by the sentence—‘ the connection of these with the Corn, etc,, 1s brought
about by means of Syntactical Connection ' ( Bhdshya).

‘Then as for the particular Syntactical Connection, in the form of
‘an indication of the capability of bringing about the Apirva,—it is
‘equally capable of pertaining to the Vegetable, the Butter and the
.“Curd-Butter mixture, as all these are mentioned in the same Con-
“text. Similarly the ‘sprinkling,’ ‘ boiling,’ etc., also could be shown
“by Indirect Indication to be connected with other offering materials not
“specially enjoined.

“Then, the question of the Adhikarana resolves itself into the follow-
“ing form: ‘(1) Are all the details to performed with reference to the
“single final Apirva of the Durga-Pirnamasa, or with reference to
“various minor Apiirvas? (2) If the latter, then are all of them connect-
“ed with every one of the minor Apiirvas, or with only one particular
“Aptirva? If they are all performed with reference to a single Apiirva,
“or if all are connected. with every one of the minor Apirvas, then
“there will be a commingling of the various details; while if they are
“ed with only one Apirva, then, there would a restriction as to the
“‘ performance of these.’

In regard to this question, the author begins with propounding
the Siddhdnta theory: They are connected with a definite purpose.

That is to say, even though the various details are found to be
mentioned independently by their own words, yet when the question
arises as to where they are to be performed, the invariable conclusion is
that they should be performed there where they may servea useful

SPRINKLING, ETC., APPLY 70 PARTICULAR OBJECTS. 94,9

purpose. Then, as a matter of fact, we do not find a commixture of these
details leading to any useful result in all cases. And even if they be
taken as performed with reference to Apiirvas, then also, the connection
could be fixed upon only in accordance with the useful purpose found
to be served by them. Or, we may take the sitra as meaning that the
scripture itself points out that they should be performed in connection
with sthat wherein they serve some useful purpose. Thus, f.i, the
Threshing comes to be taken as performed with reference to that particu-
Jar 4100, the means of which is indicated by the word ‘ Vrihi’
(‘Corn’), by reason of that capability (of bringing about the Apérva)
which inheres in the same substrate (the individual sacrificial corn) as the
Class (‘Corn’) denoted by that word (‘Vrihe’); and it could not be
taken along with the means of any other Apiirva, which is uot similarly
indicated, and with which, therefore, the Threshing could have no connec-
tion

Then we have in the Bhashya, the objection—“ As a matter of fact we
find € directly laid down that all the detacls are to be performed in connec-
‘tion with all. That is to say, (1) as there is a single Final Apérva to be
“ accomplished ;—(2) as, even when there are many Apirvus, we do not
^ perceive any ground for limiting the indication (of any 471८४ by any
^ particular word) ;—and (3), lastly, as the purpose served by them would
“ be perceived after the Injunction,—a restriction of the application of the
^ Details could not be based upon a perception of these purposes

The reply 1s—We do not yet know whether they ave directly laid down
as such, or not,—tt 18 a matter sitll to be considered. ‘That is to say, we do
not yet know whether all the details are to be performed with reference
to a single Final Apirva, or with reference to every one of the minor
Apitirvas; and that even without the specific mention of the particular
ebjects (the Corn and the like, with reference to which the Zhreshing, ete.,
should be performed), the performance of these would be restricted, in
accordance with the Sittra [~iy~-30,

Or, the reply may be taken to mean that—if all tho details be
performed with reference to a single Apirva, or with reference to every
one of the minor Apiirvas, then they would all become mixed up; whereas
if they are connected with such means of distinct Apirvas as are
indicated by the class ‘Corn’ and the like,—then there is a restriction
(or adjustment) of their performance ;—but it is still to be decided which
of these alternative theories is true; and hence we do not yet know that
all of them are directly laid down with reference to all.

950 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I1I—PADA I—~ADHI. (4),

PURVAPAKSHA.

Sutra (8): “They must be taken as pertaining to all; because
they are non-different in their Connection, and because there
is no difference of Context.”

The opponent explains his position as follows: “It is the subtle
“potential state of the Result, which appears as its Sprout, that is
“called ‘ Apirva ’, on account of its appearing in a form that. never existed
^“ before ; this we have already explained before (in Adh. II), Conse-
“quently, inasmuch as the Result of the Darca-Piirnamasa is one only,
“ there cannot be more than one Apirva; and the capability of bringing
“about this Apirva belongs equally to the Vegetables, the Butter and
“the Curd-Bntter mixture; hence the details laid down with refer-
“ence to these materials must be taken as pertaining to all of them.

“ Though it is possible that there may be other minor Apirvas, follow-
“ing from each of the various sacrifices,— Agnuéya and the like (of which the
“ Darga-Pirnamasa are composed),—yet inasmuch as these minor
“ Aptrvas do not lead to any distinct Results (as they only help in
‘the fruition of the one Final Apirva), they are, in this, like the form of
“the sacrifice, and as such have no capability of having any details per-
“formed with reference to themselves; and hence it is only tho final
“ Apirva that comes to be taken as that which has the details performed
‘with reference to itself.

“Hiven if they were performed with reference to distinct Apirvas,—
“inasmuch as of all the various details that are laid down simply with
“reference to the means of Apirva mentioned in the Context, none is
“mentioned specifically,—for if any were so mentioned there would be
“a syntactical split~—their Injunction must be accepted as having a
“universal application. And this is another reason in favour of the
“ view that the details pertain to all the materials. |

“And in support of this universal application, we have (in the
(१ siitra) two reasons: (1) ‘ samyogato’—vigéshat ’, and (2) ‘ prakarandvice-
“ shat’. That is to say, the characteristic of bringing about the Apirva
“that we find in one object (Corn), as the ground of its connection with
“a particular detail (Threshing), is also found in the other object; be-
“canse as for the specific characteristic of the ‘class ‘Corn’ (which
“subsists in the Corn only), this is of use only in the indication, and
“1s of no use in restricting the application of the Threshing. Then, as
“for the objective character (of the Oorn as mentioned in the sentence
“* Vrihinavahanti’), it is found in all the other objects also; as all of
“them are objects to be offered. Therefore it must*be admitted that, leav-
“ing aside all such objects as are not connected with the 41001४0, as are

SPRINKLING, ETC,, APPLY TO PARTICULAR ORJECTS. 91

‘not objects to be offered, and as do not help in the bringing about of the
“particular Apirva of the Context,—with reference all other objects,
५५ should all the details be performed,

“‘Then as for those details that aro either indirectly implied, or,
“not being directly enjoined, are only pointed out by certain purposes
“served by them in matters relating to ordinary worldly aifuirs,—the
‘application of these could be restricted in accordance with the purpose
“served by them. Or, in 9 case where, as in the case of the modifications
“of original sacrifices, the Details appear by means of certain purposes
“previously enjoined,—aud the purpose has not got to be assumed from
“the details themselves,—the performance of such details would be adjust-
‘‘ed in accordance with the purposes served. In the case in question,
‘ however, we find that the sacrifice in question is the original sacrifice
“ (Darca-Pirnamasa) itself; and the Injunction lays down, long before the
¢ Parposes, the Details themselves, whose purposes have got to be assumed ;
“and hence that. Injunction in question must be construed,—not as
“ ‘whore these purposes are to be served, there these details are to be per-
“ formed’, but—as ‘where these details are performed, there is a visible
‘or invisible purpose served.’

“ Consequently the Details must be taken as appertaining to all
(५ objects,”

SIDDHANTA.

Siitra (9): Yhe absence of a useful purpose would deprive it
of the character of Action.

That is to say, by denying the visible purpose actually served, or
that which is mentioned in scriptures as to be served by it,—we would
set aside the performability of the Action, etc., etc. The sense of the
Bhashya 18 quite clear.

Sutra (10): The Result is found to appear along with the
operation; it is only when there is no visible result, that its
absence could justify the Details being taken merely as ex-
pressed by the words.

It has been urged that, “inasmuch as we shall assume certain
imperceptible effects, there would not be an absence of useful purposes.”
And to this we make the following reply :

If the ‘ prathana’ (Thickening), etc., were forcibly laid down in con-
nection with the Butter also, ‘then alone could we be justified in assuming
an imperceptible results as the thickening not serving any visible purpose
in regard to the Butter, without that assumption, the Injunction would be

98 TANTRA-VARTIEA. ADH, [--2104 I—ADHT. (4).

inexplicable. That is to say, it is only on the strength of the Apparent In-
consistency of a Direct Vedic Declaration that we can rightly assume im-
perceptible effects. But, as a matter of fact, we find the Declaration of
the ‘ Thickening’ to be quite consistent in its visible purpose, when taken
along with the Cake; and as such there is no Inconsistency that could
justify our assuming an imperceptible effect, on the strength wheréot®
we would connect the Thickening with the Butter also. .

To explain—as a matter of fact, we find that the Thseshing एर
about its perceptible result in the QOorn, along with its performance
while in the others (the Butter, etc.), we find the mere operation of Thresh-
ing, without any results; and so long as a useful operation is possible,
no Vedic Injunction can ever urge the agent to the performance of a use-
less operation ; and in the absence of such urging by a Vedic Injunction,
there cannot be any ground for an assumption of imperceptible results.
And thus there would be a mutual interdependence: the assumption of
the Injunction (of Threshing with regard to the Butter) being based upon
the Results (imperceptible), and the assumption of the Results being
based upon the Injunction. That is to say, in regard to the Batter, etc.,
we do not find either the Injunction or the Result (of Threshing) ; while
in regard to the Corn, we find both, independently of each other.

The same reasoning may be applied to the case of the Bowling, etc., as
to be performed in regard to the Butter and the Curd-Butter mixture.

Then again, even when a useful result is actually foupd to be brought
about, if it be such as is not required, either by the Sacrifice or the Agent,
as according a needed help,—then, that is not to be accepted; but the
result brought about (by the Threshing in regard to the Corn) is not
such a one; as this result is found to be the separation of the grain
from the chaff; and this is needed, as helping in the preparation of the
Cake, by all the six factors of the sacrifice—viz., the Oorn, the Oake, the
Sacrifice, the 47१४८, the Priest and the Sacrificer. Because without the
removal of the Chaff, the Corn could neither be made into the Cake, nor
be offered at the sacrifice ;—this is what is meant by the Bhashya saying
‘praygjananca tén&ir

In a case, however, where there is a total absence of perceptible
effects, the Details would be taken merely as expressed by the words
and hence the said absence could justify the assumption of imperceptible
effects ; and in that case the Threshing would apply to the Butter and the
Curd-Butter mixture also. But when a distinctly perceptible effect
is present, there can be no assumption of an imperceptible one; and hence
the application of the Details becomes restricted, in accordance with the:
purpose served by each

Then again, when an Injunction has once had' all its requirements

NIRVAPANA, ESC., APPLY TO OBJECTS. 953

fulfilled by a perceptible effect in a certain place, and thereby has des-
troyed the force of the Apparent Inconsistency (attaching to it, in the
matter of a Result),—it cannot, even in another place, be assumed to
0876 an imperceptible effect (an assumption whereof could only be based
apon the said Apparent Inconsistency).

Or again, the Details could be enjoined with regard to all the objects
concerned, only under the following conditions:—(1) If they were all
performed with reference to the single Final Apirva; (2) if all of them
were performed with reference to all the Minor Apiirvas ; (3) if there were
no distinct Apirvas following from the Actions performed with the Corn,
etc ; (4) if these last Apirvas had not the requisite capability of having
Actions performed with reference to themselves.

Asa matter of fact, however, we find that for each of the Actions
there is a distinct Apirva—every one of these having the capability of
having the particular Action performed with reference to itself

As for the fact of each of these Apirvas being distinct, we have
already proved it under the Apirvddhikarana (II—~i—1-5)

And even if these 41४05 do not directly lead to any Result, yet, for
the mero sake of their Apérva-character, they will have to be taken as
having the capability of having the details (of Threshing, etc.) performed
with reference to themselves. As a matter of fact, however, they are not
wholly useless either ; because that alone is rejected as wholly devoid of
that capability, on the ground of uselessness, which brings about absolutely
no effect, or when, even without the effect brought about by it, the
Material and the Sacrifice, etc., are-all duly accomplished. The Minor
Apirvas in question, however,—viz., those that follow from the Aynéya aud
other subsidiary sacrifices of the Darca-Pirnamdsa,—are actually found
to be indirectly conducive to a distinct Result, through the help that
they accord to the Final Apirva of the Darga-Pairnamdsa. And prior to
the performance of the Details in question, these Minor Apérvas are not
accomplished ; nor have they the extent of their means clearly known.
Consequently, it is for the sake of the .accomplishment of themselves
that these Apirvas instigate the performance of the Details in ques-
tiou

And an Apiirva is acknowledged to be the instigator of a Detail, only
when it ia found that the performance of that Detail brings about that
particular Apiirea. And in the case in question, we find that the word
^ (12५५ ', as also the rest, points to that Apirva which is brought about
by Actions performed with regard to the Vrihi, and not to others (brought
about by those performed with regard to the Butter, etc.) ; because it has
no connection with these. Thus then, the Threshing comes to have its use-
fulness established byhaving obtained its own specific Minor Apurva, and
| 120

954: TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, HI—-PADA IlI—-ADHI. (4),

does not stand in need, either of the Final Ap#rva, or of other Minor
Apirvas brought about by other Actions.

That is to say, inasmuch as, in the sentence speaking of the Vrihe
(Corn) along with the operation of Threshing, we find the Injunction
having its usefulness through the particular Apirva following from that
operation performed with regard to the Corn,—that operation is not
applied to the other substances. If there were no Apiirva in that case,
then an imperceptible result would have had to be assumed ; and in that
case, we could take the operation to be performed with reference to even
such helps as are not pointed ont by the word ‘Vriht’? Asa matter of
fact, however, we have a distinct Apdérva ; and as such none of these contin-
gencies are possible. |

The sitra may also be interpreted to the same effect, as follows:
In the absence of the particular Apirva brought about by the Rice(Vrih:),
there being no useful purpose served, the connection (of threshing)
with the Curd-Butter mixture, either through the remote Final Apirea,
or through the Minor Apiirva of some intermediate Action, could be taken
as expressed by the words ; when, however, there is a distinct Apirva in
close proximity (with the Rice itself), the words cannot bear the strain
(of signifying the connection of the Threshing with other substances) ;
and consequently, there is no authority for connecting the Threshing with
the Butter or with the Curd-Butter mixture.

Objection: “ But then, inasmuch as the sacrificial implements,’ ‘the
“ Sruk, etc., would also be connected with the Minor Apirva of the Agnéya
‘ sacrifice (at which the Vrihz-Rice is offered), the operation of Threshing
“(which you take to be laid down with reference to that which brings
“ about that particular Apérva) would come to be applied to those imple-
¢ ments also.”

Reply: This does not affect our position; because the function of
the implements (which are instrumental) is wholly different from that of
the Vrihi (which is objective), and they could not be indicated by the
word “ Vrthi” (and as such the Threshing could not apply to it). Conse-
quently, just as, even though the Curd-Butter mixture is similar to the
Vrihi, in that both are objects to be offered, yet the former is not indi-
cated by the word ‘ Vrihz’, on account of its bringing about an altogether
distinct Apdérva,—so, in the same manner, even though the Implements
are connected with the same Apiirva as the Vriht, yet, inasmuch aa they
are devoid of the function of the objective (of offering) which is inherent
in the Vrihz, they cannot be indicated by the word ‘ Vrihz’ (and hence
the Threshing mentioned in connection with the Vrihe could not apply to
them). °

That however which would help in the bringing about of the samo

NIRVAPANA, ETC,, APPLY TO OBJRCTS.

Apirva, by means of the same function of the objective, would cortainly
have the Threshing performed with regard to it; as for instance the Bar-
ley (to. which the Threshing is quite as applicable as to the Vrihi).

All this will be explained in detail in Adhyaya IX.

(हि = + क ON NN LN ONL

ADHIKARANA (5)

(The Sphya, ctc., have their applicability restricted in accordance with ther
connectzons. |

Sitra (11): The substance, being connected with the originative
Injunction, would be laid down for the purpose of that.

[In connection with the Durga-Pirnamasa, we find the sentence
‘Sphyagca kapdlaint ca agnihotrahavani ca cérpaica krshnadjinanca camya
ca ulukhalaiica musalatica drshaccopala ca, &ani vat daga yajndyudhani. '
And there arises a doubt as to whether each of these implements is to be
employed in whatever they may be found capable of doing, or only in
that in connection with which they are mentioned. | |

Objection: “Inasmuch as the application of the various imple.
‘‘ments also would be adjusted, in accordance with their specified connec-
‘tions, just as in the case of the Threshing, etc.,—the conditions being
“exactly the same, what was the use of devoting another Adhikarana to
‘‘the consideratton of the Implements 0 ”

Reply: The conditions are not identical in the two cases—(1) because
in the case of the Threshing, etc., the Opponent has admitted the restric-
tion of their applicability to be in accordance with their specified connec-
tions, because of the perceptible effects produced by them. In the case
in question, on the other hand, there being no perceptible purpose served
by the restricted employment, any such employment could not be admit-
ted in the same way. On the contrary, when a perceptible effect is found
to be produced by any of these Implements in question, then there would
be no ground for restricting its employment to that Action alone in
connection with which it may be mentioned, if that effect is found to be.
of use in another Action also. :

(2) In the case of the Threshing, etc., we find that on account of
their connection with the Vrihz, etc., they are performed with reference to
distinct Apirvas ; while in the case in question we do not find any Apirva
in connection with the Uddhanana (which is the particular action in
connection with which we find the Sphya mentioned), with reference to
which that Action could be performed

(3) In the former case we find the Threshing mentioned only once, in
connection with the single substance of ‘ Vrihi’;’ while in the present

APPLICATION OF IMPLEMENTS RESTRICTED. 9)

case, we find the various Implements mentioned in two connections in the
two sentences‘ Jphyacca etc... . yajniyudhant ', and ‘ Sphyenoddhants,
etc. One of these two must be Injunctive, while the other is mercly
Descriptive. If the former sentence be taken as Injunctive, then, the
direct connection of these Implements with the sacrifice being denied in
accordance with the fourth Adhzkarana of the fourth Adhyaya (IV—i—
7-10), they come to be connocted with the subsidiaries, just like the ' sapta-
dacdratny’, asShown under Sitra 1-1-18 ; and as the subsidiary charac-
ter would belong equally to all actions connected with the sacrifice, we
would come to the conclusion that they are to be employed in whatever
action they may be found capable of accomplishing (as held by the Parva-
puksha); and in that case the latter sentence would have to be taken
as a partial description (or reference). If, however, the latter sentence
is accepted as Injunctive, then, in accordance with foregoing Adhikarana
the employment of the Implements would be restricted in accordance with
the connections mentioned in these sentences (as held by the SiddAanta).
Thus then, on the above question, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“Tnasmuch as there is no connection with distinct Apirvas, and
“as in all cases equally there are perceptible effects produced, we must
“ employ the Implements in accordance with their capabilities. In this
“ way, the sentence ‘Sphyagca, etc,’ would become justified as constituting
“an Injunction ; and as for the Plural number in ‘ én,’ that could be
“explained as based upon the plurality of the objects (sphya, etc.), en-
‘joined ; otherwise, as the whole forms a single sentence, there would be
५ 8 Ringle Injunction. Consequently it must be admitted that the Imple-
“ ments are to be employed according to their capabilities.”

SIDDHANTA,

To the above, we make the following reply: As a matter of fact, we
find that the Sphya, etc., are mentioned in their originative Injunction in
connection with certain specific functions, the ‘ uddhanana’ for instance ;
and all that the sentence ‘ sphyacca, ete.’ docs is to describe (or refer to)
what has been laid down in those Injunctions, Specially as in the sen-.
tence 'sphyagca... . dni vat, etc.’, we find the word ‘var’, which shows its
purely descriptive character ; nor does it contain any Injunclive word, ex-
pressive of the Bhavana, which could either lay down the uses of the
implements, or enjoin the Actions (at which they could be employed).

And further, in‘ your theory, many more sentences would become

958 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. ा-- ए) पा-क. (5),

purposeless ({.1,, the sentences ‘ sphyendddhanti’, ‘kapaléna grapayati’
and so forth), Nor is there any purpose served by taking these sentences
as mere descriptive references, and we actually find the Implements in
question directly mentioned, in these sentences, as to be employed in the
specific Actions of uddhanana, etc.; while in taking the sentencd
‘ sphyacca, etc.,' as laying down their uses, you will have to have recourse
to Indirect Indication ; because it will be necessary for you to taxe the
word ‘yajna’ (in the compound ‘ yajiayudhdm’) as indicsting the sub-
sidiary of the sacrifice, and the word ‘ @yudha’, which directly expresses
the Implements of war, as indirectly indicating the Instruments of other
Actions.

Nor is the law of the ‘ Sapfodagaratnt’ (detailed in Stra 1-1-18)
applicable to the case in question ; because in the case dealt with by that
धक -- ४.६.) that of the sentence ‘Vajapeyasya saptadacaratnirytipo bhavate’
—we find the genitive ending, in ‘ Vajapéyasya’, which appears after the
name of the sacrifice, and signifies only the relationship with that sacri-
fico (while in the case in question we have no such genitive ending), In
fact, however, even if that law of Sitra III—i—I18 were applicable to the
present case, then too, inasmuch as the general Injunction contained in
the sentence ‘spyagca .... &tfint etc.’ would be swallowed by the special
0४९8 in the sentence ‘ sphyénoddhants, etc.’, the Implements could not be
connected with any other Actions save those mentioned in these latter
Injunctions. Consequently, we conclude that the sentence ‘ sphyagca ....
élfini, ete.” servos to describe (or refer to) that character of the ‘ sacrificial
Implement ’ which we find belonging to the sphya and the rest [धिव down
in the sentences ‘ sphyénoddhanti, etc.’

Then, it has been argued that, “in the case in question we do not
find distinct Apurevas that could make the Actions performed with refer-
ences to themselves. ”

10 that we make the following reply: In the case of the kapdla, etc.,
.there is a difference in the Apiérvas, due to the Cake, etc. ; and as for the
others, these can never become mixed up in any common action, because
they are distinctly laid down as the means of the particular actions
‘uddhanana’ and the rest; they could not serve any useful purpose in
connection with any other action ; just as, even though the Threshing is
connected with the same Apirva as the Sruk, etc., yet it is not performed
in connection with the Sruk, ete., because of the function of these being
different (from that of the Vrihi in connection with which the Thresh-
ing 18 mentioned ),

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Implements in ques-
tion are to be employed iu connection with the Actions with which they
are mentioned in the Jujunctive sentences.

. ADHIKARANA (6),
(The properties of Redness, etc., are not mixed up. |

Stitra (12): Inasmuch as both the Substance and Property serve
the same purpose, they have the same function ; and as such
their application would be restricted.

[In connection with the Jyotishtoma, we find the sentence ‘ arunaya
pingakshya ékahayanyd somam krindiz,’ and then the text goes on adding
‘ajaya krindti, vdsasa krinatz,’ etc., where] the word ‘ Arind’ denotes the
quality, while the words ‘ Pingaikshi’ and ‘ Bkahayani? denote the sub-
stance, because of their co-extensiveness (with the price to be paid for the
Soma). And with reference to the quality of ‘Redness’ (signified by
‘ Aruna’), there arises a question, as to whether it qualifies the substance
that 18 mentioned in the same sentence with itself, or it qualifies all the
substances mentioned in the context.

Oljection: “Inasmuch as the words ‘pingakshi’ and ‘ &kahdyani’
“also siginfy qualities, there 18 no word in the sentence that signifies a
“substance (and as such there is no basis for the question raised).

“ As {0 how these two words are denotative of qualities, we proceed
“to explain as follows :

“T,—The Bahuvriiv compound (that is present in the two words in
“ question) 18 laid down in the same sense as the affix ‘ matup’; and this
“ affix is laid down as to be used in places where the sense desired to be
“conveyed is that of Possession or that °f Location, as laid down in the
“ gira ‘ tadatrasyfismin, etc.’

“For instance, in such words as ‘géman’ and the like (ending in
“*matup’), the ‘Cow’ having been denoted by the basic noun ‘go’, and
^ the ^ possessor of the cow’ having to be signified by the ‘matup’ affix,
“it is necessary for the relationship (of the Possessor and the Possessed) to
.““ be signified before the Possessor is signified. Because one who is not
“related to the Qow, is never spoken of as ‘the possessor of the Cow’;
“and hence it is necessary that the qualifying relationship should be
‘‘ expressed beforehand. ^

‘It has been alréady shown (under the Akrtyudhikarana, Sitrus
* [—i1i--30-35) that the qualification is always signified beforehand ; and in

960 TANTRA*VARTIKA. ADH. WI-——PADA IlI—ADHI, (6).

‘the case in question, what is held to be the qualification is the relatvon-
“ ship of the Cow, and not the Qow only ; because the ‘ matup’ affix could not
“be added to the unrelated Cow. Then again, if the mere Cow were the
“ qualification, then the Cows having been denoted by the basic noun
“(95’), the affix (‘matup’) would denote the qualified (¢.e., Possessor of
“the Cows) (which would not be very correct); when on -the other
“hand, the Relationship is the qualification, then 1४ becomes necessary to
५ find out that by which it would be denoted

“Now then, we find that the Relationship cannot be denoted by the
“basic noun (‘gd’); because that word denotes only the class ‘Cow.’ Nor
‘could the denotation of the noun serve as a suve Indicator of the said.
“ Relationship; because the existence of the former is quite possible, even
“ without the latter (and hence there is uo necessary concomitance between
“the two whereby one could be indicated by the other) ; and also because
“the utterance of the word ‘gd’ only does not produce any idea of the
“ Relationship ; and lastly, because even in the case of the word ‘gdmdan’,
“it 18 oply when the affix ‘matup’ is pronounced, that there arises any
“idea of the Relationship. Thus then, in accordance with the law ‘ tadd-
५ gamé hi tad drshyaté’, we must conclude the Relatiouship to be denoted
‘ by the affix (1).

“ (2) Then, again, as a rule, that which denotes the Qualified Object,
“should denote a qualification closely connected with it ; and in the case
“in question, we fiud that the noun € & `) does not denote the Qualified
“ Object. (the Person possessing the cow); and as such that noun could
“not denate the Relationship qualifying that Person. The affix, however,
“igs found to signify the Qualified Object ; and hence it denotes that Re-
‘lationship. And as soon as the affix denotes the Relationship, the idea
“of this Relationship at once brings about its necessary concomitant, the
“idea of the Related Object (the Person) ; and thus the denotative potency
“ of the affix (with regard to the Related Person) having been set aside
‘by the prior indication of it by the previously-denoted Relationship, the
“Affix could not serve to denote the Qualified or Related Object (the Per-
‘‘son). And, as a matter of fact, the idea of the Qualified Object is not
‘‘found to bring about an idea of the Relationship; because until the
“ qualifying Relationship has been cognised, there can be no idea of the
“ Qualified Object. And when the Qualified Character has been duly
‘established (and cognised), there rewains no further need of any idea
‘Sof the Qualifying Relationship; and hence if the Qualified Object were
` ^ previously cognised, there would be an absolute non-cognition of the
“Qualifying Relationship, Consequently, 1+ must be admitted that whut

shonld be denoted beforehand is the Relationship * and hence it is this that
“1s denoted by the Affix

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED UP. 961

“(§) For the following reason also, the Affix ‘matup’ should be
“taken as denoting the Relationship: In all cases, it is the denotation
“of a word that is referred to by the Abstract Affix ; and in the clause
५ ‹ [05१९१४98 8 gomativam’ we distinctly find the Relationship that is
५ 0091860. That is to say, as in the case of ‘gatva’ (‘go’ + the Abstract
“ Affix ‘tva’), the gotva qualifyigg a particular cow,— the one with
“the variegated colour f.i.,—we conclude that the qualifying ‘ class
“(*Cow’) is denoted by the Abstract Affix, as apart from the word; and
५ hence that the word ‘go’ denotes that Class ;—so, in the same manner
“when we meet with the clause ‘ Dévadatiasya gimativam’, we find that
‘there is no cognition of the Cow, while there is a distinct cognition of
“the Relationship, as, apart from the Cow; and consequently we must
“admit that the word ‘géman’ denotes that Relationship. And that
“which is denoted by the Abstract Affix forms also the basis of the
“donotation of that basic noun which signifies the Qualified Object ; and
‘in the case of all words, we find that that which forms the basis
“ of the denotation of a word, is its primary meaning, while the Qualified
“ Object forms only the secondary or indicated meaning. Then, it is only
“if the ‘matup’ affix denote the Relationship, that the Abstract Affix
‘added to the basic noun ‘ goman’ could denote the Relationship ; because
“we have a general law to the effect that ‘tho base and the affix
“ conjointly express the denotation of the affix.’ For this reason also
“the ‘ matup’ affix must be taken as denoting the Relationship.

“The above applies to all Verbal and Nominal Derivatives, as well
५८ ४8 Compounds, that have their significations based upon their etymology.
“ Because in the case of all these words, the Abstract Affix denotes the
“Relationship. In fact, all such words, as ‘ Rajapurushah,’ ‘ Aupagavah,’
“* Pacaka’, and the like, are called ‘yaugika’, simply because their
८८ denotation is based upon ‘ yoga ’—~7.e., Connection or Relationship.

“Thus then, in the case of the words ‘ Pingakshi’ and ‘ Ekahdyani’,
“also, the signification of the Bahkuvriht compound being identical with
“ that of the Possessive Affix (matup), the words must be taken as denoting
“the Relationship (and as such they cannot be spoken of as denoting 9
८ substance)

“T1.—Further, the Bahuvriht compound is laid down as pointing to
“something different from that which 1s denoted by the component
‘words; and hence also, that something different being signified by
“an (ध, the principal thing denoted cannot but be the Relationship.
“That is to say, the compound ‘ékahdyani’ being expounded as ‘ékam-
“hayanam asyah,’ the something different meant to be expressed by the
‘compound ig found to he pointed out by the word ‘ asydk’ with the geni-
tive affix; and as the denotation of the genitive is the denotation of an

141

ज

962 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. WI—pApA 1—apHt. (6).

“affix, it must be regarded as the principal factor; and hence it is for
“ tho sake of pointing out that denotation of the genitive affix, that we
५ must take the pronoun in ‘asy4h’; as the genitive affix could not be used
“alone by itself, and also as there is no cognition of the denotation of the
‘Pronoun itself. Then as for the genitive, it is a usually recognised
५ fact that all that it can dengte is some sort ofa Relationship, such os that -
“subsisting between the ‘possessor and the possessed,’ the ‘whole and
“the part,’ the ‘original and the modification,’. and so forth. For this
“reason also Bahuvriht compounds must be taken as denoting the Rela-
“ tionship.

“TII.—-Then again, in the case of Bahuvrihi compounds, we can never
“take a ‘class’ to be the something different signified by 1t; becanse, in
५५ the case of the compound ‘ Pitgdkshi’ for instance, there is no relation-—
“ship between the class ‘Cow’ and the ‘brown eyes’; nor again can ‘ one-
“vear-oldness’ (@kah@yana) belong to the class ‘Cow.’ That is to say, all
“these properties—‘ brown eyes,’ ‘one year old,’ ‘ possession of many-

coloured cows ’—belong to Individuals; and then as the number of In-
“dividuals bemg endless, we can never perceive any relationship with
“regard to them,—and as that which would pertain to one individual
“could not rightly pertain to another,—we can never accept the word
५ (+ Pingakshi’ ) to bo denotative of the Individual, as we have. already
“shown under the Akrtyadhikarana (I—11i—30-35). Nor could the very
५ first application of the word ‘ Pizgdkshi’ be accepted to have been made
“to the particular cow born to-day, Consequently we must accept a
“ certain generic entity as the denotation of the word ‘ Ping dkshi’; and
“this generic entity can be none other than the Relationship (as we have
“ already shown that the word cannot denote the class ‘Cow ’).

“TV.—Further, even though the word ‘ékahkdyani’ could denote the
“age of one year,—yet that too would be only a quality, and not a sub-
°" stance.

‘Thus then, inasmuch as the sentence in question is found to be
“ wholly devoid of a substantive, it cannot form the basis of the discus-
“sion in the present Adjikurana.

“Nor can any other sentence that could be cited as such, form the
“basis ; because as a matter of fact, there is no word that directly denotes
‘‘a particular substance, As all कृ (conventional) words (like ‘ ghata
ete.) denote classes (as held by you also) ; and all Yaugika (etymologi-
‘‘cal) words (like ‘Pdcaka,’ etc.) have been shown to denote Relationship ;
“then as for those words that are significant of absolutely nothing else save a
particular substance,—such f.i.as the Proper names ‘ Dittha,’ ‘Davittha
+ etc., these are never found to be used in the Veda

Consequently, the declaration of the Stddhanta also should have

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED UP. 963

“been in the form, that—‘ there is a restricted application of the Class and
“the Quality, or of two Qualities’ (and not as that of ‘the Quality and the
"५ Substance).’ Or, there being no Vedic sentence to serve as the basis for
“the discussion in the present Adhikarana, the Adhikarana itself should
८ never have been introduced.”

To the above, we make the following reply :—TIn all cases, etymologi-
cal words always denote a substance; nor is it possible for a Relationship
to be denoted by them ; as that would involve many complications,

That is to say, if the words ‘ Ekahdyani’ and ‘Pitgakshi’ were to
denote a Relationship, then we should not have cited them as instances in
the present Adhikarana. Asa matter of fact, however, they do not denote
a Relationship. Because such a denotation would give rise to endless
complications,

For instance, we could assume such a denoted Relationship to be either
Relationship in general, or some particular Relationship. If the former,
then all etymological words, denoting the same Relationship in general,
would become synonymous. If the latter, then, inasmuch 98 there could
not be any peculiarity in the Relationship itself, the peculiarity will havo
to 06 admitted to be brought out by the members related (7.e., the Re-
lationship could be specified only by the members related). Tho mem-
ber, however, could not specify the denoted Relationship if it were itsclf
not denoted ; and hence it would be necessary for the momber also to be
denoted by the word. Then again, inasmuch as the Relationship docs
not subsist in a single member,—and as a single member could not serve
to distinguish the Relationship from‘all other Relationships,—it would be
necessary for the word to denote both the members related.

Thus then, in the case of the word ^ gdmdn,’ one member is found to
be denoted by the word ‘gé’; of the other member, we do not find a
denotative word; hence it must be admitted that if the ‘matup’ aflix
were to denote the particular Relationship, it could not do so, unless it
denoted at least one of the members related; and hence it would neces-
sarily denote that member also. And then after having denoted that, the
affix would go on to denote the Relationship (as held by you); and cer-
tainly this process of denotation would be a highly complicated one.

‘Then again, when the Relationship is capable of being pointed out by
the member related, who is there that would seek to assume a denotative
potency in the word itself (whereby it could directly donote that Rela-
tionship)? That is to say, when, as a matter of fact, the previously-
denoted member is found to indicate the Relationship (by necessary con-
comitance), then we cannot 8888706 this latter to be donoted by the Affix
either ; and hence, in every way, the Relationship must be admitted to be
indirectly implied (and not directly denoted)

964. TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. II—PADA I—ADBI, (6).

‘Jt. has been urged above that-—‘until the Relationship is cognised,
there is no cognition of the Qualified Object.”

To that we make the following reply :—It is quite true that without
the qualification, there is no cognition of the Qualified Object. But in
the case of the word ‘ gdmdn,’ the qualification consists of the ‘cows,’
and not of the Relationship. That is to say, what is meant by the word
is that ‘ Devadatta is qualified by the cows’; and as for the cows, they are
found to be actually denoted by the basic noun itself \

Then, it has been argued that—‘ Devadatta cannot be qualified by
the cows that are not related.”

‘True, he is not so qualified; it is for that very reason that the ‘ cows’
indicate the necessary Relationship. In any way all that the word

yomdn’ expresses is that ‘one is qualified by cows’; and then there
arises a question as to the position in which the cows qualify 010 ; and
then it is that the particular Relationship (of the cows with Devadatta) is
indicated ; and thus we find that the indication of the Relationship is
done by the Cows, and not by the word ‘ giman |

For if all that is implied in the word ‘giéman’ were to form the
direct denotation of the word, then, inasmuch as the Cows could not serve
the purposes of qualification, unless they existed on the earth, the earth
also would have to be accepted to be denoted by the word! That is to
say, 8 word cannot be taken as denoting anything and everything, with-
ont which the one object denoted by it does not attain its true character ;
all that the word ‘gjma@n’ can be taken to denote is that without which
there is no idea of the qualified object. And such an object is the cow
only, without a cognition of which the idea of the person qualified by the
cow could not appear; which cannot be said of the Relationship (even
without which the idea of the Person 18 found to appear).

Then again, the seeking for the Relationship is the function of the
speaker ; as he cannot speak of the ‘ Possessor of Cows,’ without a rela-
tionship with the cows. That is to say, in all cases, the order of sequence
in the operation of the Hearer is the reverse of that of the Speaker. For
instance, the operation of the speaker is as follows:—(1) First of all, he
desires to speak of a certain Qualified Object; (2) then, inasmuch as
the Qualified Object could not be spoken of without the Qualification, he
desires to speak of the Qualification; (3) then he utters the word ( ‘ gé-
man, f.1.). While the operation of the Hearer is as follows :—(1) First
of all, he hears the word uttered; (2) then he cognises the Qualification ;
(3) and then the Qualified Object ; and after that he comes to have ideas
of other accessories (as the Relatiouship bétween the Qualification and the
Qualified, etc., etc.), necessary for the full accomplishment of the cognition
of the Qualified Object. Thus then, though the Speaker may have per-

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED UP. GBS

ceived the Relationship beforehend, yet, it is only at the end that the
Hearer cognises it. |

As a matter of fact, however, even the Speaker does not recognise the
Relationship very much beforehand; because it cannot be cognised until
the members related have been cognised ; consequently, in the operation of
the Speaker also, the Relationship comes to be recognised only latterly ;
and hence, in this case also, it does not escape from the position of being
indirectly implied.

And it is in the nature of the thing, that the unrelated Cows do not
qualify; and hence the indication of the Relationship is a function of the
Cows, and not that of the word ‘ gdman,’ which can only serve to denote
the qualified object in that position in which it would be capable of being
qualified (by the cows); and as it is only as related that the object comes
to be qualified, the Relationship also comes to be implied indirectly (as ॐ
necessary factor).

Thus then, it is that which, being accompanied by the particular
qualification (Cows), has attained the full position of the Qualified Object,
—that would come to be denoted by the word ‘gémin,’ as that ‘he is
qualified by Cows.’

For these reasons, the Relationship cannot be taken as denoted by
the word.

Further, the relationship is not recognised to be denoted by the case-
ending (genitive in ‘asyah,’ as shown above by the opponent); and we
have no rules Idying down that it is to be spoken of in any other form.
That 1s to say, the Relationship, that is expressed by the Genitive and
the Locative case-endings, 18 self-sufficient, and one devoid of any Gender
or Number, etc.; while that expressed by the ‘ matup’ affix is not so. Nor
18 there any rule laying down the declaration that, that which is devoid
of gender, etc., when expressed by the Genitive or the Locative, be-
comes endowed with them when expressed by the ‘matup’ affix,—as
there is in the case of an entity, expressed by a Verbal Derivative, which
is said to acquire the character of a substance,

Thus then, the only two alternatives that are possible are these: (1)
That we should accept the word to denote a Relationship devoid of gender,
etc., and (2) that the word should be taken as denoting the Object Related,
as qualified by the implied relationship.

And we have no hesitation in pronouncing in favour of the second
alternative. Because the second member of the relationship related hav-
ing been denoted as qualified by another member previously cognised, the
Relationship comes to be cognised along with the related members; and
hence it is not held to be denoted separately by itself.

Then, 1४ has been argued that—* the Qualified Object having been

966 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, It—PADA I—ADHI. (6).

established, there is no need of a subsequent cognition of the qualifying
Relationship

True, there is no need; but even without such need, it is cognised
all the same, as the necessary concomitant (of the Qualified Object) ; and
what harm does it do if it is so cognised ?

Another argument that has been urged is—" Inasmuch as the पल्‌.
tionship is denoted by the abstract affix, 16 must be accepted ‘as the
denotation of the ‘ matup’ affix.”

To that we make the following reply: In the case of the word
‘qimattya,’ we are forced to admit the Relationship to be denoted by if,
because there is no other quality inhering therem that could be denoted
(but even though this might make the Relationship somehow denotable
by the word ‘gimattva,’ it could never be denoted by the word ‘ géman).’
Because in the case of the word ‘ gémattva, which 18 the Bhava (char-
acter) of ‘ 06709," that upon which the use of the word ‘ gdmdn’ (in the
word ‘gémativa’) is based, 18 what 18 meant by the Bhdva (character) of
the gémin; and it is this Bhava that is denoted by the abstract affixes
‘tva,’ ‘tal’ and the like,

Thus then, we find that the Qualification-—-Cows—that is denoted by
the basic noun ‘go’ is entirely different from the Person possessing the
cows (८000419) ; and hence the Cows are not denoted by the Abstract
Affix. Then,as a matter of fact, the Abstract Affix denotes a quality inher-
ing 10 the object; and in the word in question there is no other quality
denoted, which could be spoken of as the ‘ Bhava,’ on the ground of the
denotation of the word being present in it. Nor is the Person ever called
its ‘ Bhfva.’ Consequently, in accordance with the 6८14 IIJ—i—18, the
Abstract Affix rests itself upon the implzed Relationship. And even though
there ts no reason for taking the Relationship as denoted, yet, inasmuch
as there is sufficient reason to believe that, in the nature of things, the
Relation actually subsists in the object denoted,—that reason too is con-
sidered, for the nonce, enough to make it accepted as denoted by the
Abstract Affix

Thus then, even this argument does not afford sufficient reason for
assuming all etymological words to be denotative of Relationship.

For these reasons, if must be admitted that, just as in the case of the
_ word ‘ Dandi’ it is the member related that is denoted,—so also is it in
_ the case of all etymological words, like ‘ Pingakshi.’ Then as forthe exis-
tence of the Relationship in that member, it can be explained as shown
above. Consequently we conclude that what is denoted by the Bahuvriht
compound is a Substance, and not its Quality.

It has been argued above that—“ In the case ef the word ‘ ékahdyani,’
“the predominant element in the third object (denoted by the compound)

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED UP. 967

“being that (Relationship) which is expressed by the genitive ending,
‘the compound must be taken as denoting that Relationship.”

To this we make the following reply :—Though that which is denoted
by the Bahuvrihi is spoken of by ‘asyah’ (in ‘ékam haiyanam asyih’), yet
the genitive (in ‘asyah’) is cognised as equal to the Nominative

If the third object-—-the member reluted—were really one expressed
by a War with the genitive ending, then,—just as in the case of the
word (1020498 purushah,’ the Raja, being mentioned by a word with the
genitive, becomes the qualification of the Purushu, while the Purusha,
mentioned with the Nominative ending, and thus being the predomimant
factor qualified by it, comes to be taken as denoted by the compound
(‘ rajapurushak),—so also, in the case of such Bahurriht compounds as
‘citraguh, ‘ékahayanit’ and the like, what would come to be denoted by
them would be the ‘ Cows as qualified hy Devadatta, its possessor,’ and nut
‘the possessor Devadatta as qualified hy the cows’ (which would be high-
ly objectionable). Consequently the real bearing of the Bahuvrihi com-
pound ‘ Citraguk’ must be expounded as ‘citranfim gavdm ayam’ (the
Person as related to the cows of variegated colour), Though, 88 a rule,
people expound the compound differently (as ‘ciira gavd yasya),’ yet, in-
asmuch as the final true signification of the compound is found to be in
the form in which we have explained it, the expounding also should be done
in that way. And thus then, the real meaning of the compound ‘ (पद
guk’ comes to be that ‘ the man, Devadatta, is qualified by the cows as
qualified by that Relationship.’

And just as in the case of the phrase ‘rdjiuk purushah,’ the word
being used with the genitive ending, it is the Relationship, that, being the
predominant element, is found to be denoted ; and yet when the same phrase
appears as the compound ‘ r@japurushad,' and the genitive ending has ac-
cordingly disappeared,—inasmuch as the two words ‘ Raja’ and ‘Purusha’
do not wholly renounce their own individual significations, and the extrane-
ous factor of the Relationship is brought about by the cognition of the
qualified object brought about by the proximity of the two words,—the
compound does not denote the Relationship; so in the same manner, in the
ease of the Bahuvriht compound also, the Relationship does not form the
predominant factor in its denotation ; all the more so as there 18 no geni-
tive ending in this case; nor does the predominant factor consist in the
two component words, either singly or conjointly ; and conséquently we
aro led to the conclusion that it is the third object, a Substance, that forms
the predominant factor in the denotation of all Bahuvrtht compounds,

And this third object, spoken of as related, is, in accordance with its
capability, accepted to be either (1) the Class, or (2) the Substance, or (3)
the Quality, or (4) the, Action. For instance, (1) we speak of a Class as

968 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, I-—PADA I—ADHI. (6).

‘citravyaktt’ (consisting of various kinds of individuals); (2) of a Sub-
stance as ‘ndndguna’ (having various qualities); (8) of a Qualiéy as
‘anékdgraya’ (having many substrates); and (4) of an Action as ‘ anéka-
gray’ (inhering in many substances), Yn all these cases the particular
third object denoted by the Bahuvriht compound is ascertained by means
of the signification of another word spoken of as coextensive with
the compound (f. i. the word ‘yatik’ in the clause ‘ citravyakicriyam
70:८6 `). i,

Thus then in the case of the Bahuvriht compounds in question, inas-
much as the qualification of ‘@kahdyani’ (one year old) cannot apply to
the Class which is eternal, we admit it to denote the Individual Cow.

Objection: “It has been shown above ([—iii—30-35) that on account
“of Endlessness and Anomaly, the Individual can never be accepted as form-
‘ing the denotation of a word.”

Reply : That does not affect our position; because even though there
may be an endless number of Individuals, we could very well take o
single generic character, upon which we would base the connection of the
word with every individual (having that character); and in this there
would be no anomaly. That is to say, when the third object is found
once to be marked by the Class itself, inasmuch as that generic character
would be found to mark all Individuals (forming that Class), through that
generic character once cognised, every one of these Individuals, as differing
from one another in time, place, etc., could very well be denoted by the
word ; and as the word would never be used with reference to any indivi-
dual not marked by that generic character, there could be no anomaly.
In a case, however, where the Individuals are marked by other Individuals,
there too, the basic characteristic is the generic character of the Class.
Aud, howsoever far we may proceed, so long as we keep on the proper
track of the series of qualifications, we shall always find the final basic
generic character to be identically the same (in the case of all mdividuals
of the same Olass) ; and thus there would be nothing incongruous in con-
necting the word with every one of these Individuals. Andin all such
cases, it is the first and the last among the Individuals thus found to be
pointed out by the word, that forms its real denotation; and as for the
intermediate ones, inasmuch as their cognition is brought about by indirect
Indication, they are not accepted as directly denoted by the word.

Thus then, in the case in question, the classes ‘ Prigatva’ and
‘Akshitoa’ (denoted by the two words forming the compound ‘ Pingakshi ’)
indicate their respective Individuals—viz., the particular quality, and the
portion of the eye ; and these two again indicate the Substance having such
an eye; and this Substance (being the final thing pointed out) becomes the
denotation of the compound (‘ Pingakshi `).

{४

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED UP. ` 969

Then there arises the question as to whether this denotation of the
Substance is direct or indirect (being only indicated).

As to this ‘question there is a difference of opinion. Some pcople
(the grammarians) hold that, just asin the case of the Deific Nominal
Affixes, the ‘matup’ affix, and the like, so in the present case also, the
Substance is directly denoted by the compound—(1) because it is actually
cognised ४8 the predominant factor; (2) because there is co-extensive-
ness; and (3) because of the grammatical rule ‘ anékamanyapadarthah.’

While others (the Logicians) make the following declaration: ‘In the
“case of the Deific Nominal Affixes (in the word ‘ Aindra’ f.i.), we find
“that the additional factor admitted into the word ‘Indra’ does not serve
“any other purpose; and hence we take that as denoting the other object
“(the material dedicated to Indra); specially as in this case that object is
“not capable of being indicated by the basic noun ‘ Indra,’ because of this
“giving rise to an anomaly, and also because, as a matter of fact, tle
“basic noun ‘ Indra’ does not signify that other object. Inu the case of
‘the Bahuvrihi compound, however, we find (1) that the two words
‘retain their own original significations ; (2) that there is no additional
“factor admitted into the words; and (3) that the necessary idea of the
^ Substance is afforded by the classes ‘ Pingatva’ and ‘ Akshitva’ (by Indi-
‘‘eation based upon the necessary concomitance of these with tho
“Substance) ; and hence we cannot very reasonably admit the fact of
“the Substance béing directly denoted by the compound,”

But what has been said here cannot be accepted as applying to all
the compounds. For instance, it might apply to the Kamadharaya com-
pound, where there is every possibility of Indication (because the classes
‘nilatva’ and ‘kamalatva’ inhere in the same object, which can very
well be indicated by the compound made up of the two words ‘nila’ and
‘kamala’). On the other hand, in the case of such Bahwortht compounds,
as ‘citrdguh’ and the like, inasmnch as the two component words ‘ citra’
and ‘g5’ by themselves, denote something wholly different from that
which is meant to be expressed by the compound, they cannot, either
directly (by Direct Assertion) or indirectly (by Indirect Indication), be
taken as co-extensive with Devadatta, etc.,—the owner of the cows (that is
meant to be expressed by the compound); and then, inasmuch as the com-
pound ‘ cztraguk’ by itself brings about the cognition of something different
from those denoted by the words ‘ citra’ and ‘ gé,’ even before we add guch
words as ‘ Dévadattah’ and the like,—we can not very well assume that
third object to be denoted by the sentence ‘ cétragur-dévadattuk. Nor are
the two objects, cognised,at the time of the compounding of the two words,
in any way connected with the object Devadatta ; and as such Devaduila
could not be denoted by the said sentence.

122

970 TANTHA-VARTIKA. ADH. 11474 [—ApHI. (6).

For these reasons it must be admitted that, on account of direct cog-
nition, and also on account of the grammatical rules bearing on the point,
it is this third object that forms the denotation of the Buhuvrihi com-
pound. In this way also would the predominant character of this object be
compatible (which would be hard to be reconciled with the fact of its being
indirectly indicated),

Thus then, in the case of such Bahuvrihis, the compound havitig been
found to be directly denotative of the third object,—even + in the case of
certain compounds, we find indirect Indication possible, there also, inas-
much as the previously-established denotative potency of the compound
would not have disappeared, we could very well take thé third object
to be directly denoted (and not indicated),

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the words ‘ Pinagikshi `
and ‘ Kkahaiyani’ denote a Substance

Then as for the argument that “the word ‘ Hkuhayani,’ denoting a
certain age, could not apply to the Class, etc,, etc.,”—it does not hold water ;
because the age 18 indirectly cmdicated, and not denoted, by the word. It
is only such words as ‘young,’ ‘old’ and the like that denote age; as for
words like ‘ Ekahayani,’ they simply denote Substances connected with certain
periods of time; and as such they are employed to indicate particular ages
Because as a matter of fact, the declaration ‘ékam hayanam yasyah’ (‘that
which has one year of existence’) pertains to the Substance, and not to the
aye; because the one year of existence belongs to one who has been bore
a year ago, and not to the age.

Thus then both the words ‘ Pinga@kshi’ and‘ Hkahdyani’ denoting 9
Substance having the qualities expressed by parts of the same words,—it
is quite natural that there should arise, in connection with the sentence in
which they occur, the following question: ‘Does the Redness (mentioned
by the word ‘arunay%’) appear as the qualification of all the Substances
that are mentioned in the Context as those with which the Soma should
be purchased,—or, it pertains only to the one-year-old substance which is
mentioned, as the price of the purchase, in the same sentence as Redness
itself ?’

Like the previous Adhikarana, it might be urged against the present
one also, that, “ inasmuch as the Redness is actually found to be mentioned
‘in connection with only one such substance, there can be no question of
“its pertaining to all the substances mentioned in the Context.”

Consequently we proceed to meet this objection: The sentence is so
constituted that the quality of Redness coyld be connected either with the

purchase’ or with the ‘one-year-old substance’; because it is mentioned
in the same sentence as both of these. Then on account of its being
mentioncd with the Instrumental case-endiny, ‘the possibility of its

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED UP. ५7

connection with the Substance is very remote, it would be connected with
the ‘Purchase,’ on account of the greater authority of Direct Assertion
(which justifies such connection). But the Quality of Redness, having
no action of itself, and being altogether immaterial, could not be connected
with the ‘ Purchase’ (as its means), ‘hen again, if we were forced to
admit its connection with the Substance (the one year old), then the word
‘ gkahiifanyt’ would come to have two distinct forms, as with reference to
the Purchase aiftd to the Rediess, in accordance with the siitta ‘ ékacabdlyé
pararthuvat’; and as such we would have to admit of the presenge of
two distinct case-endings in the word ‘ ékahdyany@,’ which do not really
exist (2.९., the sentence would have to be construed as ‘urunima éka-
hayanyth’ and ‘ékah@yanya somam 17180८८ ' ) ; because the connection
(of the ékahayaini) with the action (of purchase) can be expressed
only by the Instrumental case-ending ; while that with the quality (of
Redness) depends upon the Genitive ending. And thus the Redness being
found to be incapable of being connected with those mentioned in the
same sentence with itself, it would come to be connected with any sub-
stance mentioned in the Context; and thus it could very well be taken as
pertaining to all the substances mentioned in the Context (as the price of
the Soma to be purchased).

Objection: ‘Then in that case, it would be practically settled, in
“accordance with the reasons that you bring forward, that it pertains to
‘‘ajl the substancés; and as such there should be no question as to its
“being connected with the Purchase.”

In reply to this, we have the Bhishya— An authoritative word can-
not erpress what is absolutely impossible. That is to say, the fact of
Redness being mentioned in the same sentence with ‘ ékah@yani’ gives rise
to the clear idea of its being a qualification of this latter; while the pres-
ence of the Instrumental ending 10 ‘ arunaya ’ distinctly pomts to its being
@ qualification of the action of Purchuse ; and thus the unimpeachable verbal
authority of this Instrumental Ending, on the one hand, and the actual
impossibility of the connection of the immaterial and inactive Quality of
Redness with the Action of Purchase, on the other, leave it extremely
doubtful as to which view is reasonably possible, and which is unreason-
able and impossible, |

In speaking of the various phases of the question, the Bhashya, firat
of all, introduces the alternative of the connection of Redness with the
action of Purchase, on account of its commanding earliest attention, in view
of its being based upon direct Werbal Authority, and hence very little
extra weight being put upon the Vedic Word. Then, ou the strength of
the mention of this connection of Redness with the Purchase, we should try
our best to find out a certain capacity in the former (whereby it could

97.2 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. WI—-PADA I-~ADHI. (6).

justify the said connection) ; and if we should find out some sort of this
capacity, we should certainly accept the connection of the Redness with
‘the Purchase. If, however, we should absolutely fail to perceive any such
capacity, then we would even accept the anomaly of ‘ Vakyabhéda’ and
take the Redness as qualifying the whole Context.

(1) The ‘Vakyabhéda’ here spoken of is not the ordinary syntactical
split marked by the repetition of the Affix, etc.; but what if means 18
५ Disjunction'; the sense of the Bhashya being that we wovld even accept
the Disjunction of the sentence speaking of the Purchase. (2) Or, the
word ‹ bhéda’ in ‘ Vakyabhéda’ may be explained as formed with the
Passive ghan affix, thus signifyiug that which ४5 disjoined ; and in this
ease the word ‹ 2476 ` would be such a ‘ bhéda’ of the sentence in which
it occurs (2.e., it would be disjoined from the sentence speaking of Pur-
chase). (3) Or again, the affix in ‘bhéda’ may be taken in the Active
sense, the meaning being that the word ‘aruad’ taken apart would dis-
join the sentence; and we would even accept this, in connecting Redness
with the whole Context.

Thus then, the upshot of the whole comes to be this: So long as the
Direct Assertion (of the Instrumental ending in ‘arunay@’) and the
syntactical connection (of ‘arunayd’ and ‘pingdakshya ékahfyanyt’) are
operative, the Redness cannot be taken as qualifying the whole Context
(and in this case it would be connected with the one-year-old substance
only); but if these two (Direct Assertion and Syntactical Connection)
have their power annulled by their incompatibility with the nature of
things, and become inoperative, then, in that case, the connection of
Redness would be ascertained by the Context only (and hence the Redness
would be taken as pertaining to all the various substances mentioned in
the Context as the price of the Soma to be purchased).

And on this question, we have the following

r

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘‘ That which is laid down would appertain to all, because there vs no
“difference tn their relationship, und because of the non-difference of the
“contest. (Siitra8). That is to say, inasmuch as Direct Assertion and
“ syntactical connection are wholly indifferent on the question, we cannot
“but take our stand upon the indications of the Context,

“ Question: ‘How could the Context take cognisance of a Quality
^“ (Redness), which is not of the nature of an Action ?’

` Answer: What we mean is, not thatethe Context takes cognisance
“of the Redness, but that in the word ‘arunay&? that which is denoted
“ by the basic noun ‘ arund’ is predicated with reference to the Iustruments

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED UP. 97:3

“ denoted by the Instrumental ending,—such as the Soma and the rest,
‘which are aids to the bringing about of the Apirva of the Jyotishtoma
५“ sacrifice dealt with in the Context,—and the basic noun ‘arund.’ Thus
“then the word ‘ arunaydé’ comes to be taken as a sentence, the meaning
“ afforded by it being that that Individual, which has been laid down 88
“ helping in the bringing about of the Apiirva, is to be employed in bring-
‘ing about that Apirva, only as qualified by ‘ Redness.’

“ Consequently, it follows that all the Instruments employed—even
“the vessels, etc.—should be red; and if they do not happen to be so of
‘themselves, they should be painted red. And as for the sacrificer and the
“ other agents concerned in the sacrifice, inasmuch as these are spoken of
“ by other case-endings, the quality of Redness, even though cognised a
* nertaining to all, could not qualify these.

“ Against the declaration that the word ‘aruna’ being denotative of
“a, quality, cannot be connected with tho verb ‘ purchase,'—the following
“argument is urged :—

“©The word is not denotative of a quality, As a matter of fact, it is
“only such words ‘ Ripa, ‘Rasa’ and the like that are denotative of
‘qualities only ; as it 18 the case with only these words, that whenever
“¢they are meant to be connected with a substance, they are never used
“without the possessive affix matup. On the other hand, in the case
“‘ot the words ‘aruna’ and the like, we find that it 18 seldom that
“<they are used, by themselves without abstract affixes, with a view to
८ । expressing qualities ; where too such use depends upon the proximity
of words with the genitive ending,—in such rare instances as patusya
(11८44 ; as a rule, however, these words are always used as expressive
“of substances with certain qualities as their subordinate elements; and
^ 1118 for this reason that,even without the possessive 903 matup, they are
^^" used as co-extensive with substantives ; e.g., cuklah patah, aruno ghatah,
५ § ९४८,

“* It might be urged that in these cases we have an elimination of the
“© Possessive Affix, as laid down in the V4rtska on Panini, Sutra
° ' T_iy—-19, (and hence the co-ordination of these words also with substan-
^“ * tives is not wholly independent of the Possessive Affix).

“* But it is not so; because the expressed meaning of words is never
“denoted by means of eliminations; consequently we must admit that
‘the word gukla, by itself, is capable of expressing both (the property of
“ “ whiteness and the white object. For instance, in the case of words with
“the koip affix (where the presence of the affix is not perceptible), as
“‘also in such words as adhund and the like (where the affix alone is
“* perceptible, the basic'word having been eliminated ),—we find that even
“though the basic word by itself (in the former case), or the affix by

6h €

८८ 4

974 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. ITI—PADA 1—ADRI. (6).

“ ‘itself (in the latter), is quite capable of expressing both the meanings, —
“ “vet what the grammatical rule means by speaking of the eliminations
“¢igs that such double potency is present in the word; in the same man-
“ner, in the case of the word arund also, the basic noun itself is capable
“of expressing both; and this is all that is meant by the mention of
“* elimination in the Vdrtika quoted above.

“'Nor can it be urged that the word would signify the substatice by
“means of indirect Indication, (1) Because the substanve is actually
५4 ‹ copnised as the direct denotation of the word ; (2) and also because there
‘are no explanatory rules, in Grammar, pertaining to Iudirect Indica-
“ ‘tions ; (3) and if there were such an indirect Indication in the case of the
५ ‹ word aruad, such an indication would be possible in the cade of the word
‘rapa also; and hence this latter word could be used in connection with

substantive, even without the affix matup; and (4) just as we have
५५ + {116 expression candanasya gandhak, we could also have géh arunak; (8)
‘‘¢when we pronounce the word gandhatva, we give up all idea of the
“ ‹ sandal-wood, etc., having the gandha, and connect the word with the
“ Sparticular gandhas (odours),—so also would be the case with the word
“ ५ arunatva, (१,९.) if the ९४86 of gandhatva were analogonos with arunatva,
५८ ‹ ला) in the expression gok aruratvam, we could connect the arugatua
“‘*with the Cow); (6) just as the word riipa, so the word ५१५१८ also
५९ ‹ could not be used as co-extensive with any thing.

““Some people hold the co-ordination of the werd arund with
‘“Ssubstantives to be based upon Indication; but such co-ordination
“would be possible in the case of the word ripa, as also in that of
५५ ‹ ४106 word arunaiva; because these words also do not express anything
‘““* more (than mere properties ).

८ ‹ This also sets aside the possibility of the elimination of the matup
affix in the case of the word arunatva.

‘* Then again, no properties are ever connected with Gender, Num-
“ “ber, etc.; hence also, inasmuch as we find the words ("द्द क, arund, ete.
८ ‹ connected with particular Genders and Numbers, we must admit
^“ ° them to be denotative of substances, Nor can it be urged that we have
“the rule that the Genders and Numbers of gunavacanas or adjectives 816
‘““* based upon their substantive substrates ; becauseif it were so, then we could
५५ ‹ have Genders and Numbers even in such words as rilpa, guklatva and the
“‘like,and also because the word gunavacanca in the said rule does not mean
^^" the words that merely express properties, but those that having expressed u
“6 oroperty, denote a substance ; for if it were not so, the word vacuna would
५ ‹ 06 wholly superfluous ; because the form of the word is nothing other
०५ १ than its vacana (utterance); aiid as such the former sense could be got
“*at by means of the word guna alone; hence it is the addition of the

६6 6

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED OP. 046

“word vacana that serves to preclude such words as riipa and the
“like,

“<The Vartika, laying down the elimipvation of the matup in guna-
५१ ‹ ४८८८१८5) 18 also amenible to the same explanation (as there also we have
‘the expression gunavacana).

५ ‹ For these reasons we conclude that the word arura denotes a sub-
“* starfce; and hence inasmuch as it can very well be spoken of as an
“ ‘agent, it cah be construed along with the sentence in which it occurs;
“*(and thus having its denotation based upon Syntactical Connection, it
‘leaves no room for the operation of the Context as held by the Parva-
‘“*paksht) ; and as such the word cannot be taken as qualifying every-
‘* thing mentioned in the Context,’

“Fhe reply to the above argument is that ८ ¢s not very satisfactory ;
“that is to say, it is not compatible with the conclusion arrived at under
“the Akriyadhikarana (I—iii—80-35).

“Then again, it is only when a certain meaning is never found to
“abandon a word, either by agreement or difference, that that meaning is
५" acknowledged as the directly expressed denotation of that word ; and in
‘the case in question we find that the word ‘arund’ never abaudons the
“ wroperty (of Redness). And in such cases, the Property, connected in-
“separably with a substance, having been previously denoted, as forming
‘tho qualification, the substance would be implied by the mere relation-
“ship of that qualification; and hence this substance could never be
“ accepted as forming the expressed denotation of the word; as we have
“already shown above (under the Akrtyadhikarana).

“Then again, on account of the irregularity of usage, a substance can-
“not be accepted ag the direct denotation of the word ‘arund'’; because
“the word is found to be used with reference to other substances with the
‘property of Redness, and to be not used with reference to the former
‘substance, when it happens to be devoid of that property.

‘It might be argued that, inasmuch as at the time of the appearance
“of another property, the substance also becomes changed, the said
“irregularity loses its force.

८ But as a matter of fact, there is no such absolute rule as that the
^^ substance becomes changed; because, as a matter of fact, it is found
‘‘ that even while the substance remains the same, various properties are
^“ found to appear and disappear.

५ There are two thcories on the point of the appearance of new pro-
“ perties in a substance :—The first is that of the Puitharas, who hold that

976 TANTRA-VALTIKA. ADH. 111- 2474 I-—-Abat, (6).

“the black pot itself becoming. cooked in the fire, takes the red colour ;
“and in accordance with this theory, the substance remains the same.
५५ Another theory is that of the Patlukas, who hold that the cooking is in
“the atoms composing the pot; and in this theory also, the said irregu-
‘larity would pertain to these atoms. In the way that we have explained
“(in Glokdvartika) the nature of the substance, 16 cannot but be admitted
“that what undergoes the change is the Property, and not the substance
“itself. In a case where a particular substance, the jar, is reddened by
“the colour of another substance, the Red-chalk,—the former 1s spoken
“of as ‘red’ though the property (of Redness) inheres in the sub-
“stance (the chalk) connected with it; and in this case, inasmuch asa
“single substance would come to be spoken of by many such words as
“¢Blue,” ‘Yellow’ and the like (if all these were to be denotative of sub-
८५ stances),—this would be a distinct irregularity. And certainly, this ir-
“ regularity would be very much more patent than that relating to the Class ;
“and this would be highly unsatisfactory.

‘‘'Then as for the elimination of the matup affix, laid down in the
५ Vartika, it only serves the purpose of offering an explanation of an
“ Indication established by eternal usage. |

“It has been argued above that the substance is found to form the
^ principal denotation, and as such we could not admit of its Indication.
“To this we make the following reply :~—The objection could be brought
“forward against one who should declare the substante to be the sub-
“ ordinate element in the denotation of the word ‘arund’; and it cannot
“be effective against the theory that makes the Indication very closely
approximate to the object denoted by the word. That is to say, in the
‘ease of the sentence ‘agnirmapuavakah’ we find the Agni (Fire) and the |
५ Manavaka (Boy) to be wholly different from one another ; and hence we
‘explain the expression as being based upon a certain singularity in their
“characters ; and hence in this case, owing to the peculiar character of
“the idea brought about, the word ‘agnzh’ is not accepted as being
“directly denotative of the object (Boy) that it qualifies. In the case,
however, of those words, which, while expressing the Class or the Property,
“indicate the Gubstance,—we find that there is not.a very great gap
“ between that which is denoted and that which is zndicated; and it is not
“ very easy to distinguish them; and this non-distinction (idea of identity )
‘can be removed only by very learned people, on the gronnd of invariable
‘‘concomitance and difference; and hence ordinary people (not being
“able to effect the said distinction) come to. think of the substance as
^“ being directly denoted by the word. But it does not follow from this
“that when the learned would speak of the non-denotability of the Sub-
“stunce by the said word, they could be charged with transgressing

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED UP. 977

“popular usage. Because the ordinary man of the world does not take
“the trouble of making nice distinctions between Denotations and Indhi-
“ cations ; and hence on this question he would be wholly indifferent ; and
‘as such, he could not take exception to the distinction that the learned
‘would make, for the purposes of ascertaining the generic and specific
“character of things. And thus there would be no transgression in the
matter.

“Then, as for the questions—‘ Why caunot you admit of the elimi-
“nation of the matup, as based upon Indication, in the case of the word
“ ‘Rapa also ? ' and—‘ How can the explanatory rule pertain to Indication ? '
‘we offer the following explanation :—

“There are three sorts of Indications: (1) one that is well established
“by eternal usage, just as well as Direct Deuotation ; (2) one that is created
“at the time; (3) and there is one class that cannot be admitted on account
“of their incapability.

“That is to say, (1) there are certain words in which the Indicative
“potency 18 as eternally established as the Denotative, —e.g., the words
“Scukla,’ ‘aruna’ and the like. (2) There are some which are used now-
“adays, in the indirect indicative sense,— e.q,, the word ‘ Rathanganaman ’
“as applied to the Cakravika bird (the Rathfinga—part of a chariot—
“being the wheel which, as expressed by the word ‘ Cakra,’ forms a por-
“tion of the namo ‘ Oakravika’). (3) While there are certain words which
“are wholly incapable of having any indicative potency; such are the
“words ‘ipa,’ ‘Rasa,’ etc.

“Then to the question—‘The relationship of the substance with
‘“ Ripa being exactly of the same kind as that with (ष्क, how is it that
“there is no Indication in the case of the former ? -- {16 reply is, ४ ts just as

‘in the case of denotation. Thatis to say, according to you also, though both
“the words Ripa and Cukla are equally expressive of properties, yet it

is only the latter, and not the former, that is expressive of a substance
“with a property as its subordinate element; and in the same manner,
“we admit of Indication in the case of Gukla, and not in that of Ripa.
“Against this it might be urged that—the Denotative potency of a
“word belongs to it naturally; which is not the case with Indication,
‘‘ which depends upon such agencies as that of the Relationship, etc.

‘But it would be so in the caso of words newly coined (like
“* Dittha’ ete.), You, however, hold the word ‘ Cukla’ to apply to the sub-
‘tance, through a property inbpring in it; and as this is found to be pres-

ent 10 the case of the word ‘Rapa’ also, this latter would also become
applicable to the substance. Consequently it must be admitted that in
Properties there are different kinds of potentialities, whereby only certain

words expressive of it pertain to the substance bearing that property,
123

978 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, Itl—-PADA 1—ADHI, (6).

“while others pertain to the Property alone as the predominant factor.
‘‘ And this would be the case with Indication also.

“Thus then, just as words have diverse potentialities with regard to
‘“ Denotation, so, in the same manner, should the meanings also be admit-
“ted to have various potentialities appertainivg to the indicated meaning.
‘‘Though the potentiality of denoting a visible object is to.be inferred from
“its effects, —and as such the necessity of admitting an imperceptible poten-
“cy is equally present for both ofus (४.९. the Denotative and the Indica-
“tive Potencies being both equally imperceptible),—and the function of
“the word having ceased with the denotation of the expressed meaning,—
“vet, when this last expressed meaning 18 not found to be quite fully
“ established, it leads to the assumption of a peculiar potency in this
‘ meaning, and not in the word, which points to the indicated meaning ;
‘and this assumption is quite warranted by the exigencies of the circum-
“stances. And on the mere ground of having to assume imperceptible
४४ potentialities, both theories are equal.

“Thus then, there being no Indicative potency in the word ‘ Ripa,’
“it can never be applied to substances, without the matup affix. This
‘view of the case is also supported by the siitra ‘ Rasddibhyagca’ (Panini
‘‘ ९-11-95), which reiterates the matup affix with reference to ‘ Ripa,’
८ 4 Pasa,’ etc., simply with a view to preclude all other affixes in connection
‘‘with these. As a matter of fact also, we donot find that the substance is
“never signified by the cognition of ‘ Ripa’ etc., for we actually find that
“the ‘ Ripa’ points to the substance as its invariable concomitant, just as
4 the smoke points to the fire; all that we mean is that the word ‘ Ripa’
“ itself not pertaining to the substance, there is no Indication in this case.

५५ Between the Substance and the Property, whether it is the one or
“the other that 18 cognized as the predominant element depends upon
“their nature; and in the case of Ripa etc., we find that they are always
“denoted as the predominant: factors; and hence in such cases the sub-
“stance is signified merely as a qualifying subsidiary; whereas in the case
‘of the word ‘Cukla’ and the like, the substance is expressed as the quali-
“fied predominant factor. It 18 on account of this indicative signification
“having continued from the very beginning of things that it is explained
“by means of the explanatory grammatical rule laying down the elim-
“ination of the matup affix.

“That Indication, however, which has a more recent origin, and is
“not 80 well established, cannot be expleined by means of spevial rules
“laid down in the Cdstras; because even without such a rule, it is found
“out through other factors connected with it. As for instance, in the
८५ 0886 of the expression ‘Madhwro rasah snigdhah, etc. (sweet taste is soft
‘‘etc.), inasmuch as the softness, etc., are also properties, just like the

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED OUP. 979

‘‘taste, they cannot qualify this latter; and as such they‘are taken as
“ qualifying the substance characterized by taste,

“Thus then, inasmuch as no exception can be rightly taken to
“the potentialities (of words), the occasional presence and absence of
“the elimination of the muti affix becomes quite explicable

“The above also serves to explain the restrictions as to the presence or
“ absence of the Abstract Affix, and to that of Coextensiveness or Diversity
“ For instance, the words ‘Guklatva’ ete., signifying the property, as the pre-
“dominant factor, abstracted by means of the Abstract Affix, is always rela-
“ted (to the substunce) by a diversity of substrates. The only difference
“(between ‘Cuklatva’ and ‘Cukla’) is that in the case of the former it
“is the Property that 18 the qualified predominant factor, while in the
‘‘Jatter, the property qualifies a substance; and thus being subordinate to
‘the substance, resides in the basic noun only; and it 18 this property, as
“subordinate to the substance, that comes to be subsequently abstracted by
“means of the abstract affixes ‘iva’ etc, It is for this reason that the
“word ‘Gukla’ has two forms (‘Quk/a’ and ‘ Cuklatva’) while Gan-
“dha’ etc. have only one form. And there is yet another duality of
“form in ‘Cukla’—viz., that at one time it denotes the Property, while
“at another 1४ would indicate the Substance possessed of that property ;
‘‘—in the former case, the word ‘ Cukla’ having for its subordinate factor
“the substance mentioned by the word with the genitive ending; ९.६.)
“* natasya cuklak’, where from the very beginning the Property of whate-
‘‘ ness is spoken of as abstracted from the substance; and in the latter case,
“the word ‘Cukla’ having for its subservient factor the substance expressed
“by another word with the same case-ending as the word ‘ Cukla,’
“eg., ‘Cuklah patah’, where the Cukla is mentioned as swallowed up by
“the Substance.

“And thus the presence of the Gender and Number (in the word
““arinayd’) could be explained, as before, through the substratum of the
" redness.

“Thug it is that Grammarians have held the Substance to be the
“predominating element in all words expressive of Properties; as
“according to them, all such words, having expressed the property,
“apply to the substance possessing that property. Nor do the Gramma-
"11808 specify and enumerate the properties; as they base their use of the
“names ‘Property’ and ‘Substance’ on the actually perceived relation-
“ship of the container and the,contained. ‘Thus, as a matter of fact, it is
“the word ‘Cukla’, and not the word ‘Ripa’, that signifies the sub

servient substance ; and thus there can be no irregularity in the matter of
“ Gender and Number

“It is with a view to this argument that the Bhishya has made the

980 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, ा-- ध) I—ADHI. (6).

“‘declaration—~We find even such words as are expressive of properties to
“have the feminine gender —e.g., the words ‘Karuna Buddhth,’ and the (४४९.
“ Though as 9 matter of fact these words are similar in character to the
“word ‘gandha’, yet they have been cited only with a view to show that
“such words take the feminine gender, The sense of this is that even
“those words that express self-predominant Properties are found to take
partcular Genders and Numbers; what then can be said against the pres-
ence of these in the case of such words as pre-eminently signify sub-
stances ? ’
For these reasons, the word ‘arund@’ must be taken as expressive of a
^" property; and as such it cannot be connected with the verb ‘to purchase,’
“ The position being thus summed up, the opponent comes forward
“with the following objection:—If the word arunaya 18 not connected
“with the verb to purchase, it could very well be connected with the
`` @kahayani (one-year-old). As it is quite possible for a word expressing
a property to be connected with a substance
The reply to this is that the connection of 11611655 with the verb is
‘expressed by Direct Declaration, while that with the Substance is ex-
pressed by Syntactical Connection ; and as such, this latter being weaker
“is set aside in favour of the former. With a view to this, the Bhashya
“ says —What the objector hus said ४8 not possible; because the word ‘ ARUNA’
“^ denotes a PROPERTY only, and not both property and substance ; and the word
“<BxanAyant’ also denotes the substance only; under the circumstances
‘how could these two words be taken as related to each other, in the absence
“of the Genitive ending that would signify such relationship ? The sense
‘of this is that there are two ways in which words are related to one
“another: by way of coextensiveness, and by that of diversity of sub-
“* strates ;——and in the case of the two words in question ‘arund’ and
“*ékahdyani,’ they could be related by coextensiveness, only if both of
“them signified both Substance and Property, and words are related by
“the diversity of substrates, only when the word expressive of the sub-
“ stance is accompanied by the Genitive ending. Thus then, inasmuch as
“the word ‘ arund@’ signifies the Property alone, and the word ‘ &kah@yani’
“the Substance alone, there can be no direct verbal coextensiveness between
‘them; nor do we find any genitive ending; consequently on account
“ of the authoritative character of the Instrumental ending (in ‘ arunaya'),
‘“we cannot admit of any relationship between the Property and the Sub-
^ gtance (in the case in question)

‘The opponent,—not comprehending the fact of the above assertion
‘being based upon the comparatively greater and less authoritative
“ character of the various words concerned, and thinking that the rela-—
“ tionship of the-Substance and the Property is denied on account of there

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED UP. 081

“being nothing to point to it, says:—(‘ Hven though there is no genitive
“ending, yet the coextensiveness (between arund and ékahdyani ) ४5 distinctly
५८ expressed by the fact of both words having the same case-ending (the Instru-
“ mental),.’

“The reply to this is that what the opponent says is not 0850616, etc.
“Thatis to say, our declaration is based upon the comparative strength of
“ the means of gognition ; for instance, the basic word ‘ arunf’ is found, by
‘its natural capability, to be expressive of a property ; while its coexten-
“siveness with ‘&kahd@yani’ is based upon its prozimety to another word
“and certainly there is a deal of difference between the authoritative
“strength of these two means of signification

` ^ Objection :—‘ Though the suggestive power of the word points to the
“ fact of the word arunayd expressing the Property of Redness only, yet we
“have to admit, on the strength of Syntactical Connection, the fact of its
“indirectly indicating the substrate of that property also. (That is to
“say, it being not possible for the Property to be related either to the
“ Action or to its accessories, 171 order to save the word expressing it
“from bemmg wholly meaningless, we must take it as related to the word
“ 6kahdyani, which also saves us from syntactical split) | Bhashya—p. 217,
“1. 6 et seq. ].

“In reply to this, it is pointed out that the relationship of arwna@ with
“the Acton 18 expressed by the Direct Signification of the Instrumental
“ending (‘in arunaya’), while that with the Substance could at best be
“got at by indirect Indication ; and as such this latter could not but give
“way to the former, which 18 more authoritative.

“ Against this again we have yet another objection, based upon the
“inevitable character of the said Indirect Indication: ‘The Property not
“ being capable of bearing a relationship with the Action, no significtence can
be attached to the case-ending in arunaya.’

“The reply to this is,—T'hat would make the Instrumental ending wholly
“meaningless. ‘That is to say, no amount of inevitable necessity can
make that cognised which is not expressed by the word. Nor can the
‘Instrumental ending in ‘arunay@’ be justilied and explained, through
“Indication, like the Accusative in ‘ saktin’ (in the sentence ‘ saktin
‘ juhoti, where ‘ sakitin’ is taken as equivalent to ‘ saktubhth,’ on account
“of the fact of the sakté not being something to be accomplished, and as
“such incapable of taking the Accusative ending) ; because the Property
^“ (expressed by the basic word ‘ aruna *) being incorporeal, it is not capable
of the character of any sort of agency denoted by the case-endings (४,९)
all case-endings are equally inapplicable to it)
“ Says the opponent—‘“ The word arunayi@ might be taken as laying
«“down the property signified by the basic word, with reference to the

982 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I1I—PADA I-—ADHI. (6).

“ agency obtained through its substrate which is endowed with a particu-
“lar Gender and Number. As there is a theory current among Gram-
“ marians that even though the words expressing properties are devoid of
“the character of agents, yet, inasmuch as they serve to qualify such
“agents, they take the various case-endings, the Accusative, etc,’ [Bhashya
«ny, 218, 1. 12 ef seg. | |

“Reply :—There is not much in this 40001606, Though the word
arunaya’? might, somehow or other, be capable of being related to the
(५ @kahdyani, yet inasmuch as the @kaha@yanit would be taken up by the
“ Action (of ‘ Purchase,’), and it would not be possible for it to be related
“to both (the Action of Purchase and the Property of Redness),—as shown
“under Sitra |—iv—8,—its relationship with the Action, being more
“authoritative, sets aside that with the Property ; because while we find
‘the case-ending (the Instrumental) expressive of its relationship with
“the Action, we do not find the genitive case-ending that would signify
“its relationship to the Property. In the case of the sentence ‘ nilamut-
‘“nalam’ that has been cited by the opponent, there being no contradiction
of Direct Assertion, there is a cognition of the relationship pointed out
“by Syntactical Connection; and as such its case is not analogous to that
९ 0 the sentence in question

५ As for the several alternatives with regard to coextenstveness, we
“shall explain them in the Jast Adhikaraga of the sixth Adhyaya, under
८ Sitra VI-—viii—35. In any case, however, the coextensiveness can only
५५ 06 based upon Indication ; and as such it cannot but be very much less
“ authoritative.

‘“ Nor do words expressive of Properties take the case-endings, be-
“cause they qualify other agents; but because they are themselves agents.
५ This 60 we shall explain under the Adhikurana V—i—11-16.

“The opponent brings forward another argument, whereby he seeks
“to remove the contradiction of Direct Assertion: ‘ 1 ४5 true that when
“there ४8 no mutual dependence, proximity ४5 no ground of relationship ; 21
“all cases however, it 18 only after the word-meanings have been rejected
“that the sentence-meaning becomes possible, etc., ९८८, That is to say,
“when both (the Action of Purchase and the Property of Redness) are
‘connected with ékahdyani at one and the same time, then alone is there a
‘contradiction ; when, however, the relationship of one of them is only
“amphed by the way, (while that with the other is directly asserted),
“there can be no contradiction. The sepse of the latter sentence (४
“all cases it is only after the word-meanings have been rejected, etc.) is
“that the independence of word-meanings is ia every way rejected ; and
‘hence there 18 no incongruity in the assumption of many relationships
“of the same word. That.is to say, the word arund must be connected

८८ 6

SEVERAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED UP, OR3

‘‘ with some such substance as possesses the property (of Redness), Then
“as for the word ékahdyani, the independence of this also has been set
“aside by the fact of its being related to the Action of Purchase. And
“then, if the word be connected with another word, that would entail no
“ further contradiction of Direct Assertion, —in accordance with the maxim
“that when once a woman has shown her face, there is no use cover-
“ing it again, (Hence when a word has been connected with one word
“there is noincongruity in its being connected with another word); and
“hence the word ékalayani can very well be connected with the word
“arun@ also, which expresses a property.’ [Bhdshya, p. 219, 1. 25 et
४८ seq. |
“The reply to this is—Jé ४5 not sv, etc. (Bhashya, 1. 220, 1, 16).
“Tn this reply, the Bhashya admits, for the sake of argument, the rela-
“tionship of the Proporty with the Substance ; and then points out that,
‘even then, there is a contradiction; inasmuch as it involves the rejec-
“tion of the relationship of the Property with the Substance employed in
‘the sacrifice; and the simultaneous attributing, to the verb ‘krinati,’ of
“the contradictory characters of the Injunction and the Descriptive Refer-
“ence. In a case where all words tend to qualify the verb, there is no
“trouble involved in the Injunction of the qualified Action ; but in a case
‘“‘where what is enjoined is the Action, and also a little of the Substance,
“if we admit a syntactical split in the shape of a repetition of the
“verbal (Injunctive) aflix,—we have an absence of all restriction,
^“ That 18 to say, a qualification is always such as is already well known

“(and does not require an Injunction) ; consequently while the‘ Purchase’
“is still in the state of being enjorned, it cannot be said to be well known,
“and as such it would be counected with every one-year-old thing that may
“be found to be mentioned in the context (and not only with that with
“which the Soma is purchased), And whichsoover these other one-year-old
‘ones may be, in the context treating of the Jyottshtoma, to each of them
“would the Property (of Redness) be related, by means of syntactical con-
“nection. If, however, we do not find any other one-year-old thing men-
“tioned in the context, then what elseconld we do than admit such a thing
“to form part of the sacrificial gift, orto bein the shape of the cow that
“is kept tethered in the sacrificial house? Orit may be that inasmuch

as the word ‘ ékahtyanya’ does not form the predicate of the sentence

and as such no significance attaches to the particular gender and number,
“the word may be taken as yointing to any thing that may be a year old
‘(male or female), and as such would refer to the animals of the savaniya

aud the Agnishoma; and thus there would be no definito certainty as to
“which one-year-old thing is meant to be qualified by ‘ aruna.’

§ ई T ५

his argument applies to all similar cases; 6.4. in {116 - 56116066

०६५ TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, 1I—~PADA I—ADur. (6).

५4 ‹ Dacamushtir mimité’, the number ‘ten’ would belong, not only to the
‘bundles of soma, but to all other Nirvapas in connection therewith.

“The opponent, seizing the opportunity afforded by the aforeskid
“admission of the diverse character of ‘ Ekahayani', comes forward with
‘the following argument: ‘ Even though the Purehase may be enjoined as
‘ something quite new, yet being present in the mind, it would also, by the
“ way, specify the particular Ekahdyani that would be qualified by “ arund.”

“The reply to this is that ४ ४ not so; because whenever the
“meaning of a word becomes qualified, the direct denotation of that

word suffers by each qualification; and hence, because it has been

qualified by one, there is no reason why it should be qualified by others
also, in ill-advised accordance with the maxim that one who has been
‘seen once need not cover herself again. Nor would the word ‘aruni’
‘become useless (without such qualification); because it has its use else-
“ where in the context. Nor can it be urged that the Property would not be
“related with the context, just as it has been shown to be not related
“with Lkahayani. Because if the Property be laid down with reference
“to a Substance mentioned in another sentence, there is no undue diver-
“sity in the character of anything. In accordance with your theory
“also, if the Purchase be enjoined with reference to the Soma itself, and
“be referred toas qualifying theSubstance, then there comes to be a diver-
“sity in its character. Jn the same manner, it is on ad2ount of the same
“diversity that the Hkaha@yani cannot be taken as related both to the
“ Purchase and to the Property of edness,

“Qn a former occasion we have adinitted this dual relationship,
“simply for the sake of argument; and on the present occasion we refute
“that idea, with a view to remove all chauce of a false hope rising in
“tho heart of the opponent.

“The real fact is that the word ‘arunay&’ lays down the Redness

signified by the basic word, with reference to the means of purchase,
‘“yveferred to by the Instrumental case-ending

‘There 1s a party of Pirvapakshis, who hold that no significance
“attaches to the Instrumental ending in the word, which, therefore,
“denotes the Property alone,—this Property, being connected with the
“context, and being taken up by the Recapitulatory Injunctive sentence,
“and thereby pertaining to Substances, it must be taken as belonging to
“ll the Substances mentioned in the Context; in accordance with the

9१/१८ WI—i—18 | |

“But this is not right; because the Property, not forming a part of
“the Procedure of the sacrifice, cannot be taken wp by the context; and
“as for the law laid down in the sétra referred to, it points to the relation-

SPRECTAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MINED Trp, ORF

‘ship of the Property with that Akah@yaui which is accessory to the Pur-
chase; and as such there would be no ground for the Pérvupuksha.
“Consequently if is im aceordance with the reasonings we have
“explained above that the Property of Redness s] be taken as
explained above that the Property of Redness should be taken as belong-
“ing to all the Substances mentioned in the Context.”

SIDDHANTA.,

To the above, we make the following reply: In a case where the
Substance and the Property are directly fonud to serve one and the
same purpose, they must be taken as specifying caeh other, Just as in the
ease of the vessel, ete.

The expression ‘arthatkatvé* 111 the sifra refers toa particular work
done by them; and the expression ackukurmyat brings forward the same
fact as an argument. Or the expression ‘arthatkatr@’ may be taken as
menning thread. when af ८९ possible for the bia to be luken 1८10) १/९ each ather,
then, the Injunction of the one Bh@cand, qualitied by all the qualifications,
has its purpose fully served only by having pointed to that qualrfied
Bhavand; and thus there comes to bea due adjustment of all the various
factors of the sentence among themselves. Just as in the case of the sen-
tence ‘ Dévadattah kashthaih sth@/yam odanuim pacats, all the factors ave at
onee recoynised ag pertaining to the single action of cooking ; 80 would it
also he in the case in question (where all the factors would pertain to
the single action of Purchase).

Then as for the Substance alone, or the Property alone, as none of
them could be performed by itself, 16 is not enjoined. And as for the
relationship of these with any action other than Purchase, 1t could not be
pointed oat by the Injuuctive affix appeatiug along with the verb ‘ to
purchase. And lastly, as for the relationship with the Substance,
the Injunctive is ever incapable of establishing any such relationship.
And we shall show in the next Adhikarana that the operation of the
Injunetion does not extend beyond the Bhdcand and its qualiticatious.

Then tho presence of the Instrumental ending (in ‘ arunayfi’ and
‘Chahfyanya ’) distinctly shows that the Property of Redness and the Hkaha-
yant, while independent of cach other, stand in need of the action accom-
plished by means of them ; andas such they both come to be related, by Syn-
tactical Connection, to the particular action of Purchase. And the reasons
for this are the following: (L) Askdraka’ (Agent) ts that. which does some-
thing ; and that which is done can be no other than a deed ov Action, and hence .
no karaka or agent can have any relationship with a Substance ; (2) all
A@rakas equally are fully established entities, and as such they do not
‘stand in need of one another; and as for Properties, inasmuch as they are

124

I86 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADIC. TH—PADA ता, (6).

all equally subservient to others, there can be no mutual dependence
among themselves; (3) the Injunction in question too does not operate
towards the pointing out of a mutual relationship among the kdarakas ;
and inasmuch as we are guided wholly by the Injunction, we accept the
relationship with the action. The Action too is never accomplished
without the help of certain harakas; and hence also there is a mutual rela-
tionship between the action and the k@ruka, on the ground of the former
being accomplished by means of the latter, which is a well established
entity. And just as the Substance is wanted as holping in the accomplish-
ment of Actions, so also is the Property of that Substance required; and
hence the Property of Redness too cannot be related to anything clse
except the Action. That is to say, just as, on account of the impossibili-
ty of the action of Purchase being performed without a Substance, the
action tnkes up the ékahiyant as that Substance,—so, m the same man-
ner, Inasmuch as so long as the Substance lias not been specified by a
particnlar property, it cannot accomplish the Action, the Property is also
sought after as a necessary element; and consequently the Property
must also be taken as an accessory of the Action.

Objection :-— When the Substance has been iaken up daring the per-
“ formance of an Action, the Property also comes to be taken up, as the
“necessary concomitant of that Substance; and thus no special effort
“ being required for the taking up of the Property, this latter cannot be
५ 8910 to be sought after in the same way as the Substance 18 done. That
“is to say, withont taking up a Substance, there can be no performance
“of an Action ; and when the Substance has been taken up, the Property
“naturally follows in its wake.’

Reply: In that case, when the Action has been performed, there
would be no further need of the Substance (which would follow naturally
in the wake of that Action). Then again, ifit be held that the Substance 38
sought after previous to the performance, then the same may be said with
regard to the Property also, which is sought after previously to the em-
ployment of the Substance. |

That is to say, yon have argued that in the taking up of the
Substance, the Property becomes taken up by itself, and as such it does
not require a distinct effort. But when we have taken up an Action, that
involves the taking up of some sort of a Substance, and hence the
Substance also would require no distinct effort. If it be urged that before
the action is taken up for performance, ther is a seeking after the particn-
lar Substance to be employed at it,—then we could also urge that before
the Substance is taken up, there is always a desire to know what sort of
Substance— with what qualifications—is to be employed.

The only difference in the two cases is that the Substance continues

SPECIAL PROPERTIES ARE NOT MIXED UP. 987

to operate even after the form of the Action has been fully recognised ;
whereas, when the form of the Substance has once been duly cognised, the
Property has no operation apart from that Substance ; because its function
has been fully served by the pointing out of the form of the Substance !
but certainly that which operates towards the pointing out of the Substance
cannot be said to be wholly inoperative ; because there are various kinds
of operation. jAs a matter of fact also, we find a distinct operation of the
Property at the time that it specifies the Substance. For instance, when
the Action has come to be known as to be accomplished by means of a
Substance, there is always a desne to know the property or character of the
Substance that is to be employed in it.

Thus then, in such a case, if the Veda itself points out a particular
Substance, that Substance is accepted as the one to be employed; but
if no such is directly pointed out by the Veda, then any Substance
that happens to be implied by the text, and to be supported by other
authorities, would vome to be accepted; and hence, in the case in
question, the dircetly enjoined ` Redness’ would come to be an accessory
of the action (of Purchase).

And in all cases, when a certain fact has been directly laid down by
the text, all doubt and ignorance with regard to it are held to have been
rewoved, in accordance with the Siitra I--iv—30. Consequently, in the
case in question, when it is distinctly enjoined that the Action of Purchase
is to be accomplished by means of Redness, there being uo words supplied
from without, and there being a standing rule that a thing can help
only in a way that lies within its power, it 1s concluded that the action
is to be accomplished by means of Redness, as churacterising the Substunce
to be employed at the performance of thut Action. Because it is always
found to be the case that Properties have the function of character-
ising Substances; as otherwise they would be wholly moporative ; and
because their Injunction also is justifiable only in this way. That is
to say, the Injunctive pertaining to the Purchase does not, in any way,
renounce the Redness presented to it by means of the Instrumental
ending (in ‘arunayti’); and the Redness also does not become the
accessory of the Purchase by any other way save that of specifying the
Substance with which the Purchase is to be effected. Nor is it necessary
that the aids imparted by all accessories should be of one and the
same form. Nor again is thes Action, in all cases, held to be in the
form of motion alone, inhering in the Substance; nor do all accessories
directly aid the Principal Action itself; because tho relationship of these

, depends upon various intermediate operations. And of such factors as
+ Redness and the like, the only operation that they are found capable of is

988 TANURA-VARTIKA. ADH. 11 --017 [abit (6).

the specifying of the Substance ; and though nominatives to this operation
of specification, they become Instrumental to the other operations (hence
the lostrumental ending). `

Thus then it is from the word ‘arunayd’ itself that it 1s concluded
that the Purchase in question is to be accomplished by means of the
Property of Redness as specifying « certain Substance.

In the same manner the one-year-old animal also stands in need ०४
property that would specify it; as without such specification 16 could not
be employed in the action. Conseyueutly, we find that the Property
begins to look for a Substance to specify, which would also serve as its
own substrate; and in the same manner the Substance also begins to look
for a specifying property; and the relationship based upon such mutual
requirements is established very soon, And 71 the sentence in question,
we find that it 1s not possible for any other Substance or Property to
be sought after ; hence even without the genitive affix, we accept these
two (Redness aud the one-year-old animal) to be related to each other,
on the sole ground of mutual requirements; just as two men, one of whom
had his cart burnt, and auother had his horse dead, having joined together
in making up a joint cart, proceeded on their way, Specially as there
is no ground for rejecting what is found near at haud, we conclude that
the two cannot bat be related between themselves.

Then again, the Parchase, which is admitted to be the principal
action io question, has its substance and its property fully cognised ;
and as such not stunding in need of any property, not mentioned in the
sentence itself, it directly serves to restrict the Property to the Substance
(aud ४८८८ verse). That is to say, any unmentioned substance, that
would be brought forward by the apparent inconsistency of the men-
tioned Property, is, as a matter of fact, not found to be sought after by the
Purchase, which has 105 necessary substance distinctly mentioned in the
shape of the one-year-old animal; similarly any unmentioned Property,
that would be brought forward by the one-year-uld andmal, is not wanted
by the Purchase, which has its necessary property distinctly laid down
in the shape of Bediess.

It the Purchase had its Substance and Property not definitely men-
tioned, then, in that case, it could admit of extraneous factors. Tf, how-
ever, the action of Purchase were forcibly connected with such Substances
and Properties as it does not stand in need of, then it would not be per-
formed in the way that it is enjoined ; as it is enjoined as qualified by
the detinite Substance of the one-year-old Mnimal and the definite property
of Reduess, Secondly, it would involve an unwarranted repetition of the
Principal Action. And lastly, if the various substcnees, etc., were taken
ws optional alternatives, the particular [njuuction of the qualified action

SPECIAL PROPERTIES ARK NOL MIXEU UP, est)

would be contracted, And farther, because the Purchase 18 the principal
action, therefore it precludes the implication of other extrancous ऽ).
stanecs and Properties by the mentioned Sabstance and Property. Any
guch irregularity would be rejected by the action, even if 10 were a sub-.
ordinate action; just as even though the Pupil 1s subordinate to the
Tutor, yet if 16 becomes necessary for the former to eat out of a vessel of
the 40४४५ metal, it behoves the latter also to vat of the same, when the
Pnpil has (as & vrata) to eat of what is left by his Tutor, Aud itis all
the more so, when the Action is the principal one.

Nor, in the cuse in question, do we find anything incompatible or
incongruous, 111 the absence of an assumption of something not mentioned
in the sentence; because all that is necessary 1s supphed by the men-
tioned Substance and Property ws reluted to each other ; and in this way
wlso becomes established the fact of the two being coextensive,

Nor is there avy contradiction of Direct Assertion, 11 this ease,——as
will be shown by the Bhéshyu Juter on, m the sentence—uu ca grutir
vakyGrtho néte $e.

For instance, the relationship that we seek to establish is one
that is required by the Purchase; and in this even the mach weaker
Iinplications of words are found to be be quite compatible and not
contradicted—to say nothing of the fully authoritative Direct Assertion,
That 18 toe say, when the Purchase takes up the Substance, it seeks
after the Property that would specify that Substance; and when it takes
the Property, it seeks for the Substance that would be the substrate of
that Property. Thus then, iwasmuch as the two are found to he
quite compatible with one another, through the action of Purchase, they
become related to each other by the relationship of mutual subserviency.

Some people hold that, inasmuch as the Property serves to specify
the Substance, it is subservient to this latter. But to them we reply that
the Substance also beeumes subservient tothe Property, inasmuch ag ou ac-
count of its incapability of otherwise aiding in the accomplishment of the
Purchase, it becomes the substrate of that Property. Hence it must be ad-
mutted that both of them are subservient to the Purchase; and that betwecu
them there is always present a mutual help; consequently they must
be regarded as subservient to each other.

One who holds that the Property of Redness pertains to the whule
context, should explain by what that Property is enjomed,’ He docs
not admit the fact of its bearing any relationship to the Injunction of
Purchase. Then as for the Recapitulatory Injunctive sentence, that
vould not but neglect the Property, which, not being an action, could

_uof be taken up by that sentence. ‘The word ‘arunayd’ itself has uo
MAujuuctive potency. Though the character of the agent Karaka present

५90 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADU. MI—PADA I—~ADHI (6).

in the words (‘ajay@ 4८.) points to distinct substances, yet such
words cannot serve as Injunctions. Then as for the Injunctions of
actions ‘krinate’ 11) (100 krinate’ appearing in connection with
these other substances, these also having become spent up (in the
injunction of the three factors of the Bkdeand) are no longer capable of
enjouung anything else, even though they are duly comprehended. Nor
ean they ever operate towards the properties of sithstances. And hence
the property 1 question cannot in any way pertain to the whole
context.

The opponent, taking his stand upon the low that ‘ those that serve
the same purpose are to be taken as optional alternatives’ (Sutra XIT—
111 -- 10), aud not perceiving the difference in the intermediate purposes
served, comes forward with the objection: “Tf they serve the saime
purpose why cannot they be taken as optional alternatives ?”

The Siddhant: offers two replies to this: (1) This assertion of yours
does not establish the fact of the Property pertaining to the whole
context, which is: the theory that is opposed to ours; nor does it serve
to preclude the relationship of that Property with Purchase; aud hence
inasmuch you have shifted your ground, to the denial of facts not
connected with the question in hand, you have tacitly accepted defeat.
on the main poiut at issue. (2) Another reply is that there ८४ actually
no possibility of their betng opbiouel allernateces; because they have
distinel functions—that is to say, they differ in the mtennediate operations,

The opponent however takes this latter sentence to be an admission
of a dilference in the Principal Function served by them; und hence
comes forward with the followmg: “(1) Fou Aheve just declared thal
“they serve only one funchiow; aud (2) then what you suy now also
‘“contrudiels a precious decluration of yours, that the Property, beeny
‘“rncorporeal, can huve no function.

“Ttamight be argned that this latter declaration has been made by
“the Purvupukshi, and as such it is not proper to taunt the Saddha@ite
“with its contradiction.

"^ But then the question to be dealt with is always expounded from
“aw common standpoint,-—and it was in conrse of the expoundmeg of the
“question that the ¢ucorporeality (and the consequent imoperativeness )
“of the Property was declared ; and the contradiction of this would certainly
“vitiate the Siddhdata also. Or, again, the Purvapakshé has urged
“the fact of the said incorporeality as a reason; aud a reason is always
“one that is acceptable to both parties ; couseqnently if it was not accept-
“able to the Siddhdnti he showld have taken exception to it on that
‘“oecusion; and as he didnot do this, he tacitly accepted it as true; and
‘as such, if, on the present oceasion, he coolly declares the fact of both

=

४५.

पः |

<PECIAL PROPERTIES ARK NOT MINED CP, YO]

«(the Property and the Substance) serving ihe same purpose, and thereby
“gnoaks of the Property as operative, he certainly becomes open to the
“charge of self-contvadiction.”

Reply: There is no self-contrudietion ¦ nor is there any possibelity of the
tego beeng taken us optional alternatives, becanse there is a difference in

their iptermediate operations, due to the difference in’ their capabilities.

‘That is to say, ghe Substance aids the action directly, while the Property
merely serves the purpose of specifying that Substanee.

Krom the above, tho opponent jumps to the eonelusion that the
Property is subservient to the Substance, in aecordanee with the law
‘taditaraé tadartham’,—and henee arges-~* Then the Property does not
help in the accomplishment of the Action.” .

The veply is that 2८ ४६ nef so; that is to say. what wo mean is that
the Substance is the channel through whieh the Property helps the
AGLION.

This then ‘the two anomalies—of *self-contradiction, and ‘optional
alternatives ’—having been set aside, the opponent finds himself unable
to peveeive anythme 111 the nature of the one-year-old animal, whereby
it could serve as the said channel; and consequently having concluded the
said relationship to be pointed out by syntactical connection alone, brings
forward the objection that in that case the one-year-old animal would
have the double ehavacter (of the Sabject and the Predicate, as arged
before). This objection is expressed in the sentence ‘erantarké ५९."

In reply to this, the Bhashya says-- ne (0771016 vayam &e.,—the
sense of which is that ihe relationship of the Property to the ene-year-old
animal is due to the natural capacity of things.

Then the opponent proceeds to deny the Restricted Relationship ;
“'Thas too there would be a syntactical aplit; that 18 to say, even thongh
“there may be a relationship with Paurchuse, yet as there would be a
“(istinet action with each agent or प्रक्र) there would certainly be a
“syntactical split due to this difference among the actions. Sach a split
“is met with both in Vedic sentences, and in those of ordinary parlance ;
“for instance, (1) ‘yasya pita pitimahuh somam na pibél १,८०.१ and (2)
“ Devadatta- Yajnadatia-Vishnumitra bhojyantdin’; in the latter sentence
“the feediny pertains to every one of the three persons, and in the
“former the non-soma-drinking of the Father, and also that of the
‘ Grandfather, are spoken of as a veason for the performance of the
“ Vratyapaguydga; and this w3uld be possible only if each of them
“(Father &e.) were taken separately ; and thus the relationship of each
“of these with ‘aa prbét,’ as also with the Vralyapacuyaga, is taken
“ distinetly ; and hence both of these are instances in point,”’

The reply to this is that this does not affect our main position; and

J92 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADU, वा-क) Tabi, (6),
hence it is as irrelevant as the theory that the two are to be taken as
optional alternatives. |

The opponent again urges: © [6 ८६ (114८ that whut we have urged does not
* contaminate your position; but in this manner lhe Purchase could be effected
“even by an one-year-old animal that ts not red, as also by a red animal
“ that is nol one-year old,”

The reply to this is that when the action of Purehase ‘s the principal
factor, the sentence has its end in the aggregating of all the various
qualifications mentioned in the sentence (1.९. all of them pertain to the
same action of Purchase); just as in the case of the sentences ‘ Gargah
cutam dandyantim, ‘abhishutya hated bhakshayante’ (where, 10 the
former sentence, the fae of s hundred pieces of gold pertains to all the
Gargas collectively; and in the latter the Hating is done after both the
other actions have been performed).

Objection: “Inasmuch as the Fine serves to purify the person
“fined, it must be repeated with reference to each person in the Garea com-
“munity, just as the feeding pertains to each of the persons mentioned,”

Reply: {118 does not touch our position; beeanse it is only in the
case of corporeal punishment, that it pertains to each individual; whereas
the punishment of a fine of gold-pieces applies to the whole community ;
because the sentence in question lays down the fine as a source of income
to the King, qualified by the number ‘ hundred,’ as received from = the
erimunal, on account of a certain erime committed.

That is 10 say, Just as the sacrificial gift given to the Priests is in ex-
change of the services rendered by them in the performance of the saeri-
fice; so 18 the fine a conditional income provided for the King, in exchange
01 the protection; and as distinet fines are (वन्‌ down for distinct crimes.
the number ‘hundred’ forming the Predicate of the sentence, we can-
not but attach dne significance to the smgular number in ‘ (41/00 ' ; and as
for the crime committed by ‘ Gareth.’ whether it be committed by an indi-
vicual Garga, or by the whole community, it beeomes an oeeasion of the
income of a hundred pieces of gold to the King; and at that time the crimi-
nals appearing in the position of the source from which the income pro-
ceeds, the sentence comes to mean that the King shonld receive a hundred
pieces of gold from the whole Garga community; and then if he were to
receive a hundred from each individual, the crime having been fully ex-
plated by the payment of a single hundred, the acceptance of the other
hundreds would be an unwarranted forciblé taking away of the belongings
of Brahmanas: and the number also would far exceed the enjoined ‘one
hundred.’

vonsequently the sentence must be taken as ending in the whole
igeregate.

SPUECEAL PROVPERTIFS ARE NOT MINED GE. W939

Though distinct reasons have heen given, yet the opponent brings
forward another doubt, aroused by the aforesaid instanees: “There becuy
(7 (*९। 1115 (7269, HOU is ८ (5/1) "(1 1114.({ {0.1८ (॥ Nenteneer enids / )६ the aggreyale,
aiid not in each constituent part ८ "'

Reply: The Purchase being the Principal action,—beeause of its serv-
111 the p arpose of acquiring the sone that would accomplish the saeritice ;
and beeause of the fact of that which is established being mentioned
for the sake of that which has to be accomplished, —and the Substance and
the Property, for opposite reasons, having the coutrary (subordinate )
character.—the former (action) comes to be taken along both of these
latter.

Objection: “Kor fear of havine to assume that whieh is not men-
“tioned, we would have a restricted adjustment of even that Stibstance
“and that Property which ave Jaid down in a separate sentence; and as
‘such, there 1s no special purpose served by taking them as forming the
‘same sentence.”

Reply: When there is a syntactical split, there is no cognition of the
Purehuse as qualified by both (Redness and the one-year old ammatl); and
then if the Purchase comes to be related to each of them separately.
the Property world take up any substance at random; and the Suab-
stance alzo would take up any Property at random :-—specially as, at that
time, them proximity to eavh other is not eapable of precluding the m-
plication by then. of other things. Nor, im that ease, could the single
action of Purchase lake ap both the Substance and the Property ; and
then why could not the Purchase, qualified by the Property of Redness,
not having any particular Sabstance specially defined, take np any and
every Substance that would be brought forward by the said Property ?
And similarly, why could not the Purchase, effected by the one-year-old
11111181, not take up any and every property ?

ven though the Property could only bring forward such other siub-
stances as are spoken of in the context as those to be utilized in the Par-
chase,—~yet it would pertain to all the ten substances-—Ololh, ८, ; and
thus the vagueness and indefiniteness would remain there all the same.
Consequently for the sake of a single specified Purchase, it is absolutely
necessary to speak of all the three as syntactically connected in a single
sentence. And hence it must be admitted that there is a restriction as to
the application of the Property of Redness.

125

ADHIKARANA (7).
[The washing should be done to all the vessels: uon-significafice of number.)

Sutra (13): It is qualified by singleness; because singleness is
distinctly mentioned.

The application of the various accessories has been, duly explained ;
and now we proceed to consider the details of the employment of these
46068801168.

(In connection with the Jyot/shtoma, we have the sentence ‘Dugaputt-
tréna graham sammdarshti’|; and there arises a question as to whether the
washing 18 to be of only one vessel, or of all the vessels mentioned in the
context. Just as in this sentence we have a question as to the signifi-
cance of the singular number, so also in others, we havo it as to that of
the Dual and the Plural; ag. ‘ Yasya purolagau kshdyatak? and ‘ Havtn-
shit abhigh@rayati, In all these cases, an action 1s enjoined with refer-
ence to a particular thing; and hence there naturally arises the question as
to whether any significance is to be attached to the Number of the word
signifying this thing or not,

At the very outset, however, the following objection is raised: “The
“discussion herein started is not qnite proper with regard to Vedic
“sentences, Uecause, with the exception of the due comprehension of
“meaning, there is no other ‘ravaksha’ (Intention of the speaker to ex-
press); and the Vedic sentences being eternal (independent of a speaker),
“that which is found to be mentioned m them cannot but be taken as
“significant (or meant to be expressive).

That is to say, the sentences that are composed by men, are de-
‘pendent, for their meanting, पणा the wish or the intention of the
“speaker; and 16166 they are liable to mistake, capable of having been
‘‘gomposed with a different import, and having its subject amenable to
^ other means of knowledge; and hence even though a certain meaning of
“such sentences may be duly comprehended, yet it may be one that is not
“intended by the speaker to be conveyed ;,and hence in such cases such
‘meanings come to he rejected as ‘ not-intended ’; and this is possible in
“two ways: (1) The speaker himself might say ‘this is not what I mean,
“by the sentence,’ or that ‘I made a mistake, what I meant was only this
“ &eo., &e. (2) The subject spoken having been cognized by other means of

NON-SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER. 90

‘knowledge, as being wholly different to what is described in the sentence,
‘the persons hearing the sentence conclude, independently of the speaker,
“that what is meant is something different, or that a mistake has been
“made. But in the case of Vedic sentences, it is not possible that there
“ should be any other meaning intended, or that there should be a mistake.
“Nor ig there a speaker, in this case, who conld declare any othe: mean-
“ing to be the one that was intended ; because all the men in the world
“are only hearers of the Veda, and not speakers, as has been shown under
¢“ Sitra T~i—29, Nor is the subject treated of in the Veda amenable to
“other means of knowledge, on the strength of which the hearers them-
“selves could take the sentence to have some other meanme. Then,
“acain, a certain meaning bemg ‘intended’ or ‘not-imteuded’ is
“nothing more than two particular ¢deas, or two particniar phases of १८780
or intention; and hence neither of these two is possible in the case of
“Vedie sentences, where there is no speaker. Hence in all such cases, the
‘acceptance or rejection is of that alone which 1s directly asserted or not
‘asserted [respectively]; and there is no other ground for such acceptance
‘or rejection. In fact, even in the case of human assertions, until the
“meaning desired to be conveyed has been ascertained, by other means of
“knowledge, to be something quite different, the meaning comprehended
“in the first instance 1४ not rejected,”

to the above we make the following reply :

1. Jn the case in question there is no difference of opinion as to the
cunprehension (of singleness, which all of us admit to be comprehended) ;
the question, however, is as to whether the singleness that 18 comprehended
is cant to be enjoined (predicated ) or not.

There can 16 uo doubt as to singleness bemmg mentioned का the
sentence in question ; nor is there any doubt as to its being related to the
Graha (Vessel). Bnt in the case of all things, there are three ways in
which they are spoken of by Direct Assertion: (1) There is an assertion
that simply speaks of them; (2) another lays down their uses; (3)
another enjoins them; and it ison this latter that all performance 18 based.
or instance (1), in the case of the original word and the aflix, they simply
denote their respective objects ; (2) the case-affixes express its uses; and
(3) the Injunctive, the Imperative and the Lé endings have the power of
enjoining,

At the time of the performance of Actions, the man depends solely
upon the Injunction; and whee the injunction urges bim to a certain
course of action,—whether that course be expressed or not expressed,
having its use mentioned or not mentioned,—he at once takes up that

“course; and similarly, if the Injunction does not urge him to it, he does uot
` ke it up,—even if it is distinctly exprossed and laid down as useful; and

996 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADU, Ilf—PADA I—-ApHY. (7).

he is never urged to action either by Direct Declaration or by the mention
of uses; because all that these latter can do is to point ont respectivel;
that ‘this exists here’ and ‘this belongs to that’; and none of these say
anything as to the necessity or advisalnility of performance. Consequently
even if something happens to be distinctly expressed, or have its uses
mentioned, when it comes to tho consideration of its Injunction and actual
performance, there always arises a qitestion as to its being actually intended
or not, as to be enjoined or not enjoined, and as to be performed or not
performed.

Objection: “ But this also is not possible without some sort of a wish
(on the part of some person).”

Reply: By ‘intention’, we do not mean actual wish ; we take the two
words ‘Intention’ and ‘ Non-intention’ ( Virakeha’ and § Acivakshd@’) as 11.
directly indicating thew respective effects in the shape of Jeceplance and
Rejection, That is to say, justas the sentence ‘kiln pipatishate’ (the
river-bank wishes to fall down) 1s prononnuced only by a figurative attribut-
ing of the awash, based upon the extreme proxmity of the falling,—-so, in
the same manner, in the case of sueh sentences as do not originate from
any person, the ucecplance and rejection (of what is laid down) are always
known to be the effeets of what is known as ‘ Intention’ and ‘ Non-inten-
tion’ (in the case of ordinary assertions); and if 18 on this Acceptanee and
Rejection that the present diseassion is based

Objection: *‘ How conld there be a rejection of that which is directly
asserted '' £

Reply: This question does not alfeet the question ; becanse we have
already said that acceptunce depends upon Injunction (and not npon mere
Assertion). And just as m the ease of human assertions, it is the Person
speaking that is the impeller or director, even in the vase of something
that is directly asserted,—so in the case of Vedie sentences, the impel-
ling would be done by the Injunctive potency of the word, Because in the
Voda it is the Injunetive word that takes the place of the Director; and
the potency of the [njunctive that of the wish of that Director. Conse-
quently it is admutted that that, alone which is touched by the Injunction
is to be performed, and nothing else; and hence it becomes necessary, in
all cases, to ascertain the extent of the Injunctive operation.

(0411 ९८८८०१४ ; “ But how is it that when certain things are compre-
^" honded as equally spoken of by means of the varions part of the sentence,
“there are only some of them that are jaken np by the Injunction, and
“others are now” ?

Reply: When certain things have been presented by an expressive
word, the Injunctive operates towards the Injunction, of one or all of
them, always in aceordanee with the limit of its own peenliar potency ; and

NON-SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER, (0९)

consequently it could not take up all things, simply because we wish it so.
That is to say, 1f the Injunctive operated always in aceordauce with
our wishes, or with that which is expressed or mentioned as useful, by the
words, —theu we could have the Injunetion of all that is spoken of in the
sentence ; as a matter of fact, however, the operation of the tnjunetive is
ulways limited by its own potency ; and as this potency is limited in its
scope, we have the Injunction of only a few, and not all, of all that is
expressed by the sentence.

Then again, the Injunctive potency is Direct or Implied, according as it
is based upon the Bhavana or upon the .lyencées (Kavakas) ; and apart
from these two, there is no Injanctive potency, either Direct or luplied,
or instance, the bhdvuni is evujoined directly by means of the myjanetive
allix; and it is for the sake of the acconplishment of this Bhavana, that
other agencies are enjoed indirectly, And even if a certam thing 1s
funnd to be directly expressed, yet, if it is not fonnd to be a snbstratum of
the Bhavané or of the Agencies, i is not accepted as enjomed ; and as
such it forms no part of the performance in yttestion.

Thus then, with regard to the performance of the Washiay of the vessels
(as lanl down by the sentence Sqruhkam samadrshti’), ibis only natural
that there should arise the question as to whether the Sraglewess of (4८
vessel ix also to be brought about or not. And if this stagleiess, bemg an
agency, he a qualification df the Bhavani, then, being taken up by the In-
junction, it could not but be accepted as Litended (sigmiicant ) ; while if ait
be a mere qnalitieation of the Substaxce, then it could not be taken as [n-
fended,

Thas then, we conclude that the authors of the Bhashyue and its com-
mentaries have used the words ‘Intention’ and ‘ Non-intention simply
with reference to the Acceptance and Rejection based upon the potency of
the Lijunctive, which are the effects of the said Intention and Non-infeution,
and as such indirectly indicated by these words; and this round-about
11166104 has been employed with the sole motive of speaking, in the manner
of ordinary human assertions, of the Vedie sentences, whieh, by themselves,
transcend by far the limits of human conception, and as such, could not be
grasped by students of inferior intelligences, unless they were explained
111 the familiar terminology applied to ordinary assertions. 1116 same may
he smd abont all such explanations of the Veda.

11. There is another explanation also of the propriety of the use of
the words “Intention” and “ Non-intention.”? The question mased in the
Adhikaruna is with reference to those Mimadnsakas and Snacrificers, who
seek to explain the Veda, in accordance either with reasonings ov with
traditional love. They always tuterpret a sentence, 111 accordance with the

‘potencies of words; and hence they seek to explain those things that are

998 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 1f-—?CADA I—ADHL (7).

found amenable to these potencies; while those that are abandoned by
these potencies, aro not taken up for explanation. Consequently by * Veva-
kshita’ is meant ‘that which is tatended or wished by the Mim@nsakas to
be explained’; and that which, being untonched by the said potency, is not
so intended, is spoken of as ‘Acivakshita’; and this cntention and 70n-enten-
tiun pertains to those Teachers of the Veda who have gone before. Conse-
quently, inasmuch as the mention of ‘Intention’ and ‘ Non-intention ` 18
with reference to the Teachers, there is nothing objectionable in the words
being introduced in connection with the Veda,

III. Or again, the “Intention ” and ^ Non-intention” spoken of might
refer to the Intelligences ensouling the various Vedic collections, Ryveda
and the rest (the Body in this case being one made up of words). Just as
in the material bodies we have intelligent souls, who ‘ntend certain things,
and do not intend others, and this intention, though existing only in the
inner soul, is yet known, exactly as if it appeared in the external world,
by people pondering over the sentence, hy means of the potency of the
words composing the sentence uttered by them (so in the same manner
could we become coygnisant of the Intention or otherwise of the Tntelh-
eonce onsouling the Veda).

Then as for the possibility of sach a Body (as that attributed to the
Vedas), we find that there are various kinds of Bodies, brought about
by tho peculiar actions of the sonls inhabiting them,—all these diverse
kinds depending upon the modifications of Primordial Matter. For m-
stance—(1) In this world of ours we find four kinds of Bodies, made up
mostly of the earth-element, aided by-those of water and the rest,—-these
bodies being the Womb-born, the Myy-bora, the Ground-born, and the Sweat-
born ;—(2) bodies built up of water with the help of the other clements,
clean aud transparent, are known to exist in the regions of Varuna ;—( 3)
there are many beings who wander about in the sky, with their subtile
bodies made up of Air mixed with Earth and the rest;--(4) in the
Heavenly Regions, there are bodies of Light, effulgent and glorious,
which become added to by-and-by by the rays emitted from the sun; as
has been declared in the Veda also, at the close of the senteuces dealing
with the Nakshatréshti: ‘y@ hi jundh punyakriah. . téshimetam ayotineshe
yannakshatrini’,—and Manu also speaks of people proceeding to Heaven
in a body of light;—(5) the Veda also speaks of the soul inhabiting a
body of Akaga, when it declares ‘ yalé vdrind nityam yah kham Brahma.

Then again, Colour, ‘loach and the other properties that belong to the
elements, are, each of them, bodies for the experiences of the soul. And
the Veda also, which is spoken as the ‘Gubda-Brahma’, is ensouled by a
single Great Soul ; and hence the Ryreda §c., which are spoken of sepa-
rately, all belong to the soul, and are endowed with conscious intelligence.

NON-SIGNIFICANCE OF NOUMBDER, 999

Consequently, when we proceed to explain the meanings of the senten-
ces of these Vedas, which contain within themselves particular intentions,
whether they are intended to be significant or not is ascertained by means
of the potencies of the words; and the upshot comes to be that that which
ig taken up by the Injunctive potency is what is ‘intended’; while that
which is abandoned by it, 1s to be explained as ‘ not intended’ to he signiti-
cant. `

In this manner, it. 18 qmte possible to attribute, on the strength of the
potency of the Injunctive, the said “ Intention” and ^ Non-intention” to
the soul of the Gabda-Brahma, which pervades all the Vedas ; and there
is nothing incongruous im speaking of “ Tutention ' and “ Non-intention ”,
even in the direct sense of these words, with reference to the Veda, which
is beginningless and endless.

Thns then, the question comes to be whether the Veda really intended
ihe s¢nyleness of the vessel, or not; and in course of the present Adhika-
rand, our Anthor will come to a definite conelusion, by a course of well-
connected reasoning.

And on this we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“That action which is mentioned as connected with singleness, and

“that Injunction of the substance which 16 also mentioned along with

singleness, should always be performed and understood (respectively)
“as pertaming to one thing only.

“Tn all cases, the Veda consisting of Injunctions and Prohibitions,
‘whatever we come across in the course of the Veda should always be
“taken as connected with an Injunction or a Prohibition ; and we should
‘always try छाए yery best. to construe every such thing in such & manner
‘as to make it connected with an Injunction or a Prohibition.

“Aud for doing this, there are two ways: (1) even though the
“object in question be the qualification of a substance,—yet, just as in the
“case of the Injunction of 1 Bhavana qualified by acertain substance, ete.,
“the Injunction is taken as indirectly pertaining to the qualifying sub-
“stance also, as otherwise the qualified Bhavana could not be enjoined,—--so,
‘in the same manner, in the ease in question also, inasmuch as the In-
“junction of the washing gualified by the Vessel, which is qualified by single-
ness, could not be otherwise gxplaiued, we cannot but admit, on thie

strength of Apparent Inconsistency, the s¢ugleness also to be an object
of Injunction ; similarly too, in a case where we have a series of qualifi-
“cations, there is a cognition of tho Injunction of every one of these, based
is upon the fact of cach of them being connected with that which precedes

1000 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. WI—-PADA I-ADLUL (ज).

“Gt; and it is only when the accessories are not related to one another
“that the Injunction of any one of thom does not mvolve that of another,
‘as wo have shown above. (2) When, on the other hand, the Injunc-
“tion does not extend up to the qualification of the substance, then, in
“that case, everything spoken of in tho sentence would have to be admit:
“ted, on the strenyth of a single Apparent. Inconsistency, to be the object
“of Injunction; and hence, just as the ‘ Dagapavitra’ (Cloth), the
6* Singlencss’, the ‘ Vessel’ and the ‘ Washing’ are the qualifications of the
१ Bhavan, so would the ‘ singleness of the Vessel’ also be.

“ Oljection: ‘It is by the Direct Denotation of the same word
“(graham) that the singleness in question 18 pointed out to be the qualiti-
“cation of the Vessel; and as such it is searcely right to reject it in
“favour of the view that it 15 a qualification of the Bhavand, which can
“only be pointed out by means of Syntactical Connection.’

“Reply: This argument does not quite affect our position: (1)
“Because there 1s no actual difference between the indication of the Word
“and that of Syntactical Connection, the singleness may be taken as quali-
“fying the Bhavana, without being totally separated from the Vessel. (2)
‘Because as the two treat of two wholly distinct subjects, there can be no
“contradiction of the one by the other. Thatis to say, if, m both cases,
‘the relationship were either that of Tddurthya (useful accessory) alone,
“or that of that particular form of the Qualifying Relationship whieh
‘appears in the form of the Container and the Contained, then the two
“could be taken as dealing with the same subject. As a matter of fact,
‘however, we do not find any one of these relations to be present 171 both
“ (the Vesseland the Dhavand) ; because to the former, the s*ngleness is relat-
‘ed by the Qualifying Relationship of the Container and the Contacned ; while
“to the Bhavana it. is related as its accessory ; consequently the Syntactical
“Connection may be taken as implying that ‘one should accomplish the
“ Bhaivant of the Washing by means of the stngleness contained in the
“ Vessel’ ; and on the other hand, if the Relationship of the singleness with
“the Bhivana be that of Vadurthya, then, in that case, its relationship with
“the Vessel being one of Qualification, would appear subsequently in accord-
“auce with the law laid down in the foregoing Adhikarana ; and it is this
“that is pointed ont by the Word (graham). (3) When it is ascertained
‘that the Vessel is imeapable of attording refuge to the sevgleness, then, in
“that case, there would be nothing to prevent this latter from going over
“to the Bhavan, even though it be only ¢n the strength of a Syntactical
“Connection ; the Vessel itself impels it towards the Bhdvand, with the
“view that, being related to the Bhavana, the sineleness would be taken
“up by the Injunction, and thereby becoming limited in its scope, would
“qualify the Vessel also; otherwise being abandoned by the Vessel, it

VNON-SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER, LOOT

“would be wholly neglected by the Injunction. and as such, could not
‘ belong either to the Vessel or to the Bhavana, (4) Or, even granting that
“the singleness belongs to the Vessel; 1t becomes necessary to show in
‘what manner it belongs to it. Thus then, if the Vessel, alone by itself,
“were to enter into the Bhavana, then, inasmuch as the stugleness would
‘he appearing after this entrance, if would not be taken up by the 844
‘rand, and २ such could not belong to this latter; and it would be
“ragtricted to the form of the Vessel only ; consequently, it is only when
‘the Vessel moves along with, or is co-extensive with, the stugleness, that
“++ attains its true character,—just as in the ease of the qualitication of
५८ Redness mentioned by a distinct word (as shown in the foregoing Adhd -
“karana), And the veason for {1118 is that the Injunction as a whole
“always appears in a qualified form; and as the Qualitied contd not serve
“the fanetion of qualifying until it had its own qualification duly defined,
“it is always along with its own quahiication that the Qualified Injune-
“tion enters into its function.

“Thus then, in the ease in question, the Bhavana, taking np the distinetly
“nentioned vessel as qualified by singleness, does 1107 take up the qualified
“ Vessel without taking up, along with it, the qualifying scigleness also. And
“when the stvqgleness would thus enter nto the Bhavana, it would be taken
“np by the Injunction also; and then there bemg «a mutnal restriction
^ between the Substance and the Property, 16 comes to belong to the Vessel.

“(5) Or again, the objector has based lus argument upon the
“superior anthority of Direct Assertion, on the strength of wluch
“he has declared the sezgleness to be related to the Substance (Vessel).
“But as a matter of fact, the case is quite the contrary. Becanse
“the Substance (Vessel), mentioned by the basie noun ‘gyraha’, would
“be the nearest to the sényleness mentioncl by a part of the same
“word; but we find that this singleness 1s very much moro nearly related
“to the particular Agency that is signitied by the same case-ending (the
“ Accusative) as itself, and as such it is much sooner recuguized as qualify-
“ing this Agency. And we have already shown that the Agenry,
“expressed by the case-ending, is a constituent part of the Bhavana, which
“18 made up of various factors, appearing one after the other. And then,
“imasmuch as tho Agency is found to be signified by tho affix, it wonld be
‘“eognized as the principal factor; and it is a general rule that every-
‘thing (i.e. all qualifications) appertain to the principal factor; and
‘hence both the Singleness ang the Vessel become Agencies, and as such
“are thrown into the Bhavana, by means of the direct action of the
‘‘case-ending ; and as such come to be the objects of Injunction; and this
‘is due to the fact of the Injunction being a qualified one; as will be
explained later on, nnder the Satra IV—i—I5.

126

1002 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, WT-—PADA 1—apHr, (7).

“Thus then, just as that which is mentioned as to be done by means
“of the Cloth is uot done by anything clse,—as instead of the mentioned
(५ 16050224 the threshing 1s not performed,—as instead of the washing of the
“vessel one does not perform the washing of something else,—so, in the
“same manner, that which is mentioned as to be done to a single vessel,
“could not be done to many. All these conelusions are dependent upon
“one anothor, in accordance with the law of the foregoing Adhdhkarana.

‘Tor these reasons, it must be admitted that the number of the
“uddegya also is to be taken as intended to be significant, just like that
“of the enjoined vidhéya,

“The Bhashya lays stress upon due significance being attached to the
“masculinity of the object (animal) also; but this is only by the way, and
“not with a view to show that the sigmificance of the gender also 18 ainen-
“able to the reasonings of the present Adhikarana ; as that would mean a
“mere repetition of what is dealt with under the Sitras V Z—i—6 et seq.”

SIDDHANTA.

Sutra (14): All Individuals are indicated, because the generic
character belongs equally to all.

It is a well-established fact that whenever an action ts laid down, in
a subordinate form, with reference to a number of individuals, all of whieh
are indicated by the generic Class, efe., that Action pertains to every one of
them.

For instance, 171 the case in question, we at once recognize the ressel to be
the principal factor,—because it is spoken of in the Acensative case (vide
Sutra IL—1---10), and also because it is the useful factor,—and the wash-
any to be the subordinate factor. Then, inasmuch as the eluss “ vessel”
(which 18 denoted by the word ‘ graha’) is, by itself, incapable of being
washed, it 18 the individual vessels that are indicated as the objects to be
purified by the washing; but since the individual vessels are not capable
of being denoted by the word ‘ gruha, we aceept the class ‘vessel? as in-
dlicative of them. Consequently, the meaning of the Injunctive sentence
in question comes to be that the action to be performed with the vessels would
be perfect only by the previous washing of the vessels ; and if any vessel should
be left unwashed, the action performed with it would remain imperfect ;
hence it 18 necessary that all the vessels should be washed.

If, however, the vessel were laid doww as subsidiary to the washing,—
just as the anzmal is to the sacrifice,—then the necessary action of washing
having been xccomplished by the washing of a single,vessel, no other vessel
would be required to be washed ; for in that case the non-washing of the:
other vessels would not cause any tmoverfection in the action in question ;

NON-SIGNIFIGANCE OF NUMBER. 1003

as the requirements of the Injunction will have been fulfilled (by the wash-
rag 07 a single vessel). When, on the other hand, the vessel is the principal
factor, masmuch as the Injunction would apply to each of the principal
factors, if a single vessel were left unpurified (by 1८८२0८1१), there would be
an infringement of the particalar Injunetion in connection with that.
Even if there were no distinct Injunction for each of the vessels, and each
of them were to be washed only in accordance with the spirit of the single
Injuuction,-—then, too, the non-wasling of a vessel would be contrary
to that spirit. If without this rejection, one were to omit the washing of
vertain vessels,: then that would be a great sin, consequent upon the neg-
leet of that which is enjoined

or these reasons, we must conclude that the word ‘ graham’ indi-
cates all the vessels ; because all of them are equally related to the generic
class * vessel,’ and because all are equally connected with the context.

Not: perceiving any ground for taking the Stmeular number (in
‘yrukam’) to be non-significant, the objector (in the Bhashya) comes
forward with the argument that—‘“ we find the Singular number actually
nentioned.”’

The reply to this is that all that may happen to be mentioned is not
necessavily something to be performed (or brought into action); be-
case in the matter of actual performance, il is necessary to find out an
Injunction, ov thesMention of Uses,---cither directly mentioned or indirect-
ly implied. Because that which is exjodned, ov las its uses mentioned,
is accepted ay to be brought ito action, even if 1४ be not actually ex-
pressed in so many words; while even if something 1s actually so ex-
pressed, it it; happéns to be abandoned by them (1.0. by the Injunction and
the Mention of Uses), it is uot tuken up for performance. Thus then, im
the case of a sentence, thero being many things expressed by the several
words aud the affixes, ete., it becoincs necessary to find ont which of these
ave taken up by the Injunction and which have their uses and applications
mentioned, Specially as by manipulating the construction of the seutence
in different ways, every one of the things may be made to appear as en-
joined or mentioned as useful,—it becomes necessary to find which are
actually enjoined and which not. As a matter of fact, the expounders of
Mimdamsa, when discussing the neanimp's of sentences, very often throw dust
into people’s cyés, by a skilful manipulation of the syntactical construction.

Thus then, in the case in question, what we have to consider is what
is actually enjoimed by the weed ‘ Summéarshfi,’?’ which has the form of
the Present Tense, but really is in the (द form, which 18 lawl down as
having the sense of the Injunctive

It is not possible for the Bhivand alone, by itself, to be enjomed
because it 15 not possible for it to be brought mto action by itself alone.

1004 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. Wi—pAvA I1—ADHI. (7).

Then there arises the question as to whether the Bhavana that 1s enjoined
is qualified by the denotation of the Verbal Root, the washing, only, which
18 well known in the world as something to be performed,—or by the
substance Vessel,—or by the singleness of the vessel.

Ags for the word ‘ Dacdpavitréna, ’ it is equally significant in all cases ;
and serving the same purpose jn all cases, it is not necessary to consider
its various significations, as is done with the other words. ^

With reference to the word ^ graham’ and the rest, however, it becomes
necessary to consider what is actually enjoined. And in this connec-
tion, we are faced by the following alternatives :—Firstly: as regards the
“washing” and the “ Vessel,”-—do these qualify the Bhavana, alterna-
tively or conjointly ? or is it their relationship or their aggregation that
qualifies it? or is it that one of these two while qualifying the other,
qualifies the Bhavana also, and through that, comes to be enjoined ?
Secondly, as regards the “washing” and the “ Singleness,” also we have
the same eight-fold questions to consider. Thirdly, as regardsthe “graha-
iva” and the “ katvw” also, we have the same questions, That is to
say among the three—the ‘ washing,’ the ‘ Vessel’ and the ‘ Singleness,’ —
we can take any two of which one would qualify the other, and then
proceed to consider the question of the relation of these with the third.

Along with these questions, there arises the farther question, as to
whether these (the Vessel, the Singleness and the Bhavan) form the Object
of Injunction (1.6. Predicate) or of mere Assertion (1.6. the Subject), with
reference to the “washing”; and that tou whether singly or conjointly

When the Action is the principal tactor, then, there jis a conjunction
of the Substance and the Number; and hence all the requirements are ful-
filled by a single performance of that Action. When, on the other hand,
the Action is ]aid down as with reference to the Vesseland Singleness (and
thereby becomes the subordinate factor), then, in that case, the Action
aud the injunctive sentence, are taken as complete in each of the Vessels.

But here also, we are faced by the following questions: Is the
washing enjoined for the Vessel only, ov for the Singleness only, or for
both of them alternately, or for both conjointly, or for their relationship
and aggregation, or for the Vessel as qualified by the Stinglenesa, or for
the Number (one) as qualified by the Vessel? Or, with reference to the
action of washing, is it the Vessel that is enjoined, or the Singleness, ov
both alternately, or both conjointly, or the relationship and the aggre-
gation of these, or the Vessel as qualifiefl by Singleness, or the Number
ag qualified by the Vessel ¥

A manipulation of the construction of the sentence in question having
given rise toso many donbts and questions, the opponent is led to believe
that, masmuch as the number forms the predicate of the sentence, it 18

NON-SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER. 1005

this that is enjoined; and hence lic takes paius to bring forward all the
reasous that he finds capable of favouring the view that the Number is
predicated in regard to the Vessel, aud is enjoined with reference to the
washing; and he concludes that just as Time and Place, though really the
subjects, are often taken as objects of Injunction, through the Action,—so,
also weuld the ‘ Vessel’ and the ‘ Singleness’ he,

On the otleer hand, all the syntactical constructions that he would
attribute to the sentence, with a view to make the sengleness an object of
[njunction, will be rejected by the Siddhdnts as involvi vg a syntactical
split.

As a matter of fact, also, the Vessel can never be the predicate of the
sentence in question; and it becomes all the more impossible for the
‘ singleness ` to be so; because it is subservient to the Vessel. Thus then,
the sentence being taken as enjoming the washing for the Vessel, its
[njunctive potency 1s wholly spent upon that, and as such, 1) conld not
enjoin the sengleness. Nor could the sentence be taken as enjoining
singleness for the Vessel, because there is no repetition of the Lujyunctiv
word and the word ‘ Graham’; as it would be necessary, in that case, to have
two Injunctive words and two ‘grahas.’ And in case the relatiouship of
the Vessel and Stngleness were positively enjoined,—if it were found
desirable to have an Injunction of something over and above the connec-
tion of the Vessel*and the washeng,—then, also, it would be necessary, for
the sake of the accomplishment of the two relationships (of the Vessel)
tu havea repetition of the word ‘graham’; and in this case also, the Injunc-
tive word would have to be repeated ; as a single Injunctive cannot enjoin
two relationships.

For, if the Injunctive affix were to enjoin two relationships, either
sinnitaneously, or one after the other, how could it do so, unless if were
pronounced twice ¢ so also if the ‘ Vessel’ were to attain the relationship
of the Singleness and the washing, it could not do so without its bemg
repeated twice. Then again, tho first utterance of the Injunctive having
its potency wholly spent up in the enjoiming of the washing for the Vessel,
it would be absolutely necessary to utter it over again, for the enjoiming
of the Singleness of that Vessel. And this second utterance could not but
he something wholly outside the Vedic Text; and thus originating from
५, human speaker, it could not have any authoritative character,

Thus then, however much we may rack our brains over the various
constractions of the sentence in question, we cannot find any proper way
whereby we could have an Injunction of Singleness; and as such this latter
_ “annot be taken as something to be brought into action. If in any way
ve could have an Injunction of this Stnxgleness, it wonld bo like the Vessel
८६५, ; and kow eould anyone uevlect it, during the performance +

1006 TANTBA-VARTIKA, ADH. MIPADA 1 -+ 111. (7).

But this would be possible, only if the Action were the principal
factor. Asin that case, on the strength of the fact of the Injunction being
that of the qualified Vessel, we could have an mdireetly imphed Tyjune-
tion of the qualifying Singleness also. Cousequently, if the opponent can
establish the fact of the Action being the principal factor, then, through
that, he could establish the fact of alJ things mentioned in the sentence
being inteuded to be duly significant. |

For these reasons, we conclude that the mere fact of something being
mentioned in a sentence is not sufficient reason for taking it as enjouned १५.
and hence the qualification in question—‘ Singleness —is not similar in
character to such other qualifications as ‘ white’ and the like,

Further, we ask :—Would this ‘singleness’ be a qualification of the
Substance (Vessel) or of the Action (washing }, on account of which fact
it could be absorbed by the Vessel, the washing, and the Bhavana ?

First of all, we proceed to show that it could not be a qualification of
the Substunce, As a matter of fact, it could be its qualification, cither as
forming au integral part of-the Substance, or as serving to preclude, from
it, all other Numbers. The former is quite compatible with the fact of the
washing being performed with regard to all the Vessels; for if one washes
many vessels, he certainly washes one; and in that case, the washing of ult
the Vessels being known, by reason of the genevic character of the `" Vessel "`
belonging to all of them, as to be performed,-—and not heing found to be
prohibited by (i.e. incompatible with) the singular number (पा
‘yraham’),—what reason can one have tor leaving off the washing of the
second and the following Vessels ?

Lhe folowing argument might here be brought forward by the oppo-
nent: “The basic noun ` 41/10 ' itself! beme sufficient to denote the fact
“of one and all of the vessels bemy washed, the aflixed singular ending
‘could not be taken as a subsidiary Arthacddu ; and as such it would he
“taken as serving the purposes of preclusion (of the weshing of more than
“one Vessel).”’

Reply: Tt is not so; itis only ima case where a general proposition
having been laid down, it is repeated ayain with a certain specification,
that we admit of Preclusion; in the case im question, however, we do not
find any repetition; because a repetition would be possible only if there
were many sentences; while what you have asserted is that the same
sentence serves both to enjoin and to preelude; and certainly that is ex-
tremely ineungruous, In fact, what youshave asserted is that the two
opposite functions are served, not by the same sentence, but by the same
word (‘yraham’); and this certainly shows an insight transcending all
possibilities! That is to say, you have declared that the basic nonn in that
word enjoins the connection of the washing of all Vessels, and the casc-end-

NON-SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER, 1007

ing 1 11 precludes that connection ; this is what passes our understand-
ing! Then again, justas whens sentence is found to serve the purposes of
enjoining and precludiny, it is constrned in two different ways,—so would
the word also have to be construed in two differcni. ways! Tt is really
strange how you can make such aself-contradictory assertion that at one
and the same time, the same word serves to enjoin ag well as to preciude

Then agaiy, Preclusion (Parisankhya@) is possible only when there is a
likelihood of the mniversal appheation of a certain thine being counte-
nanced hy an assamed text, while its particular application is directly men-
tioned ina vedic text; because insuach a case the Preclusiye Injnuetion 18
(166 from all objections. Specially in this case, as the text supporti ng the
universality has got to be assumed, while that supporting the particniar
application is already existent, the Preclusion is accepted in view of the
desirable result that it is found to aceomplish.

In the case in question, however, your Preclisive Injunetion serves to
rejoct the cognition of the washing, as applying to all Vessels,—this coeni-
tion being brought about by the basic noun whiclyforms part of the same
sentence and word as the case-ending, which, though depending for 118
existence on that basic noun, is yet held to bring about the said Preclusion !
And such a preclusive Injunction is open to all the three fantts (that of
rejecting the enjoined, renouncing of its own meaning, and acceptance of
thower टपा ति ),

On the oceasion of showing a case of faultless Preclusive Injunction,
the Bhishya has declared, (in connection with the sentence ‘amééma-
yrbolinan...clyacvabaidhdnimadatté ’) that the desirable interpretation is
that the latter clause of the sentence (। etya¢gra@bhidhdnimadatté’) enjoins
the ‘Horse’s veins’, and not tle * Holding’; and the reason that he gives
is that the mantra in question (‘ andgrbhnaw’) is already known (from
the wards of the wmunfra itself) as to be employed in Holding, (and the
only thing that remains doubtful is the object to be held, and this is
mentioned in the latter clause).

But this is scarcely right ; because, as a matter of fact, the Injunction
1५ quite possible from the verb ‘ddatfé’; while as for the connection
hetween the Holding and the ‘ Horse’s reins’, there is no Injunction ;
becanse the word ‘ agrbhnan’ in the mantra is capable of indicating the Mun-
tra to be as applicable to the ‘ Horso’s reins’ as to the ‘ Ass’s reins’; because
of the word ‘racanad’ (stving, which is equally applicable to the reins of
both). Nor is the ‘horse’s rein’ any further remote from the ‘ ragan@’
than the ‘asse’s reins’; because the word ‘racund’ being equally applhi-
cable to both, both would be expressed and cognized at one and the same
time. Then, again, in any Injunctive sentence, there is always a difference

1008 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ABI. ITI—PADA I—aADI (7). |

between Direct Assertion and Implication by Syntactical Connection; be-
cause there is a distinct difference in the degree of the relationship of that
which is expressed by the verbal root, and that of that which is expressed
by anoun. That is to say, the noun can have wo connection im the sentence
unless there are three words (e.g. ‘ali’, ‘agvabhidhanim’ and ‘ adatté’),
while, that of the verbal root is accomplished by means of two words only
(‹ 2/४ ` and ‘ddatté’). Then again, the Injunctive affix in question also does
not so well and quickly lay down the application of the Mantra to the de-
notation of the noun (‘ ageabhidhani’, the Horse's reins)—which is noi
mentioned by the same word as that in which the aflix appears,—as Jt does
that to the denotation of the verbal root (the Holding) which appears in the
same word (‘adatté’); and the ALantra also becomes connected with the Reins
more quickly by means of the Direct Assertion (in ‘ityagudbhidhanima-
datté’), than it could do by that of the indicative power of the word
‘agrbhnan’ inthe Mantra. Nordoes the Mantra stand in need of any other
ground for being applicable to the Horse’s Reins ; because the generic word
‘gagani’ (in the mantra) serves to point out that application just as well as
any specification of 1t. Then again, in all cases, it is necessary to have
recourse to indirect Indication, at least for the indication of the fact of the
Reins, etc., leading to certain Apirvas; and hence inasmuch as the mention
of the ‘Horse’s Reins’ would be got at by the Indication (of the word
‘vagand@ ` ), another direct Injunction of the same (in the sentence ‘ ityacud,
९४९.) would be wholly useless. As the word ‘ Horse’s-Reins’ would take
exactly the same time in indicating (its Injunction), as the word ‘ ragana '
would in indicating the Horse's Rezns.

For these reasons, we cannot take the clanse ‘ clyadutlé’ as merely
roferring to the application of the Mantra which 1s poimted out by its own
words; nor can we tako the latter sentence to be injunctive of the Horse's
eins; as what the sentence does is to enjoin the Bhadvané which is
simultaneously qualified by all the three—the Horse’s Reins, the Mantra
and the Holding denoted by the verbal root.

Then again, in no way does the form of the Mantra itself point to its
connection with the Holding; because the Mantra does not enjoin any such
connection, without bringing about the assumption of a vedic text to the
effect ; but long before the form and the context of the Mantra bring about
the assumption of the uecessary vedic text, the required Injunction (of the
connection of the Afuntra) is accomplished by means of the already exist-
ing text (‘ ८८०८४, efc.’). ;

Consequently, the latter sentence must be taken ‘as enjoining the
connection of the Mantra, which has not been laid down before. It is
spoken of as a ‘ Preclusive Injunction’ simply because it is found to lead
to the separation of the Mantra from the Holding of the Ass’s Reins,—and

NON-SIGNEFIGANCE OF NUMBER, 1 (10

not because of a repetition of the specification. When we proceed to seek
for the speciul purpose served by this Injunction, we find that it does not
serve nny other purpose than the preclusion of the Muntra from the 455१
Reins. But this preclusion of something else does not form the meaning
of the sentence, like a specialization; becesuse the preclusion of the Ass is
accomplished by the very fact of its not having any connection with the
Mantra; and if is only that which 18 likely to eome in that is precluded by
means of a sentence. Specially as wa find that the Munfra ean not pertain
ty the Reins of the Ass until 16 has brought about the assamption of a
vedie text to that offeet; and hence it cannot be held that the Repetition,
in the latter sentence, of the ‘ Horse’s Reins’, is to be taken as precluding
that Mantra from being applied to the Reins of the Ass; because the men-
tion of the ^ Horge’s Reins ” could ba called a “ Repetition” ouly if it had
been laid down before by the quicker action of another text; and the pre-
vions mention of the “ Reins of १ Ass” cannot make the sabsequent
mention of the “ Florse’s Reins” a repetition. Bocause the application of
the Muutra is found to have been previously laid down by the quieker
operation of the Direct mention of the ^ Horso”’; and thua the Veda, as
well as the subject in question, having all its requirements fultifle |, there
can be no assumption of another text, on the sole anthority either of the
indicative power (of the words of the 211240६) or of the Context. And
when no such tex§ 1s assumed, there is no application of the Muara to the
Retns of the Ass. It is on this that we have tho well-known proverb —
‘How can the Ass overtake that which has been taken away by the
Horse ¢ '

We can, however, enquire from tho Direct Assertion (of the Horse)
what special purpose it serves; an] on this point, we could address her in
the following manner: ‘Ts it by sheer forve that yon have obstructed the
assumption of the indicated text? Whenthe Mantra coud be applied to the
Horse's Reins, even by mews of the assumed text, why should you have
beenina harry to enjoin it? It is quite true that no texts could be
assumed for that which you enjoin; but what do you gain by obstructing
that assumption ?’

(And we have the following reply :) If the assumed text vonld lay
down the applicability of the Afanfra tothe Horse's Reius only, in the sane
inanner as 18 done by the Dire:t [njunction,—then alone could this litter
he useless. As a matter of fact, however, the textassumed on the strenuth
uf the words of the Mantra wontd indicate the applic bility of the Mantra
८० tho Reins of the Horse,as also to thatof the Ass; and hence it is for the
purpose of averting this dual application that the Direct Injanction
hastens to mention the ^ Horse’s Reins.” And we have this latter [ojunc-
ton, because the assumed text could not point out the application of the

127

1010 PANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. [1--220॥ [—-ADHI. (7).

Mantra to the Reins of the Horse only, as is done by the Direct Injunction.
Thus then, not being a mere repetition, this Injunction comes to he recog-
nized as serving a usefal purpose; and inxsmuch as all requirements are
fultilled by it, the Mantra cunnot bring about the assumption of any other
text.

If the Injunction in qnestion had only repeated the fact of the pre-
viously ment med applicabiliry of the Mantra,—then, in, that case, the
Preclusion would be open to all the three objections. When, however, tlic
text being restricted, thee is nothing to lay down the common applica.
bility (of the 1644५41५ to the Reins of the Horse, as also to that of tho Ass).
then the Preclus‘on is totally free from the three objections. This is
what we have already explained under the Sutra I—ii —42 ; and it 18 only
in the way explained there that the Preclusion can be shown to be free
from all objections.

Kor these r-asons, we conelude that we should not attach any
importance to the expression in question that the Author of the Bhashya
has inadvertently used,

Nor is it pos-ible for the sentence in question to be an Injunction of
tho connection of ‘singleness’; becanse its injunctive potency 18 wholly
taken up by the injunction of the connection between the ‘ washing’ and
the ‘ Vessel.’ Just as in tho ease of the sentence (‘ Protect this food from
animals—the dog, and the cit’), which enjoins the protecting of the food,
even thongh the particular animals ‘doy’ and ‘cat’ are mentioned, yet
they are not accepted as in any way restricting the Injunction ;—and
the reason for this is that in this sentence the ‘dog’ and the ‘ eat’
are not mentioned as the objects to be protected (1.9. objects of the
enjoined protection) from the euting of the food; and consequently (inas-
much as the protection of the food is what is enjoined), the man directed
protects it from other animals also—such as the crow and the like—-which
too are as much spoilers of the food as the dog and the cat. In this
connection we have the following saying: ‘ Kven a cluild, when told to
protect the food from crows, does not omit to protect it from the dog and
other animals, because he knows that the chief factor in the direction was
the protection.’

Though the above example of the ‘ protection of the food’ has been
cited by the Bhashya, yet it does not quite fit in with the case in question.
Because in the sentence cited what is not intended to be significant is the
‘crow,’ which is a definite object expressed by a word in the sentence ;
whereas in tho case in question, what is held to be non-significant is only
the number (sinygleness) of the vessel (and this number 18 expressed by the
case-endiug); and that makes a great difference between the two

NON*SIGNIFICANCKE OF NUNBER. 1011

sentences. 11118 sentence would be fitly cited in connection with the
next Adhtkarana, where it 1s considered if the ‘washing’ is applicable
to the Ladle, etc., also, just like the washeng of the altar. As for an
example like the one cited, there is one in the Veda itself, in connection
with the ‘Animal’ sacrifice, where we read ‘ Yalé caturavatti 1/1 10101400
pancivattarva 9८00 karyd, where the object of the Injunction is that ‘ that
which is cut into pieces 18 to be five im number,’ and hence the mention
of the ‘vapa’ is not intended to be siguificant ; as otherwise there would
bs £ syntactical split. All this we shall explain under Adh, X; and
it would have been fitting to cite, in that connection, the sentence that
the Bhishya has cited here. In the case im question, on the other hand,
it should have cited some such sentence of ordinary parlance, in which the
Number alone 18 intended to be non-siyvuificant; for instance, the sentence
‘Vrshaluth na pravéshtavyam, where the Plural in ° Vrshulath’ 18 not
intended to be significant, because the sentence ix taken as prohibitive of
the entry of the vrshalu, singly, as well as collectively in large numbers.

Objection: “ The word ‘sammarshti’ might be taken as enjoining the
‘eonnoction of the Vessel and the Sinyleness.”’

Reply: This could not be; as that would 06 contradictory to what
1५ directly mentioned (by means of the same word), Specially as a
sinzle Injunctive word is not capable of laying down the Bhdvand of the
wash:ng, as well ag the connection of the Vessel and the Singleness ; and thus
there being a contradiction between these two objects of the Injunction,
it 18 the former that is accepted as its object, on the strength of its proxi-
mity to the Injunctive affix being closest; and hence there being no other
Injunction, there can be no comprehension of Singleness,

It has been argued above that in the case of a qualified Injunction,
the qualification of the qualification also forms an object of Injunction.

But that is not possible; beesuse if the Vessel itself does not present
the Suagleness to the Action, which is qualified by the Vessel purely by
itself, —then the Action cannot be said to be qualitied by the qualified
(vessel),

That is to say, if tho vessel throws itself as qualified by sizgleness,
into the Bhavanit, then, iu that case, it would be necexsary to throw in
tho qaalifying singleness beforehand ; as otherwise the Bhavana could not
he qualified by that qualification; and in this ease, the Bhavana also, taking
inthe Vessel as qualified by Sinyleness, conld not take in the Vessel thus quali-
hed, unless it took in also the qualifying Singleness. For instance, as the
word denotes a substance as qualified by a certain genus or class, it dues
not apply to the substance, until it has denoted the qualifying Class; and
hence in that ease it would be absolutely necessary to accept the scnyleness®
10 he a qualification of the Bhavani, Asa matter of fact, thia also we shall

1012 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. UJ—PADA I—apuH. (7).

refute helow. And in a case where a substance itself is the qualification
of the Bhavana), as in the case in question, the Bharand too 18 connected
with the Vessel only, and not with its Number; and the Number also is
related to the Vessel only, and not to the Bhavana. And thus the qualified
Injunction, having its end in the pointing out of the qualification of the
Bhavana, does not imply anything else; specially as Singleness does noi
necessarily qualify the Vessel, at the time that it 1s actuglly qualifying
the Bhavand; because the Bhavana does not take up the Vessel as qualified
by Singleness: as it does not notice the Number, which 15 lidden under
the form of the vessel itself. Nor can the Singleness be taken as quality.
ing the Vessel qualified by the Bhivand ; becauso that would be tantamount
to taking if as qualifying the Bkavuna itself (which we shall refute
below), Asa matter of fact too, the Bhavana cannot qualify the quatzfied
Vessel. Consequently there can be no impheation (by the Lnjanction) of
w qualification of the substance (Vessel): because no such qualification 3s
wauted by the principal Injunction in question,

Then aguin, if it be insisted upon that there 18 an Injunction of the
qualification, such injunction could not be possible without १ repetition of
the Injnnetive affix; and that would involve a syntactical split. Even il
we admit of this split, at the time of the actual wuskimyz, no attention
could be paid to the Sizyleness; as what the Injunction lays down 15 the
connection of the Sigleness with the Vessel independently by itself,
apecially as it is not possible for an action, that is still in the position of
being enjoined, to qualify a substance related to a qualification,—as we
have already explained in the foregoing Adhikuranua.

For these reasons, the ‘Singleness’ cannot be comprehended as ॥
qaalification of the substance (‘ Vessel ’).

Jf it be urged that the ‘Singleness’ is laid down as qualifying the
Bhitvana of the ‘washiny,’—then, we reply, that it could not be its quali
fication, either as a subordinate factor (iu the shape of the means of
accomplishing the washing), or as a predominant one (in the shape of some.
thing to be purified by the washing).

In the first place the ‘ Singleness’ could not be the predominant factor ,
because being incorporeal (or immaterial) it 1४ not possible for 1४ to be
purified. Nor can it be said to be punfied by the purification of the
substance (° Veasel’); because it is something wholly different from it.
and because the purification that is laid down for the Vessel is not througk
this Simyleness ; as it being laid down for the vessel independently by
itself, it would be wholly useless to Jay it down egain; specially as, ever
at the time of the actual performance of the puvificatory Rinsing, this
Intter is recognized as pertaming to the Vessel directly, and not as due te
the Singleness.

NON-SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER. 1013

In the same manner it can be shown that ‘Singleness’ could not be
1.10 down as the subordinate factor.

Question: “ How is it that: it has not the subordinate character ¥ `

Answer < A quality 15 accepted to be subsidiary, only when it is found
ty qualify a subsidiary substance; in the case in question, however, the
‘Vessel’ is not held to be subsidiary to the ‘washing, which docs not
bring about ang visible results; and as such the quality, *Singleness’, of
the Vessel, which is not a subsidiary, could not have the subordinate or
subsidiary character.

Objection: “ Bren when the Visset ४५ the pronctpal sactor, wt ts found to
‘accomplish the washing. ‘That is to say, in the first place, the capability
“of accomplishing the washing belongs to the Vessel; and hence it would
“he through this, that the Siagleness would aid in the washing ; and even
“though the Vessel is the principal factor, yet 16 would become tlic
* Property of a Subsidiary Substance, by becoming qnalitied by a property
*( Sinyleness) that is subordinate to the Action. It 18 not necessary that
“an Accessory should always rest upon an Accessory ; all that is neces-
“sary is that it should rest upon something that helps the Action, and
“thereby helps in its fulfilment; as we shall prove later on to be the
“universal rale. And as to whether a certain thing is पा Accessory
“or not, this would be ascertained by Direct: Assertion, Indirect lmplica-
tion, ete.’ |

Tn reply to this, the Siddhdanti declares that even though it be possible
for the ching in question (‘Singleness’) to be subordinate to (for the sake
of) more than one thing (1.६. to the washiny, as also to the Vessel), yet, in-
asmuch as the Injunctive word is not capable of enjoming any such thing.
that would be either very remote (from the {11111110}; or net a sub-
sidiary ; and as such it could not but be rejected.

Objection: “The above argaments are not enough to prove that
` " Singleness’ is not intended to be significant. Because it would be
“truly non-significant, if it were a qualitication of the Substance. But it
“has not been shown that it cannot be related to the wushiny, either in
“the subordinate or in the principal position.

“It has been argued above that inasmuch us the Simyleness is
incorporeal, it could not be purified, But that would be the case with the
“denotation of the basic noun ‘ yraha’ also, which 18 the class ‘gruhatva.
“and which, as a class, is incorporeal, and as such incapable of being
` purified, Tf it be held that there could be 9 puritication of the Class,
“through the constituant Individual, then, that could be said of the
` Number (‘one’) alsa If the purification done to the I ndividual be held
“to have been done to the Class, then the same would be the case with
ia Singleness ' 180 ; as ‘Singleness’ serves to indicate the fndividual

1014 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. U1—-PADA 1-—apat. (7).

“just 88 well as the (लक does. If, again, the Class be held to ln
“corporeal, and non-different from the Individual, and as such directly
‘capable of tho purification, —then, also, the same may be said with
“verard to ‘ Singleness ` also.

“Tt has been argued above that what is done to the Substance
५ cannot be taken as done to the Number. But this argument applies, in

your case also, to tho Class as well. If you meet the argument b)
“declaring the word to denote the Individual, then that would he a direc
‘contradiction of the conclusion arrived at under the Akrryadhikaranu
“ ([—iii—3 et seq.). Nor is it possible for us to have any idea of the rela.
« tionship of all the individual vessels used at the innumerable performances
‘of the Jyotishtoma, extending over the past, the present and the future; and
“farther (if the application of the word vested upon a cognition of all the
“ Individuals), then the word could not be applied for the first time 1)
“the Vessels seon to-day. Consequently it is necessary to admit of a
“ certain generic character (inhering 1m all the Individuals). Nogsuch लो.
“eric character is possible except the Cluss ‘grahatua’; and being the gen.
“erie character, it is the Class that comes, before all, {0 be denoted by the
“word. Nor can the word ‘graha’ he taken as denoting « certain shape ;
५, 0९68८६6 each individual Vessel differs from the other, 011 saecount of
“there being a diversity in the arrangement of the constituent parts of
“each of them (and as such, the shapes of all not being identical, they
‘could not all be spoken of as ‘graha’). Nor is there any other generic
‘character, save the Glass ‘grahatva, which imberes in all vessels, and
‘excludes all other things. Consequently it 1s the Class that must be
‘‘ taken as denoted by the word.

“It has been argued above that if the washing were done to the
“ Vessel, it would he cognized as belonging to it; and as such it could
“never be known as pertaining to ° Qdngleness’; and consequently there
* would not be much use In the repetition (of the Injunction).

“To this argument, we offer the following reply: Even when con-
‘nected with Sing'cvess, if the Action were of the same extent (as when
“not connected with it), then alone could it be rejected as useless; as a
“ matter of fact, however, we find that the connection of Scngleness makes
“a great difference in the Action ;—sach difference lying in the fact that
“the Action (uf washing) is dune to one Vessel only ; otherwise (if 1८ were
‘not connected with Singlencss) every one of the Vessels would have had
“to be washed. Thus then, there being a mutual restriction between the
* Substunce (Vessel) and the Property (Singleness), there is a distinct
‘useful purpose served by the connection of Singleness,—just as by the
“word ‘arund’ (in the previous Adhikarana); and as such it is quite
"° possible for this Singleness to be an object of puvification. hen as for

NON-SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER. LOLS

“the fact of its being an Accessory, 16 has been spoken of by the author
“of the Bhashya himself, to be like the Property of the Pranita.

‘Nor is there much reason for holding that it is only when the
“ Aecessory rests upon an Accessory that it helps the Action, because, 1s
ia matter of fact, the Accessories help to accomplish the Action, even if
“they sre incspable of being directly related with it, when they rest in
« something thet is related to the Action, and are not connected with any-
“thing that has no connection with that Action, Tuasmuch nas the
“ Accessories performed in that which 1s wholly unconnected with the
‘Action would not pertain to (or qualify) that: Action ; they always rest
` upon something that is connected with it, Then, inasmuch 28 it does
“not make any difference whether they have the character of the Primary
“or the Subsidiary, no attention 1s paid to these characters, Just as the
‘means of accomplisiing the Action stands in need of the mention of
“Its number, so also does it stand in need of the knowledge of the number
‘of the Primary action that would be helped by it; and it is on this faet
“alone that the relationship of the two 18 based.

“Then again, when the Action takes to itself that Property which
“helps its own Accessory, it would certainly take it up when it is found
“to exist in that which 38 purified by that Action. Asa rule, it is the
* Primary factor that 18 helped even by the Property of the Action; and
“the Property does not becoine subsidiary to the Action so well, when
“it rests in the Accessory, as 1६ does when resting in the Primary. It is
“always in need of something that would help it in bringing about the
‘Primary action; and it is a great help to it to have the extent of the
*Promary action (of washinz) limited (to one Vessel) only. Then as
for the purifieatory rites pertaining to the sacrificer, we shall show (in
“Adh, VI) that they ulso are subsidiary to the sacrifico,—even when
“existing apart from their nominative character, which actually forms part
ol the sacrifice, they fall into his character of the enjoyer of its results,
“by making him capable of enjoying those results. And as the same rule
“would apply to the case in question, there can be no incongruity in the
“fact of the character of the Accessory belonying to those resting in the
` Primary Action.

“Such being the case, the fact of the Injunctive word being incapable
“(of enjoining the number), that has been urged by you, would apply
“equally to the number of those that are predicated,—such, for instance,
“as in the word ‘pagun&’ (in the sentence ‘ pacund Itudram yujeta’).
` Because in this case alse, we find the sentence laying down the Bhdvana
“qualified by the substance (Pagu), the Deity (Rudra) and the Sacrifice ;
“and then, if there were to be another injunction of the connection of the
` Seuder and number, either with the Action or with the Substance,

1016 VANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, II—PADA 1—-ADHI. (7).

“there would be a split of the sentence. If the split be avoided by tak.
“ing the original Injunction to be a qualified one,—then, that could he
‘done in the ease of washing also.

‘And the only difference in the two cases is that in the case in ques-
“tion the ‘ Vessel’ 18 the nddegya (that with reference to which somethin
“as predicated), while the ‘ Pagi’ is an upaideya (that which is predi-
"° cated), :
^` Bunt this alone does not prove anything; for if the mere fact of
“there being a difference between the two were sufficient cause for
“accepting the number in one as significant, and rejecting that in the
‘other as non-sivnifieant,—then the mere fact of the namber being in
‘the one related to the ‘ Vessel’ and in the other to the ‘Paen,’ would he
“sufficient for establishing their non-significance and significance,

“And further, in the very sentence in question, thongh it is the
* washing that is enjoined (or predicated) with reference to the Vessel,
* yet due significance 15 attached to the washing Cloth and its singleness,
"° without incurring a syntactical split; and it could be the sate in the
‘caso of the Singleness of the Vessel also. If you were to declare that the
‘two cases are not quite similar, because the cloth, etc., are mentioned
‘in wa different word from the washiny, while the Singleness is mentioned
"° by the same word as the Vessel,—then, for you, there could be no citing
“of examples of Singularity; as there wonld always be some sort of a
‘difference between any two cases; specially as there are no two cases
“that are precisely amenable to the same laws and conditions. Then
“again, when one accepts, as significant, the property that is mentioned
‘by another word,—then, how could he reject, as non-significant, that
“which is mentioned by the same word ?

‘ For these reasons, the Séngleness of the Vessel must be regarded as
° significant.

‘As a matter of fact too, we find that even that with reference to
“which something is predicated is touched by Injunctions. For, if. it
“were not so, then, in the case in question, the Injunction wonld have
‘been duly carried out, even if the washing were performed «part from the
'‹ Vessel.

“Tt might bo argued that the sentence could not be taken as enjoin-
“ing the Vessel, becauxe it has already been laid down elsewhere. But
‘that would not be correct; as the Vessel has never before been laid
“down in connection with washing, Then, it might be urged that it could
* not be enjoined, becanse of its having been already laid down in connec-
‘tion with the Jyotishioma, But in that case, there could not be an
‘Tojunction of the Anwnal, etc., because these are already found in the

‘ordinary world. Then, as for the animal not having been laid down in

NON-SEGNTBIGANCE OF राभा 1117

3

> eonnection with the sacrfice,~the same mieht be said of the Vessel
-also (which las not beenelaid down in connection with washing). Then,

ore 11111 ! be urged tlrart )11:1:3111111*}] {1 the १८. ४॥11./ is not ottside the

~
-

| ।
। +

~

‘pale of the Jyotishtoms, the tact of the Vessel having been laid down in
‘eonnection with this latter would make it ineapable of being enjoined
“by the sentence in question, But then, tmasmuch as the Animal-

sacrifice is net outside the limits of the world, the faet of the Animal
being found in the world would mike it incapable of being enjoined |
“Then again, as for the argument that the Vessel cannot he enjoined,

‘heeause it is that with referenee to whieh something else (the (९/1)
iy [र्त्‌ dewn, oii is wholly nosound: beeanse Peferewee (baeedda) and

Fapuuction (Vidhe) ave respectively totally diferent from thal iecih reference

i

toaelich something ts predicated (Uddéeya) and that irhreh ex predteated

“Ceopideyo't, Beoause we find that that which is the (il/@ey1 Cthat with
“vofopence to whieh something is laid down) —e.g. space, time, cis

“whieh is predicated)—eo the hkilldny

“ofien found to be enjoined; while that) whieh is the Upadéya (that

is not enjomned (in the sentence

` ° pacand, &e.’), bDeeruse it has been laid down elsewhere.

=
1d

“Thus then, inasmuch as the sentence im question implies the
lnjunetion of the qualified mashing, the Scng/eness 18 as anuch touched by
the Injunction as the Vessel itself; and as for the fact of the former

` 1111; the subordinate and the [तलः the predominant factor, --that ts

“dre to the faet of the latter serving a useful purpose, which is not done

“by the former.

"Then again, if is seareely proper that there should’ be sinmltaneous
Injunetion and Non-injunction by the same werd; nor would it be
correct to take the basic noun । yrahke? and the Accusative Affix as two

‘distinet words, `

“That is to say, when the single werd (‘yraham’) is pronounced, it

would be highly [प्ट to take it as enjoining the ‘Vessel’ (denoted

hy the basiv noun), and not the ‘Sayleness’ (expressed by the Affix).

“Nov can the affix be taken as a distinet word ; heenuse 11. is never used
independently by itself, and it always appears at the end of words, and
` 11001 ludiscriminately, sometimes before and sometimes after them (as ts

| ¢ +>} rit 0) (5 9 । ५ न + -
the case with words; for instance, we have ‘ghutam dnaya’ as well as

„ ( न ne 5 , ext
(21/८८ yhatam’ when both ‘duaya’? and ‘yluttua’ are two distinct words).
“Nor ean it be weed that the Affix is a word, because it expresses, 0).
brings abort the cognition of, a certain meaning. Beeause in that case

the smoke would also been word, Inasmuch as it denotes the existence

uf fire. And then, inasmuch as a single verbal affix is found to denote

more than one meaning, we would have to take the same affix as a

Cistifet word, with each meauing denoted, Aud again, the word ‘words

128 :

101६ TANTRA ९4211६4, 41111. 11 --7द्)+ I—ADHI, (7),

¢
“as one that is in common use in the world; and as such it cannot he
precluded from that sense in which itis used, and which is pomféed ont
by the enunumatieal rules relating to 11. ‘The [वरलाः distinetly lny down
“thatca word is that which endsin declensional ov conjugational affixes’:
“and the word is commonly used in the sane sense ; conseqiwently 11 is the

et

base and the ewdfag taken together, and not each by itself, that ass
ord,

“ Feven if we adinit the fact of the Affix bene a word, then too, when
‘yon admit the objective character—which is denoted by the Atlix—to be
significant, vou cannot veasouably reject the significance of the 1411८

Which alsu is denoted by the same affix.

“And further, in all cases of non-signiticanes, the word is taken to
be as pood as not uttered (Le, not present in the sentence) ; and conse-
‘quently until the uttered (present) word has heen assumed to be not-
uftered (absent),—-who can set aside its denotation from the meanniy
‘of the sentence m which it occurs ट Then again, 11 you would reject. the
stoniication of the number, you would have to set aside the Accusative
Altix (denoting it); and when this affix world be sct aside, the objective
character would also disappear with if (as there would be nothing to
denote 11} ; and hence the ‘Vessel’ would cease to be cogmsed as some-
thing to be purified (by the ‘washing ). Nor could 16 he held to be the
‘object of purifteation, on the ground of its serving wusefal purpose in
“eonnection with the action; beeanse in the absenee of the Affix, there
‘would be nothing that would connect it with the Action, That 1s to
say, the mere basic noun ‘yraka, without the Allix, could not be taken
as bearing any relationship to the verb ‘Sammérshti’ Consequently
“it is absolutely necessary to accept the objective character to be duly
significant; and thus due significance being attached to the Affix (for
the sake of this objective character), imasmuch as there would be
nothing {0 jnstify the rejeetion of another part of it (which pertains to
the singular weber), this number too could not but be regarded as
sivnificant; and as sneh there could not be a washing of all the
^ vessels.

“ Because if there were a washiny of all the vessels, on account of the
singleness not being significant, -— then, in that ease, there would be no
“washing of any Vessel, because of the non-siymificance of the oljectire
character of the Vessel. Because in the same word (‘graham’) as con-
“sisting of a basic noun and an affix, it is not right to take one part (the
‘“ base) as uttercd and the other (the Affix) as not-uftered; hecanse these
“two are as contradictory as Presence and Absence, and as such could not
* beloug to the same word, Then again, from among a number of things,
‘denoted by their respective denotative words, we cannot, at one antl the

NON-STGNTFICANCE OF NUMBER, Lobo

“same time, accept some and reyect the rest, because that wonld he as
impossible as cooking only one half of the bied (and leaving the other
‘half nncooked) !”

To the above arguments, we make the following reply :—

The puriticatory rite (washing) is distinctly recognised as pertainmg
to every oneof the Primary factors (vessels), which latter are not accepted
to be significgnt, in their snbordinate character; as that would be mean,
patible with the sense of the Accusative (which always signifies the
Predominant factor).

If the washing were laud down both for the Vevse/, and also for the
Sinyleness, then, masmuch as there would be no relationship between (hese
latter—beeause they would both be addéeyas (that with reference to which
the washing as lanl down) (and as such both being predonunuit fietors,
they could not pertain to the same Bhavani, see Sutra ||| --1-- - 1),
the Injunetion would be taken as separately complete with each of
these two; and that would entail ao syntactieal split. On the other
hand, when we have many things predicated (with reference to a single
(hing), the Action im question is cognised as one only. having its end in
tsingle Biieund quabhed by all the various qualifieations ; and hence the
syutuetical connection remains wholly itachi 1 त onty mu this latter

ise, that all the guahficatious being ander the sway of a ६1116 pemerpal
11/14; 1/0) they come to restrick one another (as shown in the previous
ddokerana), Whereas when these appearas distinct addegyas Che, when
somethin is held to be laid dowu with reference to then), then they ave
bot taken up by the Bhfeaud; and hence, each beng capable of taking to i
the aetcow im question, ib ts this Action that comes onder the sway of
these, and hence being taken up by cach of them, if comes to he taken as
to be performed in connection with each of those qualifications > and tn
that case the Vessel would eome to be purnitied (by mashing} independently
of the stngleness, and the sdayleaess would have to be purified indepen-
dently of the Vessel,

Thus then, if it were the Stugicuess inhering in the Fesse: that were
puritied, then, 111 that ease, it would be dependent npon this latter; and
tliat would do away with the predominant character of both, as previousls
recognised, on the sole ground of theiv being mdependent af one another,
If, on the other hand, the Stugleness puvitied were onc inhermg in ancther
substance, then it would not be known what that substance is. Becnuse
in the Context we do not find any other Séagle substance mentioned, in the
Way that the Vessel is mentioned; and even that whieh is ae may be
netic, 111 vefevence to something else; amd theve is nu ease for gts bemy
specilically defined; and as such it could not be recognised as owe, indepen:
+ of everything else |

1090 ` TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, UI—PADA I--ADHI.. (7);

Objection: “That would be recognised. as one which is spoken of, in
“the originative Injanction, by a word in the singular number

Reply: That could not be; as there being many such things, it
would be impossible to ascertain which one it 1s, ।

Question: “ Why could not all of these be taken as such ?"

Answer: Not so; because that would involve the acceptance of that
which is not enjoined (according to you) aud the rejection of that. which
is enjoined. Yor instance, if one were to stop with the purification of any
one of these, then the purification of the others would have been omitted
without any reason

That is to say, in the case of Singleness being the subordinate factor,
when the Action (of washing) would be performed by means of the vessel
connected with singleness, then the action would not stand in need of any-
thing else; and hence the Injunction would be duly fulfilled by taking up
any one of the vessels, If again, the Singleness also were a predominant
factor (as held by you), then, even if asingle object with singleness were
left unwashed, that would mean tho infringement of the Injunction, in that
particular respect. If, on the other hand, this latter were also washed, then
the aggregation of many Singles would ‘bring about a different number :
and that would mean the abandoning of the directly mentioned ‘ singleness’ ;
and hence the washing of many would involve a rejection of the enjowned.,
and the acceptance of that which is not enjoined; and Isstly, 1t would be
necessary to construe the verb ‘Samméirsh{i’ many times over, as per-
taining to every one of the single things.

If, on the other hand, the Purificatory Rinsing were laid down with
reference to the Qlass, or with reference to-such other properties as White-
ness, etc,, then, even if the action were performed with any other individual,
that would not invelve any other Class or Property. For instance, if the
washing be performed to the one or the other Vessel, that does not bring
in any other Class (save the ‘ Vessel’),—as it does in the case of number
(where a distinct number is brought up); and hence in such cases, there
would be nothing incongruous in the repetition of the same action (with
veference to each of the individuals of the same Class) |

Objection: “ Kven when all are purified, at the time of the purifica-
“tion of each, it is only one that is purified; and as such there would be
“no incompatibility (with the mentioned ‘ Singleness,’ even in accordance
+५ with our theory )

_, deply: In that sense, the Singleness of the Vessel might be quite
_ @igmificant; and even when all the Vessels are, purified (as held by us)
the. Vessel would be only one at the time of the actual purification. Fo: |
nobody ever washes all the Vessels at 006 . and the same time. Conse
. quently as, even if the Stngleness were non-significant (and gs such. ‘the

NON-SIGNIFICANGCE OF NUMBER, - 102}

washing were done to all the Vessels), the Vessels would be washed one by
one, there is not much use in attaching a special significance to the
‘ Singleness.: — |

Objection: “The use of its siguificance would lie in the preclusion
‘(or prohibition) of the simultaneous washing of all the Vessels.”

Reply: It is not so; because, inasmuch as they would be taken up
one by one, they could not but be washed one by one; and as such there
would be no possibility of semultuneous washing (that could be precluded).

This reply we have given, by taking for granted what the oppo-
nent says, As a matter of fact, there is no idea of the Singleness
independently by itself (without tho substratum in which it inheres) ;
aud hence the sentence in question giving no idea of any relationship of
the fact, or of mere Stugleness, the Injunction is distinctly recognized-as
pertaining to the Vessel only; and hence even though the Séngleness
might berintended to be significant with reference to other substances,-—
yet with reference to the Vessel, it cannot but be regarded as non-signi-
ficant. And hence it 18 established that all the Vessels are to be washed.

Thus then, we must bear m mind the general rule, applicable in all
analogous cases,---that.a Purcficatory Rite ts never enjoined with reference

` (0 the Number.

Further, if the Singleness be held to be enjoined as a subordinate
factér,—then thatewould be in direct contradiction to the rule, arrived at
under the Saktvadhikdrana ( I1-1-12), that the Accnsative never denotes
the snbordinate factor. And if the Accusative were taken as not signify-
ing the objective, and as indicating mere agency,—then in the first place,
that would mean the abandoning of its original signification; and
secondly, the Vessel too would have to be taken as the subordinate factor
(because that also is mentioned by the word with the Accusative
ending), |

If then the Vessel be taken as the primary, and the Singleness as the
subor-lénate factor,—then, that would involve a syntactical split; inas-
much as the single word ‘graham,’ uttered but once, would have to be

‘taken as serving the diverse functions of directly denoting the primary
| factor, and at the same time indirectly zudieating the subordinate factor.

| Oljection: ‘Kor the sake of the uniformity of the Accusative, the
; ' Vessel also, like the Singleness, might be taken as the subordinate factor ;
“but the fact of its serving a useful purpose will impart to the Vessel the
“predominant character; and this implied predominance would not
disturb the uniformity of the word (i.e. the expressive Accusative
Affix) ` = ` | | |

Tothis we make the following reply: When the subordinate character
# ०९७ ‘wot really exist in the Vessel, how could it be intended to be directly

‘it ak fe

1022 TANTRA-VARTIKA., ADH. 1—PADA I—aDIT. (7)

signified ? And why should the predominance actually inhering in it be
held to be implied indirectly 7

That is to say, as a rule, in all cases of the functioning of words, a
remoter functioning is admitted only when the more proximate 18 found
to be incompatible, and not merely by our wish. Hence, in the case in
question, if we once, on the strength of the direct mention of the Accusa-
tive, admit the predominance of the Vessel, then that would be its only
character. If we should, somehow or other, find this character to be
incompatible, and consequently have recourse to Indirect Indication (of
the subordinate character), then, there being a contradiction between
actual possibility on the one hand, and this latter assumption on the
other,—even though it serves a distinctly useful purpose,—yet the text
would point it out as the subordinate factor; aud thus the simultaneous
acceptance of the possibility and impossibility of its predominant and
subordinate character would throw into complete disorder the expressive-
ness of the word with regard to the predominance; and that would be
putting a heavy burden upon the word. For instance, first of all, the
predominance of the Vessel is cognized through the direct. expressiveness
of the Accusative ;-—then that is abandoned ;---and in the middle, we take
it to be the subordinate factor ;—and then, finding this latter to be incom-
patible, we again, 1 the end, conclude it to be the predominant. factor ;--
and certainly all this means a lot of disorder and irregularity, For even
though the preduminunce would appear subsequently, yet it would have to
be based upon the word itself; as the mere signeficuécon of 8 word is not,
i means of right knowledge by itself; all that 16 does is to afford a gronud
for assuming a potency in the word, And thus your theory would entail
१ xyutactical split, caused by the aforesaid assumptions (of the diverse
significations of the Accusative).

Further, when a word has got hold of something that is enjoined, ण
definitely known by some other means, and which is sure to come about,—
then, that word does not appertain to anything else. That is to say, even
though the preduminance of the Vessel is established by the fact of its
serving & useful purpose,—yet, when the Accusative comes to express (or
bring about) that predominance, even if it gets at a mere reference to it,
it cloes not indicate anything else. For instance, in the sentence ‘dudh-
néndriyakAmasya guhuyat, what the verbal root in ‘juhuydt’ refers to is
only the Homa,—even though this is already pointed out by the Context,—
- भित्‌ it does not, for the sake of having something to enjoin, indicate any
` other root-meaning, such as Going and the like. Thus then, what the
` word ‘graham’ would do would be to refer to the predominance of .the
Vessel, and to enjoin the subordinate character of Szngleness; and this
` would lead to another Syntactical Split, And the predominance of the.

NON-SIGNIPICANCK OF NUMBER. | 1028

Vessel having been positively pointed out by the Direct Denotation of the
word, who would be such a fool as to assume it to be implied indirectly ¥

In certain cases, Singleness also serves tho useful purpose of qualify-
ing a substance ¦ and hence on account of Singleness the Accusative
cannot be said to renounce its sense of predominance, Consequently on
५ 0011189 07 the peculiar patency of the oxpressive Accusative, both (Shagle-
yess and V essel)emust be regarded as predominant.

The Bhashya also must be explained as pointing to the above-
mentioned syntactical splits (consequent, npon the theory of the Parvu-
piksha).

Objection: “ What you have said might apply to the case of the
“sentence ‘graham sammarshti’; but in the case of the sentence ‘ aynéh
‘frndni,’ inasmuch as there is no Accusative in the word ‘ agnéh,’ there

wonld be no chance of any of the syntactical splits referred to above
and as such its singlene:s would have to he admitted to be significant.

Reply: Your argument does not affect onr position; though the
Genitive ending in the word shows the ‘ Agu:’ to be the qualifying, and
hence the subordinate, factor, yet inasmuch as there is no other relation-
ship possible (between the ‘Agni’ and‘ Trad’), the two are cognized as
related to one another by the relationship of the whole and the part.
Then too, because the Agni (Fire) serves a useful purpose, while the
removal of grass (trnw) does not,—therefore Agi 18 cognized as the master
of the grass; just asin the expression ‘7(7#ak purushah’ (the king's man),
the Raja is known as the master of the purwha (Man). And if the case-
ending in ‘agnéh’ be taken to be the Ablative, then too, inasmuch as
there would be no useful purpose served hy the Removal of the grass from
the Fire, the Ablative would not be regarded as intended to signify the
subordinate character; and hence it would come to be taken, through the
exigencies of circumstances, as indirectly indicating the predominance
of the offered material; just as is the case with the sentence ‘ madhyat
purvdrdhaccdvalyati’; aud thus Ayn: would come to be recognized as the
predominant, and the Ginyleness as the subordinate factor; and so forth,
exactly as in the case of the other sentence (‘ graham, &e:’).

Then as for the word ‘frnani’ (in the same sentence), there is no
significance attaching to the Plural number

So also in the case of such sentences as ‘ bhinné juhvti’ (pours the
libation when there is a breakaye), if the Locative ending (in ‘bhinné’)
be taken as denoting the fact of both the Breakaye and the Singleness
being the cause of their alternation and collation, &c., then, inasmuch as
the syntactical connection would be complote with each of them, there
would be no connection between the two. If, however, Singleness were
taken*as the predicated, and the Breakage as the non-predicated (i.e. that

1024. WANTRA-VARMIKA. ADH: TI—PADA [-- +. (7),

with reference to which the former is predicated),—then, in that case;
though there would be no contradictory predominance and subservience
subsisting in the same substrate, yet there would be, as before, the
anomaly of the same word ‘bhinné’ denoting both predominance (of the
‘Breakage’) aud subservience (of the Singlenexs); and then, if they be
all taken as syntactically connected, there would be diverse ‘ Breakages,
and no significance could attach to Singleness, च

As a rule, it is only when there is an actual want of a certain thing,
in a sentence, that it is regarded as significant; and as a matter of fact,
the want that is felt is that of something that is predicuted, and of that
with reference to. which it is predicated. And in the case of this latter,
inasmuch as all that it stands in need of is a certain relationship with
that which is denoted by the basic noun, there is no want felt, of its
number; as the number is known by other means. Consequently in the
case in question, we conclude that the washiny is to be done to such
number of Vessels as have been pointed ont by other means (the Injunc-
tions relating to the various vessels, f.1.).

As for the various characteristics (or qualifications) of a thing, inas-
much as the only purpose that they servo is the bringing about of an
idea of the thing, they cannot be taken as integral parts of the perform-
ance of the action in question. For instance, in the case of the sentence
¢ Bring in the man who is with the white dress,’ the cloth, &c., do not form
integral parts of the Bringing; because that alone can be taken as
the predicated, without which the performance of the action would be
impossible; and hence in the case in question, it is the Vessel alone that
can be accepted as the predicated.

Here an objection is raised in the Bhashya: viz: “It is only when
MANY are intended that we have the plural number; and the sense of this is
that even if a thing were not /ntended, it could not be spoken of (by words)
if it did not actually exist (and that if the Singleness did not exist, it.
should not have been spoken of by the word).”

The sense of the reply given in the Bhashya is that, inasmuch as the
Veda is eternal, all that we can do, in its case, 18 40 find out what it means
as it stands; and we cannot rightly reproach it, like an ordinary speaker,
for having used certain words. Therefore the singular Accusative Affix
in ‘graham’ must he taken as merely helping to make the use of the basic
uoun (‘graka’) possible for denoting the particular object (as the basic
noun could not be used without a certain affix); or it may be taken as”
actually expressing only the particular agency.(of the objective), and
‘denoting the number (Singleness) as its necessary accompaniment. Just
as though the fire is lighted for the purpose of giving light, yet it burns
wp the fnel also, so in the case in question, the singular Accugative'only

NON-SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMBER, 1025

‘serves to denote objectivity, in accordance with the law that ‘the denota-
tion of a word must be restricted to that which is the first to be expressed
hy it.’ |

In the case of the sentence ‘yasya purodagau skannau &e.,’ all that
the dual number does is to point out the applicability of the enjoined
expiatory rite,—just like the duality of the offering material. Otherwise,
the ‘ plrodaga’ meant might be taken as only that which is dedicated to
Ayni (and in*that case the expiatory rite would apply to the destruction
of that one Cake only), i accordance with the law that ‘the denotation of
a word is to be restricted to that which is the most predominant’ (as the
‘Aqnéya’ cake is the most predominant of all the cakes concerned).

And further, it ४5 the Vessel that is signified by the basic noun, That is
to say, when, as a matter of fact, however much we may look for it, the
Singleness is not found to have any direct relationship with the action in
question, it cannot, in any case, be regarded as significant ; and hence it
is far more reasonable to take it as qualifying the Vessel. And conse-
quently, even without the Singleness, there can be no deficiency in the
Washing. Or lastly, the Singleness may be taken as pertaining to the
Class ‘Vessel’; and as such subsisting in every 0116 of the Vessels washed,

Sutra (15): That which is enjoined (or predicated) 18 89.
ordinate to something else; and as such it should be taken
exactly as mentioned in the text.

In the case of the sentence ‘pagumalabhet,’ inasmuch as the Animal
does not serve a useful purpose, and the Accusative ending in ‘pagum’ 18
not found to be significant of tho objective,—just as in the sentence
‘stktin guhott’,—it is taken as indirectly indicating ‘agency’ in general ;
and then there arising a question as to the particular agency meant, the
animal comes to be recognized as Instrumental (in the sacrifice),—in
accordance with the law that ‘that which is an accomplished entity helps
that which has to be accomplished,’ as also the law relating to the rela-
tionship of Substances and Actions,—and hence subordinate to it; and
then inasmuch as the Class, the Substance, the Number and the Gender are
always predicated with reference to the Bhavand,—and as the sentence in
question enjoins that Bhdvand alone as qualified (by those),—and as the
apparent Inconsistency of all this would give rise to an Injunction of
these qualifications,—there would be nothing incongruous in the syntac-
tical connection of the various factors of the sentence.

ADHIKARANA (8).

¢:

[The Washing 28 not done to the Ladle, &९.]

Siitra (16): “Because the Washing is a purificatory action, it.
could not be restricted in its applicability to the several
accessories.”

There are two ways in which the Parvapaksha is put forward :
(1) ^“ {71 the case of the sentence ‘graham sammarshti,’ just like ‘ Single-
‘ness,’ the class ‘ Vessel’ also 1s not intended to be significant (of the
vessel only), but as simply pointing out the nature of the object to be
‘* washed; and hence the Washing should be done to the Luadles also.”

And (2) “inasmuch as there is nothing to justify the taking of the
‘word as explained, and as the sentence distinctly lays down the
“ connection (of the Vessel),—the Injunction should be separated from the
“Vessel, being taken as laying down the Washing alone by itself (and as
“such applicable to the Ladle as well as to the Vessel).”

This Pirvapaksha is amenable to the same objections that have
been urged against the Adhikarana dealing with the Avughdia; and these
objections are also amenable to replies similar to those given i that
connection

Objection: ‘In that case, the present Adhikarana will have been
‘“ineluded in that Adhikarana; and there should be no necessity of
“taking 1६ upon the present occasion.”

Reply : Certainly it should not have been taken up, if the foregoing
Adhikarana had not given rise to the idea of the deficiencies of one’s
intention with regard to the significance of words. As it is, however,
being frightened away by the foregoing Adhtkarana, from attaching any
significance to ‘ Singleness,’ the Purvapakshi takes everything to be non-
significant

And there is yet another point of difference between the present
Adhikarana, and that dealing with the Avaghdta: viz—in the case of the
_ latter, there being a difference among the various Apurvis of the Agnéya,
and the rest, due to the difference among the objects themselves, it is only
right that there should be a restriction in thé applicability -of -the.
Avaghata, &c,; wherens in the case in question, the action being one only,

SIGNIFICANCE OF DENOTATION. 1027

—that of the Jyotishtoma,—it will be a single Aparva that would be
helped by the Vessel as well as the Ladle; and as such there is every
possibility of the details of these two becoming mixed up.

The expression ‘ because it 18 a purificatory action’ is meant to show
that as the action of Washing is performed for the sake of bringing about
an Apirva, it has to be repeated with every one of the principal things,

।

8101) प्त 2 12.

Sutra (17): There would be a restriction, because the particular
object is directly mentioned; specially as such things are
based upon the sole authority of the scriptures.

The reply that is first given to the above Pirvapakshe 1s just as
rough 98 the Pirvapaksha itself. It is this: If the Wushing be not
related to the Vessel, then, there could be no injunction of the Washing ;
consequently it would be absolutely necessary to have another member of
the Relationship ; as there could be no injunction of the Wushiny alone,
by itself,

Or the Washing might be restricted to the Vessel, because of the
particular Apirra that is indicated by the latter.

Objection ~ ^ But both (the Vessel and the Ladle) are related to the
“same Apiirva; that is to say, there is a single Apdrva in the case in
^“ question.”

Reply: Even though the Action is one only, there 18 no difference in
its Apirva,—yot, because the action of Washing could not be done to the
Vessel and the Ladle, at one and the same time, therefore, in reality, the
two do not appear together, either in a single Action or in a single
Apitirva; and hence we must admit the existence of distinct intermediate
Apiirvas in connection with cach repetition of the action of Washing.
And as the form of the sacrifice would be completed, even without
the repetition of Washing, such Repetition could only lead to trauscenden-
tal. results, : |

Thus then, there being no reason for passing over that intermediate
Apiirva which is pointed out by the word ‘graha,’ and as such is the most
proximate (to the mention of Wushing),—the Washing would come to be
restricted to the graha (Vessel) only,—just like the Avaghata &c.,—in
accordance with the rule laid down under the Sara III~i—10.

And further, the significauce of the ‘ Vessel’ does not give rise to any
syntactical split &c., as has been shown to exist in the case of the signi-
ficance of Singleness ; and hence in the case in question, we should not be
led"away. by the foregoing Adhikarana,

ADHIKARANA (9),
[The measure.of seventeen cubits appertains to the sacrificial post.

Site (18): Being of no use in the Primary, it would appertain
to its Subsidiaries.

In the sentence ‘Saptadagaratnir-vajapéyasya yupak,’ it is doubtful
what is to be ‘seventeen cubits’ in length; because (1) if the word
‘saptadagdratnth’ be taken with ‘vdjgapéyasya’, —the Tnjunction being
construed as ‘ saptadapdrainir-vijapéyasya’,—and the word ‘y#épa’ be
taken, somehow or other, as a mere anuvdda (merely descriptive ),-—then
the measure would apply to the shodagi vessels of the Vajapéya sacrifice :
(2) if the Injunction be construed as ‘yd vaizyapéyasya sambandhi su
sapltadagdratnih,’ then also, the measure would apply to the same vessels:
and lastly, (3) if 1४ be construed as ‘yd yiipak sa suptudacgdratnth, and
the word ‘vijapéya’ be taken as a qualifying adjunct, or as a mere
reference to the particular sacrifice mentioned in the gontext,—then the
measure would apply to the एद (sacrificial post) used at the ‘ Pugu
sacrifice’ which is one of the subsidiaries of the Vajapéya.

On this point we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA,

“The measure is related directly to the. Vdjapéya, and not to the
‘ Pacu sacrifice; (1) becauso the word ‘ réjapéyasya ' is immediately proxi-
“mate to the word ‘saptadacaratnik, (2) because the Vajapéya is the
“ principal sacrifice, (3) because the context is that of the Vajupéyu, and
“ (4) because of the direct denotation (of the genitive in ‘ vfjapéyasya,
'which distinctly points to the Vajupéya as related to the ‘seventeen
enbits `)

‘Then, inasmuch as the measure of ‘seventeen cubits’ could not
“apply directly to the performance of the sacrifice, it is taken as applying
“to the substance forming a part of it. And of such substance too, we
“should take that which is directly connected with the sacrifice. Though
-“ the Pagw sacrifice also is mentioned in the Context of the Vajapéya, and
५५ 28 such the Context would not be infringed by taking the measure with
“the Pagu sacrifice, because by being connected (with the latter, the

THE MEASURE APPLIES TO THE YOPA.. | 1029.

“measure would be connected, indirectly, with the Vajapéya also,—
५५ yet, inasmuch as there is a difference in the procedure of the Primary and
“that of its subsidiaries, the process of the Pagu would not be taken in
“by that of the Vayapéya; and as such there would certainly be an
“infringement of the Vdjapéya context (by taking the measnre with the
५ Paeu), Then, the genitive affix in ‘vdjapsyasya’ also directly denotes
“the direct cgnnection of the Vajapéya with the measnre mentioned ;
‘while for you the connection of the measure with the Pacu would be
“denoted by Syntactical Connection, based upon the co-cxtensiveness of
“the ‘yzpa’ with that sacrifice (and certainly the direct denotation of the
“penitive is. more authoritative than the indication of Syntactical
‘ Connection). Nor is there any incompatibility in the word ‘ Vaja-
“ meyasya’ (being taken along with the measure), which would justify
“ your taking that word as indirectly indicating (the Page sacrifice)
“spetially as, in accordance with the law that ‘undue assumptions ean he
“made only with regard to subordinate elements,’ it would be fur more
‘“yeasonable to take the word ‘ yipa’ as indirectly indicating a h/gh vessel ;
“and consequently the measure should be taken as applying to the high
“vessel employed at the Vayapéya sacrifice.”

SIDDHANTA.

T'o the above ‘we make the following reply: There are only two cases
in which a recourse to indirect Indication could be justifiable: viz.: (1)
When there is no other way in which the word could be taken, or (2) when
there is a certain degree of co-existence. In the case in question how-
ever, we do not find the word ‘yi#pah’ in any way connected with the
High Vessel. |

One who wishes to take his stand upon the Context alone, and 1s
anxious to admit of a relationship between words in closest proximity to
one another,—- for him the word ‘ yipah’ would be wholly meaningless. 1४
could not be taken as indicating the Hizh Vessel; because there can he
no Indication when there is no coeextensiveness between the Indicator and
the Indicated, and when the word is capable of being otherwise taken (in
Its direct sense)

In the case of our theory, no word has to be taken in its indirec
sense ; because, as for the genitive ending in ‘vdjapéyasya,’ inasmuch as
all that it denotes is mere ‘relationship,’ there would be nothing incongru-
ous-in its pertnining to the relationship of the Yipa also; for even though
this latter is not a direct accessory to the Vajupéya, yet, inasmuch as all
that the genitive requires is that there should be some sort of help
accorded, and it does not denote the only relationship of the whole and the

1030 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I11—PXDA 1--ADHI. (9).

part (accessory),—it helps in the Vajapéya by helping in the perform-
ance of its subsidiary, the Pagu sacrifice,

It has been argued that, on account of the extreme proximity (of the
word ‘ saptadagaratnih’ to the word ‘vdjap8yasya’) the genitive ending
directly applies the measure to the Vdjapéya. But this would he
the case equally with the yiépa also (because the word ‘ yiipak” is next to
the word ‘ vdjapyasya’ ; and so this latter word could be as reasonably
tuken with the word preceding it as with that which follows it)

Thus then, the sentence being taken as an Injunction of the measure
of ‘seventeen cubits,’ the Vajapéya would be taken as merely referred
to (or recalled) by the word ‘ vAjapéyasya’; and we woulg take that

yapa’ to be related to the measure, which we would find to be connected
with the Vajap&y@ sacrifice; and the only such yapa is that. which 18.
employed at the Pacu sacrifice

In fact, there would be a doubt as to which yipa should be taken, if
there were a yipa at the Vajapéya itself; but as there is none at this
sacrifice, we have taken it to be one that is used at the Pugu.

Then again, the measure cannot be taken as related to the VAjapéya in
any of the following three ways: (1) eitter directly, (2) or indirectly,
through something directly connected with it, (3) or through the yiapa of
the Vayapéya

For instance, (1) we have-already shown that it could uot be directly
related to the Vajapéya itself. (2) Then, as for anything connected with
it, there is no such thing mentioned ; as any such thing is not denoted by
the ward ‘viyapeyusya’; as for the denotation of the word ‘yipah
it is very far from the Va@japéya, and there is no yipa directly connected
with that sacrifice. Thevefore-all that the word ‘ ca@japéyusya could do
would bg toFecall the fact of this sacrifice being a quabfication, which
is pointed out by the Context being one of that sacrifice

It will be fully explained under Sitras IT1-—vii—3, 4, how, through.
the peculiarities of the Context, the details are enjoined in connection
with that which helps in the sacrifice that forms the subject-matter of
that Context, and not directly in connection with those alone that are
direct subsidiaries to that sacrifice, And as such our theory 1s not
contrary to any authoritative means of knowledge.

ADHIKARANA (10).
(The*Abhikramana is subsidiary to the Praydjas alone. ]

Siitrva (19): “In the case of the performer's qualifications, inas-
“much as an action cannot inhere in another action, the
“sentence must be broken up.”

Purificatory Actions, Substances and Accessories have been duly
discussed; and we now proceed to consider those cases in which an Action,
being: mentioned as related to another action, comes to be taken ns a
purificatory action

For instance, in the case of the sentence ‘ abhikra@man juhoti, we find
in the word ‘abhikrdman’ the repetitive aftix ‘namul’; and hence, there
arising the question as to what is done by one ‘ walking round and round’
we weet with another word ‘juhoti,’ which points to the Prayaju, m
whose context we find the sentence in question. And then there is a
‘doubt as to whether the ‘ walking round’ is connected with that Prayfja
alone, or to every one of the Homas that are mentioned in connection with
the Darca-Pirnamisa,

The raising of this question, when the connection 1s distinctly men-
tioned by the sentence in question, is open to the same objections that
were raised against the raising of the question of the Arunddhikarana
and in the present case also the objections are to be set aside in the same
manner 98 in that connection. `

In the present case also, the Action is incorporeal, and its relatiouslup
is mentioned (just 28 in the Aruniidhikarana); and yet the present
discussion is started, because the points in which the two discussions
differ are as follows: (क) in the previous Adhikarana, it was the
Substance that was found to be mentioned as co-extensive, and hence if
was the relationship of that Action which is accomplished by its means,
that was found to be the means of restricting the application of that
Substance ; ` while in the present case, it is that Relationship itself that
has got to be established : (b) in the former it was the Property, the
method of whose connection with the action was known, that was wanted
as the distinctive feature: while in the present case, even the Action 18
not kuown (with which there would be a connection); and (८) in the
former case there were many other substances pertaining to other actions,

1032 | TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, I1T—PADA I—ADHT. (10).

while in the present case, in regard to all the various Homas, there is the
same Priest that is the performer, Consequently the present Adhtkaranu
cannot be said to be a mere repetition of the Arunddhikarana.

On the point in question we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“The ‘walking round’ pertains to all the Homas Because the
** Action, being incorporeal, is never cognized as one to be accomplished by
५४ means of another action; and hence the ‘ walking round’ (which is an
action) must be taken as enjoined (as a qualification of the perform-
ance), withont any connection with the verb ‘juhoti’ (which denotes
‘an Action).

“hat is to say, we cannot say that the ‘Homa is performed by the
“walking round’; and hence the ‘ walking round’ cannot be connected
“with the Prayajas. For in that case there would be the same syntactical!
“split that has been shown under the Pérvapaksha of the Arunddhi-
karana.

“The Bhashyu raises an objection: ‘ For the same reason the walkiny

round could not pertain to the other Lomas (because these latter also are
actions).’

“This objection is exactly similar to that which was brought forward
“in counection with the Arunddhikarana, and it iscto be met in the
“following manner: Inasmuch as in the verb the Nominative is the
“subordinate element,—(if the connection of the walkiny rownd were
“controlled by the verb ‘ juhot:’), it would connect it with the action of
‘Homa (and not with the performer); while as a matter of fact, the ‘ walk-
“ing round ` 1s connected with the performer (of the Praydju, etc.), not
“as pointed out by the verb ‘ juhott,’ but as pointed ont by the Context,
‘in which latter case he is the principal element; and inasmuch as the
“ performer pointed ont by the Context would be that of all the Homas,
‘there would be no incongruity in the ‘walking round’ becoming con-
“nected with such a performer, and as such pertaining to all the Homas,
“and not to the Prayfjas only |

SIDDHANT

Sata (20): Inasmuch as it is in need of another relative, it
must be taken along with the next word; specially as the con-
nection of the word is not completed by what precedes it

In any case the word ‘ abhikr@man’ (walking round) does not have all
_ Ita ‘wants (of connections) supplied, unless it is taken along with some

ABHIKRAMANA I® SUBSIDIARY 10 THE PRAYAJAS. 1084

other verb. Because it does not, in any way, express the relationship of a
substance. Consequently, inasmuch as it appears in the same sentence
with the verb.‘ juhoti,’ which refers to the Praydjas, it is cognized as
pertaining to these latter; and it is capable of helping them by bringing
them into proximity with their performing agent; specially as they stand
in need of the proximity of the officiating priest to the sacrificial Fire.
Or, it may be that the ‘walking round’ has its connection with a snh-
stance implied ; and as such there is nothing incongruous even in the fact
of the performing agent being the subordinate factor.

Thus then we find that it 18 quite possible for one action to help in
the accomplishment of another action; and as such one could very well
be spoken of as the ° Sadhya’ of the other.

It is possible for the Pirvapiksha to be put forward, not as above, —
because 111 that form it 18 much tov palpably absurd, being based upon a
forced. disjunction of the word ‘abhikr@man’ from the sentence,—but in
the following form ;—“ Inasmuch as the ‘ walking round ‘is laid down with
‘‘reference to all the Homuas of the Context, that are referred to by the
“word ‘juhoti,’—and as there is no intermediate Context (that could take
“in the Praydjas only),—the connection of the ° walking round’ cannot but
‘he controlled by the single great Context (which takes in all the Homuas) ;
“and in this case the sense of the preceding (Purcapaksha) sitru would be
“this: In the property of the agent—i.e., in ‘walking round ’—there beiny
“no inherence of the action of Praydja, which could be brought about only
“by an intermediate Context, there would be a split of the sentence, only
“in so far as the ‘ walking round ’ would not be syntactically connected
“with that intermediate Context.”

Tu that case, the present (Siddhdnta) sittra should be interpreted as
follows: ‘Sakdnksham’ would refer to the intermediate Context; and
the sense of the Siddhanfa would 6 that the ‘ walking round’ 18 syntacti-
cally connected with that intermediate Context, through its connection
with the want of the procedure, which is aroused by the injunction of the
Pray@jas (1.6. the ‘walking round’ is to be taken as forming part of the
procedure of the Prayajas), Andin this case, the concluding clause
‘asamaptam hi purvéna’ would not mean the incompleteness of the
sentence, but that the Intermediate Context is not completed by what pre-
cedes—i.e,, by the mere injunction of the form and the accessories of the
P ray Has. |

And further, inasmuch as, even after the mention of ‘ क)
certain accessory details of the Prayajas are laid down, we must admit of
the existence of the intermediate Context of the Prayajas (as otherwise
the details subsequently laid down could not apply to them). _

130

ADHIKARANA (11).

[The Upavita is subsidiary to the entire DarcusPirnamdca and not to
the Samidhénz only. ]

Satie (21): In all doubtful cases, there being an interruption
there would be a split of the sentence.

The fact of Actions subsisting in one another having been established,
we now proceed to consider the question as to whether such application
of Action is controlled by the Intermediate, or by the Prime Context.

[In connection with the Darga-Pérnamisa the Samidhéni Mantras
are lnid down as the seventh and eighth Anuvadkas, the Nivids are laid
down as the ninth; and the Kamyas, identical with the Samidhénis, as
the tenth; and then in the eleventh we have the mention of the 50८10८71
thread as to be worn on the left shoulder, passing under the right arm-pit.
And then there arises the question as to whether the thread is to be so
worn at the time that the person is reciting the Samidhénis, or during all
the time that he is performing all that 18 laid down in tne Context.] In
this, the Sdmzdhéni has been mentioned separately, simply with a view
to discriminate between the existence and non-existence of an intermediate
context of the Sanidhéni

Objection: ‘‘ The Context is one of the Darga-Pirnamisa only ; that is to
“say, Inasmuch as all things mentioned are taken up by the Prime Context.
‘ there is no appearance of any intermediate contexts. Or again, inasmuch
‘fas the Samidhents indicate the Kindling of the Fire, they are distinctly
“yvecognized as serving the purpose of a visible preparatory rite; and as
“such there can be no context of these (as they do not stand in need of
‘‘ anything else, wherewith they could form a Context).” |

Reply : It is not so, because in all cases, there are as many processes
as there are verbs; and there 18 no obstacle in the way of the Process, put
by the Prime Context, etc.; and as a matter of fact, neither the contin-
gency of another Context, nor the Preparatory Rite, can ever set aside. the
Process | |
.. Just.as the passages laying down the subsidiary sacrifices, though
“having all their requirements fulfilled within themselves, yet, come to ‘be
‘connected with the passage: laying down the primary Darga-Parnamdsa,
and, yet they do not, by that connection, lose their own. character,—s9,. in

UPAVITA 18 SUBSIDIARY TO WHOLE CONTEXT. 1035 —

the same manner, the subsidiary Bhdvands, though complete within them-
selves, become connected with the final Bhavana (of the Durga-Piiraa-
masa); and they do not, by this subservience to it, lose their own peculiar
characteristics. ` |

The Preparatory Rite also, serving the purpose of bringing about an
| Apiirva, always stands in need of some means for its accomplishment, and
thereby becomes related to the Coritext. In fact, even in the case of such
preparatory rites as bring about visible results, there is a certain trans-
cendeutalism attaching to the restriction or specialization of the particu-
lar method of bringing abont the visible result; and thus there being a
need of the mention of this method or process, there 18 an actual inter-
dependence of the Context. And even in the case of a visible result, the
want of the mention of the method or process does not cease; and that
want is not supplied by any perceptible means. Consequently, it must
be admitted that even such sabsidiaries as those in question are amenable
to particular intermediate or subsidiary contexts.

Thus then, though the want of a visible element 1s supplied only by
a visible factor,—and hence in the case in question the 68/7८ having
beén put forward in the form that ‘one should accomplish the indication
of the kindling of fire,’ the question arises as to ‘by what’ it 1s to he
accomplished ; and in answer we have ‘by the recitation of the Samidhénz
‘Mantrus’; and then, to the question as to ‘ how it is accomplished by this
means,’ we have the answer ‘by making the recitation helped by prepar-
ing the Har, to be capable of cognizing the letters, by means of a series of
actions, such as the desire to speak, the effort and the striking with the
tongue (of the various parts of the mouth)’;—yet there still remains the
want to know how there is to be accomplished the peculiar transcendental
result pertaining to the specialization (of the particular Mantras tu he
revited); and this want can be supplied only by the scriptaral myjanction of
i means that brings about only transcendental results. For these reasons
it must be admitted that: there is a subsidiary context which connects the
‘wearing of the thread’ with the Recitution of the Samidhéeni.

Objection: “In that case, the subsidiary context being more proxi-
“^ mate (to the ‘ Upaviia’), and hence more authoritative, it would distinctly
point to the Zpavita as connected with the Sa@midhéni ; and hence why
“should there be any question as to its applicability being controlled by
“the Prime Context?” |

1९/07 : True, it would be so, if there wore no likelihood of the connec-
tion of the Upavita with the Sdmidhéni being taken as to be broken np
(or interrupted) by the intervention of the word ‘ Nivid.’
_. Objection: “If the connection be broken up, then there would be
“ nothing to set aside the indication of the Prime Context.”

1036 ` TANTRA*VARTIKA. ADH, 11f—PADA 1—ADHI, (11).

Reply: It is not so; because, inasmuch as the text subsequently
speaks of the Kimya Sdmidhéni, there is some doubt as to the connection
of the Gamidhéni being broken up; and hence the course of the Prime
Context is not quite clear

Thus then, on tle question under consideration, we have the follow-
ing a

PURVAPAKSHA. .

“ Inasmuch as we have the mention of the ‘ Samidhéni’ both before
‘and after that of the ‘upavita,’ the Context of the Sdmidhéni must be
‘admitted to continue all along; and as: for the ‘ Nivids,’ they must be
“taken as mentioned, either as something wholly extraneous to the
‘‘ matter of the Context, or as subsidiary to it

“That is to say, as a matter of fact we find, that in connection with
“the Darga-Pirnamasa, the mantras mentioned as to be recited to Pashan,
‘“etc., do not break the original Context, even though they have no con-
“ nection with it, and in the same manner the words relating to the ‘ ५१४१६ ’
“also would not break up the context of the Sdmidhéni. Or, it may be
“that, through the Subsidiary Context, the Nivids also would be taken as
‘‘ accessories to the Sdrnidhéni-recitation ; and in that case there being no
‘intervention of an unconnected word, there would be nothing to alter the
^" Upavita also from being taken as an accessory to the Samidhéni-
"८ recutation.”’

SIDDHANTA.
10 the above we make the following reply: Inasmuch as the context
of the Sdmidhéni is broken by the Nivids, it could not be linked up by the
subsequent mention of the Kamya Samidhani- Recitation.
| As a rule, the Context extends only to that extent up till where it
perceives something capable of being used or applied in connection with
it; and then too, it is only that which is connected with something else,
that is applied by means of the Context. In the case in question, how-
aver, we find that the words of the ‘ Nivid,’ through the indicative power
of the words themselves,—for instance, the words ‘ dévéddhah,’ ‘ manviddhab ’
etc.,—~ distinctly appear as equal, in importance, to the Samidhéni, and are
equally, with these latter, applied to the kindling of fire. Under the
circumstances, if the Fire were subsidiary to the Sdmidhénte, then, in
that case, through the Fire, the Négvids also would be ubsidiary to them.
If, even in the absence of real subsidiary character, such character were
to be gratuitously assumed, then some people might, as reasonably,
assume the Samidhénis to be subsidiary to the Mivids. For these reasons,
it must be admitted that the Context of the Samidhani does not extend
to the Nivids. Then, as for the Kamya Samidhéni-Recitations, they

` UPAVITA 18. SUBSIDIARY TO WHOLK CONTEX', 1037

are, from the very words of the text, recognized as serving x desirable
end for the performing agent; and as such these could not be taken mp
by the former Sd@midhéni- Recitation. 11, again, the névids could be sub-
sidiary to the Sdmidhénis, then,—in accordance with the law of the
godohana,’ the container also being taken along with the contained,—
the Context of the Sdimidh&nis could extend to the Kamya Sa@midhéni-
Recitation. And if the Kamya Samidhéni-Recitation were subsidiary (to
the former Samidhéni- Recitation, then, in that case,—as in the case of the
mantras vecited to Pishan, etc., so here also,—we could take the original
Context of the Sda@medhéni to be uninterrupted by the mention of the
Nivids, —these latter also being, somehow or other, taken along with if.
48 ४ matter of fact, however, neither the Nivéds nor the Kamya Sami-
dhéni-Recttatton are subsidiary to the original Sa@midhéni-Recitation.
‘Thus, there being no subsidiary context (of the Samidhéut), the Upavite
must be taken, on the strength of the Prime Context, as connected with
all the Mantras
Objection: “If the Kamya Recitation be taken to be mentioned after
“ the Context has been stopped short (by the mention of the Nirids), then,
“in the case of the (Kdmya) Injunction—‘ one should accomplish fame hy
“means of the twenty-one ’—the want of the particular substratum of the
“number ‘twenty-one’ would remain unsupplied, if we do not adnut this
“substratum (in the shape of the Sdamzdhénz) to be pomted out by the
“Context; and as such the Injunction would remain incomplete. If the
“required substratum were pointed ont by Syntaciical Connection, then,
‘inasmuch ag the sentence would be pointing out two relationships im
“connection with the enjoined action (of Recitation), there would be a
syntactical split. Then, if this split we accepted as inevitable, and it be
‘explained away somehow or other, then in the case of the Hévuti, the
“Varavanti and the Saubhara also, the required substratum would be
^" pointed out by the Syntactical Connection, which would be in direct,
“ contradiction to the Siddhanta conclusions arrived at in connection with
“these Sdmas. Then if, for the sake of obtaining the required substratum,
“the Context were extended to the Kamyn Recitation, then the (pavita
“also becomes taken up by that Context; and thus there are two horns
“of the dilemma from which you can ill extricate yourself.”

‘Reply : In the casein question it is not proper to take the desired
result (fame) as following from a qualifying detail, which has its substra-
tum disjoined by a ruptured Context; and there cannot be an injunction
of many things, unless there is an altogether new action involved
| That is to say, the result mentioned does not follow from the qualify-
ing detail ‘twenty-one’; in fact, just like the sentences speaking of the
‘ Révati,’ etc., the sentence — one should accomplish fame hy meaus of

1038 | TANTRA*VARTIKA. ADH. 11-——piba t—apat. (11).

twenty-one’—lays down an independent qualified Action; and hence, in
` 9०018066 with the Bhavarthadhikarana, the result must be taken as
following from the Root-meaning (६.९. Recitation) ; thus then, the sense of
the injunction in question would come to be that ‘one should bring about
‘fame, etc., by means of Recitation qualified by twenty-one ; and then, As to
‘how’ it is to be brought about by this means, we come to understand
that it is through the Recitation of the Samidhénis thaj it is brought
about ; because the word ‘ anubriiy at ' 18 common to both ( the ‘ Sdmaedhani'
and the ‘ékavimeati’), and because the numbers of these two are nearly
.the same (i.e. ‘seventeen’ and ‘twenty-one’ respectively). And thus, for
the independent ‘ Recitation of the twenty-one,’ the verses qualified by the
‘number, 98 also the other details, come to be supplied by the previously
laid down ‘ SG@midhéni Recitation,’ |

Though as a matter of fact, in the present case, there is no special
purpose served by the two being taken, or not taken, as different actions,
yet all that we mean by the above explanation is that the sentence lends
itself to such construction and interpretation.

Objection: “In that case, these other Recitations (of the *twenty-
“ one’), not being taken up by the Darca-Péraumdsa, would come to be
“done apart from the performance of these sacrifices.”

Reply: In the first place, this argument does not set aside ont
theory ; because even if it be as you urge, the Upavitu comes to be con-
nected with all the Recitations in question (which is all that the Siddhantu
clings to). | | 7

As a matter of fact, however, there could uot be an independent
performance of the Recitations (of the ‘ twenty-one’); because that, im
connection with which we find the word ‘ann’ used, becomes part of the
Nacrifice in question; and this could not be if the Recitatious (which are
enjoined as ‘anu-briiyit’) were performed independently. For instance,
that Recitation, which is performed before that of the Sdamidhénis, is not
aubsidiary to the Sdmidhénis, just like the Nivids; and again, the injanc-
tion ‘ anubriiydt’ could be explicable, only if the Recitations were meant
to be performed after (the Samidhéni-Recitation), (in connection with the
Darya-Parnamasa), and not independently by themselves. Then again, if
they could be performed separately, though they would be recognized as
subsidiary to the Samidhéni-Recitation, yet they would lose their charac-
ter of ‘anuvacanatoa’ (being recited subsequently to something), if there
were nothing else to be recited. | + 4 =
as And further, the character of the Samdhénis also, which is based upon
‘the fact of their indicating the kindling of fire, “could not belong to the
Recitations ( of the ‘twenty-one’ ), if performed independently by them-
selves; because that which does not appear in the course of the perfor-

UPAVITA 18 SUBSIDIARY TO WHOLE CONTEXT, 1039:

mance of a Sacrifice (at which alone Fire is used) conid not help in the
kindling of fire.

That is to say, it is absolutely necessary that the numbers, ‘twenty
one’ and the rest, should pertain to the Sa@mzdhénis; and it is a known fact
that these latter are so called, simply because they indicate the kindling of
fire; and this fire too that is pointed ont by them, could only be one that
5 115८ at some other action (than the Recitation itself). And thus, in
weordance with the Sara 1V-i-26, entering into the Recitation, just like
the conditions of the Primary, the original function of the Sa@midhénis,
in connection with the Primary sacrifice, in the shape of the indication
af the kindling of fire, comes .to be applied to the Recitation of the
‘Twenty-one’ also; which latter, therefore, comes to be dependent upon _
such Sa@midhénis as are recited in course of the performance of the
६1107९6. `

Objection: “Then, in that case, the Upavita would be connected,
either with all the Kamya-Reettations, or only with the last of these.”

Reply: Not so; because, the want of the process of the Kdmyu-
Revilation being supplied by the process of the former Samidhéni-Recita-
tion, laid down in the same Context, the Upavita could be taken as’ snb-
sidiary to the Ka@mya-Recitation, only on the strength of the Prozimity
(position of its mention); and it is a known fact that this latter is much
weaker in its authority than the Context (which points out the Kamya to
be done in the same manner as the original recitation of the Samidhéni).

That is to say, in the case of all secondary modifications of sacrifices,
that which is not found to have been mentioned along with the accessories
of their originals, is not recognized as serving any useful purpose with
regard to themselves; and as such, the Context having all its requirements
supplied, if such an accessory were to appear subsequently, it could be
amenable only to the authority of Prowimity. And it is a known fact that
Proximity can authoritatively point to the fact of a certain accessory
heing used, only when such an accessory is not found incompatible (with
the indications of the other means of cognition, f.i, of the Context, in the
cuse in question); consequently whenever there is an incompatibility of
such an accessory with the indications of the Context, it has to be
rejected, just like the Vidévana.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Tpavita is connected.
as subsidiary to the whole of the Darga-Pirnamdsa.

ADHIKARANA (12).
‘The vessels of the Varana, Vaikankata, etc., belong to all sacrifices. |

Siitra (22): Inasmuch as all accessory details are equally sub
servient to the purposes of something else, they can have
no relationship among themselves.

This Adhikarana 18 an exception to Adhi. 9.
In connection with the Kindling of fire, we find laid down certain
‘vessels of the Vdrarna and the Vatkatkata wood, as employed at the
performance of the sacrifice,—some of which are used at the Homu,
while others are not so used. And inasmuch as these vessels have noth-
ing to do with the actual Kindling of fire, they are, as a matter of course,
taken apart from the Context ; and then there arises a question as to the
particnlar sacrifice at the performance of which they should be used.

And on this question we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘In accordanee with rule laid down in Satra T11-—i-—18, we must
“conclude that the vessels in question are used for Kolding the offerauy
“materials at the Pavamanéshti (as this 501, being laid down in connec-
“tion with Kandling of fire, is directly subsidiary to it).”’

SIDDHANTA.

To this we make the following reply :—Inasmuch as the Pavumdanéshte
offerings are shown, by syntactical connection, to be as primary in their
character as the Kindling of fire,—the said offerings cannot be taken as sub
sidiary to the said Kindling ; and hence the vessels must be taken as belong
ing to all sacrifices

That is to say, that the said offerings are subsidiary to the Kindling of
five is shown ouly by the Context, while that they are subsidiary to the fire
is shown by the Syntactical Connection of the sentence ‘ yadahavaniyé
guhoti’ (and under the circumstances there can be no doubt as to the
latter being the more authoritative of the two).

Against this way of putting forward the Siddhanta, the following
‘objections are raised: “If the sentence ‘ yadd@havaniyé juhoti’ be taken
` “asmaking the fire something to be purified or prepared by the Pavamana
“ offerings, then the fire would be recognized as to be purified by means
“of the Agnihotra ete., aluo; which latter are equally mentioned: in the

VESSELS BELONG TO ALL SACRIFICES, | 1041

‘same sentence. It might be argued that inasmuch as the Agnihotra, etc.,.
“bring about distinct results, the sacrificial 016 is a part of them. But
‘in that case, of the Pavamana offerinys also, it would be a part; because
“one and the same sentence could not speak of the same sacrificial fire, as
‘ subsidiary part of the actions leading to definite results, and as the
“primary factor of those not leading to any results; as Simultaneous
« Injunction and Reference, Subject and Predicate, and Primary and
“ Subsidiary are irreconcilable combinations. And your theory involves
“a further incongruity : viz. that in one case the Locative (in ‘ Ahavaniye ` )
“is {€ 88 indicating the objective, while 1) another it is taken in its
“own original sense (of location). And further, in accordance with your
“areument, the Vicvajit, 60९.) which have no results mentioned as following
‘from them, would all become subsidiaries, And all this js most undesir-
“able and improper. Specially as the sentence lays duwn the ‘ sacrificial
“ fire as a well-established entity (and not as something to be prepared
“or purified); and in view of such actions as do not bring about definite
“results, the name ‘ d@havaniya’ is to be tiken in-its prospective sense.”

In view of these objections, some people offer the following explana-
tions : We must admit of there being two such sentences as ‘ yaldhvantyé
guhote’,—one in connection with the Pucamna offerings, and another
independently by itself (not in connection with any particular action).
The former of these speaks of the fire as something to be prepared, and us
such standing in need of the preparatory rites ; and consequently it can he
taken as laying down the Pauvumdna offerings, etc., which have no results of
their own, as the required preparatory rites. And the latter may be taken
as Inying down the fire as a well-established entity, calculated to serve us
that into which the libations of all sacrifices are to be offered. And in
this avay there can be none of the incongruities urged above.

The explanation that we have to offer is as follows: There is uo use
in taking all this trouble of assuming a sentence (in the shape of the second
` yadithavaniyé, etc.) which does not exist ; specially as the incongruity is
capable of . another explanation: even if the Pavamana offerings were
subsidiary to the kindling of Fire, the vesse!s in question could not belong to
those. Because in the case of the sentence ‘Vayapeyasyx yipuh’, inas-
much as the Yipa is distinctly. mentioned, it has been tuken (in Satra [||
—i--18) as belonging to the subsidiary Pagu sacrifice ; specially as even
in this case the Genitive was found to be quite compatible. In the case
in question, on the other hand, there 18 no such ground for taking the
vessels as belonging to the subsidiaries. Then again, the expression
‹ 1 ५ १८०९५०१० ^ must be taken independently by itself, as laying down
the vessels for ali sacrifices; because there is no previously-mentioned
sacrifice:to which it could refer specifically. = † |

1042 PANTRACVARTIKA, ADH. 111—PApA I—apHI. (12).

But inasmuch as this end could be got at by means of the law
arrived at in connection with the Recitation of mantras to Paishan etc,,—
there can be no use of:the present Adhikaranu for that purpose. Conse.
quently the present siira is to be taken as supplementary to the foregoing
Adhikarana, added in answer to a supposed argument emanating ण
the opponent. That is to say, there arising the argument—‘ inasmuch
as the Nivids are subsidiary to the Sdmidhénis, 8 mention of those cannot
interrupt or disjoin the Context,"”—the 57८70 makes the following declara,
tion in answer: The accessory detatls being, etc., etc., which has already
been explained. The sense of the declaration is that inasmuch as the
Nivide also, like the Sdmidhénis, speak of the kind/ing of fire, they are
equally subservient to the purposes of the Fire; and as such the one (the
Nivid) could not be taken as subsidiary to the other (the Samidhéni).

ADHIKARANA (13).
[The Vartraghni Recitation, etc., belong to the Ajyabhegus. |

Sditra (23): There is no connection of the meanings of
the two verses (with the Primary).

We now proceed to consider those cases in which the muntras are
employed in accordance with the order in which they happen to be
mentioned.

(In connection with the Darva-Pirnamasa, we find the injunctions :
Varivaghn? paurnamasyam, aniicyété, vrdhanvatt amdavasyayam’; and
with regard to this, there arises a doubt as to whether the duality of the
mantras belongs to the Primary sacrifice, or to the Ajyabhagas. |

At the very outset a question is raised 98 to why there should be such
a doubt. र

And the reply to this is that the doubt is due to the fact of the order
of connection, as mentioned in the sentence, being found capable of being
taken in two different ways. For instance, when the connection is
mentioned along with the ‘ Pauwrnamast' it remains doubtful as to whether
it is to be taken along with the time (Puurnamisi) or with the actions
(the Ajyabhaga, etc,, performed at the time); because if the order men-
tioned were meant to refer to the Actions, then the taking of it with
reference to the {786 would involve an infringement of the Injunction,
And as a matter of fact, it is only when two relationships are equally
authoritative that they are capable of being considered as mutually contra-
dictory,—and not when they differ on the point of authoritativeness ; and
hence there would be equality (of the Relationship of the mantras with
the Primary sacrifices and with the Ajyabhayas), only when the sentence
would be taken as connecting the mantras with the Actions, and not when
it 18 taken as connecting them with the Time.

Thus then, on the above question, we have the following

POURVAPAKSHA.

“The mantras to be recited are always connected with sacrifices, and
“never with the two points of Time (the Pauraamdsi and the Amdvisya) ;
“and hence the order mentioned must be taken as fully taken up as
` belonging to the Primany sacrifices. Then again, on account of the argu-
“ment u rged in the preceeding sitra, the four mantras in question (the two
“ Vartraghnis and the two Vrdhanvatis) can never be connected with

1044 “TANTRA+VARTIEA, ADH. 11I—PADA I—ADBI. (18)

“the Ajyabhdgas (because these latter are as much accessory to the ए.

mary sacrifices as the mautvas themselves), And for these reasons, the
“order (of the Recitation) must be taken as pertaining to the Primary
“sacrifices, as pointed out by Syntactical connection, and not with the
“ Ajyabhagas, as pointed out by the order of sequence (which latter is
‘weaker in its authority than Syntactical connection)

¶.

SIDDHANTA

To the above, we make the following reply : - 45 a rule, the connection
of the Primary with the Subsidiary is not desirable, when the meaning is
not found to be so connected ; and in the case in question, we find that the
meaning of the four mantras has no connection with the Primary sacrifices.
Because if they were so connected, there could not be two mantras to he
recited, when the Primary Action 1४ one only; and further, because the
Deities indicated in the mantras do not belong to the two Primary sacri-
fices,

That is to say, the Saumi-muntra (whieh forms part ot the Vrdhan-
vati) can not find its connection with the Amdufsyai sacrifice; because in
this sacrifice, Jowa is not the principal Deity ; and then, as for the Paurac-
10087 also, even though Soma does appear as its Deity, yet 10 18 so only as
accompanied hy Agni; und as such the mention of Soma alone could not
be tuken as connected with that saeritice, ag we have shown under the
Mahéndradhikarana (1-1-19 et seq.) ; and none of the two mantras in
question is found to be applied to Agnishomu (which is the joint Deity of
tho Pauranmasi); becanse in the sentence ^ Puronuvtky@manvaha’ (found
in connection with the Paurnaméast), the smgular number in ‘ Puronu-
vikyaim’ is significant; and as such only one mautra could be recited to
Agnishoma. If the seutence in question (‘Vartraghni, etc’) be taken as
laying down the duality, never before laid down,—then there would bee
syntactical split,--the sentence being taken as laying down the particular
mantra, and also its duality

Qn the other hand, in the case of the mantras in question being
counected with the two Ajyubhayus, it would be easy to take the mention of
the times (Paurnamasi and Amfyfisy@) as restricting the application (of
the mantras to particular Ajyabhagas), as we have already explained
hefore. For these reasons, on account of the relationship of the Primary
8116 the Subsidiary (between the Durga-Pirnamisa and the Ajyabhagas), it
is only reasonable to take the sentence in question as pointing out the Teme
specially १8 it is the Time that is first of all found to be denoted bythe
sentence, and ‘it is extremely difficult to outstrip Time’ (as a- well-known
saying has it - | |

| ADHIKARANA (14).
(The Mushtiktrana, etc., belong to the whole of that which is dealt with
11 the Context. |

Stra (24): Immediate sequence 18 not authoritatively
| expressive.

We have just dealt with the employment of mantras in accordance with
the order in which they are mentioned ; and now we proceed to deal with
the exceptions to that 1116.

[In connection with the Jyotishfoma we tind the sentence—‘ Mushtim
karvit, vdcam yacchati, dikshitamavédayati’ ; and.then again, ‘ hast@u ११५1६.
wkté, ulapardjinstrnate’ ; and in connection with this, there arises a
doubt as to whether the ‘ aushtikarana’ (Closing of the Fist) and ` cagya-
mah.’ (Silence) simply serve the purpose of ‘ dvédana’ (Addvessing the
initiated Sacrificer) or they cntcr into the whole of the Context ? and
similarly too, as to whether the ‘ hastdeanégana’ (washing of the hand) is
for the sole purpose of ‘ ulupuragistarana’ (spreading of the bundle of
yrass), ov it pertains to all the actions performed ? |

At the very outset of the discussion, an objection is raised :—* The
ˆ" Olosing of the Fist and the Silence are the actions of the Sucrificer, while
“the Addressing belongs to the Priest ; how then can there be any doubt
‘as to the former two being subsidiary to the latter?”

Reply: This doex not affect the question; because of the actions
of the Priest also the Sacrificer is the directing agent; or, it may be that
the former two are taken as subsidiary to the action of being addressed
(which of course belongs to the Sacrificer).

On this question we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA

[On account of immediate sequence, we must take the Closing of the
“ Fist and the 8४60966 to be for the sake of the Addressing, and the washing
of the hand to. be for the purpose of the epreading of grass. |
`" Objection: ‘How is it that the immediate sequence operating both
ways, it is the preceding (Closing of the Fist and the Silence) that are
“ taken as-subsidiary to the following (Addressing), and not vice versa ?’

1046 TANTRA*VARTIKA. ADH, WT—PADA 1—ADHI. (14).

“To this some people make the reply that it is with a view to shon
“ the doubtful character of the situation, that whut is mentioned first is
‘taken up as the subsidiary, simply because it happens to be mentioned first.
* But the fact is that in the case of all Bhadvands, at the very outset, there
“always arises a desire to know what would be accomplished by that
“ Bhavani; and in all cases that which 1s found to be mentioned first, is,
‘owing to its plave in the text, always tuken as answering the said desire.
Couseqnently, as soon as therearises a desire to know what is to be doue by
means of the Olosing of the Fist and the Silence,—we are met by the next
“sentence ' dikshitumfvédayati’ ; and we have no ground for not accepting
“this ‘@védana’ (addressing) as that which is to be done by the former
“two; specially as this Addressing too can, subsequently, be assumed to
‘‘be capable of serving a distinctly useful purpose. Consequently we

must take the former two to be for the sole purpose of this Addressing

“In the same manner, the Washing of the Hand is for the purpose wt
“ the spreading of the bundle of grass,—the word ‘ tiluparapistarana meaning
“the spreading of long grasses in the middle of the toug altur.

“ As a rule, Capability, Subsidiary Context, and Syntactical Counection
“are more authoritative, in the matter of application of the accessory
“details, than the Prime Context. Consequently in all cases, that which
“is mentioned first must be taken as serving the purposes of that which:
‘is mentioned next after it

“Then 88 for the Closiny of the Fist and the Silence, the former 18 not
“taken as being for the sake of the latter, or vice versu, because they are
“not capable of being taken as subsidiary to each other; specially as both
“serving the purpose of bringing about the attentiveness of the sacrificer,
“they do not stand in need of each other. Consequently we cannot neglect
“this inherent incapability, and proceed with farther assumptions.”

SIDDHANTA.

‘'o the above, we make the following reply: (1) We donot find any
yyntactical connection between the Olosing of the Fist and the Silence on the
one hand, and the Addressing on the other ; (2) as for Qupabslsty, it applies
equally both ways; and (3) as for the desire of any intermediate process,
we do not find any appearing, at the time

That is to say, (1) the two verbs could not be syntactically connected
until there were some word denoting such connection; and so there 18
no syntactical connection in the case in question that could set: aside the
significations of the Prime Context. (2) As for‘capabslsty, it is as appli-
cable:to the Olosing of the Fist being taken as belonging to all the actions,
as to its being taken as belonging to the Addressing alone ; im fact, it 18

MUSHTIKARANA BELONGS TO WHOLE CONTEXT. 7 LO47

more reasonably applicable to the former ; because the need of attentive-
ness (Which is brought about by the Olosing of the Fist and the Silence) ix
more urgent, when there are many actions to be performed, than when there
is only one such action as Addressing, which could be done somehow or other
(even if no special steps were taken by the sacrificer to secure attention).
(3) As 9 matter of fact, in the case in question, there is no intermediate
context (that could set aside the indications of the Prime Context). For
when there is ४ deficiency 10 the process of the former action, then the latter:
becomes its subsidiary ; as a matter of fact, however, this is not possible ;
because the object to be accomplished by the Bhavand@ is yet only incom-
pletely known (and as long as the object is not fully recognized, there can
be uo desire to find out the process of its accomplishment. Nor could the
want, even if it had arisen, be supplied by the latterly-mentioned action.
hecause the use of this Jatter has still to be ascertained ; and so this latter
also would stand in need of another action; and so on and on, till we vet
tothe Primary Action itself.

Objection: “If it be so, then, whenever we would have, in the
‘middle of a context, some sentence laying down the connection of a
“certnin accessory detail with a definite desirable result, then, all that
“would follow after that would have to be taken as auxiliary to that
“ accessory detail, and could not reach the Primary Action ; because in such
‘‘a ease the intermediate context will have been an accomplished fact.”

Reply: 11 the two accessories mentioned in the sentence (viz., the
(‘losing of the Fist and the Silence) were known as belonging to the Address-
11441, then there could have been an intermediate context between those two
and the Addressiny. While as for the Process of the Primary Action, it
operates on all sides; and leaving only that which happens to be connevted
with something else, goes on to the very end (of the context),—as we have
alroady shown under the Anushanyadhikurana (TI—i-—-48).

Objection: ^° [71 that case, there is a total annihilation of all Inter-
“mediate or Subsidiary Contexts.”

Reply : In a case where the subsidiaries of actions, mentioned in the
text of another Action, have been known by means of Direct Assertion,
or by that of the Indicative power of words, or by Syntactical Connection,—
it is by these alone that an Intermediate Context is admitted by the law of
Sandameu.

That is to say, in the case of the Prayd@jus, we find. that a fow of their
accessories are laid down in one place, and then after some break are taken
up again ; and hence in this case we admit. of an intermediate context extend-
ing from the former mention of the details to the latter (just in the manner
of a clip which connects a number of separated things). Otherwise there
Would be a great uncertainty as to the details.—nll the auxiliaries being

1048 _- TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. UI--PADA I—aDH}, (14).

capable of being taken as auxiliaries to oné another. Ina case, however.
where there is no such subsequent mention. of details, all that is mentioned
must be taken as pertaining to the Primary Action. Then, as to whether
they wonld pertain to the Primary, by itself, or as together with all its
subsidiaries, that question will be dealt with under Sutras III—vii—1 et
fq. | `
Thus then, in the case in question, the Closing of the Fist, etc., must
through their capability be taken as belonging to the Primary Action
together with all its subsidiaries

If we had such words as ‘ dvéditum’ and ‘ starztum’, then, in that case,
the Closing of the Fist, etc., and the Washing of the Hand could be taken
as syntactically connected with these words, in accordance with the
stitra ‘tumunavuluu kriydyam kriyarthiydm’ (Panini, I1I—iii—10); and
then alone could the Closung of the Fist, etc., and the Washing of the Hand
be taken as belonging to the Addressing and the Spreading of the grass
respectively. As, however, we have no such words as ‘ dreditam,’ ete., the
actions in question must be taken as belonging to all the actions in question

Sitra (25): Also because the sentences are complete in
themselves.

That is to say, thereis a further reason for rejecting the signification of
‘immediate sequence: v?z., that each of the sentences ugder consideration
has all the marks of a complete sentence, when taken singly, and 1101
when taken collectively ; hence also, the actions in question cannot be
taken as subsidiary to one another,

ADHIKARANA (15).
| The Quartering belongs to the 4 yneya Cake ouly.|

Siitra (26): “The auxiliary, connected with the Accessory
“Detail, should be taken as common to fall; specially as
“there is no mutual relationship among them.”

We have spoken of the application of accessory details, in accordance
with the order in which they are mentioned ; and we now proceed to
consider whether that application is possible to a part also, or only to the
whole.

fIn connection with the Darcu-Parnamasa, we tind the sentence,—
‘Aynéyam caturdha karti’); and with regard to this there arises the ques-
tion as to whether the ‘ caturdhakarana’ (Quartering) 18 to be done to
the Aynéya cake only, or to the Aguishom7ya and Aandrayna cakes also,

On this question, we have the following

५ PURVAPAKSHA.

“The Quartering applies to the Agnishomiya and Aindrayna cakes
‘also. Becanse the mention of a single Deity (व्य in ‘ Agnéya’) is
“capable of indicating the two Deities (Agni and Soma, and Indra and
“ Agni); just as in the Manofa, the ‘ Agni ' indieates the connection of
“both Aeni and Soma.

“Though Agni is not the proper Deity of the Aguishomiya, yet it is not
‘wholly unconnected with it; and it is the presence of the Deity, and not
“the actual fact of its being the Deity, that is the basis of indicativeness ;
“nor in the case in question, is Agni inseparably connected with the
“action of Quartering ; and as such much significance cannot be attached
to the specification of ‘Anya’ ; and all that this can be taken as doing
“is to indicate (the presence of Agni); nor are the indicative factors to
“be taken exactly as they are mentioned ; for instance, the ‘two (५1६68 >
ave taken as indicative of the time intervening between the Upimeuyagas ;
‘and again in the case of the mention of the ‘ 77८17460," no significance 18
“attached to the specification of कवर}; and lastly, even in ordinary
^ parlance we find that the mother of Dittha and Davittha is spoken of
“as the ‘mother of Dittha’ (similarly the cake dedicated to Agni and
7 Soma can be spoken of as ‘ Agnéya ’).

132 | ।

1050. +s TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 111—PApa 1—apat (15). -

“Thus then, there being no necessary connection between Indication
“and Actual functioning, the name ‘ Agnéya’ becomes. equally applicable
“to the Agnéya, the Agnishomiya and the Aindraynu cakes,

“Tt is with a view to this that the Bhishya has construed the प्र
“as that, ‘inasmuch as there is no mutual relationship among these, there
“ would be no injunction.’ In fact we often find such things to be spoken
“of as applying commonly to many; as for instance, in the case of th
५ Pragitra.”

SIDDHANTA.

Sutra (21): There should be a restriction; as the actual
signification is connected with the word; because the indi-
cative power is connected with such meaning; and as for the

_ subsidiary text, it serves the purposes of indication.

Just as ina previons Adhikarana, we have found that the Ladles are
not indicated by the mention of ‘ yruhua’; so in the same manner, in the
case in question, ‘ Aynéya’ cannot indicate the cakes dedicated to two
Deities (the Agnishomiya or the Aindritgna).

1# has been shown above that that with reference to which some-
thing is laid down must be regarded as significant. And as a matter of
fact, that the character of being the ‘ Agnéya’ does not helong to the
Agnishomiya and the Atulrdgna cakes is shown by the fact that the word
ˆ Agnéyu ' does not signify the mere presence of Agni; what it does sicnify
is the Deific character mentioned by the nominal affix, and the mention
of ‘Agni’ 18 merely by way of qualifying that deific character. That
to which certain offerings are made is the Detty ; and as a matter of fact,
the cake that is dedicated to two Deities (Agni and Soma) is not offered to
Agni 81006 ; as that which has been known as pervading over two, cannot
be spoken of by means of one only; hence either the Agnishomiya or tlie
Aindragna could not be spoken of as the ' Agnéya

Then again, in the word ‘ Agnéya,’ the indicative power belongs to
the siguification of the Nominal Affix; and according to P&yini’s rule
(LV-i-82) nominal. affixes are applicable to ouly such words as are capable
(of direct denotation); and for this reason the nominal affix cannot bi
taken as appertuining to the word ‘ Agni’ as forming a compound with
‘ Soma,’ and as such not being (by itself) ‘ capable

That is to say, that alone is spoken. of as ‘ Aynéya,’ which belongs to
-: Agni alone, independently of all other Deities ; and certainly that which
` "16 dedicated to two Deities is not one that is dedicated to Agni:alone. It 1s
for this reason that the deific nominal affix is not applied:to the word
` ‹ Agni’ when it occurs in such compounds as ‘ Agnishoma’ and the like

QUARTERING BELONGS TO AGNEYA CAKE. — 1051

and as such the nominal affix in the word ‘Agnéya’ does not signify the
deific character of Agnishoma; while that wheroof Agni alone is the
Deity is always spoken of as ‘ AgnBya

Then as for the corroborative instance of the Pricitra that the Pirva-
paksha has brought forword,—in that case the subsidiary mention of the
‘A gnéya’ 18 meant to be u:dicative of a particular place. That is to say,
the general sentence having pointed out theperformability of the Praqztra-
cadana (cutting of the Pragitra cake) in all places, what the subsequent
sentence ‘ dgnéyasya mustakam viruzya, etc.,’ does is to lay down the parti-
cular breaking up of the head of the cake ; and thus there 18 no similarity
hetween this and the case in question.

Some people take exception to the Adhikaranu presented as nhove.
They argue as follows: “ Katyayana has distinctly laid down the rule
“‘avyicéshadubhau v&’ (which makes the name ‘ Agnéya’ applicable to
“both (Agni and Soma) also. And the rule has been laid down by him
“in accordance with a passage that he met with in the Catapatha Brah-
“mana—viz., ‘tancaturdha krtod purodagam carhishadum kuroti’ (which
“speaks of § puroddga’ in general as quartered ).”’

To this we wake the following reply: It is quite true that we have
tlhe above text speaking of the Quarteriny as applying to all cakes in
gencral ; but it is restricted to particnlar cakes by means of passages found
in other Rescensional Texts.

It might be argued that—“ in the case of the Pragitra also we could
take the subsequent sentence as restricting the former general Injunction.”
But this is not possible ; as the sentence speaking of that is meant to lay
down an accessory detail ; ६.९.) the expression ‘ having broken the head `
distinctly lays down such a detail with regard to the head; and as such it
is incapable of restricting the preceding general Injunction ; in the case in
question on the other hand, the sentence ‘ Agnéyam, etc.,’ makes the repeti-
tion without mentioning any accessory detail; and as such it is quite
capable of restricting to itself the general Injunction (of Quartering )

It might be argued that—‘inasmuch as the texts (in different
Rescensions) are far remote from each other, there could be no such restric
tion.”’ But this.cannot hold ; because of the general law that ‘ that which
18 connected with something else, through its meaning, 18 to be taken along
with it’; and hence. the general rule always goes forward to meet the
special; and as soon as it has met this latter, if becomes restricted to that
particular case

प, the Catapatha text quoted above may be taken as merely referring

1052 | TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. UI—PADA I—ADHT. (15).

to the previously mentioned particular cake by the general word ‘ puro-
dacau,’ for the purpose of enjoining the ‘ varhishudatea’ (the laying on
the grass). And if this laying on the yrass also be found to have been
laid down previously, then the text may be taken merely as laying dows;
the order of the performance (i.¢., the laying on the grass should he per.
formed after the Quartering has been done).

Thus then, it is established that the Quartering is to be doné to the
4 (ney a cake only.

The sentence in the Bhashyu— If there were no cake dedicuted (५ Aqui
alone, then for the sake of saving the word from meantuglessness, we could
have taken it to signify that which is dedivated to two Deities “-—is ar
explanation of the sitra clause—‘ lakshanftrtha gunacrutdh’; the sense of
this is that if there were no cake dedicated to Agni alone, then, as in the
ease of the Manotd, so here also, the word ‘ Agué’ could be taken as indi-
cating both Agni and Soma; and the mention of the accessory ‘ Agni’
would, in that case, serve the purpose of this indication of both. Asa
matter of fact, however, there is a cake dedicated to Agar a/oney and [1८०५८
it is to this cake alone that the Quartering is to be done.

Though it is trne that the indicative factor is not connected with the
action (of Quartering), yot until the thing in question is indicated by it,
it cannot be comprehended; and consequently we accept that cake which
14 dedicated to Aeni alone, |

Thus ends the First Pada of Adhyaya IT.

ADHYAYA IIL.
PADA IT.
ADTIKARANA (1).
[The Mantras expressive of Chopping apply to the Primary, |

Sutva (1): Inasmuch as the auxiliary character of the Mantra
would be based upon the meaning expressed by it, the connec-
tion of the Mantra should be with the primary meaning; as
it 1s with this that it has eternal connection.

We now proceed to deal with the application of Mantras in waecord-
ance with their own ‘Tanga.’ By ‘Langa’ is meant the capability of
Ahe Mantra to signify something ; and asa matter of fact, this capybility
is sometimes found to pertain to the direet primary, and sometimes to the
mubivect secondary, meaning, And henee in the case of Montrus, it is
doubtfil whether they are to be nsed in their primary sense, or im the
secondary one,

Some people, labouring nader the impression that there is no second.
ary Meaning of Jfantras, have put the question: ‘ What ds the Primary,
und whut the Secondary 2”

In the Sutras I --iv--23 et seq. we have taken for granted the exis-
fence of the secondary signification as an established fact, and then
considered the various bases of such signification, which have been shown
to be incapable of abandoning the Primary signification: and hence the
discussion that we are taking up now (where we are yoing to establish
the existence of the Secondary signification) must be taken as really
preceding the Sutra T—iv —23.

The answer to the above question, given by the Bhashyu, is as 10].
lows: The direct denotation of the words of the Muutra is the ' Pri mary `
or" Mukhyu,” hecanse, like the face, ‘mukha’ of the human foetus, it is the
first to appear; and the ‘ Secondary’ or “ Gaunw” is that which is imphed by
that denotafiin ; it is called “ Gauna” hecanse it is due to the presence of
a certain. property or ‘Guna.’ The above interpretation of the word

1054, —PANTRACVARTIKA, ADH. UI—PADA H—ADHI. (1).
‘ Mukhya’ is also supported by its etymology—the word being formed as
+ Mukha—ya,’ in accordance with the Sativa (Panini V—iii—103),. the
affix denoting similurity (hence ‘ Mukhya’ is that which as similar to the
mukha or face)

Against these definitions, the opponent raises the following objec
trons +

“Inasmuch as the word is denoted by the word ‘ gubda,’ it would
“apply equally to all meanings of words. That is to say, it 1s absolutely
“impossible for the property of one thing to appear in another; and
“hence the ‘guuna’ or ‘secondary’ cannot be explained as due to the
“appearance of a property, Thus then, whenever a word is uttered, if a
“certain meaning is found to be expressed by it,—either directly or in-
“ directly-—it inevitably leads to the assumption of a corresponding expres-
“sive potency in the word; and whether the meaning be the direct or the
‘indirect one, it is, in either case, uninterrupted by any other meaning ;
‘and as such, being the first to be comprehended, it must be called
““mukhya ov ‘Primary’ (and thus all meanings are equally mukhyc).
^“ Having disposed of the definition given in the Bhéashyn, we proceed to
(^ ९0181062 the other detinitions.

“Some people explain the terms as follows:—‘That is the Mukhya
“* which is denoted by the word independently of all supernumerary
“*additions, ‘That is to say, in all cases, a definition is that which serves
५५८ {0 differentiate a thing from others; and there is no doubt that the

‘“guuna or secondary meaning is that which depends upon something
“else, For instance, the word "4079 ` by itself denotes Five; but it does
“*not, in the same way, denote the Boy (in the sentence Aynirmanarakah
८“ ‹ --- 130 is fire); and the only reason for this is that in the denoting of
“*the Boy, the word Ayni depends upon its proximity to the other word
‘““aufnavaka, Hven in a case where no second word is found, the opera-
“*tion of the word found is always aided, in its indirect signification, by
“some other word, which, thongh not expressly mentioned, is implied by
“the context, etc., and thus such cases are also included in the aforesaid
५ ¢ definition; because in hoth cases, there is the common basis of the
५९ signification of the word, in the shape of a certain property or guna,

“ But it is not so; because even in the case of secondary signification
“that you have cited, all that the proximity of the second word does 1s to
“bring to hght the meaning of the first word ; and thus the second word
: “being only an illuminative factor, the detinition of ‘ Makhya’ 18 not in-

applicable to that case |

: © That is to say, though the eye stands in need of light 9९८ colour 18
५५ nniversally acknowledged to be its object ; and though the Primary mean-
“ing stands in neod of a due perception of the letters composipg the

. CHOPPING MANTRAS APPLY TO THE PRIMARY, 1055

^ word, their order of sequence, their accompanying vowels, and a १५९ |
“pemembrance of the various relationships of the word,—yet it is
५, acknowledged to be the Primary meaning ; and in the same manuer, the
‘second word cannot be required as a necessary element in the signifi-
‘eation of the meaning, unless it has the requisite potency ; and even if it
“were required, 1४ would be required only as an illuminative agent; and
“thus, taking the place of the method (of signification), it could not
“deprive the meaning of its Primary character. ‘Thus then, even with-

out the second word, the meaning of the first coutinues intact; but for
“some reason or other, it 1s not duly manifested (to be comprehensible) ;
“just as the word ‘g@'1is not quite directly comprehended as denoting
“the ' Harth,’ |

“If you deny the illuminative character of the second word, and

“take both words to be equally expressive of the meaning in question,
‘on the ground that the expression ‘ agnirmanavakah ` 7 always found to be
# exp) essive of that meaning; then in that case, the meaning in question
‘ would have to be accepted as expressed by the. two words taken collec-
‘“tively,—and as such the expression would be similar to the compound
“word agvakarna (denoting a plant); and on that account, each of the
‘component words (both ‘aygnt’ and‘ ma@navauku’) would have to he
“xecepted as herein used in their secondary meanings !

. “As a matter of fact, however, the meaning in question could not he
“taken as expresstd by the two words collectively ; because, from con-
"° (0110066 as well as non-concomitance in usage, we find the two words
“having two distinct meanings. Two words are known as one compound
“word only in a case where the meaning of the component parts is
^" completely set aside, and the parts themselves are cognised as insepa-
‘rable. In the case of the expression ‘ Agnirmanavakak, however, we
“find that while the word ‘Agni’ expresses something yellowish and
“bright, the word ‘ Ma@navaku’ denotes a wholly different thing, a
“ certain aggregate of physical matter; and as such both words, expressing
“something distinct, are found to be used in their primary meaning.

“Some people, however, with a view to show, by means of the deno-

“tation of each component part, that the two words form a composite
“ word, offer the following explanation: ‘That the Mdnavaka is briyht,
is the meaning of the sentence (agnirminavakahk), in which the elements
^ of the denotations of both component words are perceptible; just as in
“the case of the expression blue lotus; and as such that meaning is
“found to be expressed by means of the meanings of the component
“ words ; and hence with reference to the words themselves, it cannot but
“be regarded as secondary (yanna)
“ But.we reject this view also, for the following reasons: The meaning

1056 TANTRA-VARTLKA. ADH. ILI—-PADA ADA (1).

“in question could be taken as that of the sentence, if the Agnitva and
५ Manavakatra had inhered in a single substance, as in the case of the
“ expression blue lotus, the blueness and the character of lotus both in-
“ Lere in the individual lotus before us. As a matter of fact, however,
“we find that the word ‘a jnthk’ cannot be taken in its primary sense of
“agnitea (as this does not inkere in the Boy) ; nor can you hold it. to be
“directly siguificant of bright yellowishness; because that would bring
“you over to our side; hence the meaning im question cannot be
^ vevarded as that of a sentence. |

“ Consequently it wust be admitted that the functioning of the word
८ ‹ Agni’ is exactly of the same character, with reference to five, as also
“with reference to the brightness of the Boy ; and heuce both these
“ meanings should be regarded as equally Primary.

“Tn the Bhashyw we have the sentence— agnicubdo minavakasya abli-
५८ ‹ (0/6 ˆ; and the genitive in‘ mdnavakasya? denotes the connection of
“the Boy with Brightness, and not that with the denoting word (‘ aqnd’).
“ Because, in the first place, the form of the Boy is not cognized from
“the woul tagné,’ and second'y, because if the two words were wholly
“synonymous, the two eould never have been used at the same
time.

* The following reasoning might he bronght forward: ‘ That whaeh
“aswell known as the denotutiou of a word ८५ rts Primary meaning, etc., ete.
‘That is to say, not taking into consideration the operation of the
०८ second word, we shall admit, as the basis for declaring the Primary and
८ Secondary character of meanings, the fact of their being well ot
‘not well known (respectively), on Prich fact is based the use of the
“ companion word (in such sentences as agnirmanarakuk).?

“To this aryument, we make the following reply: The prasiddhs
“of ५ meaning consists only in its being comprehended, and nothiug more
“or less: and hence the differentiation of the Primary and the Secondary
¢ cannot very well be said to be based upon that.

“ Our opponent next proceeds to show that the required differentia-
“dion would be madeon the ground of the greater or less extent of the
“ use made by the speaker, in consideration of the greater or less know-
९ ledye of the person spoken to; and to this effect he makes the follow-
* ine decla ‘ation: ‘That which is most used ete., etc. :

“ And to this we make the following reply: Ifa certain denotative
“ potency of a word has been once recognized, if cannot be rejected,
“even it be found to be used very little; and hence there cannot be any
` “ difference between the greater used and the less used, In this contiéc-
“tion also we can cite the example of the word ‘go,’ which is: accepted
“as equally primarily expressive of the Cow and the Earth, though 1४ 1४

” . CHOPPING MANTRAS APPLY 10 THE PRIMARY. 1057

“ very much more used in the former’ sense than in the latter, To this
“uffect, we have a proverb: ‘We appease our hunger mostly by means of
“bread, and only seldom by means of sweetmeats; but that does not
“make the bread the primary and the sweetmeats the secondary (means
« of appeasing hunger ).’"’ | | |

Wenow proceed to show the difference between the Primary and the
Secondary meatfings: Though there is a coextensiveness of the meaning
of the word ‘agni’ with the mdnavaka, yet, in accordance with the rule
arrived at in connection with the word ‘«arund,’ as we find that there is
a denotation (by the word ‘ Agni’) if there is some similarity (hetween
that and the Boy), and none when there is no such similarity,—and also
that the word (‘Agnz’) is used also in connection with things other
than the Boy, when such things are found to have some sort of a similarity
with it, and not in connection with those that have no such similarity,—
it is this stmelarity (to, Agni) that is the necessary qualification ; and as
such it is this similarity that is the first to be denoted by the word
‘Ayn’; then inasmuch as the similarity to Agni cannot be cognized until
the Agnz or Fire itself 18 cognized, the Fire comes to be expressed even
before the Samilarcty ; and all the rest (in the sentence ‘agnirmdnavekah’), `
hemg mdicated by the relationship of that Similarity (which indicates the
Boy as qualified by it), does not come to be spoken of as directly expressed,
being, in this matter just like the Individual (which is held to be indicated
as the correlative of the Class which is denoted by the word). And we
have already explained that there are various common properties—such
as brightness etc.—belonging to the Fire and to the Boy, |
| Thus then, there being an actual difference between the Primary

and the Secondary, it becomes necessary to proceed with the question
started in the present Adhikarana.

Thus then, together with the three alternatives of the secondary
character spoken of under Sutra I—iv—23, there are nine such alterna-
tives as follows: (1) Indicating something after wholly renouncing its
Own meaning, (2) a mixture of both, (3) assumption, (4) operating with
the help of a companion word, (5) the two words taken together as one
composite whole, (6) the whole taken as a sentence, (7) the lesser extent
of its knowledge, (8) the lesser extent of usage; having shown the
‘mpossibility of admitting any of these eight alternatives, we have
established (above) the ninth definition of the secondary character.

| On the question started, we have the following

# `..." ` PORVAPAKSHA. | _
= ^ "4800609 as the word is always subservient to something else,
hoth the Primary and: the Secondary meanings are equal; because

i 2 व ~ S55 oa Pa |

1058 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADU, LI—PADA tt—aput. (1). .”

nothing more is gained by the direct denotation of » word. The advan-
“tage gained by this view is that, when we find, m the context of
* the Darga-Piirnamdasa, certain mantras with the word ‘ 2291129, we do
not find it necessary to remove these mantras to another sacrifice, even
¢" though there is no such deity as Pashan in the Darga-Pirnamasi
‘‘hecause the word ‘ Pishar’ indirectly indicates Agni, which 18 9 Doity
“at that sacrifice; while if any preference were to beeshown to the
` direct denotation of the word ‘ Pishan,’ thenit would be necessary to
‘remove the mantras from the context in which they are actually men
+“ tioned in the Veda. In the same manner, inasmuch as the word
“* * Agni’ would indicate the ‘ Sdrya,’ the Injunction (that ‘the ectype is to
‘be performed in the same way as the archetype’) would be duly fol
“ lowed, even without changing the words of the mantra (i.e. the Sauryu
“aru 18 8 modification or ectype of the Aynéya caru, and the mantra laid
“down for the latter being ‘ agnayé tva etc.’, when one comes to offer the
“ Saurya caru, he employs the same mantra; but as the Deity is not
“ Agni, but Sirya, in this case he changes ‘ Agnayé tvd’ into ‘ Suryayn
“ tea’; and this change would not be necessary according to the Pfirvu-
“ paksha, asthe word ‘ Agni’ would be as significant of Surya as of Agni?).”

SIDDHANTA.,

To the above, we make the following reply : Mantras become auxili-
aries to sacrifices, only on account of their capability of expressing cer-
tain meanings; and when they have this purpose served by their direct
Primary meanings, the acceptance of their secondary meaning would in-
volve the necessity of assuming another text.

That is to say, in accordance with the law laid down under the Sitra_
Il—i--31, the Mantras, even in their direct significations, lead to the
-asaumption of texts, pertaining to their application. And hence if we
were to accept them in their secondary signification, which totally aban-
dons the primary, then in both cases it wonld be necessary to assume
Vedic texts. And even while the mantra indicates the secondary meaning,
if it denote, beforehand, its primary meaning also,—then, inasmuch १४
thero would be no reason for passing over this primary,meaning, when
the text pertaining to that meaning has been once assumed, ‘all. the
requirements of the mantra, of the sacrifice in question, as also of the
Injunctions regarding the study of the Veda, will have been fulfilled by
that text; and hence there would be no ground for assuming any other
text; and the mantra could not be applied in its secondary 860868६ ` = `

_ Farther, the recitation of the mantra having its purposes fulfilled
{by its. primary meaning), there would be nothing. with its indicative

-CHOVPING MANTRAS APPLY TO THE PRIMARY. 1039

“power unsuppressed, which could point to its secondary meaning; and
hence the secondary meaning is rejected |

Then again, in # case where it is the secondary meaning that is
desired to be conveyed, why should the primary meaning be also signi-
tied P It cannot be urged that this latter is signified, as without this the
secondsry would not be possible; because this latter could be got at by
means of due pondering, etc

If the two meanings were taken as optional alternatives, then, there
being no permanence attaching to any one of them, in one case, the
mantra would be wholly meaningless; and if the primary meaning were
never lost sight of, then that would be a tacit admission of our view of the
yuestion.

And further, when the primary meaning of the mantra has been
duly cognized, 16 is not right to make it expressive of any other meaning ;
specitilly as the laying down of the mantra has its purposes served by
ifs primary meaning.

Thus then, the siitra should be interpreted as follows: Inasmuch
as the auxiliary character of the mantras is based upon their capability
of expressing a meaning, they could be connected only with their original
(primary) meanings; becanse that is the meaning with which they are
eternally and inseparably connected.

Siitre (2): The Mantra, being a sanctificatory agent, could not
apply to that which is not enjoined.

That the mantras of the Darga-Pirnumasa do not apply to Piashan,
etc., Which are not enjoined as its Deities, is only reasonable; because all
sunctificutions appertain to that which has to be sanctified ; and hence the
indicative power of the mantra, which is more authoritative than the
context, would make it applicable to Pdashan etc. and not to the Deities
of the Durca-Parnamasa

Question: ‘When these mantras have been removed from the place

mm which they are mentioned in the Veda, how could they be connected

with any Vedic actions? How too could the Indicative Power of the

mantras pertain to the Deity only, in the absence of an indication
" of their general applicability as subsidiaries to sacrifices ? ”

Answer: The mantras in question are spoken of as ‘ Yagamunantrann’ ;
and this name would serve to connect them with sacrifices ; and on account
of the indicative power of the words of the Mant as, they come to be
émployed in those sacrifices alone, at which Pishdn etc. are the Deities
— Concerned

That is to say, unless the mantras were related to a certain sacrifice,

1060 ` TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, 111-९404. H—ADHI. (1), 7

they could not be called ‘ Yagdmunantrana !; and hence it is this name
that points, in a general way, to the mantras being subsidiary to a sacri-
fice. And when we come to consider the question as to the. particular
sacrifice to which they should belong, inasmuch १8 they could not belong
to those to whom they are incapable of belonging, the indicative power
of the words of the mantras themselves come forward to point opt their
applicability to such sacrifices as are connected with the.Deities directly
denoted by the words'of the mantra (+ Pishan’ and the like). .

we कन ¢ । he ६.6 ६, 4 भ "क, (च 0 " ०७० ९. १ ="

ADHIKARANA (2).
[The Aindri mantras apply to the Garhapatya. }

Sitra (3): The Mantra could not be applied in its dire t
literal sense,because of the subsequent direction.

We now proceed to deal with an exception to the general rule arrived
at in the foregoing Adhikurana

‘The sentence cited in connection with this Adhikarana is—‘ nivécanch
sargamano vastinamile aindrya garhaupatyamupatishthaté’; and though this
maniva is as applicable to the sacrificial tire (G@rhapatya) as to Indra, yet,
the special mention of ‘aindryd’ shows that it is to be taken in its direct
sense, applying to Indra, Some people, however, take the present Adhi-
kavana as based upon the sentence ‘kad@ ca nastartras: , , , , Indra, ete.’

In both these sentences, however, the question is the same, viz.—Is
the mantra to be taken in tts direct literal meaning; and as such recited
wi descriptive of slndra ? or is it to be taken in its indirect meaning, and
therchy applied to the sacrificial fire, on the strength of the subsequent
direction £ |

Kven though we find the subsequent direction distinctly connecting
the Mantra with the sacrificial Mire, yet the Doubt is quite justifiable ;.
because, as in the case of the word ‘arunai’ (vide Arundidhikarana), so-
here also, the sacrificial Fire is not capable of being connected with a mantra
speaking of Indra. Then again, in the case of the word ‘arund,’ it was.
found that it was capable of being connected with the Purchase, through
its qualification of the sebstance ; in the present case, on the other hand,
inasmuch ‘as the relationship of a word with its meaning belungs to it
naturally, and is not produced by any scriptural Injunction, the ‘ gdrha-
patya’ could not, in any way, be connected with the Mantra in question
(the words whereof are found to be expressive of Indra). Because the
word ‘Indra’ (in ‘ Aindrya@’) can never denote the sacrificial Fire,

The sentence in quegtion shopld be taken as an injunction of tke
Description; because of the Afmanépada endiny in ‘ upatishthaté’; as, in
accordance with Pénini’s Sara I—iii—25, the root upa-stha with the Ai-
manépada affix.expresses an action in which the mantra is an instrument
and apart from Description, there is no other Action in which a Mantra
can he the. instrument. | Thus then, if we take the word ‘ Aindryd@’ witls

4

1062 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADM. UI—PADA 11-—ApHI.. (2). -

| upatishthaté,’ the Injunction should be recognized ag one of the Deserip.

tion of Indra; while if the word ‘ upatishthaté’ be taken with ‘ gdrhapat
yam, then the accusative ending in the latter word should make the
sacrificial Fire the object of description (by the Mantra). And which of
these two constructions 18 correct, and which incorrect, is extremely doubt-
ful. Specially as the sacrifiqjal Fire is not known as another meang of the
Description of Indru ¢

On the above question, then, we lave the following

-PURVAPAKSHA.

“In accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing
“ Adhikarana, the Mantra must be taken as applying to the Description of
“Indra. Then, as for the accusative ending in ‘ gdrhupatyam,’ it could
“be taken as indicating other agencies, such as the Locative or the
“Ablative etc.; just as in the case of the sentence ‘saktiin juhote,’ the
‘“acensative in ‘sakfun’ is taken as indicating the Instrumental ;—simi-
‘larly in the case in question, inasmuch as the objectivity (expressed
“by the Accusative) 1s found to be incompatible, we can not attach
‘any direct significance to it, and must take it as indicating mere agency
“in general, Consequently, in accordance with the Satra VI—i—1, the
“sacrificial Fire (Garhapatya) becomes subsidiary to the Description (of
“ Indra),

“Says the Bhashya—‘yuded upasthanarigéshanam sambandhad gitr-
५ hapatyacabdah. Some people explain this sentence as meaning that
* the word ‘g@rhapatya’ indicates Indra. Thus then, the word ‘ gdrha-
‘natyam’ becomes capable of being taken in two different ways: (1) the
५ Accusative ending may be taken in its indirect and the basic noun in
“its direct sense; or (2) the basic noun may be taken as indicating
“Tndra, through the fact of both (the Fire and Indra) being accessories of
“the sacrifice, and the Accusative ending may be taken in its direct
“sense of objectivity.

“The sentence of the Bhashya in question however could be taken
“as menning that the sucrificeal Fire is £ qualification of the Description,

५ --1.6., of the root-meaning apart frum the denotation of the affix (11

(4 ‹ [00060 {1॥ 006), 1080 18 to say, what is incompatible is the fact of the

` ५ Fire and the Mantra both pertainiug to the same Action ; i.e., the Fire can-
“not be the objective of that of which the Mantra is the instrument ; and the
“ Mantra cannot be the instrument of that of which the Fire is the objec-

“tive. Then in the word ‘upatishthaté, which is made up of a Verbal

= Root and an Affix, there are two functions mentioned : the Root denoting
` the standing, and the Affix expressing. Description. And we have al-

` (प्रणि MANTRAS APPLY TO GARHAPATYA 1063

“yeady explaingd the agency of the Fire with reference to the Description
“and what is mentioned is the fact of the Mire being the direct objective
“of that which is expressed by the affix. Thus then, the meaning of the
५ Injunction, contained in the sentence in question, comes to be that, ‘one
«should describe Indra while standing by the sacrificial Fire.’ Though
“on agcount of the denotation of the Affix being the predominant factor,
“it would be proper for the Fire to be spoken of as the objective of that,
yet, on account of its imherent incapability of being snch an objective
“it 18 separated from that and taken as the objective of that action which
“ig denoted by the verbal Root
“Kor these reasons, the Manéra in qnestion caunot be applied in its
«direct primary signification.”

SIDDHANTA.,

To the above, we make the following reply: On account of the sub-
sequent direction, the Mantra cannot be taken in its primary meaning.
Because when 11 becomes necessary to take one of the two—the Brdhmana
or the Vantra,—in its indirect secondary meaning, if is always the Muntra
that is so taken; becanse this latter is merely descriptive in its character

For instance, in the case in question, it is directly denoted by the
Accusative ending in ‘ g@rhapatyam,’ that this Fire is the objective of the
। principal action expressed by the affix (in ‘uputisthaté’); aud hence the
Aiabri mantra in question must be taken as to be employed in the des-
eription of that Fire. And then, if in consideration of the sabsequent
direction (‘aindry& gadrhaputyam upatishthaté’), the Mantra comes to lose
its primary signification, it must be accepted as an inevitable fact. Be-
cause it is absolutely necessary to take either the Brahimana (‘atudrya
garhapatyam ete.’) or the mantra (‘ nivégunah, etc.’) in the indirect scvon-
lary sense. But, as for the Br&hmana, inasmuch as it embodies the Injunc-
tion of something not mentioned elsewhere, it is the first to function;
and hence in a matter which is not amenable to the authority of any other
means of knowledge save the Vedic Injunction, such a Brdhman sentence
cannot be taken in the secondary sense. As for the Mantra, on the other
hand, it is found to be descriptive of things laid down in the Brakmuna
sentence, and hence it depends, for its functioning, upon that sentence ;
consequently it must be taken in its indirect secondary signification, as
apirt from its primary meaning, which is incompatible with the Brdah-
mana sentence

In this way we are gaved from the contingency of taking the Accnsa-
tive ag indicating agency in genera’, whereby the Fire could be connected
a8 @ qualification (as urged in the Piérvapaksha). Nor could the word

garhepatya’ in any way be etymologically explained as denoting Indra ;

1064. , TANTRASVARTIKA. ADH. 1I—PADA 1—abut. (2)

fonsequently the word cannot but be taken in its universally recognized
‘primary meaning of Fire

Sitra (4): Even though the relationship of the word to its
meaning is not created by scriptural injunctions, yet the
Description in question would pertain to the Fire, in°view
of certain common properties

Objection: ‘‘ As a matter of fact we find the mantra wholly. incap-
“able of being applied to the Fire. Because, in the first place, it involves
‘much trouble to take the word ‘Indra’ (in the muntra) in its secon-
“dary signification; and then too, imasmuch as there is not the least
“similarity (between Indra and Fire), the word could not, even indirectly,
‘indicate the Fire. Even a hundred directions could not make the word
५९ ‹ Indra’ capable of denoting the Fire. Nor is ‘Indra’ atechnical name
“for the Fire, like the technical name of ‘ gusa’ given to ‘at’ and ‘én’ ;
“because the relationship of the word to its signification is not known to
९८06 based upon scriptural injunctions,”

Reply: 10 18 quite possible for fire to be indirectly spoken of as
' 1०018, --( 1) because of the connection (of both with the sacrifice),
(2) because the word ‘Indra’ 18 made up of the root ‘tndd’ (which
signifies supreme lordship), and the Fire also is the ‘supreme lord’ over
its own actions (and as such it is quite capable of being called ‘ Indra’).

Thus then, there being no otler correct way of taking the mantra,
‘we cannot but take rt in its secondary sense,

0 ate ential +) क) a a gg OF ns

ADHIKARANA (3).
| (९ manigas speaking of ea/l/ag are to be employed in Catling. |

Sitva (6) : “The same may be said to be the case with Calling.”

We have dealt with the general rale that Mantras are to be taken in
their primary sense, and also with an exception to this rnle. We now
proceed to consider which cases are subject to the general rule and which
to the exception.

There is a mantra—‘ Havishkrt éhi ete.’—which speaks of the calling
of thé sacrificer’s wife, who prepares the offering material; and with re-
yard to this mantra, we have the following questiou: Is it to be applied to
that Calling, the mention of ‘threshing,’ in the direction accompauying the
mantra (‘itd triravaghnan Ghvayate’), being explained as pointing out the
time for the ‘calling’ ¢ Or, on the strength of the direction, the mantra
is to be applied to the ‘threshing,’ which is the first to be mentioned in
the Direction, and not to the ‘calling,’ to which it literally pertains ? If
‘the divection be construed as ‘havishkrt éhi itd avaghnan, Ghvayatié’ (while
threshing with the mantra havishkrt ete., he should call’), then the muntra
becomes subsidiary to tho Threshing. While if it be construed as ‘ avagh-
nun ébénahvayate etc. (‘while threshing, he calls with the mantra’), the
mantya becomes, from its very words, connected with the {Calling ’; and
then the Direction would be taken as Jaying down the number ‘three’
with reference to the maztra to be recited at the time of the Calling ;
in this case the word ‘avayhnan’ being taken as indicating the time (of
the threshing); and thus the Direction does not abandon its true signi-
lication; and the mantra also is applied according to its direct signifi-
cation, |

On this question, then, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“On account of the direct mention of the ‘ Threshing,’ and of the

“fact of the Calling’ being mentioned by the word of the Manéra itself

and lastly of the capability of the Threshing being taken, somehow or

other, as the ‘maker of the offering material’ (Havishkrt),—the mantru

cannot be taken in its literal sense; specially as, the property of

making the offering material’ belonging to the Threshing also, the latter
could be ingicated by the word ‘havishkrt’ in the mantra,

1394 ¢

1066 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, I1I—PADA 11~—ADHI. (3).

SIDDHANTA

Siztra (6): Not so; as it is the Injunction of time; because it
is actually known as such

Inasmuch as the subsequent Direction distinctly pertains to the
three-folit repelttion, it cannot be taken as laying down the. Mantra; speci-
ally as the affix (0८ › (in ‘avaghnan’) denotes a qualifying character
istic; and it is this characteristic that is referred to (in the Direction)

Phat 15 to say, the word ‘ avaghvan’ distinctly denotes the Agent as
subservient to the Root-meaning, being connected with the qualifying
characteristic (of Threshing, which forms that meaning); because such
is the force of the peculiar Present Participle Affix ‘gaty’—vide Pani
LI—ii—126. And thus our view of the case does not militate against the
direct meaning of any word. Consequently we must take the Direction
as enjoining the ‘three-foldness,’ with reference to all that has been said
before (viz. the calling, the reciting of the mantra, the Agent, etc., etc.):
and nothing else; as all else would bring about a split of the sentence.

Then as for the 4916, inasmuch as tts existence is implied by its
own inherent capability, it cannot be taken as enjoined by the Direction
in question ; and what the sZtra means by ‘ Injunction,’ is only mere
‘mention’ or ‘ Declaration.” Specially because the ‘ Threshing: itself has
been enjoined in the original Injunction ‘ vrihinavahants? ; but still it
comes to be pronounced thrice, hy being repeated three times ; consequently
the Direction in question must be taken as enjoining this Hepetition; ani
under the circumstances, it could not but be taken as enjoining the 771
As we have already explained, in connection with the direction ‘ yavaj7i
piko =bhydsah,’ that the Time and the Itepefition are the cause of each
other's Injunction. |

It has been urged by the Parvapuksha,; that “the Threshiny could he
taken as the § Huvishkrt.’ (maker of the offering material)” And to this,
we make the following reply :-— | a

Siti (1): Because of the non-existence of property.

In denying the application of the Maxtra to the Threshing, on account
of the non-existence, in it, of the property of ‘ Havishkrt,’—what w«
mean is that-il is not capable of being called (or addressed), which ‘calliny
1s distinctly mentioned by the words of the mantra
Or, the stitra may be taken to be an answer to an objection from oui
_ side,—this objection being—‘‘ Inasmuch as the Direction pertains te
: “the three-fold repetition, it cannot be taken as enjoining the क,
“whieh latter can be taken as pertaining to the ‘ Threshing,’ throngh the
‘direct denotation.of the words of the. Muntra itself.” _

; >: ० .

CALLING MANTRAS EMPLOYED IN CALIING, 1067

In this case, the sense of the reply, embodied in the sitva, would be
as follows :—Thongh you could, in some way or other, assume the Thresh-
ing to he the ‘ maker of the offering material,’ yet the subsequent word

fihvayat (Calls) would be absolutely meaningless, in regard to the
nanumate Lhreshing. Aud further, we find the Vocative case-ending
(in ‘ Havishkrt’), and then an order or request (to come) contained in the |
word ‘éhz,’ wltich is in the Second Person Singular; all this wonld he
absolutely méaningless if the Mantra were applied to the Threshing. On
the ‘other hand, when the Mantra is applied to the sacrificer’s wife, who is
an animate and intelligent being, all that has been tudicated becomes appli-
cable aud useful; consequently the words of the dautiat cannot be accepted
as applying it to the Threshing.

~+ Stra (8): Also, on account of the implications.

Close upon the sentence under consideration, we find the sentence
‘Vageat havishkrt, where we find the ‘maker of the offering material’
enlogised distinctly as a feminine ebaracter ; and this would be applicable
only to the sacrificer’s wifo; as otherwise (if it were taken as applying
to the Vhreshing), inasmuch as the action (of Threshiny) has not its
gender restricted to the feminine,—being, as a matter of fact, of an im-
` perceptible gender,—the eulogy in. question could be applied to it, only
indirectly, by applying the werd ‘ Kriya’ (whichis in the Feminine gender)

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the aanéra is subsidiary
to the Calling.

Stitr«e (9): There would be an incompatibility of the Injunc-
tion, if the mantra in question were taken as applying to
Threshing

Inasmuch as there are other mantras distinctly Jaid down in connec-
tion with the Threshing, these would be incompatible with the Piirvapaksha
theory; while as the manéra in question is the only one that is laid down
in connection with the Qalling, there would he no incongruity in its
being applied to the Calling.

at पि + a ^ a tl et Seal कः wee” Oe ae” * ot”

ADHIKARANA (4).

©

[The maniras speaking of Agniviharana are applicable to itself. |

Sitrea (10): 80 also with ‘rising’ and ‘giving vent.’

[In connection with the Jyotishtoma, we find the sentences, ‘ uttishtan
anvdha aguidaguin vihara? and “cratan kraufa tte vdicam cisrpati’s and
in reenrd bo these, there aries a question ५५ {0 whether the two mantras
‘ugnidayuin, ete.’ and ‘rratan krauta, ete. ave enjoined as applying to the
‘vising’ and the ‘giving vent to speech’; or these two latter are men-
tioned simply with the purpose of pointing out the time of the recitation
of the two maztras. |

The present, sétru is an Aéidéga-sittra, and as such all that has been
said under the foregoing Adhikarana is to he construed along with this
also. The only difference between the two cases is that in the previous
Adhikarana, it was the word (‘avaghnan’) in the subsequent direction
that was taken as pointing out the time, whereas the word taken as such
in the present instance occurs in the Injunctive sentence itself,

PURVAPAKSHA.

“The basis of the present Purvapaksha lies in the fact that in the
‘ease of the Directive sentence considered in the previous Adhikarana,
“we found that it could not be taken as enjoining the Mantra, because
‘it was taken up by the injunction of the three-fold repetition; and the
‘case with the sentences in question is not so,

“Says the Bhashya—‘ utthanéna agniridhyaté? (the fire is brightened
‘up by rising); and the sense of this is that the Rising is spoken of in
“the mantra, which thus would become subsidiary to the Rising; and
“then the mantra would cease to bo directive (in its signification); and
‘hence there being no second person to be addressed by the mantra (which
‘‘has to be simply recited by the sacrificer when rising), the Imperative
“afhx in ‘ohara’ will be taken in the sense of time present, and the
“agniviharana (walking round the fire) will be done by the priest; and

ag such it would be quite. possible for the Priests Risiny tu be mentioned
“by the mantra in question, which is distinctly found to speak of other
“actions of the same person

“In the same manner, the sentence ‘vratan krnuta may -bée. teken as

AGNIVIHARANA MANTRAS APPLY TO ITSELF. 1069

ai sponking of ‘vik’ (speech), just ke the sentence ‘ rah (7200014 '‡ €.
„ (9986 the speech being located in the month, the capability of the mouth
‘to observe the penance (२५८५) conld very well be attributed to the apeech ;
‘the sense of the sentence would thus be that ‘it is time to observe the
५८ penance of speech.’ As for the Plural number in ‘krauta, it conld be
“explained as based upon the plurality of speech due to the diversity of
५ {{8 location, iu the Palate; the Throat, etc., ete.”

SIDDHANTA.

Because of the non-eatslence of property (Silva 7)—thatis to say, inas-
much as the rising and the giving vent do not possess the qualifications
mentioned in the mantras,—this latter could not be applied to them,
This is what is meant by the answer given in the Bhashyu—-that if the
muntvas were to be recited in connection with the rising and the giving
ren, it would be so, only with a view to an unperceptible end. And
further, we shall explain later on that the Second Person is not possible
unless there ig a certain direction.

Then as for the ‘ Lingua’ (Indicative word, spoken of in Siitra 8), one
could be easily found, on looking closely into the Vedic texts.

Lastly, there would also be an incompatibility (of the Pérvapakshu
theory) with a distinct Injunction (Sutra 9); that is to say, we find a
distinct mantra—yah pacindmyshubhah, etc.’—enjoined in connection with
the giving vent to speech; and there would be nn infringement of this
Injunction, if the mantra ‘ vratam, etc.’ were applied to the same Action.

ADHIKARANA (5)

(The Suktavtka is subsidiary to the Offering of the grass-bundle |

Sita (11); “In the Siktavika we have the injunction of time,
because it is subservient to the purpose of something else.”

{In connection with the Duarcu-Parnumasa we find the sentenc
siiktavakéna prastaram praharafe’ ; and there arises the question as to
whether this sentence lays down the Siktacdka as subsidiary to the Offeriny
of the yrass-bundle, ov 16 only indicates the Time, Ayd on this question we
have the following — |

PURVAPAKSBHA.

“The 4४ (71 एत व (1.e., the mantra ‘Idan dyfviprithivi, etc.’) serves the
“purpose of pointing out the Deity, and the Prastura (the Bundle of
‘‘ 1088) serves as the place for the keeping of the Sruk; and hence both of
‘these, having their purposes served independently of each other, do noi
५६ stand in need of being related to each other by the‘relationship of the
‘“ Primary and the Subsidiary ;—and hence the sentence must be taken as
“ pointing out the Lime. The Instrumental ending in ‘ siktavdkéna’ may
“ be explained as indicating the qualification (Panint 11-11-21).

“The Bhashya speaks of the Bundle of grass having tts purpose fulfilled:
‘and the sense of this is that inasmuch as the Bundle of grass is the
५८ objective of the Pratipattikarma (offering of Disposal), it has a certain
“predominance attaching to it; and as such it conld not be takenas
“subsidiary, either to the Siktavaka, or to the Deity mentioned in the
५८ Suktavaka. In the same manner the Siaktavaika also, together with the
“Deity (therein mentioned), is not capable of being taken as subsidiary to
“the Bundle of grass.”

SIDDH ANTA.

92४, (12): The sentence contains an Injunction (of the mantra
with reference to the Offering of the Grass-Bundle); as other-
wise the name ‘ Yajya&’ could not be applied to it, without
reason. :

, . In the sentence ‘ sékiavakéna prastaram praharati’ we: find ‘that the
Sukétavtka is distinctly mentioned as connected with..the:-aaion (of
Praharana, offering); and the Instrumentality thus distinctly: mentioned

SOKTAVAKA SUBSIDIARY TO GRASS-BUNDLE-OFFERING, 1071.

cannot be set aside; specially because of the great authority attaching to
the signification of the case-ending (in ‘siktavékéna’). Thus then, the
word ‘s#ktavaka’ would, in its direct: meaning, be connected with the
Action; otherwise what would be connected with the action would be the
time indirectly indicated by the Sa@ktavaka, And it is only the Siktavaka
that is taken as subsidiary to the Action; and being thereby similar in
character to the other subsidiaries of sacrifices, it becomes capable of
having the name ‘yd@jya’ applied to it;—as is done in the declaration
siktavaka evt yajyacabdah | |

In connection with this last declaration, a side-question is raised as
to whether the Sé#htavdka is a real Yayyda, or the name is applied to it
only figuratively. ‘The difference made by these two is very great; for
instance, if it be a real Yajyd, all the accessory details laid down in
connection with Yajyas would apply to the Saktavaka also,—such details
as ate mentioned in the sentences, ‘dsind yajati, ‘anavinam yazuts,
‘yapyaya adhi vashatkarott, ‘purdnuvdkyaiica prathamam. praywhkté’ ;
while if the name were applied to it only by way of Praise, then none
of the said details would have to be observed.

On this side-question, we have the following Péirvapaksha: “All the
“said details should be observed; because a ‘ ४ 7 1/2 ` is that whereby
“a sacrifice 25 performed ; and as a sacrifice is performed by means of the
` ^ Saktavaka, thereds no doubt as to this latter being a real Yay ya.

“ Against this, the following argument might be urged: ‘The feminine
“affix (in ` 0/4 ' ) would not be compatible with the Siktavika, which,
“not being a Rk, is devoid of the feminine character.’

* But this does not affect our position; becanse we find the name
“* 1410 ' applied to the samid yi7ya, ete., which are not ke

“Then, it might be urged that—‘in the case of the sacrificial
“accessories, mentioned in the Yayurveda, we tind that even thongh they
“are accessories in the performance of sacrifices, they are not called
^ 4 17/४4 ' ; and hence the mere fact of being accessory in the performance

of sacrifices cannot be sufficient ground for the application of the name
"` Fazy&; hence that alone should be accepted as Yayya, which is actually
spoken of as ‘ Yayya

“ Bat, in that case, inasmuch as we have the declaration ‘ saktavaku eva

/% ४0 ` the said accessory details would certainly apply to the Saktavaka,

Nor can this declaration be taken us applying the name only figuratively ;

‘because we find the two quite proximate to each other—which is the
rincipal basis of direct relationship |

“Then again, the word ° $तु्ते ' is a generic term; and as such conld

not be taken as applying to certain definite things only, unless we had
a definition distinctly laid down (as governing its application) ; and such

1072. TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1—pApa t—apur, (5).

‘“a definition would be something like this: ‘That which, mentioned 111
“the section on Homa, is found to be an auxiliary in the performance of
“sacrifices, is Yajya’; and this definition would be quite applicable to the
“ Saktardka. Consequently, it must be admitted that the Suktavaka isa
‘ real Frigyd, and this name is directly applicable to it

In reply to this, we have the following Siddhanta arguments. That
mantra, by which the sacrificing priest offers the sacrifice to the Deity
connected with that sacrifice, is the Yajya@; because such is the univer-
sally recognized fact, And, as a matter of fact, the Saktavdka is not such
a mantra. |

As a rule, in all Primary sacrifices, everything connected with it is
recognized as appearing in some such form as serves some useful purpose
in the action. And as for the character of the ‘ Yajy@,’ it is found to
consist in the fact of a mantra being laid down as serving the purpose of
pointing to the Deity of the offered material. As for the Sukfavaka, 10 has
not been mentioned, in the orginative Injunction, as servmg the purpose
of pointing to the Deity of the grass-bundle; as all that it does, 1s to men-
tion the Deities to whom offerings have been made.

It might be urged that the indicative power of the words of tle
Siktavaka would be set aside by the superior authority of tho Direct
Declaration (‘ sthiavdkéna prastaram praharatz’ ).

But this is not possible; because we shall show «dn the next sétra.
that the Direct Declaration of a text is incapable of restricting the applica-
tion of the mantra unless it is supported by the indications of the words
of the mantra itself,—this capability being as pronounced as that of
the declaration ‘ agnind siitcate.’

Thus, then, we cannot admit the Gaklavaka to be a real द्वपत, Nor
is there any such Yaya, as in which being contained, the Siktavaka could
take to itself the details laid down for the Yajya

It is a well-known fact that when an action has been previously
recognized as a ‘sacrifice,’ if a certain accessory of 1t happens to be men
tioned subsequently, that Accessory becomes known as ‘ Yajya.’ And in
the case in question, we find that the offering of the grass-bundle has never.
been cognized as a ‘sacrifice,’ before it came to be connected with the
Siktavaka (in the sentence ‘siiktavikéna prustaram praharati’); and
thus there would be a mutual interdependence: the said offering being:
a sacrifice because of its connection with the Ydajyd in the shape of the
Siktavaika, and this latter being a Ydajya because of its connection with
the sacrifice in the shape of the offering of the grugs-bundle, ५
` This argument might be met in tho following manner; “Hven
* without being uamed ‘ Vajya, the Saktuvdkha, merely as such;.could ver)
“well be applied to the sacrifice, and then, it would become thoe¥ajy4

SOKTAVAKA SUBSIDIARY TO GRASS-BUNDLE-OFFERING. । 1073

‘by reason of its connection with the Offering (Praharana) in which the
“predominant element is the sacrificial character, which is pointed out by
“its connection with the Deity mentioned in the Yajya@ mantra (and thus
“there. would be no mutual interdependence ).”’

To this we make the following reply: That which has not been
known 98 ‘ Yajy@,’ either in the oviginative Injunction, or in its applica-
tion,— how could it ever, subseqnently, be known as having that `
character P

That is to say, it is only sach a word as 18 wholly anknown,—the
word ‘yipa’ f.i.,—that can be taken in a sense indicated by the use to
which it is subsequently found to be put. Tho word ‘ एतत, however, |
18 one that has its meaning well known, both at tho time of the origina-
tive Injunction, an at that of its application ; and as such it does not
stand in need of any subsequently appearing character. As for the ac-
cessory details laid down in connection with the दते, inasmach as
these are found to have acquired an existence, in connection with the
previously known sacrifices, they could not stand in need of the Yajya-
character, which would be acquired with great difficulty. If the Siktuvaka
were ® modification of the Yajyd, then its ‘ yijya’-character would be as-
certained by its functions, just as the yapu-character of the Paridhd and
the Khalévali. As a matter of fact, however, it is a Primary in itself ;
‘and hence the knowledge of its qualifications (or accessory details) could
not depend upon its functions; and consequently the qualifications of the
Yajy@ could not apply to it.

Thus then, in the declaration — suktavaka va yazyaA'—the word ‘ eva’
implies the fact of the name being applied to the Séktavaka figuratively ;
because the use of that word would have been possible only in case the
name ‘ {0} 1/0 ' were applied to something that is not Yazya, and not when
1८ was applied to a real Yajya. For instance, in the next sentence —
‘Prastara Ghutik’—the Bhishya does not use the word ‘éva’ ; for the
simple reason that the Ahutiisreal, That is to say, the word * Prahurana’
does not apply to all sacrifices; but it is distinctly a Homa ; because it
consists of the netual throunnyg in of the offering also (and not a mere
offering). Just 03 the Aghara etc, acquire the character of Homa. because
of their consisting in the action of Pouring, so, in the same manner, tle
‘Praharana’ has that character, on account of its consisting in the action
of throwing in |

Then again, the name ‘ Yaya’ is never meant to be directly applicable.
ty the accessories ‘of Homa; and the uname is specially precluied from the
Saktaritka, hy the fact of this latter being a Niyada (Prose), which is
"ecognized on account of its being repéated in the manner of Prose. And

ne applicability of the name * Fayyt’’to all nigadas has beén distinctly
189 |

1074. WANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, UI—pApA tt—AbHI, (5).

prohibited, in the declaration—' दुत क eva nigadah,’ as it is with the help
of Rk mantras alone that sacrifices are performed, |

Though the name is thus precluded, yet the Bhiishya applies it, by
way of eulogizing the Suktavaika, as by being connected with the Yajya
the 6४८५४१४५ becomes highly praised. Nor can the declaration he
taken as meant to be a glorification of both,—as in that case the glorifica.
tion would be wholly groundless (because the basis of glorification lies in
the fact of one of them being far superior to the other).

920८2, (13): It serves the purpose of indicating the Deities,
because of its connection with them.

It has been argued above, in the Pirvapaksha, that “inasmuch as
the Saktavika has its purpose duly fulfilled by the indication of the Deity,
it cannot be employed over again (in connection with the offering of the
-grass-bundle).”’

To this we make the following reply: If the Direct Injunction and the
Indication of the mantra words pointed to two distinct subsidiary charac-
ters for the Sik/avaka, then alone could there be a contradiction (and
conseqnent rejection) of the latter by the former, As a matter of fact,
however, both point to the same character; and as such there can be no
contradiction

Thatis to say, though it is quite true that the words of the Saktavaku
itself point to the fact of its serving the pur pose of indicating the Deity,
yet this indicative capability does not disappear from it, when it is em-
ployed in connection with the offering of the grass-bundle; because in this
latter it is not employed in any other way (than the one justitied by the
indications of the words). The fact is that the capability of the Sikta-
_ vaka to indicate the Deity stands in need of a reconciliation with the

Direct Declaration ‘ siktavakéna prastaram praharati’; and this latter
Declaration also, finding the Saktavaka itself making no mention of the
said ofering,—and finding itself incapable, in the absence of such indica.
tiveness (of the offering), of applying it to the said ofering,—and yet not
taking upon itself the responsibility of creating a fresh indicative potency
—keeps looking out for some such way in which the Siktaraka could be
employed in the work mentioned by it, and yet not stepping beyond
what is signified by the words of the mantra itself. Now then, as a rule,
8 Mantra becomes subsidiary to a sacrifice, only when it speaks of eithe
. the Action itself, or certain accessories thereof, And the very first way
in which it becomes. related as a subsidiary is that the mantra should
‘speak of the well-known form of the Primary Action itself; but when
४.19 not fonnd capable of speaking of any of the well-known details of the

SOKTAVAKA SUBSIDIARY 10 GRASS-RUNDLE-OFFERING, 1075

sacrifice, then it is taken the other way :—that is to say, we are led to
the conclusion that ‘what is mentioned by this mantra is certainly present
in this Action’; as otherwise it could not be subsidiary to it, as is dis-
tinctly declared to be the case.

For these reasons, we conclude that the Direct Declaration —‘ Sitkta-
vakéna prastaram praharati’—addresses the mantra thus: ‘ While express-
ing what you already do, please help in the accomplishment of the
Offering of the grass-bundle’; and the mantra replies in the following
strain: ‘I will do all that I can do, while indicating the desired Deity,’
And if the Deities ‘desired ` were only those connected with previous sacri-
fices, then the mantru could not accord any help to the offering (of the grass-
bundle); if, however, these very Doities were connected with this offering
also, then, by indicating these, the Sakéavdku would be according a dis-
tinct help to the accomplishment of the offering of the grass-bundle.
Theaé' Deities too are not known as to be employed in any other capacity,
save that of serving as Deities; and hence the Deities spoken of in the
Siktavaka, could not be anything other than Deities, in the said offering
also. Thus then, the substance ‘grass-bundle’ being spoken of as an
offering material, and Agni and the rest (spoken of in the Séktuvaka)
heing Deities, the offering comes to be known as @ sacrifice; and it further
comes to be recognized as the particular kind of sacrifice known as
Homa,’ because it consists of the further action of Throwing in.

And thus there is no contradiction between the Direct Declaration
and the Indications of the mantra.

Thus then, the meaning of the stra comes to be this: In the case
of the Offering also, the Suktavaka serves the purpose of indicating the
Deity ; because the Offering is connected with the sume Deities.

And as for the pointing ont of the time, this also would he done by
the Saktavaka, by the way; because in the order that is laid down for the
reciting of the mantras, the Saktavaka is known as appearing at a definite
time,

Says the Bhashya: ‘yadyagniridam havirajushata ity@vamidyéva
८११४९८८, etc, ete.” The sense of this is that even before the declaration
` sitktuvtkéna prastaram praharat:,’ it is found that a portion of the Siktu-
-vaka-mantra itself is capable of connecting it with the Offering in question.
Though the capability of the Mantra 18 equally applicable to all offering
materjals, yet,-on the strength of the Direct Declaration in question, the
sentence ^ yadanéna havisha, etc.’ must be taken as refering to the Bundle
of grass, Or it may be that: from the very beginning, the word ‘idan
(this) refers to the grass-bundle; for the simple reason that the other
materials—-Pwrodaga and the like—are not present at the time. -

Nog can it ba urged that, in that case, the word ‘ajushata’ would be

1076 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. (11—PADA 11-—apH, (5).

meaningless. Because all that it does.is to eulogize it, as already known
to have been respected and followed (accepted)

Consequently there can be nothing incongruous in the Sthtaviky
being subsidiary to the Offering of the grass-bundle

Sutra (14): If it be urgedthat “the Action is a Pratipatti
(an offering of Disposal).

This s#tra may be taken either as recapitulating an objection, or as
actually bringing forward the objection. The sense of the objection is
this: ‘How could the Saktavaka, or the Deities Agni etc., be subsidiary
“ to the Offering of the grass-bundle, which is a secondary action ? ”’

In reply to this we have the next stéra.

9८1" (144): Like the Svishtakrt, it could be both (Yaga and
Pratipatti).

We have broken up Siétra (14) of the Bhaishya into two sitra
as this splitting has been indicated (as desirable) by all old teachers,

Just as the Seishtakrt-offering is both an independent sacrefice, and
a Disposal-offering,—so, 111 the same manner, the Offer/ng in question also
would be both. And the mantras would be subsidiary to this latter,
exactly in the same way as they are to the former. .

And certainly the character of the Disposul-offering is not imcon-
patible with that of a sacrifice, As what the sacrifice consists of is the
bringing about of a certain relationship between the Deity and the Offer-
ing material, And when a certain action has been thus recognized as a
sacrifice, then follows the consideration of the question as to whether it
18 a Disposal-offering or an Independent sacrifice; and it comes to be
taken as the former, if it is found to fulfil the conditions laid down under
Sutra 1 ४-11-19, Certainly there can be no incongruity in this.

Thus it 18 the Independent sacrifice and the Disposal-offering that are
meant by the word ‘ubhayasamskdra’ (in the sitra).

Or, the sijtra may be taken as follows: Just as the Svishtukrt offer-
ing 18 only meant to be a purification (sunskara) of the substance, because
the Svishtakyt, having had its purposes fulfilled, is auxiliary to Agni; an‘
yetb this offering does not lose its sacrificial character,—so, in the same
manner, even though the two—the Siltavaiku and the grass-bundle-—may
have their purposes already fulfilled, yet they would be purificatory of
each other; and as bringing about a transcendental result by means of
their mutual restriction, the offering of that grass-bandle. with that
mantra would have the character of the sacrifice 9180. = <: *

Or, again, the sense of the sittra. may be this: dn the. Sueshtaks!

+ ताता SUBSIDIARY TO GRASS-BUNDLE-OFFERING, - 1077

‘also, we find the mantra—‘ uyddagnih, etc.,’ which speaks of Deities; and
hence this forms au instauce of the matual puryication spoken of above. |
किणः is it necessary that the mantra cannot be subsidiary to a Dis-
posal-offering. Because such an offering is distinctly seen to serve &
useful purpose ; and for the sake of the bringing about of the transcen-
dental result, proceeding from the Restriction laid down, it would certainly
.tand in need of certain Vedic accessorics (in the shape of the mantra, ete. ).
Ana thus there can be nothing incongruous in applying the Siktavaku

to the Offering of the grass-bundle,

we Te I ET MN AN pte ee 2 = ष ®

ADHIKARANA (6).
(The Saktavakas are to be applied in accordance with their significttions. ]

Sittra (15): “The whole is to be recited on both occasions:
because it is enjoined as one complete whole.”

Reverting to the original subject of the Durga-Parnamdsa, we proceed

to consider the question as to whether the whole of the Saktavaka is to be

recited at the Darcaas well as at the Parnamdasa sacrifices, or portions of

it are to be extracted in the case of each of these, in consideration of

the Deities (connected with the sacrifives and spoken of by the Mantras).
And on this question we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“The whole of it is to be recited at each of the two sacrifices. Be-
“cause it 18 the mantra, as 16 appears in the text, that is called the
५ ८ Saktavaka’; and if extracts were made from it, 1४ would cease to be
‘* Saktavaka ; and hence in this latter case, the Offeri ng of the grass-bundle
“would be made with a mantra that is not Siktavdku (and that would be
‘fan infringenent of the Injunction ‘ siktavdkéna prastaram praharati’).”

SIDDHANTA.

Siitra (16): It is to be employed in accordance with. what it
signifies; because it is the purification of an Auxiliary.

That there are always extracts made out of such Mantras has been
explained under the Stutacastrddhikarana (Sittras I[—i-13-29) and the
Pashadyanumantranadhikarana (Satras XTI—iii-29), If the Deities men-
tioned in the Suktavaka mantras were such as belonged to the offering of the
grass-bundle only, and were wholly different from those belonging to the
Darca and the Pirnamasu sacrifices,—then in that case, the whole of it
could have been recited at each of the two sacrifices. As a matter of fact,
however, we find that the mantras speak of the same Agni etc, that are the
deities of the sacrifices; and as such there is no ground for making 4
difference (between the Deities of the Darga-Parnamdasa, and those spoken
of: in the mantras); we must admit that what the mantras.-:do is
‘simply to indicate the Deities to whom the sacrifices have been.offered, and
that the offering of the grass-bundle is not the sole motive cauag:of the

SUKTAVAKAS EMPLOYED ACCORDING TO MEANING. 1079

recitation of the Sakiavaku. For the simple reason that it is based upon
the Deities that have been employed at the Primary sacrifices (of the
Darga and the Piirnamésa.), it is concluded that the Saktavaka, as well as
the offering of the grass-bundle, is subservient to those Primary sacrifices,
Aud as for these Primary sacrifices, they are performed in connection
with their respective Deities, and not equally with all the Deities (of the
0077 and the Ptrrzamfsa). Consequently, of the Gitakavaka also, it is
necessary to make extracts (fitting in with the sacrifice at which it 18 to
be recited ).

Sutra (19): Objection: ‘‘On account of the name (there could
be no extracts).”

“Thatis to say, how could you explain the name ‘ Saktavdka’ (which
“certainly could not apply to mere extracts from it)?”

Sutra (18): Reply: The word ‘complete whole’ would apply to
the parts (of the mantra, recited on two different occasions) ;
because both would appear in the same Context (of the Darga-
21910889).

There are two performances of the gruas-bundle offering ; because 16

has to be perforraed at two different times—one on the occasion of the

Dargu and another on that of the Parnamasa. Consequently the whole

name of ‘ Saktavdka’ would apply to these two recitations on the two

occasious (taken jointly). Because the whole of the Saktavaka is known
as an auxiliary to both (the Darga and the Pirnamasa); specially as
both of these appear in the same context. When, however, we consider
the case of the grass-bundle offering alone, then the Siktavaka comes to be
recognized as connected with each of the constituent sacrifices,-—just
like the Préyuniya, the Udayaniya, the Lkddagini and the Odturvidhadhana.

And thus there is no incompatibility among the Direct Declaration

(‘siiktavdkéua prastaram praharaty’), the Indicatious by the mantra-words

(of the sacrificial Deities), and the Context (of the Darga-Parnamisn),

The above is the exposition of the Siddhanta, as contained in the
sitva, But the Bhashya takes exception to that exposition, on the
following grounds

“What has been said ubove is not possible, becuuse those that are
‘ dependent upor something else cannot be connected with the method. of

procedure, That is to say, if the Injunction (of the Saktavdta) were
with reference to the method of the Primary sacrifices (ef the Darga

1686 ss TANT RA-VARTIKA. ADB. 11—PADA 1--+ एषा, (6)

4 Pirnamasa), then, the whole of the Siakiavaka. would 96 recited jy
© connection with both (the Darca and the Pairnamasa ।

“That is to say, the Primary sacrifices are laid down with reference
“to a certain result, aud not with reference to the method ; consequent!
“itis only with regard to the Result,—and not with regard to the Method
‘—that they could be meant to be taken in combination (with one
“another). Because it is the method that 1s laid down with referece to
“the Pmmary sacrifices; as otherwise, if it were not so laid down, it
“could not form an auxiliary to these sacrifices ; and then, if the method
"^ 06 taken as enjoined, then, inasmuch as 2६ would be wholly impossible
‘for this method and the Primary sacrifices to be enjoined with reference
“to each other,—as that would leave them wholly unconnected,—the
“ Method could not but be taken as enjoined with reference to the Primary
“sacrifice, And inasmuch as these Primary sacrifices are uddécyas (i.e.
“those with reference to whom something is enjoined), no significance
“can be attached to their combination, which is denoted by the Dvandva
“compound (‘ Darca-Pirnamdsibhyim’). Consequently, the sentence
“Jaying down the method being taken as complete with each one of those.
“sacrifices, each of the Primary sacrifices must be accepted to he
“connected with the whole of the method; and the performance also
“coming to be done accordingly, inasmuch as each of the six Primary
“sacrifices constituting the Dargea and the Puruamdsa, performed at
“different points of time, would be complete in itself, the Recitation of
“the Saktavaka would be done but once, and would apply to all the rest.
“Thus then, though the Siktavika may not be repeated with each of the
“six. Primary sacrifices—the Aynéya and the rest,—like the Prayaja, yet
“the whole of it will have to be repeated once on the occasion of the
५९ Darea, as well as once on that of the Parnumfsa. As otherwise, the
Pruyaja eto. also would have to be performed in parts, for which there
“would be no authority at all. Consequently, on account of the superior
“authority of Direct Declaration (‘siktavakena etc.’), we should set
“aside the Indications of the mantra-words; and take the Siaktavaka
“(as apphed to the grass-bundle offering) either in an indirect secondary
^ 86186, or as leading to certain imperceptible results, or as indicating,
‘for the offering, other Deities (than those related to the Darca-Parna
५ masa)

“८ Qnestion: ‘When, as a matter of fact, the combination (of the
“ Darga and the Pirrzamfsa) is 191 down as the means of attaining the
-“yesult (Heaven), why should the method he connected with the con
“* gtituent parts of these sacrifices, which. parts are not the enjoime:
“means tothe Result?’ =~ a ee
` ` ५ Ansicer: Inasmuch as each of the inherent parts of the sacpifice is

SUKTAVAKAS EMPLOYED ACCORDING TO MEANING, - 1081

८ connected with the Result, how dq you make out that it is the Combina-

«sion that brings about the Result ? |

“That 18 to say, the character of sacrifice inheres in each of the
“constituent sacrifices; and the root expressive of that (sacrifice)
५ distinctly points to the fact of the potency of bringing about the Result
“ belonging to the sacrifices (forming the Darga-Parnamfsa) as depending
“ gpon one another ,

„ “Objection: ‘Inasmuch as the means to the Result is specitied by a
“compound name expressive of the Oombination, the Root (‘ yagi’) also
५८ would be taken as denoting the combined sacrifices

“ Reply: Not so; because it is the Name, that, depending upon the
‘‘ Root, applies to each of the sacrifices (and the Root is not dependent
‘upon the Name),—as we have already shown under the Paurnamdsya-
“dhikarana. Consequently, even when the Root (‘yaji’) occurs together
“with a Name, all that is meant is that the constituents are companions,
“and not that it is only a combination of them that can bring about the
“ Result.

“ Objection : ‘Thus then, jast as the potency of bringing about the
“yesult belongs to the constituent parts as associated with one another,
“80; 111 the same manner, the method also, as helping the accomplishment
“of that Result, would pertain to them as thus combined.’

“ Reply: Not so; because, inasmuch as the Combination appears to
“be spoken of in connection with a thing with reference to which some-
“thing else is enjoined,—it cannot be accepted as significant, with
“reference to the Method; because it is a very common occurrence that
“the same thing is regarded as significant in one place, and not in all

places, — .

Question :,‘ How is it possible that one and the same thing should;

“at one and the same time, be the Predicuted, and also that with refer-

“ence forwhich something else is predicated ¢ '

“Answer: We have already explained that such contingencies are
quite possible, according as the thing in question is taken along with
one thing or the other

Objection : ‘ Sach a diversity would lead to a syntactical split.’

^ Reply : Certainly; who is there that does not admit the sentence,
“—which lays down the method with reference to the Primary sacrifice

and which is inferred from the texts appearing in the Context,—to be

distinct (syntactically) from.that.which is directly mentioned (viz. the
sentence Darga-Parnanasabhyam syargakamo yazéta )

“ Objection: ‘The mnatual combination (of the constituent. sacrifices)
“though meant for the accomplishment of the Result, would certainly `

136

1082. «ss TANTRA-VARTIEA. ` ADH, UI-——-PADA 1I—ADHI.: (6)

‘force itself to attention at the time of the connection of the Method; and
‘there would be nothing to set it aside | |
4 Reply: It is true that it could not be set aside from mere cognition
“ but it could very well be set aside from the Injunction, “Because, in this
‘‘ case, certain intervening Injunctions being assumed as appearing afte
“the Injunction of “the qualified Bhavana, the Agent, while becoming
“ engaged in that element of the Action which brings about the Result
“comes to take up also the association (or combination) of actiona;. just
‘“‘as (in the case of the Injunction ‘ Pagund yajéta) he takes up the
singleness of the animal; but'as regards thes method-element ‘of the
“Primary sacrifices, inasmuch as he does not take up these Primary
“ sacrifices, he does not take up the combination of these either’; though
“ he 18 engaged in the subsidiary sacrifices combined together, For these
reasons, no significance can be attached to the Oombination with reference
‘“‘to the Method; just as none is attached to the singleness of the Vessel
“(in the sentence ‘graham sammdarshti’), And further, a single word,
‘expressive of the Primary sacrifice, while’ referring to the. Primary
‘sacrifice (Darga) for the sake of the (injunction of) tho subsidiary
“sacrifices, could not lay down the said combination; as that would
involve a duplicity of syntactical connection
‘Thus then, it must be admitted that the method applies. to each of
“the Primary sacrifices; and the following reasons are given for this
(1) Because every one of them is equally nearly related (to the method)
` ““ (2) because every one of them is equally mentioned as the means to
“the desired end; (3) because not one of them has anyother method
“ laid down for itself; (4) because the Context, in the shape of the want
‘of the Procedure, is equally applicable to every one of them; and
“hence the whole Context must be taken as belonging to every ०९ of
“them |

“Thus then, the position taken up in S#tra 17 remains untouched.’

Having, jn the above manner, demolished the position taken up by
thé Siddhanta sitra (18), the:anthor of the Bhashya proceeds to lay down
his own exposition of the Siddhanta, in the words—‘It is not 50, etc
« 180 18 to say, the Siktavaka cannot “be taken, either. as applying
indirectly (to the Offering in question), or as leading to an inperceptible
Result, or as indicating other Deities; because all these contingencies
have been shown.to be impossible; स: ८ म
| Consequently, we conclude that- when éxtracts “are madé-out of: the
` Qtktavaka, 10. accordance with: the significations of its various parts, each
of these extracts becomes # Sukiavdka ;. because there are many. Saktavakas

SOKTAVAKAS EMPLOYED ACCORDING TO MEANING. 1083

specially. as. we find that the various mantras ‘Ayninidam etc
(constituting the Saktavika),——-which are capable of. indicating several
Deities. connected with. different sacrifices, serving. distinct purposes
independently of one another,—do not form a single sentence ‘by being
gyittactically connected. Hence it must be admitted that there are many
Suktavakae. (contained in the ‘S#kéavdka’)—each of which is supplied
with elliptical. portions from that which precedes as also from that which
‘follows it. For instance,~(1) there is one अद्रवत, beginning with the
mantra ‘Idam. dydivdprthivi, etc.’ and ending with ‘agniridam, etc.’; (2)
while there is another beginning with ‘ Idam dyavatpythivi, etc.’ and ending
with ‘soma adam, etc

Thus then, we find that among these Siktavakas, which differ with each
different Deity, and which are amenable to the same procedure of recita-
tiou,—there are some that are recited as common to many. And hence
whighever.of these may be recited at the Offering of the grass-bundle, the
offering will:have been done with the Saktuvdka (as declared in the injunc- `
tion, ‘siktavakéna prastaram praharatc'). Because, just as a single class
inheres in many individuals, so, in the same manner, the character of the
Suktavaka, which consists in being a ‘well-sacd saying,’ would inhere in
every one of those recited. And the word ‘siktavdka’ being thus found to’
be applicable to each of them, if those mantras, or words of mantras, that
“ave found to be indicative of Deities not connected with the Action jw
course of performance, are not recited,—that does not constitute an in-
fringement of any Direct Declaration; what is infringed and rejected —
18 the Context; but as this rejection is done on the superior strength of the
Indicative Power of words and Syntacticnl Connection, there is nothing
objectionable in it

or these reasons, it must be admitted that we should make use of
-extracts from the Siaktavika

As a matter of fact, however, even this exposition of the Siddhdnta
is not quite right, Because it is a clearly perceptible fact that the
.Whole forms. a single sentence, as is shown by there being certain
words that are. to be. used as: common to all the mantras concerned ; just
४8 in the case of the sentence speaking of the Vazgudnara. Then again,
(for ‘a number of sentences to be taken as ‘syntactically connected) it is not
necessary that every one of the words of one sentence should stand in
1660 of the conntction with those of the other sentence; as even if a
single word: happens to cbnuect # number of sentences, they are taken to-
gether as one dénterice. . For instance, in the vase of the sentence ‘ arunayd
Pingakshya tkahayanya, etc.’ we find that, even though these words are

1084 ss taNTRA-VARTIKA: “ADH, 11—PIDa apa. (6); ` `

not.connected with one. another, yet'all of them being connected with the.
single word ‘ krindtz,’ are taken as syntactically connected.. In the same
manner, in the case in question all the mantras are found to be connected
with the words ‘yadanéna havish@ dgdehté, etc.’; and as such they must
be taken as syntactically connected and forming a single sentence. And .
then again, all of them are found to serve the same prupose of indicating
the sacrificial Deities; and there are certain words that are common to
many,—which fact makes them dependent upon portions of one another.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that though every one of the
sentences 18 complete within itself, as regards its meaning,—yet, inas-
much as they are all enjoined with reference to the Offering (of the grass-
bundle), all of them combined should be taken as forming a single sen-
tence. = |

If'each of them were a distinct sentence by itself, then we would
have the following anomalies: (1) each of them would have to be recited
Separately, because at the time of the performance the Deity is the princi-
pal factor ; just as in the case of the mantras of the Upasad, Dakshini, etc.,
and (2) inasmuch as the singular number (in ‘ siktavakéna’) would be
significant with reference to the offering of the grass-bundle, its require-
tents would be fulfilled by the recitation of any one of the sentences.

Thus then, it must be admitted that the whole of the Saktavika forms

single sentence; and it becomes necessary for us to explain why the

whole of it is not to be recited (in the Darea as well as in the Parna-
"` miisa)

We offer the following explanation: We find that the word ‘ water’
is applicable to a drop as well as to a combination of drops; for the simple
reason that water is ॥ substance made up of many constituent parts.. The
same may be said to be the case with the word ‘ siktavaka.’

That is to say, from its capabilities, as well as from the purposes
served by it, the Saktavaka is recognized 98 having the following charac-
ter: It is a sentence, which contains words expressive of Deities connect-
ed with the performance, which abounds with common words applying
_ on all sides, and which serves the purpose of pointing out the sacrificial
Deities. And thus (while reciting the Qéktavaka), as soon as, one has.
uttered the word expressing one Deity, those expressive of the'many
Deities ‘pertaining to the Primary and Subsidiary sacrifices also become
expressed as implied by the use éf the words that are commonly appli-
cable to all; and the whole of the Stiktavaka becomes recited (by the
— utterance of that single word). Specially as the actual ntterance.of the

words expressive of Deities not connected with the sacrifice it: hand
_ would be an ‘ill-said anying’ (‘ Duruktavaka’—and आ0ौ 9 + Séktavdka,
well-satd saying). = a oe ee ee

SUKTAVAKAS EMPLOYED ACCORDING TO MEANING. `" 1085

, ` {Phus then, we conclude that in the Darga, as well as in the Parna-
masa, sacrifices, the Siktavdka to be recited is only that much which
contains the words pointing out the Deities of each sacrifice,—such recita-
tion being quite.in keeping with law and reason; just like the recitation
of the mantras in which certain clliptical portions are supplied from out
of other mantras ; and hence, it is the recitation of the whole Saktavaka
that would constitute an infringement of the Direct Declaration (‘ sékta-
vikéna etc.); as the utterance of words denoting things not connected
with the sacrifice in hand would be an ‘ill-said,’ and not a ‘ well-said,’
‘saying’ (vaka).

In the same manner, the grassebundle offering also, when done with
the Saktavaka as 1t happens to exist at the time (1.6, as it appears at
the time of the Darga or at that of the Pirnamdasa), becomes, by this,
performed, as it were, by the whole Saktavdka; and there is no incon-
grnity in this

Thus then, the Saktavaka must be taken as having three forms: (1)
one that. appears in the actual text of the Veda; (2) that which it has,
at the time of the actual performance of sacrifices, on the occasion of the
Primary sacrifices ; and (3) that which it has, at the time of the perform-
ance of the Subsidiary sacrifices. (1) As it appears in the text, it is
held to pertain to all the Deities of the Primary sacrifices ; because during
the repetition of the text, if one were to recite it in any other form, he
would destroy the text altogether, (2) When recited along with the
Primary ones of the Combined sacrifices, we use them as pertaining to
certain Deities chosen out of the rest. (3) And in connection with the
Subsidiary modifications of sacrifices, it has its words (such as ‘ Agni,’ etc.)
changed into ‘Surya’ and the like (in accordance with the character of
the particular Subsidiary in hand). *In all these cases, however, we have
the Sikiavdka, appearing of course in the forms above ascertained. And
it loses the character of the ‘ Saktuvaka’ (Well-said saying) only when it
speaks of things unconnected with the Action m hand. |

The Bhdshya also must be taken as accepting the multiplicity of the
single Siktavaika, as is shown by its assertion that there can be as many
` Siktavtkas as there are Deities.

The Satra also may be taken thus: ‘In connection with both, the
word ' whole-s#ktavaka’ is applicable, in only so much: as it mentions the
Deities connected with each: because the Context is the same

` And thus, inreality, the Giddhanta exposition given by us does not
differ from that contained in the Sutra, or from that given in the Bhashya.

| ADHIKARANA (7). _
{The sections dealing with the Kamyayajyanuvaky& belong. to the
Kamyas only. | |

Siitra (19) On account of the Indicative Power, the. Order of
sequence and the Name, the mention:.(of the Yajyapuronu-
- viiky&) would be in connection with the kamya sacrifices.

We find the kamya sacrifices (i.e. ‘those performed with a view to
certain desirable results)—Aindragna and the rest—laid down in a
definite order of sequence ; and we also find laid down, in the samé order
certain Yajyapuronuvakyd Couplets, associated with the name ‘ kdmya,’ aud
pertaining to the same deities (Indra, Agni etc.) as those of the kamy.:
sacrifices “

And in regard to these, there arises the question as to whether these
Couplets, from their indicative power, are to be employed, irrespective ot
the order in which they are mentioned, in all the sacrifices that happen
to be connected with those Deities,—or they are to beemployed only in
the aforesaid ka@mya sacrifices, in the same order in which these latter are
mentioned

The Bhashya has cited many examples, only with a view to show the
various instances to which the several specifications in the Sutra apply.

PURVAPAKSHA
On the above question, the Pirvapaksha is that—“ The couplets, through
“their Indicative power, are to be employed in all the sacrifices that

‘have those Deities.”
| SIDDHANTA

As against the above Piirvapaksha, we have the following arguments
Unless a certain mantra is connected with a sacrifice, its Indicative Power
alone canttot apply it to any sacrifice ;:and in the case in question. we find
that that which connects the couplets in question with sacrifices, also
‘distinetly shows that they belong to the said kdmya sacrifices :
| That is to say, all thatthe Indicative Power of the Mantra could do
न would be to connect it with a certain’ Deity. But no useful purpose 15
‘served by. the mantra used for the sole purpose of pointing out:the form
of the Deity, The fact of the Mantra. being connected with.a sacrifice, or

RAmya YAIVANUVAKYA, 0 + ` 108:

‘with the Deity connected with the sacrifice, cannot be expressed by Indica-
tive Power alone, independently of Syntactical Connection, Context
etc, Nor can 1४ 06 known, from Indicative Power alone, in which part of
ihe sacrifice the Mantra is to be employed. For these reasons, it becomes |
necessary to have recourse to the agency of Name; as by means of the
Name is shown the connection of the mantra with. the sacrifice, as well
as the particular function of the Mantra. For instance, in the cage in
question, the name of the conplets is ‘ Ya7ya,’ which, denoting that whereby
८ sacrefice is performed, distinctly connects the couplet with a Sacrifica,,
and it also establishes the further fact of the Couplet serving the purpose
of accomplishing the offering of the material. This being done by the
Nane, the further question, as to the particular sacrifice with which the
couplets are connected, is settled by the Indicative Power of the Couplets,
which shows that they are connected with those sacrifices that are
connécted with the Deities indicated by the couplets

| Objection: “This does not quite prove what is desired (by the
“ Siddhanti).”

Reply : How 18 1t not proved, when the Name, ‘ Kdmyam y aj ytikdndam
distinetly restricts the application of the couplets in question to the kamya
sacrifices ?

And further, even if the Name merely pointed out the connection
“of the couplets with sacrifice in general, such universal application
(authorized by Name) would 06 set aside by the stronger authority of
the Order (of sequence). Consequently 16 must be admitted that the
couplets are mentioned as connected with the kdmya sacrifices.

The Bhashya raises the question—“ Why should the Satra have men-
“tioned both? That is to say, the fact of the couplets being connected

with the kdmya sacrifices is-esfablished by the Indicative Power of the

couplets as helped by the Order of their sequence; or the very Name

alone (of the couplets) proves all that is desired by the Siddhdnta ; and

under the circumstances, why should the sééra have mentioned both
““ Indicative Power’ (linga) and ‘Order of sequence’ (kruma) ?”

The reply. to this is as follows: It is true that the Indicative Power
and the Order of the couplets would establish their applicability to the
Avndiagna and other -sacrifices, because the verses in question, being
Yajy@nuvdkyas, could not be-used in any other sacrifice ; but there are cer-
tain other sacrifices,—the Agnéya, for instance,—Jaid down by. such sen-
tences ‘ Aynayé vratapatayé, etc.’; and in these sacrifices there are two
places. for the Rk verses—one in connection with the mention of Agni,
Where: they appear’ in the character of the Sdmidhéni (literally ‘that with
which fuel is supplied to the Fire ), and another, where they appear as the
Ldjydnnvakya ;-and.as for the SAmidhani verses, they starid in need of two

1088 ` ` PANPRA-VARTIKA, ADHI, {11—~PADA II——ADHI (7)

verses, in order to make up the ‘ seventeen’ which is the number enjoined
in connection with them; and in regard to these latter sacrifices (the
Agnéya etc.), if we do not admit the Name to be the means of controlling
the application of the verses, then, inasmuch as the Indicative Powe,
and the Order of sequence would apply to the Samidhéni verses also.—and
as there would be no ground for rejecting that which is the first to
present itself,—the couplets in question would all be applied to the
operating of the Samidhéni (i.e. the mention of Fire). This application,
however, is set aside by the Name (‘ Ya;yanuvakya ’)

Objection: “In that case, the Sava should mention Name only : what
` ५ 18 the use of mentioning the two, Indicative Power and Order of Sequence ¥

Reply: What you say would have been quite right, if the couplets
speaking of the Deities of the sacrifices laid down were exactly of the
‘same number as the sacrifices themselves; as a matter of fact, however, we
-find that, in the order of the Action, which has a Deity other than Agni
and which is filled up with a Yajydnucdkya in keeping with its form,—
there are mentioned certain verses pertaining to Agni; and if these were to
be applied in accordance with their Name only, then they would be applied
to the operation of the एदु एत (in connection with other Deities than Agni).
As a matter of fact, however, such application of the verses is not
possible; (1) because there is a diversity of the Indicative Power (of the
verse with the Deities other than Agni); and (2) because the application
of the verses pertaining to Agui is set aside by the other verses that are
indicative of the same other Deities. Consequently there would be no
application of the verses pertaining to Agni (ifthe application depended
upon the Name alone). When, however, we accept the. Indicative Powe
as also the Order of Sequence (as controlling the application of mantras)
then, when the Name will have ceased functioning (after having pointed
ont the fact of the verses being connected with a sacrifice), the application
of the verse would be defined by means of their Indicative Power and the
Order of their sequence; and thus the verses pertaining to Agni would
-become applied to the Samidhénit

The Bhashya shows a case where what is said above actually happens
The Yajyapuronurdkya couplets of the Agnivdruni sacrifice having been
‘mentioned,—before the couplets of the Somaraudri sacrifices have beer
‘mentioned,— we find mentioned the Manu-verses; and these latter ‘verses
become the Dhayya verses of the S@midhéni. ‘The same is the case with
the Prihupajavati verses ; as in the cise of these also, we' find that the
_ former is recognized as pertaining to the latter sacrifice,‘ because, 25
against the order of the Sdamidhéni, it is mentioned after the Yajy7-
- puronuvdkyd verses
~ Wf we did udt have recourse to the Order of Sequence, then, through:

KAMYA YAJYANUVAKYA. ; 1089

‘Indicative Power and Name alone, the first verse pertaining to Indra and
Agni would become applied to the second Aindrdgna sacrifice, and the
seqond verse would be applied to the first sacrifice. When, however, the
Order of Sequence steps 170, inasmuch as it connects the verses with the
sacrifice, long before the Name comes in, it controls the Indicative Power.
in the assumption of the corroborative text,--and hence is avoided any
auch application 98 is not in- keeping with the Order of Sequence.

Thus then, there is nothing incongruous or objectionable in the
composition of the sifra.

137

ADHIKARANA (8).

(The mantras of the Context are applicable to the Agnidhropasthana.
Sittra (20): “The injunction of mantras in a certain connection
would pertain to those also that do not appear in the context
because all are equally laid down (as auxiliaries to sacri-
fices).” |

In connection with the Jyotishtoma we find that there are certain
mantras—such as ‘Agna Aydhi etc.’—specially laid down as making up
certain Songs and Hymns ; and then again, we find such general injunctions
as ‘ Ayn8yya agnidhramupatishthate

_ And in connection with this latter Injunction, there arises the
question as to (1) whether the Agnéyi verses to be employed in the
Agnidhropasthana are those wholly apart from the former muntras (° Agna
dyahi, etc.’); (2) or, this upasthdana may be done either with those very
mantras, or with others ; (3) or, lastly, 1६ is to be done with those very
mantras only. That there are these three alternative vjews on the ques
tion is shown by the text

As a matter of fact, however, there is no basis for the first of these
views—that the verses to be employed are those alone that are not
mentioned in the Context. Because, all that the Pirvapaksht can, with
great effort, establish is that we should apply both those that are found
in the Context as well as those that are not so found; and there is
nothing to prove that the latter alone are to be employed, Specially as
the only reason that could be brought forward in support of the employ-
ment of the verses not in the Context would lie in the fact of the name
‘ Agnéyi’ applying to these also; but this reason would equally apply to
the verses appearing in the Context also, and there is no reason by which
these latter could be excluded. Nor has the Bhashya mentioned the three
alternative theories ; as the only theory that it speaks of, by means of the
word ‘aprakrta’ without the qualifying ‘api,’ is that the upasthana is to
be done with the verses appearing in the context, as wll as those not
appearing in it. And itis the absence of the qualifying ‘api’. (‘also’)
that has led people to believe that it speaks of the application of only
those that do not appear in the context. _But the argument that could be
-brought forward in favour of this theory would also establish the theory
. that both kinds of Agnayt verses are tobe “employed ; and this. will be

MANTRAS APPLYING To AanTDHROPASTHANA; ` 1091

“explained below, | by the Bhashya also, in the words— aprakrte'pi
pratyayo bhavatt, prakrtamapyupadiran, |
‘Tf, however,.it be considered absolutely necessary to have the third
alternative theory, then the following wonld be the arguments in its
fayour, which would be acceptable to the ultra-orthodox Crotriya :

-PURVAPAKSHA (A).

(1) “The verses appearing in the Context having been utilized
elsewhere, they will have become too stale. to be used in the said
“ woasthana. ` (४) The Injunction ‘Agnéyya agidhramupatishthate’ is
५ 2 general one, while the Injunctions of the special Agnéyi verses (‘Agna
“ dyahi ete.) are particular ones; and as a rule a general rule can
५ operate only by laying aside the particular rules. If these latter were
‘not taken as particular Injunctions, then the two Injunctions would be
“equal; and as such could not serve as the basis for the present Adhz-
‘‘karana. Consequently, then, we should employ, im the upasthdna, only
‘those verses that are not in the Context.’ <

PURVAPAKSHA (ए).

| “The words ‘Agnéyi’ and the rest being common to all Aguéyi
“verses, the word ४.4 gnéyya’ (in ‘ Agnéyya agnidhyam etc.) denotes all the
‘ verses (those mentioned in the context as well as those not mentioned
“in it); nor do we find any peculiarity mentioned which could point,
“ specially, to those alone that appear in the Context; because, as for the
“ Context, all that it can do is to lead to the inclusion of the verses; and
it cannot serve the purposes of specification ; and as for the Proximiy,—
' which constitutes what, in ordinary parlance, is known as Context,—it
“is set aside by the idea brought about by the Direct Mention of the
“word ‘Agnéyi’ which literally applies equally to all the verses in
‘question; and hence the injunction must be taken as laying down all
^ Agnéyi verses (those in the Context as well as thoso not in it).

“Says the Bhashya: Upadishtopadéco hi na ny@yyak avanjatiyakasya.
The. word ` ‘ upadishtopadéguh’ must be taken as = ‘ upadishtasyaiva
` upadégah,’ and ‘évanjatiyakasya’ as = vigeshanarahitasya; the sense
" being that when such verses without qualifications have been laid down
` once, it is not right for them to be 1५7 down again.

“ Question: ‘Kathanjatiyakasya ?’ This question emanates from the
* Siddhants, “and what it means is this: ‘Even in the absence of specifica-
` Gons, there isa ground for particularization, in the shape of the Contezt.’

“The Stddhanti's opponent says—Why do you put this question, when
` you haye the Indicative Power of the verses themselves as regulating their

1092 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADHI, t11I—~PADA U1—ADHI. (8).

“application? In this the opponent brings forward an argument which,
really supporting his own position, is said in a way as if it were meant
‘by the 64८00067 as one in favour of specialization. The word ‘ Indica.
“tive Power’ (‘ Linga’) that is used in this sentence is not in the sense of
‘the Power of indicating the Deity, which will be spoken of later on—
but i the sense of the Power of the Verbal affix, or the Power of being
‘‘enjoined by that affix; because the Bhaishya speaks of the absence of
‘Injunction when the potency of that Affix has been spent up.

“Then says thé Bhdshya: Naisau siminyénu lingena anyatropadéca-
‘“marhati. That is to say, the distinctive feature of the word ‘ Agnz’
“being common {0 all the verses, there is an idea of all these; ‘and as
‘there is no distinct specifying feature, we can have no idea of any
‘“narticular Mantra. If a specifying feature be admitted, then, in
‘accordance with the Law relating to the Nirvipalambha of the Durga-
"° Pirnamfsa, the specification must be done by the Indicative potency
‘(of the Verbal Affix), which speaks of the performability of the action,
‘This Indicative Potency is precluded from the Dagataya verses ; and as
“such could be admitted as specifying the particular Agnéyi verses to he
“employed. This specification is shown by the Bhashya, in the sentence
५ <yéna anénatvamlingéna étatkaroti,, which means that the Agnidhropas-
“thana is to be done by such Aygnéyi verses as are singled out as being
‘‘enjoined by means of the verbal affix, which directs that ‘it is to be done
‘‘by such mantras as are indicative of Agm or Indra,’ But in this‘ case.
“the Injanctive word being taken up by the said specification, there
‘would be no Injunction of any thing at all, If, on the other hand, the
‘sentence be taken as enjoining the upasthana to be done by the Aynéyi
‘‘etce., then there would be no specification; and hence we could take up
“any Agnéyi verse af random. Thus then, what the Siddhdnta would
‘have is the Injunction of the specified Agnéyi which has already
‘heen once enjoined; and this would be wholly unwarranted, and most
objectionable.

“Thus then, through the power of the verse, to indicate the Deities,
^“ Agni etc., apart from any mention of performability, the Daeataya verses
“(speaking of Agni) also would come to be employed (in the upasthana
‘in question),

‘Question, emanating from the standpoint of the Szddhanti: ‘On
“the strength of the Context, we could certainly adneit those only that

wppear in the context.’

०८ Answer: Indicative Powe (Linga) ४४ more authoritutive than tl
Contest. By the word ‘ Linga’ (‘Indicative Power’) in this sentence is

meant the Direct Deelurution which is literally connected with the dia-
7 tingnishing feature of the Deity,—and not mere Power. Henceforth.

MANTRAS APPLYING TO AGNIDHROPASTHANA. 1093

‘the word ‘Ziga, appearing in many places, is to be taken in this
“ sense.

“ Objection: ‘Virodhé sati, etc. That isto say, then there would be
«a contradiction (of the Lirga with the Prakarana) if we were to admit
५ 81111 a verse, out of those appearing in the context, as is not related to
“ Agni; when, however, the verse that we admit is one that is related to
८ Agni, we follow both the (वद and the Prakaranu. It is in this way
‘that we have explained the compatibility of Direct Declaration with
* Syntactical Connection,—under the Tadbhitddhikarana (I~i--25),’

“Reply: It is not so, That is to say, when the Dacataya verses also
“appear as optional alternatives (for the said Agnéyi verses), it is not
“right to reject them, in consideration of the Context. Consequently it is
“not right to follow both (the Liiga and the Prakarana),

“Then the Siddhanti (in the Bhashya) adds—‘ Tallingavatta anéna-
‘nugrahitavya: The sense of this is that, the generic character inhering,
“in its entirety, in cach of the individuals, the admission of all Aguéyi
'' verses in general would pertain also to the particular Aynéyi verse that
“appears in the Context; and as such there would be no contradiction. in
“the case at all; consequently, inasmuch as the sentence with the Indica-
“tive Potency pertains to the generic character (of the Agnéyi), and as the
Context only brings forward the much-wanted particular verse possess-
“ing that generic gharacter, there is no incompatibility in the co-inherence
‘of these two; and as such, there can be no rejection (of any thing, on
“the strength of the Context).’

| The reply given to the above (iu the Bhishya) is that though the
admission of the Agnéyi mantra in the content would not cause an infringe-
ment of the Context, and would also be in heeping with the Indicative
^“ Power,—yet there is no doubt that some other idea given rise to by the same
“Indicative Power (i.e., the idea of the admission of the Dacataya verses)
` will have to be rejected as false.| The sense of this reply is that 186.
“much as the word ‘ 40120 ' denotes all the individual Aynéyi verses, the
"` word ‘ Agnéyya’ points to the adrnissibility of the Dagataya verses also ;
‘consequently if, on the strength of the Context, those Agnéyi verses
“alone that are mentioned in the Context should be admitted, then the
* Dagataya verses would be set aside,—and this would lead to contradiction
between the Context and the Indicative Power

“The Siddhanti objects—' But the Individual is never denoted by the

word A gnéyi (and hence the word Agnéyya would not denote the indev-
dual Agnayi verses).’ This objection is meant to strike at the very basis
of the reply just given

"The reply to this, however, is that we do not yet quite know if what
pertains to the case im question is the generic character of having the

1094 TANTRA-VARTIKA ADHI, TH—PADA W—aAbur, (8).

Indicative Power in question. ‘bat is to say, if in the present ९४३6, the
“denotation of the individual Aynéyi verses were as improbable‘as that
‘of the individual cows, then, inasmuch as the Injunction (in ‘ Agna yyii
^" agnidhramupatishthat2’) would be one of the Agnéyi ih general, ther

would be nothing incongruous in the admission of those Agnéyi verses
‘that appear in the context,—even though such admission would ,involye
“the acceptance of certain particular individual verses not directly men
‘tioned in the Injunction (according to yon). If, on the other hand, the
“word ‘ Agnéyya’ be taken as denoting the individual verse characterized
“by a mention of the deity Agni,—then, if we were to restrict ourselves
‘to those Agnéyi verses alone that appear in the Context, we would be re

jecting one portion of the idea arising from the Direct Denotation of thi

word (1.6 the admissibility of the Aynéyi verses not mentioned 11} the
“ Context, such as the Dagataya). This would be all the more objection-
‘able, because, as a matter of fact, 111 the case in question (ie. in the
“upasthana of the Agnidhru), it is the Individual Agnéyi—and not any
"" generic entity—that is the means to its accomplishment.

“ Question: ‘Does the author of the Bhashya now mean to reject the
denotability of the generic entity, established in the Akrtyadhikarana ?

Answer: Certainly not; because all that the Bhashya means to prove
“here is that the generic entity cannot be an auxiliary (to the sacrifice).
^" This 18 the explanation given by some people, But ¢his explanation is
“scarcely right. Because in that case (the denotability of the generic
‘entity being admitted), inasmuch as the Individual verses would not be
“mentioned by the sentence in question, there would be nothing incongru-
‘ous in the rejection of every one of the individual verses. Consequently
‘ we must take the Bhashya to mean that it denies the denotability of the
‘ generic entity, as with particular reference to the verses appearing in the
^" Context,

“As a matter of fact, the word ‘ Agnéyi’ is denotative of the
‘Individual, because of its signification being based upon its etymology:
“and as such it can never be denotative of the generic entity. In fact, in
‘‘the case in question, no generic entity 18 cognized, because the word
५५ । Agnéyi’ applies to many verses, of various different metres, on the
basis of the fact of the Deity spoken of in them being one aud the same.
“For instance, in the two verses ‘Agna Gydhi vitayé, etc.’ and ‘ Agnim
“ hotdran., etc (known as Agnéyi), we do not find any comnion element
“and we find that what is invariably concomitant with the nam
‘* Agnéyi,’ is the relationship of the Deity Agnz, and nothing else ; no!
“even the generic character of being a verse; asthe name is applicable te
Actions and Substances also (f. i. we have ‘Agnéya puroddga' and
“+ Ronéyi ahati’). In view of this the Bhashya has said that, the only

MANTRAS APPLYING 10 AGNIDAROPASTHANA. 1099

५ 01007100 element is the Derty. As for this relationship (of the Deity).
-thongh that too is a common element, yet the Bhashya has not men-
“tioned it, because it is not directly expressed by the word, being only
«implied by it.” And inasninch as that Deity would be common to all
^ Agnéyi verses, there would be no endlessness or incongruity (as has been
‘found to be the case with the denotability of Individuals),

‘And the reason for this is that, though, in the word ‘ Agnéyi,’ the
+ yualifying (Agni) is the first to be denoted (by the basic noun ‘ Agnz’).
“vet, inasmuch as the denotative potency of the base is distinct from
^ that of the री, there would be nothing incongrnous in the denotation.
^ by the affix, of the qualified (verse). Ina case, however, where the same
“word (* ठ ' {. 1.) is used to denote both (the quali/ying Class as well as
“the qualéfied Individual), there can be no denotation of the qualified. In
“the case of the word ‘ Aynéyi, on the other hand, we find that the word
र Agni, which denotes the qualifying (Deity), 1s never used in the sense
“of the qualified (verse); nor is the word ‘ Agnéy?,, which denotes the
“vualified, ever used in the sense of the qualifying Deity; and hence the
‘same word could not be extended to the guulzjtied, It the word denoted
“the qualifying Deity alone, then, inasmuch os that would fulfil all the
‘requirements of the case, there wonld he no reason for admitting the
"` qualified,

“Bor these reasons, it must be admitted that the word in question
`` (1610168 the Individuals ; as we have explained above, in connection with
“the words ‘ Pingakshi’ and ‘ Bkahdyani.’ And hence, in certain cases.
“we could admit the verses mentioned in the Context also.

‘ Objection—with reference to an assertion made in course of Piirva-
“paksha (A):—‘ Jt has been asserted above that, inasmuch as the verses
“appearing in the Context have been luid down for another purpose, they
“could not be meant to be laid down in connection with the upasthana in ques-
“tion, That is to say, the Parvapakshe himself has declared that no stale |
` verses could be admitted.’

“The reply given to this is from the standpoint of Pirvapaksha (B) :
` What we meant to say was that if the verses mentioned in the Context
“alone were taken as laid down, then there would be an incongruify in
“the shape of the same affiz (in ^ Agnéyi ’) simultaneously serving the two
` purposes, of enjoining and indicating (the verses as those mentioned in
“the Context); whereas in accordance with our view, those are not the
“only Agnayi verses to be employed in the updsthana in question, but
“others also, as the word makes no specification ; and hence there would
“not be the said incongruity.

a " Objection —emanating from one who cannot brook an infringement;
. Without zeggon, of the Context: ‘ Your theory is open to the great objection,

1096 TANTRA-VARTIKA, तकता, TH—PADA 1—-ADHT. (8).

“that ध ts not in kéeping with both, the Indicative Power and th,
“ Content.’ |

‘The reply to this is that the Direct Declaration connected with the
“ Indicativeness of the Deity is much stronger in its authority (than the
“ Context). |

“Says the Bhashya-—And further, wt 1s not necessary to follow the
।, Indicative Power, in the shape of the literal Declaration, as well as the
५; Context. ‘This is meant as a general rebuff to the extremely objection.
‘able popular idea that both are to be respected. As a matter of fact, in
‘the case of all authoritative means of knowledge, the Persons concerned
take up the objects of cognition, not with a view to help or respect those
‘means, but for the sole purpose of helping themselves (in then
‘ knowledge of the things concerned)

“ Question: ‘ What do you mean by this ? '

५ Answer: What we mean is this: When the same means of cogni-
“tion is found to be applied to a number of things, if it happens to he
‘respected with regard to any one of these, it is taken as having its
“ pequirements fulfilled; and the other things, even if of use in accow-
* plishing certain ends of the man, would not be admitted (if the mere
“ respecting of the means of Cognition were the sole motive) ; and further,
९८५ when aman would have performed a certain action calculated to bring
‘‘ about a certain desirable result (the text laying'down that Action
‘‘ will have been duly respected in this single performance, and) he would
‘not perform the Actton again, even if he desired a further supply of the
‘“ game desirable result. Hence, it must be admitted that we should reject
‘ the necessity of respecting the means of knowledge, and confine our-
selves to the helping of ourselves by the actions (cognized by those
‘“means). And thus the word ‘ Agnéyi* must be admitted to be not
indicative of any particular Agnéyi verses.

“ Says the Bhashya: The Contest cs not to be followed, ७९८८९५७८ it :
‘ contradictory to the idea produced by the Linga. And in this sentence,
५५ the word ‘ Liaga ' must be taken as used in the senso of the Indicative
power pertaining to no particular verses. And the sitva also, when speak
ing of the admissibility of verses other than those in the Contest, must
not be taken as restricting the admissibility to those alone; 11
mentions those only, because there is no difference of opinion as to the
admissibility of those that are in the Context (and which therefore
needs no reiteration)

r ।
a

~

MANTRAS APPLYING TO AGNIDHROPASTHANYA., 1097

SIDDHANTA.

60८1" (21): Only those mentioned in the Context (are meant
{0 be admitted), because of the Context and reasons

The word ‘ tad@khya’ means ‘that which 18 spoken of (in the Context)
as admissible’; or ‘that which 18 spoken of as belonging to the sacrifice
‘under treatment (i.e. the Jyoteshtoma). It 18 such a verse that is to be
admitted; because what the sentence (‘ Agnéyya etc.) lays down as a
particular function that the mantra is to serve in connection with ५
sacrifice; and as a rule the Injunction-of the particular is always based
upou that of the general.

That is to say, in the sentence in question, the wpasthiina is not laid
down as due to the form of the Agnidhra himself ; nor is it an independent
aclion, leading to a certain desirable result; because no such result is
mentioned in connection with 1t; hence it must be admitted that the
upasthdna is performed with a view to help in the accomplishment of the
Apiirva resulting from the Jyotishtoma sacrifice. And consequently the
sentence in question comes to be taken as laying down a particular action
mm connection with the Jyotishfoma. The injunction of this particular
action could be possible only when there was a general Action already
enjoined; and then if the same sentence (‘ dgnéyya etc.’) were to lay down
“the connection of the Agnéyé verses with the general as well as the parti-
cular action, then there would be a syntactical split.

Objection: “The sentence in question (‘ Agnéyya etc.’ ) lays down tho
“conuection of the verses with the particular Action, while that with
“the Action in general would be established by the Context.”

Reply: True, it would be established by the Context; but not without
having assumed a Vedic text (in support of the indication of the Context)
(some such text as ‘By this Verse wo must do something connected with `
the Jyotishtoma’); but no such text can be assumed, when there already
exists a text (viz. ‘ Agneyya etc.’ which establishes the connection of
the verse with the Agnidhra who forms an integral factor of the Jyotish-
toma). |

Olyection: ‘ The sentence in question having laid down the particular
“relationship, the general would be implied by that itself.”

Reply: Not so; because Implication is equal to the Context (in the
point of authority), And again, if the general connection with the
Jyotishtoma were an invariable concomitant following on the wake of the
establishment of the connection of the verse with the Agnidhra,—in the
same way as satisfaction follows on the wake of a hearty meal,—then, in
that case, there would be no necessity of calling upon a scriptural text
(pointing tg that conneation). As a matter of fact, however, we find that

138 7 |

1098 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADR, एद) fIl—ADHI, (8).

the general connection with the Jyotishtoma appears long before that with
the Agnidhra; because this latter being a mere substance, no results are to
follow from a conuection of -the verse with this. And hence, inasmuch
as that goneral connection would not be possible without a scriptural text,
the trouble of having to assume a non-existing text would remain ag
before. Then again, inasmuch as the connection spoken of in the sentence
in question is capable of being met with in the matter of ordinary worldly
actiops also, it could not necessarily connect the verse with the sacrifice
(Jyotistoma). Thus too, it would be necessary to assume a Vedic text, on
the strength of the Context.

It is in such cases as the above that the authority of “ Apparent
Inconsistency ” comes in; and this ^" Apparent Inconsistency ” is admitted
only when there is no other way of explaining the inconsistency, Hence,
in the case in question, “Apparent Inconsistency” could justify the
assumption of a Vedic text, only if, without such a text, the declaration
of the particular connection (in the sentence ‘ Agnéyya etc.’) were found
to be inconsistent. As a matter of fact, however, we find that the
Declaration in question is quite consistent, as asserting what it directly
does, something in regard to the verses, that have their general connec-
tion (with the sacrifice in hand) already established (by the direct
enumeration of the verses in connection with that sacrifice—the Jyotish-
toma); and having its requirements fulfilled by that, it does not have
recourse to the cumbrous method of assuming a text that does not
oxist.

This is what is meant by the Bhishyu when it says—The sentence ta
question cannot be tuken as pointing out the functioning of the verses in
connection with the Jyotishfoma, as that has been already laid down else-
where, For instance, just as when the Kindling of Fire has already been
laid down in such sentences as ‘Vasanté Brihmano ’gninddadhita, the
subsequent texts Ilnyimg down sacrifices leading to definite results (f. 1
‘Agnihotram guhuyat svargaka@mah’) are taken, not as implying an in
junction of the said Kindling of Five, but as merely laying down those
sacrifices for those who have duly performed the said Kindling ;~so, in the
same manner, what the sentence in question means is that in the upd
thana in question, only those Agnéyi verses arc to be omployed, that have
been connected with the Jyotvshtoma

Otherwise, if it were held to lay down the emplofment of only those
that are not mentioned in the Context (as held by Pilrvapaksha A), then,
inasmuch as in the face of other possible solutions, the connection of such
| verses could not be accepted by the Vedic texts, the burden, quite gratui

tously and groundlessly assumed, would be too heavy to bo safely
carried a

MANTRAS APPLYING 10 AGNIDHROPASTHANA. 1089

If (in accordance with Purvapaksha B), it be taken as laying down
the employment of those in the Context, as well as those not in it,—then,
‘+ would be necessary, 17 one case (that pertaining to the verses‘mention- `
ed in the Context), to take the sentence as specializing their connection
that had been already generally mentioned; while in the other (that
pertaiging to the verses notin the Context), it will have to be taken as
laying down both the general and the special connection. And this
diversity would lead to a syntactical split.

And if we admit only those that are mentioned in the Context, then
we are saved from all the said undesirable contingencies. And in this»
there is & further advantage,—viz. that on accountof the proximity (of
tho Injunctive affix with tho verses mentioned in the same Context), it
docs not become necessary.to carry that affix very far from its context.

Objection: ‘In the Context also there is no such general connection
“mentioned, as is wanted; and even if it were there, inasmuch as it
“would point to the verses being employed in other purposes, the utilizing
‘of itin the Upasthiua in question would be most incompatible.”

Reply: This does not affect our position; becanse we do actually

make use (in the Upasthdna) of such verses as have been utilized olse-
where. |
Objection: “In that case, the assertion of the general connection
“would become insompatible with what you say.’’
Reply: Why should it be incompatible, when, as a matter of fact, the
general 18 mvolved in all particulars ? Consequently what we would
do (in the case in question) would be to leave off the specialities of the
general connection (as Jaid down in connection with the Jyotishtoma),
which could be of no use in the case of other particulars,—and_ to
accept only the general feature of that connection, which has been
established, through those specialities ; and there would be no incongruity
in this,

The Bhashya has declared that ~if independently of the Context, the
Digataya verses were laid down by the sentence in question, then there would
be a syntactical split; asin that case the sentence could only be construed
as—* Unasthanam kurydt, facca .evamlingéna. But such ‘syntactical |
splits’ would be inevitable in all qualified Injunctions; f. i. even the
sentence ‘Soména yajéta’ could bo construed only as—‘ Yagam kuryat,
tacea soména.’ Nor is the qualified Injunction in question known as 4
whit less important than the other qualified Injunctions,—as, equally with
the rest, it lays down something quite new. Specially as, in accordance
with the Siddhanta also, inasmuch.as no other indicative power (save
that pertaining to the Deity) is admitted, the addition of ‘tacca évam-
lingéna 1९95 necessary as in accordance with the Parvapaksha; as even

‘wll.

1100 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, WI—-PADA tl1—aDuHt. (8).

the verse mentioned in the Context could not apply to the Upasthana, if
it had not that Indicative Power

Consequently the “Syutactical split,” involved in the Pérvapakshg,
should be explained as shown before. And in thet case, 7 the Bhashya
passage just quoted, the first portion—‘ Upasthanam kuryat’—is to be
taken as pointing out a particular action in connection with the Syotish
toma, and the second portion—‘ tacca évamlingéna’—as pointing, indepen.
dently of the Context, to the connection (of that Action) with the Mantra
eharacterized by the Power of Indicating that Deity whose connection
with the Jyotishtoma has already been laid down.

If, in order to avoid the Syntactical Spit shown against hin, the
opponent should take the sentence as merely laying down the connection
of the verse with the directly-mentioned Agnidhropasthana,—then, to that
explanation we offer the following reply :

Stra (22): The Injunction, in that case, would be wholly use-
less: because of its non-connection with a fruitful action; as
the Upasthana is not fruitful

Objection: ^^ The sentence in question would, fromthe Context, help the
“ Jyotishtoma,—that 18 to say, the general connection of the verse being
obtained from elsewhere :
In reply to this, the Bhashya shows that the general connection would
not be possible, nnless it were distinctly enjoined. If the sentence’ meant
a direct declaration of the Upasthanu with the Jyotishtoma, then it could
have ‘been taken along with tho Jyotishtuma, When, however, the
sentence is taken as laying’down, by a qualified Injunction, the connection
of the verse with reference to the Upasthana,—without laying down the
connection of this latter with the Jyotishtoma,—then, what the injunction
comes to is that the verse is to be employed in an ordinary worldly
Upasthana (not in connection with any Vedic sacrifice) not leading.,to any
desirable resnlts,—such an injunction being got at by the rejection of the
ontext which has had no corroborative text assumed in its support, and
which, for this reason, is unable to give any idea of a particular conne
tion (of the verse with a particular Upasthdna connegted with the Vedic
sacrifice of Jyatishtoma). In accordance with our view, on the नाल
hand, inasmuch as the verses will have béen already taken up before
hand by the Jyotishfomu, they could not apply to any other action (out
side the pale of that sacrifice); aud thus the Injunction would: lay down
something useful (the Upasthina performed with the mantras, along

_,With tho Jyotishtoma,. serving the useful purpose of helpyig in the

MANTRAS APPLYING TO AGNIDHROPASTHANA. 1101

accomplishment of the Result of that sacrifice) ; and further, this way of
interpreting the sentence is very much simpler. Or, there may be shown
another simplicity in our view of the case: according to us what is laid
Jown is the connection of the auxiliaries of the Jyotishtoma, in the shape
of the Agnidhra etc. with the instrumental accessories, in the shape of
the Verses; and this Injunction would be with reference to the Upasthina.

Sutra (23): And further, all mantras are already enjoined.

It has been argued above that the Agnéyi verses mentioned in the
Context of the Jyotishtoma will have been already used in connection with
that sacrifice, and hence bejng stale, could not rightly be employed in
connection with the Upastgdna in question.
| एण this is not correct; (1) because the text itself lays down a stale
verse, and (2) because the subordinate position of the mantra makes it
capable of being repeated (with general actions),—there would be no
incongruity in the application of the said versea to both (the Jyoteshfoma
proper and the Upasthdna connected with it). For this reason, we can-
not accept the sentence to admit of the construction ‘ Yénaivamlingéna
kuryat’ (88 shown in the Pirvapaksha). Also because all mantras are
such as have been already enjoined, in connection with some action or
“other; (and hence all mantras would be equally stale).

Then, it has been urged above that the verse would be particularized
by the Injunctive affix (in ‘ Upatish{hét’), But inasmuch as the neces-
sary particularization is got at by other means, such an assertion can only
shine as an irrelevant assumption. For even if we conld specify the
verses by means of the Injunctive affix, we could not avoid the admis-
sibility of all the verses in question; because every ono of them is
enjoined (and as such specified by the Injunctive affix), either as forming
part of the Vedic text to be studied, or as occurring in the Brahmayayjiias,
or 88 forming a part of the Vaeastobha and the Apvinavastha, Conse-
quently it cannot be.rightly asserted that the specification would be done
by the (Injunctive) verb; as even after such a specification, there would
be nothing to set aside the idea of the admissibility of all the verses in
(uestion. . ;

Thus then, for the very simple reason of there being no “ Apparent
Inoonsistency ` (to justify the Indicative Power in leading to the assump-
tion of a Vedic text), it must be admitted that, in the Upasthdna of the
Agnidhra, weiare to employ only those Agnéyi verses that are found to be

mentioned in the Context.

ADHIKARANA (9).

®

[ The Bhaksha Mantras are to be employed in the Holding etc.,
in accordanco with their Indicative Power. ]

Stitra (24): “On account of its Indicative Power and Name,
the Anuvaka must be taken as applying to the Bhaksha.”

| We find the Bhaksha mantra \aid down as follows: ‘ Bhakshé hi ma
vied..... , Bhi vuso purovaso......bahubhyam saghydsam, nrcakshaniva déra
eee atakhyésham, hinva mé......ma@ me’ vaninibhimatigah, mandrabhibhuti'
kétuh.. ...érpyatu,......gayatracchandasak ...... Indrapitasya...... bhakshay-
mi. | The Bhashya has quoted the whole mantra, with a view to show
which word in it is capable of what use, as will be discussed in the nex
four Adhtkaranas. As a matter of fact, just as in the case of the Siikta-
vika, the words ‘ Pratassavanah etc.,’ a8 also the ‘Vasuwmadgana ete.,’ that
are eulogised as qualified by them,—so in the mantra under consideration
also, the ‘gayatracchandah etc,’ and also ‘ Indrapita etc.,’ are to he
used, separately, according to thoir several significations

Though such is the fact, yet, in connection with the Mantra, there
naturally arises the question as to whether the whole Anuvaka is to he
used in the ‘ Hating,’ or different parts of it are to be used in connection
with ‘ Holding,’ ‘Seeing’ and ‘ Proper Digestion,’ as may be found to be
indicated by the words of the several sentences

On this question we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘Inasmuch as itis the Hating alone that is enjoined,—as the word
५८ * bhakshayami’ in the Anuvaka itself distinctly indicates that Hating,—
“as the whole of the Anuvadka, being held between the two words
“ *bhukshé” and ‘ bhakshaydmi,’ cannot possibly pertain to anything else,
—and, lastly, as, in accordance with the Saira 1X—i—37, the Holding
“etc. also being mere concomitants of the principal action of Hating, the
whole Antivdka is capable of being taken as a single sentence’ syntactl
cally connected,—the Anuvdka must be taken as to be used, in 168
“complete form, in connection with the Hating
“The following objection is here raised: ‘(a) The firstsentence of
“the Anuvdka— Bhakshéht etc.—is quite applicable to the ating ; but

BHAKSHA MANTRAS USBD ACOORDING 10 INDICATIVE PowER. 1108

५ (४) the next sentence—from vaso etc. down to saghydsam—olearly
॥ pertains to the Holding ; though the root saght (in saghydsam) being
Wiaid down in the sense of killing, the word saghydasam is not clearly
“ expressive of Holding; yet, inasmuch as the instruments mentioned in
“eonnection with the action are the Arms (bahubhyam), the word saghya-
५ sam, like the word nirvapatz, indicates the Holding ; and it isa well-known
“fact that a single root has many signitications ; or lastly, it may be-that
‘the killing meant is that which is done by holding; (c) thon again, the
sentence beginning with xrcakshasam 18 found to be applicable to seen
“or looking into; though the root cakshin is laid down in the sense of
“making an audible sound, yet in usage, it is found to be expressive of
“mere illumination; hence the word nrcakshasé comes to mean one who
“ds well known among men; and inthe word ‘avakhyésham’ also has its
“origin in the root cakshin ; and though the change that this root
“andergoes is into the form khya#, yet it is changed into khyén (as a
“Vedic form); consequently the sentence must be taken as _pertain-
“ing to seeing; (d) in the same manner, the sentence ‘hznva mé eic.’
“must be taken as pertaining to the proper digesiton of the Soma, as
“it 18 only when properly digested that it can make the body healthy,
“and not pass off below the navel. And thus the whole cannot be taken
“as a single sentence (pertaining to Hating alone); as that would be
‘“meompatible with the indications of the sentencos as shown above.’

“To this we make the following reply: All these--Holding eto—
“coming as they all do, before and after the Mating, must be taken ६६
“ qualifying concomitants of this latter; and hence if the whole Anuvaka
“were taken as indicative of the Hating as qualified by them, these
“ qualifications also would be indicated by implication; and thus there
“would be no incongruity in the whole being used in connection with
“the single action of Hating. Though itis a fact that the Holding etc.
“do not abandon their predominance, and are directly expressed by the
“words of the mantras,—and as such the mantras should be taken as
“pointing to these,—yet, inasmuch as no useful purpose would be served
“by pointing to that which has not been enjoined, it is more reasonable to
“take them as concomitant auxiliaries to that which is enjoined (1.6, the
" Hating); as we have explained in connection with the Nirvapa Mantra.
“ For these reasons it must be admitted that our view is not incompatible
“with the indications of the Mantras.

“There is yet another argument in favour of our view—viz. that it
‘is in keeping with the name ‘ Bhakshinuvaka’ that is given to the
° whole. | ° |

“ Objection: ‘The Name that controls the applicability of mantras is
“that which is found mentioned in the Veda; and as for the name

1104 ` TANTRA*VARTIKA, ADH. all-=PAQA I——aval. (9). —

¢ * Bhakshanuvaka,’ it is not found mentioned in the Veda; and as suc},
“it can not be rightly taken as controlling the applicability of the
५८ Anuvaka.’ : Se “

“Reply: A means of knowledge, whether it be Vedic or pertaining
८८० the ordinary world, is accepted as authoritative, with reference to the
“subject it deals with, only if it is found to be free from discrepancies;
“and as a matter of fact, there are no discrepancies in the Nume in
‘‘ question (as controlling the applicability of the Mantra). | |

‘That is to say, just as the authoritativeness of the Veda rests upon
‘the fact of its being free from all discrepancies attaching to the speaker,
° 80 too would be the authoritative character of a Name found in the
“ordinary world ; as this latter is as eternal in its application as the Veda.
“Nor can the ordinary usage of the Name be relegated to the realms of
“the ‘ Blind following the Blind,’ because the Name (‘ Bhakshanuvaka)' as
“well as the named (the Anuvaka) is clearly perceptible; for certainly
“no imperceptibility attaches to the Anuvéka, as it does to the faci
८ the Agnihotra being the means to the attainment of Heaven. (101.
“sequently the mere fact of the Anuvaka being recognized as called by
‘the name ‘ Bhakshdnuvdka’ must be accepted as sufficient authority for
“the correctness of the name; it is for this reason that whenever we
‘come across this particular Auuvdka, the name ‘ Bhakshdnuvaka’ always
‘‘comes up to our mind; and the compound ‘ Bhakshanuvaka ’ being ox-
‘pounded as ‘bhakshasya anuvakah,’ distinctly points to the fact of the
“ Antivika being connected with Hating. And thus whenever these two
“(the Anuvaka and the Hating) present themselves to our mind, it
‘becomes at once apparent that they bear some sort of a mutual relation-
‘ship; aud it is this general relationship that becomes specified by their
“mutual requirements, That is to say, the Hating stands in need of
“something that would recall it to the mind of the sacrificial performer,
“and the Anuvaka stands in need of something that it should indicate:
“and both of these being thus circumstanced, inasmuch as they are found
‘to be capable of supplying each other’s need, the Indicator and the
“Indicated become connected with each other; and this connection is
“enjomed by the sentence laying down the performance of the Primary
“ Action with all its details. And thus too the whole of the Anuvaka m
^“ question comes to be recognized as to be employed in the Eating.”

र |

SIDDHANTA.

Siitra (25): The rest is to be taken apart, because of the actio.s
(Holding etc.) being enjoined, by means of the peculiar form
of the Mantras, and also by the injunction (of Eating. itself).

BHAKSHS MANTRAS USED ACCORDING TO INDICATIVE POWER. 1105

The disjunction of the mantras is to be explained in the manner
-ndicated in the first objection against the Purvapaksha; that is to say,
on the ground of the direct significations of the mantras themselves ;
specially as the fact of the whle Anuvika being syntactically connected
5 set aside by the ‘ peculiar form of the mantras ’—i.e. by their Indicative
Power.and Context, which distinctly point to Holding etc. .

Objection: “The fact of the whole being syntactically connected
«with Hating is also based upon the Indicative Power of the Mantras.”

Reply: True; yet that Indicative Power is very much weaker, in its
anthority, on account of. its being mnch farther removed from Direct
Declaration. That is to say, the Indicative Power pertaining to the
Holding etc. directly leads to the assumption of the corroborative Vedic
text, and thereby quickly points to the applicability of the mantra ;
while in the other case, in the first instance, it wonld be necessary to
assume the fact of the whole being syntactically connected,—then, through
Indication, to assume the existence of tle power in the whole to indicate
the single action of Hatiny,--and then the corroborative text; and thus
in this case the Vedic text is very much farther removed than in the
former case. Consequently, the Hating being found to be directly
connected with the first sentence of the Anuvika, which happens to be
_ most proximate to it, and the other sentences being found to be capable
of applying to the other actions (Holding etc.), these latter are taken
apart from the sentence pertaining to the Hating.

Objection: “There is not much useful purpose served by a mantra
“pointing to those that are already implied by something elxe.”’

Reply: How can such pointing out be said to be useless, when we
find that, anless the actions are so pointed out, they cannot be performed.
It is only such an implied action as is not pointed out, which requires no
further effort for its performance than what is made in connection with
the Action that implies it. In the case in question, however, we find
that each of the actions of Holding etc. requires an independent effort for
its performance ; and as such until each is recalled to the mind (at the
time of the sacrificial performance’, it cannot b+ performed ; and conse-
quently it becomes necessary for these to be recalled (and this recalling
can be done only by means of mantras).

Then again, we find that the injunction that we have of the Hating,—
viz. the sentence ‘abhishutya hutvd etc., etc.,—-is incapable of bringing
about a due performance of its own object, unless it also lays down the
other actions of Holding etc.; and hence it lays down these also.

Thus then, on account of the peculiar form of the Mantras themselves,
—and of the fact of the'injunction.of these actions just pointed out,—the
Actions thamselves are laid down (as cognected with the Mantras) ;—the

99 | | + .

1106 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, -I1I—PADA प-कर, (9).

Proper Digestion and the mantra connected with it being separated from the
rest through a distinct Injunction (shown below) ; and hence even though
the direct Injunction of such connection, being not .perceived, cannot he
distinctly pointed out,—yet that does not. much affect the position. As for
the Proper Digestion, it must be taken as directly enjoined, on account of
certain expiatory rites laid down as consequent upon Vomiting or
Purging (which follow only when there is no Proper Digestion).

ADHIKARANA (10),

‘The portion of the Bhakshanuvaka, beginning with ‘mandrabhibhutch '
and ending with ‘ bhakshay@mi’ forms a single Hymn]

Sutra (26): The portion beginning with ‘mandra’ 18 to be taken
as & single mantra, because it speaks of a subsidiary detail ;
specially as the two sentences therein contained jointly
express a single fact.

(In the above Bhaskshinuvika, we tind the sentence ‘ mandrabhibhitih
rr bhakshaydmd¢’; and in connection with this, there arises the question
as to whether the sentence, from the beginning down to ‘trpyatu,’ forms
one mantra, and that beginning with ‘vuswmat’ down to the end forms
another, or the two together form a single mantra. |

On this we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as, like Holding etc. in the previous Adhikarana, the
“single fact of satisfaction is denoted by the sentence ending with ‘ trpyatu,’
‘this must be taken as a distinct muntra,”

SIDDHANTA.

To this we make the followmg reply: That Action alone can form the
object of Indication by mantras, which requires a distinct effort for its
accomplishment,—and not those that merely follow on the wake of other
actions.

That is to say, in the case of the Holding etc. we' find that unless one
performs these other actions, he cannot accomplish the Eating; and hence
it was only right for the person, as well as for the Scripture, to make a
distinct effort (towards its performance and Indication respectively). In
the case in question, however, we tind that for the satesfaction (of Hunger)
there is no other effort possible than what 1s involved in Hating ; and as
such no usefal purpose could be served by its indication (by the mantra)
Consequently, we can explain the Imperative (in ‘irpyatwu’) either as
denoting a request, or as having the force of the Present ; and thereby the
two sentences would be connected_ syntactically,—indicating, jointly, the

smgle act of Eating as. qualified by satisfaction,—thus forming a single
mantra, `` |

ADHIKARANA (11).

[The mantras beginning with ‘Indrapitasya’ etc. are applicable to all
Hatings, with the necessary modifications. | | .

[An Hypothetical Adhikarana. |

Stitra (27): Inasmuch as the mantra indicates the particular
‘Eating,’ out of a number of those that are all enjoined by the
same Injunction,—-the ‘Eating’ of the Soma other than that
dedicated to Indra is to be done without any mantra.

[In connection with the Jyotishtoma, there are several cups of Soma
dedicated to a number of Deties, Indra and the rest. The remnants of
these offerings are to be eafen, and the mantra laid down in conection
with this eating is the Bhukshadnuvdka under consideration, And there
now arises the question as to whether the mura is to be repeated with
the eating of every one of the remnants, or of that alone which has heen
dedicated to Indra, and those of others are to be done without any
mantras. |

Inasmuch as the word ‘Indrapitasya’ (in the manira) is co-extensive
with the Soma (that is offered to Indra),—as there are no words in the
mantra indicative of those not dedicated to Indra,—and lastly, as there
can be no modifications in muntras connected with the Primary Actions,
(and every one of the eatinys is a distinct Primary by itself),—it would
appear that the eating of the Soma dedicated to other Deities is to be
done without mantras

As ayainst the above, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

Sttra (28): “The mantra will have to be applied in accordance
with the Deity (to whom the offering has been made) ; because
the offerings to the other Deities are shown to have their
archetype in the offering made to Indra.”

~ “Ta connection with the eating of the Soma dedicated to other Deities
‘than Indra, the mantra 18 to be repeated with the necessary modifications ; `
‘because the offerings to the other Deities are mere ectypes of the
“offering to Indra. Though all the offerings’ are similar-actions, yet
“inasmuch as they are distinct actions, some would be meve offshoots of
“the other. And here we find that the offering of the. Dhruvasoma t
“ Indra forms the archetype of the other offerings ॥ अ

USE OF THE MANTRA ‘INDRAPTTASYA, &८.' 1109.

५८ Question : ‘ How do you know this P’

“ Answer: We know this from the fact of the manéra relating to the
« Holding pointing to the Soma as forming the object of offering to Indra ;
‘as there is always 9 restriction of the object to be accomplished by its
‘Instrument; as for instance, the Agnihotra etc, are restricted by the
^ Ahavaniya Fire etc. Asa matter of fact, too, all the accessory details of
“the Soma are present only where the Soma is present; and hence it is
“only the offerings (of Soma) to Indra that are accompanied by the acces-
“gory details; and the other offerings, not being directly connected with
“those details, would take them only by transferenco (from the former)
“And thus it is established that the same Mantras, with necessary
^ modifications, are applicable to the other offerings also.

“Tt is only thus that we have the Injunction, with reference to the
* previously mentioned ‘namatz’ (= viparinamate, modifies), specified to
“the Anushtup metre (that is to say, this injunction distinctly points to
।\ {16 fact of the modifications of mantras being quite in keeping with the
“Scriptures). This injunction is in connection with the Jyotishtoma ; and.
“it is because the various parts of the Jyotzshtomu are not yet recognized
‘as its offshoots that the change in the mantra has to depend upon the
‘said Injunction ; as if they were recognized as its offshoots, then the
“changes would have been made in accordance with the general law that
“the ectypes are tb be done in the manner of the archetype; and hence
“in that case the Injunction brought forward could not have shown what
“1618 meant to show.

“ Objection: ‘The parts of the Jyotishtoma are its mere ectyes ; and
‘hence the mention of the change does not indicate what you mean.’

“ Reply: Not so; because all the offerings ending with the Agnish-
“foma being contained in the same Injunction, even though the Parts
(sanethds) were mere ectypes, the mantra applied to these would be in
‘its unchanged form—in accordance with general law that ‘the ectype 18
“to be done in the same way as the archetype’; and in that case there
“ should not have been any mention of ‘ Ohunge’ (in the word ‘namatz’).

“ When the offering to Indra forms the archetype of the other offer-
ings, the mantra does undergo changes, in connection with the Aynzshtoma
etc, occurring in the Third Savana ; and hence the mention of ‘Change

‘becomes quite compatible with this. By the word ‘namati’ what is
^ Meant 18 the inserting of a particular word, and not that of the word
= anushtun

“Consequently certain modifications are to be made in the mantras

in accordance with the Deities, to whom the particular offerings are
made,” . |

ADHIKARANA (12) |
[There should be a mention of Indra in connection with the Punarabhyi
nnita Soma. |

Stitra (29): In connection with the Punarabhyunnita, there
should be a mention of all Deities, because it contains the
remnants of both *

While the foregoing Adhikarana still rests in the Parvapaksha, and
the Siddhanta is not finally stated and ostablished, till the end of the
Pada, we take for granted, for the time being, the propriety of having
modifications, and then proceed to consider under what circumstances
the modifications, if allowable, would be possible.

When the soma contained in certain vessels has .been offered and
poured out, even while there may be some remuants left in them, more
soma 18 pouret into the same vessels (for dther offerings) ; and the somu
thus poured in is called the ‘ Punarabhyunnita Soma.’ How this character
belongs to that soma, and how it forms the object of the discussion rela
ting to modifications, 1s thus shown:—There are ten vessels; four of
these belong to the Brahma, etc., who make the middle offerings; and
each of these four is used twice in the offerings of Vashatkara and the
Anuvashatkdra of the Hotr priest; while the Hautraka vessels (that is
the vessels belonging to the Hoty) are used only once in the offering of
the Vashatkéra ;-—in all these, the Deity is Indra ;—and while these vessels
still contain remnants of the previously offered soma, more séma is

poured into them and offered to other Deities ;—all this is shown bythe
Directions,—in connection with the offerings to many Deities that are
made by the Priests m connection with the Second Homa,—implied in the
# व¢ ४0 mantras connected with those offerings ;—such, for instance, 45
mattrdvaruno milrdvarunau amitram vayam havamahé, etc., etc.’ ;—and
_when, after all these offerings have been made, the vessels are brought out
for the purpose of the post-sacrificial eating, then they are found to
contain two remnants,—the former, the: remnant of the first offering .to
` Indra, and the latter, that of the offering to Mitrévaruna. And then,
when the time comes for the mention of the Deities (in..course of the
mantras to be recited in connection with-the eating of these remnants)
there arises a doubt as to whether there should be a mention of Indra:
whose connection with -the vessel as its Deity has been passed OVer, as ६150

ADHIKARANA (13).
(At the eating of the Pdtnivata, Indra, etc., should not be mentioned. |

Sutra (82): “In the Patnivata, it would be as before.”

We proceed to consider exceptions to the genoral rule arrived at in the
foregoing Adhikarana.

Asa matter of fact, we find that the remnants of the offerings to the
pair of Deities are thrown into the Adityasthali, and from that they are
again transferred to the Agrayanasth4li ; and, subsequent to this, we have
the declaration of the Holding of the Patnivata -in the sentence ‘ Upaneu-
patréna Pdinivatamayrayanat grhnati.’

And when the ealiny of the remnant of this Panivata offering comes
to he done, there arises the question as to whether the Deities other than
Patnivat should be mentioned in the mantra recited, or not. Andon this -
we have the

PURVAPAKSHA

that they should te mentioned—the mantra being read as Indravadyw-
patnivatpitasya,.etc,’
SIDDHANTA.

9210४ (33): Inasmuch as the remnant is taken up (by the subse-
quent Deity), the connection of the previous Deity should be
set aside. |
The present case is by no means similar to that dealt with in the

previous Adhikarunu. Because, at the time of the Holding of the offering

to Patnivat, the proximity of the other Deity is set aside; as the offering
to Patnivat is laid down as to be conveyed together with the remnants of
the previous offerings

That is to say, the conveying of the gift to Patnivat is laid down, as
to be done when the remnants of the offerings to the pair of Deities have
been transferred to the Agrayana vessel, And under the circumstances,
ven if the gift were conveyed to another Deity, the implication of its
connection with Patnivet would be unobstructed; and when Patnivat

1108811 is declared as one to whom the gift is to be conveyed, its connection

with the remnants becomes all the more potent. For instance, the some

that issues from the Ay ayana vessel is meant to belong to Patnivat; and as
® matter of fact, the remnants of the other offerings are actually found to
140

1114 74 प्रकर द्रा ६५. ADH. 1—PApa abut. (18).

issue from the Agrayana vessels; hence these remnants algo are ९01
veyed as gifts to Patnivat .

If we had the declaration in the form ‘ Agrayanam patnivatam kayo
then, even though the Remnant would have been proximately connecte
with Patnivat, yet; inasmuch as it would not. be the ‘ Agrayana,’ it would
on the strength of the text be removed from the conveyance of the gift,
But we find the direction in the form, ८ Ayrayanat piitnivatam grhnati,
—and not as ‘ Ayrayanusyu’ or ‘Ayrayanam,’ And in such cases—e.g. in
the sentence ‘ vrkshat parnam patate’—we understand the parna falling to
be, not only the leaves of the tree, but also the feathers of the birdy
inhabiting the tree; because the 1५९6 is spoken of only as the pluce from
which the parnu falls (and not as that to which the parna belongs). In the
same manner, in the case in question, all that is laid down as the ground
fov the connection of the Remnant with Patnivat 18 the fact of its
issuing from the Agrauana vessel, and not that of its being the Agrayuna
itself, And from between the. Sumpaita and the Ayrayana, which
occupy the same place, that which issues forth can be spoken of as
‘Ayrayanat apétah’; and that is the sole ground for the connection with
> Patnivat, | _

As for the fact of the Remnant heing mixed up with offérings other
than the Agrayuna, it 1881168 (or flows) from the Non-Agrayana also,
this fact is of no use either in the prohibition or. the injunction (of
the Palnivata); beeanse we have no such declaration as that ‘that which
flows from the Nun-Agrayana zs not Patnivata. If such were the sense
of the scriptures, then that Ayrayana offering, which actually flows from
the Ayrayuna, would be flowing from both the Agrayana and
the Aufgrayana, and would thus cease to be ‘ Patnivata.’ Consequently,
inasmuch as there would be nothing to warrant the restriction that
the Remnant mast (in order to be connected with Patnivat) flow
from the Agrayana only, we must admit it simply as that it should
flow from the Agrayuna. And as this wonld be applicable to the Sampata
also, 16 becomes quite possible for the Remnant to be connected with
the 2५८४८ Deity. And as until the ownership of the previous Deity
has not been set aside, it could not belong to the previous Deity,—there
can be no mention of the previous Deity (at the eating of the Rem
nant of the Patnivata); just as when the teacher gives the remnant of his
food to his head-pupil, and this latter, having had his full ont of 1
gives it to the subordinate pupil, this latter eats it as the remnant of the
` food of the head-pupil, and not as that of the teacher os |
Objection : ^ The Remnant in question is only a part of that which
“belonged to the previons Detty,—that is to say, before it was offered ०
“ Patnivat, ` = *

नि. । ज च aia... -

NON-MENTION OF INDRA AT PATNTVA'TA. . 111;

The author of the Bhdashya, thinking of making the objector
admit his own view of the case, replies jointly: Certaznly, we do not find any
part of that which has been poured into the fire as an offering, That is to say,
all that belongs to the previous Deity is that which was actually poured
for it into the fire, and that which was thus offered was destroyed by.
the fire. | ।

. The opponent, not comprehending the drift of the answer, urges—
“ven tn the original offering, we do not find any portion of that which has
been poured as lubation

The answer to this is that, in the original offering the Deity was duly
named at the time of the utterance of the words conveying the gift to the
Deity.

Says the opponent: ‘‘ The same was the case in the case in question
also.”

The Szddhanti replies: In this lies the difference from the orvginal
afering. That is to say, in the caxe of the original offering, there was no
mention made of the Deity that had been set aside; while in the
present case, the fact of its having been set aside is distinctly stated.

Thus,-then, it is established that Patnivut alone should be men-
tioned—(the mantra being read as ‘ Putnivatpitusya, ete.’ ).

ADHIKARANA (14).

[At the eating of the Remnant of the Pdtnivata offering there should he
no.mention of Tvashty, | *

Sutra (34): “Tvashtr should be mentioned, because of the
a Drinking.”

[In connection with the Pd@inivatu offermg, we have the Maura,
‘Agnat patnivan, sajirdévéna Teashtra somam piva’; and with regard to
this, there arises the question as to whether Tvashtr should be men-
tioned at the eating or not. | .

On this question, we have the followmg

.PURVAPAKSHA.

“Tnasmuch as in connection with the Patnivata offering, Tvashir is
“spoken of as ‘drinking the Soma’ in the company of Patnivat, he also
“must be regarded as the Deity of that offering, as indicated by the
“words of the Mantra.”

SIDDHANTA.
Satra (35): Such should not be the case, because of inequality.

Tvashtr should not be mentioned ; becanse between Mantra and the
Direct Injunction, there 18 a vast difference of authoritative strength (this 13
one ‘inequality’); and then again, there is a difference in the characters
of Tvashty and Patnivat as nominatives to the action of Drinking ; as what
the Mantra denotes is the mere companionship (of Tvashty) (this is another
‘inequality ’).

That is to say, in the Injunction of the Patnivata offering—* Patni-
vatam grhniti’—we have Patnivat alone mentioned as the Deity, and that
too by means of a nominal affix (in the word ' Patnivatan’) ; and the nom-
inal affix could not denote this, if the deific character depended upol
something else (the association of another Deity for instance); and for
this reason also, the Indication by the words of the Mantra (of the deitic
character of Tvusht;) is extremely weak in its authority (as against the
direct denotation of the Nominal Affix). Then again, as a matter of fact,
it is not found to be impossible for the Mantra to be an auxiliary to the
Action in question, unless the deific character of Tvashtr is admitted ; ५९
_ the connection of the Maztra with the Action is accomplished by its deno-

NON-MENTION OF TVASHTR AT PATNYVATA, 1117

‘ation of Patnivdt only. Nor is the mention of Zvashff in the Mantra
otherwise inexplicable; as its mention could be taken to be in praise of
Painivat. Thus then, the meaning of the Mantra would come to be this:
‘You, and Patnivan, who are associated with Tvash{r, drink the soma! ’

` On the other hand, how could the mention of Tvashtr being the
‘drinker of soma’ (even if the Mantra could be made to give this meaning)
make Him the Deity of that offering ? Because the sole function of the
Deity of a sacrifice lies in his serving as the agent with reference to whom
the offerings are made (and not in his actually eating or drinking the
materials offered ). ‘he deific character of Tvashtr, however, becomes all the
more unacceptable, when all that the Mantra speaks of is his companzon-
ship (with Putnivat) (and not even the fact of his being a ‘drinker’); and
this too, 1४ does only figuratively ; and it does not mean that he actually
accompanies Patnivaé in the ‘drinking’; as we often find the word ‘saha’
used i cases where that which is spoken of as ‘ accompanying’ does not
join in the Action; for instance, in the common saying, ‘ sahaiva dagabhih
gutrath 6074102 vahats gardabhi,’ we find that all that it means is that—-
‘oven while the ass has ten offsprings, it 1s she that 18 made to carry the
burden.’ |

Thus it must be admitted that the Mantra does not indicate the fact

of Tvashty being the Deity (of the Patnivata offering) ; and as such there
should be no mention of him (at the eating of the Remnant of that
offering’).

ADHIKARANA (15)

[At the eating of the Remnant of the Pa@inivata offering, there should be
no mention of the Thirty and Three. ] *

Sitra (36): So also the Thirty, as the Mantra serves another
purpose

This Adhikarana simply deals with the applicability of the conclusion
of the foregoing Adhikaran: to another case. =

[In connection with the same Pdtuivata, we find another Mantru:
‘Aibhih agné saratham yahyarvtk nanaratham va, vibhavo hyugvih,
patnivatastrimeutastrimeca dévinanushvadhamivaha madayasva’; and there
arises the question as to whether at the eating of the Remnant of the
27८20410 offering, there should be a mention of the ‘Thirty and three
Deities spoken of in this Muntra, or not. |

And on this question, we havo the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

०५ Inasmuch as there are several points in which the present case differs
“from that dealt with in the foregoing Adhikarana, the conclusion thereof
“is, for this reason, not applicable to the present case. These points ot
“ difference are the following :— ` ˆ

“(1) The same mantra that indicates Agni to be the Deity, also in-
“dicates the fact of Agni being the Distrébuter of the Drink to the
“Thirty and Three gods, who are. spoken of as the partakers of that
८ Drink; and hence the fact of these latter also ‘being the principal
“ Deities is shown by the Mantra itself, which presents Agni in quite
“a secondary position (of that of Distributer or Attendant at meals).

५८ (9) In the case of the mantra treated of in the previous Adhikarane,
‘“we found that it denoted mere companionship, and hence Tvashtr
“not being~found to be mentioned on terms of equality, was rejected
* from the deific position. The caseris reversed in the mantra now under
५ consideration ; as in this it is Agni that is spoken of as subordinate; and
“hence the former law cannot apply to the present case
| ५ (8) All that the Injunction contained in the word काण. the nomina!

“affix (‘ Patnivatam’) denotes is that the deific character in connection
‘with the Action im qnestion consists in the fact of a certain Deity
“being ‘Patnivtn’ (having a wife); and this qualification 18. fonnd

NON-MENTION OF THE THIRTY-THRER AT THE PATNIVATA, L119

«to be as concomitant with Agnui—in the mantra ‘ Agndi Patnivan'’—as
with the thirty and three gods, who are also spoken of in the same
‘© Yantra ag ‘having wives’ inthe sentence ‘ Patnivatastrimgatastrimegca
५121018. Nor does the original Injunction (‘ Paénivatam grhniyat’) pre-
«elude the connection: of other Deities,—which preclusion would have
^ ९10९ the indications by the mantra. Nor is there any infringement
‘tof the Injunction involved in the acceptance of the other Deities (the
“thirty and three) along with the one formerly enjoined. And inasmuch
“ag the connection of these other deities 18 cognized by altogether
५ different means (1.6. the indications of the mantra), it cannot be said to
“have anything to do with the nominal affix (in ‘ Patnivatum )) which
“therefore cannot be said to be dependent upon the mention of these
“(and as such impossible). That is to say, if the nominal affix had
“enjoined the Deity ‘ Patnivat,’ as depending upon the ‘ Thirty and
“thrée,’ then alone could it be open to the charge of standing in need
‘of an extraneons factor. And as for the mantra, there is nothing
incongruous in 108 indicating the Deity, as depending upon the previous
“Injanction (as such dependence is declared to be. incompatible only
with the nature of the Nominal Affix), Then too, inasmuch as we
“accept both—Agni as well as the Thirty and Three gods—to be the
“ Deities, there can be no contradiction between the original Injonction and
“tho latter mantria Indication
“ Question: ‘When both the Deities serve the same purpose, how
‘can they be both accepted P {as in such cases, it is necessary to take
the two as optional alternatives |
“Answer: Both could not be taken together, if the mantra did
“not speak of both. As a matter of fact, however, we find that, while not
“abandoning the mention of dguije-who has been enjoined in the
“previous Injunction,—as having the character of the Deity in the
shape of the Dustributer, the muntra indicates the fact of the Thirty
and three gods heing the Deities
“Thus then, both being taken together, it becomes necessary to
make a mention of all of them (at the eating of the Péatnivata
“ Remnant). And that this is authorized by the mantra itself, the
‘Bhashya proceeds to show by appending an explanation of the mantra
as follows
` “To reciting the Yazya the Agnidhra Priest thus respectfully prefers a
“request to Agni, in the words—Ayfhi, Come—though the ‘4’ appears
at the very beginning of. the mantra and ‘ydhi’ after three words, yet
“such usage is in accordance with the rule ‘ Ohandast vyavahitagca ’—
" &bhih-—ie, along with the Thirty and Three gods mentioned later on,
“either on, the same chariot, or on different chariots, as you are exception-

1120 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, U—PADA वअ 40, (15).

“ally rich in horses ; but having come before them, present to the Thirt,
“and Three gods and their wives the Svidhd food, Soma, and satisfy
“them fully,’ By this itis clearly shown that these Deities are mean;
४४ {6 be the enjoyers of the Drink.”

SIDDHANTA.

To the above we make the following reply: There should be yy
mention of the Thirty and Three gods at the eating of the Patnivat,
Remnant. Becnuse in all cases the functioning of the mantra is con.
trolled by what is directly enjoined; consequently, as in the case of
Tovushty, so in the present case also, the mention of the Thirty and Three
gods (in the mantra) must be taken as contributing to the praise of
Agni. That is to say, inasmuch as the sole bnsiness of the muntra
lies in recalling to mind what has heen previously enjoined (in the
Injunction ‘ Patnivatam grhnati’), it could not, m any case, serve
the pnrpose of indicating either the fact of Avni being the Déistributo,
or that of the Thirty and Three gods being the partakers, of the Drink,—
both of these facts not having been previously enjoined

Thus then, the mantra being found to serve a distinct purpose,
` 1४ cannot be endowed with the power of independently indicating the
deific character of the Thirty and Three gods, thereby stepping beyond
the original Injunction. And when even this indicative potency 18 nof
possible, it is all the more improbable for the mantra to have the injunc
tive potency

Nor could the mantra be taken as recalling the deific character of
these thirty and three gods only; because these gods have been men-
tioned simply for the purpose of indicating the greatness of Aynz, enjoined
by the previeus Injunction. And the reason why we take it this way is
that, inasmuch as the mantra describes, as the giver, one (Agni) whose
lordship over the Soma is unknown, such description cannot be taken
in its direct sense; and hence it is taken as implying the said lordship of
Agni

That is to say, as a matter of fact, the Soma has not been offered to
Agni at the time that the mantra is being recited; and then before he
has himself received the Suma, if he were really asked to give it to others,
i¢ would mean a pure deception. ` If, however, the request to ‘give’ be con-
strued as implying the praise of his greatness that ‘Thou art the true
giver and the master of this Soma,’ then the sentence would become quite
intelligible; as in that case it would resemble such ordinary complimen
‘tary talk as we come across even in ordiuary parlance; as for instance,
in specially complimenting one of the persons invited, one says ‘ when you

NONeMENTION OF THE THIRTY-THREES AT THE PATNTvaTa. 1121

have been invited, you have become the master, and it is you who should
` ४6 the others.’ And in this case the sentence comes to serve a dis-
tinctly useful purpose, in keeping with the previous Injunction, And
the word ‘mfdayasva’ (satisfy them) also, not being found to be com-
patible in its direct signification, is to be taken as implying the request
‘come with these.” Then also the mention of Agni as the giver could
not serve any perceptible purpose; and as such it must be taken as in-
dicating the fact of Agni being the actual Receiver of the offering. And
thus, that which is clearly expressed by the nominal affix (in ‘Patnivatam’)
would not have to be rejected, in view of the Mantra (as the two would
in this case be quite compatible).

Question: “ The injunction mentioning merely the word ‘ Patnivatam’
“how do you make it out to be an injunction of Agni alone as the Deity,
‘and not the Thirty and Three ?”’

Asswer: In the injunction in question, what is taken as the Patnivat
(having a wife) is Agni, and not the Thirty and Three gods; because
in the mantra ‘Agnat patnivdn’ we find the epithet ‘ Patnivcn’ applied
to 44102, ` |

Objection: “ But we find the same epithet applied to the Thirty and

‘Three gods also,—in the mantra ‘ patnivatastrimeutah, ete.”
_ Reply: True; the epithet is applied to them; but in spite of that, we
take Ayn alone to be the Patnivan that is meant by the previous Injunc-
tion. Because as a rule, when something is mentioned by means of a
nominal affix as in (‘ Patnivatam’), there is no manifestation of the
number of that which is denoted by the basic noun; and inasmuch as the
denotation of the basic noun could not be inserted in any other way, in an
explanation of the word (‘Patnivata’), it is spoken of in the singular
number,—as ‘ Patnivan dévatat asyu.’ As for ‘ Thirty’ however it is al WAYS
in the plural number, and as such could never find a place in the explana-
tion of the word (‘ Pdinjvatam’); consequently no such nominal affix (as is
found in the Injunction) could ever appear in connection with them; and
hence they could never be taken as the Deities connected with the Action
laid down in that Injunction.

१ न ण gt pgs LP I ON ०

141

ADHIKARANA (16),
(At the eating, there should be no mention of the Anuvashatkara. |

Siitra (37): The Vashatkara also, like the Agent, (should not
be mentioned).

(There is an Anuvashutk@ra mentioned in the sentence—‘ Somasyiigré
vihtlywnuvashetkacoti, and in connection with this there arises the ques-
tion as to whether this Anurushathdra should be mentioned or not, at
the time of the Latiny. |

On this question, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘‘Tuasmuch as there is no doubt as to the deific character of the
०५ Anuvashutkdra being expressed by the said Injunction, as well as hy
“the words of the muntra,—there must be a mention of this.”’

SIDDHANTA.,

To the above we make the following reply: Just as the Drinker
appearing subsequently could not make a mention of the previous Drinker,
who is not connected with the Primary Sacrifice,— so, in the same manner.
there could be no mention of the Vashufkara in question. Because this
latter is not mentioned in the Primary Sacrifice; and even when it does
appear, it does not appear as doing anything for that sacrifice. Conse-
quently there should be no mention of this.

ADHIKARANA (17)

[The Remnants of offerings other than the one to Indra should be eaten
without Mantras. |

Sutra (38): As the Soma belongs equally to all the
Deities, ((there can be no relationship of the Arrhetype
and Ectype among the various offerings); (and as for the
declaration of the change into the Anushtiup metre) it is «
mere prohibition of the use of the preceding metre

We now proceed to offer our reply to the opponent’s arguments
contained in Sutra (28).

There should not be any modifications in the mantras, in accordance
with the Deity, the remnant of whose offeriny is to be eaten; the
remnants of the offerings to other deities than Indra should be eaten
without mantras. Because the whole «ction of the Jyotishtoma forms a
single context; and as such an action could not be its own archetype
{Prukrtt) and ectype (Vikrti)

That is to say, if each of the several repetitions of the same action of
offering to the various Deities (which repetitions constitute the Jyotushtoma
sacrifice) were @ distinct action by itself, then each would have been
related as the archetypes and ectypes of one another. As a matter of fact,
however, they are not so many distinct actions; for neither the Soma
nor any accessory details are laid down with reference to these indivi-
dual offerings ; as the way in which one of these takes up the Soma, ete.
is exactly the same in which they are taken up by the rest. We shall
explain this in detail under ७7/7८ T1I—vi—30. Nor can the mantra
( Indrapitasya, etc.’) make the Soma entirely connected with Indra ; as we
have a direct declaration (‘ Soména yajéta’) to the effect that the Sona
belonys to all the Deities. We find in the cave of the declaration ‘ Aha-
vantyé juhoti,’ that, not appearing in the context of any particular sacri-
fice, it points to the fact of the Ahwvaniya pertaining to all Homas; and
hence inasmuch as there are no actions without the fire, what the sen-
tence 18 taken to denote is the fact of such persons as have not lidd the
fre not being entitled to the performance of any sacrifices. But the fact
of the Soma belonging to all the Deities is not indicated by the mantra in
the same manner, in the case in question; as in this case, the Manira
heing found in the context (of the particular sacrifice Jyotvshtoma), could

1124 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. u—PAbA s1—avu. (17).

very well, by its indicative power, indicate the fact of the Soma belong.
ing to Indra;—and that the Soma belonging to the other Deities wonld
be held and measured (by handfuls), without beimg indicated by the
Mantra. । |

Or, it may be that there being no discrimination among the several
Somas, all of them being held up, they would be distinguished by the
words conveying the offerings to the several Deities.

Or, as in the case of the Subrahmanya, the mantra could be taken
ag indicating Indra as the chief among the rest, the sense being ‘ Indra
and the rest.’

Or, lastly, inasmuch as the word ‘Vasumat’ is not found ‘in the
original Injunction of the sacrifice, the mention of that in the mantra
would be otherwise useless; and hence the word ‘ Vasumativéna’ may be
taken as denoting ‘ Indra as accompanied by the other Deities.’

Thus then, the Soma is equally connected, by Injunction, with all the
Deities ; and thus none of the offerings could be taken as a mere ectype of
the other.

It has been argued above (under ७7८ 28) that, inasmuch as we
have an injunction as to changing the metre of the original into the
Anushtup, the offering, in connection with which this change 18 laid down,
is an ectype of the former. But the injunction of the change could
very well be applicable, even when the Somu is equally applicable to all
Deities ; as in that case it could be explained as a qualified Injunction
of a particular metre in the place of the Jagaté metre which would have
been used, on account of the offering falling in the Third Savana. Or, it
may be that, inasmuch as the several Samsthiis of the Jyotishtoma are mere
ectypes, it 18 only natural that there should be modifications in connec-
tion with these; but that docs not serve the purpose of “showing” that
the offerings to the other Deities are mere ectypes of the offerings to
Indra (as held by Sitra 28).

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Bhakshamanira 18 to
be employed only in connection with the eating of the Remnant of tho
offering to Indra; and like the Holding and the Measuring, the Mantre
could not restrict the eating; and hence the Remnants of the offerings to
other Deities are to be eaten without Mantras,

eal ay age ee Og gy ee tm वि = =>

{The eating of the Aindragna Remnant is to be done without mantras.)

Siztra (39) : “Inthe case of the Aindragna offering, the mantras
«should be used, because of the presence in the mantra of an
“indication of that Deity.”

Now then, there arises the question as to whether the mantra ‘ Indra-
pitasya, etc.’ 18 applicable to those cases where the Deity is Indra accom-
panied by another Deity. And on this point we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“'The Mantra 18 quite applicable to such cases. Because the declara-
“tion of Indra being the Deity does not depend upon the fact of the Soma
“being drunk by him ; and hence there can be no similarity between the

present cases and the case of the Quartering of the Agnéya Cake (dealt
with under Satrq II—i—27) for the simple reason of the incapability of
“the word

“That is to say, in the case of the sentence ‘ Agnéyam caturdha
“karott, we find that, in the word ‘ Agnéyam, what is expressed as the
“distinguishing property 18 the fact of the sacrificer having conveyed
“the gift of that particular cake to Agni; and inasmuch as this fact 18 men-
“tioned by means of the nominal affix (in ‘ Agnéyam’), as pertaining
“to Agnt alone, independently of all other Deities,—it is not taken as
“denoting the fact of its depending upon other Deities. In the case in
“question, on the other hand, in the word ‘ Indrapitasya,’ the distinguish-
“ing property spoken of is the fact of being the Receiver of the gift; and this
^ property belongs partially to each of the two Deities (Indra and Agni) to
“ whom the gifts have been conveyed by words; and in so far as the action
“ (of being the Receiver of Soma) belongs to each of the two, each is spoken
* of as the ‘ Drinker.’ Consequently in the case of the Aindragna offering,
“inasmuch 88 both Indra and Agni would drink the Soma offered, we
“could very well assert that half of it had been drunk by Indra, and

half by Agni. And as the character of ‘being drunk by Indra’ does
not exactly exist in the Remnant that is before us (at the time of
Hating), we must take the word ‘ Iudrapitasya’ (in the Mantra) as
त applying to it, through that portion of it which has been poured in

1126 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1I—PADA U—abDHI. (18). |

“libation; and there is no such limit to this as that it 18 only when x

‘“ much has been drunk of it that it can be called by the name.

“Thus then, inasmuch as the distinguishing property expressed jy
“the word ‘ Indrapitasya’ is found to exist in the Aindragna offering, the
“remnant of this latter also 18 to be eaten with the mantra ‘ Indrapitarya
५५ etc.’),”” ।

SIDDHANTA.

Sutra (40) : The Mantra should apply to that of which there js
a single Deity (Indra); because (Aindragna is) a dis.
tinct Deity (/7°0m Indra); just as in the case of the Quar.
tering (of the Cuke).

The Aindragna offering would certainly have been included in the”
word ‘ Indrapita,’ 11 the distinguishing feature, expressed hy the word,
had consisted in the functioning of the Deities towards actual drinking
(of the Soma). But, as a matter of fact, our Deities do not drink ; as all
that they do, in the caseof an offering being made to them, is that they serve
as the Recipjents of the conveyance of the gift. And at the time that the
gift is conveyed to a joint Deity, there cannot be a mention of any one
of them singly; as like the nominal affix (in ‘ 4ynéyam’) the compound
also (in ‘Aindrfigna’) would not be possible in case tle factors com-
pounded depended upon something else. Consequently, just as in the
case of the Quarteriny of the Agnéya Cake, 80 111 the case in question also,
inasmuch as the word ‘ Inirapitasya’ denotes the fact of Indra alone
being the Deity, 7४ could not apply to the offering that is made to both
(Indra and Agni) conjointly; and as such the Mantra in question cannot
be applied to this latter offering.

The point, however, wherein the present case differs from that of the
said Quartering, and which saves it from being taken as a mere repetition
of the same discussion,—-is as follows: In the present case what the
Pirvapakeht holds is that the distinguishing character expressed by the
word ‘ Indrapitasya’ is not the Deific character, but the character of being
the Drinker subsisting in the Receiver of the gift,—and that this exists in
each of the two Deities (Indra and Agni); and the Siddhants replies by
showing that the actual character of ‘ Drinker’ being inapplicable to the
Deities, what the word ‘ Indrapitasya’ indicates is the fact of Indra beiny
the Deity. (And the two positions are very differently argued in the caré
` ० the said Quartering. } |

As a matter of fact, however, even if the actual character of Drink
had belonged to the Deities, it would not have been possible to apeak ul
the Remnant as ‘drunk by Indra.’ Because it is not the Soma that was
poured as offering to Indra that is spoken of by the words. ‘ Indrapitasy¢

EATING REMNANTS WITHOUT. MANTRA, | 1127

ate.; as that which was actually poured has heen all drunk by Indra
(and as shch could not have remained in the vessel, to be eaten and
addressed as ^ Indrapitasya’),—whilo that which has not been poured as
n offering could not have been drynk by Indra (and as such this too conld
not be spoken of as ^ Indrapitasya’ )

That is to say, it is the Remnant of the Soma in the vessel that is
spoken of as ‘ Indrapi but as a matter of fact, this has not been
‘drank by Indra, because the word could apply only to that which was
actually poured as an offering (and not to that left behind in the vessel)
Consequently, inasmuch as the word ‘ Indrupita’ denotes a property
of that which exists in the vessel, it must be taken as denoting ‘ that
which ‘has been conveyed, by words, as an offering to Indra’; and this
would simply mean that the word expresses the fact of Indra betiny the
Deity as the distinguishing feature of ‘ Indrupita.’ Nor is it possible for
the character of being drunk, really subsisting in the Soma poured as
offering, to be attributed to the Remnant in the vessel ; because the word
‘Indrapita’ is quite applicable to the Remnant, through its own real
property—that of having Indra for its Deity.
| As a matter of fact, when a certain part of a substance is actually
poured as offering, it is the whole of that substance, being given away
(in words) to the Deity, that accomplishes the sacrifice ; and hence in the
word ‘ Indrapita,’ the root ‘pa’ (to drink) must be taken in the sense of
‘ sacrifice, —~just as is done with the verb ‘nivvrpet’ (in the sentence
‘ sauryancarun-nirvapet, which literally means deposits, but is taken in the
Sense of sacrifices), And consequently inasmuch as the word । Indrapita’
would denote the means of the accomplishment of the sucrtfice to Indra, it
could not express that of the sacrifice to Indra-Agni; and hence the
mantra im question could not apply to the offering to Indra-Agni.

ADHIKARANA (19).

[The Mantras beginning with the word ‘ gdyatracchandasak’ are appii-
cable to the offerings in connection with which several metres are
used. |

627८2. (41): ‘The metre is like the Deity.”

The present Adhikarana deals with an exception to the conclusion
arrived at in the foregoing Adhikarana

[We find, in the Bhakshauuvdka, certain mantras beginning with the
word ‘gayatracchandasah’; and there arises the question as to whether these
mantras are applicable to that Soma-offering alone wherein the Gayatri
is the only metre used, or also to those in which many metres are used. |

On this question, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“ As shown in the foregoing Adhzkarana, inasmuch as the compdund
“ vayatracchandasak’ would be impossible if the Gayatri metre depended
“pon any other metre, the word ‘ gdyutrackandasahk’ could not apply
५ 10 that offering wherein the Gayatri metre used would depend upon other
“metres; and hence the mantras in question should be employed in
‘connection with that Soma-offering wherein the Gdyatrt is the only
५५ metre used.”

SIDDHANTA.
To the above, we make the following reply :

Sittrva (42): It should apply to all offerings ; because there is no
offering in which a single metre is employed.

It is only when the distinguishing character mentioned can exist
independently by itself, that we do not accept it as depending upon others,
—and not when it has no independent existence |

We have shown in connection with the Quartering also, that if
there were, in the context, no such cake as belonged to Agni alone, then
we could have accepted those belonging to it in conjunction with other
Deities also (as the objects of Quartering);-—-s0 also in the foregoing
Adhikarana, it was simply because there was an offering’ made to Indra
alone, that we denied the applicability of the epithet ‘Indrapita’ to that
which was made to Indra conjointly with Agni. But it is a well-known

USE OF MANTRA ‘GAYATRACOHANDASAH, &TC,’ , 1129

fact that there is no offering in which the Gayatri is the only metre used;
as in the skerifices mentioned in all the three Vedas, other metres are sure
to come 1n. Consequently, the name ‘ gayatracchandasah’ must be taken as
applying to those in which there are many metres used; just as the name
¦ Rathantarasama@’ is applied to offerings wherein there are many other
50115 9180. 7 :

And the rule that.‘ what is dependent upon something else is incap-
able of being compounded’ does not apply to those cases in which the
factor concerned is never without dependence upon something else.

Thus then, it must be admitted that the mantra in question is
applicable to those offeriugs, in connection with which there are many
metres used (besides the Gayatr? ) |

[The Final Siddhanta conclusion derived from the Discussions contained
in the last nine Adhikaranas, Sitras 27-42, }

Sutra (43): One and the same mantra belongs to (the eating
of) all (the offerings) as held by Aiticayana; because the
word ‘Indrapita’ indicates the savana; as otherwise, the
‘Drinking’ (as pertaining to the Remnant) will have
to be taken in its secondary figurative sense.

This s#tra supplies the final reply to all that has been said in Sdtras
27-42, None of the eatings is to be done without a mantra; even in the
eating of the remnants of those offerings that are not made to Indra, the
mantra is to be used just as if stands, without any modifications. Because
the word ^ Indrapita’ meaning ‘ that savana in which the soma ts drunk by
Indra,’ even those offerings of soma that are not made to Indra come to be.
called ‘ Indrapita,’ as occurring in that’ savana. |

That is to say, the word ‘ Indrapitasya’ is to be taken, not as quali-
fying ‘somasya’ but as qualifying the ‘ Prataksavana’ (Morning libation),
and as such applying to every one of the offerings connected with that

.savana. Nor is the word ‘ Prataksavana’ coextensive with ‘Soma’; as it
is the name of a certain part of the sacrifice (Jyotvshtoma). If then, the
word meant the ‘Soma connected with the Pratahsavana,’ then we should
have had the word ‘ Pratahsavaniyasya " (and not ‘ Pratahsavanasya’).
‘has then, the word ‘ Pratahsavanasya’ being taken as coextensive with
` Indrapitasya’, the genitive in these two words is due to their differentia-
hon from all connection with Soma; and that in ‘ somasya,’ being non-

_ extensive, is based upon the non-differentiation (from the Soma).
Thus then, on account of the indication of another word (‘ suvanasya ’),

444 | ।

~ ४.

130 _ TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. III—PADA 1I—ADAI, (19).

and on account of the fact of all the offerings having the same connections
and occurring in the same context, the Mantra should be used in connor
tion with every one of them

Question: ^“ How do you make out all this ? ”

Answer: We conclude thus, for the simple reason that, otherwis,
the ‘Soma-remnant’ (if connected with ‘Judrapity’) would have to ly
taken in its secondary figurative meaning. That is to say, the whole
quantity of soma, conveyed, by means of words, as gift to Indra, would be
the direct or principal ‘ Indrapita’; and the portion of it left behind in the
vessel after the offering has been actually poured into the fire, would he
spoken of as ‘Jndrapita’ only figuratively, And certainly this would be
highly objectionable

Consequently, inasmuch as all the soma-offerings are ‘connected with
the Indrapitasavanu, it is established that the eating of the Remuant of
every one of them should be done with the mantra ‘Indrapitasya, etc.

Thus ends the Second Pada of Apuyiya III.

FRNA POV PPR LL OOP

प ADHYAYA III.
| PADA III.
ADHIKARANA (1).

[The Loudness, etc., are properties of the Veda.]
Siitra (1): “Because of the Direct Declaration, the properties
_ = would pertain to the community.”

Having dealt with the applicability of mantras based on their
Indicative Power, we now proceed to take that based upon syntactical
connection. . |

The sentences taken up for consideration are ‘uccatrrca kryaté’ (the
Rik is recited londly), etc., and also ‘ Tadyadi rkta ulvanamkriyaté Garha-
putyam parétya bhith svdhéti juhuyat’ (if we should make a mistake in
the Rk he should offer a libation into the Garhapatya Fire with the
mantra ‘ bhith svah@’), and so forth.

The question now is this: In the former sentence, which lays down
the qualifications of loudness etc. with reference to the Rk, etc., as also in
the latter sentence which lays down the Homa into the three Fires with
the three Vyabrtis,—should we, on the strength of the fact of its being
directly mentioned a independent of anything else, take the word ‘Rk’
in the sense of Verse as explained in 6४४77 II—i—35? or should we take
it as denoting the whole of the Rgveda.consisting of the entire set
of mantras and Brahmanas?

Question: “* Why should there be any such doubt as to the significa-
“tion of the word ?”

Answer: The reason for the doubt lies in the fact of there being a
disagreement between the declaration in the beginning, and that in the
end, of what forms a single sentence syntactically connected. That is
to say, in the beginning we have the mention of the Vedas, while in the
end we find the Rk, Sama and Yajush mentioned, Under the circumstances
the word ‘ Védu’, found in the beginning of the sentence, may be taken as.
indirectly indicating the Rk, ete., and, on the other hand, the words ‘ Rk’
ete. occurring in the end may be taken as indicating the Vedas; and thus

1132 PANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. UI-—PADA + प्रा, (1).

there arises a doubt as to which of these two interpretations 1s the more
reasonable and correct of the two. The Doubt,.is open to the same
objections, and capable of the same justifications, as those in connection
with the sentence ‘ akiah carkarak, etc.’ (Satra I~iv-—29)

Objection: ‘In that case the present question may be taken as having
“been effectively dealt with by that same sttra; and as such there is no
“need of its being taken up for consideration again

Reply: This reproach is scarcely justifiable; as what has been
established in that sitra is the authoritative character of the sequence of |
a sentence, in cases where the bearing of the Injunction is doubtful:
while in the case in question, there is no doubé as to the bearing of the
Injunction, as there is no doubt as to the Rk, Sama, etc. being denoted by the
words occurring in the Injunction. Consequently it becomes absolutely
necessary to definitely ascertain the correctness of one of the two alter
natives, by finding out which word is to be taken in its secondary figu-
rative senso.

On this question, then, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“Tn accordance with the arguments advanced under the Pérvapakshu
“of Sitra I—iv—29, it must be admitted, on the strangth of the direct
“Declaration of the object of Injunction, that the properties pertain to
“the communities of the ‘Rk,’ etc. (i.e. to the Verse, etc., and not to the
‘ Rgveda, eto.).

“And further, just as the Generic Substance or Action 18 not
“incompatible with special forms appearing in the sequential sentences
‘go, in the same manner, the Rk, etc. are not incompatible with the
“Vedas. Nor are the words ‘fk,’ etc. ever capable of being used with
“reference to the Brdhmana-portion .(of the Vedas); while the word
“*Véda’ can be used with reference to any part of the Veda (be it even &
“single Verse); as words expressive of a collection are always found
“to be applicable to single components of that collection; as, for in-
८ gtance, we speak of the ‘whole village having come (when the word
(५ ‹ 11196 ` 18 used with reference to the men in the village). Thus too
“people who are reading the Veda, speak of ‘reading the Veda,’ and of

“the ‘ Veda remaining to be finished,’ etc. etc. only when they are stud)
“ing the k-portion of it, and not when they are reading the Brdhmana
^“ portion

“Then again, there is a definite line differentiating the &h the
` “Sama and the Yajush from one another; and as such their properties af
` “Touduess could be duly ascertained and delegated to eich of them. The

t

LOUDNESS, BTC., ARE PROPERTIES OF THE VEDA. = 41138

“Vedas on the other hand are mixed: up with one another; and as such
«that would always be a hopeless admixture of the properties in question.
“That is to say, there are certain /tk-verses that are found in all the
‘three Vedas; and so also are certain Yajush sentences. And hence if
“the character of the Vedas were the sole criterion for the application
“of the properties, then, in the case of such verses it could not be
“ascertained whether they should be recited loudly or slowly (because
“as occurring in the Rgveda they should be recited loudly, while
“as occurring in the Yajurveda they should ` ०6. repeated quietly) ;
“or we would have to take the properties as optional alternatives,
“because the applicability to them of the name of one Veda would be
“as correct and justifiable as that of the other; and there are no grounds
“for such option. If, however, we take the words ‘Rk,’ etc. in the
“sentence in question as expressing the classes of Rk etc., then we
“are saved from these anomalies; because a single collection of letters
“does not belong to any two classes (‘Rk ’ and ‘ Sama’ f.i.).

“The latter theory has the further advantage of being in keeping
“with the indications of the fact of the sentences in question occurhing
“in the context of the Jyotishtoma. Otherwise if the words were taken
“as referring to the particular Vedas, then, inasmuch as the Veda treats
“equally of all Grain-Sucrifices, Animal-Sacrifices, One-duy sacrifice, etc.,
“the properties laid down im the sentence in question would pertain
“to all these sacrifices; and would thus overstep the bounds of the
‘context in which it occurs. | .

Objection: +‘ Hven in accordance with your theory, inasmuch as the
“class Rk also would be found in several contexts, the contingency you
“have just shown would be equally possible in your case also, If you seek
“to restrict the injunction to the Rk in the context, on the ground of
“there being no reason for overstepping the bounds of the Context,—then
“the same may be said in our case also; because we could restrict the.
“injunction to that much of the Veda as occurs in the Context.’

“Reply: The two cases are not equally open to the objection ;
‘because for us, inasmuch as the genus ‘ Rk’ inheres completely in each
` collection of letters (known as such), we have it in the Context, in its
= complete form ; for you, on the other hand, the Veda being a very large
“collection, it cannot exist, in its complete form, in the Context. If the
“class ‘Rk’ had pervaded, as a single whole, over the collection of all tke,
“then it could not exist, in its complete form, in the Context ; and im that
; cage, it would be exactly’ like the Veda. For the character of ‘ Védatva’”
| inheres only in the collection of all Mantras, Brahmanas and Deductions
। —known a8 the ‘Kathaka’ and the like—which treat of many sacrifices.

For us, on the other hand, the generic character of the Rk, or Sama

1184s ttanrra-varrrea, aby. mt—pApa 1—abut, (1).

“ or Yajush inheres, in its complete form, in each of fhe endless collections
“of such feet of verses, words and parts, as are found to forma Single
‘syntactical whole. And just as such corporate (collective) substances ag
“the Forest are related to the commanity of ‘Vanaiva,’ so it is this
“community of the collections of Rk that is spoken of as ‘ safa ' (in the
“satra). Though the Bhashya, and the commentators on it, hawe ex
“ plained the word (4 कद ` as synonymous with ‘7dé,’—yet this explanation -
८५ १8 not correct ; because there can be no मुत › (+ genus’ or class) in the
“Rk, etc. Because we have shown (in the Tarkapdda) that there is no
“such class as ‘gogabdatva’ inhering in the word ‘go’ (which is made
“up of the two letters g and 6); and then how could there be any such
“classes as the ‘Rk,’ ‘Sa@ma’-and ‘ Yajush,’ all of which would be as
‘impossible as the class ‘ Vakyatva’?

“That is to say, we have already shown, under the Tadbhutadhikarana,
“that we cannot, like the class ‘ Brdmanatva,’ assume any such class ag
“*Vakyatva’ as inhering either in the last letter of the sentence or in
-“the whole aggregate of letters arranged in a certain order, each of which
८18 manifestable by means of distinct efforts, organs and positions of
“speech ; because of the fact of these letters being separated from one
“another by the intervention of the desire to recognize the relationship
“ of the denotations of words with parts differing from one another. And
५ 17 the same manner, we could not assume any suth class as ‘ Akiva,
५ ‹ Vajushtva’ or ‘Samatva, all of which depend upon certain letters
“ and intonations arranged in a definite order.

‘For these reasons, what we must take the word ‘ jaia’ to mean 18 the
“aggregate community—called ‘Rk,’ or ‘ Yajush, or ‘ Séma’—which
“inheres in every one of such collections of words as form a single syn-
“tactical whole ; and there is no class known by any of those names, Justas
‘among certain words, whose significations are based upon their efymo-
^“ logical composition, we admit of a community other than the Class,—so
‘the community of aggregates, spoken of as ‘ jaa,’ is something wholly
“different from what is known as ‘ Class’ or ‘ Jat.’ In ordinary parlance
“too, the words ‘fata’ and jati’ are taken just as we have explained ; and

hence we must interpret the sé#tra accordingly.”

SIDDH ANT
Sittra (2): (It pertains to the Veda) because of the fact of
the words occurring in a context dealing mostly with the Veda

Question: ^ What do you mean by ‘ Prayadargana’ here ? Certainly
^“ 10 18 not similar to the Prayadarcanas’ mentioned in other places ;—that 18
“why we put you the question. The sitra ‘ Prayévacandcca’ (II—ii—12)

“LOUDNESS, BTC,, ARE PROPERTIES OF THE VEDA. 113४

‘has been explained as because of the mention being in a content where all the

vest are Primartes—‘ Prayé’ being taken as ‘ Pradhanaprdyé ’; so also in the
“sutra ° Vigayé prayadurgandt’ (11-11-16), the word ‘prdya’ has been
५ explained as sanskarepraya, the meaning of the sitra being—because we
५ find it in ¢ content where all the rest are subsidiary purificatory rites, such ag
“ the milking of the cow, etc, In the case in question, however, we cannot take
‘the sutra to bring forward the reason that the Rk, etc., are seen where all
५ {16 rest are Vedas; because there are no Vedas apart from these Rk, etc,
‘themselves; and hence the latter could not be spoken of as appearing in
“the midst of the former. Consequently there can be no ‘ priyadargana ’
“in the case in question.” ‘

Reply: What we mean is that these words—‘ Rk,’ etc.—~are found
in ‘Vedapraya ’-—i.e. in a Context that begins with speaking of the Veda ;
and as such are presented to the mind which is pervaded by the idea of
the Veda. The Bhashya quotes the sentence wherein there is a mention
of the Veda, and in continuation of which we have the sentence under
consideration.—‘ Prajaputirva iduméka कक ..... tasmat.... trayo déva
ajdyanta..... tébhyah trayo ४९46 asrjyanta .... agnerryvédo, vayorya-
jurvédak adityadt simavedas,’

Then, it has been argued by the Piérvapakshi that “on account of the
strength of the direct declaration of the object of Injunction (in the
‘sentence under consideration), we should take the word ‘ Veda,’ occurring
in the Avthavdda passage (just quoted), as indicating the parts of the
Veda, the Rk, etc.”

To this we make the following reply: The comparative authoritative
strength or weakness as based upon the relationship of the Injunction and
the Arthavdda is wholly different from that based upon the fact of the
cognition appearing in the beginning of a sentence or in a latter part
of it.

That is to say, those Arthavddas that are found in the Veda after the
object of the Injunction has been mentioned, may be weaker in their
authority (than the Injunction) ; but those that appear before them are
certainly stronger, because of their appearing first (mukhya, lit.). Asa
matter of fact, in the case of every word the only reason that can make it
give up its direct denotation is the incompatibility of that denotation
(with something else expressed on a stronger authority); and this incom-
patibility is ognized only when this something else, its counter-entity,
has been perceived. And in the case in question we find that, at the time
that we meet with the sentence ‘trayo védd asryyanta, etc.,’ we have no
mention of the words ‘ Rk,’ etc. which you hold to be denotative of the
community, (as these words appear after some time, lower down 10 the
text) ; and as such there is nothing perceived at the time, with which the

1136 - TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. WI—PApA Tit—aDHT. (1)

direct denotation of the word ‘Vedahk”™ (in the former sentence) coult [ह
found to be incompatible, and the word taken as indirectly indicating the
eomponent Rk, etc. Thus then, while the mind is fully pervaded with.
the idea of the Veda directly denoted by the word ‘ Vedah,’ we: come across
in-a subsequent sentence, the words ‘ik,’ efc. (in the sentence unde
consideration) ; and finding that in their direct denotations, these latter
words are not construable with the rest of the sentence, we take then. .
on the strength of this incompatibility, in their indirect sense (i.e. as
indicating the source of the Rk, etc., the several Vedas). And thus even
though these words appear in the Injunction they are much weaker in
authority than the preceding Arthavada, which is much stronger in its
authority,—in accordance with the sutra ‘ Mukhyam ४ pitrvacodanat lokavat’
(XTI—ii—23)>

Objection: “In accordance with the Stitra VI—v—54,—that ‘when
५४ 076 comes before the other, the former is weaker than the latter ’—it
“must be admitted that the idea of the Veda, brought about by the
“Arthavada (‘tébhyo vedi esrjyanta,’ etc.) appearing in the beginning,
“would be set aside by the idea brought about by the subsequent Injunc-
“tion, which latter must, therefore, be accepted as the more authori-
५ tative.”

Reply: Not so; the comparative strength of sentences based upon
precedence and sequence is admitted only in cases where the ideas brought
about by the sentences are independent of one another. That is to say,
when we find certain contradictory things spoken of, independently of one
another, in distinct sentences, then alone do we find that, while the
sentence. occurring first appears in‘its full form without having to set
aside anything else, the sentence appearing subsequently is not capable
of having an existence without setting aside its contradictory precedent ;
and hence in such cases alone we apply the rule of the stronger authority of
that which follows over that which goes before. Ina case, however, where
the things are spoken of as dependent upon one another, that rule is not
applicable; because in such cases the two sentences are syntactically
connected, on the sole ground of their mutual requirements ; and under’
the circumstances, it is that which has been already cognized by means
of the preceding sentence, that requires what is subsequently mentioned,
to be in keeping with itself, or to add something over and above itself
consequently that which is not found to be over and above this, or to be in
keeping with it, is not taken as syntactically connected with the previous
sentence, for the simple reason that it is not required by it: ‘And at the
time that the preceding sehtence expresses its meaning, the subsequent
‘Sentence does not exist, and as such could not set it aside: consequently. it

is the preceding sentence that possesses stronger authority |

LOUDNESS, ETC., ARE PROPERTIES OF THE VEDA. 1137

Thus then, in the case in question, inasmuch ५8 the Injunction
and the Arthavdda treat of the same object, at the time that the Vedas are
“described in the Arthavidua, it 1s concluded that there is something to be
vid down for these Vedas; and what ia wanted to be known is the
particulae,thing to, be laid down for them, and that for which it should be
aid down. - Consequently from the sentence appearing subyequently we
single out only that which 28 wanted; and as it is only the object to be
aid down—and not that for which it is to be laid down—that is wanted,
we take only. the loudness etc. as connected with previous sentence, and
uot the 1९९, etc.; and thus, inasmuch as no significance is attached to
these latter, they cannot be spoken of as forming part of the object of the
Injunction, and as such they cannot set aside the Arthavaida (in the
preceding sentence ). In fact tt is the Veda as mentioned in the Arthaviada
that is recoguized as that with reference to which we have the subse-
queniceInjunction, And hence the words ‘Rk,’ ete. in this latter must be
taken as indicating the Vedas (Rguveda, ete. ).

As for the Veda, on the other hand, inasmuch as it ts far more |
oxtensive (than the Rk, ete.), there can be no reason by which it could be
riken as indicating its part, the Rk-Verses, otc.; while the Ak-Verses, ete.
149131८ contained in the Veda, could very well be taken as indicating this
latter (as a collection of themselves). And just as, tn other cases, there 1s
vothing icongrnous in the Arthavades being taken in their indirect
indicated seuse, because of their being mere descriptive culogies,—so, in
the sinte manner, in the case in question, where the Injanction has the
sume Object that has been already mentioned in the preceding Arfhavdda_
tie words ` Rk,’ etc, are merely descriptive references (to the Veda therein
mentioned), and as such there ean be nothing incongruous m these being
‘akem as mdirectly indieati ng the Vedues.

Gonsequently the whole sentence under consideration should be
vonstrred in the following way: ‘Inasmuch «as these Vedas came out
of Agni, ete.), they should be recited loudly, ete.’; and itis with reference
to. this well-established fact that we have the subsequent words ‘ Rk,’
etc. {111 the sentence ‘ uccach red,’ etc.). Otherwise these words would be
wholly irrelevant, because of the diversity in the objects of the Injunction
1114} the drthurid

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the propertics spoken of
berfain to the Vedas

Sitra (8): Because of indicative texts.
it is that indirect Indication which has-been met with before that
ESCLES itself totthe mind much sooner than any other, And we have
Wten found the words ‘Kk,’ ete. indicating the Vedas—f.i. in the sen-
143 | 3

1138 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, IlI—-PADA III—ADHI. (1).

tence ‘Rybhih pritardivi deva iyate, yayurvédéna tishthatt madhy&-hna}
siimavédéntistamayé mahiyate, Vedatragiinyarstribhirét: Stryak,’—we fing
that the three last feet, all, speak of the Vedas, and hence we are led t,
take the word ‘Rk’ (in ‘ Rgbhif’) as indicating the Rgveda ; specially
as the last feet speaks of ‘Vedazh’ in the Plaral (which could not he i
only two Vedas, the Sama and the Yujush, were meant), which digtinedly
shows that the word ‘Ak’ indicates the whole of the Rgveda— Mantry
as well as Brahmanas

Then, it has been urged that the students of Veda use the wor
‘Veda’ for the Manira. It is true that they use it in that way ; but in
the case of all such usages, we must take the word ‘ Veda’ as used in its
secondary meaning. But in spite of this usage, in accordance with the
Siitra, I~iii—9, we must admit that the Indication (that of the Vedu
by the words ‘ Rk,’ etc.) is more authoritative than the other (that of the
mantras by the word ‘ Veda’) [as the former 18 based upon a Vedic
Arthavaida, while the latter is hased upon mere usage].

(The fourth sittra is taken by the Vartuka, after the eiyhth, at the end of
the Adhikarana., }

Sutra (5): One who knows the three Vedas is spoken of as
‘Trayividya.’

Even if the discussion 19 to be carried on, in accordance with ordinary
usage, we have the usage of the words ‘ Rk,’ etc. in the sense of the
Vedas |

“ How?”

You know very well that the Rk, Sama and Yajush are known 2s
‘ Trayi’; and the word ‘ Trayividya’ is capable of being explained only as
‘Trayi Vidya asya, ‘This word is found to be applied, in usage, to one who
hag read the three Vedas, and not to one who has only read the Rk verse,
the Sa@ma-song and the Yajush ; because the name is never applied to the
Samavédis, even though, in knowmeg the Samavédu he knows the three—
` ए; the Bk-verses, ७7045, as well as certain Yajush. Consequently, 11
follows that in the word ‘ Trayividya,’ the word ‘ trayi’ is used in the
sense of the Three Vedas. and hence it must be admitted that the words
‘ Rk,’ ‘Sama’ and ‘ Yayush,’ which are spoken of in lexicons:as eo-exten-
sive with the word ‘trayi,’ denote the Vedas themselves; and thus too
we find that the words ‘ Rk,’ etc, are applied to the Vedas... `

LOUDNESS, ETC., ARE PROPERTIES OF THE VEDA. 1139

Ba

sutra (6): Obj: “In 8 case where there is transference, the
Injunction will have to be taken in its direct signification.”

This is a reference to a previous objection (the sense whereof is this) :
“Tn a case where a Rk-verse will be found in the Yajurveda, 17 will have to
५" be sung slowly, as occurring in the Yujurveda, wecording to the Siddhanta ;
‘this However is not the case ; while according to us, being a Rk-verse, in
“ whichsoever Veda it might appear, ib will be quite reasonably sung
“Joudly ; in keeping with the direct signification of the Injunction.” |

Sittra (7): Reply: No; because the qualification belongs to the
whole.

he mere fact of being found in the text of a Veda does not make a
sentence liable to be called by the name of that Veda. The fact is that
that which is enjoined by one Veda, is always done in accordance with
that Veda; cousequently a mantra would be called by the name of that
Veda in which it may Be enjoined. If it should be found to have been
enjoined in both V edas (the Yajush and the Rk), then, inasmuch as the law
laid down in the Satra III—iii—10 would not apply to the case, we could
not but take the two (qualifications of loudness and «lowwness) as optional
alternatives for that Mantra.

Sutra (8) : Because of being connected (syntactically) with
‘Veda,’ the indication (by the words ‘Rk,’ etc. of the Reveda,
etc.) could be set aside by the context.

[That is to say, Syntactical Connection being more authoritative than
Context, there would be nothing objectionable in the indications of the
Context being rejected in favour of Syntactical Connection. |

Some people read ‘ badhéta’ instead of * badhyéta.’

Siitra (4); Because of the injunction of qualification, it could
have no connection with the substance. |

If the injunctions were taken as laying down the qualifications of the
Ri-verse, etc, then, inasmuch as the sentence ‘2icyadhyidham Sama
१०१४४ ' points to the fact of the Sama never being separate from the Rk,
the qualification of the former would be included in that of the latter;
and as such the further injunction ‘ Uccath Sama’ would be wholly redun-
dant. Because it is not possible for one to sing the Sama based upon a
Rk in any other way, while he 1s reciting the Rk itself loudly.

If however we take the qualifications as laid down for the Vedas, both

1140 TANTRA-VARUIKA, ADH. UI—PADA II—ADHI. (1).

-injunctions become quite justified, inasmuch as -what is enjoined hy the
Samaveda is wholly different from that. which 1s enjoined by the Ryrédi

Objection: “The injunction uccack simni would have its use in thy
“case of such Sémas as are not based on a Rk,—such, for instance, as th,
Sama of the Prajdpatihrdaya
| Reply: Not so;. because that Sima does not form an auxiliary tu tie
Jyvtishtoma ; and the Injunctions of ‘loudness,’ appearing in the context
of the Jyotishtuma, could pertain to those Saémas of the Hymas occurring in
that sacrifice; and as a matter of fact we find that in that sacrifice ny
Sama is sung which is not based upon a Rk

And farther, there being very few Samas not based on Aks, your
explanation removes the tuint of redundaney (in the Injunction ( (८
Sdmna’) to an extremely small extent

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the qualifications pertain
to the Vedas

ADHIKARANA (2).

(In the Adhjna the singing is to be done slowly.}
satya (9): When the Primary and the Accessory belong to two
different Vedas, the Vedic characteristic of the Accesssory is
determined by the Primary; as the Accessory is subservient to
the purposes of the Primary : -

We now proceed to consider a case where the Primary laid down in
one Veda’ (the Adkdna in the Yujurveda, 1.1.) has an accessory laid down in
another Veda (f. i. the singing of the Samas, Varavantiya, ete. laid down
in the Sa@maveda). In such cases the question arises as to whether the
Accessory (singing) is to be done in a way in keeping with the Veda in
which its Primary happens to be laid down (f. i. quietly, on account of the
Adkinuw being laid down in the Yajurveda), or it is to be done in a way in
keeping with the Veda in which it is itself laid down (f.1. loudly, on
acconut of the S@ma-singing being laid down nm the Sa@nuvéda ).

Qn this question, we have the followin

»

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘Inasmuch as the qualifications based npon names pertain to each
“unit, the way in which a certain thing is to be done is that in keeping
“with the character of the Veda in whieh it. happens to be mentioned.”

SIDDITANTA.

To the above, we make the following reply: Ina case where there
15 One qualification pertaining to the Accessory by itself, and another
Pertaining to it, through the Primary,—the former qualification is always
to be taken as set aside by the latter.

Lhat is to say, the two qualifications being wholly incompatible with
each other, and hence it being necessary to set aside one of them, it is
always that per taining to thé Accessory by itself that is to be set aside
४१ itis only thus that the Prima y would be.performed as it should be,
Without its being deprived of its own accompaniments ; and certainly the.
Proper fulfilment of the. Primary is a business of the Accessory also ;
€ this latter 8180) operates solely for the suke of the forme Conse-
quently, if, in consideration of its own qualification, 16 were to deprive the

"imary of its natural accompaniment, then there would be a disruption-

1142 TANTRA*VARTIKA. ADH. Uf —PADA III—-ADHI. (2).

of that action (the Primary) for the sake of which it was meant to operate,
Though in such a case the proper fulfilment of the Primary with all its
accompaniments would mean the deprival of the Accessory of: its own
natural accompaniment,—yet, as the fact of the Accessory being equipped
with all its accompaniments is not so very necessary (ns that of the
Primary), there would be nothing incongruous in the said deprival

Consequently, inasmuch as: the Adhana belongs to the Yajurvada
the Sdmas that are accessory to it should be sung quietly

Objection: “As a matter of fact, we reeognize the rule to be
“that only that much of the Adhdna is to be done quietly, which
“ig enjoined in the Yajurveda; and as such the quietness could not
“pertain to the singing of the Sama. Itis only the Primary action
“(the Adhana) itself and its other Accessories that belong to the
५५ Yajurveda ; and hence it is these alone that should be done quietly.”

Reply: 16 18 not so; because it is distinctly shown in Sara XI~
1i—7 that the Accessories are enjoined as along with the Primary, because
of the injunction; and also in 69110 1-1-16 that on account of the
whole Injunction (of the Primary with its Accessories) forming a single
declaration etc. (all the accessories are to be performed in accordauce
with the Primary). Consequently when we find certain Accessories
mentioned in the comprehensive Injunction of the performance of the
Primary with all its accessories,—even if these Accessories be found to
have their origin elsewhere (in another Veda f.1.),—their Injunction will
have to be taken as belonging to that Veda wherein we have the Primary.
Consequently the Adhana together with all its accessories belonging to
the Yajurvedu, every one of them should be done quietly.

Objection: «^ In that case, the quietness would belong to the accesso-
५५ 1168, on the simple ground of their belonging to the Yuyurveda; and
“as such it would not be a fit basis for the present Adh:karana, in
“ which you seek to establish the fact of the qualification of the Accessory
“being rejected in favour of that of the Primary, with which latter
“the former is incompatible (while as you have just explained, the
८५ Accessory in question would have the same qualification as the Primary,
“and as such there would be no incompatibility between the two). And
५ further the Quietness of the Sama, as pertaining to it as an Accessory, !8
५५ equal to its Loudness ; and the Quietness inhering in the Accessory (singiny }
“cannot be spoken of as belonging to the Primary (Adhana); and
“hence the rejection of the Quietness (inhering in the Accessory) would
“mean & rejection of the qualification of the Primary; and such a rejection
would not deprive the performance of the Primary of its natural Quietness
` “ Tf, however, in some way or other, the qualification of the Accessory
“be spoken of as the ‘Qualification of the Primary,’ then, in that case,

SINGING TO BE SLOW -AT ADHANA, 1143

५ Loudness also (which is a qualification of the Sama that is an accessory
“of the Adhana) could be spoken of as sneh a qualification (of the
५ Primary Adhana); and thus both the Loudness and Quietness (of the
“accessory Sama) would be equally authoritative,” |

Reply : - It is in view of the fact of the Samas having their originative
Injunction in the Samavedu that ‘those appearing in connection with the
Yajurvedic action of Adhana are spoken of as ‘belonging to a different
Veda’; and it is only in consequonce of the Primary (Adhdna) being laid
down as connected with all its Accessories, that we come to conclude
that the Sdma-singing—one of these Accessories—is to be done quietly.
That is to say, if the Samas in question had their origin in the
Yujurvéda, then alone could the Quietness have belonged to it as its
natural qualification; as it is, however, they have their origin in the
Samaréda: and as such itis Loudness that belongs to them by their nature ;
and it is only by reason of their being connected (in the present instance)
with a Primary (belonging to the Yajurvéda) that they come to be sung
quietly; and as such this quietness could very well be spoken of as the
‘Qualification of the Primary.’

Objection: “Inasmuch as the Injunction of the Adhana is that it
“should be done, along with all its Accessories, by the Yajurveda, the
_“ Quietness comes to be recoguized as belonging to it wth all tts accessories ;
“and ag such the Quietness comes to be quite natural to the Accessory
“ Sama.”

Reply: Not so; because the very fact of the Adhina being mentioned
२५ laid down with all dts Accessories, shows that the Accessory is not the
principal factor. Because itis only when the Primary has certain Acces-
8019085 subservient to it that it is spoken of as ‘ s@iga.’ Consequently it is
the Primary (Adhdna) alone that directly pertains to the Yajurreda ; and
as such Quietness belongs naturally to that alone; and it 18 as belonging
to this Primary that it is spoken of as extending to the Accessories ; and
these latter are not enjoined as themselves connected with Quietness.

Thus then, (if the Sama-singing in connection with the Adhjna were
not done guzetly), it would be the Qualification of the Primary, as pertain-
पा to the Accessory, that would be rejected ; because the Primary throws
its Qualification into-the Accessories ; and hence in whichsoever accessory
that Qualification #ould be rejected, that would mean a deficiency in the
Primary itself. ` ,

As for Loudness, it is not recognized as a qualification of the Primary
( 2710994) ; because the Qualification of the Accessories are never trans-
ferred to the Primary. 7

Objection: * We find that the natural qualification of the Accessory
* Sama (Loudness) belongs to it directly, while that of the Primary (i.e.

1144 TANTRA*VARTIKA, ADH. 11-श72+ या + फप्रा, (2).

“ (Quietness) could belong to that Accessory, only indirectly, through 16
“ Primary; and thus the comparative authoritativeness of the two would
“be quite contrary to what vou hold it to be (1.6. the former would he More
“authoritative than the latter)

Reply: True; the natural qualification of the Accessory pertaining
to it directly, is very much more quickly; perceived as belonging to it; bu;
still, the Qualification of the Primary, being found to belong to it, subse
quently, after the comprehension (of the comprehensive Direction of the
performance of the Primary with its Accessories), sets aside the former
qualification, in accordance with the law laid down under Sitra ViI—y
--९ 4. |

Objection: ‘‘This law would lead to the application of Quietness to
“those Stutras and Castras (Hymns of the S@maveda) also, which are
“non-Ya 1112९, ४८ accessories to the J yotishtoma.””

Reply: 111०6 ; it does become applicable to these also. But in regard
to all these, different accents are used, in consequence df distinct directions
to that effect. That1s.to say, in connection with the LarcapiirnamAasa, there
are Accessories enjoined in two Vedas; and it would appear as if various
Vedie accents were to be employed in connection with these ; but im accord
ance with the law laid down in the siéra under discussion, they would all
hecome amenable to the single tone of Quielness which belongs to the
Yujurcedic Primary (the Dargepitrnamasa). But then ‘finally, we come
across certain Vedic Directions laying down definite Tones for them,—-f.1.
the directions.— The part of the sacrifice down to the Ajyabhaga-
offering is to be done in quiet tones, the rest in medium tones, and that
hoginning with the dnuydja with the Aighest (loudest) tones.’ Similarly
there are certain Vikyi sacrifices, modifications of the Dareapirnamtse
offerings,—such as the Ishti, the Pagubanitha, ete.,—which would apjieu
to ७८ subject to the three tones just mentioned in connection with their
Original (the Dargapiirnamisa); but, on account of the fact of their
heing directly enjoined as subsidiary to a sacrifice belonging to a par-
ticular Veda (the Yajurvedu), they come to be taken as done with the
tone peculiar to this Veda (i.e, quietly) s.but then, it is found that, iv
accordance with the Sutra TT—vii—51, the comprehensive Injunction of
the performance (of the Primary with all its subsidiaries) (on wineh
Injuuerion rest the subsidiaries in question) 18 much weaker in. its antho--
rity, On Avcomnt of its being dependent upon.a*direct Injunction; axe
hence it is tiually concluded that the tones to be employed are all the
three as laid down in the above-quoted Direction. Exactly it: the same
manner, in the case of the Vikshuniyd, etc., subsidiaries of the dyotishtom:.
‘they would, at first sight, appear to be amenable to the three tones 114
dow 11) connection with their original (the Jyotishtoma); but-this ameria-

SINGING TO BE SLOW AT ADHAINA. 114;

bility is set aside by the fact of their injunctions being contained in a
particular Veda (which fact would justify the use of a single tone);
but it is again brought forward by the distinct Injunction (that ‘the
ectypes are to be performed in the same way as their archetypes’) ;
but then it is found that the Jyotishtoma belongs to the Yayurveda, and
that it does not take up the apparently useful qualifications of any Original
(forthe simple reason that it 18 not the ectype of any other sacrifice);
and hence in accordance with the sitva under discussion, the subsidiaries
in question would come to be taken as amenable to the Quiet tone of the
Jyotishtoma ; but the application of the present siitra to this case is 866
aside by the distinct Injunction that ‘one should recite the Dikshaniya in
whatever tones he may desire,’ which distinctly lays down all the three
tones—High, Medium and Low—for the Dikshaniyd together with all its
subsidiary Hymns, etc. In the same manner, inasmuch as the Jyotish-
toma is found to be amenahle to the three tones—the Low, the Medi-
un and the High—lIaid down in connection with each of its ताऽ
tinctly mentioned three Savanas, all its subsidiaries also come, through
the Primary, to be connected with the same three tones. And then,
we meet with another Vedic direction to the effect that ‘all that
precedes the Agnishomiya offering should be done quietly’; and this
points out the Dikshaniyd, etc. with sll their accessories, as to be done
quietly (because it precedes the Agnishomiya offering) ; but then we have
certain other particular tones specified as belonging only to the Dikshaniyd,
etc.; and these belong to themselves, and not to their Accessories ; because
these tones are laid down with reference to the Dikshantya, etc. alone
by themselves, in the following Direction: ‘The Dikshaniyad should
be sung as loudly as one may wish, the Prayaniya is to be done in a low
tone, the Aftithya in still lower tones, and very gucetly in the Upasat.’
But inasmuch as the last, Quietness, is found to have been already laid
down in the previous extensive Injunction, its mention in this Direction
must be taken as a mere passing reference, by way of eulogizing the
tones laid down in connection with the Dikshaniyd, etc. Inthe Agnishomiya
offering, however, there is a return of the tones of its original sacrifice,
laid down, in connection with the division of that original (Jyotishtoma),
into the three Suvanas,—in the sentence ‘in low tones, to the end of the
Ajyabhaga, etc.’ Or we could divide the performance with all accessories
10६0 three parts, just like those of the Savana, and then employ the three
tones—the Low, the Medium and the High—in accordance with that
‘division. ` ;

The same case holds respecting the tones to be employed in connec-
tion with the Anubandhya, the Avabhrtha, and the Udayaniya |

The Savaniya, etc. performed at the time of the extracting of the

144.

1146 * ` aNTRa-VARTIKA. ADH. (1t-——PADA प्ा--~+ एषा. ( 2}

Soma-juice would also appear to be amenable to the same three toneg q
those just mentioned ; bnt on account of their being included within the
Pratahsavana, etc, the tones of those are regulated in accordance wit}
particular Savana in which they occur.

Objection: “Inasmuch as the words of the Savana are expressive
“of the parts of the Soma sacrifice, they could not have the tones of the
“ Savana,—just as the subsidiaries of the Dikshaniya do not have the tones
‘of the Dikshaniya

Reply: Not so; because the Locative ending in ‘ Savane’ distinctly
shows that, the tones belong to all the mantras that are used at the time of
the Savana; and hence even though the words be expressive of the parts
_of the Soma sacrifice, yet they would be amenable to the tones of the
Savana, Kor if we had the genitive ending with ‘Savana,’ then the
Injunction of the tones—low, ete.—would apply to those manérus alone that
are accessories to the Savuna; as it is, however, we have the Locative ; aud
hence whichsoever mantra happens to be employed in the Savanu, it
becomes connected with the three tones—the Low, ete.

Some people make the following declaration: “If all that the
५५ Locative means is that the Suvanas are the container of the mantras,
“then these latter do not become amenable to the tones—low, ete.; becnuse
“mantras are never spoken of as the contained; and the tones would
“come to apply only to the Savaniyu, etc., which ave sppken of as distinctly
८ contained in the Suvuna; while as for such auxiliaries of the Saranda as
“the Stotra, the Custra, the Anuvakyd, etc.—the tones, low, ete.—-could
“not belong to them, on account of the absence of the genitive ending
“(with ' Savana’) |

To the above we offer the following reply: The above objection is
scarcely tenable; because even without the genitive ending, we can have
the sense of the genitive conveyed by the fact of the Savana being the
container. For instance, the bird is held to exist in the tree, just as well
as the flower exists in 16; and hence the character of the contained in both
(though we speak of ‘vrkshé pushpam,’ yet it can also mean * Vrikshasys
pushpam) (and hence the Aluntras, the Stotra, etc. would be as well ^
tained in the Savana as the Savaniya)

Or, we may take the whole of the Stotra ete. as accessory to the
Suiyd (extracting of the Soma juice); and in that case, the Savane
would contain them just as well as they do the other accessories. Conse-
quently, though the Stotru, etc., from the very beginning, had appeared
to be amenable to the tones of various. Vedas, yet all: that is set aside
by the Quretness, that is pointed out as belonging to them, by the
fact of their being subsidiary toa Primary (that belongs to the Yujurreda)
And it is for this reason that we recite. the Stotra etc. in connection

“SINGING TO BE SLOW AT Aptixa, 5 | 1144.

with the juice-extracting, in the low, or the medium, or the high tone,
sn accordance with the Savana in which they happen to occur; as such is
the distinct Injunction on the point
What has been explained just now applies to all the ectypes of the
Jyclishtoma., .
Question: “‘ Where then would there be room for the use of the
accentuations peculiar to the several Vedas P”

Answer: In accordance with the Sitra TlI—vii—51, in a case where
mn connection with a Vikrt: sacrifice, which is connected with accessories:
having the accentuation of the original sacrifice, there happens to be laid
down an altogether new accessory belonging to another Veda (this
accessory would have the tone peculiar to this other Veda, and thus this
Vikrtt sacrifice would have the tones of the two Vedas, that to which
the original belongs, and that connected with which the new Accessory is
laid down)

Objection: “ Even in such a case, in accordance with the sutra under
discussion, the subsequently-enjoined Accessory would have the same
‘tone as its Primary, the Vekyt: sacrifice in question.

“Question: ‘Then, in that case, we could have the tone of two
“Vedas in a case, where, the Vikrit belonging to-a Veda ‘other than to
“which its Original belongs, and the remaining accessories of that Vikriz
“having the tone of the original, another new accessory happens to be
“enjoined m the same Veda as the Vekrt.

But that too conld not be; as in this case also the tone 18 got at
through the Primary itself

‘Question: In that case, that Primary sacrifice itself would have
“the tones of the two Vedas.’

“Not so; because that too has the same tone as its Original,

“*Then a case,—where the new Accessory does not come in through
“the Primary,—would be one of the presence of the tone of two Vedas,’ |

“That would not be possible; because there also we have the same
` qualification that belongs to the Primary.

“Then again, when the sacrifices have been divided into three parts
“(the three Suvanas), and the Tone remains the qualification of these
“parts of the sacrifices, even though something new in the Accessory
“might come in, it would fall into one of these parts ; and hence it could

not but be equipped with the properties of the Original sacrifice;

Specially 9१ the case would not be similar to the Yupavatustaranavarht,

` And for this reason algo, there can not be any case where we have the
tones of many Vedas. ` +

“And further, the mention (of ^ Loudness,’ ete.) in the context (of

1148 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA Ill—ADHI. (2).

“the Jyottshtoma) would be wholly useless (as there would be no cag,
‘‘ where all the three tones could be employed).”

To the above, we make the following reply :

It would not be useless; as the injunction ‘what is done through the
Yajush is to be done quietly’ would apply to all the Darvihomus (ag
these employ only Yajush mantras). Then as for the Rgvedu and the
Samavedu, the injunction of Loudness with regard to these would have
its use in connection with accessories other than the necessary ones
(that is with those that are laid down with a view to a particular
‘desirable result, and that which is laid down as to be performed only
when certain specified conditions present themselves). The injunctions,
uch as ‘The morning suvana is to be done in low tones,’ are neces-
sary ones; and as such they belong only to the necessary accessories,
not being connected with the kamya (that which is done with a view
to a certain desirable result) and the Naimititka (the conditional, to
be performed only when certain conditions present themselves) accessories.
Consequently any accessories of the latter two kinds, that are enjoined by
the Ryveda or the ‘ Samavedu, are to be done loudly ;—as for instance,
‘ Bhinnamabhimrigedyatrité, crdabhigrishak, etc., etc.’ In the same way
we could cite instances of the Yajurvedic Quietness of tone; so also, those
accessories (of the Jyolsshtoma) that appear after the Sutyd, not being
taken up by the Savanas (and hence not being connected with Suvane
tones), come to have the same tone as that belonging to the Veda in
which each of them occars; and hence it becomes established that the
Sdma-singing of the AvabArthu also is to be done loudly. Otherwise they
would be performed just as one might wish, In the Samas about the
Dikshaniya, however, we will have the Quiet tone (of the Yajurveda) ;
because of the specific direction that ‘all that precedes the Agnishoma is
to be done quietly ; while again for the Pravarjya Samas, we would have
Loudness, according to the Direction ‘ Uccath pravar7 yéna.’

As for the 6715 connected with the Adhana, however, we would have
them done quzetly, because of their being laid down by Injunctions in
connection with a Primary sacrifice belonging to the Yajurveda ; for the
sentences ‘yu gvam vidvin Vamadevyam giyati,’ etc. belong to the
Yajurveda. Consequently, the case of the Samas should not have been
cited as an example of the siltra; because in this cnse, as just shown, the
Sama is sung quietly, not because of the incompatiblity between the quali-
fication of the Primary and the Accessory as mentioned in the .séira,
‘but on account of their injunctions being contaiped in the Yajurveda.

To this argument, some people reply as follows: “It is the
“ Samaveda that brings forth the forms of thé Samas ; but it does not speak
“of them by way of laying down their applications or uses (which 18 done

SINGING TO BE SLOW AT ADHANA. 1149

“by the Yajurveda ; and hence they are amenable to the peculiarities of
५ poth the Vedas).”’ | ।

But this reasoning 18 scarcely correct ; for in that case the discussion
would have turned upon a. consideration of the comparative strength
and weakness of Originative and Applicatory Injunctions,—and not of the
contradiction between the properties of the Primary and the Accessory (as
js done in the siéira); and in that case, the Stddhanta conclusion would
have been in the form that ‘inasmuch as the performance is dependent
upon the Applicatory Injunctions, greater authoritativeness should be
attached to this latter (and, the Sémas would be sung quietly in the Jyotzsh-
foma for this reason, and not for the reason of the S@ma being an Acces-
sory and hence not taking its own character of Loudness which is contra-
dictory to the character of the Primary Jyotishtoma, as declared in the
stitra ).

iu view of this, there is yet another explanation offered by some
people; it is this: “In certain texts of the Sdmaveda itself, there are
“applicatory Injunctions of the Sdmas (that are laid down in the
“Yagurveda also), (And thus there would be a contradiction between
“ these two Injunctions, on which the sitra is based ).” |

But (if there were such an applicatory Injunction of the Sama
im the Sdmaveda itself), the mere repetition of the same Injunction in the
Yajurveda would have very little use. If the two Injunctions were
treated in the same manner xs the several Injunctions (of the same thing)
met with in various texts of the same Veda,—then, in that case, the
Pirvapaksha would have been in the form that, “ the two tones of Loudness
and Quietness should be treated as optional alternatives ” (as such 1s the
conclusion in the case of two injunctions being found in two different
texts,— Vide IT—ivy—8—32). And this too, only if such an Injunction
alleged to exist in the Samaveda were actually quoted from it. 1,
however, no such actual Injunction be forthcoming, the explanation
offered could not be admissible. »

ADHIKARANA (B).

For these reasons, then, we must take the words ‘guna’ (Acces-
sory) and ‘mukhya’ (Primary) in the siitra to have been used in the
Sense of the Originative and the Applicatory Injunctions respectively.
And accordingly we should expound the Adhikarana in the following
manner ;

Question to be dealt with: In a case where a thing, having its origin
प one Veda, has its application or use laid down in another Veda, should

1150 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. UI-—PADA III—ADHI. (2).

that thing be equipped with the properties peculiar to the former Ved,
or with those of the latter ?

| Pairvapaksha: “ Inasmuch as the origination of a thing always
५५ precedes its application, the properties employed should be those of the
“Veda in which it has its origin.”

Siddhainta: The properties should be those of that Veda which lavs
down its application—(1) because the origination of a thing is only for
the sake of the uses to which it may be applied; (2) because it is only
when the thing in question—the Sdma-siuging—is applied to use that jt
‘stands in need of some tone to be applied to it ; and hence the tones enjoined
(in the Injunction ‘ Uecuzh red, etc.’) are those that are perceived at the
time of usage, and not at the time of the erigination; as there is no
injunction of its bemg brought into action at that time.

ADHIKARANA (0);

Or, we could take the word ‘ vyatikrama’ in the siitra, not as signify-
ing either Rey ection or Contradiction, but as denoting nun-concomitance, —i..
existence in different places. Thus then, we would have the Adhikurana
as follows :— ८

Question: Ina ९४86 where the Orig¢nation and the Application of a
certain thing are non-concomitant,—i.c, the origination is in one {९८
and the application in another,—with the properties of which Veda should
the Sdma be equipped ?

Pirvupaksha: “It must be equipped with the properties of the
“ Oriyinative Veda, or with those of one or the othor, optionally.”

Siddhanta: It should be equipped with those of the Applicalory
Veda; a8 application is the more important factor

ADHIKARANA (D).

We might have the Adhikarana as follows :—

Question: In a case where the Primury is in one Veda,. and the
Accessory in another, after the name of which Veda should, the Accessory he
called ?
| The Siddhanta conclusion would be that it should. be dalled after
the ‘Veda in which the Primary happens to be mentioned |

SINGING TO BE SLOW AT ADHANA. | 119

In this case (7) however, it would be necessary to reject the conclu-
sion arrived at in the Satra IT] —vii—51, and to accept the performer to be
she same, in the Original sacrifice, as in its ‘modifications,—the one that is
mentioned in connection with the Primary. If then, on the strength of
the Injunction, that Performer should be accepted who is mentioned in the
same Veda with the Accessory,—then the tone to be employed would भ80
le the same that belougs to the Accessory ; and it would not be proper to
employ the tone of the Primary

For this reason, it is best to take the AdAcharana as based upon the
onsiderution of the comparative authoritativeness of the Oriyinative and
the App/icatory Injunctions, As it is only thus that the citiny of the
example of Adhdna appears justifiable, Specially as if the Adiikarana be
explained as pertaining to the incompatibility of the Primary nnd the
Secondary, or to the contradiction between the Primary and the Subsi-
diayt,—then, it would be necessary to explain how this would not he a
mere repetition of what is said under Sitran XII—ii—v5

ADHIKARANA (3).

[The Jyotishtoma belongs to the Yajurvéda |. ;

Stitra (10): The Action mentioned, in two Vedas is to be taken
as belonging to that in which most of its constituent details
are found.

We now proceed to consider the question after which Veda a certain
Primary action is to be called, when it is found to be mentioned in more
than one Veda. (As for instance, we find the Jyotishtoma mentioned in
the Yajurvedu aswell as in the Samaveda, and the question is whether
we should call it a ‘ Yajurvedic’ or a ‘ Sdmavedic ` sacrifice)

The Siddhania conclusion is that it 18 to be called after that Veda in
which we find it laid down originatively, and not as a mere subsidiary.

The Pirvapaksha is put forth in the following manner: “ Just as
“in the various texts of the same Veda, so in different Vedas also, we
“have the action laid down originatively ; and hence the matter of the
“property attaching to it would be a matter of mere option ; or it may be
“that, inasmuch as both Vedas would be found to lay down the form as
“well as the accessones of the action, sometimes one, and sometimes the
“other Veda might be taken as originative of it.”

SIDDHANTA.

To the above we make the following reply :—

There can bé no option in the matter of different Vedas, as there 18 1n
the case of different teats of the same Veda ; consequently one Veda must
be taken as enjoimmg the sacrifice, and the other as mentioning it simply
for the purpose of laying down certain accessories for it.

Then there arises the question—‘‘In the case of the Jyotishtoma for
instance, which of the two Vedas (Sama or Yajush) is to be accepted as
enjoining it ?”

The reply to this is that that Veda which appears to mention the
greatest number of the accessory details, making up the procedure of the
sacrifice, should, for that very reason, be accepted as enjoining the perform-
ance of that sacrifice. For instance, in the casq of the Jyatishtoma, 16 18
in the Yajurvéda that the largest number of details of procedure—sin the
shape of the Dikshapiya, etc.—are found mentioned. Consequently it
is in the Yajurveda that that sacrifice has its origin ; and. henee.it is spoker

JYOTISHTOMA BELONGS TO YAJURVEDA. 1153

of as ‘Yagurvédéne kriyaté, which means that being pointed out by that
Veda, itis created by it; or that being performed in accordance with that,
it is spoken of as ‘being done by it.’ |

But this explanation of the word ‘ bhityastua’ (in the siitra) is not
quite correct, Because when a certain thing has been recognized, from its
nature, to be indicative of something else, a little or more of it does not
make any difference in its cognition. For instance, when smoke is recog-
nized to be indicative of the Fire, whether it be much or little, it must
indicate the fire. In the same manner, in the case in question, it is the
presence of the details of procedure that has been recognized as indicative
of the Origin of the injunction of the sacrifice; and even in a case where
very Tittle of these details is mentioned, even this little would be inexplic-
uble unless 1{ indicated the performability of the sacrifice; and hence
even this little of it would certainly indicate its performability (and as
such the presence of its originative Injunction). ‘Then again, in the case
in question, it is not the dargeness of subsidiaries that is meant to be the
details of procedure; but what people call the subsediary, that itself is
_What is meant by the Details of Procedure. Then it might be held that
“where we find ouly a little of the details of procedure mentioned, we
nust take it as laid down with reference to the Primary sacrifice enjoined
in another Veda.” But the same may be said of a case where a large
number of these details are mentioned (i.e. these may be taken as laid
down with reference to the sacrifice enjoined in another Veda).

The following argument might here be brought forward: ‘ That
“which 18 only a little can be more easily taken as pertaining to some-
“thing enjoined in another Veda, than a large number of it could ever
be.”

But it is not so; because even in the case of a large number of
details, it ig possible for the large number of sentences to be taken as
pertaining to some Injunction in another Veda.

Consequently we must expound the Siddhantu as follows: In the case
of the Jyotishtoma, we find the form of the sacrifice consisting of the Sub-
stance, the Deity and the Action; and it is in the Yajurvedu that all these
three are laid down; while what the other Veda (the Samaveda) does is
to merely mention the Action by name with a view to laying down cer-
tiin Hymns, etc, in conneetion with it; and hence inasmuch as this latter
stands in need of the mention of the Substance and the Deity, it cannot
be taken as independently by itself, laying down the Action in question.
This we have explained under the Cakhintaradhikarana (Il—iv—8 ef

145 ` ॥

1154 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I11-—PADA I1I-—-ADHI. (3).

seq.). And even though the complete form of the Sacrifice is given in th,
Yajurvedu, yet it ia quite possible to establish the relationship of thig
sacrifice to the Hymns, etc. mentioned in the other Veda; as even though
these latter serve only transcendental (imperceptible) ends, yet they are
taken as connected with the sacrifice, on the strength of the directions laid
down in connection with them

Thus then, the meaning of the sitra comes to be this: That action
which 18 mentionvd in two Vedas, should have its name ascertained by
the mention of a larger number—i.e. the whole—of its constituent details,
which may be capable of supplying all its requirements. The siitr
speaks of only ‘‘two Vedas,” because the Rk and the Sama Vedas have
the same character of Loudness, and as there is no difference conse.
quent npon this, a mention of these would be useless. (Hence all the
difference that is possible is as between the Yazurveda and the Samavedu,
and the Yajurveda and the Rgveda.)

ADHIKARANA (4).
(The Context 18 @ meaus of pointing out the application of Mantras. |

Sutra (11): That which is disconnected (by Direct Declara-
tion, Indicative Power or Syntactical Comunection)
is connected by means of the Context; because it stands in
need of the details of procedure.

We have explained above, with examples, the application (of mantras)
by means of Direvt Declaration, Indicative Power and Syntactical Con-
nection,—dealing with such principal cases as are amenable to them,
individually or collectively. But out of these three, no mention has been
made in the Siitras of Syntactical Connection, because it is almost included
in Direct Declaration—in the shape of the expression of the application by
means of a Direct Injunction,—and also in Indicative Power,-~ which
consists in the power of the mantra-words themselves to indicate its uses ;
specially as in the case of sentence (or Syntactical Connection) there 18 no
‘single word that is ysed, and it is absolutely necessary to have the proxim-
ity of another word. Or, it may be that, Syntactical Connection is not
meluded in the former two, but that it has been spoken of (as the means
of the application of mantras) in the Satra Ill —iii—2, which from begin-
ning to end has been shown as pointing to the fact of that Connection
bemg a property of the Veda.

As an example of application by Syntactical Connection, the Bhashya
has cited the sentence ‘arunayi, etc.’; but in this case it could be very well
sail that, as in the case of ^ Aindryd, etc.,’ so here also, the application is
directly declared by the Instrumental ending (in ‘arunaya’), If the idea
in the mind of the author of the Bhashya be that though the Instramen-
tal ending points out its relationship with Action in general, yet it is the
Syntactical Connection that points out the particular relationship,—then,
the same may be said of the sentence " Aindryd, etc,’ (which too would be-
come an example of application through Syntactical Connection); because
in the case of this latter sentence also, the word ‘ Aindry&’ only requires
something that is to be addressed, and the word ‘ garhapatyam’ stands in
ueed of only the means or Instrument; and hence the particular relation-
ship (between the two particulars) is brought about by Syntactical Con-
nection alone. And hence in both these cases, the Syntactical Connection
may be shown to be included in Direct Declaration; consequently both

1156 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. ItI—PADA (1--+0प्ा, (4).

the sentences must be taken as instances of both (Direct Declaration पते
Syntactical Connection).

As now the consideration of the comparative authoritativeness (of
Direct Declaration, etc.) is drawing near (to be done in Siitra 14), the
87८70 proceeds to point out the forms of the three other means of pointing
out the application,—as also the way in which they are capable of point.
ing this out. |

But on this point, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA

—which proceeds to show that “by means of Context, there can be no
“cognition of the application of Accessories, or that there can be a doubt.
“ful cognition, or that the cognition would be a mistaken one: Because
“so long as there does not appear some other means of such cognition,
“there is no cognitiou at all; or even, if there be such other means, if it
५५ (06, somehow or other, not pointed out, the cognition would be a doubt-
“ful one; or inasmuch as there is no other operation of words, except the
‘hearing of the letters, the following of the expressive potency of those
“letters, and the proximity of other capable words required for the com-
“ prehension,—the Uontext, Order of sequence or Name cannot be the
“ correct means of obtaining any idea of the application of accessories,

SIDDHANTA.

To the above, we make the following reply: So long as the continuity
of the details of procedure relating to the Primary Action has not heen
broken, whatever action, without any particular result, happens to be
mentioned in the text, is taken to be an accessory of that Primary,—and
this only by means of the Context (Prakarana).

For instance, the Injunction ‘ Darcapiirnamasabhyam svargakamo
yayéta ' having given the idea that ‘one should obtain Heaven by means
of the 0010-2 11040750 sacrifices,’ there arises a question as to ‘ how’ this
is to be done; and while this ‘how’ is being expounded in the Veda, we
find mentioned certain Actions (the Praydjas) apparently useless (having
no use stated in the context), in such sentences as ‘ Samidho yajati,
‘ Taniinaptitam yazati;’ etc., etc. Now then, we are led to believe that 80710
help must arrive for the Durgu ० Pirnamasa (in the shape of certain
details of its procedure), and also that these latter 2100146 mast hare
some end or purpose to serve. And then, we find that for the Darf«-
Péraamasa, there is no aid,—mentioned either in the same word, in the
same sentence, in the same context or in any other context,—which ५6

MANTRAS EMPLOYED ACCORDING TO CONTEXT. © - . 1157

could percel ve by any of the five means of cognition (Sensé-perception and
the rest), or by any words cognizable by these means of cognition. Simi-
larly too with the Praydyas (we do not perceive their end or purpose).
And yet it is necessary that both of these must exist (as otherwise the
Darea-Parnamasa could not be performed, and the mention of the Pray@-
ias in the Veda would be wholly useless). And we could conclude that
these do not exist at all, only if we failed to obtain them by all the
resources at our command. As a matter of fact, however, we have, at our
command, a means, in the shape of Context, of obtaining an idea of those
much-needed factors. Nor is extreme proximity the only ground of
relationship between two things; and as a matter of fact, the Vedic
potency continues to move on to the more remote factor, when it does not
find a fit object among the more proximate ones. And in the case in
question, it is this fact that will be the ground for admitting the mutual
help {accorded between the Darya-Purnamasa and the Pray@as). The
fact that, on not obtaining a fit object among those in close proximity, a
remote one is admitted, is established by the mutual requirements (of the
| Primary Sacrifice and the Prayfjas),--the infallible conclusion being
that the aid that the Darga-Pirnamasa stand in need of is supplied by the
Prayfijas, and the use or purpose to be served, which the Praydjas are in
want of, lies in the help that they avcord to the Durga-Piirnumasa. And
“as a matter of fact, neither of these has got anything more proximate to
itself, supplying the said needs. Though we conld assume this help to be
accorded by some other Action,—yet, inasmuch as this other Action will
have had its relationships all supplied through other Primary sacrifices,
it would not stand in need of being connected with the Darga-Pirnamiisa.
For the same reason, the Prayfjas cannot be taken as leading to Heaven
(the common result assumed in connection with the Vigvajit, ete.). Nor
again could they be taken as bringing about, independently by themselves,
the Result that is declared as following from the Darga-Pirnamasn ;
because this one-sided supplying of requirement (by the Darca-Pirna-
7४750 to the Praydjus) could be admitted, only if there were no relation-
ship between them based-upon mutual requirement; and not while such
४ relationship is possible. Consequently, 1t must be admitted that these
two supply each other's needs, just in the same way as the person whose
vart-horse has died is helped by one whose cart has been burnt, and
vice versa.

Question: “ What special purpose is served by the mention, in the
sutra, of ‘asamyatktam'?”, . |

Answer: The purpose served by it is the preclusion of the application
of the Context to cases that are connected by Direct Declaration, In-
dicative Power and Syntactical Connection,—such, 11.) as the Injunction of

1158 = TANTRA-VAWTTKA, ADR. ~+ पा-क, (4),

the Pratipat, with duality and plurality, and the words ‘ Pasha,’ etc. and
their auxiliaries. |

Or ‘asamyuktam’ may be taken as ‘thet which 18 not connected with
something contrary to the Context.’—Those that are connected with its
non-contradictories,— such, f.1, a8 in the case of the sentences ‘ Vrihin
prokshati,’ ‘Varhirdévasadanandimi,’ ‘Arunaya krindti,’ etc. being connec-
ted with the Vriht, Varhi and Kraya mentioned in their Contexts,—there
is every admissibility of the agency of the Context’; but as this is:proved
by the very capability of things, it has not been mentioned in the sé#tra,

ADHIKARANA (9).
(The Order of sequence points out the application. |

Sutra (12); The Order of sequence also (serves to point out
the application of accessories), on the ground of the
sameness of position.

The Pirvapaksha, with regard to this sitra and the next--dealing
with the agency of Order of sequence and Name—is much in the same
strain as that with regard to that of Context, in the foregoing sittra

1

SIDDHANTA.

The Order of sequence, consisting of the commonality of position, is
of two kinds, as based upon the text and upon actual performance; and it
is a means of pointing out the application of Accessories.

Even wheu the two are not performed at the same place, if it be found
that the mantra appears in the same place in the mantra-sectton of the
Veda, as the Injunction of the Primary sacrifice does in the Braéhmana-
Section,—then, when we proceed to seek for the relatives of both, the one
brings the other to the mind, by reason of their sameness of position,--in
accordance with the Law of Sequence. Thatis to say, when we proceed
to look for the mantra to be employed in connection with the Primary, that
is the first to be enjoined (in the Brahmana-section), we begin from the
very beginning of the Mantra section; and as soon as the first mantra
comes to our mind, if we do not find any reasons for passing it over, we
accept that as the Mantra sought after. In the same manner, when we
proceed to look for an Action, to which the mantra occurring in the
beginning of the Mantra-section would be an auxiliary, we begin from the
very first Action enjoined in the Brahmana-section; and not finding any
reasons for passing over that Action, we accept that as the one in connec-
tion with which the Mantra should be employed. And in the same
manner, the second would be connected with the second, and so forth.

In the case of such mantras as the Agnéyanumantraga, their applica-
tion is found to be pointed ont by the indications of such words as‘ Agnéya ’
and the like. Consequently, the Bhashya has cited, in the present connec-
tion, the mantra ‘ Dabdhirnamasit, etc.,’ whose connection is not pointed
out by the indicative power of its words and which is found mentioned
in the same order of sequence as the एत guydja.

1160 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. T1f—PADA T[—ADRI. (5).

Objection: “The mantra cited is found to be pointed out by Context,
“ag pertaining to all the actions (therein mentioned) ; and as the context
५ 18 more authoritative than the Order of Sequence, the mantra must be
“taken as to be employed in other actions also.”

To this, some people make the following reply: By connecting the
mantra with the Upamguyafa, we follow both (the Context as wellas the
Order of Sequence) ; and that is why we take it in that way

But against this explanation it might be urged that it is not propet
to follow the Order, when we find it contradictory tothe Context
because when the Auxiliary belongs to all the actions (as 18 shown
by the Context), it has got to be repeated with every Primary action,
which would not be the case if it were taken with only one action (the
Upameuyaja, as showu by the Order); and hence the following of the
Order would mean a rejection of the Context, which cannot be allowed.

Consequently, to the above objection, we offer the following reply :
The other primary Actions, the Agnéya and the rest, are taken up by
other mantras that are connected with them by Indicative Power, as well
as by Context and Order; and as such they do not stand in need of tlie
mantra in question. Nor could this mantra be taken as an optional
alternative, because its indication wit! reference to the other sacrifices is
not at all distinct

It might be urged that—“ inasmuch as the mantr1s serve only imper-
ceptible results, they could all be used in connection with a single Action.”
But that could not be; because by pointing out to the Primary sacrifice of
the Context, they serve a visible purpose. And even if they served only
imperceptible purposes, inasmuch as they are independent of one another,
they can never be employed conjointly, so long as there is'‘any other way
of utilizing them; and only in such a contingency could the mantra in
question be employed in connection with the Agnéya etc., which having
their needs supplied by other mantras, have once rejected it. Butinasmuch
as there is a way of utilizing the mantra—viz.: in connection with the
Upameuyaja—(it cannot be connected with the other sacrifices).

And further, the mantras, whose indicative power is unknown, cannot
have their application pointed out by Context; and in the case of the
mantra in question we find that the word ‘asi’ has its indicative power
taken up in its closest vicinity. That is to say, the indicativeness of the
mantra is not very distinct; and as such the Context could not point out
its application ; while for us, inasmuch as the word ‘asi’ (pertains to the
second person ‘ Thou’) it points to something near and before it, and
none other ; and we find that it is the Upaimeuydja that is near and before
the Mantra ; and hence the indicative potency of the Mantra is recoguized
through the Order of Sequence, as pertaining to the Upameuyfija ; and it

USE OF MANTRAS POINTED OUT BY ORDER. 116]

is only right that this Indicative Power should set aside what is pointed
out by the Context | ;

The Order of sequence, as pertaining to the Kamayajydkanda, has been
explained And as for the Order of sequence relating to the position of
performance, that will be explained in connection with the Adhikurana
dealing with the fact of the qualifications of the Animal pertaining to the
Agnishomiya (animal dedicated to Agni-Soma)

146

ADHIKARANA (6).
[The Name points ont the Application of Mantras.]

Sitti (13): The Name also does so; because it is for that
purpose.

The Name, that is applied to Actions in its literal sense, is a sure
pointer of their relationship ; and that relationship is shown to be one that
the Auxiliary bears to the Primary.

As the names ‘ Adkvaryava’ and the like are used in the Veda alone,
we do not show here the objections that were brought forward, on a
previous occasion, in regard to the names occurriny in ordinary parlance.

As a matter of fact we find that the Adhvaryu (Priest) stands in
need of a function for himself—somethiny to be done by him; and if no
particular function present itself, then he would take up anything. Sumi-
larly the action, called ‘ Adhvuryava,’ stands in need of an auxiliary in
the shape of a Person that might perform it. And at the very outset,
the idea afforded by the two words (‘ Adhvaryava’ and ‘ Adivaryx’) is that
the action that is done by the -ldhvaryu is called ‘ Adhvaryava, and that
he who is the performer of the Addvuryava action is one who is called
‘Adhvaryu’; the signification of the basic noun ‘ Adhvaryu’ (in the
word ' Adhvaryava’) indicating that of the derivative (‘ Adhvaryava ’),
or vice versa. Though the derivative is a distinct word,—and hence the
two words (‘ Adhvaryu ' and ‘ Adhvaryura ` ) are independent of each other,
and have independent eternal relation with their respective significations,
—yet inasmuch as it is ouly the eternal functioning of a word that
depends upon an eternal relationship, we have given the above explana-
tion with regard to all such names as are applied to things in their literal
sense ; and we have already shown before (under the Avéshtyadhikarana)
that the functioning of the word ‘ Rajya’ has had no beginning in time.
As for the causal relationship between the word and its meaning, there
18 nothing incongruous in it, even if they be eternal.

Some people assert as follows: ‘Before the application is pointed
“ont by the Name, there is no connection between the Adhvaryava and the
“Adhvaryu; the mere bame cannot bring about the cognition of its literal
“application. If the connection were established before the functioning of
“the Name, then the Nume would not be the means of pointing out the
“necessary application. Consequently, we must take the pointing out
“of the application of the Adhvaryava as based upon the two words

USE OF MANTRA INDICATED BY NAME. 1163

५ (" Adhvaryu’ and ° Adhvaryava’); they are similar in forn, though they
‘aye taken in the ordinary conventional signification (and not literally),
‘and are independent of each other.”

But this is scarcely correct. Because the words that have no literal
signification have not the capacity to poimt to one another in matters
relating to the qualifications, even though they may be similar in form;
for instance, the qualifications of the Ruthantara-siima do not belong to the
Ranvarathantara-sima—as will be shown later on; it is all the more so
in the case in question, where the relationship meant is one of the Action
(Adhvaryava) and its Performer (Adhvuryu) ; as otherwise the citing of
sich instances as ‘ pivaka’ ete. would be wholly irrelevant (if no im-
portance were attached to the name applying in its literal sense), Conse-
quently, we must admit the word under consideration to be taken as apply-
ing: literally.

It has been argued above that prior to the performance, there 18 no
eround (for admitting the word in its literal signification). Though it is
tine that there is no such perceptible ground, yet, it could be inferred from
the Name itself, In matters relating to the Veda, the relationship of the
Action and its Performer is established from time immemorial; and it is
while this relationship is existent that the Name is applied. We, however,
not comprehending that relationship by any other means, come to compre-
hend it only by means of the Nume; and from this we are led to believe
that the Name precedes the relationship. In reality however itis the
Relationship that precedes it; and though not comprehended, it is that
Relationship which leads, by its mere existence, to the application of
the Name. If this Name had a beginning, then it would be necessary for
the Performer to have a prior knowledge of its relationship ; and inasmuch
as this is not possible, we might be lable to reproach on that account. As
५ matter of fact, however, we admit the relationship to be eternal; and as
such there certainly exists some sort of a relationship with the cternally
functioning Name; and this having been duly established, 1t would be on
the ground of the apparent inconsistency of this relationship, that we
would subsequently come to accept the relationship of the Auxiliary and
the Primary.

Hence it must be admitted that the application is pointed out by a
Naine applied literally.

ADHIKARANA (7).

(Among Direct Declaration and the rest, that which precedes i» more
authoritative than that which follows. ] .

9८0८ (14) : When there is a coalition of Direct Declaration,
Indicative Power, Syntactical Connection, Context, Position,
and Name, that which follows is always weaker than the one
preceding it; because it is more remote from the purpose in
view.

We now proceed to consider the comparative strength and weakness
of the six agencies of Direct Assertion and the rest, in the matter of the
employment of Mantra., ete. And as no comparison could be made when
each of them treated of different subjects, we take them up as referring to
one and the same subject; and that is why the saru speaks of their
‘samavaya, ‘coalition,’ by which is meant the fact of their bearing upon
a single subject.

As against the wording of the sitra, some people make the follow-
ing declaration: “The sitra should have Jaid down ‘conflict’ as 4
“condition; because in the case of the sentence ‘ arunaya 1१21000८ ` we
“have found that though both Direct Assertion and the rest point to the
‘same object, yet, inasmuch as they are not found to be conflicting
“each other, we do not stop to consider which of them has the stronger
“anthority. That is to say, we find that in any case, the Redness alone is
“the accessory concerned ; and by Direct Assertion, this Redness is pointed
“ont as connected with Action in general ; hy Syntactical Connection it is
‘pointed ont as connected with the particular action of ‘purchase’; and
८ by the Context it is shown to be connected with that Purchuse which
‘pertains to the Jyotishtoma sacrifice; and though thus we find all these
“three bearing upon the same object of Redness, yet, inasmuch as each of
“them is found to assist, and not contradict, the other, we do not stop to
“consider which of them is possessed of the greater wuthoritative strength.
‘Specially as no good would come out of the reference being made
“indefinitely to Actton in general, and as it would be absolutely useless to
‘refer the Redness to the mere form of the Purchase,—we find that the
५५ Direct Assertion and the Syntactical Connection stand in- need of the
“assistance of the Syntactical Connection and the Context. respectively.
‘Bor these reasons, it 18 necessary that the s#ira should have spoken of

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC, 1165

“éeonflict’ (and not mere ‘coalition’) among Direct Assertion and the
“vest,”

Reply: It would not be right to make any mention of ‘Conflict.’
Because it is the fact of bearing upon one and the same object that
is spoken of as ‘Samavdya’; and when the means of cognition (Direct
Assertion etc.) are found to bear upon the same object, then alone is
such Samavaya cognized as belonging to the Accessories concerned. That
is to say, in the case of such accessories as the said Redness etc., we do
not find a coalition (Sumavaya) of the moans of cognition; as ‘ Sama-
viya’ does not consist in the possibility of the application of all of them
to a single sabject, but in the fact of all them actually bearing upon one
and the same subject. In the case of Redness, we find that its connection
with Action 18 pointed out by Direct Assertion ; then when this relation-
ship of the Action and its Agent, pointed out by Direct Assertion, comes
to be in need of the specialization of the Action, we have the action of
Purchuse (pointed out by Syutactical Connection) ; but all requirements
not being fulfilled by this, there arises a need of further specification ;
and this is supplied by the pointing out (by the Context) of that Purchase
which ts connected with the Jyotishtoma, and as such is related to an Apirva.
Thus we find that each of the three means of cugnition has a distinct
-object of its own; and as such there is nothing incompatible in the
acceptance of all of them as laying down the employment of accessories.
Then again, in the case of Redness, we find that the acceptance of the
remote factor does not involve the rejection of the proximate one;
because by accepting ‘ Purchase’ wo do not reject the relationship of
‘Redness’ with ‘Action’; nor by performing the ‘ Purchase’ in connec-
tion with the Jyotishtoma, do we set aside its connection with ‘ Purchase.’
As a matter of fact, we have a Samuvaya (‘coalition’) of two means
of cognition, only in a case where the Accessory in question is one only ;
—and this is pointed ont to be subservient to a Primary other than that
shown by the other Means; the former Means being contrary to its
relationship with this latter Primary; while the latter means, not finding
it compatible not to reject the relationship pointed out by the other Means,
points out the accessory as subservient to a distinct Primary ;—and where
the Accessory, having its requirements fulfilled by being connected with
one Primary, does not stand in need of being employed again. And it is
111 such cases alone that the ‘ Sumavaya’ of the Means is such as consists
in the fact of both of them bearing upon the same object, and being
mutually contradictory. Then again, we have a Sumuvdyu in the shape of
having to take up the same object exclusively, in a case where, though
there are different Accessories, yet the Primary is one only, which is
equally assisted by all the accessories; and it is found that one Means of

1166 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, TUI—PADA IE—-ADHI, (7).

knowledge points out one Accessory as the active auxiliary, while the
other points to another; and asa matter of fact, the Primary is so cop-
stituted that, having received assistance from one source, it does not stand in
need of any other assistance. Such a Samavdya involves a contradiction ;
(and hence it was not necessary to mention the word ‘conflict’ over
again) ७

On the other hand, (L) in a case where there are distinct acces.
sories concerned— as in the case of the sentence ‘samidho yajatt, ete. ;
(2) where additional qualifications of the same Accessory are spoken of, as
in the case of the ‘ Redness’ spoken of above; (3) where different Pri-
maries are concerned,—as in the case of the Agnéya Ashtakapéla, etc.; (4)
where additional qualifications of the same Primary are mentioned,-—
as in the case of different aids imparted by the accessories of the Dureu-
Pirnamisa ; -in all these cases, the subject-matter of the various means of
cognition being distinct, we have no ‘ Samavaya’ of these. Whether an
accessory has its use laid down by Direct Assertion, or implied by its Name,

it isallthe same; and ina case where all the Accessories combine to render

a single assistance to the Primary,—these accessories are not laid down
separately ; and the means pointing them out, as well as the Accessory
character concerned, 18 one only; and as such there being only distinct

|

functionings of the same means, there can be no ‘ Samavaya.’ Similarly,.

in 2 case where the same Accessory is laid down in cennection with the
same Primary, by the Proximate as well as the Remote Means,—there tov
it is only one of these latter that is accepted as the operative means, the

other being taken as serving some other purpose; and in this case too,

there 18 no ° Samavdya,’ For these reasons, it must be admitted that the
mention of ‘ Samavdya’ implies the element of Conflict iso.

Though it was necessary to have shown the comparative strength of
all the six in reference to a single instance, yet, inasmuch as declarations
are made in a certain order of sequence, and it is impossible for them to
appear all simultaneously, we proceed to take them up one by one; and
we take up the other means, only because unless there is something else
against which the comparison is made, there can be no mention of the
comparative streugth of that one which has been taken up for considera-
tion, {४ 18 for this reason that the Bhashya speaks of ‘ Dvayor dvayth.’

The sentence in the Bhashya— &kirthavartitvadvacah'—is capable
of another explanation: The present enquiry into the comparative
strength of Direct Assertion etc. appertains to each of these singly, and
not. to all of them collectively ; as it is these, and not the comparative
strength, that have their purpose served by the employment of the

| COMPARATIVA. AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC 1167

Accessory in question, Conseqnently, inasmuch as the declaration of com-
parative strength will have to be repoated with each Primary, 16 becomes
necessary to take them up one by one; and as such the mention of the
second is made simply because unless something else is shown to set off
the strength or weakness of the other, we cannot form any idea of such
strength or weakness ; and it is for this reason that the Bhashya speaks of
` dvayorduayohsumpradharanam.,’

Then again, though as indue form it should have been necessary to
ompare one out of these six with the other five, yet we compare each of
them with one only ont of the rest, because that which is suppressed by
one thing is naturally taken as suppressed by that which suppresses
this Jatter thing, its suppressor. For instance, those--Context, etc.-—
that ave suppressed by Indicative Power, are certainly suppressed by
Direct Assertion, which suppresses the said Indicative Power; and as
guch. those former are not brought 11110 direct comparison with Direct
Assertion,

Thus then, as Direct Assertion and [ndicative Power are the first two
aniong the six, we proceed to take up these two for comparison.

Question: “ What particular example have you got for this purpose ¢
“The sense of the question is that inasmuch as it is impossible for mere
“aurds to be used by themselves, m all cases these must occur ina
“certain sentence; and as such we can have no instance whero there
“would be an exclusive functioning of Direct Assertion and Indicative
‘ Power only (apart from Syntactical Connection ).”

With a view to the differentiation of Direct Assertion etc., from
Syutactical Connection, to be explained later on, the Bhadshya puts forward
the question ६०.96 dealt with in the following form: ‘In the case of the
sentence Aindrya garhapatyamupatishthaté, should the upasthana (greet-
ing) be of Indra alone, or of Indra or Garhapatya optionally, or of
Garhapatya and Indra conjointly, or of Garhapatya alone?’ Thatia to say,
(1) if Indifative. Power has an authority superior to Direct Assertion,
then the Greeting should be done to Indra alone; (2) if both are equally
Strong, and mutually contradictory, then it should be done to Indra ०४ to
Garhapatya optionally ; (3) if they be equally strong, and not contradic-
tory to one another, then it should be done to both conjointly; and lastly,
(4) if Direct Assertion have the superior authority, then, it should be
lone to Gairhapatya alone

Thongh on a previous occasion, in the Satra III—ii—8, it has been
leclaved as a well-established fact that the Andri verse in meant to be
addressed to Garhapatya,—yet this was done in view of the superior

strength of Direct Assertion, which is to be established in the present
Adhikarana `

1168 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. UI—PADA I1I—ADHI. (7)...

{7 view of the fact of all the six—Direct Assertion etc — appearing
in the form of a sentence, the opponent takes all of them to be identica|
with Syntactical Connection, and then puts the question: “In this case
what is the Direct Assertion, and whut the Indicative Power ?

The reply is—The Direct Assertion consists in the distinct mention
of the Garhapatya, and the Indicative Power in the indications» of the
Manira

Says the opponent: ‘If such collections of words were to be called
५ ‹ T)irect Assertion’ and ‘Indicative Power,’—well, then, there is nothing
“that can be called a ‘Sentence’; so will you please explain what a
(‹ ‹ sentence’ 18 ?”’

Still with a view to the capability of all the rest being duly differentia-
ted from ‘Sentence,’ the Bhashya replies: A ‘ Sentence’ consists of a number
of words which collectively erpress u certain idea. Though there is uo such
single object denotable by all the words collectively, yet what is meant is
that which is implied or indicated by them. Or, it may mean that a
number of words go to form a ‘sentence,’ when they denote their objects,
after having been thrown together, to form a corporate whole, by means of
the one single idea that is songht to be indicated by such a whole.

Objection: “In that case, inasmuch as both the mantra and the
८८ Brahmana-passage that have been quoted in the present connection
“ (‘hada ca nastarirast etc., and ‘Aindryd girhyopatyam etc.’) would
८ fulfil the conditions necessary for the ‘sentence,’ the present discussion
५८ would be one about the comparative strength of two Sentences (and not
“of a Direct Assertion and an Indicative Power). If then, it be abso-
“Intely necessary to establish the fact of the sentences in question
‘involving a conflict of Direct Assertion and Indicative Power, then
“it becomes necessary to define and point out the differences among
‘‘ Direct Assertion, Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection.”

Reply: The expressive potency of a word is what is called ‘ Indica-
tive Power’ (‘ Linga’); and ‘ Direct Assertion’ is of three kinds: (1) The
Injunctive, (2) the Declaratory, and (3) the Applicative; and the
*gentence’ we have already defined before.

Objection: “Inasmuch as Declaration, Injunction and Application
“are all necessarily preceded -by a certain Potency, in the case of the
“ sentence ‘Aindry@ garhapatyam etc,’ 9180 we have an instance of Indica-
“tive Power (and not of Direct Assertion exclusively); and similarly
५ too, in the case of the Mantra ‘kada ca etc.,’ we have the Declaration of
“Indra; and as such in this cage there can be ‘no differentiation between
“ Direct Assertion and Indicative Power. Because neither an Injunction,
“nora Declaration, nor an Application, is possible, without certain potencies
“attaching to the words; nor, on the other hand, is it possible for the

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1169

‘ word ‘Indra’ to have an Indicative potency, apart from a Direct Asser-
“tion in the form of Declaration.” |

Reply: True; in the sentences in question we have a mixture of both
( Direct Assertion and Indicative Power). But, (1) the fact of the
Girhapatya belonging to the Aindri is not cognizable by means of Indi-
eative, Power; (2) nor is the idea of Indra being the accessory deity
obtainable by means of the Direct Denotation of words. |

That is to say, (1) all that the potencies of the words ‘ Aindryd gairha-
patyam’ imply is that each of these words is used in ordinary parlance in
its various meanings, and not that the Aindri mantra is an accessory of
the Garhapatya ; because the potency that has gone away in one quarter,
cannot serve any purpose in another quarter ; when, however, the words of
the Brahmana passage (‘ Aindry@ efc.’) function by means of their own
depotativeness, independently of all Indicative potency or otherwise, then
they distinctly point to the Muntra as pertaining to the Ga@rhapatya. And
in this case, we do not, in the first instance, have recourse to the assump-
tion of the Denotative potency; as this potency is implied by the
apparent inconsistency of the Denotation or expression which is an
established fact; and it is only after this latter has pointed out the
use, that we assume the necessary potency; and the potency is not the
cause of the use. Though in reality it exists beforehand, yet it is only
latterly that it comes to be cognized, on other grounds (of apparent in-
consistency) and hence even though it is fully endowed with the capa-
bility of the agent, yet, not being indicative, it is spoken of as having no
causal efficiency: If the sentence in question had emanated from a
human agent, then, in that case, the Denotative Potency of the speaker
would have preceded the declaration of the use. As a matter of fact,
however, the assertion in question 18 not human; inasmuch as the Veda is
independent of all human agency. Consequently all men being mere
listners, it is only subsequently that the cognition of potency appears ;
and hence it must be admitted that the idea of the mantra being accessory
to the Garhapatya is obtained directly from the hearing of the words
( ` Aindryd etc.’ ). | |

(2) In the mantra ‘kada ca etc.’ though Indra is denoted by the word
‘Indra,’ yet, inasmuch as no use is expressed by the word, we find no operation
of Direct Assertion (in the pointing out of the use); because there is no
word in the mantra, on hearing which the listner obtains any idea either
of Indra being the Primary or of the Mantra being the Accessory ;—as
We have in the case of the, sentence ' Aindryd etc.,’ where the accusative
ending (in ‘ garhapatyam’) distinctly points to the fact of Garhapatya
being the Primary factor, and the Aindri being the Instrumental accessory.
Though the mantra (‘kada ca ९८८.) by its own expressive power is capable

147 |

1170 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. JI1l-—PADA UI—ADHI. (7),

of pointing out its own use, yet its use cannot be taken as declared or laid
down by that alone; nor by that alone is the use enjoined; because the
Muntra has no injunctive potency; in the Brdahmanu-passage, on the
other hand, we can have both the Declaration and the Injunction (of
use), |

Objection: “ For the Mantra also, the Indicative Power is assumed on
“the ground of the direct denotation of its words.” |

Reply: True; it is so; but there is no mention or declaration of
the use to which the mantra 18 to be put; as all that the words denote is
the mere form of the objects denoted by them. The denotative potency
of a word, which precedes all other potencies, is something wholly differ.
ent from the potency of laying down applications or uses,—this latter
being based upon the former potency. Because that which is cognized
as capable of denoting something, 18 also recognized as capable of being
applied; as the incapable could never bo applied. Consequently the
application of the Mantra would be based upon this second potency, and
not upon the first (denotative potency) ; as what the word ‘Indra’ does,
by its pristine denotative potency, is merely to denote the deity ‘ Indra.’

For these reasons the discrimination among the six (Direct Assertion
and the rest) should be made in the following manner: ~

(1) In the case of one (1.e. in ‘ Aindryd@ ९1८. ), 16 is in the absence of
any Indicative Power that the Alantra is directly declared to be an acces-
sory (to Garhapatya); (2) while in the other (in ‘hada ca ete.’), what is
cognized is the Indicative Power, without any direct declaration of the
accessory character. That isto say, in the former case, from the direct
declaration of the use to which the Aindrz verse is to be put, we infer
the existence of a potency in the verse itself of indicating the Garhu-
patya; and its application has been already determined (by the Direct
Declaration contained in the sentence ‘ Azndry@ etc.’). In the case of the
mantra ‘ kudd cu etc.,’ however, we actually perceive a potency of indicat-
ing Indra; and from that we have to proceed to assume that the appli-
cation of the dfantra is declared or enjoined (by the word), (3) Then
again, in the case of syntactical Connection, we find that it neither: has
the indicative potency, nor does it directly declare the accessory charac
ter; what is found in it is only a conglomeration of a number of words
bearing some sort of a relation to one another. As for (4) Context, (5
Order, and (6) Name,—which respectively take the forms of Procedure,
Commonality of Place, and Literal signification, respectively,—the differ-
ence among these is easily perceptible; and hence the opponent has not
put any question with regard to these, nor has the Bhashyna thought it, fit
to supply the answer

We find all these sia present either collectively or singly, in all sen-

tences. That is to say, there 18 no sentence which is wholly devoid, either
of indicative potency, or of direct declaration or of the proximity of other
words. A differentiation among these we have already explained; and
from among these it 1s sometimes the one, and sometimes the other, that
i; the first to be cognized. This we now proceed to show: In the case in
questign, we find that the sentence ‘kadé ca ete.’ does not declare the
application (of the Mantra); nor is the application implied by the
proximity of any other words; what we find is that the verse contains
the word ‘ Indra’ capable of denoting the deity Indra; and the rest of
the words in the Mantra being syntactically connected with that word,
it follows that the whole Mantra is capable of denoting Indra; and then
this Judra too forming an integral part of the action (sacrifice), is quite a
fit object for heing denoted ; and as such we are led to admit the fact of
its being denoted (by the Munéra). As regards the Garhapatya, we find
that, without any indicative power of the Mantra (with reference to
the gdrhapatya) the application of the Mantra to that is distinctly
declared by the Brihmuna-passage (‘ Aindrya etc.’). And thas it 18
only natural that we should proceed to consider which of these two has
the stronger authority,

Some people make the following observations: “ Under the cireum-
“stances, the passage of the Bhashya that we have been considering should
have been taken before the sentence ‘ Lingavikyé ete.,’ or as preceding
“the sentence ‘ nitraikavakyatvdt ete.’ (Bhashya, p. 286, line 18). Ve-
“cause if we once admit of the indicative power (of the mantra) towards
“connecting if with the greeting of Indra,—then how can we, again,
“admit both to have the character of the sentence? Consequently the
“ sentence under consideration should have been placed in a place where
“it has been asserted that there are two sentences. Or again, it might be
“ taken along with the sentence—' through Syntacticul Connection, the
yreeting cannot be suid to be subservient either to Indra or to Garhapatya’ ;
“because in both cases we assume the existence of the operation of
“rejecting the Syntactical Connection. Otherwise as the fact of the
“ Mantra being applied in accordance with the Indicative Power 18
“admitted by the Parra pakshi, the raising of the question that ‘ the mantra
“ig applied to the greeting of Indra on the basis of Syntactical Connec-
* tion,’ and its subsequent refutation, would be wholly irrelevant. For
“ these reasons, we must take the passage of the Bhashya as misplaced by
^ mistake, and shonld explain it by removing it to its proper place.”

We need not attach much importance to the above observations ;
because it is a common thing to find that-when there are many objections
to he dealt with, the objection that has gone before is refuted at the time
of the refutation of that which comes after it. Then again, even after the

1172 TANTRA-VABTIKA. ADH. IMI—PADA III——ADHI. (7)

declaration ‘ ndtraikavaikyutvat etc.’ has been made, the mention of ‘ Syntac-
tical Connection’ in the sentence ‘ Lingavdkyé etc. would be wholly
irrelovant.

Consequently we must take the Bhashya just as it stands,—explaining
in the following manner: It is only by way of admitting for the sake of
argument, that the Purvapakshi has spoken of ‘‘ Indicative Power ” in one
place; and hence it is with a view to remove even the slightest remnant
of \ longing that he may have for bringing in syntactical connection,
that the Bhashya has declared—‘ nitraikavakyatedt etc.” Or it may be
that with a view to declare the ineffectiveness of the Syntactical Connec-
tion in the Bradhmana-passage, the Bhashya has, by way of illustration,
spoken of the same with regard to the manira 2180.

Objection: ^ ‹ Aindryd@ etc.’ 1s a sentence. Thatis to say, the Jnstru-
“mental ending in ‘aindry@’ only denotes the fact of the Acniri verse
८५ 06100 an accessory, without indicating the particular Primary to which
“itis an accessory,—and similarly, the Accusative in ‘ garhapatyam ' only
“denotes the fact of the Garhapatya being a Primary factor; and
“certainly none of these is incompatible with the Indicative Power (of
“the mantra ‘ kada ca ९८.) ; as so long as there is no relationship with
“another word, the instrumentality of the Atndri would be quite real;
“and the Garhapatya also could be the Primary for some one of the
५ Agnéyi verses. But it is the proximity of the two words (‘ aindry@' and
“‘ garhupatyam’) that precludes the application: of the Mantra to the
“greeting of Indra; and this proximity constitutes what is known as
“<«Syntactical Connection’ (consequently the case under consideration
“would be one of the rejection of Indicative Power by Syntactical
‘Connection, and nof by Direct Assertion).”

Reply: It ४6 not so; in the reply the Bhashya brings forward the
Direct Assertion of the Garhapatya. Mutual proximity also could not be
taken, without contradiction, unless it opposed the said Direct Assertion.
If the word ‘ga@rhapatya’ were construed as ‘Grhapatérayam,’ thereby
denoting Indra,—or if it were to indicate Indra as an accessory of the
sacrifice,—or, if it were to denote proximity to the sacrificial fire,—then, the
said proximity (of the words ‘aindrya@’ and ‘ garhapatyam’) could be expli-
cable, compatibly with the Indicative Power. Inasmuch as, however, as ५
matter of fact, the word ‘ gaérhapatyam distinctly sticks to the denotation
(of fire) belonging to it as a whole (and not taken etymologically),—
there 1s a distinct contradiction of the Indication by the Direct Assertion
(in the shape of the Direct Denotation of the word ‘ garhapatyam’) (and
not by Syntactical Oonnection, with which it has been shown to be com-
patible)

Says the Bhdshya: Atha vd ndatraikivakyateoat etc. This brings

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1173

‘orward the contradiction of the Direct Denotation of the (accusative)
ending. That is to say, if the Accusative ending (in ‘g@rhapatyam’) had
the sense of the Locative or of the Instrumental, then there might not be
a contradiction. As a matter of fact, however, it signifies the objective;
and this is certainly contradicted. The contradiction of Indicative Power
has been already pointed out above; and it has been brought up again
simply with 8 view to reject the possibility of the operation of Syntactical
Connection affecting the case in question.

Question: ‘“ Inasmuch as, 98 shown above, contradiction is possible
“in both ways, how is it that the Bhashya takes up the contradiction of
“ Direct Assertion by Indicative Power, and not that of the Indicative
“ Power by Syntactical Connection ?”

Reply: Just as by reason of its quicker operativeness, Direct Asser-
tion sets aside Indicative Power and the rest; so in the pointing out of
the application of the mantra also, it 18 the first to become operative.
That is to say, it is the one that is quickest in pointing out the application,
that is cognized as contradicted by its counter-agent.

Objection: “It has been declared above that Direct Assertion is not
“the only one that is contradicted.”

Reply: Why cannot if be contradicted,—when the limits of the
relationship of Direct Assertion with Syntactical Connection have been
strictly detined,—one being in the form of the Primary and the
Accessory, and andther in that of the Qualitication and the Qualified ?
What Direct Assertion distinctly avers 15 that to the relationship of the
Qualification and the Qualified, which is expressed by Syntactical Connec-
tion, belongs such and such a relationship of the Primary and the Acces-
sory (and there is no contradiction involved in this), The Indicative
Power, on the other hand, contradicts the very relationship of the
Primary and the Accessory (expressed by Direct Assertion), and not that
of the Qualification and the Qualified, which is expressed by Syntactical
Connection. Consequently when the relationship of the Qualification
and the Qualified has been established by Syntactical Connection 1n-
opposed, then what remains to be considered is the contradiction by
Indicative Power of the Direct Assertion.

Or, it may be that as soon as the word ‘ Aindryai’ has been
pronounced, it becomes evident, from the law laid down under Sétra
1-1-31, that he that is to be greeted by the mantra is someone other
than Indra,—and certainly this is contradictory to the Indicative Power
which points to Indra as one to be greeted by it.

Thus then, it is clear that the texts under consideration involve a
conflict between Direct Assertion and Indicative Power; and as such
there is nothing wrong in the discussion propounded by the Bhashya.

1174 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 11—~PADA U1--ADHL. (7).
On the above question, then, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“Tt must be admitted that all means of right knowledge are equally
‘ anthoritative.

(A) “ Because, as a matter of fact, when one of these has, on its own
‘strength, once been accepted as authoritative, that strength does not
‘‘ disappear, when it is compared with another means.

“In the case of all means of right knowledge, Sense-perception and
“the rest, there are only two possible contingencies :—-they are either
‘true or false; there is no intermediate course: and that which is once a
‘‘true means of knowledge can never be false; and conversely that which
‘is false can never be true; and in all cases it 18 only the falso means of
^" knowledge that is rejected, and never the true one; nor is the false one
‘‘ ever recognized as a true means of knowledge; for the simple reason that
‘“the very character of the true means of knowledge consists in non-rejecti-
“bility. Now then, with regard to the six means of knowledge, Direct.
‘“ Assertion and the rest, it has been shown (in the preceding Adhikaranas)
“that each of them is a true means within its own limits; and none
‘of them ever steps beyond those limits, where it could be suspected
“of weakness. And when an idea has once been brought about by one of
‘these, it 18 not possible for it to be made non-existent. And inasmuch
“as every one of these ideas is only self-destructible, it could not be set
‘aside by any other idea. Nor is it possible for the sanskdra (impression)
“of that idea to be removed,—as there can be no destruction of the
“ sansk@ra that is the source of memory. Nor, lastly, is it possible to
^^ separate it from its legitimate effect in the shape of due action; as the
“idea of acivon is strongly-rooted. Consequently, all the six being
“equally strong im authority, whenever they are found to contradict
“one another, they must be treated as pointing to optional alterna-
‘“ tives,

‘“(B) If it be absolutely necessary to admit the rejection of one by
“the other, then the rejection will take a course quite contrary to that
“held by the Seddhduti, as it 18 a matter of common experience that that
“ which follows can never come about unless it has rejected that which
५५ 188 gone before it. That 18 to say, among Direct Assertion ete. it 18
“ found that that which precedes is quicker in its operation than that which
‘follows; and as such the latter could have an existence only after it
‘had set aside the former; consequently the rejection of these by one
‘another would be in a way quite different from that held by you.

“And further, even Direct Assertion could never lay down the
«^ application of that which would not have the power (necessary for that

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1175

- application ) ; and there could be no such power, unless there were a
+ Syntactical Connection (among the factors concerned).

“That 18 to say, (1) that which, at the time of its appearance, has
“had its capabilities ascertained as being suited for one thing, could
“never, at the time of its actual application, be turned away from that
“thing; and it 1s only right to hold that the use to which a thing is put
“depends upon its capabilities (and thus Indicative Power is stronger
“than Direct Assertion).

“ (2) Similarly that which is not found to be related, by Syntactical
“Connection, with another thing, could never be believed to have any
“capabilities with regard to that thing. And when there is such a
“relationship ; then the apparent inconsistency of this very relationship
‘establishes the said capability ; and thus Syntactical Connection would
“appear to be by far the stronger in authority (than Indicative Power,
‘and hence than Direct Assertion).

‘* (8) So also, in all cases Syntactical Connection is dependent upon
“mutual requirement (Context); hence it is that it is only when such
“a mutual requirement is perceptible that we recognize the presence of
“Syntactical Connection; and never otherwise; and thus being the
“necessary precursor of that Connection, Mutual Requirement, in the
“form of Context, cannot but be admitted to be the superior. Specially
“as all notions of Syntactical Connection, that go against mutual require-
“ment, are found to be totally mistaken. |

“° (4) In the same manner, all Requirements are based upon those
“that proximate to one another; becauso factors that are remote from
“one another cannot be १८५४1६५ by, or related to, one another; conse-
“quently all that has gone before is possible only when there is Proxi-
“mity, which, therefore, in the form of Order, must be regarded as
saperior to all the four that have gone before.

“(5) As for Name, it denotes the relationship directly (and as such
“is the strongest of all).

“ Thus we find that the order of superiority 18 wholly reversed.

“(C) Or again, all this discussion could have been relevant only if
“there were a contradiction among the six means of knowledge. As a
“ matter of fact, however, there is no such Contradiction; as it is quite
“compatible for the Mantra (or any other accessory in question) to be used
“in ways denoted by both (means of knowledge). Consequently, even when
“the various means of knowledge coalesce or conflict, due authority must
^ belong to every one of them.”

SIDDHANTA.

To the above we make the following reply: Among these six, that

which follows is rejected by that which precedes it, as they are more and

1176 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, III-—PADA IlI—ADHI. (7).

more remote from the sense of Direct Assertion. Because in the case of
all of these it is universally considered necessary to admit of the corroho.
ration of a Direct Assertion laying down the necessury application; and
the cognition brought about by this corroborative Direct Assertion varies
in its proximity to each of tle six means of cognition in question.

If, like Direct Assertion, the authority of Indicative Power and the
rest also were self-sufficient and independent, then, in that case, what you
say would have been quite true. As it is, however, the authority of theso,
like that of the करः, depends upon their capability of pointing to a
corroborative Direct Assertion ;—which latter alone is the sole authority
(in matters relating to Dharma). And this Direct Assertion is held tu
be of six kinds, in accordance with the six means of its being cognizel
(viz.: Sense-perception, Inference, etc., etc.).

Objection: ^ How is it that Indicative Power and the rest have no
^° independent authority of their own?”

Reply: We have proved above that Dharma is that which has Vedic
Ingunction for tts sole authority (1—i—2), and then again that that which
is not supported by direct verbal testimony is of no use in matters relating to
Dharma (1—11i—1). And when the words that are directly heard are found
to lay down the application, we call that 9 case of Crutz, Direct Assertion,
because it inheres directly in the Har (Crotra). In a case however
where the words are not found to directly lay down the application,
after we have cognized the words by direct Sense-perception, the agency
pointing out the application is inferred by apparent Inconsistency ; und it
is in such cases, that we have Indicative Power and the other five; and
certainly in such cases there is a certain remoteness between the means of
knowledge and the final object of cognition (Application).

For instance, in the matter of the use to which the Azndri verse is to.
be put, when both Direct Assertion and Indicative Power proceed to
point it out, at the time that we come across the words of the former
directly laying down the use, we find those of the Indicative Power to be
capable of only reminding us of those words ; and consequently while we
are yet taking steps to infer the existence of such words from the apparent
inconsistency of the appearance of the verse in the Context,—the necessary
use is long before laid down by means of the direct words of Direct Asser-
tion; and this use having been duly cognized, the subject-matter of the
Context—i.e. the sacrvfice—has its requirements fulfilled in connection
with the Mantra, and the Mantra also has its own needs in connection
with the sacrifice duly supplied. And thus the appearance of the mantra
in the particular context having been otherwise explained, there is no
longer any Apparent Inconsistency capable of leading us to the inference
of a Direct Assertion of Indra (as the person. to be greeted with the

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, BTC. 1177

Mantra); and in the absence of such a Direct Assertion, there can be no
such application for the Mantra

In fact we have explained it more than once that only that much is to
be regarded as Vedic which has to be assumed in fulfilment of certain needs
of the Veda.

For these reasons 16 must be admitted that Direct Assertion is
superior in authority (to Indicative Power, which is one step further
removed from its objective). Because Direct Assertion does not ueed the
help of anything else, in the way that it is itself needed by Indicative
Power.

To this effect we have the following declaration: ‘ That which does
not stand in need of something else is the stronger of the two; while
that which has its functioning dependent upon something else—how could
that ever set aside this latter?’

Thus then, among Direct Assertion and the rest, we find that that
which precedes operates independently of that which follows, and _ is,
therefore, stronger than that; while that which follows, having its autho-
rity dependent upon that which precedes it, can never set aside this latter,
We have already shown that we cannot admit of the authority of Indi-
cative Power and the rest unless they are capable of leading to the
inference of a corroborative Direct Assertion.

Objection: “It has also been declared that that which is itself
“devoid of Power can never be applied to any use (even by a hundred
“ Direct’ Assertions)

Reply: True; this has been declared; but it was & most improper
declaration; because, as a matter of fact, the capability of Direct Assertion
to lay down the use of an accessory does depend upon Indicative Power ;
it is after the use has been cognized (by means of Direct Assertion), that,
upon the strength of that cognition, we come to infer its capability of being
used in that way. That 18 to say, after Direct Assertion has pointed out
the use to which the accessory is to be put, there arises the question as to
the manner in which it would serve that purpose; and the conclusion
arrived at 18 that it would serve it in the way in which it would be capuble
of doing so; and though there may be nothing in the accessory itself that
points to its capability for such use (ns f,i. there is nothing in the Aindri
mantra itself that points to its being used in the greeting of Garhapatyc),
yet such capability is inferred from the Direct declaration of the nse (88
In the Injunction ‘ Aindrya& garhapatyam upatishthata’), It is on this
account that we have the declaration contained in the 5४८14 III—ii—3

Objection: “ There can be no use to which an accessory is put, until

it already possesses the requisite capability; and consequently the
existence of such capability. must be presumed before everything else ;
148

11z TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, U11—PADA III-—ADBI. (7).

“and thus Direct Assertion would certainly become weaker than the
“ directly perceptible Indicative Power

Reply: True; such would be the natural conclusion if the inference
of the capability preceded the operation of Direct Assertion. As a matte:
of fact, however, it is not so; because until the Azndri verse has been
declared to be used in a certain way, there is no reason for seeking for
any capability, in it, of denoting the (drhapatya; in fact, when the use
has been laid down, and is found to be otherwise inexplicable, the said
capability, even though existing from before, comes to be inferred only
subsequently,

Objection: “रह then the remoteness from the final objective is
“exactly the same in both cases. For instance, the remoteness from the
^“ pointing out of the use, in the case of the Indicative Power, that leads
“to the inference of a Direct Assertion, is exactly tho same that there is
‘fin the case of Direct Assertion, which leads to the inference of the
“necessary Power. In any case the remoteness is due to the necessity
“of the inference of something not visible; and this is exactly the same
‘in the vase of both.”

Reply: True; so far it is the same in both cases; but this is of no use
in the matter of the strength or weakness of the two. Because it is only
when the idea of the use is remote that there is a notion of weakuess :
and this would apply only to a case where the non-existent factor has got
to be assumed, or inferred, before there is an idea of the uee. |

That is to say, in the case of Indicative Powor, there is no pointing
out of the use, until there is a prior inference of the Direct Assertion
(laying down that use) ; and hence in this case there is a certain degvee
of remoteness, which is not present in the case of Direct Assertion,
wherein the declaration of the use having been duly cognized, it is tho
presence of this use that leads to the inference of the necessary capability ;
and this inference, appearing subsequently, docs not remove, to any remote
point, the previously-obtained idea of the use. In all cases where the two
means of knowledge proceed towards a common objective, that which is
found to take more time in reaching it is taken as remote from it, and as
weaker in 168 authority than the other; and when the use has been ouce
duly cognized, even if there were a thousand inferences to appear, they
would in no way remove the means of knowledge away from its objective.

What has been said above holds good respecting all the remaining
pairs—such as Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection, Syntactical
Connection and Context, Context and Order, and Order and Name. Asin
the case of all these, there can be no idea of the use obtained from anyoue

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHROTI, LINGA, ETC, 1179

until it has led to the inference of the preceding ones ; whereas when the
ase has been pointed out by the preceding one, the existence of the follow-
‘ne one is merely accepted as an invariable concomitant

Objection: ^“ Inasmuch as Direct Assertion is directly perceptible
“(which none of the other is), it is right that it should be stronger than
“Indicative Power; but in the case of the others, inasmuch as all of them
“equally stand in need of the inference of corroborative Direct Assertion,
“on what ground could we admit any one of them to be stronger or
“ weaker than the other?”

Reply: Indicative Power and the rest aro removed from the final
objective of Direct Assertion, by one, two, three, four and five steps
respectively; and this makes a great difference in their respective
strength and weakness, That 18 to say, the operation of Indicative Power
is removed by the single step of the inference of a corroborative Direct
Assertion, while that of Syntactical Connection is removed by two steps,
in the shape of the inference of Indicative Power and Direct Assertion,
and soon. For instance (in the case of the sentence ‘ Kudé@ ca nastarirasz
etc.) all the other words, that are not denotative of Indra, being
found to be syntactically connected with the word denotativo of that.
Neity,—we come to assume the existence in those words of the power of
denoting that deity ; and this power leads us on to the Direct Assertion
(which points ont the use to which the mantra is to be put).

As a matter of fact, in all Mantras it is only a certain word that
denotes something directly connected with the action to be performed ;
ug. tn the sentence ‘ Agnayé jushtam nirvapaimi, the words ‘nirvapame’
aud ‘Agni’; the other words, denoting things not directly connected
with the action, appear to be incapable of being of any use in its perform-
ance; and yet the apparent inconsistency of these bemg syntactically
connected leads to the inference of the existence in them of the capability
of denoting things connected with the action; and consequently they
suppress their own original denotations, and then coming to indicate
things connected with the action, become capable of being utilized in its
performance; and then it is that having led to the inference of a Corrobo-
rative Direct Assertion, they come to be actually utilized in connection
with that action, All this is quite admissible in a case where there is no
incompatibility (between Syntactical Connection, Indicative Power and
Direct Assertion ).

When however we find two mantras so constituted that though
yntactically connected, each of them indicates a distinct object con-
nected with actions—[e.g. in the sentence ‘syonanté sadunam krnomi
9 tusmin sida,’ we find that the former part is employed in the spread
ing of the grass, while the latter in the laying down upon it of the

1180 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. III——PADA Il].——-ADHI. (7).

Cake]—, in such a case, the two stand in need of two distinct Indicative
Powers,—and these Powers also standing in need of two distinct objects
to be indicated, when the Syntactical Connection proceeds to point out the
application of the sentence in question, as soon as it is found that the
indicative power of a certain portion of it points to a certain use for it, it
comes to be quickly taken up by that use, and Syntactical Connection is
ntterly incapable of employing it to any other purpose; nor does it allow
any others to serve that purpose. And the sole reason for this is that,
while Syntactical Connection is still on its way to the inference of In-
dicative Power, the already existing Indicative Power hastens to bring
about the inference of the corroborative Direct Assertion, and thereby
restrict the use to which the sentence 18 to be put.

That is to say, when the whole is applied to a certain use, it can be 80
applied without taking along with it all its parts; and in the sentence in
question we find that all that is directly perceptible is the fact of the two
parts of the sentence (‘syonam etc,’ and ‘tasmin etc.’) being syntactically
connected,—and not the fact of their indicating the same thing; on the
other hand, the fact of their indicating two different things is proved by
the coguition of their meanings. Thus then, in the matter of the appli-
cation of the whole sentence and its parts, when Syntactical Connection
and Indicative Power proceed to point ont their uses,—inasmuch as that
which 18 devoid of power cannot be applied to any use, while Syntactical
Connection is still on the way to the inference of the fact of the latter
portion of the sentence being subservient to the purpose of the former, or
vice versa, the Indicative Powers belonging to each of these two portions
themselves distinctly brings about the inference of a Direct Assertion
pointing out the fact of each of the two portions being applied to a
distinct purpose of its own. Consequently, while Syntactical Connection
is still exerting itself towards the inference of the necessary Direct Asser-
tion, Indicative Power has fully established the uses to which the two parts
are to beapphed; and thereby the mention of the muntra on the Contest
having all its requirements fulfilled, there remains no cause for the
inference of any further Direct Assertion; and thus, the use, which av
inferred Direct Assertion might have pointed ont, falls to the ground
having no basis to go upon. As for the Muntra also, that which is the first
to appear is more quickly applied to the use that is the first to present
itself, to which the former Mantra could be applied only very slowly
Similarly that which appears latterly becomes more quickly applied to the
use, which is the last tonppear. And the Mantra that is quick to be applied
does not pay any regard to the slow use to which it might be put. In the
same manner, the meaning also, being taken up by the Mantra cognized
first, does not take up any other; and 80 long as it is possible for it to be

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC, 118]

taken in its primary sense, it cannot be relegated to a secondary posi-
tion. ee

Thus then, Indicative Power being stronger than Syntactical Connec-
tion, the Mantras are to be applied by breaking up the sentence into two
distinct parts.

Objection: “Such being the case (in the sentence ‘ Dévasya tva
५ savitug......mirvapams’) the word ‘nirvapaimi’ having its indicative
“power duly ascertained, and appearing much more quickly, takes up
“the purpose in question; and precludes tlie application of the remote
“ words ‘ dévasya tvd etc.,” which, for this reason, can not be applied to
“the same use. Then inasmuch as theso words have distinct purposes te
“serve, they cannot be taken collectively. Consequently, there being no
५ Syntactical Connection, it becomes necessary for these words (‘dévasya
५४ ete.") to indicate, in some way or other, the sirvdpa itself,—and nothing
“olse, as this something else could not belong to the action to be per-
“formed, For these reasons, all the words coming to have the same
“objective, there comes about coalescence (of Indicative Power and
^" Syntactical Connection), and there must be a rejection of the application
‘of those words that are pointed out by Syntactical Connection alone.”

Reply: In a case where other words denote things connected with the
Action, there alone can we have distinct uses for them; while for those
words that do not denote any such thing, their use must unavoidably
be accepted as indicated by Syntactical Connection. That is to say,
those words that do not denote things connected with actions,—if these
be taken independently by themselves, they become wholly useless.
Consequently, even though the object (णद) has had all its require-
ments f{nlfilled by previously ascertained relationships, yet it becomes
denotable by the other words, in case these latter are found to be in need
01 some such object. Just as even though the details of an action are all
fully supplied, yet in consequence of the order of sequence, the same
details are again brought in; and again, just as though certain accessory
details may have their requirements fulfilled in connection with the
Primary sacrifice, yet they are employed again in connection with the
subsequent modifications of those sacrifices; as we have explained in
connection with the Kirptis, Consequently even such words as are not
denotative of things connected with the action come to be so connected
and used (in accordance with Syntactical Connection).

Those words, on the other hand, that are found to denote things
connected with actions, have their use, even if they do not happen to be
Connected with things not denoted by them; and they do not obtsin a
place on the mere ground of their uselessness. As all the six, Direct
Assertion and the rest,—if they happen to be tainted by uselessness,—are

1182 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, IJ—PADA III—ADHL, (7).

held to be capable of being set aside even by those that are weaker
than themselves. For instance, though Direct Assertion (in the sentence
‘Vrihin prokshati’) points to the fact of the Prokshana being an accessory
attendant upon the form of the corn, yet we lose no time in rejecting
this and taking it to be attendant upon the capability of the corn to brine
about certain transcendental results,—as shown by the Context. ,

Thus then it becomes fully established that Indicative Power is
superior in authority to Syntactical Connection; a has been shown
above in connection with Bhakshanuvika (III—ii—24 % seq.).

Between Syntactical Connection and Context it is the latter that is
the weaker, because of its being further remote from its object.

We find that the connection or relationship (between the Accessory
and its Primary) is distinctly perceptible in a case of Syntactical
Connection; while in that of Context it is not so perceptible, but has vot
to be inferred from mutual requirement; and this constitutes «a remote-
ness,

That 18 to say, in the case of Context all that we perceive is the mere
mutual requirement of the helper and the helped, subsisting between the
Primary and the Accessory sentences, both of which are fally equipped
with their complements; whereas in the case of Syntactical Connection,
it is the direct connection between the Primary and the Accessory that 15
perceptible; consequently, when these two start upon their way to
connect the Accessory in question with a particular Primary, while
Context 1s still on the way to the assumption of a Syntactical Connection
(between the two), Syntactical Connection will have succeeded in assum-
ing a Power in the words of the sentence (to indicate the required
relationship); and while, in the former case, the assumed Syntactical
Connection would assume the necessary Indicative Power, the assumed
Power, 1n the latter case, will assume the corroborative Direct Declara-
tion; and lastly, while in the former case, the assumed Power would bring
about the assumption of the corroborative Declaration, the assumed
Declaration, in the latter case, would have fully established the necessary
application of the accessory; and thus the Requirement (upon which
Context 18 based) haviug been set aside, there would remain no basis for
its assumption of the necessary Corroborative Declaration ; and hence the
Indicative Power, even though assumed, would disappear before it reaches
the stage at which it could definitely point out the necessary application.
It is for this reason that we hold Syntactical Connection to be the
stronger of the two. | | |

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1188

In the same manner, between Context and Order (or Position), it is
the latter that is the further remote from its objective.

Because while one (1.e. the Contoxt), on its way to the assumption of
the corroborative Direct Declaration, begins with Mutual: Requirement
(upon which the Context is directly based), the other (i.e. Order) has got
to obtain this (Requirement) also from another source, and then, through
that, reach the corroborative Declaration

That is to say, Order or Position consists merely in the fact of the
two (the Accessory and the Primary) being mentioned or performed in
the same place; and in a case where the two things thus occurring in the
same place, happen to be in mutual need, we have an instance of Context.
As instances in point we have those modificatory sacrifices that happen tobe
montioned in an extensive Context. From among these, that which has not
been originally laid down as falling in the midst of the accessories of the
Original sacrifice, is found to be mentioned either before or after this
latter; and thereby becomes subject to the operations of Order. In the
case of Context, on the other hand, all requirements having been fully
falfiiled by the accessories mentioned along with the Original sacrifice
which have had their uses distinctly defined,-~if there is an acces-
sory which happens to be meutioncd near something that has all its
needs supplied, as also near another thing that stands in some need, and
thereby comes to be simultaneously taken up by both of these,—then,
while it would be still giving rise to the necessary assumption of a require-
ment of that which 18 in proximity to it and hence connectible to it by
Order, it would become syntactically connected with that which already
has such a requirement, and as such, is connectible with it by Context.
And while in the former case, we reach the assumption of Syntactical
Connection, there already appears, in the latter case, the assumption of
the Power, in the Accessory, to help that with which it is related by
Context. And while, in the former case, there is an assumption of the
said Power, we have, in the latter, the assumption of the corroborative
Direct Declaration. And lastly, while, in the former case, we shall be
assuming the Corroborative Declaration, the already assumed Declaration,
in the latter case, would have distinctly established the application of the
accessory in question; and all the rest would thereby become wholly
inoperative.

Similarly too, between Order and Name, we find that in the case of.
the former, the mutual relationship of the Primary and the Accessory,
assumed on the ground of their occurring in the same place, is still based
upon the Veda itself; and in all cases the relationship of two things is

1184 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. WI—-PADA IL—-ADHI. (7).

always based upon some sort of an identity; whereas in the case of
Name, there is no such identity of place. pointed out by the Veda as
would establish the possibility of a direct relationship

Objection: ‘The Name directly denotes relationship itself; ang
“operating thereby, if would come to be equal to Direct Assertion, in
८ authority

Reply: It is not so; because the relationship that is established by,
the Name is something wholly different from that of the Primary and
Accessory, pointed out by Direct Assertion. That is to say, the Name
operates towards the establishing of a relationship among certain things
that have not, in any way, been recognized as being related ; and it does
not establish the relationship of the Primary and the Accessory ; speci-
ally because this latter is capable of being based upon any sort of a
relationship. In reality the Name 18 incapable of denoting any relation-
ship ; as we have shown (under the Arunddiikarana) that Names apply-
ing literally do not denote any relationship. And every relationship is in
the form that the two objects (related) have something in common
between themselves.

Thus then, it becomes established that Name is inferior to Order.
Because in the case of the latter, the common element has not got to be
inferred, as the fact of their place being common 18 distinctly perceptible
while in the case of the former, there bemg no word expressive of any
common element directly perceptible, it has got to be inferred; and this
constitutes a remoteness from the real objective

For instance, while Name is still assuming the existence of the said
common element between the two factors, Order has ascertained the fact
of the two being in need of each other, because of their occurring in the
same place, and thereby has established the Context; while the former
common element is assuming the presence of a mutual requirement, the
latter Context has established a Syntactical Connection ; while the former
case assumes a Syntactical Connection, the latter has established the
Power of helping; while the former 18 assuming the Power of helping,
the latter has established the Corroborative Direct Assertion; and lastly,
while the former is assuming the Corroborative Direct Assertion, the latter
has established the use to which the accessory is to be put. And thereby
the mention in the Context having had all its requirements fulfilled, all that
follows it, even though pointed out by the right means of knowledge, ‘be
comes like the unripe seed plucked from the tree, and as such incapable
of bringing forth any proper fruit

Thus then, it is fully established that on the ground of remoteness
from the chief objective, each one of the six—Direct Assertion and the |
rest—is inferior to, and is set aside by, that which precedes it. _

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1185

.* In support of this we have the following declaration :—

When there is a single fruit that is reached by a flight of stairs, and
hich is acquired by mere approach, and for reaching it two men contenid-
ing for its possession start up, both equally fast and free from obstacles,—
but one of them starts from the ground, while the other starts from one
stcp of the stairs already gained,—then, thore is no donbt that the latter one
will reach the fruit first; and the fruit having been taken away by that
man, the other would get down without having obtained anything. And
iu this case we find that though each of the men had power enough for
obtaining the fruit at another time, yet when put together, the younger
man—the one that is a step behind—is always vanquished.

And as a matter of fact, we find that it is in one way that operations
are carried on even by weak agencies, when there is no force to contend
with; while the character of the operation becomes wholly different when
thére is an inroad of more powerful agencies, which destroys all the
strength of the weaker ones. For these reasons, it is by no means reason-
able to hold that simply hecanse the latter means of knowledge (Indiva-
tive Power and the rest) are held to be authoritative in one place, they
must be so also when they are opposed by stronger and more anthorits-
11९९ means of knowledge (Direct Assertion f.i.).

{t has been argued above that—“it is only a false semblance of
“authoritative means of knowledge that can be set aside, and not what is
“a real means of knowledge.”

And in reply to this we say that in the cases under consideration what
are set aside are really mere semblances of authoritative means. Because
in these cases (1.९. where there 15 a more authoritative means to the con-
trary), those that are set aside have never had any authority. There was
only a semblance of authority assumed from the fact of their having been
perceived to have an authority in other cases.

That is to say, no authority attaches to these other means of know-
wp Age, in a case where they are set aside; the fact is that having, in
another place, been found to have proper authority, wherein they appear
by themselves,—-they are inferred, from that, to have an authority, even
111 the cases under consideration. But inasmuch as they are ejected
by other superior means of knowledge, they fail in their purpose, and arc
therefore concluded to be wrong and mistaken.

Though it begins its operations with the same functions that helonged
to it previously, yet, inasmuch as its objective has been wrested by anotier
. means very much quicker in its operations, and thereby, having its very

root cut off from under itself, it does not reach its end; consequently,
What else could we do, but set aside its authority, rejecting it as a
mirageP = :
149 ।

1186 TANTRA*VARTIKA. ADH. (1i—-PADA 1--+ 0४1, (7).

In all such cases, the idea of accessory character 1s rejected, before
it has come into existence, as there has been no Direct Assertion yet
assumed pointing to such character,—such rejection being done by the
assumption of the falsity of all intervening cognitions (brought about hy
the former) ; and thus there can be no similarity in strength between the
two, on the ground of the similarity of their appearance. For this reason,
the rejection in question should not be mistaken for one in the form of tle
setting aside of a mixture of the two cognitions, The rejection of that
which has come into existence, is in the form of the setting aside of its
consequences, and will be treated of later on (in Adhydya X).

Thus then we have explained what happens in the case of conthiet
between any two of the six means of knowledge. Inasmuch as the case
of the conflict of one by two or more, is similar to what has been ex-
plained, the Bhashya has not treated of it separately. But it 18 neces-
sary for the Commentators to explain those cases also in detail; and this
is to be done in the following manner:

(1) When there is a conflict between Direct Assertion and Syntacti-
cal Connection,—e.y. in the case of the sentence ‘arunaya pinrgikshyi,
etc.’ the Redness, etc. are shown, by the indicative power of Syntac-
tical Connection and by co-extensiveness, to belong to the one-year-old cou ;
while the Instrumental endimg directly declares it to belong to the
Purehase,—we find that while Syntactical Connection is still on the
ground, Direct Assertion 18 already two steps nearer the goal; and hence
while the former 18 still on its way to the assumption of Indicative Power,
the Direct Assertion will have established the use to which the accessory
is to be put; and this constitutes » great difference between the opera-
tions of the two.

(2) When there is conflict between Direct Assertion and Contest,
—as when the ‘twenty-one recitations’ are shown by the Context to
helong to the Darca-Pirnamasa, while the Direct Assertion (contained
in ‘ Pratishthakd@masyackavimigatirannbruyat’) makes them accessory to ५
certain end desired by the Agent,—it is the Context that is always set
aside. The ‘recitations’ too having the nature of actions, and this
forming part of the ‘ Procedure,’ are subject to the specific authority of
the Context; and as such they have been cited here as examples.

Some people put forward the following as an example of the con-
flict; botween Direct Assertion and Order or Position: “We have the
declaration that ‘ there are three upasads for the Sdhna, while there are
‘twelve for the Ahinu’: and herein inasmuch as the number ‘twelve’ has
not the character of an Action, and as such does not form part of the

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC, 1187

, Procedure, it cannot be subject to the authority of Context, which is
hased upon the Procedure; and it is only by means of Proximity that it
romes to be accepted, throngh the assumed agency of the Context; conse-
quently, this must be regarded as an instance of conflict of Direct Asser-
tion and Position or Order.” |

Bat this is scarcely admissible ; because if the number (Twelve) in
question had belonged to the substance (used at the sacrifice), or had been
an independent factor by itself, then alone it conld not be taken as part
of the Procedure, being entirely devoid of the form of an action. Asa
1021167 of fact, Inasmuch as we have the imjunction of ‘twelve’ with
distinct reference to the action of upasad, which latter distinctly forms
part of the Procedure,—the said number cannot but be contained in the
Procedure, And in this case while the wpasad contained in the Procedure
wonld be assuming the Syntactical Connection and Indicative Power of
the number, the Direct Declaration by the genitive ending (in ‘ahinasy:’)
will have established the fact of its belonging to the Ahina; and this
Ahina is nothing other than the Aharganu. (Consequently this would be
५५ case of the setting aside of the Context by Direct Assertion.)

(3) Question: ‘‘ What, then, is the example of conflict between
Divect Assertion and Order ? ”’ |

Answer: The qualifications of the Rope (used for tying round the
sacrificial Post)— ९.2, the being made of grass and the like would be shown
hy Order to belong,to the Agnishomiya animal; while by Direct Assertion
they are shown to belong to the Post. As it is clearly perceptible, by
Direct Assertion, that the Rope is accessory to the T'ying of the Post; and
hence tovether with its qualifications, it cannot belong to the Animal.
Because while the Order or Position would be assuming the corroborative
Context and the rest,—thus separated from its objective by four inter-
vening steps,—it will have been defeated by the said Direct Assertion.
And while the Order would be engaged in assuming the existence of
mutual Requirement alone (which would be the basis of the Context), its
objective, tle Rope, before it was reached by the said Order, would be
taken up by Direct Assertion.

(4) As an instance of the conflict between Direct Assertion and Name,
we have the following: We find the mantra ‘ikhé tva etc.’ mentioned 1n the
chapter on Darga-Pirnamasa called by the name of ‘ Pauradagiku '
chapter (chapter devoted to the ‘ Purodica-offerings), and occurring
it a Context common to all the other sacrificial materials (the
Sannayya etc.), not having its application pointed out by any clear
Indicative Power; and at first sight, the name of the chapter wonld
show it to belong to the Purodaga only; while the Direct Assertion
contained in the Brdhmana-sentence ‘ धट (धट cakhan chinaiti’ distinctly

1188 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. ILI—PADA II—ADHI. (7).

points it out as pertaining to the ontting of the tweg required for the
making of the Sannayyd. Aud while the Name would be still engaged in
assuming 9 common element, the Direct Assertion will have estab.
lished the use to which the Mantra is to be put, long before the former has
had time to assume the intermediate corroborations of the Context, Syntac-
tical Connection, Indicative Power and Direct Assertion; and as such it is
set aside by the aforesaid Direct Assertion.

In the same manner are to be explained the conflicts between Indica-
tive Power and Context and the rest.

(1) As an instance of the conflict between Indicative Power and
Context, we have the muntras to be addressed to Pitshan (called the
+ Pushanumantruna mantras’); with regard to these, while the Context in
which they occur (viz. that of the Darga-Parnumasa) 18 still on its way
to the assumption of Syntactical Connection, their Indicative Power will
have established, throngh the assumption of the corroborative Direct
Assertion, their applicability to the addressing of Piishan; and 80 also
while the former will assume the Power of indicating the Agni ete. men-
tioned in the Context, the latter will have established their use as lyiny
in the addressing of Piishan.

(2) The conflict between Indicative Power and Order has been shown
in the Stutagastradhikarana, under Satra I1—i—14. The example that 1s
given in the Bhdshya also is the case of the Abhyanujnipana and the
Abhyanujni along which are mentioned, in the same order in which the two
are mentioned, the two mantras ‘ upahita, etc.’ and ‘upahvayasva, etc.’; and
from their Position or Order, it would seem that the mantra ‘ upahiita, ete.’
applies to the Abhyanugndpuna and ‘ Upuhvayasva, etc,’ to the Abhyanujna.
But the Indicative Power of the words of the Mantras themselves point to
the contrary procedure, Consequently, while the said Position or Order
would assume the Context and the necessary Syntactical Connection, the
Tudicative Power would have assamed its corroborative Direct Assertion
and definitely established the applicability of the mantras; and thus we
have the rejection of Order long before it has had time to assume the
Corroborative Indicative Power and Direct Assertion.

We have another instance (of conflict between Indicative Power and
Order) in regard to the mantras Parivirasi, etc.’ and ‘ yuva 5१५9, ete.’
which are respectively descriptive of the karana and the kriyamana of the
४४१५ (winding), The Position or Order of these muntras would
show that they belong to the Purivydnu of the Aqnixhomiya, while their
Indicative Power shows that they pertain to the second Parivyfna of the
Su ४८१३११६. | |

Question: “In that case, why is it that the Manota is not taken as
‘belonging to the sacrifice of the Savaniya animal,—as shown by the

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1189

९ |ndieative Power, which would be capable of rejecting the Order that.
“connects it with that of the Agnishomiya ?”

Answer: It 18 not 80, for the simple reason that, like the case shown
under the Satra 11-11-38, the mantra is applied to the Agnishomiya by
reason of the implication (of Agni by the word ‘ manota’) based upon the
applicability pointed out by Direct Assertion, which is more authoritative
than the Indicative Power (connecting it with the Savaniya), It is witha
view to this that we have the Direct declaration— even if the animal be
dedicated to another Deity, the Manota should be the one dedicated to
Agni.) And this Direct Assertion stands in the way of any Indicative
Power applymg the Manota@ to any other animal ;—the sense of tho
Assertion being that ‘even when the animal is dedicated to two deities,
the Manota to be employed should be that pertaining to the single Deity
of Agni, and it should not, on the mere ground of its pertaining to that
single Deity, be disjoined from the anima! (Agnishomiya) dedicated to
the two deities (of Agni and Soma).’ Or again, we can take the word
‘éva’ differently, and explain the Assertion to mean that the Manot:i
shonld be applied in the same order in which 17 ovenrs,

(3) As an example of conflict between Indicative Power and Name,
we have the Bhaksh@nuvaka, which contains sentences expressive of holding,
etc.; these sentences begin to be used as auxiliaries to the eatiny,
on nccount of the Name (‘ Bhakshanuvaka’) pointing to the fact of their
bearing a common relationship (to the whole anurviika); but before they
come to be thus used, the words of the mantra indicate the applicability
of its various parts to the actions of holding, looking and proper digestiny,
to which use, therefore, they come to be put. In the same manner, the
Manu-verses, as well as the Prthupajavati verses, come, by their Indicative
Power, to be applied as Sdmidhénis, rejecting, thereby, the indications of
the name ‘ 1716."

(4) As an instance of conflict between Syntactical Connection and
Order, we have the case of the words other than ‘ Parivita’ and ‘ Pari-
virast’ which are descriptive of the winding—viz. the words yuvit suvasi
11/70 sa ५ créyan, etc.’ —, which, being syntactically connected with the words
` Purivirust’ and ' Parivita’ that are used in accordance with their Indica-
tive Power, come to be used iu the winding of the Suraniya.

Of conflict between Syntactical Connection and Name, we have an
example in the aforesaid Bhakshinuvaka ; £.1., the words ‘ Sayhyasam, ete.’
having been used in connection with Hating, ete. 1t becomes necessary to
repeat, with each action, those other words of the mantra that are
syntactically connected with the aforesaid words, (And this on account
of the indications of the name ‘ Bhukshanuvdka’ being superseded by those
of Syntactical Connection); similarly, the Name ‘ Adhvaryava’ indicates

1190 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. UI[—-PADA IlI—ADHI. (7).

the fact of all the primary sacrifices of the Jyoteshtoma, etc. belonging ty
the Adhvaryu alone; these sacrifices. being syntactically connected wit),
the ‘Desire for Heaven,’ they come to belong to all persons desiring any
result,

Objection: ‘“‘ This that you have explained would be an instance of
“the superiority of Direct Assertion (and not of Syntactical Connec.
* tion).” | :

Reply: The indication im question 18 not due to any particular word
(of the mantra), as the Injunctive affix does not denote the agent ; it is got
at by means of a co-ordination based npon the indications due to the
propimity of two words (which constitutes Syntactical Connection) ; and
hence it is a case of the supersession of Name by Syntactical Connec-
tion.

As an instance of Conflict between Context and Name, we have
the case of the Prayajas, that are mentioned in the Bradhmana vamed the
‘Paurodictka, which (though, by the name, belonging to the Purodaea-
sucrifice) are applied to the Sfinnayya Upameu-sucrifice, as shown by the
Context,

We have explaiued the examples of conflict involved 11, the
application of a simgle Accessory to several Primaries. And it now
becomes necessary to explain the instances of those involved in the
application of several Accessories to a single Primary.

(1) As an instance of conflict between Direct Assertion and
Indicative Power, we have the case of the Aindri Verse: the sentence
‘aindryd garhapatyamupatishthaté’ being found (by reason of the Atmune-
puda-ending in ‘ Uputishthuté’) to be injuuctive of a certain action the
instrumentality whereof belongs to a mantra (vide Panini—Satru
I —iii—25),—and the Indicative Power (of the word ‘ garhapatyam `)
pointing to the applicability of any mantra pertaining to Agni, the Direct
Declaration (by the Instrumental in ‘ aindrya@’) lays down the application
of the Aindri Verse ; and when tho place has been once filled by that verse,
there is no room for any other verse.

(2) As an mstance of conflict between Direct Assertion aud
Syntactical Connection, we have the case of the Yajndyagniya Pragathu,
in which Syntactical Connection points to the use of the word ‘ gira,’ while
what is actually used is the word ‘irda,’ as shown by the Direct Assertion
(‘airankytvd udgayét’). Yn the same manner, for the Vipvé-Dévas, the
substance mentioned by Direct Assertion is the Amikshd, while Syntac-
tical Connection shows it to be the Vayina; and this latter, being
possessed of-an authority inferior to that of Direct Assertion, being
rejected, the # 20४40 18 not admitted as a substance for the Vicvé-dévas.

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1191

(3) As an example of conflict between Direct Assertion aud
Context, we have the case of the Darcgu-Pirnamndsa performed with a
desire to obtain fame,—in regard to which the Context pointing to the
use of fifteen Samidhéni-recitations, the Direct Assertion (contained in
the sentence ‘ Pratishthikimasyuikavimgatiranubraydt’) shows the num-
her of the recitations to be twenty-one; and hence there is a rejection
of the number ‘ fifteen’ which pertains to that performance of the Darea-
Piirnumasa, which is done without desire for any particular result.

(4) Of the contradiction of Direct Assertion and Order, we have the
case of the sacrifice performed with the desire for cattle, for which, Order
points to the Camasa as the Vessel (for the fetching of water); while
Direct Assertion (in the sentence ‘ godohénu pacukdmasya’) declares that
vessel to be the melking vessel ; aud here the indications of the former are
set aside.

~ (5) Similarly as an example of the contradiction of Direct Assertion
and Name, we have the case of the Vayapéya, which, from its Name,
appears as to be performed by the Adhvaryu, while the Direct Assertion
(* Vajapeyéna svdrajyakamah, etc.’) points to it as to be performed by one
who desires the ‘ Kingdom of Heaven’; and hence there 1s « rejection of
the Adhvaryu as the performer of that sacrifice. Another example of the
same we have in ‘ yajamfnasya yajya.’ In connection with the Pitryajus,
the name ‘ Hautru’ points to the fact of the yaya belonging to the Hoty
priest; while the fact of its being performed by the Yajumdne is shown
by the Direct Declaration of tho genitive (in ‘ yagamdnasya’), which
denotes the relationship of the agent.

As an example of conflict between Indicative Power and Syntactical
sonnection, we have the mantra ‘ Syonanté etc.,’ wherein by Syntactical
Connection the whole mantra—from the very beginning ~is shown to
pertam to the action of seating or depositing (the Purodaca); while
Iudicative Power points only to the part ‘tasmin sida’ as the mantra
pertaining to that action. In the same manner, Syntactical Connec-
tion connects the portion ‘tasmin sida’ with the action of Abhightranu
(Pouring of ghee over the grass-bedding), while Indicative Power points
to ‘Syonanté......kalpayami’ only as belonging to that action; and the
jormer is accordingly set aside. ‘These mantras have been cited, on #
previous occasion, as affording an instance of a single accessory belonging
to several Primaries, while on the present occasion they are cited as one
of several Accessories belonging to a single Primary, That is to say, on
the previous occasion we had 8 yntactical Connection pointing to the fact of
the mantra ‘ synonanté ete,’ belonging to the Depositing together with the
Abhigharana, while Indicative Power connected it with the Depositing
alone; and while the former indicated the mantra ‘tasmin sida’ as

1192 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. LI1—-PADA 1I—ADHI. (7),

belonging to the Abhighdrana, Indicative Power showed it to belong
to the Depositiny, in connection with which it is actually used :—on th.
present occasion, on the other hand, we have Syntactical Connectioy
indicating the fact of the two. mantras pertaining to each of the tw,
actions (Depositing and Abhigh@rana), while Indicative Power connects
only one mantra with each action.

The Bhashyw has spoken of four examples mixed up in a single expla.
nation ; and it is necessary to differentiate these.

As an instance of ‘conflict between Indicative Power and (1)
Contoxt, (2) Order and (3) Name, we have, (1) the case of the Nirvitpa,
etc., for which the mantra ‘ Dévasya tua, etc.’ is pointed out by Indicative
Power, which sets aside the applicability of any other mantra indicated by
the Context; (2) the Aindra@gna is performed with a view toa vertain
desirable result, wherein the couple of Yajyyatnuviikyds proceeding from the
Sdmidhent, indicated by the Order, is set aside by Indicative Power; and
(8) in the Somdraudriya, wherein the application of the Manu-Verses
pointed out by Name as the Yayyanuvdkyds is 8९1 aside by those Yay yinu-
cdkyds that contain words indicative of Suma and Rudra.

As an example of conflict between Syntactical Connection and
Context, we have the sentence ‘ Pirvédyurumarasyaydm védinkarott.’ ‘The
Context shows that we should have recourse to that process of making the
Védi (altar) wlich is laid down as following after the adhivdsana of
the sacrificial material ; while the Syntactical Connection with ‘ amdara-
ey’ shows that it should be done on the ‘previous day.’ This 18 not a
case of Direct Assertion; as the Locative Huding (im ‘amdvdsyayam’) does
not denote the relationship of the Primary and the Accessory; though 1
denotes locutzon, yet the character of location could not possibly belong to
the actzon ; consequently the connection shown must be admitted to have
been pointed out by the proximity of the words to one another (which
constitutes Syntactical Connection), and which operates more quickly than
the Context. |

Of conflict between Syntactical Connection and Order we have
an example in those Pratipatkalpas of the Jyotishtoma that are performed
with ४ view to certain results, or on account of a certain occasion having
presented itself; we have the Direct Assertion specifying only cne
foot of each Mantra, as the one to be employed ; and then the second and
subsequent feet that are to be used are shown, by Order or Position,
to be those of the verses appearing in the same order in connection with
those Kalpas whose performance is absolutely binding; for instance, 10
convection with the Declaration ‘Vrkha pavasva dhdrayéti rijanyaye
pratipadan kuryit,’ the second and third feet to be employed are shown,
by Order, to be ‘ pavanvindyéndavé abhidévam tyakshaté’; but we have

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1193

Syntactical Connection indicating,—‘ marutivaté camatsaruk vigud dadhéina
gjast'—as the feet to be added (and it is this latter that is accepted as
the correct form).

Objection: ^“ 106 example cited would be a case of conflict of
Indicative Power, because of the difference in the case-endings.”

Reply: That does not affect the situation; because all the mantras in
ynestion are indicative of Soma; and what the difference in the case-
endings is incompatible with is the Syntactical Connection (and hence it
is 9 case of the contradiction of Syntactical Connection, and not of Indica-
tive Power, as all are equally indicative of the Soma). Consequently
while the Order in question would be engaged in assuming a mutnal
requirement and the consequent Syntactical Connection, the Syntactical
Connection will have established the application, by means of a prior
assumption of Power, etc. based upon of immediate Proximity and the
sameness of case-endings, Consequently this latter is possessed of the
greater authority.

Of conflict between Syntactical Connection and Name we have
the following example: In the chapter called ‘Hautra’ we have a
mention of the addressing of the Directions, in the sentence— Tasman
mutravarunah préshyats cinucdha’; and when we look out for the person
who 18 to do this Addressing, the aforesaid Name points to the Holp
priest as the person; whtle the Syntactical Connection of tho sentence
quoted pomts to Matrdvaruna, Then as a matter of fact when the
required agent has been pointed out by some one means, there is 10 need
of the mention of any other; consequently Maztrdvaruna having been
pointed out by the more-quickly-operating Syntactical Connection,
the indication. of the Name is set aside, long before it has had time to
reach the assumption of a corroborative Context.

Nor can this be said to be a case of conflict of Direct Assertion ;
hecause the Verb does not denote the Nominative Agent; specially as
there is no operative (kdrakg) ending with the word “ Maitravarunah `
(the Nominative not being a karuka ending).

As an example of conflict between Context and Order, we have the
use of the word ‘ gir@’ and ‘7ra’ in regard to the Hymn. In the Agnish-
toma Sama, the word to be used is indicated by Order to be ‘ gira’; while
Context points it out to be ‘ira’; and certainly this latter is stronger
in its authority. On the former occasion we had cited the case of the
Words with regard to the Sama (while the present is with reference to the
Stotra), consequently the two cannot be said to be mixed up. =

As an example of conflict between Context and Name, we have the
Case of the sentence ° fasman maitrdvaruiah préshyatt canucdhéti’ 88 with
reference to the Jyotishtoma. The addressing spoken of in this devolves

1194 | TANTRAeVARTIKA. ADH. MI—-PADA IlI—ADHI. (7).

upon the Hofr priest, as indicated by the Name (‘Hautra,’ of the section in
which the sentence occurs); while the Context distinctly points ty
Maitravaruna as one who does it. This same example had been cited aboye’
but that was with reference to the form of the Addressing of the Directions
itself.

Lastly, as an example of ‘conflict between Order and Name, we
have the case of the couple of Aindrdgna mantras occurring in the
chapter of Kamyayajyas; the Name of these mantras points to the fact of
their being used as alternatives iu both the offerings (to Indra and Agni)
while the stronger authority of Order indicates the use of the first couple
with the first, and of the second with the second. As for the Indicative
Power of the Mantras themselves, it lends its support to both alternatives ;
consequently, the case is one of conflict between Name and Order. .

We have considered the cases of the collision or conflict of Direct
Assertion and the rest, when the Accessory, as also the Primary, is
one only. And we have now to show that just as these six differ in
authority from each other, so does each of them from another of its own
kind,—the ground of difference being the same as that in the former case.

(1) On the point of the application of an accessory, we have the
conflict of two Direct Declarations—one of them being more specific in
its bearing than the other; e.g. we have the general statement—* Purodi-
cancaturdha kurote’—according to which the Quartering comes to apply to
the Agnishomiya, etc., also; but when we meet with the specific Declara-
tion ‘ Agnéyancaturdha karoti,’ we come to the conclusion that the
Quartering applies to only that Purodtgu which is dedicated to Ani.
Similarly with the conflict of two Declarations in regard to two
Primaries, we have the Declaration ‘yadahavaniyé juhotz,’ wherein the
Locative ending in ‘ Ahavaniyé’ shows that the Avabhrtha offerings also
are to be poured into the Ahavaniya fire; but this is set aside by
the specification contained in the Declaration ‘apsvavabhrthéna’ (the
Avabhrtha offering is to be made in water). ‘The comparative strength or
veakness in these cases is based upon the doubtful character or otherwise
of the declarations made P

Similarly we can cite instances of conflicts between two Direct
Assertions, in regard to preceder ce, to subsidiaries and accessories, etc.,
etc, Tor instance, the wore pagun&’ (in paguna yajéta’) directly
asserts the fact of the Singularity being an Accessory of the animal
while the stronger agency of the common case ending declares it to
belong to the Action. The word having declared the objective of the
Bhavana to be the denotation of the Verbal Root, the stronger agency of

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, GINGA, ETC. 1195

the Injunctive affix makes out the end desired by man to be the required
objective.

(2) As an instance of conflict between two Indicative Powers,
we, have the case of the mantra ‘ syonanté sadanam krnomi.’ In this
we have two Indicative Powers—one in the shape of the capability of
the two portions of the mantra to be syntactically connected with each
other, and another in the shape of expressing its meaning, Of these two,
it is this latter that is more approximate than the former, to its corrobora-
tive Direct Declaration ; specially as the former is much weaker even
than Syntactical Connection, as has been explained in the Bhashya.

(3) As yan example sf conflict between two Syntactical Connec-
tions, we have the sentence ‘ Pancadaca Samidhéniranubriydt,’ ‘ saptadaga
Vaicyasya’; in both of these the Syntactical Connection having been
established through co-ordination, when we come to consider the actual
application of the Sdmidhénis, it is the number seventeen that comes to
he accepted as the more authoritative of the two, being more definitely
specified of the two (in the case of the sacrificer being a Vai¢ya).

Of conflict between two Contexts, we have an example in ‘abhikrdmun
juhott’; the one vast Context shows this abhikrdmanu to belong to the
Darga-Piirnamasa; while the sub-context connects it with the Praydjas ;
and this latter is the more authoritative of the two, because of its being
more nearly related to the subject in question; specially as long before
the snbject is affected by the vast Context, the sub-context establishes
the necessary relationship in the shape of Syntactical Connection.

As an example of conflict between two Orders or Posittons, we
have the case of the two couples of mantras, the Aindra and the Agnéyu,
which are found in the section on the Kémya-yAjyds; the order of prece-
dence of Proximity points to the fact of both of these couples being used,
without restrictions, with any of the two sacritices; but the Order of
mention, consisting of proximity in the shape of the commonality of the
place, restricts their application to definite sacrifices.

A conflict between two Names, we find in cases where one of them is
more generic in its indications than the other; and the rejection of the one.
by the other we shall treat of under the Sara I11—vii—a4l.

The examples of the conflict of these in the matter of Accessories and
Primaries should be carefully distinguished and explained.

We have explained the above conflicts in cases where we had
the Direct Assertion directly perceptible, The same would be the case
when those conflicting with others of the same or of different kinds, would
be such as are cognized by means of Inference, etc. The comparative
Strength of these, when the perceptible is pitted against the inferred, and
when the inferred is pitted against the inferred,—whether they belong to

1196 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, 1-- ए); ILI-——ADHI. (7).

the same or different kinds,—would be found ont in the same manner ४२
has been shown above. As for instance, the Direct Assertion pertaining
to the modificatory sacrifices, through Implication, are rejected by those
applying to them, perceptibly or directly.

In these cases however, the order of strength is sometimes the othe
way,—f.i. the inferred Direct Assertion is set aside by the directly percep
tible Indicative Power; as in the case of the krshnala (rice made of gold)
the threshing (pointed out by the Direct Assertion ‘ Vrihinavahanti, which
has a real existence, but is applied to the krshnala only by implication)
is set aside by the Capability of the golden Rice (of not being threshed),
By ‘ Linga’ or Power, in this connection, 1s meant the Power pertaining to
all things, and not only that which belongs to the Mantras; as we shall
tind the declaration in the Bhashya further on that—‘ ka punarasya lingasya
praptiranyathasambhavak '—which means that the character of Linga
belongs even to such agencies as the fact of being found to serve the purposes
of something else, and also that of having no other way of being utilized, and
so forth.

In a case where the Direct Assertion is purely an inferential one
(and has no real existence), while the contrary Indicative Power is
directly perceptible,—as in the case of the Smrti in contradistinction to
the Vedic Indicative Power,-—inasmuch 88 it is quite possible for the Smyti
to be based upon something (1.1. misconceptions, etc.) other than Direct
Vedic Assertion, while Vedic Indicative Power can Siave no other basis
than such a corroborative Vedic Declaration, it is the latter that should
be accepted as the more authoritative of the two.

In all cases however, if the rejection of even the less authoritative
makes some assertion or other (in the Veda) meaningless, then the
rejection is to be accepted the other way; as has been declared, contrary
to what is pointed out by Direct Assertion, that in the case of the sentence
‘Vehin prokshati, the Prokshana is meant to be the means of bringing
about a transcendental result (47१४८).

Similarly too, when the weaker means of knowledge has a very
strong support, then too the effect of rejection is reversed, as has been
explained under the Sétras I—iii—5 et seq. That is to say, of all means
of knowledge, the contradiction lies in their objects, and not in their forms.
Consequently, in a case where the means of knowledge is contrary to the
object as it really exists, and its properties,—even though the compar:-
tive strength of the Means be the other way, yet in consideration of the
nature of the object of knowledge, even that means, which, by itself, 18
weaker in its authority, would set. aside the naturally stronger one; 45
` 1198 been declared on a former occasion—‘ dcamanddayah padarthahk, padar-
thanadnca gunak kramak.' = 40 the same effect we have the following say

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, BTv. 1197

ing: ‘ ven though the people of the town are very strong in their
combination, yet they are successfully repressed by a handful of men,
who have the support of the king’s authority.’

Thus far we have explained the sitra, as also the Bhashya, up to the
place where it. establishes the existence of the conflicts under considera-
tion.

धिवषय

We now proceed with the explanation of the remaining portion of the
Bhashya.

PURVAPAKSHA (B).

“ Tulyabalé eté karané, idamapi karanam idamapi, grutirapr lingamapi,
`" ebc.

“This assertion of the equality of strength 18 based upon the convic-
“tion that every portion of the Veda is equally self-sufficient in its
‘ authority ; specially as both (Direct Assertion and Indicative Power)
“are found to have equal authority in cases where each appears by itself.
“That is to say, whenever we come across > mantra, we at once obtain an
‘idea, even without assumption of any Direct Assertion, of the 1186 to
“which it should be put; and hence the Indicative Power of the mantra
“should be regarded to be as authoritative as any Direct Assertion,

“ Says the Bhashya—Na hi vijnainasya viyndnasya vigésha upalabhyaie.
‘hat is to say, at the time that the muutra (‘kada ca, etc.’) is mentioned
“in the Veda, it is at once recognized as pertaining to Indra; while, on
“the utterance of the Direct Assertion (‘ Aindrya girhapatyam upatish-
‘ thaté’) it is cognized as pertaining to the Garhapatya; and we do not
perceive any difference in the authoritative character of these two, when
“they have once been accomplished. As a matter of fact, even Direct
“ Assertion cannot point out the use to which a mantra is to be put, until
“the form of the mantra has been fully recognized; consequently it is
‘always necessary to ascertain, beforehand, the form of the mantra; and
“at the time that the mantra in question is ascertained, there at once arises
“the idea that it is to be employed in the hymning* of Indra; and this
“idea can never be set aside.

“ Objection: ‘nanu lingasya bhangurasyaiva ripam savicikitsah. That
‘is to say, while we perceive the Direct Assertion (aindry@, etc.) there is no
^ possibility of the inference of another (in corroboration of Indicative
“ Power), and this is what constitutes the transient character of Indica-
“tive Power; and what is meant by its being saviciékiisa is the fact of
“its being delayed in its operations, For these two reasons (of transience
“and delay in operations), no self-sufficient authority can belong to Indica-
“ tive Power.’

“The reply to this objection is based upon the fact of the bringing

1198 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADI, I[II--PADA IlI—ADHI, (त).

“about of conviction being equally present (in the case of Indicatiye
“ Power), as also upon the notion that by ^ savictkitsa ` the objector means
“the presence of Doubt, mistake or uncertainty. “The reply is—It is not
“ag you say; as a matter of fact, we do not compare Direct Assertion with
that Indicative Power which is doubtful in tts effects. That 18 to say, if it
“ig doubtful whether the mantra in question 18 Aindri or not, the Power
“ indicating this fact is no authority, even without the contradiction of a
‘“ Direct Declaration; and hence our enquiry of comparative strength and
“ weakness does not concern such doubtful Indicative Powers. That Indi-
‘‘ cative Power, however, which brings about a certain conviction, that the
‘“ mantra belongs to such and such a Deity, 18 equal to Direct Declaration
“in its authority,—and as such must be taken as laying down an optional
‘‘ alternative,

“ Objection: ‘nanu naiva kadacit, etc,’ Thatis to say, as shown before,
“the Indicative Power is never without delay in its operations.

“The reply, based upon the idea that the objector has admitted the
‘fact of Indicative Power being savicikttsa (taking this in the sense of
doubtful), 18 that im that case (if it were never free from doubt) there
“could be no such authoritative means of knowledge as Indicative Power.

“The Siddhanit retorts: ‘If the mere fact of heing delayed in its
‘‘ operations were to so much disturb the nature of Indicative Power as to

make it relinquish all authority, then, let ४ be devord of all authority,
as there certainly is a doubt in connection with objects pointed out ly
५ Indicative Power

^“ Now, how is it that you have given up the declaring of Indicative
“Power being delayed im its ‘operations, and yet come to speak of it as
^ doubtful? How, too, is it that at the same time, you speak of the object
“८ being cognized by Indicative Power, as an established fact? -

‘“*This does not affect our position,’ says the Siddhant{ ; as the
“ declaration of the fact of the object being cognized by Indicative Power 1s
“with reference to the case wherein there is no contradiction (of the
“more authoritative*means of knowledge) ; whereas the declaration of its
‘doubtful character refers to that case wherein there is such a contradic-
“tion, That is to say, the Power of indicating the use of a mantra that 1s
‘“nerceived in a case of non-contradiction, does not remain intact in all
‘‘ cases; and in many cases, it remains doubtful. In one place, the use thus
“ pointed out is accepted, in the absence of contradiction ; and the ques-
‘¢ion is whether it continues the same, in a case of contradiction, or it 18
“set aside by some cause? Or is it that Indicative Power 88 wholly
“ devoid of abl authority? The doubt remains only so long as we do not
“come across a Direct Declaration; as soon as we have got one, there
‘“‘yemains no cause for the assumption of any other Direct Declaration

COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1199

« (in corroboration of the Indicative Power), and so the Indicative Power
‘(to the contrary) loses all its significance. In Indicative Power, all that
is perceptible is mere capability; but this is not enough to point out
“the uae of the mantra; and that which is not clearly expressed can have
no authority in the matter of Actions,—e.g. even though they have the
power, yet the Brahmana and the Kshattriya do not perform the Vaicya-
stoma sacrifice. For these reasons, you must admit that Indicative
“ Power is not a means of pointing out the use of mantras

“The reply given to the above is in neglect of the fact of the declara-
“tion of the Stddhanti with regard to the non-authoritative character of
‘Indicative Powér being in reference to the case of contradiction and
‘in fear of the declaration being one of its universal absolute non-authori-
‘tative character; and hence it is shown in what way the authoritative

character of Indicative Power can be established; when a certain fact is
“sentioned in proximity to a certaun thing in the context, the former is
५" believed to be instrumental in the accomplishment of the latter; and then
“there arises the question as to how ४८ helps in its fulfilment; and the
“answer to this question is setiled by the capability of that thing. This is
“what has been explained under the Sivas II—i—31 and I—ji—40,

“Or, the sense of the aforesaid declaration of the Siddhanti may be
“this: ‘In the case of contradiction, the non-authoritativeness of Indica-
“tive Power would be easily established ;—consequently at the outset we
“have shown the fon-authoritative character of Indicative Power, in-
“dependently by itself. This being done, we shall make our opponent
“himself establish the fact of its authoritative character being based
“upon the inference of a corroborative Direct Assertion. And this done,
“he would be easily vanquished by us.’

“And in reply to this it has been declared that there is distinct
“authoritativenesa, and hence the two are equal in authority ;—and no
‘attention has been paid to the declaration of the condition of the

presence of contradiction

“ Even granting, for the sake of argument, that there is difference in
“the authoritativeness of Indicative Power and Direct Assertion, there
“ can be no setting aside of the one by the other, simply because there is no
“contradiction between the two. For instance, the help accorded by the
* Prayajas being, both by Direct Declaration and Indirect Implication,
^ pointed out as helping both the Primary sacrifice and its modifications,
‘there is no contradiction—specially as it is only desirable that, even
“ when that which is mentioned once is performed over and over again,
“there should be a repetition of the subsidiaries, in accordance with the
‘ Primary

“ Objection: ‘Inasmuch as the word Indra can apply to the

1200 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I—-PADA IfI—.DHI. (7).

“ Garhapatya only indirectly, and ‘the literal signification of the word
“ Indra applies directly to Indra, there is a contradiction of the signi-
“ fication of the word as a whole (if the word Indra is taken as signifying
“the Garhapatya fire) |

“ Reply: Not so; because the seeming contradiction can be vary
‘‘ easily explained away, with reference to different uses (of the mantra
“in question). It is only if the mantra were pointed out as to be used in
“two different ways, at one and the same time,—that there would
“have been a contradiction, because of the impossibility and possibility
“of usage being in that case simultaneous, When, however, the uses are
^“ different, at the time that the word ‘ Indra’ would be taken as denotiny
“the Girhapatya fire, its denotation could be taken as based either
“upon the property (of fire) of being an auxiliary of the sacrifice,
“or upon the presence (in the fire) of the glory, which is denoted by the
“root ‘énda’ (in the word ‘ Indra’); while at the time of the same word
“being taken as denoting the deity Indra, it would be used in its own
“direct signification. And certainly, there can be no contradiction in-
“ volved in this. |

“For these reasons, it must be admitted that there can be 110)
^“ rejection (of Indicative Power by Direct Assertion),”

SIDDHANTA (ए). +

Direct Declaration is stronger than Indicative Power; because
that the mantra ( Aindri) belongs to the Garhaputya is mentioned directly
by the word (in ‘ Aindry@ gdrhaputyamupatishthaté’) ; whereas the fact of
its belonging to Indra is only «ferred from the Power (of the word
‘Indra’ in the manéra), and is not mentioned directly by any words,

That is to say, the fact of the mantra belonging to Indra, that has
been held to be inferred from Power or from Context, is untouched by
any direct functioning of the word ; and as such it can have no authority
bearing upon such cases (as the performance of sacrifices and other
matters of a transcendental character; vide 8011 1-11-1).

The opponent thinks that the S¢ddhantc has declared the universal or
absolute non-authoritativeness of Indicative Power, and thence its rejection
18 due, not to contradiction, but to its inherent non-authoritativeness ; and
with this in view he argues as follows: “ If what you say ४5 correct, then even
“in a case where there is no contradictory Direct Declarution, there can be 10
८५ cognition of anything obtained from Indicative Power, and hence this latter
“would have no authority even in such cases of non-contradiction.”
| In reply to this, the Stddhanti proceeds to establish the authoritative-

ness of Indicative Power in the way that it has been done by the oppor-

THE COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1201

ent himself, in course of the above Pirvapaksha. That is to say, this much
8 clear from the Context, that the mantra should help in the sacrifice in
the way in which it is capable of doing so; and as a matter of fact, apart
from the denotation of it3 meaning, there is no other way in which it
could be able to help; and hence the said capability comes to point to
the usé to which the mantra is to be put.

The opponent thinks that the S¢ddhdanti has admitted his own stand-
point, and as such he could not escape from its necessary consequence, in
the shape of an admission of the Pérvapaksha view; encouraged by this
prospect, he retorta: “If the Oupability is based upon Direct Declaration,
“then, in that case, 7४ could not be rejected by another Declaration, ‘That is
“to say, 16 must be admitted that if what is pointed out by Indicative
५ Power 18 not supported by the authority of the words (of the Veda)
“then if can have no authority; but if it has the authority of the words,
“then it is equal in authority to any Direct Declaration.”

Both of these contingencies are met by the Saddhanti, by the words:
nfipi etc. That is to say, the Direct Declaration inferred by the Indica-
tive Power can have an existence only in case the Indicative Power is not
contradicted by Direct Declaration already in existence ; and it can never
appear when there is such a contradiction ; consequently in a case where
the use of a mantra is not laid down by a Direct Declaration,—all that
may be assumed or inferred for the pointing out of its use is sealed with
the authority of the apparent Inconsistency of something mentioned in the
Veda, and as such, is as Vedic as anything else. On the other hand, in a
case where the use of a mantra is distinctly laid down by a Direct
Declaration,--.e.g. in the case in question where the Aindri mantra is
clearly laid down as to be used in the hymning of the Garhapatya,—the
purpose of the mention of the mantra, as well as its result in the shape of
the help accorded to the performance of the Action, having been already
duly cognized, the Veda cannot bear the assumption of anything else-—in
the shape of the assertion that the Mantra should be used, in the hymning
of Indra. It is for this reason that Indicative Power is weaker than
Direct Declaration.

Then again, it has already been shown above that all option is
unwarrantable ; specially as the optional existence and non-existence of
the same thing in the same place is scarcely tenable. Thus then, in the
case in question, the Direct Declaration independently lays down the fact
of the mantra being employed in the hymning of the Garhapatya; while
the Indicative Power, by itself, lays down that of its being used in the
hymning of Indra. And the acceptauce of any one of these would mean
the neglecting of that which is laid down by the other; and in view of’
the latter Injunction this acceptauce would mean the doing of something

B

151

1202 YANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. INI—PADA 1I—ADHI. (7).

not enjoined; specially as the neglect of the latter too is nowhere Jaiq
down; and all this would involve the rejection of the enjoined and the
assumption of the non-enjoined; and both of these would be equally
undesirable. Then again, there would be the rejection of a fact that is well
known. That is to say, it is a well-known fact that that which is enjoined
should be carried into action, and that which is not enjoined should not
be so carried; and the above procedure would be directly contradictory
to both of these. For these reasons, we cannot admit of an option

With a view to set aside the seeming contradiction, it has been
suggested that both should be followed conjointly. But in reply to this
we declare that there actually 73 a contradiction; because Direct Declara-
tion, in the case in question, has fulfilled all the requirements of the
Mantra and the Context; and as for the Indicative Power, 108 object is
distinetly deficient in certain elements; and it is certainly contradicted
(by the aforesaid Direct Declaration, which does not leave any deficiency
in the object in question).

That is to say, 111 the case in question, there is a single Mantra and a
single Context; and that which 4s mentioned once can be of one form only.
And at the time that its use is pointed out-by Direct Declaration, only two
contingencies are possible—that the muntra and the subject-matter of the
Context should have all their needs fully supplied, or not. If then, their
needs are not supplied, then the use pointed out remains unaccomplished ;
‘because it is not proper that that which is actually brought into use
should have any needs unsupplied. If, on the other hand, they have their
needs supplied, then there can be no chance for the use pointed out by
Indicative Power; and such use depends upon the presence of certain
otherwise unfulfilled requirements. Lastly, if we were to admit both
simultaneously, then that would involve a self-contradiction, in that there
would be, and at the same time not be, certain requirements unfulfilled.

If, even in the face of all this, both Means were equally authoritative,
then, inasmuch as there would be no difference in them, it could not be
ascertained which one of them is foremost in supplying the requirements
in question ; and consequently these requirements being fulfilled by both
simultaneously, the mantra would come to be taken as serving both’
purposes. As a matter of fact, however, there is a vast difference
in the character of the two Means of knowledge in question,—in
that Direct Declaration is very much quicker in its operation. Conse-
quently when once the mantra has had its use pointed. out by Direct
Declaration, there is no room for the functioning of Indicative Power
And thus the superior authority of Direct Declaration becomes estab
lished

Though the sitra has spoken of the ‘weakness of the following,’ ye!

THE COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1203

the Bhashya speaks of the ‘‘ strength of the preceding,” which is implied
in what the sitira has said; and by this the Bhashya has shown that much
significance cannot be attached to the actual words of the s#ira.

Of the conflict between Syntactical Connection and Indicative Power
we have yet another example in the following: In connection with the
Jyotishtoma, we have certain ‘ Directions,’ mentioned in the Hautra section;
and these are enjoined as belonging to (to be addressed by) the Maitra-
yaruna, by Syntactical Connection, in the sentence ‘Tasman maitra-
४९५ nok préshyutt conucthéli.’ But among these ‘ Directions’ we meet
with one, in the form ‘ Pragdstaryaja’; and the Indicative Power of this
sentence distinctly points to the fact of Maitrévarupa being the priest to
whom this ‘ Direction’ is addressed. Now then, if Syntactical Connection
had the greater authority, then, in the case of tho latter ‘ Direction’ also,
Mattravaruna would be the priest who would address it; and as the
addressing of a Direction to one’s own self would be impossible, the ‘sacri-
ficing’ (spoken of in ‘ Pragastaryaja’) would have to be done by the Hoty
priest. Whereas if Indicative Power were possessed of the superior
authority, then, the ‘Direction’ in question would have to be used in
directing the Maitravarura priest; and as he could not be directed by
himself, it would have to be done by another person; and this Director is
known in the manner shown under the Sttra ‘Téshdam yato vigeshak
81/0८ ' : By the cammon Name (of ‘Hautra’) it is, m the first
instance, indicated that the mantra in question belonged to the lotr
priest; but this is set aside by Syntactical Connection; and when this
Syntactical Connection is, in its turn, set aside by the said Indicative
Power, then it is the aforesaid Name itself that reverts to its work and
points to the Hotr priest as the person who should address the Direction
in question; and as for the Maitravaruna priest, he is recognized as the
person carrying out the Direction addrensed.

Though the sentence ‘Tusmin maztravarunak, etc.’ occurs in the
Brihmana (and as such 18 capable of the authority of Direct Declaration);
yet, inasmuch as it merely consists of a conglomeration of words, it has
not the character of Direct Declaration; and as such, it is set aside by
the Indicative Power, which has its corroborative Direct Declaration in
close proximity to it. If the Maitravaruga priest were to address the
Direction, then, in that case, the word ‘Pragastah’ (in ‘ Pragastaryaja’)
would be wholly meaningless with regard ta the Hotr priest.

Objection: “In case the Maitravaruna priest were the person direc-
“ted, the words ‘ Hota yakshat etc.’ would become devoid of any méaning.
` Nor can it be held that these words-would have their secondary signifi-
“cations, Beeause’such could be the case with the word ‘ Pracdstah’ also.
` Aud further, in fact, it would be far more reasonable to take this latter

1204 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. Wie=PADA I1I—ADHI. (7).

५ word in ita secondary signification, on account of the fact of its being
“the last to come, and as such most susceptible of the effects of contradic
“tion, (by the word ‘ hotr’ that has gone before it). This could not be
“said of the word ‘ Holf,’ which is the first to be uttered, and as such,
‘not susceptible to the contradiction (of the word ‘ pragastah’ which has
५ 10४ yet appeared on the scene). Consequently the instance that you
“have cited is one of conflict between two Indicative Powers, and not
“between Syntactical Connection and Indicative Power.”

To the above we make the following reply: Jt 18 necessary to take
one of the two words in question in its secondary signification ; because of
the one being contradictory to the other. But the application of the word .
'Pragdstuh’ to the Hoty priest would be absolutely without foundation ;
while that. of the word ‘ Holt’ to the Muztravaruna pricst would be based
upon the fact of this latter pricst performing the duties of the 11)
priest; specially as all words expressive of the principal priest (the
‘Hotr’ f£.1.) are often found to be applied to his subordinates (the
Maitra@variuna f.1.); while the reverse 18 never found to be the case.
Consequently on account of the words of the mantra (‘ Pragdastaryaju’)
having the Power of indicating the Mactrdévaruna priest, it would be
addressed in directing him. Nor does the sentence (‘ Zasman maztrd-
varunak, etc.’) become wholly meaningless; as it would have its use in
regard to the other ‘ Directions’ ; and hence this sentence would certainly be
rejected in reference to the one ‘ Direction’ in question (* Pragastaryaja’).

Against the example ‘ Syonanté sadanam krnomz’ the following objec-
tion is urged: ^" Inasmuch as the two sentences (‘syananéé...... kalpaydmi’
‘and * (८61१1४८1 sida’) have been shown, before, to be distinct, the two
‘together could not be pointed out by Syntactical Connection as to be
“used conjointly. That is to say, even though the two conjointly fulfil
‘one condition of being syntactically connected (i.e. forming a single
‘‘sentence)-- namely, that when separated, cacl: of them remains wanting
“in an integral factor,—yet, on account of each of them serving a distinct
“purpose (and thus not fulfilling the first condition of Syntactical
¢ Connection—viz: arthaikatva, singleness of purpose), they are two
“ distinct sentences, as has been shown before; consequently, there can be
‘no question as to the two conjointly, as a whole, being used in connection
“either with the abhighfrana of sadana, or with the Depositing of the
५ Cake, either singly or conjointly.”

To the above, some people make the following reply: The discussioD
is not, with regard to the complete sentence as one composite whole, but
with regard to each of its parts

Or, it may be said in reply that two sentences are generally taken a8
forming a single sentence, nly when each of them is found to be wanting

THE COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1205

in some integral factor. And it has been already shown, on account of
the well-established fact of Indicative Power being stronger (than Syntac-
tical Connection), that the two sentences in question are wholly distinct.

That is to say, it was the fact of the sentence ‘tasmen sida’
being wanting in an integral factor, that was made the basis of the
declayation of the two as forming १ single sentence ; and certainly this is
the principal basis (of connecting two sentences syntactically); as on
that ground, we can assume, whenever we like, the relationship of the
Qualification and the Qualified ; and thereby assuming the two to have a
single purpose, they can be taken as syntactically connected. For
instance, in the case in question, taking the former part with the latter,
we have them conjointly denoting—‘The comfortable seat that I am
preparing for thee by means of the flowing of butter,—on the seat pre-
pared by this process thou shouldst sit down,’—thus the two together
having the single purpose of depositiny the cake by a certain process; or
they may mcan—‘ I am performing the preparation of the seat by means
of the butter-flow, for the purpose of your sitting’—the two together,
in this case, having the single purpose of indicating the preparing of the
seat with a particular result; in this way, the two together could be taken
as syntactically connected, and forming a single sentence.

The aforesaid declaration,-—that, on account of the difference in
their purpose, they are distinct sentences,—was based upon the fact of
the Indicative Power (of the two sentences) being more authoritative
(than Syntactical Connection),—a fact that has been established on the
present occasion, In case Indicative Power 13 the stronger of the two, we
reject the possibility of the two forming a single sentence on the chance
of the one qnalifiying the other; and we accept each of them to be self-
sufficient, as shown by Indicative Power; and thus giving up all idea of
the one serving as tho qualification of the other, wo find that each of
them has a distinct purpose of its own; and as such they cannot be
taken as distinct sentences. Thus then, the present discussion refers to
the fact of the two sentonces being endowed with syntactical character,
through their applications, and also to the strength or weakness of
Indicative Power (as compared to Syntactical Connection). Then again,
the sentence having attained to its position, through our cognition of it
४8 such,—there follows the consideration of the presence or absence of
cognitions to the contrary.

On the question thus stated, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA (C).

“ Both (Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection) are equally
` anthoritative. In that case, the action would be performed in such a

1206 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA I11—ADHI. (7).

८ way that at one time the two mantras would be used separately, while
‘at times the two would be used conjointly in connection with any one

“of the two actions, and lastly, at times, with both of them.

“ Question: ‘How could the sense of the scripture be so very un.
“ certain 0 ' *

“ Answer: When sach an uncertainty happens to be distinctly point-
“ed out by a correct means of knowledge, what harm does it do us to
“admit such an uncertainty? And there can be no doubt that the
existence of such uncertainty is quite admissible in view of the equally
“ authoritative character of Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection,

५ When however, like Direct Declaration, Syntactical Connection is
“ cognized as setting aside Indicative Power, on the ground of its being a
‘distinct means of knowledge,—then in that case, the two sentences are
“always used conjointly.”

SIDDHANTA (C).

As a matter of fact, we find that the mantra beginning from ‘ syonam’
and ending with ‘kalpay@mi,’ is, by its inherent capability, quite capable
of being used, with all its requirements fulfilled, with reference to its own
independent purpose; and the appearance of its being deficient in some
points is due to the other sentence (‘ tasmin sida’); (and not to anything
in the sentence itself).

The whole manira, from the very beginning, is on the look-out for
some use to which it should be put. And as a matter of fact, we find that
the mantra ending with ‘kalpayaémi’ does not stand in need of anything
outside itself ; consequently we conclude that that mantra ends then and
there; and finding its purpose duly served by that, we conclude that it 1s
to be used in connection with the Pouring of Butter over the bedding; and
hence it can, in no way, be extended so far as the action of the Depositing
of the Cake. Nor do we find any inconsistency or uselessness in the latter
mantra (‘tusmin sida’), without the companionship of the former (manira
ending with ‘kulpuyami’),—to avoid which inconsistency, the two should
have been taken together, because that mantra also has its use in
connection with the Depositing of the Oake. Thongh the word ‘tat? (in
‘tasmin’) stands in need of a certain antecedent, yet it could be taken as
referring to the previously-established meaning of the preceding sentence;
and there would be no incongruity in snch a distinct use of the
pronoun ‘tat,’ For instance, we have the sentence ‘tupt® payast
dadhy@nayatt,’ which ends with the laying down of the préparation of the
substance, and then, we have the sentence ‘sa vaipvadévyamiksha,’ which
is taken distinctly by itself, as laying down, independently by itself, the
relationship of that substance with the deity (Vsevédéva).

Thus then, we find that the separate use of the two mantras bas

THE COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1207

‘ty corroborative Direct Declaration not very far from it; and conse-
quently there can be no overlapping of the operations of the one by those
of the other

Says the Bhashya—Thus then we find that the mantru ‘tasmin sida’
has no capubility of being connected with the preparing of the Bedding.
Though this has been already said before, yet it is repeated over and
over again, with a view to strengthen the conviction. And we can
explain the repetition as serving the purpose of recapitulating the proper-
ties of the sentence in question, after the imposition of other foreign
properties has been set aside. The first time that the declaration in
question was made was with reference to the existence and non-existence
of authoritative means of cognition; the second time it was with refer-
ence toits capability and incapability ; and the last time it 1s with reference
to its serving and not serving visible purposes

For these reasons, then, it must be admitted that Indicative Power is
more authoritative than Syntactical Connection.

Question: “In the phrase ‘conflict between Syntactical Connection
“and Context,’ what do you mean by ‘ 0०१८८८८ ' 2 So far you have made
“use of the term ‘Context’ as a well-known entity; though what it
“is has not yet been explained. Consequently it 18 necessary for you to
“explain what it js; specially as 1४ 18 only when its form and character
“are known that we could learn whether it 1s strong or weak in its
“authority.

“In reality, however, there seems to be no difference between Context
“and Syntactical Connection or Order, Firstly, it is only the proximity
“of certain words that stand in neod of one another, that is called
५ ° Syntactical Connection’; and this same proximity is found in Context
“also, Nor is there any authorized limit to the number of words in a Syn-
“ tactical Connection ; ag all that coustitutes Syutactical Connection is the
“fact of the words, when separated from one another, being wanting in
“certain elements, coupled with the fact of their combining towards the.
“fulfilment of a single purpose. Consequently that which contnins a few
words, | 0 constituted is Syntactical Connection; while that which
“contains a large number of words thus related is Context,—all the.
` smaller sentences in the Context being pervaded over by intermediate
“purposes, and thereby capable of forming a large combination with the
“chief purpose of the main Context. This is what will be spoken of later

on, in the Bhashya, in the sentence—‘ vakyam hi ekam Durca- Pirnamdasa-

bhyam sahadharmandm.’ Secondly, Order is said to consist of prozimity ;
“and this proximity is a necessary factor in Context also; consequently
` Context.is the same as Order.”

1208 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA 111—ADHI. (7).

The Bhashya replies to the above by showing—(I) the true form ; (11)
the signification of the component parts (of the word ‘ Context’); and
(111) the synonyms (of the word)

(I) To explain the real form of Context—Oontezt is the (a) declaration
of (0) what ts to be accomplished, this latter standing in need of (c)
the Process (of accomplishment). (Kartavyasyétckartavyatakankshasya
vacanam prakaranan)

(b) By ‘kartarya’ (what is to be accomplished) is meant either the
resultant Apiirva, or the Bhava (or Bhavana) which 1s signified by the
affix, 18 having the character of that which is to be enjoined and to bo
performed.

Objection: ^^ Inasmuch as the desirable results, Heaven and the like,
“are included in the Resultant factor, it must be these results that are
“called ‘ Kartavya.’”’

Reply: Not so; becanse, inasmuch as such results appear at a
different time altogether, they do not form an integral part of the
Performance; and hence it is the Apiérva that leads to the subsequent
accomplishment of those results, that should be regarded as the ‘ Kartavyu.’
Consequently the results could be accomplished only after the Apiirva
had been brought about; this fact of the Apérva being the motive of the
action will be explained later on, under the sttra, ‘ yajnakarma pradhanam
tuddht codanibhittam ' (IX—i—1) ; while the possibility of the Result and
the Deity being the motive will be brought forward in the s#tra ‘ Phala-
dévatayogca’ (IX—i—4-5), simply to be immediately refuted.

(c) By ‘akanksha’ is meant the longing or need for the means of
help—as to how the result 18 to be brought about. [The word ‘ a@kaaksha’
= 0 + kanksh + ghat|. Or the word ‘ittkartavyatakinksha’ may be
explained as that which needs the Procedure, 1.6. the Bhavana or the
Apirva; and the ‘ vacana’ is of such a Bhavana or Apiirva—the two words
with the genitive ending being taken as co-extensive.

(a) By ‘vacana’—Declaration—is meant the bringing about of a
conviction by means of words.

Thus then, the upshot of the whole definition comes to be this: Even
though the Need may be existent, in the nature of things, yet tha& alone
does not constitute the “ Context’; but it is only when it is duly cognized
that it comes to be so called; and that too only when it is cognized as
subservient to that which is to be accomplished, and not independently by
itself. Therefore it is the Need, when clearly expressed, that constitute:
“Context”; or the Bhdvand along with the Need may be taken as consti
tating it

(II) What has just been said is again reiterated by the Bhashya,
by explaining the significations of the component parts of the word

THE COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI. LINGA, ETC 1209

(+ Prakarana *). The word ‘pra’ means beginning, and ‘ karana’ means
action; hence ‘ Prakarana’ means Prakriyd, the beginning of action, The
Bhashya next explains the particular action the beginning of which is
meant: Of the action of Decluration—i.e, of the action of direct denotation.
That is to say, it is the beginning of the action of expressing the Bhavant—
which-means the beginning of the operation of the sentence laying down
the performance of the action. The factors of the Result and the
Instrumental are always expressed by two words; while the denotation of
the Procedure can be done only by means of several sentences. Conse-
quently, by looking into all things, we conclude that it is the Procedure
that constitutes the ‘Context’—by which is meant the beginning of the
actions of Denotation and Injunction.

Though the word ‘karana’ is expressive of mere action, yet, when
used in connection with a scripture, 1t is used to denote the action of
denotatzon.

(III) The Bhashya next speaks of the synonyms of ‘Context’: I¢
isthe ८ Beginning of the Injunction’ (‘Vidhyddih’). As both the words
“beginning” and “end” are relative terms, the Bhashya proceeds to
show with respect to what it is the ‘ beginning ’:—It 25 with reference to
the end of the Injunction. By ‘the end of Injunction’ here is meant the
cognition of the Procedure in the shape of the method of action. The
Injunction, which has, in its middle, the perception of the various
subsidiaries, their uses and results, has for its beginning the Procedure ;
and hence the Teachers speak of it as ‘ Vidhyadi’ (Beginning of Injunc-
tion).

In this Context, we have recourse to connecting, over again, for the
sake of another purpose, sentences that have had their purpose served by
means of the words contained in them; and this is what distinguishes
it from Syntactical Connection. As Syntactical Connection does not
operate, for the slightest purpose, in disjoined parts, the purpose
18 served only by connecting them together in a definite relationship

As for the difference of Context from Order, we shall explain it
presently.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that Context is a distinct
means of knowledge |

Question: “ What ¢s the example of this? Whatever example you

wil bring forward, I shall show it to fall under Syntactical Connection

The Siddhanti cites the case of the Saktavaka,—being fully conscious
of the fact that the Brahmana and the Mantra, serving the distinct func-
tions of enjoining and recalling (something connected with the perform-
५०९6९) respectively, can never be syntactically connected

In regard to this Saktavaka, there arises this question; The

152 |

1210 . TANTRACVARTIKA, ADH, II—PADA III—-ADHI. (7).

Indicative Power having extracted the words expressive of the Deities
(from the sentences dealing with the Darga, and connected it with the
Parnamasa), should the accessories also of these be extracted along with
them ? Or should the former words be used without these latter?
In reply to this, the Context shows that all the accessories should be
used in connection with both (the Darga and the Pirnamasa). As for
Indicative Power, that is common to both ; because the Singular and the
Dual numbers (met with in the Siiktavaka) are present in both.

Objection: =“ The words expressive of the Deities (of the Parnamasa)
“being fully taken up with their own accessories, there can be no room
‘“ for any other accessories,”

Reply: Trae; but that does not remove the contradiction between
Syntactical Connection and Context. Firstly, because by Context it
would seem that we conld make use of the accessories even without the
Deity ; while Syntactical Connection points to the use of only such as
have not been deprived of the Deity; and inasmuch as the latter is
possessed of the superior authority, it is the latter alternative that is
accepted in actual usage. Secondly, Context shows that it should be used
several times; while Syntactical Connection shows that it is to be used
only once, in accordance with the word expressive of the Deity ; and this
constitutes a contradiction (between Context and Syntactical Connection).
Thirdly, Syntactical Connection is the stronger of the five because its
connections are fully established. While in the case of Context we
employ the accessory in accordance with its declaration in the scriptures,
after we have inferred the connection between the subject-matter of the
' Context and the mention of the Procedure—in the form that ‘ one should
perform the sacrifice in such and such a way’; und then again, there is
the assumption of a further relationship (of the Pirnamasa) with such
words expressive of the Deities as have not their accessories fully defined.
This constitutes a remoteness, in the case of Context, from the real
objective in view; and hence the Context is set aside by the aforesaid
Syntactical Connection. | |

Thus then it must be admitted either that the extraction of the
accessories of words expressive of Deities is always necessary, and not
optional, or that they should not be used at all.

Question: ^ What ४५ the example of conflict between Order and Cor-
“text? The sense of the question is that, there being no possibility
“of an example of the conflict of that Order which consists of the
‘respective relationship between two sets of things,—while that, which
‘is mentioned either before or after a certain thing, being snbject to the
५ authority of the Sub-Context consisting of Proximity,—we are perfectly

THE COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1211

«gure of there being no example; and hence we do not put forward our
‘ignorance or doubt (with regard to the example in question).”

In reply to this, the Bhashya puts forward an example, with a view
to the fact that we can easily refute the fact of the case cited being
amenable to the authority of a Sub-Context. The example is this: In the
Context of the Rajasiiya, we find laid down, that ‘ after the Abhishécaniya,
one should recite the Gaunahgépha,’ ‘he conquers the Kshattriya,’ ‘he
gambles with the Prashthauwhi (excellent cow),’ ‘ he 18 bathed,’ and so forth:
There is no doubt, or diiference of opinion, as to all these actions being sub-
sidiaries (to another action) ; consequently all that we have got to consider,
in connection with these, is the exact relationship of these subsidiaries to
a particular Primary action ; the question being—(1) Do these accessories
belong to the complete Bajusiiya, or to the Abhishécaniya sacrifice only ?
(2). 18 there an option in this matter ?—the third alternative, that of the
accessories belonging to both conjointly, not being possible 11 this case
(as the Abhish€caniya also is an accessory of the Razusiiya). And these
questions can be answered only by ascertaining which of the two, Context
as Order, 18 pogsessed of the superior authority.

Objection: “Inasmuch as the Abhishécaniya is pointed out by the
Sub-Context, it would certainly set aside the larger Context of the
Rajasitya.”

Reply: This dges not affect the case in question; because we could
have a suh-context (of the Abhishécaniya) only if the actions in question
were mentioned before all the requirements of the Abhishécaniya had been
supplied. As it is however, that has had all its needs supplied, prior to
the mention of the Gambling, etc., by means of the details mentioned in
connection with the Primary sacrifice. And even though all these actions
are mentioned in close proximity to the Abhishécaniya, yet this sacrifice
steps over them and looks to the Primary sacrifice for the supplying of
its needs; because the usefulness of these actions in question has not
yet been established. And when the Primary sacrifice has supplied
that sacrifice with proper aids, the Context of that sacrifice ceases
then and there; and it could be raked up again only if, without it,
the actions mentioned in close proximity with it were useless. But
that would make it tantamount to Order, And as a matter of fact
while the Abhishécaniya, which has had all its needs supplied, rakes up a
further need,—the directly perceptible Procedure of the Rdjasiya
establishes the use to which the actions are to be put; specially as the
Procedure of the Rajasiya, extending from the Pavitra down to the
Holding of the kshattra, can very well take in the Gambling, etc. Conse-
quently, in the case in question, there can be no Sub-Context of the
Abhishacaniya. | |

1212 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. LIT PADA Ilt—ADHI. (7).

In the case of that modificatory sacrifice in which, after certain
accessories of the original Primary sacrifice have been mentioned, there
are cortain accessories of the modificatory sacrifice mentioned either
before or after the former,—in such cases, inasmuch as these latter
accessories are mentioned in the midst of those that are included in the
Procedure of that sacrifice, we recognize the fact of their having’ been
mentioned in the Context of that sacrifice. There is no such thing,
however, in the case in question; consequently we must accept it to be
a case of the operation of Order.

Says the Bhdshya: Sannidhdvamnaténa paripurnéndpi avakalpéta eka-
vakyatvam—this with reference to the completing of the meaning of the
sentence (the sense being that the assumption of Syntactical Connection is
much easier in the case of Context than in that of Order).

Again, says the Bhashya: Anékasyaimndyumdnasya sannidhivicéshim-
ninamatram hi kramak. (Order consists only of the declaration of the
proximity of the several things that are spoken of.) The sense of this is
that in the case of Order, the proximity of something 15 a necessary
concomitant. That is to say, that which is spoken of as serving the
purpose of many things, cannot possibly be in close proximity with all
the principals concerned ; and hence it is only necessary for it to be in
close proximity with any one of these, There is no need of any such
necessary concomitant in the case of Context. Consequently whenever
Context and Order both start on a common errand, the Context is quicker
in getting at its corroborative Direct Declaration; and as such it is the
stronger of the two

Question What ts the example of conflict between Order and
Name?” This question emanates from one labouring under the mis
conception that, “inasmuch as the Name applies to its object in its literal
signification, it is as operative in its indication of the relationship as
Direct Declaration itself; and as such it is very much stronger than
Order.’

Answer: We find that the name ‘ Paurodagika’ applies to the whole
section of the Darga-Pairnamisa, And there we find the mantra ‘ gundha
dhvam,’ mentioned in the Position (or Order) of the purification of the
Sanniyya-vessel. The Context and Indicative Power indicate that the
mantra is to be used in the purification of the vessels connected with the
Darga-pirpamasa iu general; and then there arises the question as to the
particular vessel that is to be purified, the question being—‘ Is the
mantra to be employed in the purification of the Purodaga-vessel, 9
indicated by the Name ‘ Paurodacika,’ or, in that of the Sannayya-vessel
as indicated by Order P '

And on this question, the Piérvapaksha is that-—‘‘Inasmuch 45

THE COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1213

“the Order has been often found to be set aside, and as it does not
“ gxpress any relationship,—it must be taken to be rejected by the Name,
“which has never been found to have been set aside, and which indicates
“a distinct relationship.”’

In reply to this, we have the following Siddhanta: It 18 the Name
that is set aside, on account of its being further removed from its
objective. That is to say, in Order we find a common element, in the
shape of position, which belongs wholly to the Veda,—while in the case
of Name, the common element has got to be assumed, and hence is
remoter.

Question: ‘ What do you mean by the ‘ remoteness’ from the objective P
“That is to say, no such is possible in the case of Name, which denotes
“ that factor of the relationship which has the idea of that relationship
“meluded within itself.”

Answer: The Syntactical Oonnection with something having been
cognized by means of Oontext, that which happens to be mentioned in prozt-
mity to tt leuds to the assumption of a requirement and to that of Syntactical
Connection,—a case wherein we have the use pointed out by Order, not
contradictory to Context, but contrary only to the Name.

Objection: ‘‘ How is it that in the case you speak of, the Context
“is not contradicted,—when we find this latter pointing to the fact of the
“mantra pertaining to all the vessels, and yet, on the strength of Order,
“we take it as pertaining only to the Sdnundyya vessel 7 ''

Reply: This does not affect the situation ; because if the use pointed
out by Order, and accepted by us, pertained to something not included in
the Context, then alone could there have been a contradiction of this
latter. As a matter of fact, however, we find that all that the Context
indicates is that the mantra pertains to the cleaning of any one of the
vessels used at the Darga-piirnamdsa sacrifice ; and hence when we come to
consider the question as to which particular vessel it pertains to, we find
the Order alone operating (towards the pointing out of the Sannayya
४९68861) ; and this involves no contradiction of the previously-operating
Context.

Objection: “Inasmuch as the Context indicates the fact of the mantra
“applying to all the vessels, the disjoining of the mantra from a single
“one of them would certainly involve a contradiction of the Context (to
+ gay nothing of the case when you disjoin it from all of them with the
“single exception of the Sdundyya vessel).”

Reply: Asa matter of fact, the Context does not necessarily indicate
the fact of the mantra applying to all the vessels; because the mantra
haa its requirements fulfilled by being related to a single one of the
vessels ; and as for the other vessels spoken of in the Context, they could

1214 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. HI—PADA III—ADHI, (7).

have their purposes equally served by other mantras. In the case in
question, what is accomplished, prior to the operation of the Order, is the
Direct Declaration, laying down the use of the mantra, in general terms,
And while a distinct Direct Declaration would be assumed with regard to
each of the vessels, the aforesaid Order also will have assumed its own
corroborative Direct Declaration; and this would swallow up the Direct
Declaration indicated by the Context,

0 the other hand, the Name operating in a way reverse to the Order,
is contradicted by it; and being remote from its objective is weakor in
authority, Then again, as a matter of fact all relationship is brought
about by a certain intermediate commonality ; and between the mantra
in question and the Purodfgu, we do not find any such commonality,
shown by the Veda; as there is that of position between the manéra and
the Sdnviyya. |

The Name ४५ a word of ordinary parlance. Though this view has been
set aside in the Adhikarana on the Bhakshanuvika, yet it is brought forth
here only with a view to show that the Name is very much removed from
the relationship declared by the Veda.

The opponent believes the above to be an utter annihilation of the
Name from its very root,-—exactly like the refutation of Indicative
Power; and declares thus: “ Jfit be so, then, [in such cases as the one
‘under consideration, we miyht accept the use as shown by Order; but the
“Order cannot be believed to be stronger (than Name), on the ground of the
“ fact of the Nume being very remote from its objective; as what we are
“compareng are two authoritative means of knowledge; while in the way
“ shown above, Name entirely ceases to be such a means, etc,, etc. |.”

The Siddhantz brings forth the same reply that had been given
previously, in connection with the Bhaksh@nnvaka: Not so, etc. That 1s
to say, if the relationship of the Accessory and the Primary were based
upon the cognitions of man, then alone could Name cease to be an autho-
ritative means of knowledge; as a matter of fact, we hold that relation-
ship to be wholly Vedic

The sense of this is that it is the Name ‘ Paurodigika’ which, not
being found in the mantra or in the Brahmana, is not Vedic; but this
cannot be said of the relationship, under consideration, of the Accessory
and the Primary; this relationship is quite authoritative; because even
though the word (‘ Paurodagika’) is not Vedic, yet the relationship that
it denotes is eternal, and it has for its basis an actual Smrtt-text, Then
again, that the word ‘ Pauroddgika’ denotes the relationship is not some
| thing transcending the senses ; as it is as directly perceptible, as the tree f.1.
to. persons making use of the word ; and it is quite possible that each mau
might be using the word, after having heard it used by some other person

THE COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1215

This is what is shown by the Bhashya in the sentence—man is a com-
otent authority on such potnis, as that ‘ the mantra 1s mentioned in the position
or order of the sinn@yya, ‘1b occurs in such and such a Context,’ ‘there ४8
such and such a Syntactical Qonnection,’ ‘this word ts Veilic,’ and so forth.
That is to say, as a matter of fact, we find that, in all cases the action of
one man depends upon what he has seen in other men; and then we do
not find the Veda making any such declarations as that, ‘this subject is
mentioned in the same place with that subject,’ ‘this occurs in such a
Context, ‘these words are near one another’ or ‘that they are related
to one another,’ etc. It 18 only when men are repeating the Veda, that we
come to notice these things. Those men again must have noticed them
while some other man had been repeating them; and so on and on, spch
noticing would be eternal; and, not being like the case of the blind fol-
lowing the blind, it would be authoritative also. Otherwise, from the
view of the Veda alone, the Context or the Non-Context would be both
equally devoid of authority. Then, inasmuch as the above facts are
noticed by many men, there can he no suspicion of their being faulty on
account of certain discrepancies in the perceptive faculty of any one man,

Thus then, it 18 clear that due authority attaches to the Name, as a
means of knowledge; but though it is so in certain places, yet it is set
aside whenever it is found to be more removed from its objective (than
some other means of knowledge). And this setting aside of it we have
explained above in the course of the explanation of the sitra.

Thus then, among Direct Declaration and the rest, as put forth in
the Bhashya, Direct Declaration always sets aside others, while Name is
always set aside by others, and the others set aside by, and are set aside
by others,

The Bhashya next proceeds to show, through an objection, the form
of that which is set aside
Question: ‘In a case of conflict between any two of these, when it
18 said that one is set aside by the other,—e.g. the Indicative Power by
“Direct Declaration, Syntactical Connection by Indicative Power, etc.,
etc.—-that which is set aside, is it one that has been duly accomplished
or not? If it has not been accomplished, then, there is no ‘collision
or ‘conflict’; and then, what would be there that could be set aside?
“Tf, for the sake of the ‘collision,’ it be held that what is set aside is
“that which is accomplished,—then, inasmuch as the objective of both
wil have been equally accomplished, they would be equally authori-
tative; and as such there could be no validity in the Rejection under
consideration.”

The teply to this, as given by the Bhashya, is as follows: That

1216 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I11—-PADA III—ADHI. (7).

which.is pointed out being found to be amenable to the Means rejecting
(as well as to that rejected), on account of the cause (of giving rise to
cognitions) being common to both,—the cognition brought about by the
latter is declared to be ‘ false,’ by the rejecting means which 18 possessed
of greater authority. That is to say, we find that the cognitions of the
mirage, etc, though appearing in a fully accomplished form, are rejected
by being subsequently shown to be false; and being disjoined from such
results, as acceptance, rejection and the like, they come to be known as
“rejected” or “set aside.” Inthe same manner, the cognition produced
by the Indicative Power, though appearing in an accomplished form, is
separated, by the contrary cognition produced by Direct Declaration, from
the result in the shape of performance, and is set aside.

- But this explanation is scarcely tenable. Because, in the first place,
inasmuch as the way in which one sets aside the other has been already
shown above, the question itself is not possible (to the point); and
secondly, when, as a matter of fact, it has been actually found that what
18 sct aside is not fally accomplished,—the answer, that the setting aside
is of that which has been accomplished, is scarcely the proper one.

That is to say, a question can be rightly put only with regard to that
which has not been already explained. As for the Indicative Power, etc.
it has already been explained that they are set aside, by reason of their
not bringing about the assumption of the corroborative Direct Declaration
on account of their remoteness from their objective; consequently no
question can be rightly put as to the way in which these are set aside.
If, however, such a question be put (however unreasonably), then, the
answer that is given should not be one that is incompatible with the
Stddhanta view in general. And in the case in question we find that,
inasmuch as Indicative Power, etc. have been shown to be set aside on
account of their not succeeding in bringing about the assumption of the
corroborative Direct Declarations (and thus not attaining their fully-
equipped forms),—the setting aside is clearly of something that has not
been accomplished. And this conclusion, once arrived at, would be set
aside, without reason, by propounding, in answer to the above question,
that Indicative Power, etc. are set aside in their accomplished forms.

It has been declared that the matter in question is amenable to both,
because of the existence of the common cause. But as a matter of fact,
Indicative Power and the rest do not, by themselves, possess the direct
capability of bringing about a correct cognition; nor is this capability
possible when there does not exist a Direct Declaration giving rise to that
cognition; consequently, it 18 only through the assumption of the corrobo-
` 180९९ Direct Declaration, that Indicative Power, etc. can be said to be
fully accomplished and operative (towards the bringing about of the

THE COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1217

correct cognition); consequently when the inferred Direct Declaration has
been brought about, there can be no difference between such a Direct
Declaration and one that is directly perceptible; and hence both (Indica-
tive Power and Direct Declaration) would come to be equally authori-
tative.

Or again, if the rejection of Indicative Power, etc. be meant to be in
the form of declaring the falsity of the cognitions brought about by them,
—as this could be possible only when there would be a contradiction,—the
process of rejection would be quite the reverse of what has actually been
shown to be the case. For instance, as a matter of fact, the previous
cognition (due to Direct Declaration f.1.) is brought about without having
set aside the subsequent one (due to Indicative Power, ete.) for the
simple reason that this latter has not yet appeared; while the latter
cognition is never fully brought about without setting aside the former
cognition to the contrary,

That is to say, Direct Declaration being quicker in its operation, is
the foremost to function towards the bringing about of a cognition; and
it is after this that Indicative Power and the rest begin to operate.
Consequently, if, for the sake of establishing the fact of the Rejection in
question being that of something fully accomplished,—the Indicative
Power, though operating subsequently, were to lead to the inferonce of
the corroborative Direct Declaration,»then, inasmuch as this latter
Declaration could not obtain a footing, withont having set aside the
previous contrary Direct Declaration bearing upon the same subject, the
inferred Declaration would, in the very act of appearing, reject the
cognition brought about by the previous Declaration as being false,—just
like the cognition of the mirage and the like.

For these reasons, the portion of the Bhashya under consideration
cannot be explained, in a way compatible with what has been previously
established, with regard to Direct Declaration and the rest.

Even though the passages under consideration, appearing in the
Bhashya at the conclusion of the Adhikarana, would appear to he referring
to the subject-matter of the Adhikarana,—yet we proceed to explain thom
by taking them apart from the place in which they are actually found, as
is indicated by their inherent capability; just as is the case with the
mantras to be addressed to Pishan (which are used in a place other than
that in which they are mentioned in the Veda).

Inasmuch as the way in which one Means of knowledge sets aside the
Other has already been explained above, the sentence ‘atha yuattatra ete.’
cannot possibly refer to the Rejection by Direct Declaration, etc. In fact

153 |

1218. TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. (1--ण INI—ADHI, (7).

the matter of Rejection must have brought to the mind of the Author all
the different kinds of Rejection that are met with in the course of
treatment of the scriptures. And the idea present in the mind of the
questioner, putting the question as formulated in the Bhashya, is that the
character of these Rejections is not exactly similar to that which we have
been dealing with in connection with Direct Declaration, etc.; and yet it
is necessary that the method of all Rejections should be alike; and hence
the question comes to be this :—Is the method of those Rejections like that
which has been shown to belong to the Rejections in connection with
Direct Declaration, or the methods of these latter are like that of those
others? Then, inasmuch as the method of the Rejections in connection
with Direct Declaration, etc, has just been explained, there would be no
use in bringing forward a question with regard to them; consequently
the question ‘athu yattatra tatra, etc.’ must bo taken as referring to the
Rejections other than those pertaining to Direct Declaration, ete.

As examples of such other Rejections, we have the following :- (1)
That of Inference by Sense-perception; (2) that of the cognition of the
mirage, and such other cognitions as are given rise to by mere semblances
of the six means of knowledge, by those brought about by the real
means of knowledge; (8) that of the Smrit by the Gruti; (4) that
of the Smrézs emanating from untrustworthy and disreputable sources, by
those proceeding from trustwortlry and otherwise good sources; (5) that
of the Smriz serving a visible purpose by that which serves a transcen-
dental purpose; (6) that of the Smrtz originating from Indicative Power
or Valedictory Passages by that based directly on the Crutz; (7) that of
usage by the 610 ; (8) that of one usage by another of more learned
people; (9) that of the Doubtful by the Certain; (10) that of the weak
by the strong; (11) that of what occurs in the Conclusion by what occurs
in the beginning; (12) that of that which serves au absolutely transcen-
dental purpose by that which serves a transcendental purpose by mere
restriction ; (13) that of the remote auxiliary by one that is more closely
related; (14) that of the Injuncton of several things by the Injunction of
one thing; (15) that of that which is expressed by many words by that
which is expressed by one word; (16) that of that which involves the
rejection of many things by that which involves that of fewer things; (17)
that of what is laid down in another Veda by that which is enjoined in
the same Veda; (18) that what is enjoined in a different Rescensional
text by that laid down in the same Text; (19) that of the necessary by
the occasional; (20) that of the necessary and occasional actions meant
to serve a purpose useful to the sacrifice, by those meant to serve the
desirable end of man; (21) that of that which is mentioned apart by itself,
by that which oceurs .in the same context; (22) that of the preceding

THE COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1219

by the following, when the two are contradictory ; (23) that of that which
pertains to the Original sacrifice by that which pertains to the modifica-
tion (in the performance of the latter) ; (24) that of that which is based
upon a supposed sentence recapitulating the Actions with its accessories,
by that which is based upon the Injunctive sentence; (25) that of the
useless by the useful; (26) that of the Brahmana-order by the Mantra-
order; (27) that of that which is based upon the Deity by that which is
based upon the Substance; (28) that of that which is mentioned
subsequently by that which has been previously mentioned; (29) that of
the small by the great; (80) that of the secondary by the primary ;
(31) that of that which is laid down in general terms by that which
is specifically enjoined; (32) that of that which has other uses by that
which is otherwise useless; (33) that of the Subsidiary by the Primary ;
and (34) that of the properties of the Subsidiary by those of the Primary,

And with regard to these, there arises the following question: “ In
‘all these cases, is the rejection of something that has been accomplished,
“or is it that of the unaccomplished, as in the case of Direct Declaration,
“ete.? If, as in the case of these latter, so the case of the rejection of
“the «mplied by the enjoined were one of something not accomplished,
“then in this latter case, it would be necessary to admit the total absence
“of the scriptural text laying down the application in question ; just as in
“the case of the Indicative Power, etc. we admit the non-existence of any
“Direct Declaration bearing upon the point. Jn that case, inasmuch as
“the text laying down the use could be one only, it would be necessary
“to admit its non-existence in other cases also, exactly as in the case
“of contradiction; and thereby the rejection of that which is wmpled
“would be universal, If, on the other hand, we were to admit its
“ existence, in the case of non-contradiction, then its existence would have
“to be admitted in other cases also; and in that case it would be equal in
“authority to that which is directly enjoined (which would be an
absurdity).

“ And further, inasmuch as the generic texts could not obtain o
“footing, unless they set aside the specific scriptural texts, if we were to
“admit the authority of such texts, the process of rejection wonld be
“reversed (i.e. the generic would set aside the specific). Specially the
“same text cannot reasonably be accepted as existing, with reference to
“one thing, and non.existing with reference to another. Consequently,
“in the case of such generic and specific declarations as,—‘give curd to
“the Brahmanas, and takra to the Kaundinyas,’ ‘ the modification of a
“sacrifice is to be done in the manner of the original,’ ‘the grass used
“should be that of the gara,’—inasmuch as there could not be distinct
“texts for each individual Brahmana, or each snbsidiary sacrifice, the

1220. TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. Wt—PAva i—ADHI. (7) .

‘text must be admitted to be one only. And if, in view of the cara
“and the takra, it be held that there is no text relating to the kuga
“and the Kaundinya,—then there could be no text applying to the
“ Prayajas and the Mathara Brahmana respectively. If however there be
“a text relating to these latter, then there must be one relating to the
“kuca aud the Kaundinya also. The assertion that it does not exist in
“reference to the latter, while it does with reference to other things,
८ 001 involve a self-contradiction, striking at the very authority of the
‘text. Nor is there, in this case, a difference of comprehenders, whereby
“¢he seeming contradiction could be explained as being due to its being
“comprehended by one and not comprehended by another. And, inas-
‘much as the text is comprehended but once, there can be no cognition of
‘any difference in it, whereby the existence admitted would be of one,
“while the non-existence would be of another. This might have been
‘nossible if the denotation of words consisted of the Individual; as, how-
५ ever, it consists of the Cluss,—in the case of the Implication of certain
५५ operations relative to the sacrifice,—-the object being one only, at one and
“the same time, there could be only one operative scriptural text.

‘The same line of arguments would set aside the case of a Rejcction
‘in the form of total removal; because, inasmuch as the words Brahimuné-
“bhyah’ and ‘ Prakrtivat’ (in the sentences quoted above) have exactly
‘the same grounds (for applying to every Bralimana and every subsidiary
“ sacrifice respectively), there is no possibility of leaving out any of them;
५ as will be shown, by means of question and answer, in S#tras 1I—vi—3,
“and IlI—vi—5. That is to say, in the case of sentences emanating
“from human sources,—as the sense imparted to the words used resides in
“the heart of the speaker, it would be possible for him to make the
“arbitrary declaration—‘ I made this assertion, but I did not mean it to
“apply to such and such cases,'—even though the words used do not
“imply anything of this exception. But even this arbitrary exception 18
‘not possible in the case of a Vedic sentence. Because in the case of
“the Veda, we do not deduce specific declarations from general statements,
“whereby we could take the generic statement as acting merely as the
“source of the specific deduction, with reference to which the seeming
५५ contradiction of simultaneous existence and non-existence could be easily
५५ explained

“For these reasons, inasmuch as it is necessary for all Rejections
“ to be of one uniform character, all the Rojections enumerated above could
“not be of the same form as that which is desired (as belonging to the
८ 08४86 of Direct Declaration ete.)

‘‘ Then if it be held that the Rejections are of those that are accom-
५५ plished entities,—these latter being rejected by being shown to be false,

THE COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY OF SHRUTI, LINGA, ETC. 1221

«and that, in this way, there would be no such self-contradiction as that
“shown above,—then with regard to Direct Assertion, ete. also, the
५ Rejection must be admitted to be of that which is accomplished. But
“with regard to these, the case has been shown to be quite the contrary.
“Consequently, there can be no uniformity in the methods of all Rejec-
“tions.”

To the above we make the following reply:-—It is by no means
necessary that all Rejections should be of one uniform character ; specially
as there is no incongruity in their diversity, which is supported by authori-
tative evidence.

That is to say, just as in tho case of Rejections explained before,
there was no uniformity of character,—so, in the same manner, even if
we admit of a diversity in their character, there is no incongruity in it.

Thus then, we conclude that in the case of Direct Declaration etc.,
the rejection is one of something that has not been accomplished, as has
been explained before; and there is nothing incongruous in that; as we
do not admit of more than one accomplishment with regard to any one
thing. As for the other rejections, resembling these,—e.g, those of the
Smrti etc.,—which also are duc to the remoteness of the objective,—these
should be taken as explained by the explanation of those relating to the
Direct Declaration, etc., as is implied by the mention of ‘hétusd@marthya’
(the potepcy of the’causal agency). But as for the Rejections that have
been enumerated above—viz.: those of the false means of knowledge by the
true one, of the necessary by the occasional, etc., etc.,—it has been
declared that ‘ it is the accomplished that ४5 rejected.’

Question: “ How is that?” This question emanates from one who
has been bewildered by the said dissimilarity from Direct Declaration
etc,

Answer: Because of the existence of the common cause. This fact, of the
commonality of cause being the reason for believing the rejection to be
one of something that has been accomplished, has been explained above,
17 connection with the words ‘Brahmana’ and ‘ Prakrtivat.’

It has been argued that “ there can be no rejection of that cognition
" which has been accomplished, because no non-appearance, destruction, or
“cessation of residual effects is possible for such a cognition.” And inreply
to this it is pointed out that we do not mean that the cognition is wholly
Set aside; all that we mean is that it is superseded by another cognition,
which is to the effect that the previous cognition was a mistaken one, That
18 to say, what happens in such cases, is that on finding a subsequent scrip-
tural text to be otherwise inexplicable (i.e. irreconcilable with the cognition
’ccomplished), one comes to the conclusion that this cognition that he
had obtained had been a mistaken one, brought about on account of his

1222 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, III—=PADA III--ADHI. (7).

intellect having been led away by a false similarity,—just as in the cage
of the mirage etc. Consequently, when we come to the case of the
Praydjas and the Mathara-Brahmana, though we may have the ideas of
the kuga and Kaundinya respectively appearing, yet they are believed to
be mistaken ; and from this 1४ is concluded that on account of the cogni.
tion being devoid of its legitimate result (in the shape of the carrying of
it into practice), it 18 the cognzzed idea, or text, that is rejected in all such
Canes.

Question: ^" What, then, 18 the form of ‘true knowledge’? That is to
‘‘say, if the cognitions that actually appear come to be set aside in the
५ manner shown above, then, how could we have confidence in any cogni-
“ tion at all P”’

Reply: When we find that however much we may look for it, we do
not perceive any cognition setting aside the cognition that we have
obtained (then we conclude that that cognition is atrue one). Though, on
a former occasion (in the Clokavdrtika) we have spoken of the ‘recog-
nition of discrepancies in the source of the cognition,’ as the second reason
for the falsity of that cognition,—yet that was with reference to ordinary
human assertions; and hence, not pertaining to Vedic sentences; this
fact has been brought out on the present occasion.

Having thus dealt with the side question, the Bhashya sums up the
Adhtkarana, and proceeds with the next. :

ADHIKARANA (8).
[The ‘Twelve Upasads’ pertain to the Ahina.}

Sutra (15): “Onaccount of the Context, the word ‘ ahina’ should
“be taken in a sense indicated by the presence of a certain
“ qualification.”

Question: ^ Ail that had been laid down at the beginning of the
“ Adhydya as ita subject-matter, having been fully dealt with, what more
“of it is left to be treated of, that the fourth Adhyd@ya is not now taken up
“ forthwith ? ”

Answér: We now proceed to consider in what specific cases we have
the conflict of Direct Declaration and the rest, that have been duly differ-
entiated and explained in the foregoing Adhikarana.

And first of all we are going to deal with the cases of the conflict
and non-conflict of Context by Direct Declaration, Indicative Power and
Syntactical Connection.

In the context of the Jyotishtoma we find the sentence—‘ There are `
to be three upasads for the Sahna and twelve for the Ahina.’ And in this
the word ‘ sdihna,’ meaning ‘that which is finished in a day,’ refers to the
J/yotishtoma, with regard to which we have the declaration—‘ They finish
it within a day’; consequently it follows that the Jyvtishtoma has three
upasads, Then as regards the clause ‘twelve for the Ahina,’ there arises
the question as to whether ‘twelve upasads’ also belong to the Jyotish-
toma, or only to the Ahina sacrifices, the Dv@dagiha (Twelve-Day sacrifice)
and the rest ?

If the name ‘ Ahina’ could, in some way or other, be found to he
applicable to the Jyvtishtoma, then, in view of the compatibility of the
Context, the ‘ twelve upasads’ would certainly be taken as finding a place
in that sacrifice. If, on the other hand, the name ‘ Ahina’ belonged to
those sacrifices that extend over a number of days, then, inasmuch as the
‘ twelve upasads’ would be connected with the Direct Declaration
(“twelve upasads for the Ahina’), they could not be taken up by the
Context, which takes up only that which is not related to Direct Declara-
tion (Vide Satra III—iii—11), [and consequently the ‘twelve upasads’
would belong to those sacrifices that last for many days, and not to the
one-day Jyotishtoma]; and thus the sentence in question presents a case of
the conflict between Direct Declaration and Context. |

And on the above question, we have the following

1224 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I1I—PADA पा -- एषा, (8).

PURVAPAKSHA.,

“The continuity of the Siddhdnta having been broken by the word
५४ 1९0 ' (in the अव), we declare that, from the Context it is clear that the
“ ‘twelve upasads’ belong to the Jyotishtoma. Nor does this involve a
५५ contradiction of Direct Declaration; because the same Context shows that
“the name ‘ Ahina’ applies to the Jyotishtoma (and not to any other sacri-
“ fices), [and as such, the Direct Declaration also lends its support to the
८५ gonnection of the ‘twelve upasads,’ with the Jyotishtoma]. And further,
“the word ‘ Ahina,’ by itself also, when taken as a negative compound, is
“found to be literally applicable to the Jyotishtoma. [‘ Ahina’=that
‘which is not devoid of any accessories, or that which is not totally
“neglected by any sacrifice; and these two qualifications reside in the
५८ Jyotishtoma only. |

“Though in reality, the word ‘ Ahina=ahan + kha=group of sacrifices
५ —and as such it denotes the sacrifices extending over a number of days,—
“ vet, in order to reconcile it with the Context, we should take it as synony-
“mous with‘ Jyotishtoma,’ on the ground of this latter having the quali-
८ ficatiofi of ‘ahdanz’ (non-deficiency and non-abandonment). That is to
“say, inasmuch as the Jyotvshtoma has all its details minutely laid down,
“and it serves as the archetype of all sacrifices, ४ ४5 in no way deficient (na
“hiyaté); nor ४5 ४८ abandoned (na hiyaté) by any sacrifice (i.e, there is no
“sacrifice of which it does not serve as the archetype).

“The Bhashya has explained the word ‘ahina,’ (in its application to
“the Jyotishtoma) as ‘that which 18 not liable to any retrenchment (nu—
“hiyaté) as regards either the sacrificial gifts, or the accessory details of
‘the sacrifice.’

“ But this 18 not quite relevant; because the word does not contain
“anything to denote the ‘sacrificial gift’ or the ‘accessory details’; and
“if we were to interpret a word just as we wished (without any considera-
“tion of what it actually denotes), then, there would be no fixity as to the
‘‘denotations of a word. Even granting, for the sake of argument, that
“the word really denotes what the Bhashya has said,—we find that as 8
“matter of fact, the ‘ gifts’ given at the Jyotishtoma are very much less
(‘hind’) than those given at several other sacrifices, where gifts are com-
“puted by the thousand; and also that the procedure of the Jyotishtoma
“igs much inferior (‘hina’), in the point of ‘accessory details,’ to the Pro-
‘cedures of its modifications, the Ukhihya and the rest (and as such the
“word ‘ Ahina’ in the sense given to it by the Bhashya, could not apply
“to the Jyotishtoma )

_ “For these reasons we conclude that the name ‘ahina’ signifies ‘that
“which does not abandon (na jahdat:) any sacrifice, in supplying the details
‘of the performance’ gnd ‘that which is not abandoned (na hiyat8) by any

TWELVE UPASADS PERTAIN TO AHINA. 1225

„ 88011806 (for all of which it serves as the original fountain-head ) ’ ;—
“and inasmuch as it 18 the Jyotishfoma alone that is possessed of these
* qualifications (and fulfils these conditions), and as the Context too be-
“longs to the Jyotishfoma, it must be this to which the ‘twelve upasads’
“belong. a

“The word ‘gaunah’ in the siitra must be taken as signifying ‘ that
“ pointed out by the qualification,’ and not in the ordinary sense of the
“indirect, secondary signification.”

a SIDDHANTA.
‘S@tra (16): Inasmuch as the principal (Jyotishtoma) is not
connected (with ‘ Aferna’),.it should be disjoined from that.

By the word ‘mukhya’ (‘Principal’) in the आत is meant the Jyotish-
‘oma, because 1४ 18 the first to be performed; and, as a matter of fact,
this has no connection whatsoever with the word ‘Ahina.’ And inas-
much as the Jyotishtoma has no connection with this name, the number
(‘Twelve’) that is found mentioned in connection with that name could
not be taken as belonging to that sacrifice, merely because of the Context ;
consequently it must be taken (and used) apart from that. Specially
as we find that the number ‘Twelve’ is connected with the Ahine, by
‘means of the Direct, Declaration of the genitive (in ‘ahinasyu’); and as
for the word ‘ahina’ what it literally signifies is a number of days, while
the Jyotishtoma is a distinct Sahna,—being finished in a single day.

It has been argued above that the word ‘ahina’ would apply to the
Jyotishtoma, through the presence of certain qualifications in that sacrifice ;
and we now proceed to refute every alternative that is possible, in connec-
tion with this theory.

(1) If the word ‘gauna’ be taken in the sense of tndirect secondary
synification, then that could not justify the abandoning of the direct
signification, on the mere strength of the Context. Nor does the sentence
in question serve the purposes of an Arthavdda, in which case even the
one-day sacrifice could be taken as being eulogised by being indirectly `
spoken of as one extending over many days. Then again, asa matter of
fact, it is not that there is no other word applicable (more directly) to the
१४०४१०1० ; and as such we could not be justified in taking all this
trouble of interpreting the word indirectly, and thereby making it appli-
cable to that sacrifice,—in the same way a8 the word ‘simhu’ is made to
indicate the presence of the qualities of the lion. Consequently the
taking of the word in its indirect secondary sense is not admissible.

(2) Nor can the word be rightly made literally applicable to the
Jyotishtoma, by being explained as a negative compound. Because any

164 | | #

1226 VANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, 1I—PADA. 1H—ADHI. (8),

such literal application is set aside by the meaning known to be conveyed
by the word as.a whole. Then again, as a matter of fact, we do not find
the word bearing the marks of a negative compound ; because a negative
compound having the accent of the indeclinable, it is the first word, ox
the basic word, that should have had the uddtta (Acute) accent in its
beginning; while, in reality, we find that it has the acute accent at the
middle. For this reason it must be admitted that the word is made up of
the word ‘ahan’ (=Day) with the affix ‘kha.’ In that-case, in accordance
with the Vartika,—‘ dyanniidishu upadépivadvacanam svarasiddhyartham,
we have the insertion of the particle ‘ina’; and thereby the letter ‘j’
forming the beginning of the affix, it is only right that the accute-accent
should be on that letter

For these reasons, the word ‘ Ahina’ must be taken as the name of
those sacrifices that extend over a number of days

Then again, inasmuch as the connection of the Jyotishtoma with the
‘twelve upasads’ would have been signified by the use of the word ‘ s@hna’
only, without using another name (‘ahina’) of the same sacrifice,—the
very fact of the putting in of the word ‘ahina’ shows that the scripture
meant, by this, to signify something other than the ‘one-day’ Jyatishtoma.
Or again, inasmuch as the connection of ‘ three’ and that of the ‘s@hna’
and ‘twelve’ would have been indicated by the Context itself (which is
that of the Jyotishtoma), the use of both the words sdhna’ and ‘ahina’
would be absolutely purposeless, Whereas if the word ‘ahina’ meant some
other sacrifice, it would be absolutely necessary to insert it, And then
inasmuch as the close proximity of the mention of ‘three upasads’ to the
word ‘ Ahinasya’ might indicate the connection of these latter with the
Ahina, 1 would be necessary to specify the ‘s@hua’ also (as the one
connected with ‘three upasads')

Thus then, it must be admitted that the ‘twelve upasads’ has to 16
taken apart (from the Jyotishtoma—which is indicated by the Context ॥
the sacrifice connected with them)

The above representation of the Adhikarana is not quite correct
Hirstly ,because it is scarcely right for the details of one sacrifice ( the Ahine )
to be laid down in the Context of another ‘the Jyotishtoma); secondly, in
case such details were laid down, the continuity of the Context would be
broken by that interpolation of foreign matter; and then it would in
volve a deal of trouble to take up the chain of the Context over again ;
-and thirdly, we find that the ‘twelve spusids * for the Twelve-Duy sacrifice
have already been enjoined in the Context of this latter sacrifice,—and

_ TWELVE UPASADS PERTAIN TO ABTNA. 1227

as all the sacrifices extending over a number of days have their origin in
this Twelve-Day sacrifice, the said injunction in the Context of this
latter would be enough to connect the ‘‘I'welve upasads’ with all such
sacrifices. Consequently, the sentence in question must be taken wholly
as cgntaining the injunction of the ‘three upasads’ alone; specially as
there are no objections against this. Then, as for the connection of
Twelve,’ that has been enjoined already in another. sentence; and hence
its mention in the sentence in question must be taken as meant to be in
praise of the propriety of the number of upasads at the Jyotishtoma,—-
just as in the case of the "दध (the sense of the sentence being that
‘the Jyotishtoma has only three.wpusads, and as for twelve upasads these
belong to such petty sacrifices as the Ahina and the rest, and not to the
excellent /yotishfoma sacrifice ’). |

Now then, we proceed to show the-way in which the Adhikaranu
should be represented.

` If the character of ‘Ahina’ had belonged to the Jyotcshtoma, then,
the sentence in question would have been an Injunction; but inas-
much as that character belongs to the sacrifices extending over a number
of days, for which, again, the ‘twelve upasads’ have been already laid
down elsewhere,—the sentence in question cannot but be taken as meant
to eulogise (the Jyotishtoma as shown above).

Thus then, the question of the Adhskarana comes to be this: Is
the Jyotishtoma the Ahina, for which the sentence, occurring in its Con-
text, lays down sn accessory detail? Or the word ‘ Ahina’ applies
to the sacrifices extending over a number of days,—and inasmuch as the
‘twelve wpasads’ for it have becn laid down elsewhere, their mention in
the sentence in question is meant to serve some, other purpose (that of
enlogising f.i,) ? |

Objection: “If such be the case, then the ddhikaranu would not be
a discussion of the conflict and non-conflict of Context (with Direct
“ Declaration) ; because it would come to this, that though connected
“with the Ahina sacrifices the ‘twelve npasads’ would be mentioned
“ with a view to eulogise the Jyot’shtoma.” |

Reply: ‘That does not quite affect the case. Because as a matter of
fact, the Parvapuksha (B) would favour the Context; inasmuch as the
Context: would take . up the number ‘twelve’ as enjoined (in connection
with the subject of the Context, the Jyotishtoma) ; while the Siddhanta
(B) does not favour the Context; as in accordance with this view the
‘twelve’ belongs to the sacrifices extending over many days, which
has nothing to do with the Context; which latter therefore, in this case,
hecomes contradicted, And that this is still of ०86, in another way, in
the Context has got nothing to do with the main point at issue.

1228 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, II—PADA HImapitt. (8),

If however, in accordance with the law arrived at in the next
Adhikarana, we could admit of the Memoval (or taking apart, of the
‘twelve upasads’), and if while we had the Injunction in one Rescen-
sional text, we could justify, on the ground of its having no other use
the injunctive character of that contained in another Text,—then, in that
case, we could take the Adhikarana as presented in the Bhashya. =

In any case, it becomes fully established that the sentence ‘ drady-
caihinasya ' 18 to be taken apart from the Context, as it evidently pertains
to those sacrifices that extend over many days

ADHIKARANA (9).
[The Pratipats are to be taken apart, along with the Kuldya, etc. |

Sa@tra (17): That which is associated with singleness and
duality (should be taken apart); because it is directly
enjoined (elsewhere).

[In connection with the Jydtishfoma we find the sentence ‘ yxvdm hi
sthah svahkpat? 27 dva yoryagaminuyok pratipadan kuryat, &é asrqramin-
divah itt buhubhyo yajamanébhyah.’ -And in reference to this there arises
a doubt as to whether the two Pratépats herein laid down find place in
the Jyotishtoma, or they are to be taken apart from it and nsed in
connection respectively with the Kuldya performed by two yajgamdnas,
and with the Duirftra performed by more than two yajgumanes? |

The discussion of the present question is similar to that in the fore-
going Adhikaranu,—with the following difference: in the former the
connection was with a totally different Primary sacrifice denotable by a
word having no connection with that sacritice which formed the subject
of the Context; while in the present case, it is with a property, the
duality, etc. of the yagamdna, which 18, in some way or other, suspected
of being related to the subject of the Context.

The sétra begins the discussion with the putting forward of the
Siddhanta, in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in, the foregoing
Adhtkarana. |
SIDDHANTA.

The passage in question does uot lay down the Jnaltty and Plural-
ity of the yajaména ; because it is fully taken up with the enjoining of
the Pratiputs: and refers to the Duality, etc. only as conditions for the use
of the one or the other Pratipat; specially as the Injunction of many
things would involve a syntactical split. Then again, inasmuch is
they are not enjoined, the Duality and Plurality of the yajamana can not
pertain to the Jyotishtoma; while they are found to. exist in the Kulaya and
other sacrifices, —those extending over one as well as those extending over
many days,—wherein they are distinctly enjoined by such sentences 88---
“ Raja ca purohttagea yajeydtam,” “éténaiva dvaw yajayet,” “ éténaiva tyn
ydjayét,” “éko 2४८४ bahavo va ‘hinatrynjéran. '

1230 . . TaANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, I11—PADA-Ul—ADHI. (9)

For these reasons the Pratipats should be taken apart from the
Context

Siitra (18): Objection: “They might find place (in the

५ Jyotishtoma) as alternatives implied (fo7 a special pur

* pose)’

“The Pratipats must be taken as finding a place in the Jyotishtoma,
“as indicated. by the Conteat (in which they are found to be mentioned)
They are not in any way connected with any sacrifice other than that
‘which forms the subject of the Context,—as had been found to be the
‘ease with the Ahina. As for the connection of the Duality, etc. of the
"४ yajgamana, it ia mentioned merely as a condition (for the use of particn-
“lar Pratipats), and it has nothing to do with the indicating of the connec-
‘tion of certain accessories with their Primaries. Nor could these serve
‘‘ag the means of establishing the connection of any sacrifice ; as that
“would involve the necessity of the words being taken in their indirect
“secondary signitications; and as a matter of fact, those that have hai
“their use laid down by Direct Declaration, cannot rightly be brought
‘into another use, on the ground of an indirect secondary signification.
“Tf the connection meant were that with the mere form of the Duality,
“etc. then the Injunction itself would become wholly useless. And ther
“can be no doubt that the assumption of Context is far more reasonable
‘than that of the Result
“It has been argued that in the Context we do not find the conditions
“ (Duality, etc. laid down for the use of the Pratipats), But they could
‘he tuken as implied; for the conditions are not always directly enjoined ;

‘as it is just possible for them to be indirectly implied; and in the case’

“of the Jyotishtoma also we find that there is an implication of the pre-
sence of more than one yajandna, in case one is found to be incapable
of carrying it through. And up to this time we have had nothing to

“show that only one yajamdna is really meant for the Jyotish{oma;

“though in fact, even if due siguificance were attached to the singleness of

“the yajamdna,—yet, just as, in accordance with the Sutra VI—iii—2,

“certain accessory details of the Jyotishfoma are left off, in the case of
` ^ ४6 yajamana being found incapable of performing them all, so, in the
same manner, it may be that in the case of one yajamdna being found

# ।

‘incapable of finishing the sacrifice, two or more of them could very `

`^ reasonably be brought in to do it. And in this way, the,necessar)
` ¢ conditions would. be present in theJyotishtoma also. |

+ +. “Or again, it may be that the very injunction of the Pratipats
“(contained in the passage under consideration), being found to.serve 8

-PRATIPATS TAKEN WITH KULAYA. , 1948

^ visible purpose, would lead to the assumption of Direct Declarations
“laying down the fact of the Jyotishtoma being performed by two or more
५४ yagamanas. And this assumption would be possible only in accordance
“with oar theory, and-not with the theory upholding the use of other
०८ Pratipats, Consequently there is nothing in our theory that is incom-
५ patible with the mention of the singleness of the yajamdna (in connection
“with the Jyotishtoma).”

Sutra (19): Reply: Not so; because the original (Sacrifice of
the Oontext) is connected with one only.

The word ‘ Prakréi’ here 18 meant to signify the Sacrifice that forms the
subject of the Context ; and it might have been meant to indicate that, being
the object of direct Injunction, the singleness of the yajyamana in the
Jyotishtoma cannot be superseded ; though that which is indirectly implied
could be rejected, for special purposes. As a matter of fact, we know
that. the singleness of the yajamana is directly enjoined ; specially as we
find that whether the Jyotishfoma is laid down as to be performed with a
view to a certain desirable result, or as a necessary duty, the yujaméinu
is distinctly mentioned as one only, as is shown by the use of the word
‘yujéla,’ Nor do we find any reason for not attaching a significance to
the singular member of that verb; in fact we shall show later on, in
Adhyaya VI, that due significance is really meant to he attached to it.

The leaving off of certain accessories of the Jyotishtoma, on account of
the incapacity of the sacrificer to carry them all out entirely,—that has been
brought forward by the Pirvapakshi,—is also based upon.the declaration
‘the Sacrifice should be performed in such ४ way as one persom may
he able to perform it’; and in other cases also we find the word ‘one,
which shows that the leaving off allowable is meant to refer to other
nccessories (and not to the number of yajantiinas); as for instance, leaving
off the exact amount of the ‘ gift,’ the sacrifice can be fully accomplished
by one person. Then again, inasmuch as the number ‘one’ is found
both inthe originative injunction (of the Jyotishtoma), as well as in
that of its: actual performance, we cannot but attach due significance
to that number. Thus then, we conclude that inasmuch as the 01101.
nal sacrifice of the Jyotishtoma has only one yajaména, it does not fulfil
the conditions of the use of the particular Pratipats in question ; and hence
these latter must be taken apart from it

It has been argued that “the very passage under consideration
. would, by its capability, imply the nécessary conditions.” But this is not
possible ; because the passage is capable of being taken differently (and as
such there would be no Apparent Inconsistency to justify the implication)

1232 .- TANTRA‘VARTIKA. ADH, UI-—PADA IM—~ADHI, (9).

That is to say, if, without implying the said ` conditions, the passave
would have been meaningless, then it could be. taken as implying them ;
and this meaninglessness would have been possible, only if the Duality
and Plurality (of yajamanas) did not exist in any sacrifice, in the same
way that it does not exist in the Jyotishfoma; as a matter of fact, we
do not find these to be non-existent in other sacrifices; as they are’
actually found to exist in-the Kulfya and other sacrifices, And inas

much as in the passage in question, we find them laid down as well.
established conditions, and as they would otherwise lead to a syntactical
split, they cannot be indirectly implied (with regard to any sacrifice).

If the Duality of the yayamdna were meant to refer to the presence
of the wife of the yayaménu,—then, as her presence with her husband is
a necessary condition for all sacrifices, such Duality could not have becn
laid down as the condition for the use of a certain particular Pratipat only ;
and further, in the case of the word ‘ bahubhyah,’ inasmuch as 16 18 dis
tinctly found to denote the plurality of men, by making it include the
sacrificer’s wives, we would be assuming, without sufficient grounds, an
ékacésha compound made up of heterogeneons elements (one male and two
females). |

In the case of the sentence ‘kshawmé vasdnau, etc.’ (met with in
connection with the Aguyddhfina) we have had to accept the wife as the
second person, as there was no other way of taking it; specially as the
Adhaina is nowhere laid down as to be performed by two men, in the
way that we find the Dviyajiia (Kulaya) laid down

Then again, inasmuch as the sacrifice would always be performed
by the yajamédna accompanied by one or more wives, there would, according
to you, always be‘ two’ or ‘three’ ‘ yajamanas’, and thus all sacrifices
fulfilling the conditions laid down for the use of the Pratipats in ques-
tion, these would come to be used on all occasions; and the Pratipat that
is laid down as the unconditional invariable concomitant of the Jyotish-
toma would never be used, and wonld become wholly useless; or, at best
it would be taken as an optional alternative to those Pratzpats that are
laid down apart from the originative Injunction

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Pratvpats in question
are to be taken apart from the Context

1४ has been argued above that “the passage under question does
not lay down the connection (of Duality, etc.) with a Sacrifice.” But
that does not affect the case ; asthe very word ‘ Pratipat’ having indicated
the fact of its pertaining to sacrifices, all that the mention of ‘ Duality,’ etc :
does, is to indicate the particular sacrifice with which they are connected
Or again, the word ‘yayaméina ’ itself would, through Apparent Inconsis-
tency, indicate the sacrifice

PRATIPATS TAKEN WITH KULAYA. | 1233

Thus then the Pratipats being taken as connected with sacrifices
other than the Jyotishtoma, in whose Contest the passage in question
occurs,—this 15 a distinct case of the contradiction of Context; and as
Direct Declaration is much more authoritative than that (there can be no
incongruity in the Siddhanta).

ADHIKARANA (10).
[76 Jaghani is not taken apart from the Oonteat.

Siitra (20): “The Jaghani also (would be taken apart),
because it is a part.”

We now proceed to consider the exception to the principle of factors
being taken apart from their context ॥

In connection with the Duarca-Pirnamdsa, we find the sentence
‘Jaghanya patnih suiyajayanti’; and as this admits of two distinct con-
structions, bearing upon the comparative predominance and subservient
character of the two factors (in the sentence),—there arises a donbt as to
its actual meaning. That is to say, (1) if the sentence be taken as
laying down the Patnisumyfjas as purificatory rites for the purification
of the Jdghani (the animal’s tail), then, inasmuch as the object of
purification would be the predominant factor, it could not be removed
from its place; and consequently, the Patnisamyagus would be taken to -
where the 112८ might be, and not vice versd. And masgmuch as the
ordinary animal’s Zuzl would be of no use in a sacrifice, it 18 not this that
forms the object of purification (by means of the Patnisumyayjas) ; conse-
quently the Yaz of the animal that has served its purpose in connec-
tion with the Agnishomiya would come to be taken as that to be purified
(by the Patnisamyajas) [and thus, in this case, there would be a removal
of the Tail from all connection with the Darca-Piirnamisa}. (2) If, on
the other hand, the sentenee be taken as Jaying down the Zaz! (with refer-
ehce to the Painisamyajas), then, in that case, inasmuch as the idea of.
the sentence being a reference to the subject of the Context does not
entirely disappear, the injunction of the Tail comes to belong to the-
Dargu-Pirnamasa [and thus there is, in this cage, no removal of the Tuil
from the Context}

On this question, then, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

` “(1) Because the Tail helps the Darga-Piirnamasa indirectly ;—(2)
“because that which helps directly in the body of ‘the sacrifice is the

JAGHANT NOT APART FROM CONTEXT | 1235

< more important ;-(8) because the other (1.6, the Putnisamyaja) being
‘‘ enjoined by means of the verbal root (in ‘ samyajuyét') is more approx-
“imate to the Injunction ;—(4) because, inasmuch as any single part of
‘an animal (the Tail) could not justify the employment of the whole
५५ animal, it would be necessary to take it ont of the animal that has been
५५ 1360 elsewhere, and hence in that case the Samytja would come to
‘have the character of a Pratipattisamskdra (the setting aside of that
which has been used);—therefore the sentence in question must be
‘tuken as laying down the purification of the Tuil of the animal used
in connection with the Aguishomiya ; and hence it must be taken apart
“ from the Context (of the Darga-Pirnumisa )
(‘‘ Says the Bhashya—in reply to the objection that ‘the Patni-
“ samyajas have already been enjouned elsewhere’—: It is true that they
‘are enporned elsewhere, but here they are again enjoined with reference tu
the Tatil. the sense being that the Tact should be made connected with the
५ Patnisamyfjas (si ca tatsambaddha karyétyucyaté)}, And in this last
“sentence, the word ‘ ucyaté’ must be taken along with the preceding
“sentence (as shown above); and then follows (in the Bhashya) a des-
‘“cription of the action: such being the case, the Putnisamydjas of the
* Darga-Pirnamdsa do not lose anything by being disjoined from the Tail,
“ete, If on the other hand, the word ‘ weyaté’ were taken with what
follows it—ax ‘aeyalé évam sati, etc.—then the sentence would fall
^" 1110 the semblance of an objection; which would not be desirable ;
“ specially as we do not find any sentence (in the Bhashya) that could be
“taken as supplying an answer to that objection. Therefore the whole
‘sentence must be taken as the statement of the Author’s own view (and
“not that of the opponent).
“ Objection: ‘If what you say be correct, then, there being a
* Removal (of the Patnisamya@jas), exactly like that of the Pratipats
“(shown above),—there would be no performance of the Patnisamydjas
“iv connection with the original sacrifice (of the Darga-Pirnamiasa). |
“ Heply: There might be no performance of these, if there were no
"^ Patnisamydjas in connection with the Puagu sacrifice; as a matter of
" fact, the existence of these in this latter is quite patent, by reason of
“being implied; aud what the sentence in question does is simply to lay
‘ these down as connected with the Tail.
‘ Objection: ‘In that case you must declare that there is no Remo-
‘val (of the Tail from the Context).’

“Reply: Trae; there is no Removal of anything substantial; but
it 18 the sentence in question that, being found to serve a useful purpose
In connection with the modificatory sacrifices, is spoken of as ‘rcmoved

` ण ‘taken apart from the Oontext.”

1236 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 1 --९4)+ tt—apnar. (10).

SIDDHANT

Stitra (21): It is the injunction (of the Tail), because it is
something new

As amatter of fact, the Injunction in question is not taken apart from
the Context ; because if the ‘ail were referred to as something to 7५
purified (by means of the Patnisamydjas), then that would have heen
the cause of the Injunction being taken apart; as a matter of fact,
however, we find that the Tail is enjoined as an accessory of the Saeri-
fice, exactly like the other accessories, in the shape of Butter and the |
like.

That is to say, it has been declared above that in all such sentences,
the force of the Iujunctive applies to the subordinate factor. Then, as
for the Painisamydjas, these have been enjoined in a sentence immediately
preceding the one under consideration ; and as such being still present in
the mind as enjoined actions (at the time that we come across the sentence
under consideration), they cannot be taken as the objects of injunction
(by this latter sentence). Nor can the sentence in question be rightly
taken as merely referring to the Patnisamyfqas of the Pagu-sacrifice ;
because at the time of its. appearance, there is no idea of the Pagu-sacri-
fice. Nor is the Tail wholly incapable of being enjoined, like the Time
etc.,, whereby it vould carry any Injunctions along with itself. Nor
can it be urged that it could be so, on the ground of its being an object
of purification, Because there is no ground for superseding the fact of
its being an accessory (to the sacrifice ), as expressed by the Instrumental
ending (in ‘ Jdghanya)

If the Injunction under consideration were to operate with reference
to that Zail which has served its purpose elsewhere,—then, in that case,
it. might be possible to take the Instrumental as having the sense of the
Accusative ; just as we have in the case of the accessories of the Prayaja.
As a matter of fact, the Tuil that is laid down is something quite new,
not made use of on any previous occasion. Consequently 1४ 18 wholly

incapable of being taken apart
| Nor can the Patnisumydjas bear being taken apart, as they are
hound up with the Context

It may be argued that “they would be taken apart, on account of
, the superior authority of Syntactical Connectiou.” But that too is nob
possible; because in. such cases, Syntactical Connection is dependent
upon the fact of the object in question having some claim for being taken
as desired; and as such, in such cases, it is much weaker than the Con-
text. If the sentence in question were the originative Injunction of the

JAGUANT NOT APART FROM CONTEXT. 1237

Patnisamydjas, then alone could the Syntactical Connection have wrested
them away from the Context. As a matter of fact, however, these Paini-
camyajas have their originative Injunction in another sentence; and
hence by the time that they are taken up, through proximity, by the
ayntactical connection of the sentence under consideration,—they could
+[80 be taken up by the Darga-Pirnamisa, Nor have we, up to this
time, come to know the Turzt.as leading to any independent result of its
own,—whereby it could supply the requirement of the Patnisamydjas
as regards the purpose to be served by them. Consequently, while we
are looking out for the purpose to be served by the Tal, it is taken up
08 an accessory, forming part of the Procedure of the Durga- Pitrnamasa,
which are known to lead to distinct results.

Nor does the sentence in question contain the Tojauction of any
new sacrifice; asitis not found to mention the root ‘ yaj7’ only; what
it'mentions is the ‘ ya@ja’ in conjunction with ‘ Patni.’ Consequently if
it were taken as laying down the Action with reference to the Tazl,—.
and at the same time laying down the Patnis ( wives) (as the Deity of
that Action),—then it would come to be the injunction of many things,
and as such involve the syntactical split in the form of ‘ Dismmilanity ’
pointed out in the Sa#tra [—iv—8. And so long as the sentence 18 capable
of being taken as the injunction of simpler things, the syntactical split
could not he explaited by taking the sentence as the injunction of the
achon as qualified (by the Deity, ete. etc.). Consequeutly, it must be
concluded that the sentence lnys down a Substance (Tail) with reference
to w qualified sacrifice (the Patnisamydja ).

Objection: “ Bat this too, being a reference to the qualhfied sacri-
fice, would involve a syntactical split.”

Reply: That does not matter; as the yualified Sucrifice is indicated,
५३ such, by the Context, the word ‘ Patn2’ not being meant to be spect-
ally significant. Just as in the case of the sentence ‘abhikrfman juhoti ’
even though the word used is the generic term ‘juhoté’ (meaning sacri-
fice in general), yet through capability (of Context), the Abhrkramana
is taken as pertaining to the pariticnlar sacrifice of the Prayiajus,—so,
in the same manner, the Patnisamyajas ave to be taken as meant by the
generic term ‘ samydjayants.’

For these reasons, we conclude that the Tud/ is not taken apart
from the Context.

Sittra (22): Objection: ‘But the Tail is a part.”

“It has been argued in the Pérvapuksha that, inasmuch aa the
“ Tail is a part of the animal,—and as the originative injunction speaks

1238 WANTRACVERTIKA.. ADH: Tt—PADA तरा, (10).

५ of it as related to something already existing, —it could not be utilized,
“ote, etc.” And to this argament the Saira offers the following reply :

Siitra (23): Not 80; because the original (Dar¢-Pirnamasa.
Jaghani, Tail) is obtained by non-scriptural means. `

Under the circumstanees, that alone wonld have been useless which.
without taking up the original, could not be recognized; eg. in the
case of the sentence ‘uttardrdhat svishtakrté’ vadyaty’ (in this what is
to be offered is not recognizable without a reference to the original
Cake). The word ‘Jaghani’ however is, like the word ‘ I[rdaya’ aud
the like. deuotalive of a certain limb of the aniinal; and as such, it could
be very easily obtamed, withont getting hold of the whole animal for
the purpose, or even out of the animal that has been used for another
purpose; specially as in the १४८१४ ‘Ripam vt céshabhittatvat’ it is
shown that an acecssory could be used, by whatever method it may be
‘prodaced or obtamed, Nor 18 11 1mpossible for the ` Jayhuni’ to be known
apart from the rest of the body; for we actually tind meat-vendors
selling the bodies of animals, limb by limb; and certainly the ‘ Jayhani’
(Tail) could be obtained, by purchase, from these vendors. Nor again is
it necessary that it should he obtained from the goal; as all that is laid
down in the text 1s only the particular limb, ‘Tail.’ In fact, in the
Aynishomiya also, it is qnite possible for the ‘Heart’ etc, to be obtained
by purchase or other ordinary means; though it is so, yet, in the case of
these, as we tind their particular ‘class ’ and method of obtaining distinet-
ly specified as ‘by lalling ' and all the rest,—we do not have recourse to
purchase, or other ordinary means, for obtaining these. But in the
case of the Tait we have no sach means specified in tho scriptures.

The word ‘ Prakrti’ is meant to give an idea of the Darga-Pirnu-
MLAS(L,

Thus then, it becomes established that the Jayhani (Vail) is an
accessory in the Putnisumydjus performed along with the Darga-Pirau-
masa; and as such is to be used as an optional alternative for Butter.

ADHIKARANA (11).

[116 Jomning together of the slabs should find a place among the

Srmsthas.) |

Sitva (24): “The Joining Together should find a place in the
“original sacrifice, because, like Purchase, its usefulness
‘does not disappear.”

We now proceed to consider the cases of conflict and non-conflict
hetween Syntactical Connection and Context.

In connection with the Jyotéshtoma, we find two slabs of stone laid
(lywn, to serve as the receptacle upon which the Some should be pounded ;
und with reference to these stone-slabs, we have the declaration
‘ Dirghasomé-suntrdyad-dhrtyai,’—that is, ‘having separated the two slabs.
one should join them together, for the obtaining of Dhrtz. With refer-
ence to the word ‘ Dirghasoma’ in this sentence, there arises a doubt,
५५ to { च) whether it applies to the original sacrifice (the Jyotishtoma), as
indicated by the Context, (b) or it applies to such sacrifices us extend
over longer periods of time, and as such not being compatible with the
Context, has to be taken apart. On the point in question we can also take
the following alternatives, (a) the word applies to the Jyotishtoma itself,
(0) or to the Jyotishfoma ns performed by a tall (‘ Dirghu') yagamana
(८) orto the Ukthu and other samsthas or parts (of the Jyotish{toma), (d) o
to the Satru and Ahinu sacrifices (that extend over many days), (९) ग
to all sacrifices excepting the Aguishtamu (which is the first samsthd@ of
the Jyotishtoma

On this question, we have the following

PRELIMINARY PURVAPAKSHA.

* (1) Because the word ‘ Dirghasoma ' is applicable to the Jyotishtonia
a8 compared with such shorter sacrifices as the Ish{z, the Pagit sacrifice,
‘the Darvi-Homa and the like,—( 2) becnnse the purpose served by the
‘joining together,’ the strength of the pounding slab, is quite applicable
` to the Jyotishtoma,—(3) because the Injunction of ‘ not-joining together '
could be taken as an. optional alternative (to the ‘ joining together ’),.
just like the alternatives of ०7 and yava,—therefore, for the sake of

` the Context, the joining together’ should not be taken apart from it
‘The example of the optional alternative of the ‘ Purchase,’ १४

1240 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. HIi—-PADA ttl—abHt, (11), त
“similar to the ‘joining together’ in question, has been cited (in the
‘ Bhashya), from the standpoint of the Parvapaksha, irrespective of the
^ Siddhantu view that the two alternatives are to be taken conjointly
“ (nud not as optional alternatives) (and hence it should not be taken as
“involving a self-contradiction) ; nor is it necessary that all examples
“shonld always be out of the Sididhanta ; because. any example, from
^“ wheresoever obtained, is equally useful in supplying the necessary
"° information.

“ Or, the expression ‘like Purchase’ may be explained only as an
‘ instance of the nun-disuppearance of usefulness, brought forward without
“ any refereuce to the Injunction of ‘not-joining-together.’ | |

“In this case we would construe the S#tru (and the Bhashya) in the
“ following manner: The objection being—‘Inasimuch as the Jyotish-
“toma sacrifice takes very little time to finish, there would not be much
‘use in the said gotniny together of the pounding slabs being done in
“ connection with that sacvifice,’—-we have the reply —that does not much
affect the question, as the juinzny together will still have its use, ‘like the
“ Purchase,’ That is to say, the actual price of the Soma nut being very
‘mach, and its purchase having been accomplished by the payment of
‘Cany one of the prescribed articles—cloth and the rest—in exchange,
“one still gives to the owner all these articles, in keeping with the
(५ seriptural text laying down all these articles as to be given in exchange
‘for the Soma; and though the payment of these iatter is not neces-
“ sary, yet it is not altogether useless, serving the purpose of still further
“ winning the good graces of the owner; because it is well known that
^° the scriptures declare the fact of prosperity resulting from the pur-
“ chase of Somu, if effected to the entire satisfaction of its original owner.
‘“In the same manner, even though the wuzoined slabs would be quite
‘efficient for the pounding of the Soma for the Jyotishtoma, yet, inas-
^“ much 88 we are cognizant of the fact that the pounding done on the
“ strengthened 5८405 brings about prosperity, the ‘ joining together,’ done
‘in accordance with the sentence under consideration, would not be
^“ entirely useless (even in the Jyotishtuma).

^ For these reasons, we conclude that the ‘joining together’ is not
^" to be taken apart from the Context.”

PRELIMINARY SIDDHANTA.

Séiitva (25): It should be taken apart: because of the mention
of the speciality.

| On account of the Syntactial Connection of the ‘joining together’
with the ‘ Dirghasoma,’ the former must be taken apart from the Context.

SLAB-JOINING INCLUDED IN SAMSTHAS. 1241

Because, an object is known as ‘long’ (Dirgha) only when it is
compared with another thing of the same kind, which is shorter than
itaelf, Consequently, one Soma-sacrifice could be known as ‘Long,’ only
in comparison with another Soma-sacrifice; and it could not be spoken
of, in comparison with such sacrifices as the Ishfi, the Pagu, the Durvi-
homa and the like (which have no connection with Sona); because these
latter do not belong to the same class (as the Jyotishfoma and the other
Suma-sacrifices), and because they are not spoken of in the Context;
and it is only when the two relative members of the comparison are
mentioned that they are differentiated into the ‘Long’ and the ‘ Short.’
—and in the case in question we do not find the [shti, etc. mentioned,
in comparison with which the Jyotishtoma could be spoken of as
‘ Long.’

Objection: “ But the different Soma-sacrifices also are not men-
tioned,”

Reply: Though no Soma-sacrife is mentioned, yet in the first
place, the ground of comparison lies in the fact of the members of the
comparison belonging to the same class; and secondly, because of the
peculiar relationship, of the qualification and the qualified, signified by
the word ‘Dirgha-Soma,’ which denotes the fact of the sacrefice being
‘long’ while belonging to the class ‘Som., thereby serving to preclude
only such ‘short’ sacrifices as belong to the same class. And then,
when we come to consider which one of these Soma -sacrifices is the ‘long’
one, and in comparison with which it is ‘lo -g,’ —we find that the Jyotish-
foma 18 not ‘longer’ than any of them; and hence we come to take the
word ‘ Dirgha-soma’ 18 referring to sacrifices other than the Jyctishtoma.,
And inasmuch as these other sacrifices are the first to be recognized as
‘ Long,’ the Joyfishtoma comes to be recognized as the lower 0418 of the
COMPATISON,

Sttra (26): Objection: ‘The speciality could be taken as
pertaining to the performer as it is upon him that it

18. based.”

“So long as we could interpret the word ‘ Dirghasoma’ in keeping
“with the indications of the Context, it is not proper to entirely reject
“this Context. And asa matter of fact, we find that it can be taken as
“ pertaining to the Performer. Nor would that make any difference in
` the accent, as regards the compound ; because in any case we have the

acute accent upon the last syllable; consequently we must expound

ˆ the compound as the Genitive Tutpurusha (‘ Dirghasya’ purushasya
ce 6 Soma $ ) 99 र |
166

1242 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADM. Mi—PADA (1--4प्ता, (11).

Stttra (27): Reply: It must pertain to the sacrifice; as, other
wise, the two words could not have their own significations
[and the Arthavada would not be explicable.]

The epithet ‘Long’ must pertain to the Sacrifice (and not to the
Sacreficer) ; and the compound must be expounded as a Karmadharayn
(‘Dirghagcdsan somah’).

Question: ‘* What special reason have you got for taking the com-
pound thus ?”

Answer: The chief reason is that it is only when the compound 1
thus explained that we have the direct significations of the component
words ; otherwise (if the compound be taken as the Genttive T'atpurusha)
one of the words qualifies something wholly different (namely the Sacri-
ficer), and that would make the direct primary significations of the words
incompatible.

Thus then, when we come to think of the extremely large quantities
of Soma to be pounded, we come to desire much strength and durability
in the pounding slab; and in that case the mjunction contained in the
sentence in question (as explained by us) would be found to serve a vis-
ible purpose (that of making the slab strong by‘ joming together’ the
two slabs). Otherwise there would be no cause for desiring any extra
durability in the slab, and consequently, the Injunction would not serve
any useful purpose.

So also, the Arthuvada contained in the word ‘ Dhrtyac’ points to
the propriety of our interpretation of the compound.

Thus then, it is only with regard to a case where we have doubts
about the durability of the pounding slab, and fear its beimg broken
asunder under the heavy pounding, that we can have the injunction in
question (of carefully ‘joining together ’ the two slabs), Otherwise the
mere qualification of the sacrifice by specifying the Performer as ‘dirgha,
1.6, tall, could only serve some purpose uot perceptible to us; because,
whether the Performer is tall or short, there is no perceptible difference
in the form of the sacrifice itself.

Then again, the specification of the sacrifice, through the Performer,
would be extrancous to it, while that by itself would be more intimately
related to it.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the ‘joining together `
should be taken apart from the Jyotishtoma itself.

SLAB-JOINING INCLUDED IN SAMSTHAS. 1243

Stitra (28): “In the case of (the word ‘Dirghasoma’ applying

to) the Samsthas also, the mention of ‘Dhrtyai’ would be as

inexplicable as in that of (the epithet ‘Dirgha’ belong-
ing to) the Performer.’

This Siitra must be taken as urged by the opponent in reply to the
following argument of the Siddhdnia: 1t is possible that the ‘joining
toyether’ may not find a place in the first Samstha—the Agnishtoma—of
the Jyotishtoma; bat it could pertain to the other samsthis—tho Ukthya
and the rest,;—which are ‘longer’ than the Aguishtoma, and by connecting
with which, we keep our interpretation in keeping with the Context,
Yonsequently, we must take the ‘ joining together’ as finding a place in all
the three samsthds; specially as the fact of the samsthds belonging to the
same Context as the Jyotishtomu has yet to be refuted by the Samsthadhi-
karana (111—vi—4l et seg.). Or, even if there be a distinct Context of
the samsthads,—then too, it would be only in those accessory details that
are of use in the Aguishtoma, wherein the ‘joining together’ could be
precluded, on account of the contradiction involved in the mixture of the
necessary and the unnecessary qualifications. Consequently we must
admit that the ‘joing together’ should have a place in the second and
subsequent Samsthdas (sections) of the Jyotishtoma.

As against these arguments we have the above र्ठ, which formu-

lates the following |
FINAL PURVAPAKSHA.

‘“Tnasmuch as the quantity of soma usedin every one of the suns-
"" thas is the same (as in the Agnishfoma), the work of the pounding too
“in every one of these would be exactly similar; and hence the eulogy
“*dhrtyat’ (= fur the sake of making it strong and durable) would be as
“ useless in this interpretation, as in that in which the Perfomer (is held
“ to be qualified by the epithet ' Dirgha’).

“ That is to say, though the subsequent samsthas take a longer time
“in performance (than the first samsthi), yet in every one of these, the
“ quantity of soma pounded is only ‘ten-handfuls,’ as per injunction
“ “daca mushtirmimité’ which is applied, by implication, to every one of
“the samsthds of the Jyotishtoma, Thus then, the strength and dara-
" bility required (in the pounding slab) being the same in all cases, the
“absence of perceptible use and the Arthavdda (in ‘dhrtydi’) remain as
“imexplicable as in the former case.

“It might be argued that—‘the quantity of somu in these latter
“samsthas might undergo an increase, on account of the increase in the
“Humber of offerings, and also because of the vessel, taken up for the hold-
“ing of the soma-juice, not being small.’

1244 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. Il—PADA 1tf—abat. (11).

५ Bat this could not be; because we have the quantity of soma precise
“ly limited by the direct declaration that it should be ‘ten-handfuls of
“such pieces as have three joints’; consequently, if there be found to be
‘‘an increase in the number of the offerings to be made, the quantity of
“ the juice should be increased by the addition of water (and not by taking
‘more of the soma itself)

“Thus then the inexplicability of ‘ Dhrtyai’ being common in the
‘case of all sumsthds, the ‘joining together’ should be taken apart from
“the later samsthds also (and hence from the whole Context of the Jyotish
“* toma)

FINAL SIDDHANTA.

[9१.५८ (29): It should belong to the Ukthya and the rest ; because

the significations of the words are quite applicable to them. |

Kor reasons shown above, the‘ joining together’ should find a place in
the samsthas of the Ukihya and the rest. And as an increase in the num-
her of offerings would mean a corresponding increase in the quantity of
the substance to be offered, the Arthavada (containedin the word ‘ dhrtyai’)
would be- quite explicable in this case, As for the assertion, that ‘the
quantity of soma-juice would be increased by the addition of water,'-—it 18
not admissible; because masmuch as the sacrifice 18 laid down as to be
performed with the soma, no other substance could rightly be added to it:
without the authority of a direct scriptural declaration to the effect. Conse-
quently under such circumstances, it would be the quantity of the some
itself that should have to be increased. But then, this increase cannot be
either in the thickness of the bundles or in the number of joints (because
of these two being restricted to ‘ten-handfuls ’ and ‘ three joints ’ respective-
ly); consequently, the only way in which the quantity of soma-furce could
be lawfully mereased would be by getting hold of such pieces of the
plant as have their joints at longer intervals than is ordinarily the case;
and in this manner we would have increased the quantity, and yet kept
within bounds of the restrictions as to the measure of the soma, and also
preserved the compatibility of the Context and the word ‘ Dirghasoma’
because the ‘length’ of the pieces of the creeper would justify us in ९91]
ing the ‘soma’ itself ‘long

Stttra (30): Objection: The eulogy would be equally meaningless
in both cases.”}] [Reply:]

Stitra (31): It would be quite applicable (to the case of the
samsthas); because of (the restrictions) not being univer-
Sally applicable. =
Some people explain the word ‘anityutvat’ as referring to the fact of

the restrictions as to the quantity of soma not being always honoured im

_ SLAB*JOLNING INCLUDED IN SAMSTHAS. 1245

actnal performance;—the sense being that the quantity of soma could be
‘noveased in ways other than that shown above.

But this explanation cannot be admissible; becanse such increase
would be impossible in the case of such sacrifices as the Sutra and the
Ahina. Consequently the word ‘anttyaivait’ must be taken as referring to
the absence of .restrictions 10 regard to the exact quantity of soma to he
used in the 4014४04 laid down in tho sentence ‘ Avigishtanamgiinabhyit-
184.

Or the word may be taken as embodying the reply in accordance with
the Sumsthddhikarana (I11—vi—A4l et seq.),—to one who would bring for-
ward against the Siddhant: the fact of his theory involving a contradic-
tion of the Context ;—the sense of the reply being that the ‘ nitya’ (Jyo-
tishtoma) does not take in the Dirghasoma (on account of the sub-context of
the samsthas being distinct from that of the Jyotishtoma itself).

. In regard to the sentence ‘ értiyasavané amguréko grhyaté, there is a
difference of. opinion; as this ‘amcw’ (portion) has also got to be taken
out of the same soma. Consequently the only means that we could rea-
sonibly have for the increasing of the soma would be by taking such
pieces as have the joints at longer intervals. |

For this reason also, the ‘joining together’ shoald find place in
the later samsthds (of the Jyotishtoma).

Then again, the place of the ‘joining together’ should he restricted to
these samsthas alone, Because the word ‘ Dirghasoma’ applies to every one
of the Soma-sacrifices, except the Agnishtoma; aud also because like the
declaration ‘ ya @éna, etc,’ the word applies to the later samsthds (of the
Jyottshtoma) as well as to the other Soma-sacrifices.

That is to say, we find that in the sentence ‘ yu éléna anishted‘nyénn
yajéta’ (Sone who should perform another sacrifice without having previ-
onsly performed this Agnishtoma sacrifice’), the word ‘anyéna’ refers, not
only to the later samsthds of the Jyotishtoma, but to all sacrifices other than
the Aginshtoma; and in the same manner, the word ‘ Dirghasoma’ also
would apply to all sacrifices other than the Agnishtoma; and as such it
could not be restricted to the later samsthds alone, on the sole authority of
the Context; specially as these samsthas, being the Vikrtis of the Jyofish-
toma, could be completed by the help of the declaration ‘ Prakrtivadvikrtih
kartavya’; and &8 such having no requirements, they could not have a
Context of their own. And further, we find that the ‘ joining together ` is
hot enjoined, after the mention of any such accessory of the Original sacrifice
(Jyotishtoma) as has been taken up for the occasion; because it falls
within the details of the Jyotishtoma which is the first to be enjoined.

For ‘the following reason also, there can be no distinct Context
relating to the samethds: In all cases the Context ceases on being inter-

1246 TANTRA*VARTIKA. ADH. UI-—PADA HI—ADHEL (11).

rupted by something not connected with its subject; and hence when these
{samsthas) have been once interrupted by the details of the Jyotishtomu,
there is no idea of the continuous relationship of these (with the ‘ joining
together ’). |

That is to say, if the ‘jouning together’ were mentioned im the अप्र).
context (of the samsthds), after the Ukhtya and the other sumsthds had
been enjoined, tlen we could have admitted of the Context (relating to
these sansthfis). As a matter of fact, however, we find that, in accordance
with the Samsthadhikaranu (I1]—vi—A4l ef seq.), the continuity of the
80157005 is broken by the iutervening mention of such details of the
Jyotishtoma as do not pertain to the samsthds; and hence the ‘joining to-.
gether’ cannot be said to be included in the Procedure of the samsthas,
Consequently we have neither the authority of the Context, nor that of
Position or Order, for taking the ‘joining together’ with the samsthas:
and in fact, its connection with them is indicated by the Syntactcial Connec-
tion (of the sentence under consideration); and we find that this sentence
actually connects the ‘joining together’ as much with the samsthd@s as with
all sacrifices other than the Jyvtisfoma. Consequently it must be taken as
belonging to all the Somu-sacrifices (with the single exception of the
Agnishtoma).

ADHIKARANA (12),
{The prohibition of the Pravargy refers to the First Performance. |

Sitra (32): “The sentence mentioning the number would apply
to the whole sacrifice; because of the Context.”

The Pravurgya is mentioned without reference to any particular sacri-
fice, in the sentence ‘yat pravargyam pravrnjanti’; and it is only by the
syntactical connection of such sentences as ‘ purastadupasadam pravargyan-
caranti’ that it becomes connected with a sacrifice; and this Pravargya
betakes itself to the Jyotishtoma, in accordance with the Satra 1I1T—vi—2 ;
specially as it 18 only in connection with this latter sacrifice that. the Upu-
sads are laid down; and by the time that these would go over to the
vikrtis, on the strength of Inference, the Pravargya would also go to them.
It is for this reason that. the BhAshya has said —Jyotishtomé pravargyam
prakptya cruyaté (though in reality the Pravargya is not mentioned in the
Context of Jyotishtoma).

Or it may be that,—inasmuch as in the Kaushitaki-Brahmanu, it is
in the, Jyotishtoma-Context that we find the Pravarygya laid down, in ४
certain order of sequence,—the Bhashya-statement is based upon a refer-
ence to this fact.

In regard to this Pravargya, it is declared—‘na prathamé yajné
pravpngyat’ (‘one should not perform the Pravargya in the first sacrifice ’).

And with reference to this last sentence there arises a donbt as to
whether the expression ‘ First Sacrifice’ refers to the Jyotishtoma with all
its samsthds and all its various developments, or to only the first perform-
ance of that sacrifice.

And on this, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“(1) Because the expression is co-extensive with ‘sacrifice’; (2)
“because the word prathama (‘first’) is distinctly found to be synony-
“mous with the ‘ Jyotishtoma, as found in the sentence ‘ésha vava pra-
“thamd yajninam yajfyotishtomah’; (3) because the sentence ‘ya éena
^` anishtud, etc.’ shows that the Jyotishtoma is the sacrifice to be performed
“ before all other sacrifices, which shows that the word ‘ First’ applies to
“ that sacrifice; (4) and because of the indications by the Context (in which

1248 < | vanrra-vARTIKA, ADH. 1I—pApa 111—apHI. (12).

‘the sentence under consideration occurs),—[the expression ‘ Firgt Sacrj.
“ fice’ should be taken as referring to the whole of the Jyntushfoma’].

५५ Objection : ‘If we take the expression asreferring to the First p
‘formance of the Jyotishtoma. (viz. the Agnishtoma) only, that also would
“be quite in keeping with the Context.’

“ Reply: How could that be in keeping with the Context, when even
“though the Prohibition ‘of the Pravargya, like the prohibitions of the
“ Homa, Dana, Paka, etc., for the initiated person applies, through Context,
“to the whole of the Jyotishtoma,—yet, by syntactical connection, it is
“sought to be taken along with only one performance of 1४ (the First), aud
“the Context is left wholly inoperative :

“Then again, as a matter of fact, the fact of the prohibition in
‘‘ question applying to the whole Jyotishtoma is also indicated by Syntactical
“ Connection ; and then, if there were any sacrifice capable of being per-
“formed first (i.e. even before the Jyotishtoma),—then alone could the
^“ Prohibition not be taken as pertaining exclusively to the Jyotishtoma.
“As a matter of fact, however, there is no such other sacrifice ; conse-
“quently, the Syntactical Commection could not but be taken as referring
“to the Jyotishtoma, which is found to be the only sacrifice capable of
“first performance; and this not affecting the Context adversely, would
“it still involve its contradiction ¢

“For these reasons, for the sake of the Context also, it must be
“admitted that the sentence in question, containing the mention of the
“number ‘first,’ refers to the Jyotishtoma.”

SIDDHANTA.

Sutra (33): It (the ˆ First’) isconditionally relative, through
the connection of the Performer ; because the Indicative Power
(of the word) is actually determined by that.

li the word ‘ Prathama’ (‘First’) were a name of the Jyotishtoma it-
self, then what has been said in the Parvapeksha would be quite adinis-
sible. Asa matter of fact, however, it is.found to be expressive of the
Performance

(hat is to say, what the word ‘Prathama’ actually denotes is tha’
operation of the Performer which precedes all his other operations, and no!
any particular Action; and it is only by its connection with the said opera
tion that 1t comes to be applied to the Action also; but this too would
_be possible when the Action would be undergoing such an operation as
that pointed out. Specially as when one is found to be going on with the
second and subsequent performances (of the Jyotishtoma), he.is not spoken

PRAVARQYA PROHIBITED IN FIRST PERFORMANCE, 1449

of as ‘performing the first’; nor 18 one, who is not actually performing
+ sacrifice, called ‘the performer of the first sacrifice.’

Thus then, the word ‘ First’ having been shown to be denotative of the
firet operation, if it be applied, by indirect indication, to that which has
that (firstness) as its qualification (the Jyotishtoma sacrifice f. i.), then
that would involve a certain degree of remoteness (of the word) from its
objective ; and this remoteness can be admissible only in such cases where
no syntactical connection is found to be possible withont it ;~—e.g. in the
sentence ‘ 2570 viva prathamo yajnGnim, &e.’ In the case in question,
however, we do not find the character of ‘First’ incapable of being taken
as the ground of the Prohibition (of Prwvargya); consequently, it would
be only after having superseded this previous denotation of the word,
that we could apply it to the sacryfice ( Jyotishtoma), even in course of its
first. performance ; and under the circumstances, the chances of its being
applicable to the other performances (by the same sacrificer) would be
very much remoter indeed!

Objection: ‘In that case the “rst performance of any and every
“sacrifice would come to be the condition of the Prohibition in ques-
tion. ”

Reply: Such would have been the case, if the sentence in question
were an Injunction. As a mattor of fact, however, it 18 a Prohibition ;
and as such requires a declaration of the possibility of that which it
prohibits; and not finding any possibility of the performance of the
Pravargya, either in the ordinary actions of the world, or in the course
of such Vedic actions, as Study of the Vedas, Kindling of the Fire, Agni-
hotra, Darca-Piirnamdsa, and the like, —it naturally leaves these actions
alone, and betakes itself to the Soma-sacrifices, throngh the capability
(of these latter, of having the Pravargya performed in their wake), And
among these too, it is to the Jyotishfoma that it betakes itself, in accor-
dance with the law of the Andrabhyavdda; and of that again, only to
the very first performance, because of the word ‘ prathama.’

Consequently the relative term ‘ First’ must be taken as with refer-
ence to the second and subsequent performances of the same sacrifice
(the Jyotishtoma); as these would be most near the First Perfor-
mance, as well as of the same kind with it. Otherwise, if it were made
relative to other sacrifices further removed from the First Performance
(of the Jyotsshtoma), then that would involve a great remoteness of the
relationship

For these reasons, we must reject the Context, and taking our stand
upon Syntactical Connection, hold the Prohibition of the Pravargya to
apply to the First Performance only of the Jyotishtoma (i.e. only to the
Agnishtoma-portion of it) |

1250 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1([—PADA IN——aDHt. (12).

In the Taittiriya text, we find a further Injunction of the Pravargye,
in the sentence ‘ Agnishtomé pravrnakti.’ With regard to this there is a
diversity of opinion. |

(1) Some people declare thus: “If this further Injunction be taken
as referring to the Qecond and subsequent performances, then, inasmuch
as we have never found any Prohibition of the Pravargya with reference
to these performances (the aforesaid Prohibition distinctly referring to the
‘ First Performance’), the injunction of its performance in connection
with the other performances would be contained in the previous sentence,
‘yat pravaryayam pravrnjanti'; and the further Injunction would be a
useless repetition. Consequently it must be taken as referring to the
First Performance (of the Jyotishtoma); and thus the Prohibition under
question, being set aside by this subsequent Injunction, would find scope
for itself in the ‘first performance’ of another sacrifice (other than the
Agqnishtoma)

But this is not admissible; because the Agnishtoma exists as the sams-
tha (the first to be performed), in connection with other sacrifices also.
Nor 1s the epithet ‘first’ free to be applied to any sacrifice ; because we
have the Direct Declaration—‘ Ya éténa anishtva, etc.'—which restricts it
to the Jyotishtoma alone,—and the name ‘ Prathamayajnah’ (‘ First sacri-
fice’) means ‘that sacrifice which is the first to be performed,’ and as
such cannot apply to any sacrifice other than the Jyotishtoma.

(2) In view of this, some people offer the following explanation :
“The Prohibition applies to the ‘first performance’ of the Atiratra-sec-
tson of the Jyotishfoma, and the subsequent Injunction applies to the
Agnishtoma. Because the Atsrdtra also is laid down, as the ‘first to be
performed ` in certain cases, in the sentence ‘Tasmat prathamam yajamano
197८1870 yajéta.’ Thus then, we find that the Prohibition (referring, iv
general terms, to the First performance ') is common to both (the Atirdtra
and the Agishtoma), while the later Injunction applies particularly to
the Agnishtoma only; consequently in regard to this latter sacrifice, it is
the Injunction that is the more authoritative. "`

But even this explanation is not admissible; because, inasmuch as
the name ‘ Agnish{oma’ also is commonto many other performances and
sacrifices, the Injunction in question cannot but be regarded as common
to all these (and not particularly to the Agnishtomu of the Jyotish{oma).

(3) In view of all this, the third alternative proposed is the follow-
ing: The Prohibition of the Pravargya is always applicable to the ‘first
performance’ of the Atirftra, and being alternatively optional with regard
to the Agzzshtoma, in connection with this latter, it ig both prohibited and
९11} 099९५

_ Against this explanation, some people bring forward the following

PRAVARGYA PROHIBITED IN FIRST PERFORMANCE, 1251

objections : “ What is here said would have been quite possible, if the
‘sentence ‘na prathamayajné, etc.’ were a real Prohibition ; as 9 matter of
“fact, however, all such sentences are mere Paryud@sus (partial preclu-
€ sions), a8 will be shown, in Adhyaya X, under the sétra ‘apivad vakya-
4 géshah syat’ ; and we find that the sentence does not form part (syntacti-
‘‘cally) of the sentence dealing with the Agnishtoma. If the sense of the
“sentence be explained as that ‘the Pravargya is to be performed in that
^: Aynishtoma which ts not the first to be performed’ (the ‘na’ being taken
‘with ‘ prathamayayné,’ and not with ‘pravrnjanti’),—then, inasmuch as
“this performability will have been laid down in that general Injunction
“(‘yat pravargyam pravrnjant.’), its injunction in yet another sentence
“(* Agnishtomé pravrnakic’) would be altogether useless. Consequently,
“the sentence (‘na prathamayajné, etc.’) must be taken as connected with
“(and following in the wake of) the said general Injunction,—thereby mean-
“ing that ‘the pravargya that is performed should be in that which is iot-
५८ first’; and thereby the upshot of 1४ comes to be that the prohibition of
“the Pravargya applies to the Atzratra. Then again, one and the same
‘‘ sentence cannot be taken as connected with both the sentences (relating
“to the Aiirvatra and the Agnishtoma); as it has all its requirements
“fulfilled by the counection of a single sentence, ‘hus then, there being
“no exception to the Injunction of the Pravargya in connection with the
“ Agnishtoma, it should be performed, without fail, along with that sacri-
“fice (and not optionally as explained above).”

To these objections, the following reply is given: What is here de-
clared would have heen quite possible, if the sentence in question were a
Paryudaisa (partial preclusion) ; but as a matter of fact, if cannot be a.
Paryudasa ; as in that case, it could not be taken as connected (syntactically )
with another sentence; while such connection of it you have yourself
proved, with reference to the sentence mentioning the Agnishiomu; and as
regards the sentence mentioning the Afirdira, 1t would be connected with
this sentence also, if it were uttered at the time of the fulfilling of the re-
quirements of the Procedure of the Atirdtra; but this you have omitted
to mention. And asa matter of fact, the method of the mjunctions of al!
simsthas is similar; and we do not find any prohibition in the sub-con-
text,and the sentence cannot be taken as connected with the words
` Prakytivad vikrtih kartavyd’ as used with reference to the Atiratra, which
18 separated from it by the intervention of all the other sentences dealing
with the Jyotishtoma. Consequently, the sentence must be taken as a
Prohibition (and not as a Parynddsa), exactly like the sentence— the Pra-
y&jas are not performed along with the Pagu-sacrifice.’

Objection: “Even if it were a Prohibition, it could only be taken as
“applying to the original sacrifice (the Jyotishtoma).”

1252 | TANTRA-VARTIKA., ADH. I-—PADA HI——aDHI. (12).

Reply: Such would be the case, only if its application to the Modi
fications were not possible; as a matter of fact, inasmuch as such ap
plication depends solely upon the possibility of the performance, it occurs
in both (the original sacrifice as well as its modifications), irrespective of
the fact of its applying to the one by Direct Injunction, and to the
other by Indirect Implication; and in support of this we could bring
forward the contention contained in the Sara NI—vi—2

Objection: “ What you assert could be reasonable, only if it served
“the same purpose in connection with both (the Original and its Modifica.
‘‘ tion); 88 a matter of fact, however, it serves distinct purposes ; as with
“reference to the Original (Jyotishtoma) it is wholly optional; while with,
‘reference to the Aterdtra, the Prohibition is absolutely necessary.”

Reply: It is not so; as it will be shown under the sittra—‘ Prati-
2११८१ pradécé ° nirabhyavidhing ca praptapratishiddhatedd vikalpah syfit’
{(X—viii-—l). Then again, inasmuch as a Prohibition of that whose perfor-
mance 18 not possible without a scriptural Injunction, wonld not be possible,
without having presupposed the possibility of such performance,—the
Prohibition itself would necessitate the assumption of the said Injune-
tion. And if the existence of this latter be once accepted, then, inas-
much as both the Injunction and the Prohibition would be equally scrip-
tural, both would be equally authoritative; and consequently there would
always be an option with regard to the Aizratra. ‘Thus then, on account
of the fact of its being mentioned twice, and of the difference in the time
of the application of the Direct Declaration and the Indirect Implication,
tt would be by far the most reasonable to take the Prohibition as pertain-
ing to the Original sacrifice (the Jyotishtoma).

Objection: “Such being the case, inasmuch as the injunction (of
“the Pravargya) in connection with the original sacrifice would have
“been supplied by the sentence—‘ aynishtomé pravrnaakit’ —the former
“sentence (^ &‰ ५८ pravargyam pravynjanti.’) which does not occar in the con-
“text of any particular sacrifice, would be totally useless,”’

Reply: This objection does not hold; because while this latter sen-
tence (‘yat pravargyam, etc.’) would serve as the Originative Injunction
(of the Pravargya), the other sentence (‘ Agnishtomé pravrnakté ’) would
lay down its particular application (thus serving as its Viniyoguvidhe) ;
and thus there would be two distinct purposes served by the two sentences.
Or, the sentence ‘ yat pravargyam, etc.’ could 16 taken as serving the put
pose of laying down the Pravargya in connection with the sacrifices othe
than the Agnishtoma |
। Objection In that case, the sentence ‘yat pravargyam, etc.’ would
“tbe swallowed. up by the subsequent sentence (‘ Agnishtomé, etc.’)

Reply: Such swallowing or recapitulation would be hy no means pos-

PRAVARGYA PROHIBITED IN FIRST PERFORMANCE. 1253

sible. Because only that general assertion is swallowed up by the particular
one, which, by itself incapable of being directly connected with a sacrifice,
happens to be, somehow or other, connected with it indirectly,—e.g. the
namber ‘seventeen’. फ 11116 17 the case in question we find that the sen-
tence ‘ yat.pravargyam, ९८८.) by itself, is capable of being directly connected
with the sacrifice ; and as such, it does not deserve to be swallowed up. For
this reason too, 16 would appear to pertain to the modifications (of the
Jyotishtana), And in that case, the sentence ‘na prathamayajné’ could
very well be taken along with the sentence ‘yat pravargyam, etc.’ ; and
consequently, the non-performance of the Pravargya would be absolutely
necessary, jn connection with the first performance of the Atirdtra; while
in connection with the Agnishtoma, it would be its performance that would
he absolntely necessary ; as in regard to this latter, the Pruvargya forms
the object of the sole Injunction (‘ Agnishtomé, eic.’); specially as it has
already been shown that the Prohibitive sentence (‘na prathamayajne,
etc.) is not capable of being taken along with the sentence dealing
with the Aguishtoma (‘ Agnishtomé, etc. `}.

The following conclusious are what appear to be the ontcome of all
this discussion: The sentence ‘ yah pravargyam, etc.’ does not betake itself
to anywhere else except the original sacrifice. For if 16 did so, it would be-
tuke itself also to the Ishti, Pagubundha and the other wholly heterogeneous
sacrifices, which as a matter of fact 1t cannot do; as m that case the
restriction of its position, in the sentence ‘ purast@dupasadam’ (before the
\pasads), would not be compatible; consequently it could apply only to
that sacrifice where we could have the Upasads; so, on account of the
difference in the time of the possibility of its performance,—inasmuch
us we have the Upasads in the original (./yotishtoma) sacrifice,—the
Pruvurgya would apply to it, even without the further declaration (in the
sontence ‘ Agnishtomé, etc.’); and it does so all the more, because of this
niditional Direct declaration, And we have already shown under the
‘ Caturdha-karanddhikarana’ (I11—i-—23 et seq.), that there is a swallow-
1119 up of such sentences, even when their relationship to a generic factor
1s distinctly cognisable.

For these reasons, the two sentences being an Originative Injunction
and an Injunction of Application respectively, they cannot be taken as the
mere repetitions of each other

Such being the case, the sentences would be actually connected with
those sacrifices, in whose Context the Pravargyu will be fonud to be men-
tioned, . Thus then, if out of both the sentences (‘yah pravargyam, etc.’ and
‘ dgnishtoma, etc, ’) we could get the same sense that ‘the Pravaryya is to be
performed in the Agnishtoma,’—then these would be quite reconcilable
with the sentence''‘na prathamayajné, etc.,’ which latter would mean that

1254 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, II-—PADA 111--+0प्ना. (12),

‘the Pravargya is to be performed in that Agntshtomu which 7s not the first
to be performed,’ and thus this latter sentence being a Paryuddsg, th,
non-performance of the Pravargya would be absolutely necessary in a]!
‘First Performances

For these reasons, we must explain the Siddhania in the following
manner: The sentence ‘yah pravargyam, cic.’ having been shown to he
applicable to the original sacrifice, the sentence ‘ Agnish{omé pravrnakt: '
found to be of no other use, comes to be taken as calculated to serve the
purpose of pointing out the occasional allowability of what has been pro.
hibited (the sense of the sentence being that though the performance of
the Pravaryya has been prohibited m regard to all ‘ First Performances’ ,.
yet if it be performed along with the Agnishtoma, which also is a ‘ First
performance’, that would be allowable).

Objection: “It has been shown above that the sentence ‘nu prathanu-
yagné etc,’ 18 not a prohibition.’

Reply: We take it as a prohibition, for the purpose of making out
some use for the sentence ‘ agntshtomé, etc.’; and specially as it has been
shown that the sentence cannot be taken as Paryuddsa, along with this
latter sentence. Nor does the sentence ‘ yah pravargyam, etc.’ apply only to
those sacrifices that are 110८ Agnishtoma ; when the sentence could be taken
asa Puryudasa referring to that. Consequently both the sentences must
be taken as applying to the Agnishtoma.

Consequently, even if the sentence under consideration be a Paryudasca,
yet, on account of the denotative power of the two sentences, we must
accept both (performance and uon-performance of the Pravargya)
optional alternatives. Because, if we had its performance in all cuses (in
accordance with the Injunction ‘ Aguishtomé, etc.’), then the Paryuddsa (‘ na
prathamayajné, etc.) would become wholly useless; while if we had no
performance of it at all (in accordance with this latter sentence), then the
former Injunction would be useless.

Thus then, we find that the necessity of taking the two as optional
alternatives, for fear of which you had recourse to the theory of Paryudasa,
is found to remain also when the Paryuddsa is accepted. Consequently,
it is far more reasonable to accept the sentence as a Prohibition, as is in-
dicated by the words themselves.

Thus then, we come to conclude that it is in the First Performance oj
the Agnishtoma that we have both optional alternatives (the Prohibition
applying to it on account of its being a ‘first performance,’ while the
Injunction does so on account of its being the Agnishtoma). Then too
when we meet with such a declaration, as—' .f a Grotriya happens to be
a Teacher of Vedas, he must perform the Pravargya’ ;—then in that case
inasmuch as the sentence (‘ Agnishtomé, etc.) which makes the Pravargya-

- PRAVARGYA PROHIBITED IN FIRST PERFORMANCE. 1255

parformance allowable in the Agnishtoma, and which is the sole ground
for the option al alternative, comes to refer to a particular perfor-
mer (the Crotriya who is a teacher of Vedas),—the optional alternative
(that of the performance of the Pravargya in the Agnish{oma) would hold
ood only for that performer; while for all others, the only course
admissible would be never to perform the Pravargya in the Aynishtoma.

Question: “Is a non-Crotriya (one who has not read the Veda) ever
“entitled $o the performance of Vedic sacritices,—that it should have
“heen considered necessary to qualify the performer as ‘a Crotriya’?”

Answer: It is quite true that when a word is found to express something
that 18 already known, the use of that word, for the sake of expressing
that alone, is considered useless; consequently the force of the word
‘Crotriya’ must be taken as pomting to the excellent Crotriya; eg.
in the sentence ‘the girl should be given to a handsome man,’ the word
‘handsome’ 18 taken in the sense of ‘handsomer.’ The mention of the word
‘anticina’ (Teacher of Vedas) is meant to preclude the Vargya and
the Kshattriya; as, though they are entitled to be Crotriyas, yet they can
never be ‘ Teachers.’

What has been said above applies to the case of the Alirdtra also,
In this case we find that the prohibition ‘1a prathamayajné, etc.’ is quite
applicable to it; and then not being Agnishtoma, it is not subject to the
declaration of the allowability of the performance (in the sentence ‘ Agnish-
tome, etc.’); consequently it comes to be concluded that the ‘ Pravargya
should never be performed in the Aézraira,’

As for the other modifications (of the Jyotishtoma), inasmuch as
none of these would be ‘first performances, the Prohibition could not.
apply to them; and hence it would be absolutely necessary to perform.
the Pravargya in connection with these.

Objection: “Inasmuch as the Prohibition ‘vu prathamayajné, ete.’
“would indirectly apply to those other modifications as well,—and
‘they would not have the character of the Aynishtoma, which is the only
“condition of the allowability of the Pravargya-performance,—there should
“never be a performance of the Pravargya, at the first performances of
“ these sacrifices.”

Reply: It is not so; because the word ‘prathama’ (‘ First’) by it-
self, applying to that which precedes all others, could never apply (even
indirectly) to those modifications,

Thus then, it is established that the Prohibition contained in the
sentence under consideration (‘na prathamayajné etc,’) refers to the Furst
performance of the simple Jyotishtoma by itself.

ADHIKARANA (13).
[The grinding of Piisha’s share is to be done at the दद sacrifices.

Sutra (34) : The grinding of Pusha's share is recognised as
pertaining to the ectypes; because it is not enjoined with
regard to the archetypes.

[In connection with the Darga-Parnamasa, we find the sentence
Tusmat Pusha prapishtabhagak, adatko hi sak (‘Thus then Pushan has his
share ground, because he 1s without teeth’); and in regard to this there
arises the question as to whether this grinding is to be done in the
Vikrit sacrifice or in the Prakrti.} And on this question we have a
conflict between Syntactical Connection and Context; and hence, in
accordance with the ‘ Law of the Joining-together,’ [11-11-24 € seq.),
it is clear that the Grinding is to be done in the Vikriz; and the subject
is yet introduced again, simply with a view to serve as the introduction
to the next Adhikaruna.

ADIIKARANA (14).
[The Grinding of Pusha’s share applies ouly to the ९. |

PURVAPAKSHA.

Sitra (35): “The grinding applies to all offering materials
equally ; because of non-distinction.”

(‘Whatever may be the particular material to be offered to Pushan,
be it Rice, or Cake, or the Animal Body,—it is necessary to grind it; as
no distinction has been made in the sentence lavine down the Grinding
५8 to the particular material to which it should apply.” ]

SIDDHANTA.

Sutra (36) : But it should apply to the grain only; because
in the case of the Cake, it 18 necessarily implied by the
useful purpose served by it; and in the case of the animal
body, it could not apply to it, because of incongruity.

Some people might urge that--“ Inasmuch as the Cake could be
made even if the grinding done were of the ordinary kind (not the Vedic
one), the Vedic grinding could uot be necessarily implied by the very
nature of the Cake and the purpose served by the yrindiny (as declared
in the Satre).”’

To this we make the following reply: By the word ‘arthu’ we
mean the help accorded to the original sacrifice; of this help, in the ori-
ginal sacrifice, the means of accomplishment has been found to consist of
the grinding; and this previously-cognised grinding implies the same in
the Oake also.

In the case of the animal body, there would bo a deficiency in the
character of the Primary offering. Because the primary offering has
been recognized as being in the shupe of the Heart, etc.; and this could
be done only by cutting these limbs out of the body. But when the body
would be ground down, the necessary shapes would be no longer there,
and so the offerings could not be cut out off the masses of those shapes.
Even though it might be possible to make those shapes out of the
pounded mass of flesh, yet in this case the names ‘ Heart.’ and the rest

158 < |

1258 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. IT[—-PADA IlI—ADHI. (14),

would apply to these newly-shaped masses of flesh only secondarily,
just like the name ‘gavaya’ to the animal made of clay; and thai
causes a deficiency in the offering. Then again, we have the declaration
that ‘the piece is to be cut out from that region in which it has been
torn from the body’; and when the Heart, etc, have been ground down, it
could not be known by which particular part it had been torn from the
body of the animal |

Thus then we find that it is only in the case of the Grain (or Rice}
that the grinding does not cause any deficiency in the offering material,
and that it is not necessarily implied by the purposes served by it; conse.
quently we conclude that the grinding laid down should be taken «x
applying to the Grain.

Objection: ^^ Inasmuch as the condition that has been laid down for
“the grindiny—viz. the absence of teeth—is applicable to all kinds of
‘‘ offerings, the grinding in question becomes applicable to the Cake and
“the Animal Body also, the Cuttings of the Pieces and its attendant
“accessories should be offered after being ground down (the grinding
“being done after the limbs have been cnt out). Nor do we find the
“ grinding ‘ necessarily implied’ (in the case of the Cake) or ‘ incompat-
९ 1016 ` (in the case of the Animal body).”

Reply: Inasmuch as the actual offering of the limbs is laid down as
following immediately after their cutting out, it could not be proper to inter-
rupt this immediate sequence by bringing in the grinding in the middle;
pecially as the sentence ‘ because he is without teeth,’ which appears to
be the statement of a reason, is meant to be a mere Praise, as we shall
show later on.

Consequently, the Injunction must be taken to be of the grinding of
that alone which happens to be in due order for it.

When the sentence under consideration is taken with reference to
each of the three kinds of offering materials, it leads to the following
conclusions: (1) in regard to the Cake, being necessarily implied by its
usefulness, the mention of grinding would be the mere recalling of a previ-
ous fact; (2) in regard to the Grain, it would serve as laying down the
allowability of the grinding in this particular case (of the offering being
meant for Pishan); (3) and in regard to the Animal-Body, it could only
be taken as the injunction of something wholly new, And certainly, 2
single sentence could never be rightly taken in three diverse forms.
Consequently, it being necessary to take it in a single form, we naturally
accept the second of the above three forms; because it is the simplest of
the three, and serves a distinctly useful purpose

Thus then it is established that the grinding applies to the Grain
only

GRINDING OF RICE FOR POSHAN. 1259

Satra (87): Objection: “In the case of the Grain also.”

| [171 the case of the Grain also, we find that the word ‘ Caru’ (‘cooked
18111") is applicable only when each grain is distinctly visible and cooked ;
and if it weve to be ground and then cooked, then we would have, not
distinct grains, but a single mass of cooked flour, which would lead to as
great an ‘incongruity’ as the grinding of the intimal Body. ]

Siitrva (388): Reply: “* Not so; because it is the name of a pecu-
| liarly-cooked preparation.”

There is no incongruity of purpose in the case of the Grain. Because
the condition of all things is determined by ordinary experience; and it is
a matter of ordinary experience that it is a certain cooked preparation
that is called ‘Quru’ (cooked grain).

That is to say, though the word ‘ Caru’ is used in the sense of the
‘‘ooked rice’ and ‘ Caru-bread,’—yet inasmuch as one and the same word
could not rightly be accepted as having more than one signification, we
take the word ‘CGaru’ as signifying that element which is common to the
‘cooked rice’ and the ‘ bread’; and that element consists in the fact of the
(1) water 11) which it has been cooked not being thrown away, (2) m that
of its bemg hot inside, and (3) in that of its being thoroughly well
cooked.

The Bhashya says— pikshoktam phalum'—(‘the use of the inquiry 1168
11) what has been shown to be the conclusion m each case, --according to
the Pirvupaksha the grinding is done to all offering materials, while
according to the Siddhdntu, it is done to the Caru only’). But this is
not much of a use explained, as regards the Pirrapaksha,—the principal
end of which lies, not in the application of grinding to the Cake, but
in that of applying it to the Animal Body,—thongh, it is true, that the
case of both is almost identical.

a Oa a Ot in, धा ष च + ee

ADHIKARANA (15).

(The Grinding of Pusha's Share finds place only in that Oaru which is
dedicated to Pishan ulone.|

Siitra (39): (There should be a grinding of the Curu) only
when there is one (Deity); because (the mention of
grinding is) connected with one (Deity) only.

Now then, there arises the question as to whether the Grinding 18 to
be done also when tho offereng of that Caru is meant for two Deities—
Indra and Pushan,—or only when it is meant for Pushan alone. And
as the question 18 subject to the principles arrived at under the ‘ Qaturdha-
14149 ' and the ‘ Indrapita’ Adhikarana (111—-i-~26 et seq., and I[—ii
-- 20 et seq.),—we (onut the Piirvapaksha and) start off with the --

SIDDHANTA.

Inasmuch as we find the sentence, under consideration, which lays
down the yrinding, speaking of Pishan alone as having his ‘ share ground,’
the Grinding would apply to that (दव alone which is dedicated to
(and meant for) Pishan only.

Sutra (40): Also because of the incongruity involved in the
particular action (when applied to any other (110).

For the following reason also, the grinding should be done only to that
Caru which is meant for Pishan alone :—Iu the case of the Caru meant
for two deities (Pushan and Indra), would you grind the whole of it or
only half? Tf the latter, then the cooking of it would be deranged; and
if the former, the two shares would get hopelessly mixed up.

That is to say, if only half of the Carw were ground and the other
half left unground, the ground half would become cooked very much
sooner than the other half; consequently, if the whole thing would be
removed from the oven as soon as the ground half would be ready cooked,
then the other half would remain uncooked ; while if we were to wait for
this latter to become ready cooked (before removing the vessel from the
oven), then by that time the ground-half would become melted off in a
single mass (of flonr), A careful and neat method of cooking makes even

SHARE OF POSHAN ALONE TO BE GROUND. L261

, ‘cooked rice’ of the ground grain also; bat this would be absolutely
impossible in the way suggested (by the Parvapaksha). It might he
suggested that, the portion consisting of whole Rice should be pnt upon
the fire first, and when that should have become half-cooked, then the
yround half would be put in (and then the two portions would be ready
hy the same time). Bnt in that case the simultaneity of the cooking
of the offering material (meant for the two deities conjointly) would
disappear. Then, lastly, if for the sake of Pishan, Indra’s share were
also ground, then the two shares would get hopelessly mixed up; and if
the portion of one Deity happened to be offered to another, that would
mean a great anomaly im the sacrifice.

Objection: ^ What yon say now would apply to your theory also, as
regards those offerings that are meant for two Deities conjointly. Be-
“cause in the case of the Caru, or the Animal Body, or the Cake, being
‘offered to two Deities,—before the offering is actually made, there is one
‘whole mass of the substance to be offered; and thus certainly there is a
“mixture of the portions of varions Deities. And in fact you admit of
“this mixmg up of the portions —on the grouud that there is no ineon-

gruity in the mixed-up offerings being simultaneously made to the joint
*" Deities

Reply: This non-incongruity would he possible ouly 1 such cases
where the sacrificial Details are such as ave calenlated to help in the
bringing about of the sacrificial Apirva (as we hold the grinding to be):
as for you, on the other hand, you hold this grinding to be something
pertaining to the Deity (Piishan).

That is to say, for us the Grindiny is meant to be an aid in the bring-
ing abont of the Apirya of that sacrifice which has Pishan for its Deity ;
wud hence, inasmuch as such an Apirea would not be possible in the ease
of a sacrifice which would have two Deities, Grindéng conld never apply in
such cases. Lu fact, in the case of other kinds of offering materials also
meant for two Deities, the conditions are the same (१,८, the peculiarities
in the material ave meant to aid in the bringing about of the particular
0४१०५८६) ; and as such the Deity is alwa ys the secondary clement. Conse-
quently, inasmuch as there can be no repetition of the Principal factor for
the sake of the secondary, it is held that even in such cases (of two Deities }
the actual offering is made once only; and hence the Portions of all the
Deities (jontly) being offered all at ०1८९, there is no harm done by the
melure (in the final Apirva, which is the only result of the offering
according to our view). For you, on the other hand, it is not possible to
speak of the grinding as we have done (४.९. a8 helping in the bringing
about of the Apiirva); and hence you must take it 1s due to the partacu-
lar Deity, And in that case, the Deities being the Principal element,

1262 PANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I[—-PADA Wap. (15),

each would want its portion separately; and the offering also would have
to be made accordingly. And from the very beginning, it has been a
settled fact that there is only one Portion (that meant for Paishan) that
has to be ground; and thus there would be the anomaly in cooking (as
‘shown above)

It may be suggested that—‘‘ even that portion which is meant to be
“in whole grains of rice could be ground down, for the sake of the nni
“* formity in cooking

But in reply to this, we urge the following arguments: Until the
Portions have been differentiated out of the whole mass of substance. we
do not know how much of it is the portion of which Deity ; and as such till
then there is no harm done by the mixing up.of the Portions. But when
the differentiation has been made, inasmuch as the Portions could not be
nixed up again unless we actually had a text authorizing such mixing up,
it becomes absolutely necessary to offer the Portions separately: and in
that case, if the portion of one Deity were offered to another, there would
he a great anomaly in the sacrifice.

Nor could it be urged that the two portions (the ground and the
unground) would be cooked in separate vessels. Because the Veda lays
down the Caru as the material to be offered, in the words ‘ Carrum, ete.’
where ‘ Carum’ being the object enjoined, its number (the singular) could
not but be regarded as significant; consequently if it were put into two
vessels, there would be two Carus, which would involve a contradiction of
the said scriptural text. |

Thus then we conclude that the grinding could not but be incongruons,
as regards the ‘Qaru’ meant for two Deities ; and consequently it should
not be performed in the case of such Carus,

[ But upon the above we have the following arguments for the

PURVAPAKSHA.]

stra (41): “Even in a case where Pishan is coupled with
“another Deity (we would have the Grinding); as the
“presence of that Deity (Pétshin) is the only condition
“(aid down for it).”

“We could have the grinding even in those cases where we had
‘“Pashan coupled with another Deity. Because if the grinding were laid
“down either for that offering which is meant for Pishan alone, or for
“that which forms part of the sacrifice to Piishan ;—then,.in that case,
“there could have been no grinding in regard to the Oaru meant for two
` ५ Deities, on account of its not being. declared to be for that purpose. As
“Sa matter of fact, however, we find that the only condition Jaid down

SHAKE. OF PUSHAN ALONE TO BE GROUND. 1263:
“for the Grinding is the presence of Ptishan, and not any substance
qualified by that Deity Then, inasmuch as the character of the Deity
of a sacrifice is pervasive (that is, the Deific character pervades as one
“gomplete whole over both Deities in a T'wo-Deity sacrifice), though
५: the sacrifice which has two Deities (Indra and. Pishan) could not be
^ gpoken of as ‘one qualified hy Pishan as its Deity,’ yet by this it is not
‘meant that either Piishan, or his Portion, does not exist in connection
‘with that sacrifice; as will be declared in connection with the Manota
‘(in Adhytya X) that ‘though Agni is not its Deity, yet that does not
“mean that he does not inhere in it.’ Consequently, even if the deific
character does not belong to Piishan (in the case of the Two-Deity
“ sacrifices), 18 the only condition (for grinding) is the mere presence of
“ Pishan, even when the Ouru would be meant for two Deities (Indra and
“Pashan),—it. is always cognized that half of it is the portion of
‘+ Pishan alone, m accordance with the conclusion arrived at under
“ Satra X—iii—d3; and thus when we would come to do the grindiny of
“this portion of the Caru, then, in aceordance with the ‘Law ot
“ Kansyabhoju’ (which makes it incumbent upon the Teacher to eat ont
“of the Kansya vessel, for the sake of his Pupil who is nnder a penance
‘which makes it necessary for him to eat out of such vessel, and for
“ whom it is necessary to cat only of what has been left by his Teacher),
‘ag the condition of even that which may be the secondary factor might
‘affect that of the other, the Portion of the other Deity also would come
“to be ground, (for the sake of the grinding of Pisha’s portion); and
“there would be nothing objectionable in this. If, however, 1६ be found
“undesirable to do something (the grinding of Indra’s portion) not
“directly laid down, and it be concluded to grind only the Half meant for
"° Piishan,—even then, the proper cooking of both (the ground and the un-
“ground grain) could be done by some clever stroke of the culinary art.
“Orv, we could very leyitimately do away with the necessity of the minor
details of the fact of the cooking of both being simultaneous, or that of
“both being cooked in the same vessel; and thus we should do the
“grinding (of Pasha’s portion even in the case of the Qaru being meant
“for both Indra and Pashan).
“It has been argued above (under Stitra 39) that ‘the Laws of the
“ Ohaturdhakarann and that of Indrapita would apply to the case in ques-
“tion (and the performance of the grinding would be limited by the
“words of the sentence laying it down).’ And to this we make the
2 following reply: As for the compound (in ‘ Indrapitw’) and the word
“formed by a nominal affix (1.8. | 4 01200. *), these can never appear in
connection with such words as are incapable of affording the sense
“required ; consequently in the case of the use of such words, we do not

1264. WANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. Ut—-PADA UI—ADHI. (15).

‘admit the capability of the word expressive of one Deity referring t,
“that which belongs to two Deities. That is to say, in the case of the
“ words § Agnéya’ and ‘Indrapita,’ we find that they are fully capable of
“ referring to Agni and Indra respectively, and as such cannot in any case
“ vefer to that which belongs to two Deities; but in the sentence under
“ eonsideration we tind that the word ‘ Push@’ does not occur in a com-
“nound, (and hence there is no exclusive capability belonging to it):
“ hence even though the compound ‘Prapishtabhagahk’ 1s dependent upon
‘something else, yet a reference to the Caru meant for two Deities dogs
“not deprive the word ‘Pusha’ of any recognized capability ; and hence
“ there can be nothing objectionable in speaking of the offering meant for.
“ Indra and Pishan as ‘one meant for Piishan

Sutra (42): “Also because we perceive an Indicative Force.”

“The reason (for grinding) that is given is—‘ becuuse Piishan ४५ with-
“ out teeth’; and this clearly indicates that the Grinding depends upon, and
‘is conditioned by, the Deity. And certainly Pashan does not become
‘endowed with teeth, when joined by another Deity; hence the
“condition (for grinding) remaining intact in the latter case also, if is
“necessary to do the Grindiny. Specially as it is thus alone that we
* could reconcile the following declarations: ‘We should offer the Caru
“meant for Soma and Pishan, half of which has been gronnd ’;—-'In the
“case of two-Deity offerings, half of the Caru should be ground and
“half nneground.” And that this 15 the right course 18 also indicated by the
‘fact of the presence of the Deity being laid down as the sole condition
‘‘ for having recourse to Grinding.

Sutra (43): “If the sentence were an injunctive one, then we
would have the Grinding of all (offering materials); and
with reference to that (the unqualified Soma-Paushna offer-
ing) the Grinding would be scripturally authorised; and
it would be of the Caru that there would be no Grinding;
as there would be no use for it.” |

“(In regard to the sentence ‘somaipaushnan carunnirvapet némapish-
“tam, etc.’) it might be argued that ‘inasmnch as it is an Injunctive
“sentence, the expression némapishtam could not have the desired indi-
“cative force; in fact it would point to the contrary view.’ And in view
“of this objection, we explain as follows: If this were an Injunctive sen-
“tence, then, inasmuch as it would not bo right to have an injunction
“of many things (by a single sentence), the ‘grinding of half’ would be
“the object enjoined; and then, this could be enjoined, with reference

SHARE OF PUSHAN ALONE TO BE GROUND. 1265

+ either to the ‘Cary,’ or to ‘ Somapaushna ' ; and with reference to which-
soever of these two the injunction would he made, that could not be
qualified by the other,—and hence the grinding would come to have an

‘aniversal application; and as such all the offerings would have to be

“ground; and in that case one of the two words (‘ Carn’ or ‘Somapaush-

ma’) would become useless, That is to say, if we were to take the

५ Injanction as ‘that which is the Caru should be half-gronnd,’ then the

५ ypiniding coming to be recognised as applying to all Carus, the word Somi-

“ 11090210, as referring to only one of the Carus, would become useless, If,

“on the other hand, the Injunction be interpretted as that ‘that which is

५" Jomapaushna should be half-ground,’ then, too, the (frinding would come

¢ toapply to all offering-materials ; because all that the word ‘SomApaushna’

‘would indicate would be the character of being meant for the goint Deity

५" Somu-Pishan; and this would be equally applicable to the Cake and

“the Animal Bedy also (just as much as to the Carn) ; and thus the word

“¢ Oarum’ would become absolutely useless.

‘Specially would such be the case, because with reference to that-~i.c,
“with reference to the Somd-paushna even when unqualified (by ‘ Caru’)---
‘the grinding would be scripturally authorised,—as no usefal purpose
‘would be served by the qualification.

“In fact, in accordance with this view, there would be no grinding of
"the Camu.

“ Objection: ‘Inasmuch as the Grinding is necessarily implied in the
“very nature of the Cake, it does not need to be specially enjoined in
“connection with that; and as for the Animal Body, it has already been
“shown that the grinding when applied to 16 involves a most hopeless
“incongruity. (And as sach the Injunction of the Grinding could not
“apply to any of these two materials ; it must apply to the Oaru).’

Reply: Not so; because none of these objections is found to apply
“to the case in question ; because all that we do, on finding the sentence
“laying down the grinding of all offering materials, is to take the ‘half
“ grinding’ as enjoined in connection with the Cake; and certainly even
“ by being half cooked, the Cake remains intact. And as for the Heart
“and the other limbs (of the Animal Body), if we were to grind the whole

of these, except that part by which they may have been torn from the
` body,—there would be none of the incongruities shown above ; nor would
their shape be wholly destroyed ; nor would there be any mistaking of the
part by which they may have been torn from the Body, And as the
other part, by which it may have been torn, would be quite perceptible
even if it were to be ground down, the portion of Piishan would be dis-
tinctly distinguishable, and would not be lost, as it would be in the case
“of the grinding of the whole |
159 ४

266 VANTRA-VARTIKA, ADU. Ul—-PADA JII—ADHI, (15).

“ Or, it may be that, in accordance with this view, inasmuch as the
“ grinding, being based upon verbal authority, would serve only an imper-
“ ceptible purpose, the cutting (of the Heart, etc.) would be done before the
“Grinding. And this grinding would not depend upon the presence of a
* Deity.
“Thus then, inasmuch as the grinding would apply to all materials,
“it could not be taken as applying exclusively to the Caru; and hence its
“mention (in the sentence ‘somfpaushnan carum, etc’) would be wholly |
‘useless. Consequently it must be admitted that this sentence enjoin.
“ing the relationship of the Oaru with the Deity (Soma-Piishan), the
“* half-grinding,’ is merely spoken of by way of reference (and not as an .
‘object of Injunction) And thus this latter word, not forming part of
an Injunction, comes to be taken as having the desired indicative force
“ (assigned under Giatva 42).”

। SIDDHANTA.

920८2" (44): It pertains to one only; because it is meant to
belong to the resultant (Apiirva); consequently, it could
not belong to both, just as in the case of the Aindragna.

We could have the grinding only when Pashan alone would be tle
Deity, and not when he would be joined by another Deity. Because the
grinding does not belong either to the Deity, or to his portion; in fact: it
is laid down as a detail belonging to the sacrifice of which एत्तका) is the
Deity.

That is to say, (before the offering has actually been made) there
is no ‘ Portion’ (Bhaga) of the Deity, to which the Grinding could belong.
Specially as the material becomes the ‘ portion ° of a Deity, not: merely ly
being offered to him, but by being accepted by him. And further, the
word ‘ihdga’ (Portion) is made up of the root bhay’ with the affix
ghan, in the Accusative sense,—it being etymologically explained

bhagyalé ( =‘ 8८४४०८६! ) yuk suk bhagah’ (= that which is accepted) ; conse
quently that which is accepted by one is his ‘ Bhaga’ (Portion). And as
५५ matter of fact we do not find the Deity actually accepting the offering ;
specially as the fact of the Deity actually partaking of the offering will be re-
futed later on, in Adhyaya IX. In fact, even if the Deity were to accept it,—
yet, 1t could not have the capability of introducing an accessory, as also
will be shown in Adhydya IX (under the Sittra IX—i—4 et seq.). Thus
` then, it being as impossible for the Grinding to be an accessory of the
‘Portion ' as that of the ‘Deity,’ it must be taken as an accessory belong-
ing, through the sacrifice, to its resultant Apiirva ;—as is shown by the

SHARE OF POSHAN ALONE TO BE GROUND. 1267

erst Adhikarana of Adhydya IX, as also by the ‘ Dévutadhikarand’ (Adh, IX).
‘he author of the Bhashya has also referred to the same fact of the grendiny
being an accessory of the sacrifice, by denying that of its belonging to the
Deity. |

Question: “How then could the Grinding, when mentioned in another
Context, be an accessory of the sacrifice? That is to say, inasmuch as the
“ Syntactical Connection (of the sentence ‘Pisha prapishtabhdyah, etc.’)
“refers to the Deity (and not to the sacrifice),—and as without Context
+ there could be no indication of the means of accomplishing the Apirva,—-
‘there can be no connection (of the grinding) with either the saerifice or
“the Apirva.”’

“The reply to this (as given in the Bhashya) is: By means of Syn-
turtical Connection (we are led to this cognition).

The opponent retorts by further pointing out what he means—{* The
Sgatactical Connection points to its connection with the Deity,’ |

Aud in reply to this, the Bhashya explains the word ‘bhdga’ (in the
sentence) as signifying the sucrifice, on the ground of the principal
signification of the word not being found compatible with the rest of the
sentence. That 18 to say, inasmuch as, in the caso in question, there 16 no
such ‹ Bhaga’ as consists in the acceptance of' something offered by another,
that factor of this action which consists in the mere act of the offereng
111४४ indicate the sacrifice; and as this is quite possible in that sacrifice
which has Pashan alone for its Deity, the mention of it as the ‘ Bhdga of
Pishan’ becomes quite compatible. But this latter name cannot apply to
that sacrifice which has two Deities ;—because (1) the deific character
is pervasive in its character, (2) and the words conveying the offering to
huth ave inseparably mixed up; and consequently the sacrifice could not
be named after any one of those two Deities. Hy. just as the Cake or
Vessel belonging to Indra-Agni is not taken as denoted by the words
‘ Aynéya’ and । Indrapita,’ so, in the same manner the sacrifices to Indra-
Piishan could not be spoken of as ‘ Pishabhiiga.’

Though we say nothing as to the difficulty that would arise in
explaining the compound (as shown above), yet inasmuch as the very
signification of the word ‘bhaga’ is not found to be applicable to the
Aindripaushna offering, the word ‘ Pishabhfga’ cannot be applied to
thia latter.

Though, when two entities come to have the nature of the Deity, each
of them could be spokeu of as the ‘ Deity,’ yet, inasmuch as in the word
couveying the offering, they are not mentioned by the name of any one of
them, we conclude thut the ‘I'wo-Deity sacrifice cannot be spoken of as
` Pishabhaga,’

1268 TANTRACVARTIKA. ADH. 111-20 1 -- णपा, (15)

Siitra (45): The absence of teeth is a mere supplementary
| reason.

It has been argued by the opponent that “ the mention of the reason
‘because he is without teeth’ shows that the grinding 18 an accessory of
the Deity.” And to this we offer the following reply: The sentence
‘because he 18 without teeth’ is an Arthavdda having a form indicative of
a supplementary or corruborative reason; and as such it is only meant to be
an eulogy of the particular accessory in question (viz. grinding); and
as there would be nothing objectionable in this, if could not show that the
accessory belongs to the Deity.

Seétra (46): The other is an injunctive sentence.

Inasmuch as the ‘half-grinding’ has never been found to have been
enjoined elsewhere, the sentence (‘ Somapaushnam, etc.’) would be an
Injunction (and not merely indicative of the fact of the grinding applying
to the Caru meant for the two deities Soma and Pishan). And as the
object of the Injunction is a qualified one, there would be no syntactical
split. And as, in accordance with the law of the Arunddhikarana, the
factors spoken of in the sentence would restrict one another, the
Injunction of the grinding could not pertain to all offering materials. As
n matter of fact, it is only in comparison with an unqualified Injunction
that the qualified Injunction could be said to be less authoritative; m the
case in question however there is no umqualificd Injunction ; consequently
the sentence in question cannot be taken as merely indicative (and not
snjunclive). |

For these reasons the Grindiny must be taken as pertaining to the
Portion of a single Deity.

Thus ends the Third Pada of Adhyaya III.

a OP OF ee ५ 0 RFR Le DARE EEA BPN Oe"

ADHYAYA III.
PADA IV.
ADHIKARANA (1).

(The mention of the Nivita is an Arthavada.]

Sutra (1); “The mention of Niveta is meant to be a pro-
“perty of Man; because the word has that for its predom
“inant factor.

- We continue the consideration of the subject of the conflict or non-
conflict between Context and Direct Declaration, Indicative Power and
Syntactical Connection.

[In connection with the Darga-Parnamasa we have the sentence—
‘nivitlam manushydndm, pracindvitam pttrnaim, updvitan déviindm, upavyc-
yut® dévalakshmaméva tat 7४12. | And with regard to the first of these
sentences—‘ nivitam manushyandm'’—there are the following alternative
explanations: (a) The nivitam is a property of the Man by himself; (0)
itis the property of Man as related to a certain action; (८) 1४ 18 the
property of the Action by itself; (क) it is the property of such actions as
are mentioned in the Context, and have the Man for their predominant
factor—e.g, the actions of Anvdhdryapacana and the like; (e) it 1s the
property of such actions with Man as their predominant factor, as are not
mentioned in the Context,—e.g. the Attending wpon guests and the like.

Aa for the question, whether the sentence in question is an Injunction
ora mere Arthavadu, this would be of no use in the Adhydya that deals
with “ Accessories”; and further, being related to the chapter on the
^“ Authoritative means of knowing Dharma '-1.6. Adhydya I—it has already
been dealt with in course of the consideration of those Arthavddas that
have the semblance of Injunctions; and consequently it need not be
brought forward here. That the Bhashya has introduced this question here
न simply by way of taking for granted and putting forward something,
or the purpose of introducing a discussion; as it is found that unless
the sentence be taken to be an Injunction, it cannot be suspected of

1 270 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADIL TIT—PADA 1v—aput. (1).

mentioning the ‘nivita’ asthe property of Man, etc., etc. And what the
Bhashya does is (1) to admit, for the sake of argumeut, and assert that
the sentence 18 an Injunction, (2) to deal with subjects immediately eon.
nected with the matter of the Adiyaya, (3) and to sum up with th
conclusion that the sentence is an Arthavddu. The connection of this
introduction of the question of Injunction and Arthavada with the other
Adhikaranas also, may be éxplained in the same manner.
In connection with this sentence we have, first of all, the following

PURVAPAKSHA (A).

८: 1116 sentence is an Injunction, in accordance with the stra T—ii—
“19> And hence, in accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the
© Ahinidhikarana (U1—in—15-16), the genitive (in ‘ manushyanaim `)
“ directly denotes the fact of the nicita being a property of Man ; because
“it 38 cognised as belonging to him, while the Man is not cognised as an
‘necessory of that; as the declensional ending (attached to ‘Man,
“© Manushya’) does not denote the subsidiary character. As the mere
“ existence of Man, as its accessory, would have been necessarily implied
“by the very nature of the Action, there should have heen no mention of
“him; but as we do find him mentioned, we conelude that the Nivita is
‘the property of Man.

Sutra (2): “Objection: ‘The sentence is merely descriptive
because the object (Nivita) already exists.”

“ Object.: ‘Some people explain nivitu as ‘winding up in the way
“known as gala-vénika, while others explain it as ‘winding it up earefully.’
५ As the former 18 possible only in battle, while the latter is possible in
‘all actions, as it removes a hindrance,—it is with reference to this
“latter that we speak of the sentence as descriptive. And as for the
“ special purpose served by this, we shall cxplain it later on.’ ”

Sutra (3): Reply: “It is an Injunction; as it speaks of .
something wholly now.”

“ The sentence is an Injunction ; because it would have been merely
“ Descriptive only if the object spoken of were already fully known to be
“as it is here spoken of. As a matter of fact, however, it is not fully
“known as such; because even without the ‘careful winding up’ the
“removal of hindrance would be possible, While, as the ‘ hanging
“by the neck,’ it.is not known previously ; and hence there is room for 4
“ Restrictive Injunction pertaining to this.”

MENTION OF NIVYITA 1; ARTHAVADA. L271
PORVAPAKSHA (B) [rejecting (A)].

Siti. (4): “ Because of the fact of the Nivita being men-
“tioned in a context abounding in the mention of the pro-
“nerties of Actions,--this also would be a property of <Ac-
“tions.”

“The Nivita is a property of the Action; because while being men-
~¢ioned in an Injunetion, it is found in a context that abounds in the
© mention of such Properties as belong to Actions.”

Siitra (5): “Specially because of the peculiar nature of the
closing words of the sentence.”

‘Whenever we find « certain thing capable of being taken in two
“different ways, we should take if in accordance with that means of
“Knowledge which may not be found to be contradictory to another
"1८608 of knowledye.—And in the case in question, we find that being
‘“entioned in the Yajyurveda, the sentence dealing with the Mivita, efe., is
connected with the name of ‘| Adhvuryava.’ Consequently if the Nivite
“were the property of an Action, then, whenever we would look for its
“ porformer, the said Name would point to the Adhvuryu priest ; as thus
“alone could the Name serve a useful purpose. And we shall show later
on that the Name could not serve any such purpose with regard to the
` Properties of Man, Consequently, if the Mivita were the property of
'Man, the operation of the Name would be rejected (as useless); while
“itis duly honoured if the Nivitais taken as the property of the Action
“(as shown above).

`" For this reason also, if must be regarded as the property of Actions."’

™~
a:

-~

-

PURVAPAKSHA (©) AND (D).
Siitra (6): “It is connected with that which appears in the

“same Context: as there would be no incongruity in
* this.”

* At first. we seek to reject the theory of the Nivita bemg a property
“of Actions, by showing the superior autoritative character of the theory
of its being a property of Man; because in this way, the theory being
` put forward by easy stages, it would be easy to accept it later on. As a
* matter of fact, we find that the Direct Denotation (of ‘munushyanim’)
" Sets aside the indications of the said Context and Name, and distinctly
* points to the fact of the Nivita being a property of Man. Consequently
` Wo put forward another theory, which is compatible with all the three
` (Direct: Declaration, Context and Name). It is this: The genitive in
^ “manushyanim,’ based upon the distinctive relationship of those Actions

1272 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. Hf——PADA IV—-apHI. (1). ,

‘in which Man is the predominant factor, does not take in the niviij,
‘and such Actions, in the case in question, are found to be the Anvaha,
^“ yapacana and the like, and none others (as these alone of such actions

are found to be mentioned in the Context). Thus then, the meaning of the
“ sentence in qnestion comes to be that ‘the Mivitu. should be performed
“in those Actions that belong to Men.’”

-PURVAPAKSHA (E).

Stitra (1): “It belongs to the Action in which Man is the
“principal factor; because its mention is similar to that
“of others (the Upavita, &c.) which belong to those actions
“in which these (the gods, &c.) form the principal fac-
66 tor 59
“he Mivita would belong to that Action which is not mentioned in

‘the same Context, and in which the Man forms the predominant factor.

“ Because, inasmuch as we find the manner of declaration exactly simi-

“Jar in all the three Injunctions [ (1) ‘Mivitam manushyanam,' (2)

“* Pracinavitam pityndm,’ (8) ‘ Upavitam dévaindm'),-—just as the ‘pra-

cindvita’ and the ‘upavita’ are taken to belong to those actions in

“which the Pitrs and the Gods respectively form the principal factor,—

“so in the same manner, the ‘Nivifa’ in question should be taken as

* belonging tv those Actions in which Man is the predominant factor.

“ That is to say, we find that the two injunctions, ‘ epavitam 42८14001
“and ‘pricindvitam pitraim’ are taken as applying, independently of
‘“ each other, to those actions in which the Gods and the Prtris respec-
“tively are the principal factors; and as the ideas connected with these
‘two Injunctions necessarily apply to the third (‘Nivitam manushya-
“néim’) also, we should take the word ‘ manushyagam as signifying those
“ Actions in which Man forms the predominant element.

५ The opponent putting the question—' How do you make this out?’
“and the Bhashya having given the answer—because of the relutionshap
।। of the genitive ending in‘ manushyainaim, —the opponent again 16001
“ “this yenitive endiny points to the Nivita as belonging to Man (and not to
‘anv Action).’ | |

Or, we may take the whole of this portion of the Bhashyu as fot

mulating the opponent’s question

“In any case, the final reply of the Pirvapakshin would be this: It
‘is quite true that the Nivita would come to be cognised as belonging to
‘Man; but, masmuch as this would involve the complication. of the
“assumption of a distinct Resalt (proceeding from this performance of
"the Nirita 88. belonging to Man), we give it up; and take the genitive
५ &8 based upon the distinctive relationship of the Action of which Man

MENTION OF NIVITA 18 ARTMAVADA. 1273

५ ‡8 the predominant factor. Tlus connecting of the Nivita with such an
+ Action would have the further advantage of not standing in need of the
agsumption of any result not connected with the Nivita itself. The
; mention of ‘Manushya’ (in ‘munushyGadm’) is meant to indicate
‘the Action in which Man (AManushya) is the prelominant fuctor; and
“¢hus our theory does not mvolve the assumption of the relationship
“of anything not mentioned in tho sentence. And the further advantape
"` that our theory has is that it does not leave any ground for taking the
"° Nivitu to be syntactically connected with the original Sacrifice of the
-* Context (1.९. the Darca-Pirnamdasa.)”

SIDDHANT A.
Sitra (8): It is an Arthavada, because of the Context.

We find none of the above theories free from objectionable features,

८ Jn the first piace, if the Narita be connected with the Action men-
tioned in the Context (as declared in Satru 6), 1b directly contradicts
the Indications of Syntactien] Connection; while its connection with the
netions of Anvahdryapacana, etc. would involve a syntactical split;
and in this theory there would be a further disadvantage, m that the
Context cannot serve the purposes of specification (attributed to it).
Secondly, as for its connection with such actions as the attending upon
ynests (as laid down under Siatra 7), there can be no reasonable ground
for it; inasmuch as such a connection would not be amenable to any
one of the means of right notion, from amony Direct Declaration, etc. ;
in fact even its staunchest upholder only infers it from the ‘relationship
of Man’ (expressed by the word ‘ manushyanam’); and this would be
scarcely right; because that genitive (in ‘manushydndm') is cognised as
being based upon the distinctive relationship of that (action) which is
connected with the word ‘ xivita’; specially as no case-endings appear in a
case where a distinctive relationship of the member related is not
expressed. Then too, that theory involves the anomaly of having to
reject indications of the Context aud the Name, and also of having to
assume a Result; and so long as we have other alternatives at our dis-
posal, we cannot rightly have recourse to such extreme measures; and as
a matter of fact we find that we can quite reasonably take the sentence
in question as an Arthavdda, in the manner shown under the Awdlumbara-
dhikarana (1-1-19 et seq.).

- Stitra (9): Specially as it is syntactically connected.

~The ‘ Nivita’ and the ‘ Pracinavitu’ ave capwble of being taken along
With the Injunction ‘upavyayaté, etc’; and this connection could be

160 | \

1274 TANTRASVARTIKA. ADH. ITt—PADA tV——apHI. (1).

possible only if the mention of the two former were descriptive
Arthavadas, and not if they were Injunctions. Because two. Injunctions
that are not in the relation of the Primary and the Subsidiary to one an-
other, and which are both independent, not connected with cach other, can
never be syntactically connected ; as the construction that each of them
would admit of would be wholly different. For instance, the construction
admitted by the Primary Injunction would be of one kind, having its
sole end in the enjoining of the required element; while that of the
Arthavédu (‘nivitam, 6६९. ` ) would be wholly different, being in accordance
with its character of being subsidiary to another

Then again, we do not find an Injunctive word in the sent® ce iv ..
question. And under the circuinstances the sentence could be taken as
an Injunction, only if (1) we supplied the Injunctive word from withont
ov (2) 1f we could somehow or other assume the Injunctive, found in
connection with the duties of attending upon guests and the like, to per-
tain to the sentence in question also, But no such assumption can be
admissible; as we cannot assume anything to be the subsidiary, when it
has not been laid down as such; and that which is not a subsidiary 1s `
incapable of being taken up by the sentence declaring the performance of
the whole action; as we shall slow later on that ‘that which 1s not
enjoined as such cannot be an accessory’; and in this way the assumption
of the accessory character would depend upon that of the Injunction, and
vice versa,—thus involving a hopeless mutual interdependence. |

Then again, so long as we find the sentence in question capable ot
being, in some way or other, syntactically connected with an actual
Injunction, it is not right to connect it with an assumed one; specially us
such a theory would involve the assumption of many invisible (transcen-
dental) purposes. | ।

For these reasons the property of things distinctly shows that the sen-
tence in question is an Arthavada, a Praise, its meaning being—‘ Just as -
the Nivitu and the Pracinfvita are good for Men and the Pitrs respee-
tively, 80 is the Upavita for the Gods’; in fact we meet with such instances
in ordinary parlance also,—e.g. ‘just as Arundhati was to Vacishtha,
Rohini to Caudra, and Damayanti to Nala, so is Yajiiadatta to Dévadatta.’

Or the sentence may be taken as Praising by Contraries; the sense,
in this case,.being—‘the inferior methods of the Nivita and the Praci-
navita are for such inferior beings as Men and Pitre respectively ; for the
Gods, however, we have the superior method of the Upatita consequently

at the Darga-Pirnamiasa, which is a sacrifice to the Gods, we must adopt
the Upuvita

MENTION OF NIVITA IS ARTHAYADA 3 1475

After this there follow six Sitrvus which we do not find mentioned in
the Bhashya. And there is a difference of opinion among the Commentn-
tors, as to this omission: («) Some people say he forgot them; (b) others
say that he wrote commentaries upon these Sitras also; but this portion
of the Bhashya has become lost to us; (c) some say he found them easy
and not of much importance, and hence omitted them; (द) while others
declare that he omitted them because they are not the work of Jaimini.
In support of this last theory we have the form of Siatra 10, which
distinctly shows that Jaimini had this latter Sativa immediately after
` Satra 9

We find however that all other Commentators on the 71115 hav
noticed these six Sifras; and as a matter of fact, we often find such Satras
amouy those written by Jaimini, as are not of much importance; and as
for the- connection between Sdtras far removed from one 14101161", we
meet with many instances of 1b—eg. the Siétra 111 --1र₹--8४ ; conse-
yuently we should take up every one of the Satras and explain it,

These six Sitras some people divided into three Adhikaranas; while
others into four. .They may be put forth as follows :—

ADHIKARANA 1 (A).
[The Uparita pertains to the Darga-Piérnamésa, |

Sutra (9)A: “The Upavita would pertain to all sacrifices, be-
cause of the presence of Indicative Force.”

The first question to be deslt with is this: We have found in the
preceding Adhikaranu that the Upavila method has been enjoined in con-
nection with the Darca-Pirnumdsa; and with regard to this there arises
the question as to whether this [njunetion applies to the Darca- Pirna-
mésa only, or to all the sacrifices.

Those however who divide the Sélras into three Adiikaranas, state
the question as—whether it pertains to the Durga-Purnamasa alone, and
18 an Injunction, or that it pertains to all sacrifices, and is merely des-
criptive.

On this question we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘The Upavita would belong to all sacrifices, Because the mere des-
“ eription of this, which is cognized as an established fact, pertaining to
“other sacrifices, would, through Indicative power, subdue the indica-
‘ tions of the Context, by means of Apparent Inconsistency.
| “That 18 te say, in connection with Mrtagnihotra, of which the Deity
“is the Pitr (the Agni-hotri Father who has died), we find the mantra—
(८ ‹ Prdcinavitt dohayél, yajropaviti he dévébhyo dohayatr” And it is only
“if the Upavita be taken as pertaining to all sacrifices, that we could have
“the descriptive declaration in the latter half of the sentence (which
“speaks of the Upavitu as pertaining to nll sacrifices to the gods). Nor can.
“this sentence he taken as merely descriptive of something pertaining
“to the Darga-Pirnamasa only ; as the Context of this latter sacrifice is
‘very fur removed from the one just quoted; and specially as in that
‘case the descriptive declaration (‘ dévébhynk, etc.’), which appears in the
‘*form of showing a reason for what has been said before, would be of
“no use. If, however, the sentence qnoted be taken as laying down 4
५५ detail in connection with the same action (of the Agnihotra) performed
“under different: conditions (when it is offered to Pzty, and not to the
deities of the ‘ ordinary Agnthotra’), then, in that case, the said descriptive

UPAVITA PERTAINS TO DARGA-POURNAMASA. 1277

declaration would serve the purpose of pointing out something preclu-
‘give of that particular condition (of the same sacrifice). Nor can it be
‘“yecessary for the sentence to preclude those conditions from any other
sacrifice (that of the Darga-Pérnaméasa 1.1.) ; because this latter is itself
“go very much removed by the Context, that there is no need of any
` special effort for the preclusion of any conditions pertaining to it.
“hen again, the Plural number in ‘dérébhyah’ could not be reconciled
५. with a reference to the Darga-Pirnamasa (which has only one Deity) ;
while in regard to the dynthotra, the Plural is found to be quite com-
‘ patible with the number of the Deities connected with its morning and
- evening Libations.

“Thus on account of the apparent inconsistency of the appended
“« descriptive declaration of the Upavitu in connection with the Agnihotra,
“we must admit it to pertain to all sacrifices.”

-~

SIDDH ANTA.

Sutra (9B): Not so; because of the Context; and (as for the
Indicative Power) that points to that particular sacrifice
(the Darga-Pirnamasa).

The Vpavita does not pertain to all sacrifices: because the Context
distinctly points to it as pertaining to the Darc¢a-Pirnamiisa only.

The presence of Indicative Power has been brought forward in support
of the Parvapaksha ; but we have already refuted the force of this conten-
tion, by showing that the Indicative Power spoken of points to it as per-
taining to that particular sacrifice—z.e. to the Darga-Piurnamitsa.

And when the Descriptive Declaration is not found to be connected
with anything in its close proximity, there can be nothing objectionable in
its being taken as connected with something at a distance from it;
specially as the connection of a Descriptive Declaration always depends
upon what has, and what has not, been already enjoined.

Then as for the Plural (in ‘devébhyah’), we cannot attach much
significance to it, Or, it might be taken as referring to the deity of the
principal sacrifice of the Durea-Pirpamdasa together with those of its
various modifications.

Thus then, the meaning of the sentence ‘ Pracindvit?, etc.’ comes to be
this: ‘ Inasmuch as the Upavita belongs to another sacrifice which 18
offered to the Gods, consequently it should not be applied to the Agathotra
that is offered to the Pity (for whom the Pracinavita would be the pro-
per thing).’

~ "ऋ, iY a "प वाक)" वा पठा क क ange” Oy, gw

ADHIKARANA 1 (B).
[The sentence ‘ upavyayaté, etc.’ 18 an Injunction].

Sitra (9C): It 18 an Injunction, because of its laying down
something not laid before.

With regard to the sentence ‘upavyayaté dévalukshmaméva tat
kuruté, there arises the question, as to whether this is an Injunction, or a
mere Descriptive Declaration.

Objection : ^ Before you have decided as to whether this sentence is
‘“Tnjunctive or Descriptive, how could you take up the question (consi-
“dered in the foregoing Adhikarana), as to whether the Injunction of the
‘* Upavita pertained to the Darga-Pirnamdasa or to all sacrifices ?”’

Reply : We took the conclusion of the present Adhikarana for granted
in the last Adhtkarana; though in reality this should have been dealt
with beforehand.

On the above question then, we have the following

PURVAPAKSBA.

“The sentence in question is a mere Descriptive Declaration ; be-
‘cause in the first place, that the man should always wear the sacred
‘thread in the Upavita fashion is distinctly laid down by the Smrtis
“(and as such it is nothing new that could form the subject of Injunc
“tion by the sentence in question) ; and secondly, the use of the Present
“Tense (in ‘upavyayaté’) would not be compatible with the Injunctive
“character of the sentence. That is to say, (1) we have such Smrti
“injunctions as that one should always be ‘nttyodaki’ and ‘ nityayajiope-
“ iti,’ which would refer to the sacrifice also; and (2) the actual, words
‘‘of the sentence are not in keeping with the Injunctive character.
‘Consequently, the sentence must be taken as a mere Descriptive Decla-
“ration. And there is one further advantange in this view, that the

mention of ‘ Upavita’ does not differ from those of the ‘ Pracinavita’ anc
“the ' Nivita.”’ ।
SIDDHANTA

To the above we make the following reply: The sentence should be
an Injunction, inasmuch as it would lay down something new; because,

° UPAVYAYATE' IS AN [NJUNCTION, 1279

“1 the first place, a descriptive declaration referring to all sacrifices would
he nseless ; and secondly because the eulogy appeariny in connection with
the sentence (eg. those relating to the Nivita aud the Pracindvitu) pomts
to the previous sentence as being an Injunction

That is to say, no useful purpose is found to be served by a Descrip
tion of the whole lot of sacrifices ; and the only useful purpose served by
the eulogy contained in the mention of the Upavitu and the Pracinavitu
would be to glorify the Upavitu, which is enjoined in the sentence under
` consideration.

Then as for the present tense (in ‘upavyayuté'), it has been ex-
plained hefore as having the mere semblauce of the Present Tense, having
in reality the force of the Injunctive, based upon its constituting either
a sentence laying down the pertorinance of the action as a whole, or as
an ८11104४ वव, or as the Lat form of the root.

lor these reasons, we must conclude that the sentence in question 1s
“an Injunction.

It has been argued in the Purcapaksha that the Upatita is found to be
already laid down in the Smrtis. And the reply to this argument algo 18
contained in-the word ‘ apiirvaivat’;-- that 1s to say, what is laid down in
the Smyti is the Upavita as a property of the Man, while what the son-
tence in question does 1s to lay it down as pertaining to the Sucrifice, some-
thing wholly different from what is laid down in the Smrtz.

Consequently the sentence cannot 06 taken as a mere Descriptive
Declaration,

The use of this Adhikuranu we shall explain later on, under the
Nartadhikarana (IV —ii—23 et seq.).

The satra 9 (c) may also be interpreted differently, as formulating the
Pirvapaksha of the followmg Adhikaranua :

ADHIKARANA 1 (6).

[The sentence ‘ yajiopaviti hi dévébhyo dohayati’ is a mere Arthavidi
relating to the Upavita as connected with the Darga-Pirnamdsa].

In connection with the Mrtadgnihotra, we moet with the sentence—
‘Priicinavitt dohayét, yajnopavitt hi dévébhyo dohayate’; and with re-
gard to this there arises the question as to whether the latter sentence
(* yagropariti, efc.’) is mercly meant to be an eulogy of the Upavita as per-
taining to the Darca-Pdrnamdsa,—just as the mention of ‘ Twelve’ in
connection with ‘ Ahina’ (vide supra Til—ni—15 16),—or it is meant
as an Injunction of it, as relating to the ordinary Agnihotra.

On this we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA

“Tt ws an Ingunction, because vt lays down something new (७ ८00 Yc).
५५ By taking it thus, we are in keeping with the Context and the Plural
“number (in ‘Dévébhyah’) (both of which would be irreconcilable with
“the Darca-Piirnumdsa). Consequently, even though the sentence may
"° have the appearance of a Descriptive Declaration, yet, with a view to
“ make it serve a useful purpose, we must take it as having the Injune-
‘tive character, based upon the fact of the sentence being one that lays
‘“ down the performance of the Action as a whole, etc., etc.”

If we take the Sitra thus, we must leave off with the mere state-
ment of the Pirvapaksha; and for putting forward the Siddhantu in
reply to this we must wait till the latter portion of our explanation of
Sitru 9९. (P. 1282) |

So we take up another Adhzkaruna for the present

ADHIKARANA 1 (0).
(‘The mention of nurthewandliness is x mere Descriptive Declaration. |

Siitrva (9d): “The mention of vorthwardliness also (would
be an Injunction), because of its being something new.”

In connection with the same Mrtagnihotra, we find the sentence—
yé purodunco darbhastin dakshinfgrithstrpate ` (‘Those grasses that
farmerly used to be pointed to the North, are now pointed to the South ’)
Some people quote this sentence as occurring in connection with the
Mahfipitryajia, And with regard to the first portion of the sentence
‘yé purodancah’ there arises the question, as to whether it is an Injune-
tion, or a mere Descriptive Declaration,
And on this question, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“The word ‘ca’ in the Sitra implies that the sentence in question
‘also is an Injunction, because what ut lays down is something new. A
“ Deseriptive Declaration is always preceded by a previous Injunction.
* And as regards the case in question we find that the northwardliness
“of the grass has not been peviously laid down, even as pertaining to the

man, Nor is it capable of being taken as a mere Arthavdda ; because
we do not find any word indicative of such character—such words, f.i,
“as ‘hi’ and the like
“ Consequently, from the apparent inconsistency of the declaration
of northwardliness as an accomplished fact, 1४ must be concluded that
“ the sentence is an Injunction

SIDDHANT

Sitra (9e) The Indicative force of the word is based upon
| something that already exists.

The sentence cannot be taken as an Injunction ; because we find it
possessed of an Indicative force only pointing to the fact of the grass
facing the Nuyth, which.has been found to have been enjoined by usage.

161 ।

1944 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 1 -- 140) sV—ADAT. 107).

Because, a sentence, that is devoid of the Tnjunctive affix, 18 necepted aS
an Injunction, only when it is found that what it speaks of has never heen
known by any means. |

For instance, in the case in question, we find that the sentence in
question has the distinct character of a Descriptive Declaration, beinp
as itis, wholly devoid of (such features of the Injunctive as) the word
‘yat,’ and of any verb, either particular or general. And this deserip-
tive character having heen once definitely cognized in some way or the
other, cannot be superseded. In fact, the ‘northiardliness’ spoken of
in the sentence, we find to have been already previously laid down, in
the Smrtc sentence— Agravanti prigagrant udagayraini, va ‘ apavargarant..
prigapavarginyudagaparargint va.’ And inasmuch as the sentence in
question is found to describe exactly what is herein laid down, tt must be
taken as a Descriptive Declaration, and that too with the purpose of enlo-
yizing the raid ‘ northwardliness,’; the sense being, ‘the northwardli#
ness spoken of before does not pertain to the sacrifiee when offered to
one who is dead.’

This very Sitry is to be taken as embodying the—

SIDDHANTA OF ADHIKARANA 1 (CG).

The word ‘Av (in the sentence ‘upaviti he, ete.’) distinetly shows
that the sentence stands in need of a previous mention of the same fact
hy means of a verb. And inasmuch as we do not find any sueh verb in
the Context itself, should we accept its Injunctive character, as pointed
ont by the absence of such a verb ?—~or should we accept its injunetion in
any other Context (to be the basis of the Descriptive Declaration of the
sentence nnder consideration)? And there can be no doubt as to the
propriety of accepting the latter alternative,—accopting the fact of its
having been enjoined in any Context as enough for our purpose, thereby
not taking the sentence in question as an Injunction.

As for the argument based upon the indications of the Context ani
the Plural number (in ‘ dévébhyah’), it has already been answered before
(towards the end of Sutra 9a, by the Pitrvapakshin himself).

And further, inasmuch as in the present case we have got another
Injunction, the sentence cannot be said to be useless (as it would serve
the purpose of eulogizing the matter of that other Injunction)

For these reasons, the sentence must be taken as a Descriptive
Declaration; and hence in the ordinary daily Aguihotra, even if the Dohi
happens to be done without the Upevita, there is no harm done to the
anerifice | | .

ADHIKARANA 1 (1५).
(The sentence ‘ १५५१८ hi dévébhyo (1/4 ` is au [njunetion. |

Sitrva (9) : It 18 an Injunction, because as regards the ‘Hold
ing’ what it says is something new.

Up to this time we have been showing where, in the absence of the
Injunctive word, we should take the sentence as a Descriptive Declara-
tion. And we now proceed to show the exceptions to the rales arrived
nt in the last few Adhikaranuas.

In connection with thesame Mytaynéholra, or with the Muhdpelryajna,
we find the sentence—‘ Adhust@t samilhundhdrayannanndruvét, upari he
dévébhyo dharayuti’ (‘in pouring the libations we should hold the stick
of fuel underneath the Sruk, as it is in offerings to the gods, that it is
held over it’). And with regard to the latter part of this (le. ‘upuri he,
elc.’), there arises the question as to whether it is an Injunction ora
Descriptive Declaration.

And on this, we have the following

~PURVAPAKSHA.

“(1) Because we have the word ‘hi’; (2) because we have the
“ present sense (in ‘dhdrayute’); (3) because the sentence is capable of
“being syntactically connected with another Injunction; and (+) be-
“cause what is herein mentioned is found ‘to be already enjoined by
“usage ;—we must admit the sentence to be a Descriptive Declaration.

“ Question: ‘How do you find 1४ to be enjoined by usage £ '

“Answer: All valuable materials require ४ protective covering
“over them; and as this general usage enjoins the use of some sort of a
“covering over the material being offered, we find the stick of fuel
“ being specified and the object to be employed us the covering.

` “ That is to say, when the material to be offered to the gods is beiny
“carried in the Sruk to the altar of the Ahavuniya fire, common usage
“ points out the necessity of covering it either by the hand, or by some
‘other object ; and we take up for the purpose the stick of fuel which
“ happens to be nearest at hand. ‘The Injunction contained in the sen-
“ teuce-~-“srugdundé sumidhamupagrhyduudravats’~ ulso, depending upon

1284 oo pangpraevdetika. ADH. ti—~piba Iv—apBt. 1(B)

the aforesaid injunction of usage, is with a view to the same purpose
“ of affording a protective covering Consequently, the sentence ‘ upar;
^" dhdrayati’ shoud be taken as the Descriptive Declaration of something
५ laid down before, just ५8 in the case of the Upavita; specially for rea
“ sons shown under the preceding Sitra |

- SIDDHANTA.

With regard to the Holding, the sentence must be taken as an
Injunction; because it is not found to have been previously enjoined
and the stick of fuel being incapable of serving as an eilficient protectiv
covering, 2/8 being held over the material could not be in keeping with the
suid usage,

That is to say, it is quite true that Usage points out the necessity
of giving a protective covering to the valuable material ; but this would
not apply to the case of the stick of fuel, which therefore could not be em-
ployed on account of its being near at hand, for the purposes of the cover-
ing; as it would be more reasonable to employ the hand for the purpose,
than any such thing as the stick of fuel

Oltjection: =“ Wefind that, on the strength of certain Injunctions,
“the ladles, etc. of Soma are piven away as sacrificial gifts, for the
‘ purpose of gaining the good will of the persons receiving the gilts
“ (even though as a matter of fact such useless gifts could not bring
“much satisfaction to the recipients); so, in the same manner, we could
“ employ the stick of fuel for the covering of the material (even though as
^ # matter of fact, if could cover very little of it).”

Reply: Such would certainly have been the case, if we had a Direct
Injunction laying down the covering by the stick, of fuel, as we have one
laying down the giving of the ‘ Soma-ladle, etc.’ As a matter of fact
we do not find any such Direct Injunction; as all that: even the sentence
in question is found to enjoin is the mere Holding of the fuel-stick. If;
in the case of the Soma-ladle also, we had the Injunction laying down
the mere fact of its being given away and not that of its being given ^
a sacrificial gift, then, in that case, we should not have admitted it to bi
meaut as calculated to win the good will of the recipient |

Farther, the Injunction—' Srugdandé samidhamupasangrhydnudr«
vutt'’—distinctly points out the place—the haudle of the Sruk—wher
the fuel-stick is to be held; and this would indicate that the atitk is held
~ before the material is poured into the Srak. ` =
Thus then, we find that the Holding of the stick-over the Sruk has
“not been enjoined by any other 86006४66, And that which has: not been
previously enjoined cannot be merely desoribed either by any verbs प्र

` (एषा D RVEBHYO dc.” Is AN INJUNCTION. 1285

the Preaent Tense, or by an Arthavdda bearing the semblance of the state-
ment of a reason. Consequently, by means of a process of construction,
we must remove from the sentence the similarity that it bears to a Des-
criptive Declaration; aud then, breaking up the sentence, we come to
take it as having the Injunctive character; and the sense of the sentence
thereby comes to be that—‘In the case of the Libation offered-to Pitrs the
fuel-stick 18 to be held uuderneath the Sruk-handle, while in those offered
to the gods it is to be held over the handle.’ The special method, to be
employed in the explaining of the construction of such Injunctions, we
have shown above.

For these reasons, the sentence in question must be regarded as an
Injunction.

ADHIKARANA (2)

[The mention of the Specification of the Directions is a Descriptive
Declaration. |

ADHIKARANA (3).
[The mention of ‘ parushi-dita,’ ete. is a Descriptive Declaration]

Sitra (10): I-—The Specification of the Directions is also like
the same.

Sieve (11): T—So also is the mention of the words ‘ parushi
dita,’ ‘parna, ‘ghrta’ and ‘ vidagdha

[1. In connection with the Jyotishtoma, we find the sentence--
‘ Pricindéca ubhujanta, dakshinitin pitaruk, praticim manushyGh, wlicimea.
surah (or udictm Rudrdk); and with regard to this, there arise the
questions, as to (a) whether this is an Injunction or an Arthavdda; and
being an Injunction, (b) whether what is laid down is a property «t
Man, or that of the Action, or that of that Action mentioned im the
Context of which man is the predominant factor, or that of the Attending
upon Guests |.

111. In connection with the Duryga-Pirnamds,, we have the sentence
--(1) ‘yat parushi ditam taddévaniim, yadantara lunmanushyanim, y¢
sumilantal pitradm,’ (2) ‘yovidagdhuh sa nairrtul’ , , , `, tasmadavidalale
prupayttavyam = sadévatvayu,’ (3) [1 connection with the Jyotishfom
we have the seutenvce—‘ yatpirnantunmanushydrdm upart, adho dévanain.,
udhuh pitraim’; and again, (4) ‘ yhriandévaniin mast pitpniin 1५९॥-
pakvam manushydnaim And with regard to these there «rise the
questions—(u) as to whether they are Injunctions of the properties of the
Performer, or the Descriptive Declaration of the properties of Actions.
(¢) whether they should find a place ‘in tlhe Action mentioned 1)
the Context in which the Performer is the predominant factor, and that
which deals with Rudra, or in the Action of Attending upon yrests ;
_(¢) or they are mere drthavadus}

All that las been said in connection with the Vivitddhikarana should
be brought in bere also

SPECIFICATION OF DIRECTIONS TS DESCRIPTIVE. 128

(11९५01२. “ With regard to the sentences that have been bronght
«ap for consideration here, what additional doubt is there (over and above
^ {11086 settled under the Nivitadhikarvana), for dealing with which you
.ghould find it necessary to refer them back to that Adhikarana? Why
ton, should these two Adhikaranas have been put in at all?”

Reply: Inasmuch as the Specification of the Directions is spoken of
by a sentence which appears in the form of the description of some past
event, and which 18 connected with the mention of the root ‘bhagat?,’ we
come to think of the case of this sentence to be unlike that speaking of
the Natita. And as for the other sentences,—they are connected with words
whieh have the genitive ending and which contain within themselves the
indiention of the actions of the yazamiina; consequently, the -Resnits are
‘distinctly cognized as pertaining to the Performer.

That is to say, the Directions are, by their nature, recognized as the
necessories of all Actions ; and in connection with these, there is nothing
new that could be enjoined, as in the case of the Nivita. And even
thongh they be connected with the Performer, yet all that we have to
assume 18 the Result that would follow from the said specification of the
Directions, and not any that wonld follow Action: And the result of the
specification too that is assumed would be in connection with the ordinary
actions of the world; and that too only with reference to the unobstructed
completion of the work in hand, and nothing in the shape of Heaven, ete.

Thus the sense of the sentences comes to be this: ‘In the action that
the man does for himself,’ (1) he faces the West or the North, (2) ‘the
grass that he cuts is to be cué fron the middle, (3) ‘whatever measure
is used, it should be fall,’ (4) ‘all the work of oil is to be done with boiled
hutter, which is known as ‘2ishpakvfyuta,’ (5) ‘while in the action done
lor the Nuazrrétas and the Rudras, the material used shonld be 0111401
and wneooked respectively.’

Consequently the method of establishing all this is exactly like whad.
has been employed before.

On this question, then, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“ What is spoken of belongs to Man, because of the word used signifyiny
"him as the principal fuctor (Stitra 1),—that is to say, in the case of
“the first. sentence, even thongh there 1s no genitive ending, yet, inns-
“much ag wa have the word ‘abhajanta,’ which makes the whole thing
+ connected with Man, we must. take what is mentioned as belonging to
“him; and in all the other seutences under consideration, it is the geni-

` tive ending that points to the fact of the thing in question belonging to
= Man. | |

1288 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. पाण) 1V—ADHT. (2) & (3),

५ So also, what has been suid in Sitra (2) may be said with refcy.
ence to the case uuder consideration, which would mean the greaim
ease with which the action would be performed: That is to say, we
get at the West as the direction, because of the fact that during the morn
ing, if one were to turn to the West, he would have the sun at hi,
` back, and hence feel more comfortable. Similarly, the cutting of the
* grass in the middle, and the measure being full, are laid down because 0.
"° these being easier for the performer. In the same manner, the idea of
“ the Nairritss being ‘ burnt’ is due to the fact of the burnt-offering becom.
‘ing black, and as such being more easily connected with Nairrita (which
"४ means the earth), because of the similarity of colour. And the idea oi .
‘‘ Rudra’s portion being uncooked was suggested by the fact that. the

uncooked material would bring on disease and hence be dangerous, i.c
"° * Raudra’ (= belonging to Rudra)

“ But since all these are not distinctly enjomed, therefore, we must

take the sentences ia question as Restrictive Injunctions,

“The Oontezt and Name (Sitra 6) however point them out as

“ helonging to Actions:(and not to Man); while all the six means of
“knowledge jointly point them out as finding a place in that Oontext
‘ wherein Man 18 the principal factor. |

“ Bat Syntactical Connection (Stra 7) sets aside the indications of

' the Context; and hence, in order to avoid the assumption of Results,
“ we must take the factors in question as to be employed in such actions
'‹ ९8 the attending upon quests and the like

SIDDHANTA.

(1) Inasmuch as there would be no ground for connecting them even
with such actions (ns the attending upon guests), (2) as there should be 70
removal, from the Context, of that which is capable of. being taken along
with it, (8) and as the sentences under consideration are connected with
the Injunction of the ‘East’ (as the direction for the Gods),—all these
sentences must be taken as Arthavddas. And the glorification meant
would be of such things as ‘ Proper Cooking,’ etc., by. means of a‘ Praise |
by contraries’; (the descriptions given being those of things contrary
to those meant to be glorified) |

ee cent atin ati al के प att al a 9 च

ADHIKARANA (+4),
[The Prohibition of Lying pertains to the Sacrifice. |

Satra (12): “The prohibition: of Action, connected with the
“gacrifice, is descriptive of something that always exists ;
“because of its (previous) connection (with the Man).”

In course of the discussion as to the contradiction or non-contradic-
tion of Direct Declaration, Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection,
we come to treat of such Prohibitive sentences as ‘one should not tell a
lie’ (‘sanptam vadét’) and the like, which are met with in the context of
the Darga-Pirnamdsa, and with regard to which it has not been shown
whether they pertain to the Man or to the Sacrifice, —sentences that are
found to be prohibitions of ‘ telling a lie,’ etc. |

(I) With regard to these, in the first instance, there arises a doubt as to
whether they pertain to the Man or to the Sacrifice. |

(II) Then inasmuch as all Prohibitions refer to certain activities, a
settlement of the said Doubt depends upon the settlement of the character
of the activities; and hence the question that calls for settlement before-
hand is—‘ for whose sake is the activity that 18 prohibited P’ The Prohi-
‘bition will be taken as pertaining to that for whose sake ‘the activity
will be fonnd to be; because the prohibition of a thing that belongs 10
one could not be of any use, with regard to another; 88 no such prohibi-
tion would be called for; specially asin all cases, we find that whenever
१ man is found to be acting towards a certain end, it is with regard to
the same end that he is found to be prohibited. Hence the necessity of
the consideration of the question as to whom the prohibited activity
belongs, | |

(III) Then again, we find that tho cognition of that for whose
sake we have the activity, depends upon the verb that denotes that
activity ; consequently it becomes necessary to consider the nature of
Verbs ;~-the ‘qaestion being as to for whose sake are the activities that
they are capable of denoting. And 80 long as we have not come to a defi-
nite conclusion with regard to Verbs, the case of Prohibition should rest
aside. Thus then, the question to be dealt with comes to be this :-
‘Those Injunctions that we find in a Context, which are not connected

482 2 a :

1290 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADIT. SI—PADA Iv -ADHT. (4),

with any other words denoting a relationship with Man—for whore anke
are the Khavanas that these Injunctions express? ’ |

And in connection with thia phase of the question, we shall have for
examples, all such sentences, as ‘Samidho yajati’, ‘ Tantinapatan yajati’.
etc, With regard to these we will have the same question as to whethe;
the ‘Samit-Sacrifice’ is for the sake of the Sacrifice, or for that of Man
and so forth. And similarly with regard to the sentence ‘ xdnurtam vadét,’
the question comes to be whether the (prohibited) ‘ ‘Telling of lies’ is for
the sake of Sacrifice, or for that of Man; becanse the qualification of ‘Lie’
would belong to that for whose sake there would be the ‘telling.’ Then
inasmuch as at the time of Prohibition, the Injunctiveness is transferred
to that Prohibition, the consideration of १1) other words should be made
subservient to that one purpose

{णऽ then, in the case of the Prohibition pertaining to Man, it would
mean that ‘one should not do that telling of lies which is for the sake of
Man’: while in the other case, it would mean that ‘oneshould not do the
telling of those 1168 that are for the sake of sacrifices.’

(IV) Then, inasmuch as a settlement of all the above issues de-
pends upon the due ascertainment of the nature of Verbs, the question
with which we immediately concern ourselves comes to be this: ‘ Does
the Verbal Affin denote the Nominative Agent or not?’ If it does denote it,
then, when the Bhavani expressed would come to look for its purpose,
the fact of the Agent being directly spoken of by the word would set
aside the idea of the action being for the sake of the Sacrifice~this latter
idea being based solely upon the Context;—and we would accordingly be
led to conclude that the Bhavana in question is for the sake of the
Nominative Agent (Man); while if the verb does not denote the Agent,
then, inasmuch as the indications of the Context would not be contra-
dicted hy any Direct Declaration to the contrary, the Bhavand would he
concluded to be for the sake of the Sacrifice, as indicated by the Context.

Objection: ‘As a matter of fact, we find that even if the Vert.
‘denoted the nominative agent, inasmuch nas the Bhavana wonld always
“yemain the principal factor, even though the relationship of the agent,
“that would be denoted by the Verb with reference to that Bhavana,
"° would be one that is directly declared, yet that could very well be taken
“as subservient to the Context; and as such, there would be no in
‘ compatibility of this relationship with the fact of the Prohibition per
“taining to the Sacrifice. It isonly when two relationships are found to
“be of equal strength and mutually contradictory, that they reject each
“other; and not when one is capnble of being takenas subservient fo

PHOHIBITION OF LYING PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE, 1291

“another. As for instance, in the case of the sentence ‘ कतवर
“ graham sammarshti’ we find that with regard to the ‘sanmdrga,’ which,
“ag subservient to the Daga@pavitra, is mentioned in connection with the
“¢Graha,’ there does not arise any question as to whether it is related to
५ the Dagapavitru or the Graha ; exactly m the same manner, in the case

in question, if the action (Telling of Lies), which has the Agené sub
“ servient to it, be taken as pertaining to the Sucrifice, there can be nv
५ thing objectionable in this

“If the Verbal Afia denoted the fact of the Agent being the predomi
“ nant factor, then alone would that have gone against the indications of
+ the Context as to the predominance of the Sacrifice. Or, if the Verbal
“ Atlix denoted the fact of the Sacrifice being the subservient factor, as
“the Agent is, then we would have had the incongruity of having two
५५ auxiliaries (the Agent and the Sacrifice) coalescing in the same Pri-
“mary (the action of ‘ Telling of Lies’).
| ५ Asa matter of fact, however, we find that none of the said conttu-
^" yencies is present (८.९, the verb does not denote either the predomi-
“nance of the Agent, or the subservience of the Sacrifice), Consequent-
“ly, the Direct Declaration pomting to the predominance of the Agent,
“and the Uontext indicating the predominance of the Sacrifice, the two
“are found to pertain to two distinct subjects; and thus, there being nu
‘“ vonlition of the two with regard to any one subject, there can be nu
“ vonflict between them; and in the absence of conflict, the one caunol
“reject the other; [and hence the question as to whether the verb
“ denotes the Agent or not cannot have any bearing upon the main sub-
“ject of the Adhikarana; as whether the Ayent is denoted or not by
“the Verb, the ‘Telling of Lies’ in question comes to pertain to the
^` Sacrifice, in both ९8४8681."

Reply: It 18 not so; because though in the first instance, the Agent
is cognized as subservient to the Action, yet this does not preclude the
possibility of its subsequently becoming the predominant factor. That
is to say, though, at first, the Action, looking out for its accessory in tho
shape of its Performer, takes up the Agent as such a subservient acces-
sory,—yet, when it comes to look out for its purpose, it is the Agent that
is the nearest factor capable of supplying that need; and thus having
become the«Performer, he comes to look ont for the good that the Action
would bring to him. And thus the relationship between the two factors
(of the Agent and the Bhavana), both of which are denoted by the same
word (the verb, —in accordance with the view that the Agent is denoted
by the Verbal Affix), being established, the Bhavana (of the action in
५५९७६०0) could not be connected with the Sacrifice, which (being indi-
ated by the Context) is more remote (from the Bhavana denoted by

1299 tanrraevirtixka. abu. 11—pioa 1v—aoni, (4).

the Verbal Affix, than the Ayent, who, being denoted by the same Verh.
is more nearly related to it). Specially as, so long as the Bhavana ig
capable of being aided by that which is denoted by the same word as
itself, it is not right to assume the aid of au extraneous factor. As for
instance, 190 the sentence—‘ Agnishomiyuasyu vapay& pracarya Agnishomi-
yam pacupurodacamanunirvapal:’ (‘having made the offering of the fat
of the Agnishomiya animal, one performs the Pacgupurodaca sacrifice to
Agni-Soma’),—thongh the nominal Affix (in ‘ Agnishomiyam’) signifies
the fact of the Deities (Agni and Soma) being the subservient factor, ye
when the purpose of the Sacrifice comes to be looked for, we come to
recognise the fact of the deities Agn: and Soma—which are mentioned
in close proximity to it,—being the objects to be sanctified (by the sacri-
fice); and hence the former sacrifice (the Vap@pracdra) is not taken as
uctiug 88 a remote aid to the Pagu-puroddga sacrifice. And certainly the
subsequent predominance of a thing is not incompatible with its previous
subservient character. Specially as when we come to look for the purpose
(to be served by an action), anything can be taken as the predominant
factor

Or again, it may be that the Verbal Affix denotes the Agent ],
himself alone, and his predominant or subservient character would be
implied subsequently, in accordance with the circumstances of each case:
and thus in this case, it becomes possible for both the action and the
agent, to be predominant or subservient to cach other, in accordance with
their mutual needs, proximity and capability (and hence it is necessar
to consider this question)

Or again, it has been shown to be a general rule, that in the case of
all words, the basic root and the affix conjointly denote the meaning of
the Affix, hy reason of the order in which they appear; and in accordance
with this rule, in the case of the Verb also, both (the Root and the Affix)
would denote the Agent as the predominant factor, to which the denotation
of the basic root would be subservient,-—just as in the case of the krdanta
word (the word formed by the root and the kré affix). Specially as to
the general rule just shown, we have never found an exception, either 11.
the shape of an argument, or a rule to the contrary. And thus, just as in
the case of Roots with nominul and kyrt affixes, so in the case of the
ordinary verbs also, it is the denotation of the Affix that comés to be the
predominant factor.. And thus, inasmuch as the fact of the denotation of
the. Root being the subordinate accessory is expressed directly by the
word (the Verb), it cannot beset aside, = - `

Otyection: “The role that you have bronght forward is a general one,
‘and hence in the case of the Verb it-could be set aside, in view of ont
‘actual cognitions. For instance, .iu the case of Verbs, tle denotatien of

PROHIBITION OF LYING PERTAINS {0 SACRIFIOE, 1293

“the Root is actually cognised as the predominant factor, while the Agent
«ig recognised as the subservient factor ; as, if this latter also were the
५ predominant factor, there would be no connection between the two.
“That is to say, in all cases, we have seen that there can be no connection
“ between two factors that are erther both subservicut, or both predomin-
“ant, Consequently, when it becomes necessary to take one of them as
“the sabservient,.and the other as the predominant factor, then such
“ discrimination could only be made in accordance with our actual cogni-
“tions. And just as in the case of the Krdanta and Taddhita words, we
“yecognise the predominance to belong to the denotation of the ^ प्रिर,
‘“which has for its subservient the denotation‘of the basic Root,—so, in
“the case of the ordinary Verb, it is distinctly recognizable by all that it
“ig the denotation of the basic root that is the predominant factor,
“having the denotation of the Affix subservient to it. And apart from
this there can be no other cause for the discrimination of their pre
५५ dommance and subservience. And thus there can be no chance for the
^ Agent to be recognised as the predominant factor [and hence the Agent
“boing always the subservient factor, the mere fact of his being denoted
“by the Verb could not affect the question of the Action pertaining to him
“or to the Sacrifice; and as such there can be no use, in the present
“ Adhikarana, of taking up the question of the denotation of the Agent by
“the Verbal Affix.” | :

To the above we make the following reply: The denotation of the
Root can never be the predominant factor; and thus the aforesaid general
rule would not be set aside in our case (as we hold the Bhavana to
be the denotation of the Verbal affix). That 18 to say, it has been already
shown that, inasmuch as the predominant factor in the denotation of the
Verb consists of the Bhavana (which is denoted by the Affix), no pre-
dominance could ever belong to the denotation of the Root, winch forms
the Instrumental factor in the Bhavana; and it has also been shown that
the Bhavana is not denoted by the Verbal Root,

Says the opponent: “It has been shown that, in accordance with
“actual cognition, no predominance could belong to the denotation of the
“the Root.” a

Reply: True, it has been shown; but not with regard to your theory,
but to.ours: for he alone, who holds the denotation of the Verbal Affix to
consist of the Bhavana, has the support of the law of Predominance ts
between the denotations of the Root and the Affix, as well as that of
ordinary actual cognition ; while, on the other hand, for one who holds the
denotation of the Verbal Affix to consist of. the Agent pure and simple,
there is nothing (in the Verb) that could devote the Bhavana; and hence
there would be no possibility of your definitions pointing to the pre-

1294 TANTRA-VARIIKA, ADH. या-द, IV—abHI. (4).

dominance of that (Bhavana) ; specially as from the very definition (uf
the denotatiou of the Affix) that you vouchsafe, it is the Agené that comes
to be the predominant factor; and that (as you have also shown) ix
opposed to the facts of actual cognition. Consequently, if the trend of
actual cognition 18 to be followed, then 16 must be in due accordance with
that that the denotation of the Affix should be defined; and there 18 10
doubt that such a definition has been supplied only by those who hold that
denotation to consist of the Bhavana, and by none others. Consequent),
the other theorists having passed over the fact of ordinary actual copni
tion, like the denotabilety, the predominance also of the Agent should be
necessarily accepted by them; and thus the Action (of ‘Telling Lies’ ;
would come to pertain to him (and not to the Sucrifice). [Thus it is clear
that the question of the denotation of the Agent by the Verb has a very
distinct bearing upon the main point of the present Adhikarana. |

Says the Opponent: “What you say would be possible in cas
“the Direct Declaration referred only to the relationship of Tadurthyu
“ (belonging to, being for the sake uf). Asumatter of fact however, what is
“actually declured, and coguised as such, 1s the relationship between the
"° denotations of the Root and the Affix, of the quulification and the quuaii-
^" fied, without any vestige of Zadurthya, auything with regard to the one
५ belonging to, ov being for the sake of, the other. And thongh the denota-
‘tion of the Root, which is the qualification, .is cognised as the subser-
“vient factor, yet, as in the case of the word ' Rajapurushahk,’ so in the
‘present case also, the characters of the Subsidiary and Primary may be
‘‘ attributed in a way contrary to that indicated by actual cognition. That
^“ 18 to say, in the word ‘ Rajupurushak’ the Raja, serving as the quali-
“fymg factor, is recognised as the subservient element; while when we
‘‘come to consider the case as to which one of the two is the टप)
“ subsidiary, and which the actual Primary, it is the (कतं that comes to
“be known as the Primary, the preduminant factor.

‘Then again, in the case of such words ‘ Pacuku ' and the like, the kdruhu
“is not one that has the point of its predominant factor doubtful ; and
yet, even in such cases, the Action is not cognised as belonging to the
Agent. For instance, in connection with the ‘ sinyleness,’ and ‘masculi-—
‘nity’ etc. of ‘Pagu,’ which are all shown to be connected with one
‘another by the fact of being denoted by the various factors of the same
“ word (‘pagund’),—when these come to be considered as being subservient
“to the action (of ‘sacritice’), the declaration will be made to the effect
‘that ‘Direct Declaration does not mean that there ts no signification of the
“¢ Syntactical Oonnection’® (Bhashya on 6४८५ TV—i—15) ; and in the same
“manner, we can declare, in the present connection, that ‘ Direct Declara-
“tion dues uot ४१०४५ that there is no indication by the Context.’

PROHIRITION OF LYING PERTAINS TO SACRIFICR, 1295

“Farther, even though the Agent may he denoted, in the present
‘ease, a8 the predominant factor, yet the Import should he taken as
“indirectly implying its subordinate character. That is to say, thongh
‘the Agent may be denoted as the predominant factor, yet the Import
« does not show it to be the principal factor. Consequently, if the Verb

were to indicate the character of the Agent, it could not be indieated as
^ the subordinate factor; and if one is called an ‘ Agent,’ a ‘performer
while performing an action, then, inasmuch as one who performa’ an
“action must be a factor subordinate to that Action, he could never he
recognised a8 the Primary (or Principal) facto
` “he same may be said to he the case where the actnal denotation is
wholly indifferent (as to the predominance or subservience of the Agent)

“It has been urged above that ‘the Agent is merely denoted by the
“ verbal affix, and as for its subordinate or predominant character, that
‘ would be implied indirectly.” But even then, if the Agent were donoted
“simply as an object, its predominant or subordinate character could
“he taken as one may please, because the actual denotation would be
“ wholly indifferent as to this. But as a matter of fact, the Agent 18 always
“denoted in the form of the Agent, which consists of the subordinate
“character; and hence there cannot be said to be an indifference on the
"° point.

“Then, it has been argued that, ‘even though it may be denoted as the
“ subordinate factor, yet the second further requirement (of the sentence)
“would show it out in the character of the predominant factor.’ But this
“is scarcely admissible ;—as it directly contradicts the Direct Declara-
“tion on the point; as we have found that the verb has directly denoted
“it as the ‘ Avent, which is synonymous with the ‘subsidiary’; and if
“subsequently we were to set aside this character, we wonld be going
‘directly against the said Direct Declaration. Nor does the absence of
‘an assumption of the subordinate character leave anything meaningless,
“that might necessitate such an assumption necessary; because all that
ig necessary for the required connection is indicated by the Context.
‘Just as in the case of the non-denotation of the Agent (by the Verb),
“the Context is capable of indicating, unopposed, all that is necessary for
“the actual preformance of the Action,—-so would it also do, im cases
“Where the Agent is denoted in the way shown above; and as auch there
` would be no contradiction involved in thir

" Then again, the single verbal affix could not, at one and the same
“ time, denote the subordinate, as well as the predominant character (of

the Agent) ; and hence whien accepting any one of these, if we were to
accept it as the predominant factor, then, it would lose its nomsnative
character, which consists of being subsidiary to the Action; and coming

1296 TANTRA*VARIIKA. ADH. TI—PADA Iv—anns, (4)

“to be something that is obtained or approached, it would come to have the

“ character of the objective ; and consequently, inasmuch as the Declen

sional endings would be based upon that (objective) (in accordance with

‘ Pinin’s Sitra ‘lak karmant, etc.’), we should have the Atmanépada (0)

९४ Passive) form of the verb (i.e, ‘dyaté’ instead of ‘ yajati’), 7 accordance
‘with Panini’s sitra ‘ Bhavakarmanoryak.’

“The following argument might be brought forward here: ‘ +]

“ Agents take to certain courses of action, never without a distinct pur-

“nose in view; consequently, he always appears in a two-fold character—

(1) that of the Performer, the nominative, and (2) that of the

possessor of the results issuing from the Action. And hence, when tire
“ Agent would be denoted in both these characters, both the said require
“ments following from the Action would be found to be daly sup-
“ plied.’

“ But this is scarcely admissible; because the character of the Agent
“ig distinctly known to consist in the shape of the Performer, the
‘“ Nominative; and it is this that would be denoted (by the Verbal Affix);
‘and then, as for the fact of being the possessor (of the result of the
“ Action), that comes to be recognised subsequently, by other means of `
“knowledge. Though it is a fact that the character of the nominative
‘ Agent 18 uot possible without that of the Possessor (of the Result of the
^“ Action), yet, inasmuch as this latter is cognisable by other means
“of knowledge, what the Verb must be taken as denoting is only the
‘ character of the Performer (of the Action). In fact, we actually find
“other words (than the Verb),—words such as ‘svurgakG@mak’ and
* the like,—used with a view to the pointing out of the character of the
८ Possessor of Results.

‘For these reasons, it must be admitted that the character of the
५ Agent (even when denoted by the Verb) is always that of the subo
“ dinate factor

‘And in this case, we have the following further advantage: W
(१ find that even insentient objects, like the piece of wood for instance, are
‘ spoken of as Nominative Agents ; and certainly, the character of these
‘could not be based upon any desire for results; consequently there can
‘be no such certain notion (as that the nominative character always im-
‘ nlies that of the Possessor of Results)

“That is to aay, the definition of ‘Nominative Agent’ that we
“should admit must be one that applies to all such Agents, And as a
“matter of fact, we find that the characteristic of ‘desiring the results’
“does not apply to all; inasmuch as it is not possible in insentient
“ objects (which are often found to serve as nominative agents); while
“as for the character of ‘ being the performer,’ itis found to exist in all

PROHIBITION OF LYING PERTAINS 10 SACRIFICE. 144

‘such objects. Consequently, this latter alone should be accepted as
« constituting the differentia of the ‘ Agent

“hus then we find that the Action cannot belong {9 the Man (01
^ Agent) (even in the case of its being denoted by the Verbal Affix).

५ And hence, there is no need of taking up the considoration (of the
“question as to whether the Agent is, or is not, denoted by the Verbul

' Affix).”

To the above, we make the following reply : Though it is quite true
that-¢he verb does not denote the subsidiary character of the Action (when
it ia taken as denoting the Agent), yet such character of it is shown by
the very fact of its qualifying the Agent, and thereby being subordinate to
it, Consequently, one kind of its subservience to the Agent, with regard
tits denotation by the verb (along with the Action), 1s found to be dis-
tinctly mentioned. And that should be accepted, with regard to the Per-
formance also (of the action; and not with regard to the denotation only)
` [र the case of such expressions 88 ‘ Rajzapurushak’ also, the operation
of the words themselves distinctly indicates the fact of the Aaa being
the subordinate factor; while on the strength of other means of know-
lndge, the actual relation of sabserviency between the Raja and the Purusha
is accepted to be quite the contrary (१.९. the Purusha is recognised as
subordinate to the Raja); as has been shown under the ‘ Suktvadhtkarana ’
(I{—i—1] ef 5८0.) ; and it has also been explained that this latter recognition
uf the contrary relationship does not necessarily make such relation
the actual denotation of the words. |

In fact, that subordinate element which really subsists in the Raya,
is that upon which the operation of the word (in ‘Rajapurushah') is
based. That subordinate element really exists. Because the Itdja, pro-
viding for the subsistence of the Purusha (his servant), comes to be
endowed with the subordinate character; and as for his ‘lordship’ over
the man, he comes to assert it later on; and the way in which he may he
‘spoken of (either as the Lord or the snbordinate) depends upon the wish
of the speaker (in whichever character he may wish to represent him)

That is to say; if what is meant to be spoken of is the ‘ Purusha
(servant) qualified by (belonging to) the Raja,’ then, it must be admitted
that what is meant to be indicated by the compound is the fact of the
‘aja according such aids (to his servant) as the providing for his subsis-
(०1९6, as this would he exactly in keeping with the actual denotation of the
words. When, on the other hand, the Raja is meant to be spoken of ns
one that is helped (served) by his servant, then it would be necessary to
take the fact of the Raja being the qualified, as viieeated by the word ;

{68 - ` ¢ ^

1298 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, U11-—PADA IV—ADHL (4),

and in that case, the Purusha (servant) comes to be indicated as hic
qualification, carrying out his orders; and in that case. the OXpression
used should be in the form of ‘‘Purushar@jahk.’ Thus then, while the nec
of the two forms (‘ Rajapurushah’ and ‘ Purushardjah’) is found to ४८
conditioned by the two meanings shown above as those desired to be
conveyed, why should woe have recourse to the complicated alternative of
having the use of them conditioned by the mere desire to express, as based
upon the help accorded to the action to be spoken of afterwards? Thus
then, when the use of a word is found to be brought about by a previ-
ously existing cause, we conclude that in the case of the word ‘ Rajapuru-
shah, the subsidiary character (of the Rijé) that is meant is that basal:
upon the fact of his helping (the servant). Though, in the case of such
possessions as the Cow, the born slave and the like, the subsidiary
character (of the Master) is absolutely non-existing, yet such character
shonld be taken as imposed npon him by the possibility of his extending
113 helping hand to them

It may be argued that in such cases as that of the word ‘ Rajapury
shah,’ with a view to establish the superiority of the Baya, we can explain
‘upasarjana’ (the character whereof is attributed to the Raja) as ° Helpor,’
and not as ‘Subsidiary.’ But even then, the character of the helper
would be more proximate to the Substdiary, whose function tends to
‘helying, and not to the Primary; and hence the ‘helping’ also would
only establish the subsidiary character of thé Raya

In the case of all such words as ‘ pa&caka’ and the like, inasmuch as
the very existence of the word is due to the action of helping (by cooking
ete.), we accept the existence of this helping in the actions (of cooking, f.i.).
which thus become endowed with the character of the Subsidiary, and
not with that of the Primary, which could be based only on the fact of
their being something to be accomplished.

Objection: ‘In that case, in the sentence ‘ prokshitabhyam uliikhalu-
“ musaldbhyam, ete. (‘by means of the ultkhalaand musala duly washed,
‘ ate.’), the washing would become subservient to the substance (pounded ). `

Reply: Who denies that fact? (We quite readily admit it.)
| Objection: “Then, the consideration of the question as to whether
“or not the said washing is for the purpose of threshing, pounding, etc..
५ would be wholly incompatible |

Reply: Why should it be incompatible, specially when the fact of
something tending towards the accomplishment of another is quite differ
ent from its being for the sake of that? For instance, the accessor
though being for the sake of the substance, yet tende towards the accomplisl-
ment of the uction; and under the circumstances, it. is only natural that
there should arise the question as to whether the particular accessory

PROHIBITION OF LYING PERTAINS TO SACRIFIC ` 1499

detail (of washeng) teuds towards the accomplishment of the interveniny
action of threshing and pounding, etc., or to that of the much remoter
Apurva (of the Sacrifice). And as for the consideration of the question
as to for whose sake we have tlie washing, that could not be very well

carried. on, without a reference to the Ulikhala and the Musala,—the

yuestion to be considered being whether the washing is for the sake of
the capability of the Ulakhula and the Musuala to bring about the actions
of threshing and pounding, or to that capability of these which tends to
bring about @ certain transcendental result (Apérea). व

Then again, though the hidden objective character of a certain

thing would not include the action, yet, when the Nominative character

becomes manifested, as located in (manifested by) the Verh, this
latter would certainly include it. That is tu say, those kérakas (the Accu-
yative, etc.) that are denoted by krdantas (nouns formed by kré affixes),

cbeing hidden (not explicit), could not take up the action as being for

their own sake; those, however, that residein Nouns and Verbs proper,
are quite manifest, and would be capable of taking up the action.

[t has been argued above that, “as in the case of the singleness o!
the animal, so, 111 the case in question. also, if the Action, that has got rid
of the relationship of being for the sake of the Agent, were taken as
pertaining to the Sacrifice, there would be nothing objectionable in

this,”

To this we make the following reply: Inasmuch as the singleness,
etc, are included in the Kérakas, they would be for the sake of the
Action, because of their being amenable to the direct denotation of the
Karokas; and this would set aside the idea of those (singleness, etv. ) being
subsidiary to the substance. That is to say, 1t would be solely on the
ground of proximity (consisting of the fact of its being expressed by the
simo word) that the number could be taken as subsidiary to the 5९0.
stance ; but it is taken up and connected with the Actvon by the karaku, which.
is the predominant factor, being more proximately related to the number
(inasmuch as the Karaka and the number avo denoted by the same case-
ending, while the zumber and the substance are denoted by two distinct
parts of the Verb). In the case of. the denotations of Verbal Roots,
however, they are not shown, by any other more authoritative means of
knowledge, to pertain to the Sacrifice, which could reject the fact of those
root-meanings being subsidiary to the Nominative Agent

Then again, an argament that has been urged is that, “inasmuch
us the character of the Nominative Agent is in the shape of the Subsidiary,
even though it be denoted as the predominant factor, it all the more
comes to be established as the Subsidiary.”

But-this.is not correct; in the matter of actions mentioned in the

1300 TANTRA-VARTINA, ADH. 111—PADA- 1V—ADHI. (4)

Scriptures, it is only intelligent agents that are entitled consequently
there could be no injunction of actions for such agents, unless it were
iccompanied by a distinct definition of the Result (to follow from the
performance of those actions)

That is to say, though the character of the Agent generally consists jy,
that of his being the performer, yet, for all. intelligent performers, the
performance is always accompanied by a definite idea of the result to
follow from it; and, as a matter of fact, it is only such intelligent pev-
song, and not non-intelligent ones, that are entitled to the performance
of actions laid down in the Veda; and all these actions are connected
with certain Injunctions,—even Prohibitions being based upon the pres
ence of the Injunctive affix; and, as a matter of fact, there can be no
Injunction, unless there is something desirable by man to be accomplished
‘by the action enjoined). Consequently, when the Man comes to be
spoken of as the ‘ performer’ of a certain action, he at once comes to the

onclusion that the action is calculated to accomplish, either directly on
indirectly, something desirable for himself; and so long as it is possible
to have the help accorded directly, 16 is not right to assume an indirect.
help. Nor is the performer. wholly imcapable of undergoing preparatory
purifications, because, being meant to be the substratum of the result of
the Sacrifice, his purification would serve a distinctly useful purpose.
As for the particular help that could be accorded to him by the action.
we can, at the first instance, take 1t to be a mere /felp in general; as
this would be enough to set aside the idea of the action being for the
suke of the Sacrifice; and when this has been done, then we can go
ou assuming, as we wish, the particular helps accorded to the performer
(by the action in question); but this seeking after particular helps
would be of no uso in the present connection, as the mere fact of the
actcon according sume help to the Performer would be enough to show that
tly auction cannot be for the sake of the Sacrifice. (That is to say, in case
the Verb be accepted to be denotative of the Performer, the Nominative
Agent)

Even though the mere denotation of the Nominative Agent would.
uot express 1118 - predominance, which is not included in the former
denotation,—yet, the apparent inconsistency of the former denotatiou
would necessarily imply the fact of the predominance also being signified
by the same Verb, As for instance, even though the word ‘ svargaki
१४/८१ `, which denotes a particular Person, does not denote the fact of. the
srarga bemg the object to be attained, yet this latter is assumed (on th
strength of the apparent inconsistency of the previous denotation) (as we
shall show in Adhyayu VI): In the same manner, the ‘lordship’ of an
luitelligent person (over a certain action) would be signified bythe cog-

“PROHIBITION OF LYING PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE, 1301

nition of the nominative character being based upon the presence, in that
person, -of a desire for the acquiring of the results (to proceed from that
action), Aud then again, in the case of the Deity, which is the reci-
pient of the offering made in the action, we find that its predominance is
recognized only as leading to its being cognised as instrumental in the com-
pletion of the Sacrifice, and not with the sole end of merely establishing
the said predominance; and similarly in the ease in question, the sub-
sidiary character of the Agent should bo taken only as calculated to estab-
lish his predominance (consisting in the fact of his being the possessor of
the result following from the action). |

६« ‘Then again, the subsidiary character of the Nominative Agent is not
| ecognized as referring to the significations of the verbal roots, (but as
च reference to the Bhavana); and when the Agent comes to be known
‘as subsidiary to the Bhdvand, do not you even then admit the significa-
ton of the verbal root to be subsidiary to him ?

Thatis to say, even for one who holds the Nominative Agent to be
denoted by the Verbal Affix (४.९. for the Vaey@kuruna), it is absolutely
necessary to admit the existence of the Bhavana, on the strength of its
actual cognition, And then, inasmuch as itis the Bhavand that is denoted
hy the same Verbal Affix, and is the predominant factor in the denotation
of that affix, it naturally takes with itself the Nominative Avent as its
smbsidiary; and as such, the Agent doves not become subsidiary to the
signification of the verbal root, Aud heuce, the Agent, being engaged
with the Bhavana which he cannot turn aside to any other purpose, comes
to take up, as his subsidiary, that which is signified by the verbal root
‘connected with the affix that denotes the Bhavan@ and the
Agent).

Nor is there any incongruity involved in the factof the Agent having
the twofold character (of being subsidiary to the Bhdvand, and yet the
predominant factor in comparison to the signification of the verbal
root); because the two are two subjects totally apart. If the Agent
were taken as also subsidiary ४0 , 16 Root-meaning itself, then even
५ single such signification would be self-contradictory. As a matter
a ¦ fact, we find that, in the case in question, it is with reference to the
Ghavand that the Agent is regarded as the subscdiury, while with reference
tu the Root-meaning, it is the predominant factor; and as such there can
he no self-contradiction in this. Because, if a thing that is naturally
endowed: with a twofold character, should be denoted by words also as
having both of those characters,—what incongruity can there be in this #
vit may be that while one of these characters is expressed directly by
the word, the other is implied only indirectly ; and thas, too, there can be
ho selfscontradiction, = ` . . र ।

1302 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. (1—-PADA IV—-ADHI. (4).

And thus, inasmuch as there is always a possibility of. the nomina.
tive agent being the predominant factor, that which 1s signified by the
verbal root would certainly become subservient to that Agent (if he be
admitted to be denoted by the verbal affix) |

There is yet another point of difference deserving of notice; it js
this: The words ‘ pdcaka’ and the like are recognised as connectéd with
another action ; and hence-in the case of such words the mere denotation
of the word would make the root a qualification (of the Agent).

That isto say, we have the following point of difference between the
subservient character based upou verbal denotation aud that based upon th.
uuture of things:—In the case of the sentence—‘pacakam riapuruskim
cu dnaya’ (Fetch the cook and. the Kuny’s-servant’)—we find that the
action of cookiny and the king become subservient to the Man that is
connected with the action of fetching (Le. the man that is to be fetched)
merely through the peculiar character of the denotations of the words
( * 20८ ' and ‘rdjapurushu’); and so it 1s just possible that the ४५५
(the cooking and the king) may not go so far as to become the actual
auxiliaries (to the Man and the action of fetching). On the other hand,
in the case of such sentences as ‘aiinrtant ०५५९५, we find that the words
do not make a mention of the connection of the nominative agent with
any other action (than that of ‘telling’ f.i.); so that we do not stand in
need of a subservient character based upon the mere denotation of words ;
nud consequently, we are led ६५ accept the subservient character of the
root-meaning (the Action of telling) as based upon the nature of things ;
und this character can be none other that of being the auxiliary.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that, in the event of the
Agent being accepted to be denoted by the verbal affix, there is a «is-
tinct authoritative means of knowledge pointing to the fact of the
Action signified by the verbal root being subservient to the Man.

Objection: ‘But, even if the Agent were not denoted by the verbal
‘affix, then too, inasmuch as he would be indicated by the Bhavana that
‘ig denoted by the same. word (as the Agent, 1.6. by the verbal भीम
“it would be be that would be most nearly related, by Context, to ५ |
^“ verbal root ;.and hence, in this case too, when the Action signified by ti
“verbal root would come to look for its purpose, this want would be
‘supplied by the said Agent; and hence in this case also, just as in the
“case of the Agent being denoted: by the verbal affix, the Action would
‘be subservient tothe Agent.”

_ Reply: This objection does not quite apply to the case; because onl)
that word can be taken in its indirect indicative sense, which 18 not
capable of ‘alfording a seuse by direct denotation ; and when the word
haa once afforded this direct denotation, it-is then that the Indication

PROHIBITION OF LYING PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE. — 1303

appears as 108 concomitant (and hence it is that this latter cannot have
५ preference over Direct Denotation). | |

That 18 to say, if the Agent were denoted (by the verbal affix), thon, if
ne should happen to be spoken of, in. a general way,—withont having his
specialities pointed out,—by Direct Denotation,—then, he wonld cer-
tainly be able to fulfil all the requirements of every one of the actions that
he would perform; and as such, in no case, would he fall off from the
conse of the Scriptures. On the other hand, if he is only cadicated (by
the Bhavan’), then, from the very beginning, we would have the idea
that what is cognized is not in keeping with the sense of the Scrip-
‘avey, And certainly we cannot attach any importance to that which is
not mentioned by the Scriptures. Consequently, if we could find ont.
some scriptural authority poimting to the fact of the Agent heing ind:-
cated by the Bhavani, then alone could we accept it as being in keeping
wath the Scriptures, and hence admissible. But as a matter of fact, we
find that all the words of the Scripture betake themselves to the indirect,
lnethod of Indication only when their direct. signification is not found to
be of any use with regard to the Action; and in the case in question we
find that the Bhdvan& is of use (in the Action), only in the shape in
which it is directly denoted (by tho verbal affix). But it is not possible
for the verbal affix to operate, at the same time, both directly (with
egard to the Bhavana) and indirectly (with reference to the Agent),
| Consequently, just as in the case of the utterance, ‘ Piirvo dhavati’
(‘the former is running’), though the ‘luéfer’ is also implied as the
correlative of the ‘former,’ yet it is not connected with the action (of
running),—so, in the same manner, the fact is that the expression in
question (1.6. the verbal affix) being really given to something else
(the Bhivand), the Agent is simply implied as the correlative of
‘his Bhavana; and as such, this implied Agent is not cognized as of any
use with regard to the Action in question, ‘Then, as for the mere cogni-
tion of the Agent by Indication, that would be possible only when the
Agent would be ‘a subordinate factor, and hence the said Indication
could not point to the fact of the Agent being the predominant factor.
And then the upshot of the whole affair is that, for the sake of its
own accomplishment, which would not be otherwise possible, the Bhavana
implies the Agent, only as a subordinate, and not as a predominant.
factor; and hence an idea of his predominance would be wholly un-
founded. Specially as the Bh dvané would not be able to ¢mply the Agent,
if he were the. predominant factor. Consequently as soon as the Agent
hegins to bring itself forward to.a predominant position, and we look for
an authority for this. latter position, we find both the word (the verbal
भिद) and the Bhavana wholly indifferent on the pojnt; and as a matter

1904 TANTRA-VARTIEA, ADH, W1—PADA IV-—apHl, (4).

of fact, there can be no other right means of the cognition of the said
predominance (which thus becomes wholly unfounded)

Thus then, we find that the consideration of the question, as ti,
whether, or not, the Agent is denoted (by the verbal aftix),—has a ver
important bearing npon the main point of the Adhikarana

And wpon this question we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘Thea sentence—‘ MARTE AIM vadét’—-must be taken as proh ibiting the
"` tulling of lies that the man does for his own sake, on acconnt of the
`" {शाशा tendency of speech to be false; that is to say, it lays down the
‘prohibition of tellang lees for the sake of saving man from a grievous gin.

“(L) Because the word ‘ vadét’ directly denotes the Man (as the no-
‘‘minative agent); (2) because it is only when taken in this manne
‘that the Injunction is found to servea useful purpose; and (3) because if
“it pertained to the sacrifice, 16 would 06 altogether useless
“That is to say, in the first place, the connection of the action of
“‘ telling’ with the Agent is directly denoted by the fact of both of them
“hoing denoted by the same word (the ‘telling’ by the root ‘vada’ and
“the Agent by the verbal affix, in the word ‘ vada’); and this connection
“sats aside the indicrtion of the Context (which is the sole authority for
‘“vonnecting the ‘Tellmg’ with the Sacréfice). Secondly, the operation *
“of the Injunctive (in ‘vadét') also is found to serve the distinctly
‘‘nuseful purpose of laying down something not mentioned before (ie. the
‘“nrohibition of the telling of lies for the sake of Man); while if it were
“meant to he for the sake of the Sacrifice, then, the Injunctiveness would
“rest wholly in that which is signified by the root (i.e.—the mere
“+telling’), which would be bronght up by the declaration of the per-
‘formance of the sacrifice as १ whole; and as such an actual injunction
‘‘to the same effect would be absolutely useless, This is what is meant
“hy the Bhashya,—Otherwise, the meaning of the word ‘vadét’ comes ty
‘ha merely that ‘telling ४५ ' ; and the -use of the word ‘vadét,’ which denotes
‘the nominative as well as the Injunction, for expressing the mere fact
« that ‘telling is,’ would be absolutely useless

“Thus then, inasmuch as all Injunctions are for the sake of Man.
५ Prohibitious also, following in the wake of Injunctions, must be taken

as heing for his sake (and not for that of Sacrifice); and the

“songe of the sentence in question comes to be that, ‘for the sake of
“helping himself a Man should nof tell lies
© explain the Siatra—Innasmich as what the sentence is found to
express has already been previously laid for the Man‘by the Smrti, at
the time of his Upangyana, long before he became entitled to the per-

PROHIBITION OF LYING PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE 1409

“formance of the Darca-Pirnamasn,—the same declaration made for the
snake of Man, in connection with this sacrifice, must be taken as merely
descriptive of that which has permanent existence (for the Man, ever
since his ¢ panayana )

“ Question: ‘When the Prohibition is for the sake of Man, why
‘should.the Siitra spenk of connection with a sacrifice ?’

५ Answer :—What is meant to be set aside by the Sétra is. that (1)
‘which the Siddhanti takes to be connected with the sacrifice, (2) which is
‘gpoken of as connected with it, and (3) which is indicated, by the Context,
‘as being thus connected; the meaning of the Si#¢ra would thus be this:

‘That which is meant by the Siddhfinti to be related to the sacrifice, or that
‘which is spoken of as related to tt, or that which is indicated by the Con-
‘teat to be related to it,—inasmuch as all this would really pertain to the
‘ Man, the sentence in question must be taken as merely descriptive of what
| ‘talready. existe.

“ Objection» ‘The sentence in question, whichis a Gruti, must be taken
Stas the basis for the Smpti-teat that prohibits the telling of lies at the
“ Upanayana. That is to say, it has already been shown (in the Smrti-
“yada) that all Smrtis are authoritative only by resson of their being
“based upon corroborative Crufi texts; and consequently, inasmuch as
“the sentence in question is found to be expressive of the same thing as
“the Smyti text (prohibiting the telling of lies) found in connection
“with the Upanayana ceremony, the former should be taken as the basis
‘of the latter (and not as merely descriptive of it). ‘That is to say, if
“the authority of the Smrt¢ rested in itself, independently of everything
“else, then, on the strength of this fact, the Qruti-sentence under con-
“sideration might have been taken as merely descriptive of what has
“always existed (on the strength of the aforesaid Smrti-text). As ॐ
“mattet of fact, however, in the case of all Smrti texts, it 18 necessary
“to trace the corroburation of a Gruti-text. And in the case in question,
“the only alternatives at our disposal 976 - (1) to assume some other
^ Cruti-text as the basis of the said Smrti, and take the one under consi-
“deration as merely descriptive, or (2) to take the sentence under consi-
“deration as the basis of that 8५८४, But so long as we actually find
“the necessary corroborative Crati-text in the shape of the one under

congsideration,—there can be no ground for assuming one that does not
exist (or, at least is not 1s easily perceptible), In fact, such au assump-

‘tion would involve two unjustifiable things—the rejection of the text
that already exists, and the assumption of that which has no existence.

“Consequently we cannot take the sentence in question to be a mere
' descripti ve declaration |

‘The. veply to the above as given by the Bidshya is this: (If the

164

1306 PANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. Tl—PADA tv—-anuT, (4),

“Smrti rule were based upon the Cruti-text im. question, then) the
“ Imrté should have mention the Darea-Ptirnamasa sacrifice: as a maltey
“of fact, however, we find the 11147 rule being taught at the time of the
“ Tpanayana ; consequently the sentence im question cannot be taken as the
“ Vedic basis of the Smrti rule

“To this answer, however, some peuple object as-follows: ‘In the
६ Bhashya, there does not appear to be any connection or relevancy of
“that which follows to what has gone before. Becanse if the sentence
“in question were trken as pertaining to Man, being taken apart from
“the Gontext,—then in that case, inasmuch as the sentence would have
“the same meaning as the Smyti rule,—why should not. in that case,
“the sentence in question, be taken ns the basis of the Smrti? That is
“to say, if the sentence under consideration were meant to pertain to the
“५ Sacrifice, and thus serve as the basis of the Smyt7,—then, in that case,
५५ 8 it would be necessary for the basis and that which ts based upon it to
“be of the same nature, and as the two(the baszc (द and the based
‘ Smrti), in this case, would not be similar in character (the Cruti [न~ `
“taining to the Sacrifice, while the Smrt? pertains to Man), the one
(the ("द sentence under consideration) could not have served as the
“basis of the अपु vule. When, however, the indications of the
५ Context are set nside, and the sentence under consideration is taken as
“pertaining to Man, then, inasmuch as this also would come to pertain
“ to the time of the Upanuyana (and thus being exactly similar in charac-
“ ter to the Smrtz rule), wherefore should not the Pérvupakshi have
“ admitted the fact of the Smrfz being based upon the sentence in ques-
“tion? Why too would it be necessary for the Smrti rule to have
‘ mentioned the Durga-Parnamisa (when both the Smrti and its corrobo-
“rative QGruti-tezt in the shape of the one ander consideration would
‘come to pertain to Man)? For these reasons, we conclude that the
‘‘ denial (in the Bhishya passage under consideration) of the fact of the
^ sentence in question being the basis of the Smrii rule was ill-advised.’

५ But this objection is not quite admissible ; because in the present
“ Adhtkarana, the Bhishya puts forth three distinct Parvapakshas ;
“from among whom, the first can admit of the fact of the sentence
‘ ander consideration being the basis of the Smrti rule, while the other
‘ two insist upon the former being taken merely as descriptive of. what
“५ has been laid down in the latter
. “That is to say, if the only declaration of the Pa vapaksha were that
“in regard to the sentence pertaining to Man, then the Bhdshya passage
“4 ander consideration would have been irrelevant. As a matter of fact
© however, the existence of this very passage in the Bhashya shows that
“the author of the Bhashya had in. view three distinct Parvapakshas

PROHIBITION OF LYING FERTAINS TO SACRIFICE. 190

५ which are as follows:—(1) Fixst of all is one that is wholly indepen-
“dent of the Sitra,—and this 18 that the sentence in question pertains
“to Man; and in this case, the Smrti rule-is not brought forward at
“all; and if 1t were absolutely necessary to bring it forward in this
“case ulso, then, there would be nothing to prevent us from necept-
“ing the Smrit to be based upon the sentence under consideration

And in-the case of this Pirvapuksha both of these (the Crudé and the
“ Smrti). would be accepted as free from all doubt as to whether they
“are Injtinctive ov Descriptive (as both would be admitted to be Injune-
“ tive).—(2) But finding the two Siitras (12 and 13) not connected with
“one another in regard to the above Pdrvapuksha, the Bhashya, with a
“view to put. forward the theory of the sentence being a Descriptive
“Declaration (which Pérvapaksha would be in keeping with the
“ Oddhanta Sitra 13), takes up the view that the sentence in question
“ pertains to the Man as connected with the Sacrifice; and hence makes
“the declaration—The telling of lies was prohibited at the time of
“the Upanayana. And the objector, taking his stand upon the first
“ Pérvapaksha, objects to the declaration of the sentence in question
being merely descriptive, when it should be taken as forming the very
‘basis of the Qmrti rule. And in reply to this objection, the Siddhaints
“ (of the Parvapaksha) denies the fact of the sentence in question boing
“the basis; and in doing this he practically accepts the second Parva.
« paksha; his meaning being that we have not admitted the sentence to per

“tain to the Man by himself, but to him as connected with the Suertfice,
“just like the Abhikramana, in accordance with the Satra TIl—iv—15 ;
“and certainly this would not apply to all men, or even all through the
“life of one man even. This view would be in keeping with Direct
“ Declaration (which connects the felling with the Manas well as with the
‘Context (which connects it with the Sacrifice). And thus the Smris
“mle, which has a universal application, could not have all its require.
“ ments supplied by the Grutz-text in question, which hay a limited scope
“of application, applying to one man only, and that too, only daring
‘the time that he may be engaged in the Dargu-Pirnamdsa; conseyuent-
“ly the Smrlt would certainly point to a Qruti-text exactly like itself
“(that could serve as its basis) ; and when this latter has been assumed

‘the Prohibition (of telling lies) in connection with the Darga-Pirna-
^ masa sacrifice, being found to be a part of that contained in the as-
“ sumed sentence, comes to be taken as merely descriptive. For certainly,
^ that which serves as a Prohibition, from the very day of the Upunuyuna,
“ would act as one.during the Darca-Pirnamdasu.also ‘Thus then, inas-
“much १6 the Darga-Pirnamé=a would fall within the time between ones
Upanayana and his death, the senteuce that speaks of the prokebition

1308 ` व्क धाह, ADH. I11L—PAD4, IV—ADHI. (4)

“of telling lies during these Sacrifires must be. merely descriptive of
“the wider Prohibition pertaining to the man’s whole life; and i
“gould not form the basis of the Smrti rule. The sentence in the
“ Bhashya— apica purushaudharmam évopodiganti’— (which appears in the
“course of this second Piurvapaksha)—should be taken along with the
“ formors as it speaks of the Prohibition pertaining to the Man.—(3\
^ Or, this very sentence—‘ apica etc.’—may be taken as putting forward
“the third theory of the Parvapakshu. And in this case the sentence
‘* would not be taken as referring to the question of the P:ohibition
“pertaining to the Man or to the Sucrifice; but the question being
“as to whether the Prohibition of telling lies, that we find in
“connection with the Duarga-Piirnamise, is the Injunction of some-
“ thing never laid down before, or it is only descriptive of what has been
‘previously laid down,—we have the Parvapaksha that, because of the
^° Prohibition being contained in the Smrte, it is merely descriptive of
what already exists ।

“ Objection: ‘The connection of the Prohibition as found in the
^ Smrti is wholly different from that found inthe sentence in question ;
“ because in the furmer it relates to Mun, while in the latter it relates to
^ the Sacrefice (and hence the one could not be merely descriptive of the
* other).’

“ Reply: ‘True, it is so; and yet the sentence in question is merely
“ descriptive of what already exists; because, even in the sacrifice, thé ©
“ telling of lies must belong to the Max, and not to the Sacrifice; conse-

quently that prohibition of the telling of lies, which relates to the Man,
“ would apply to the Suerifice also

“That 18 tosay, thongh it is true that the Prohibition relating to

“the Sacrifice is something different from that relating to Man, yet the
“former could not have the true character of the Injunction,—as it
“would certainly be implied by the impossibility in the former. For
“certainly, it is not possible that a Man should avoid the telling of lies
“for his own sake, and go on telling them for the sake of the Sacrifice
“Thus then, inasmuch as the prohibition. of telling lies for the sake
“of the Sacrifice: would be included in that of telling them for the sake
‘of the Man himself, the former could not but be taken as merely descrip-
“tive of the lutter, , : a
“Tn this latter Parvapaksha, there would be no question as to the
“Pyohibition forming the Vedic basis for the other; because the
““ Smyrti role relates to the Mun (while the Cruti one relates to. the
~ ५ Sacrefice ) | |
दः .“Qr the portion of the Bhdshya, from the beginning of the passage
under consideration, down to dargapirnumisaya ity he smaryéla ,

PROHIBITION OF LYING PRRTAINS TO SACRIFICE. ` 1809

« should be'taken as containing the ansier ; the sense of which would be
“that, inasmuch as the sentence in question is only descriptive of what
“has been already laid down ina 64710 rule based upon another Vedic
‘text, it only serves the purpose of eulogizing the sacrilices (of the
“ Darea-Piirpamdsa),—the form of the eulogy being that, ‘inasmuch as
“this Sacrifice becomes connected with even such Prohibitions as
really pertain to other things, 1४ ` becomes endowed with many
“accessories; and as such it is very praiseworthy.’
| ‘ And thus the sentence comes to be a mere ‘Arthuvada.’”

SIDDHANT
Sitra (18): It is an Injunction; because of the connection
being wholly different

Kirst of all, the Bhashya takes the argument herein propounded,
viz, the difference of connection -- ४8 against the first Piarvapuksha, that
the Prohibition relates to the Man by hémeelf.

In the Swrtt, we find the rule ‘One should tell the truth

(‘Satyam brityat’)—enjoininy the telling of truth as asource of Dharmu
(Virtue); while the sentence in question—‘ xinrlam vadét’--lays down
the Prohibition of telling lies; and thus there is a distinct difference
between the subject-matter of the two rules, And as a matter of fact
we know that the mention of one thing cannot be descriptive of that of
a totally different thing; consequently the senfence in quesiton must
be tuken as an independent Injunction.

Objection: “ 11616 are only two ways in which a man can speak,
“—the telling of the truth, and the telling of untruth; consequently
“the restriction of telling the truth would naturally involve the prohi-
“bition of the telling of the untruth; and thus the latter would
“certainly be descriptive of the former.”

Reply : It is not so; because of the difference of connection, That is
to say, that sentence alone can be taken as descriptive of another, which
ls found to serve exactly the same purpose as the other १०९६. In the
Case of one being an Injunction and the other a Prohibition, there is a
distinct ‘difference between the purposes served by them, specially as
the results brought by the two are so wholly different. For instance,
whenever the Injunction operates, it operates towards the fulfilment of
something destrable, while the Prohibition operates in a wholly different
manner, serving the purpose of setting aside frum a sin

That is to say, in the case of the Injunction ‘one should tell the
truth’; we find that when the resultant Bhdvan@ stands in need of
५ purpose, this latter is found to consist in the form of Heaven, ete.,

1310 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I1I--PADA [v—ADHE (4)

because of the fact of .all Injunctions relating to something desirable to
Man; thus then, the meaning of the Injunction comes to be that :
being possible for man to tell the truth as well as the ontruth, if je
sticks to the telling of the truth, he comes to be endowed with som,
thing desirable’; and hence one who would tell the truth would attaj,
to Heaven. But the Injunction says nothing as to whether the ला
‘of untruth constitutes an excellence or a defect. In the same maune,
the Prohibition contained in the sentence ‘one should not tell lies
simply declares that the telling vf lies leads to Hell; and it says noth
ing as to whether the felling of truth constitutes an excellence or
defect, And thus inasmuch as the meanings of the two sentences sé:
wholly different, any one of them cannot be taken as a mere repetition
of the other; and hence the sentence in question must be taken as an
Injunction (of Prohibition) | |

Objection: “The ‘connection’ of the sentence in question would
“have been ‘different’, if the declaration of the Smrti had ended
“with ‘one should tell the truth.’ As a matter of fact, we find that
“the Smrti contains also the Prohibition of telling lies, exactly like
“the Ingunction of telling the truth; and thus in view of this Prohibi-
“tion, the connection of the sentence in question cannot be said to be
५८ different from that which is found in the Smptz |

Reply: Inasmuch as the said Smrti Prohibition is fonnd in conrsc
of the ‘ Observances laid down for the religious student’, it mus 3%
taken as an Injunction (of telling the truth) by contraries (Puryudéisu),
on the same grounds as those shown in connection with the sentence ‘ oue
should not look upon the rising sun.’ Thatis to say, all that the Prolibi-
tion, under the circumstances, means is that ‘ one should say what is not
untrue. And thus the connection of the sentence in question—' nianrtam
vadét ’—would certainly be different from any that may be found in the
Smrti |
In the case of. the latter Prohibition ‘ndurtam vadat’, which 1
found in connection with the Darga-Pirnumdsa, we find none of the
reasons that could justify us in taking this also as a Paryudasa (i.e. an 11.
junction by contraries); the only two reasous capable of this are---(L) tle.
ase of the word ‘observance’, and (2) the chance of optional altet
natives. As for the latter, an optional alternative is possible only m
w case where what is prohibited is something the performahility of
which is pointed out by the Scriptures themgelves, and not in that
where what is prohibited is only that which’one would perform for
-# certain end of his own, (because 10. the former case both what 1s
prohibited and the Prohibition would“‘have the support of Scriptural
authority, while in the latter case; the Prohibition. alone would hav®

— PRORIBITION OF LYING PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE. | 1311 `

this authority ),—-as we shall see later on. [And in the case in question,
the telking of Wes that is prohibited is not based upon any Seriptural
text. | Consequently, the sentence in question must be taken as an
Injunction. ae | |

If, however, the opponent should urge the argument, that— we
qui, in the Smytis, many Prohibitions of telling lies, apart from the one
found in the course of the ‘ observances of the religions student’ (and
the sentence in question could be taken as descriptive of tlese),”—-then,
{0 that case, we would explain the ‘Difference of Convection’ m the

Fi following manner: That which is mentioned in the Smrti is mentioned
for nll men, with a view to the fulfilment of certain desirable ends ;
yherens that which is mentioned in the sentence in question is for the man

engaged in the sacrifice (of the Darga-Pirnamas’), with a view to a
distinct result (in the shape of an 47190}.

Objection: “This very reason would show that while the former
“has a universal application, the latter is very limited in its scope,—
“and as such this latter could certainly be taken as merely descrip-

tive of the former.”

_ Reply: It 18 not so; because there is a difference in their results,
as just shown above. For instance, all that the Prohibition contained
in the Smrfz shows is that, ‘with a view to remove sinfulness from
08९1१ the Man should not tell a lie.’ And hence if a person per-
forming the Darca-Pirnamdasa sacrifice should come to infringe this
prohibition, he would, by that, be infringing something that is
wholly apart from the Sacrifice; and hence all that such an infringe-
ment would do would be to bring upon him a sin; and it could not
cause any discrepancy in the sacrifice itself (if we did not attach any
1181110४ significance to the Prohibition that we have found laid down
m connection with the Sacrifice. Because we know it as a fact that
the infringement of such Duties as pertain to the Man only (apart from
the Sucrtfice) does not canse any discrepancy in the Sacrifice. For
instance, if one, in the course of the performance of a certain Sacri-
fice, should eat of the flesh of the animal. killed by a poisoned arrow,
that would cause no discrepancy in the Sucrifice itself, which would be
accomplished, all the same, exactly in accordance with the Injunctions
laid down in regard to it.

‘That 18. ४०. say, as a matter of fact we find that all sacrifices stand
in need. of certain Injunctions and Prohibitions, relating to them-
selves ; aud hence whenever any of these Injunctions or Prohibitions is
nfringed, this infringement causes a discrepancy in the Sacrifice. While
those Injunctions, etc. that relate to the Mam are, in relation to one sacri-
fies, just as if they were related to a distinct Sacrifice ; and they are wholly

(BR VANTRA-VARTIKA, ‘ADH. 1I—-PADA 1¥—ApHI, (4),

indifferent to these; consequently, inasmuch as. those have never come to be
known to be accessories fo that Sacrifice, the Sacrifice does not come 10
be regarded as the least deficient im its accessories, by an infringement of
such foreign Injunctions and Prohibitions

For these reasons, the sense of the Smyti rule would come to be
this: ‘One who would tell a 116 in course of the Durra-Pirnamieg
would go to hell, but he would obtain the resalts of the Sacrifice भ
the same.’ And as for the Cruti-rule (the sentence in question), it
applies to the Man connected with the particular context of the Saeri-
fice; and hence the meaning of this would come to be that, ‘The Durga.
Piirnamasa Sacrifices bring about their true results, only when per-
formed by persons who do not tell a lie in course of their performance,
In this latter sentence, we. find that the telling of lies has been pro-
hibited, with a view to the instrumentality of the Man towards the
accomplishment of the Apdérra,—this instrumentality being indicated
by the context; and hence an infringement of this would cause a dis-
crepnncy which would stand in the way of the due accomplishment of
the Apiirva (the transcendentnl result) of the Darga-Parzamdasa ; but it
would not cause any Sin in the Man, for even if we were to assume the
appearance of a sin, at the time, that assumed sin could not attach
itself to the Man independently by himself |

Thus we conclude that the connection of the sentence in question
is different from that of the other; and hence it must be admitted to "
be an Injunction

In the same manner, in the case of the theory that the Prohibi-
tion pertains purely to the Sacrifice, the fact of the connection being
different should 06 explained on the ground of the difference between the
sin accruing to the Man and the discrepancy appearing in the Sacrifice.

And thus, it becomes established that the sentence in question 18
not merely descriptive of what has been already declared elsewhere.

As for the difference in the two theories—~that the Prohibition
relates to the Sacrifice, and that it relates to the Man performing the
Sacrifice—this will be explained later on. Inasmuch as in both these |
cases, the Injunctive character of the sentence remains tnteuched, a
consideration of the difference between them would be of no uso in the
present discussion

Says the Opponent: ^ We aimit that the sentence is aw Injunction ; but
“we hold that it 18 an Injunction relating to Man, for reasons that
“we have shown above. This brings up the other two alternative
“ Parvapaksha theories: (1) that the sentence relates to. Man, and is
“an Injanction, because of the connection being different ; (2) that it
“‘is an Injunction relating to the Man performing the Sacrifice.” .. =

PROHIBITION. OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE, 1313

fo both of these we offer the following reply: We do not admit any
Vonjngational Affix to be expressive of the Nominative agent; and as for the
‘dea of the Nominative that is found to follow from the Conjugational A ffixes
that must be attributed to a different relationship (‘ Samyogantarat )

That is to say, in all cases, when the utterance of a word is fonnd
to give rise to the cognitions of a number of things, this does not
make all these things ‘denotable’ by that word; because the assump
tion’ of the denotative potency of the word with regard to an object.
depends upon the apparent inconsistency of the concomitance between
‘them (the word and the idea of the object); and only that object is
known as ‘denotable’ by a word, with regard to which the denotative
potency of that word has been duly assumed, And such assumption of
the denotative potency that is not perceptible, 1s allowable only in
those cases where, without such assumption, we could not explain a
cartain use of the word and the cognition actually brought about by it; e.g.
we assume such a potency of the words (denotative of classes) with

= to Individuals, and that of such words as ‘ Dion’ and the like
with regard to the ‘Boy’ etc. (1.6, in the cases of recognised Indica-
tive signification).

Now then, in the case of such verbs as ‘ Pacatt’ and the like, we
tind them giviny rise to ideas of the following things: (1) the Bhavana,
(2) the Dvot-meaning, (3) the Nominative Agent, (4) the number of this
Agent, (5) the fact of the personal results accruing to the Agent (in
the case of the Atmunepada), (6) a particular potut of time. And
among these we cannot easily distinguish which is actually denoted
by the word (and which is implied or indicated) ; specially as the only
definition of the ‘directly denoted ’ is that i 7s not implied or indicated.

Of the Bhavana, in the first placo, we do not find any other denota
tion than the word itself (‘ 4006८ ' } ; specially as the (2४९) etc. are not
found to be inva iably concomitant with tho Bhavan, as these are found
to exist even without the Bhavani (hence this latter could not be indi-
cated by Time and the other factors signified by the word). Nor can it
be urged that’ the Bhavana would be implied by the Nominative Agent and
the Root-meaning (both of which are among the factors signified by the
verb), because in that case, the Bhd@vana@ would not be the predominant
factor, exactly as in the case of nouns formed with Aré affixes. That 18 to
say, if the Bhavana were implied either by the Nominative or by the Root-
inéaning, then it could be cognised only in a subdued form, just as it is
I ५116. 6886 ‘of.such words 1s‘ pdcuka’ and the like. But as a matter of
fact we find that the Bhavana is always cognised as the predominating

actor (in the verb); and from this we couclude that it is denoted directly
by the verb: itself | ५ ` ` `
16४ | a

1314 4, ADH, [दा IV—aDBT, (4)

Then again, the Bhavana does not indicate the Time, etc.,. becanie it
is found to be presont with other Times, othe Numbers, other Root-
meanings and other Personal results (than those signified by the
word ‘pacati’; and hence not being invariably concomitant with these
particular Time and the rest, the Bhavan’ cannot be taken as indicating
them). In the same manier, inasmuch as Time, Number and the rest
are not found to be invariably concomitant with one another, they cannot
be spoken of as indicating or implying one another. We find, however,
that the Bhavana is not possible without its accessory. Nominative, in the
shape of one that is signified by the verb; so that we conclude tiiat the
Bhavana is capable of indicating the Nominative agent, either by the said
apparent Inconsistency or by Inference

Objection: “Inasmuch as the Bhavand 1s related to the other
“ Karakas (the Objective, etc.) also, it cannot be invariably concomitant
५४ with the Nominative, and as such it should not be accepted as denotative
“of this latter.”

Reply : Not so; because the mere fact of being related to something’
else cannot be admitted to necessarily establish the non-concomitance of
the Bhavana with the Nominative. There are two ways in which an
object can be related toa number of objects—(1) some objects renounce
their counection with everything else before being connected with anothe er
thing ; (2) while others take to new relatives, without renouncing» the
previous ones. And among these, that which is of the former kind is not
invariably concomitant with any one of its relatives, and hence it could
not denote them; e.g. Taliness is not accepted to be denotative of the
Man. But in such cases, the reason for non-concomitance does not lie in
the fact of being related to another, but in that of the one being found
to have an existence even without the other, In a case, however, where
the thing in question, even when existing elsewhere, does not totally
abandon its former relative,—we cannot take them to be non-concom!
tant; eg. the class ‘Cingapat’ with the classes, ‘ Trea’ ‘ Harthy’ ‘ Sub-
stance’ and ‘ Hntity’; because every one of these is found to have, intact
within itself, the requisite denotative potency. In the case of Bhdvant
also, we found that it subsists in the Kdarakas. not alternatively, one
by one, but in all of them simultaneously. And certainly this simul
‘tangous subsistence in all cannot be called ‘non-concomitance’: besanse
even when existing in another, the Bhavana does not abandon its former
substrate. Consequently it must be admitted as an indubitable fact
that the Bhavand indicates all the Karakas Though in ‘certain cases
ia those of the Intransitive Verh, where there is no Objective to. be
indicated, and that of the Dative and the Ablative, which do not form
integral parts of the Verb—it might be argued that the Bhavana

PROHIBITION OF TELLING LTES PERTAINS TO SAGRIFICE 1815

does not indicate ‘these Karakas, and as such is. non-concomitant with
them; yet. even this doubt could be raised only in regard to those
other Karakas, and never in regard to the Nominative; because there
‘s no such Verb (or Action) as ever exists without the Nominative
as it is this that forms the very source of the Action. And as a matter
‘of fact what we require here is the concomitance of the Nominative
(with the Bhavund).; and while the other Karakus are found to be non-
concomitant with it, this fact strengthens, all the more, the capability in
the Bhavana, of indicating the Nominativ

This requires special justification and proof, for the sake of estab
‘lishing the fact of the Nominative being singularly fitted for being
related to the number (which is one of the factors signified by the Verb)
In the case of such Roots as ‘ Asi’, ‘Stha’ and the like, we find that
they do not need the Instrumental; in the case of the roots ‘cala
and ‘pata’ we find no need of the locative substratum; in the case
of Intransitive Verbs, there is no Objective; and in that of ‘ Ast’,
‘Stha’, ‘pata’ and the like, there are no Datives or Ablatives ;
(while in all these the Nominative is always present) ; hence finding
the Nominative alone to be invariably present in all Bhavands, we
conclude that it is that (Nominative) alone which is singularly capable
of being related to the Number, Specially as it is a fact perceptible to
All men that in the case of all Verbs (‘pacuti’ and the like) the Number
18 always cognized as determined by the Nominative, and not by any
other Karaka

At this stage of tle discussion, the Vuiyakarana might argue thus :
“All Karakas being equally indicated, why should the Number be

connected with the Nominative alone, and not with the Instrumental
“and the rest ?”

To him, however, we offer the following explanation: It would be
80 for us, just in the same way as it is for you

He might retort thus: “ For us, the Nominative and the Number are
“both denoted by the same word (४.९. the Conjugational Affix), and as such
“they qualify each other ; and hence it is only natural that the Number
“should be set aside from the other extraneous Kdrakas, which are

not similarly denoted, and joined tothe Nominative (while the Siddhantt
‘does not admit the Nominative to be denoted by the Conjugational
" Affix; hence the same grounds are not available for him)

But then, we should reply as follows: When all Karakas are equally
constituted, what reason is there for you that the Nominative alone
and not the Instrumental, etc., are denoted (by the Conjugational) Affix ?
There is no other way out-of this but the assumption of a peculiar potency.
In the: denotative word in question, pointed out hy certain perceptible

1316 WANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, Hl—~PADA IV—ADHI.. (4):

facts resulting therefrom,—on account of which potency, we could
hive the cognition of that particular thing by the word. And this
assumption would be as available for us as for you. For inasmuch
as we actually perceive the Number as always belonging to the Nomina-
tive,—from this very fact we could, quite reasonably, infer the existence
f the necessary potency in the conjugational affixes

Question: ^ All the Karakas being equally indicated by the Bhavana
“what reason could there be for restricting the assumed potency (to
“the Nominative alone) £ ”

Answer: We have already said that our reason for restricting the
potency (of connecting the number with the Nominative) would be the same
that the Vazyakarana has for restricting the potency (of the Conjugational
Affix) to denote the Nominative only, though all the Karakas are equally
constituted. And further, no objections can rightly be raised against
the potentialities of things; specially as we have already explained that
thoy have to be inferred from certain perceptible facts which are found
to be explained only as the effects of those potentialities.

Further, for you it would be. necessary to assume the potency (in
the Conjugational Affix) of indicating the nanher of the Nominative, over
and above its potency to indicate the Nominative itself. (While for
us the potency necessary to be assumed would‘be that of the Verbal Affix
to indicate only the sumber of the Nominative, this latter itself being |
only implied by the Bhavana)

Objection: “ The potency necessary for the indication of the number
“of the Nominative would be based upon the fact of both of them
“(the Nominative and the Number) being indicated by the same term
“(the Conjugational Affix) ; and hence no assumption of any second
^ potency would be necessary for us. ”’

Reply: But without the assumption of several potencies, how could
you have the desired restriction ? That is to say, it would certainly be
necessary for you to assume a potency in the Conjugatioual Affix, whereby
this latter could indicate the Number of that alone which is denoted
by the affix (te. the Nominative), and not of the other Kdrakas, even
though every one of these latter is equally capable of being related
to the number. In fact, without such an assumed potency, the effect
would be quite contrary to what you desire, the idea being. to some
such effect as—‘ for the very reason that tho Nominative is denoted
16 18.101 necessary that its number should be expressed; in fact it would
be much more reasonable to distinguish, by means of this. number,
those (Kdrahkas) that arc not distinctly denoted.’’ Specially as the. mere
fact of being denoted by the same Affix can be sufficient reason fo:
the said restriction (of the Number -to the Nominative); because we

“PROHIBITION OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE. 157

fnd that though the Bhadvand, Time, the Personal Result and the Person,
are all denoted by the Conjugational Affix, yet they are not connected
with the Number ; and in fact, if the mere fact: of being denoted by the
Affix were the sole ground for being connected with the Number, then
the Bhavana, as being the most predominant factor among those denoted
by the word, would be more entitled than any other factor of the
Nominative and the rest, to a connection with the Number. If this
connection of the Bhaeuna@ be denied on the ground of its inherent
incapability for such connection, then the same night be said (by us)
with regard: to the other Karakus (the instrumental, ctc.) that are also
similarly denoted

The following argument might be urged here: “ The other Karakus
“are quite capable of being connected with the Number; and as such,
“they could very well be connected with the Number denoted by anothex
word.”

But in reply to this we could urge that the capability of being
connected with the Number is present in the Bhévand, etc., also, which
are denoted by such words as ‘ Bhavana’ and the like.

Objection: “Inasmuch as we do not find the number present in
“these (Bhdvand, etc.), we cannot admit of the existence of the said
“capability in them

Reply: This is scarcely proper; as the question of the absence
of number in these is still an open one (being still under cousideration) ;
for the ‘absence of Number’ 18 nothing other than the ‘dncapability
of being connected with zt’ (and it is this latter that we are still con-
sideriny). Consequently, it must be admitted that, that number, or Bha-
vand, ete., which are denoted by such and such a term (the Conjugational
Affix f.i.), are not capable of being connected with one another. And
this would be equally applicable to both of us. Because the number
that is denoted. by that word would be incapable of being connected
with the other Kdrakas (except the Nominative). To the question
“How do you know that it would be incapable ? ”—we would reply—
exactly as you do in the case of Bhavana and the rest,

Objection: “ As a matter of fact, we have found the Objective
“quite capable of being connected with the Number signified by the
Conjugational Affix ; and hence the Number could be taken as connected
“with that,—in such sentences (in the Passive form) as ‘ pacyaté
6 odanah ’ 99

Reply: It is not so; because, as a matter of fact we find that though
signifying the objective in. certain cases (१.८. in sentences in the Passive
form), the Conjugational 495 does not signify it in others (where we have
the sentence.in the Active form); and in the same manner, the Number

1318 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, UI—PADA IV—ADBI. (4).

tialities of the words used, - a ee

The opponent apparently thinks that, because in certain cases
he has found the Objective capable of being connected with the Number
signified by the Conjngational Affix, it must be so in all cases. But,
if we were to argue thus, then the fact of the Objective being, in certain
cases, denoted by the Verbs with Conjugational endings, would lead
us to the conclusion that it is always denoted by such Verbs!! If there
be some gfound for limiting the denotability of the Objective in this
latter case, then we could have a similar ground for restricting .the
connectibility of the Number with the Objective. And hence it is
scarcely right for the opponent to urge the above objection against us,

The following argument might here be brought forward by the
Opponent: “The number that is qualified by the Nominative could not.
“be spoken of without speaking of the Nominative also.” |

Reply: Though it is true that the qualified cannot be cognised with-
out the cognition of the qualification, yet this general dictum says
nothing as to tho qualification being directly denoted or not; that is
to say, it is true enough that, unless the qualification is cognised, there
can be no cognition of the qualified, and as such due importance should
be attached to the cognition of the qualtfication; but there can be
nothing objectionable in this quulification not being directly denoted ;
for certainly, when we find that even when not so denoted, but simply
indicated indirectly by some means or other, the qualification is quite
capable of bringing about the cognition of the object qualified by it,—why
should we stick to the assertion that it is actually denoted P |

Thus then, in the case in question, we find that the Nominative 18
capable of serving as the Nominative only when it is indicated by the
Bhivand itself; and as such it does not stand in need of being actaally
denoted. With regard to all qualified cognitions we have laid down
the general law that ‘that alone ont of the various factors cognised 18
to be taken as denoted by the word which is not found to have been
expressed by other means’ (vide Satra I—iv—9). Consequently, when-
ever we have a qualified cognition, and proceed to consider the question
as to which out of the qualification and the qualified is denoted directly
by the word, and which is indicated by other means,-~we come to the
conclusion that wherever the qualified is found to be indicated by other
means, the denotative operation of the word pertains to the qualification,
and. where it is the latter that.is found to bo indicated by other means,
tho. operation of the word pertains to the qualified, In fact, in all cases,
11s by means of the Apparent Inconsistency of the qnalified .cogwt-.
hon itself that we admit of the.denotative operation of the word. pertain-

of the objective also would be limited (in ite relationship) by the. poten-

PROHIBITION OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE 1319

ing either to the qualification alone, or to the qualified alone, or to both
of them; and this Apparent Inconsistency is possible only with regard
to that factor (in these two) which is not otherwise attainable (i.e, which
cannot be indicated by any other means)

Thus then, in the case in question (in the verb ‘vadét’) we find
that the simgleness (which is found to be expressed by the Singular
683), whether. it be the qualijication or the qualified, is not found to
be indicated by any other means; and as such this cannot but be regarded
as denoted by the word. If the Nominative were capable of indicating
the said Stngleness, then in accordance with the law relating to the ‘class’
(by which the class is taken to be directly denoted by the word, and, in
its turn, to indicate the Individual), the Nominative would be taken
as directly denoted, while the singleness would be taken as indicated
‘by it. Asa matter of fact, however, we find that the cognition of the
Nominative is invariably concomitant with that of Singleness; and hence
the former cannot be accepted as capable of indicating the latter; conse-
quently we must admit the Singleness also to be directly denoted by
the word. And the denotative potency of the word being thus trans.
ferred (to the singleness), the Nominative comes to be the object of Indica-
tion; and as such, even though recognised as the qualification (of single-
ness), it cannot be accepted as being denoted by the word. When it is
‘the singleness that is recognised as the qualification, then too it is this
that should be the first to be denoted by the word; and when this has
been denoted, the denotative potency having been spent up in this, it
looks out for the indication of the qualified Nominative by some other
means; and as a matter of fact, this is found to be indicated by the
Bhavana (which consists of the functioning of man towards a certain
action); and consequently, there can be no ground for assuming a
potency, in the word, for the direct denotation of the Nominative.

Though there are other Kdrakas also that are found to be cognised
(through the Bhavana), yet a cognition or non-cognition of these is not
of any consequence, either one way or the other, in the matter under con-
sideration. In. any case, all that we need (for the sake of the Bhavana
itself) ig the Nominative; and there is no doubt as to this latter being
actually cognised ; and then, if in the wake of this, something else also be
cognised, what harm does that do us? It is only the non-cognition
of something that could have troubled us, and not the cognition of some-
thing over and above what is actually needed. And as a matter of fact
even though the Instrumental, etc. are cognised, yet the peculiar potency
of the word is such that they are not taken up by the Number which
stands in need of the Nominative only. Nor is it necessary that the
Number should take in every factor that happens, to be coguised. In

1320 PAN FRA-VARTIKA. ADIT, U1—-PADA IV—~ADHI. (4),

all cases, there are three causes that combine in making a thing taken
up; these are—(L) Cogmition (2) Requirement, and (:3) Capability ;
and in the case in question, we find that the fact of the Number bein»
related to the Nominative is admitted by both of us ; and hence it does
not become related to the other Karakas, simply because it does not
stand in need of these latter, and because these themselves are in-
capable of such relationship; and conversely also; these Kdarakus do
not stand in need of the Number denoted by the Verbal Affxes of. (ण.
jugation; because they are qualified by that unmber which is denoted
by the Declensional Affixes. The Number in question also, cognised only
in 9 general way, does not stand in need of any other relative (than
the Nominative); specially as we have already. shown above that the
only difference between the Word and the Sentence lies in the fact
of the cognition of the meaning of the former always preceding that
of the meaning of the latte:

Consequently, in the case of a Verb ( pacati’ f.i.) 28 soon as we have
cognised the meaning of the Verbal Root (‘para’), it is at once concluded
that there must be a Bhdvund and a Nominative with it; and the Nomina-
tive being cognised beforehand, when the Number comes to be subsequently
denoted by conjugational (the Verbal Affix itself), it is found to be capable
of being taken either as qualifying, or qualified by, that Nominative.

Or again, the Nominative is the very first factor to be indicated
by the Bhivand; and there can be no reason for the Number to pass
over this (Nominative) and connect itself with something else.

That is tosay, though all Karakas are equally related to the Bha-
vand, yet, it is the Nominative that is the first to be sought after and
taken up by this latter, specially as its relationship with the other
Karakas is dependent upon that (i.e. the Nominative). It is for this
reason that the Bhavana, which consists of the functioning in general
of the Nominative agent, indicates most particularly, the Nominative ;
whereas the other Karakas come up only as distant relations, either
through their connection with the meaning of the Verbal Root, or throagh
their forming parts of the method (of action) which forms the most
subordinate element in the Bhavana. And there is no reagon by which
the Number should pass over the Nominative, which is the first and
the most predominant factor to he indicated b y the Bhavan, —and be-
take itself to the other Karakas

Then again, even the teachers of Vyakarana—Patanjali: f:i—declare
the Nominative to be that particular Karaka whose intermediate fuuc-
. tioning the Verbal Root denotes as the most predominant of all: and
hence: it is also held that. the signification of the ‘Root. also takes no
“notice of the other Karakas together. with their fanctions, and points

“PROHIBITION OF TRULING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICR, 1421

to the previously manifested Nominative only; and it is for this reasou:
that.it is this latter.that becomes connected with Number, and appears |
as if it were actually denoted, iu its particular form (by the Conjngational
Affix). In the other Karakas, however, we do not find any such thing;
even though they. are indicated, they are considered of no consequence,
and aa such appear as if they did not exist at all. But when we
come to look into the real state of things, we find that all the Karakas
are equally “inilicated by the Bh@rand@,—with which they are uqually con-
comitant; and it is for this reason that they are not neglected altogether
Objection: “* In that case (1.6 if the Number belongs to the Nomi
“native exclusively), we could not have the number pertaining’ to the
“Objective, as wo have in the sentence ‘Odunah pacyutim tvay
‘Because in this sentence the action of the Rice (that of being cooked)
“ig not spoken of as the principal factor; for if it were, then what would
५, € denoted would be the Nominutive character of the vice and not
‘the Bhivand
“That is to say, in the sentence cited, the action of the Ice is not
“gnoken of as the principal factor, on account of which the number could
“be cognised.as belonging to the Objective (Rice) cognised in the parti-
“cular form (of the Nominative). If it were so, then alone could the
Rice lose its Objective character, and become the Nominative; but as it
‘“ig not so, it is not the Nominative; and as it is not the Nominative
“its functioning would not constitute the Bhivund; and as such there
“would be no particalar indication of the Objective by the Bhavana.
“As a matter of fact, it is necessary that the action of the humun agent
“should be spoken of as the principal factor (in all [njunctions) ; it
“would not be possible for him to be directed to the performance of
“an action that belongs to something else (the Objective, f.i.) (and such
“would be the case if the principal factor sp-ken of by the Injunctive
“sentence were the action of something other than the Nominative),
“And further; the Nomivative character tuo, not being expressed by the
“Conjagational Affix (in the sentence cited), could not apply even to that
(‘yon’) which is spoken of by a distinct word (‘feuy@'); and tien we
“eould not have the Instrumental in ‘tvaya’ (as this Instrumental is
expressive of the Nominative, which has been found to be inapplicable
“to ‘tvam’), And as the Objective (Rice) too would nor have its
“operation subdued by the action of the Nommative, it would cease
to be something that ४5 yut. at, and thereby losing its Objective character,
it” would acquire that of the No uwinative, spevially on necount of
“having -its action duly- brought forward (by the word ‘ pacyutim’):
and on account of this 1 wonid sever its connection with ita own numober,
and become connected with that of the Nominative ४

1322 PANTTRACVARTINKA, ADIT, (11-—-PADA TV ADHT, (4). =

«And thua we would find that, as in the case of the word ‘pucut;’
“ (Active,) so in that of ‘pacyaté’ (Passive) also, the Number ‘signified
éhy the word, uot being subdued by that of any other, would come to
८१ helong to the Nominative, and not to the .Qhyective (as 18 really the
५ 6886}. . a a a ee
Reply: The above objection applies also to one who holds the Karaku
(Nominative or Objective) 10 be denoted (by the Con)ugational Affix);
and as such applying to both parties, it should not have. been brought
forward against any one of them. Because, in any case, the Number,
which we hold to be denoted by the Verbal Affix, belongs to the very
same Nominative or Objective that you hold to be denoted by the
same Affix, Conseqnently, if even in the case of sentences in the Passive
Voice (१, those in which the Conjugational Affixes appear in relation
to the Objective), the Number signified by the Affix comes, for us,
to belong to the Nominative (which ४ absurd),—then for you also, ‘it
would be the Nominative (and not the Objective) that would be signi-
fied by that Affix (which would be equally absurd, as the sentence is
in the Passive Voice). And if you could have some means of avoidiny
this absurd denotation of the Nominative, then the same would be
available for us, for avoiding the denotation of the number belonging
to the Nominative; and as such we are no more open to the above
objections than yourself. | |

Thus then it becomes equally incumbent upon both of us to set
aside the said anomaly; and this can be done in the following manner:
In all cases, inasmuch as the Objective is that which is most desired
(by the Nominative), it is, by its very. nature, the predominant factor,
in comparison to the other Karakas (the Instrumental and the rest) ;
and as it is the object to be accomplished, its action forms part of the Bia-
४८११९. Consequently, when the speaker wishes to show the predominance
of the Objective by means of the Verbal Affix itself,—even though
it is the Nominative, which, verbally, has its action, in the genera!
as well as in the particular form, signified, as the most predominant, by
means of the Conjugational Ending and the Verbal Root ( respectively),
and as such it attains to the position of . the Nominative,—yet, inas-
much as what 18 meant to be spoken of is the predominant character, m
‘the nature of things, of something else (the Objective), the Conjuga-
tional Endings are used in relation to the Objective (according to us)
or to its Number (as held by. the Vaiytkurann) (i.e, the. Verb is used
in the Passive Voice pacyaté). When, ho wever, 6१७॥ though “existent,
the predominance of the Objective is not meant. to be .spoken. of,
—or when the particular Root nied indicates that that predominance
does not exist;—and what ig meant tobe spoken of is: merely. Verbal

.. PROHIBITION OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE 1323

preduminance,—then, the predominance of the Objective is accepted
to be manifested by the Accusative Declensional Ending (in the noun,
olanam’ f.i.), aud the Conjugational Ending is brought in in relation
to the Nominative (according to the Vaiyaékarana) or to its Number
(according to us) [i.e. the Verb used is in the Active Voice— pacati’}
8 for the other Kédrakas, tho [nstrumental and the rest they can
have no sort of predominance, either verbal or real; and as such tliere
can be no desire to speak of the predomiuance of these,—-and hence
these are always spoken of by words other than the Verb (and they
do not, in any way, affect the form of the Verb)

Some people declare as follows: ^“ When the potentinlity of words
“ig ascerlained to be in some such form as that,—‘such and such a
“word (the Active) is capable of denoting the wember of the Nominn-
“tive, while such other (the Passive) is capable of denoting only that
“of the Objective, —then, in that case, the Bhavundé would be expressed
“by some other word; and the said Number, being denoted as not belong-
‘ing to any other thing, would betake itself to the Nominative.

“ For instance, In the case of the word ‘Cona’ (which, though signi-
“fies Bed, is yet applied only to the Red Horse), we find that even
“when the Horse is not mentioned by any other word (in the shape
“of ‘Agea’ and the like), the word ‘Quna’, expressing a property
“belonging to the Horse, comes, by itself, to indicate the ‘ Horse’ also.
“And in the same manner, all things, such as the Cow and the like,
“would cease to be denoted (by the words ‘Cow’ and the like). Becanse
“the word ‘Cow’ (like the word ‘Gona’) could be taken as expressing
“such properties of the Cow as its particular Gender, Number etc. ;
“and these properties, being denoted by the word, would subsequently
“come to indicate the animals themselves. That is to say, if the
‘sole potentiality: of the word were to 116 in the fact of its denoting
“the properties of a certain object, then there would be no use for

assuming any further potentialities for it; as all usage would be carried
on through that single potentiality

“Tf, however, it be held that in the case of such words as ‘Gona’
“and the rest their relationship is limited by the fact of both (the
“Property: as well as the Object) being denotcd by the same word,
“and not by auy such peculiar potentiality in the word itself,—then
“similarly in the case of the Number, etc. of the Nominative also ‘(it

may: be held that the. connection of the Number with the Nominative
18 ` due, not to any potentiality in the Verbal Affix, but to the fact
of both being expressed by tho samo Affix); and thus, in this way,

‘therd would be no harm dono to the denolabslity of the Nominative. ”
To the-above, other people make the following reply: The word

1824 ss TANTRA-VABTIKA, ADH. 11-——PADA I1V-—-ADHI. (4)

ona’ also can never denote the properties belonging to the Horse, unti}
it has denoted the Horse itself; because we have tever found any copni-
tion of a thing appearing without taking in the propertiés belonging
to it. While the class ‘Horse’ remains unexpressed, how could the word
Gona’ be used to denote the Redness qualified by the Olass ‘ Horse’ ?
Because the Cona is nothing more than a particuler form of Redness
Nor can it he held that “the property (Redness) would imply that
object to which it belongs (the Horse).” Because the Redness exists in
the Cow also. That is to say, it is only that which is invariably con-
comitant with something else, that cau indicate this latter; while, as
a matter of fact, we find that Rednexs is not invariably concomitant
with the Horse; consequently all that the word ‘Gone’ could. indicate
would ४९ the ‘substance,’ with which latter alone is Redness invariably
concomitant, and not any particular substance (in the shape of the
Horse). Thus then, inasmach as both Redness and Horse are non-
comitant with one another, they cannot indicate one another; and
then, inasmuch as it would not be possible for either of them to take
up the other,—aud this latter would be brought up by something
else,—we must admit the fact of the word ‘Gona’ actually denoting the
Kied Horse. (and not denoting mere Redness which would indicate the
Horse)

But in this case, there is nothing to show that what is invariably:
concomitant (with the word ‘Cona’) is the ‘Horse’, along with many
other things. While in the case of the Nominative, we find that it
is absolutely the only factor that is invariably indicated, and that too,
in @ particular form, by the Bhdvund; as explained above (and lence
there can be no real Analogy between the case of the word ‘Cone
indicating the Red Horse, and that of the Verbal Affix denoting the
Bhavana, which would indicate the Nominative)

Or, we can even admit that what the word ‘Coma’ denotes is only
the Property that coinheres in the same substrate (i.e. the individual!
Horse) with the Class ‘ Horse | :

Question: “ How could we have a cognition of the qualified (Redness)
“antil we bad that of the qualifying (61055 ‘ Horse’) ?”’

Answer: Wo do uot admit the Class ‘Horse’ to be a qualification
of Redness (‘Conatva’); because ‘Redness’ is a Quality, and.as such
forms a (1465 wholly distinct from the Oluss ‘ Horse,’ and it is: by
mere chance that it has. become connected with this latter Olass

That is to.say, if the word Cona’ had denoted mere Redness, then
Meould have stood in need pf either a qualification by the Olass ‘Horse ›
or & distinct potentiality whereby .it, could denote only that Redness.
which -would एन णाल with itself in. the same substrate. As a mnattel

.` pROBIBITION OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE. ` 1396

of fact, however, we. find that, just as the word is not. denotative of
‘ Satta’ (Being) or the Class ‘Quality’, so also it passes over the more
extensive Class of ‘‘ Reiness”’ (in general), and restricts itself to the
denotation. of a particular kind of Redness, And this peculiar kind of
Redness belongs only to the Horse, and not to the Cow and other animals ;
and it is for this reason that the word ‘Qona’ is found to be indicative
of the Horse precisely, and not vaguely (and doubtfully), as in the
case of the generic word ‘ Red’

Question: “ Which peculiar Reduess is that which, being different
‘from the Redness belonging to the Cow, etc. inheres in. the Horse, —

and not in anything else ? ”

Answer: It is a fact known tv all people that there is a distinct
property for each Class; and this property is spoken of, sometimes. in
general, aud sometimes in particular words.

“ ‘That is to say, in all Classes, we distinctly perceive distinct proper-
ties of Blackness, Whiteness, Redness, etc., in keeping with the Individuals
of each Class. And in some cases, there being no words expressive
of the particular shade of the property meant, tho property is
spoken by the general word, the specification of the property being
left to be done by something else;—while in other cases, there being
words, like ‘Cona,’ expressive of the particular grade of the property,
-this is mentioned in its particular form ;—while in a. third case, the
particular grade of the property is expressed by certain words of the
Vernacular peculiar to each country;—eg. we have the expression
‘fauhinika guuk* for the ‘red cow’; and the word ‘rafthinika’ would
never be used in connection with the red horse, the ved cloth, or any
other red thing. For these reasons, it must be admitted that the ‘Cona
(the Red Horse, i.e. the Chestnut Horse), the ‘ Karaka’ (the Horse born
in the Karaka country), the ‘Gaura’ (‘Fair’) etc. are distinct classes
of properties 06100109 to the Horse, the Man and other things; and
hence when pronounced, they indicate these latter also; just as the Class
‘Cow’ indicates the individual animal with the dewlap, etc. But this
would not justify our speaking of the Horse and the rest as directly
^ denoted’ or ‘ expressed’. by those words (‘ Gopa,’ etc.) |

The same reasoning holds respecting such words as ‘ Kumara
(‘Boy’), “Kurabha’ (‘ Hlephant-cub'), ‘Kalabha’ (‘ young of the Camel’)
‘Vatsa’ (‘Calf’), ‘Varkara’ (‘Kid’) and the like,—all of which are -
expre sive of a certain age in the various auimals, Man, Elephant, Camel
Cow and Goat respectively,—and though indicating these animals, they
can neyer.be admitted to be directly expressive of them, as has been already
explained. That is to say, in-all these words, though .the element of
Youthfrlness is common to all, yet each word marka that age in each

1296 = 14 -प4्ा1६५. ADH, HI PADA IV—ADRI, (4)

different animal, as evinced by the youthful. ways peculiar to each
class | ५

It has been argued above that, “ In the case of the Cow also, inas
“much as the word ‘gauh’ would only denote the Number, Gender
“etc. belonging to the animal,--and as the particular Class would be
“ pointed out by these,—the Class itself would not form the deuotation
“ of the word.”

[o this we make the following reply: ‘he Number does not vary
in each different Class, in the way that we have found in the word
Cona’ etc.; and the word by itself, for that very reason, canuot dent
both (the Number and the Class) |

That is to say, if tho idea of 5४४4८८88 1४ the Horse were recognized
as different from that in the Cow,—in the same way as the Redness
of the one was recognized as different from that of the other,—theu what
you say could have been. admissible. Then again, in the case of the
word ‘Conah’, we have found that the basic noun ‘Guna’ by itself
as one composite whole, becomes expressive of both the Property (of
Redness) and the Cluss ‘Horse’; and hence in order to avoid the con-
equent assumption of a multiplicity of denotative potencies in the
word, we take it to be directly oxpressive of one of the two only;
and then finding that it is not invariably concomitant with the
“Horse”, we conclude it to be expressive of the Property of Red- >
ness, with which it is found to be invariably concomitant. And we
could say the same with regard to the word ‘guuwh’ also, only if, in
the. same manner, we found that the Olass ‘Oow’ and the Number
(Singular) being denoted by the same word (‘guak'), it was one
of the two only (i.e. either the Class ouly or the Number only) that
formed the direct denotation of the word, on the ground of that alone
being invariably concomitant with it. Asa matter of fact, however, we
do not find this to be the case, because, the Number being a universal
qualifying factor, we cannot perceive any difference in it (with reference
to any particular Class). Nor can the word alone in its basic form
(‘Go’) denote both (the Class ‘ Cow ’ and the Singular Number) , because
by invariable concomitauce aud non-concomitance, it is found that the
word in its basic form denotes the Class, while the case ending denotes
tho Number. Nor could there be anything objectionable in accepting
ॐ multiplicity of denotations, when there is more than one denotative
agent (in the shape of the basic noun and the ‘case-ending). In fact
when there is more than one denotative agent, if we did. not admit
of more than one denotation,-then the use of one of the former. (either
the basic noun or the case-ending, f.i.) would be wholly suporfuots

Nor. 18 thers aa invariable conconitance “between the Number

PROUTBITION OF TELLING LEMS PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE । 1327

nd the Numbered, by which one of these heing denoted, it would neces
sarily indicate the other; for instance, there is no number in the world
that: does not, qualify (or belong to) the Cow, ete.; nor is there any
Namber which, while belonging to one object, does not belong to another
(and thus there can be no. invariable coneomitance between the Cort
and any particular Numbe7)

Objection: “(What you say may be quite trne as regards the
Number). but the Gender is always denoted by the basic noun itself,
‘and as such this would be distinct with oach Qlass; and hence being
“invariably concomitant with it, it eould denote that Class, exactly
“like the word ‘Cona’.”

Rep'y: It is not so: (1) because, in the case of inanimate objects,
the Gender cannot be distinguished; und hence your reasoning could
not set aside the fact of the Class ‘ Prksha’ (` Tree ` ) being directly denoted
‘by the word ‘Vrkshah’ (instead of the Gender of the Tree, as you
would have it}; and (2) similarly, in a case where the feminine
characler is denoted by the feminine aflixes, ‘fap’ and the rest, we
would have the Class denoted by the word. prior to the addition of
that affix

That is to say, in the case of such words ‘ aja’ and the like (= ‘ aja’
+ ° (00 '), the affixes ‘tap’ etc. being merely indicative of the feminine
‘character, they do not become distinct denotative words by themselves ;
but all that they do is to create, in the previously existing word, a
fresh potency (expressive of the feminine character). And yet, prior
lo the addition of these feminine affixes, we still find the word in a
definite form (‘ aya’ £1.) ; and while we have yet to recognize its Gender,
we come to recognize its capability of denoting the QOlass ‘Goat’; and
this capability once recognized cau never be set aside.

Similarly too, in the case of those words in which the Masculine or
Neuter character is manifested by the case-tormination (the words
‘Sddhuhk' and ‘ Madhu’ £.1.), we would have a denotation of the Class,
prior to the manifestation of the Gender.

In the case of those words, however, in which, even before the
addition of the case-endinge, or. after the elimination of these, the
pure basic form of the word gives an idea of the Gender,—e.g. the
words ‘ Hasti’, ‘Na’, ‘ Dévadatia’, ‘Cri’, ‘Sarit’, ‘Toya’ and ‘ Vari
—if we admit what you say, there would be nothing objectionable in it
Or even in the case of these words, inasmuch as the meaning would
he correctly recognized, even without a differentiation of the word
(into its basic form and the case-ending),—it is the 0725९ (and not
the Gender) that should be regarded as the very first-to be cognized
hy a process of differentiation known to all men

4 :

1998 TANTRASVARTIKA, ADH. 1I—PADA 1९ --+ 0, (4),

Then again, Masculinity etc. are properties belonging to the Indiyi-
duals: and ag such there can be no cognition of these before the Indivi-
duals have been cognizel. While the Class is so intimately connected
with the deriotative potency of the word, that unless that 18 ९ -enized
there is no cognition of any such potency in the word :

For these reasons, tt must be admitted that it is the Gender that
is indicated by the Olass, and not vice versa. Specially as the Gerde
is always recognized 88 the subordinate element, and hence it could
never ret aside the denotability of the Class which is found to be
denoted as the predominant factor. As a matter of fact too, we find =
that in the case of the words ‘go’, ‘papu’ and the like, there is no `
manifestation of any Gender, as there is that of the पह. ` Conse-
qnently it is the Class that should be admitted as forming the denota-.
tion of the word. And in a ense where it would not be incompitible |
with the Gender, it would indicate this latter also; and in a case where
the Class is not compatible with tho Gender, and this is cognized by
some other means, it 18 this latter means that woald serve as its
indicator ; or’ it would be either the Class as aided by the other means,
or the basic form of the word itself,—we coald assume anything we
liked. | |

For these réasous, the case of such words as ‘Go’ and the rest (that
denote the Class) cannot be said to be similar to that of the word ‘Cina’. `
1 the case of the words ‘pacati' etc. also, if the Number were
cognised as separate from all the other Xarukas, as following in the
wake of the Nominative only,—like the character of ‘ Gonutva,’ which
resides in the Horse only,—then, in that case, we could very well admit
the fact of the Nominative being indicated by that Number. But that
too would leave the Nominative wlenoted (by the Conjugational A fix).
As a matter of fact, however, we are cognizant of a difference in
Nwmber; and certainly we could not very well go on assuming the
existence of an endless number of ‘ singlénesses’, with regard to each
single Individual that we might come across: and hence we cannot
but accept the fact of the Nominative being indicated only by the
Bhavana and the Root-meaning

` Then again, in the case of. the assertion ‘Cono dhavati’ (‘the Ches-
nut 18 running’), we find that there is no other word (except Conuh )
giving us un idea of the Class; and it is for this reasen that in this parti- `
cular case, we have admitted of the aforesaid complicated process of inter
pretation. That, however, cannot be admitted in the case in question
Fhat is to say, if we had another word pointing to the ‘horse’ (in the
case of the seritence । (2000 difvati'), then we could not have twisted this
fame word ‘ (००१ ' so mercilessly.’ In the case of the Number; however

` PROHIBITION OF TELLING LIBS PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE. 1829

we have the Bhadvand.and the Rvot-meaning that would bring forward
(and indicate) the Nominative related to it; and hence there is uo need
for twisting the Number itself (into giving us the idea of the Nominative)
And the special reasons, that we have for believing the Nominative
to be indicated by the Bh‘tvanda alone, we have already explained before.

Thas then we find that, even when the Nominative is directly
denoted (by the Verbal Affix) it is quite capable of bearing (to the
Number f.i.) the relationship of the qualification and qualified; and
consequently we concluie that the assumption of the denotahility of
the Nominative is wholly groundless

The denotability of the Nominative having, in the above manner,
, been 81100, by reasonings, to be groundless, the Vacytkurara proceeds to
show the incompatibility of tie view thus arrived at with the scriptures
(i.e. the Rales and Maxims laid down in the Gram nttical Scriptures).

“Tnasmuch as we have the teacher's decluration that the basic word
“and the affie conjointly express the denotation of the Affix, we must
“admit that what ts actually denoted by the Conjugational Affix is the
"१ Nominative, and also the Objective. ‘That is to say, we have Panini’s
“Sitra [1 --1 --69 laying down that the Conjagational Affixes denote
“the Objective, as well as the Nominative; and then again, inasmuch
“as the Sabstitute resembles that for which it is substituted (in accord-
“ance with the 87६४० [—i—56), the affixes ‘tip’ aud the rest would

also denote the Nominative and the Objective

Objection: ‘The Siddhinta theory having been shown to be con
“tradictory to the verbal authority of the Saira itself (Satra III—iv
' -09); the bringing forward of the popular saying—prakptipratyayau

pratyayartham, ete., 18 wholly irrelevant. ’

“Reply: How can it be said to be irrelevant, when is 18 necessary
“for the Parvapakshi to establish the fact of the Nominative being
“the predominant factor (and it is only the Assertion quoted, and not
“the Sitra, that has any bearing upon that point). And hence what
“is meant by citing the authority of both is to show that there are
“Smrtis in support of the theory that the Nominative is directly denoted,
“as algo that it is the pralominant factor. Thus then the sense of the
“whole comes to be this: Inasmuch as the basic word and the Affix

conjointly perform the work of denoting the meaning of the Affix

which latter is declared (in Satra LIE ~iy—-69) to consist of the Nomina-

“tive as well as the Objective,—~it must be admitted that what the

` Verb denotes is the Nominative aud the Objective ‘as qualified by

‘the Action (denoted by the Verbal Root); and as शालौ there is a
-‡67 । |

1330 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. Wi—PApA 1V—-ADHI. (4).

५५ distinc contradiction between Duirect Declaration (which connects the
i <¢elling of lies’ with the Nominative Agent) and the Context (whic
५ connects the same action with the Sacrifice) |

“he Satra 1 [[--1र-69 (of Panint) lays down only the denotability
‘of the Nominative and the Objective While the Siitra ‘ Kurtari gap
“(Papini [IL—i --68) shows, in the first instance, that the Nominative is
“actually found, in usage, to be spoken of as denotuble ; and secondly,
“it also uses the form ‘ Kartari’ with the sequential Locative ending
‘ond inasmuch as, ina number of words, the Nominative Agent itself
“cannot find & place in a sequential order, the sequence (signified by the
“ Locative) comes to be receguized as pertaining to the word (denoting
“the Nominative),—in accordance with the Séra ‘Anarthakyat tadar-
^ geshu’ (IIT—i—18) ; the sense of the Siéra thus coming to be that;
“when the Conjugational Affix denoting the Nominative is preceded
“ by, etc., ete.”

“In any case we find that the Teachers (of Grammar) have distinctly
“laid down that the Nominative is denoted by the Conjugation] Affix ;
“and: hence any reasoning to show that it is not denotable is most
“‘ improper.”

To the above we make the following reply: The Teachers of
Grammar say nothing as to the relationship of the Denotative and the
Denotable (1.6, they do not say anything as to certain things being
denoted by certain words); this is inferred from actual usage, throug!
the Apparent Inconsistency (of this nsage)

That is to say, the incompatibility of Verbal Authority could be
rightly urged only in that case where the Reasoning and the Verbal
Authority both pertain to the same subject. In the case in question,
however, we find that while the Reasoning treats of the question as
to what is directly denoted, and what is indirectly implied (by the Affix).
—-the grammatical authorities cited treat of a wholly distinct question,
as to which among a number of synonymous-words 18 correct, and which
meorrect, in form. And ce: tuinly when two things treat of two wholly
distinct subjects, oue cannot set aside the: other. even though this latte:
may be weaker in authority; and a rejection is all the more mmpropel
when what is sought to be rejected treats of the wholly different subject
of the denotation and implication by the Verbal Affix, and-is as well
known to all men as any fact of ordinary sense-perception, |

` Thus then, even if the Tenchers of Grammar had actually made the
. declaration that ‘the Nominative ig denoted by the. Conjigational Affix,
“we could not attach niach importance to such a declaration in the present
conubction, which deals with a wholly different subject, As @ matter
Of. fact, however, we figd that they do not make.such a declaration. : -

PROHIBITION OF TELDING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE 133]

hgeotion: “But we have just cited the Sativa [1-1-69 (which
distinctly declares the fact of the Nominative, xs well as the Objective,
being denoted by the Conjagational Affix) ~
Reply: Trae, you have cited that Sdtra: butin citing it vou have
looked into one part of the Sittra-text and not into the whole of it.. And
certainly you vannot reasonably bring forward against one theory the
incompatibility of the verbal authority of certain Sétras the import whervof
has not been fully considered in all its ba wings, Because all seriptrarl
texts give correct teachings, only when they are taken along with: the
other portions of the Context in which they occur, |
If one could rightly bring forward the incompatibility of Verba!
Authority, only in view of a portion of the Context, then, (1) in the case
of the sentence ‘shonid. not drink wine.’ we could take out only the two
_,words ‹ drink wine,’ interpreting them as enjoining the drinking of wine ;
and in that case one not drinking wine could be hauled up for disobeying
this Injunction; and thus doing something against scriptural authority ;
(2) we could take the sentence ‘one should perform the Agnihotra all
through his life,’ by itself, apart from the other sentences found in the
same Context; and in that case, even if one, wh» had passed though the
ceremony of [nitiation, should omit to offer the dgathotra sanrifice, we
could accnse him of having committed a grievous sin (x9 the sentence cited
` by itself makes the life-long Ayudhotrs as necessary for the Uninitiated as
for the Initiated); (3) in fact, in Grammar itself, if we took the Satra
‘mudérgunah’ (Panini VU—ii—82) entirely bv itself (without taking it
along with the other Satra I~i—5, which limits the applioution of the
former), then the form ‘ Minna,’ without the guna (broadening of the
vowel), would have to be pronounced wngrammaticnl, Consequently, it is
not right for you to bring forward, agamsé our theory, the incomparibility
of any one disjointed part of the Grammatical Sitras
In support of our contention we have the following declaration
Any single part of the text, when taken independently by itself, expresses
something wholly different from what is expressed by it when taken along
with the whole, together with all its accessories and auxiliarios
Specially is this the case with the text of Grammatical Sitras;
because, in this, we find almost the whole Bight Adhyadyas of the Satras
‘Operating in the formation of a sinzle word. Consequently it ix neces-
sary to avoid an incompatibility with that which is expressed by the
Sdtra ° Luhkurmani,’ etc. (Panini I1[—iv—69) when taken along - with.
all its auxiliary Sutras. = `
For instance, in the case in -qnestion, tlio full Injunction with regard
lo the Oonjugational. Affixes ig completed by the following Satrus:—
1-1-19, 8,4,.91,-92, 98, 94; IIT~ii—123; I]I--iv—67; Il iv.

1332 | PANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, TlI-~PADA -IV—ADHL (4)

69. 77. 78. I~iii -12, 78; I—iv—106, 107, 108, 101, 102, 21,22: and be
sides these many 8261058 relating to Nomenclature and Definitions, dealing
with eliminations, additions, modifications of letters, etc, eto. And all
these have to be taken as syntactically. connected (forming + singh.
sentence), laying down all that is necessary in connection with the
-Conjagational Affix (‘tip*fi.), And this syntactical connection 18 possible
only when one Stra is taken as qualifying the other; and this relation.
ship of the qualification and the qualified, between words having the
snme case-endings, 18 either by coextensiveness or its contrary; and is
of the nature of that which subsists between the Action and the Agencie
(Karakas) pertaining to it, ov that between the Primary and its Sub
sidiaries

In the case in question, however, we do not find some of the above
Siitras to have any useful bearing; and hence we take up for consideration
only the following Satras—‘the Conjugational Affixes appear in the sense of
the Nominative and the Objective’ (II[—iv—69!', ‘when there is only one
Nominative we have the Singular Affix, when there are two we have the
Dual, and when there are many we have the Plural’ (I-- iv-—-2], 22),—in
connection with which we shall consider whether the relationship of the
qualification and the qualified among them operates by coextensiveness
or otherwise

First of all, then, in these Satras, we find that the words ‘one,’ ‘two*
and ‘many’ are denotative of Numbers; and anless they denote these Num
bers, they cannot be applied to any objects, as we have shown under the
Akrtyadhikarana (I—iii 30 ०४ seg.). In fact, in the Mahdbhashya of
Patanjali, we find that he puts the question, in connection with the
Sittra ‘ Bahushu bahuracanam’ (I-~iv—21),—' Késhu bahushu £ ' (‘what
ave those that are meant by bahushu in the Sitra?’),—and then, having
put forward the objections to the wording of the question, he comes to
the conclusion that the words ‘bahu’ etc. (in the Sutras, ‘Bahushu bahw
vacanam ` 800 the rest) signify Nembers; specially as we find him explain
ing the words ‘bahushu’ and ‘dvyy8kayok’ (in the Sitras) as ‘ bahutvd
and ‘dvitvatyakatvayoh’ respectively. Then he proceeds to put another
question—‘ In the absence of an abstract affix, how can the declaration
have an Abstract. Noun for the predominant factor?’ And to this
question he gives the answer—‘ This is quite possible, when, in the very
firat instance, the Property is meant to be spoken of in its due predomi
nance’ =
The sense of this reply is as follows: There are three ways in which
a Property is spoken of—(1) in certain cases it is mentioned, in the very
0790 instance, independently by itself; (2):some Properties are mentioned
as accessories to a certain substance; and (8) there are. some which

PROHIBITION. OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE, . 1555

though really. belonging to certain substances, are spoken of as abstracted
from these substances

That 18 tosay, (1) in a case where, in the very first instance, the
Property is meant to ba xpoken of independently, as a predominant
factor by itself,—there is no appearance of the Abstract Affix, and the
Property becomes connected with the substance, even without coexten-
siveness ;—~e.g. in the expression. ‘ patasya gukluk’ (where ‘ Cukla’=

Cuklatea `) (2) In # case where the Property is meant to be spoken of
as subordinate to the substance, and no separation or abstraction is meant
.-we have coextensiveness,—e¢.g. in the expression ‘ Cutlak patah.’ (3)
Lastly, in a case where the Property is meant to be spoken of as snbor-
dinate to a snbstance, and its abstraction from it is desired subsequently, --
we have the Abstract Affixes ‘tva’ or ‘tal’ attached to the word denoting
the Praperty;—in accordance with the rule that, ‘ when a word denotes
that Property the existence whereof in the substance makes the word

| applicable to it, then that word takes the Abstract Affixes tva and tal

‘and in this case we have the expression ‘ putasya cutlatvam.’ In a case,
however, where the Property is meant to be spoken of as an independent
predominant factor by itself, the Property is not a qualifying. Property
at all, but an independent substance by itself; and hence there can be no
application, through this Property, of the adjective expressive of it, to
the substance; and as in this case, the Property does not affect (‘ bha-

४०१६८ *) the use of the word denoting the substance, we do not find it
spoken of by means of the Abstract Affixes (‘tva’ and ‘tal’). Specially
because, inasmuch as the Property has been already abs/racted beforehand,
the useof an Abstracting (or Abstract) Affix would be wholly superfluous.

Objection: “If sach be the case, then in all cases, that to which the
Number would belong would always be inthe Genitive Case.”

Reply: It is quite true that such would be the natural consequence ;
but, just ag in certain cases, the Adjective, with a view to point to the Sub-
stance to which the Property (denoted by that Adjective) belongs, hecomea
coextensive with the word (substantive) denoting tlnt substance,—so, in
the same manner, there is the coextensiveness, with the Adjective, of the
Substantive which is used with a view to express the Property to which
the Substance (denoted by that Substantive) is snbordinate; specinlly as
in both cases we have the same gronnds for taking both (the Adjective
and the Substantive) as non-different, or one of them as indirectly indi-
cating the other. Buteven thongh such an expression would be corrent in
form, yet, inaamuch it is never found in actual usage, it does not become
comprehended as quickly as it. should be. If, however, it happens to be
met with, in a certain case, then it should be explained in the manner
shown above ; this is all that we mean by putting it forward |

1334 | TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. TH—PADA Ty-ADHL. (4),-

For these reasons, it must be admitted that even without the use of
the Abstract Affix, we can speak, quite intelligibly, of a Property (Num.
ber f.i.) as the predominant factor. And it is only thus that we cond
justify the Dual number in the word ‘doyékayok’ (in the 64८1 1—-jy—
99) For if ‘two’ and ‘one’ in the Sétra meant ‘two things’ and ‘one
thing’ respectively, then the total of these being three, we should have
had the Plural Number; and in that case we should have had the form
‘dvyekeshu,’ if it referred to the objects qualified hy the Numbers.
That isto say, if the expression were meant to apenk of the Substances
qualified by the Number, as the predominant factors, then in that cise, the
‘two’ Substances together with the ‘one’ Substance would make up three,
and thus necessitnte the use of the Plural ending. When, on the other
hand, it is the Numbers that are meant to he spoken of as the predomi-
nant factors, then, inasmuch as ‘ Dnoality’ and ‘Singleness’ would be the
predominant factors meant to be spoken of, they would take their own
Numbers; and as such there would be only two factors (those of ‘ duality `
and ‘singleness’), and we would lave the Dual ending; and as such the
form ‘ dvéyékayok’ would become justified. |

Question: ‘‘ How is it that the Abstract Affix does not denote the
“substance qualified by the Property ? ” | |

_ Answer: The chief reason for this lies in the fact of the wish of
the speaker being of varions kinds. Or, if the Siitra ‘ Bahushu bahuva: `
canam’ (Panini I—i—21) meant that ‘we should have the Plural Number
whenever we have ७५५१५४८५ ' ~ then we would have the Plural Number in
cases where the word ‘ bahu’ is used in the sense of great, large quantity,
big, extensive, etc., as in the case of such expressions as ‘bahihk samudrah,’
‘bahurodanak’; na also in connection with all numbers above ‘two,’
which have the common character of ‘being above two.’ {Both of which
would be inadmissible; as in the former case, the expression itself would
be absurd; while in the second the Plural applied to the Numbers over
twenty would be wrong, as all such numbers are laid down as to be used
always in the Singular.] Asa matter of fact, however, we find that the
Sitra uses the word ‘bahushu’ (and not ' bahutvs’), with the sole view of
showing that the Plural ending should be used only for the denoting of
that number which depends upon diversity among the individuals. And
thos it 18 that we have the expression ‘ bahurodanak । [without the
‘Plural; simply because there is no diversity among the*individual grains,
oftherice), = / .. 7 क oe
. ~ : We find in the Muhabhashya that, against the. theory of: the. Number
being the. predominant factor, has been’ raised the ‘objection that in
accordance with that theory; we conld not have the expression ‘até many-

ant,’ because ‘@ku’ Signifying singleness ga: the predominant factor, if

। PROHIBITION. OF TELLING LIKS PERTAINS TO SACRIFICE. 1335

should have had.the Singular ending; but this objection has been met
by showing that in such expressions the word ‘ eké’ means ‘ others’ (and |
ug 8761118 capable of taking the plural endiny)

Thus it becomes established that what the Sdtras ‘Buahushu bahuva-
caiam’ etc. (I—iv—21, 22) mean is. that we have the Plural ending where
there is mulfiplicity (‘many-ness ), and the Singular and the Dual
ondings, where we have Sinyleness and Duality respectively

Thas-then, in connection with the Injunction of Conjugational Affixes,
we have the following two declarations: ~~ (1) Inssmuch as tho affix ‘tip’

‘is substituted in the place of the Conjugational endings, it should be taken
ys used in the sense of the Nominative (in accordance with the Satra
‘lakkarmani, etc.’ IIT—iv—69). (2) Inasmuch as tho affix ‘tip’ is
called a ‘singular affix,’ it appears only when there is Singleness. ‘I'hus
then, we have two alternatives: (a) that the Nominative and the Single-
ness are both related to the ‘tip,’ without being related to each other,—in
his case the sense of the above two declarations being that ‘the tip affix
"aie either in the sense of the Nominative, or in that of Singleness’ ;
“and (४) the meaning of the two declarations is that ‘ the dip affix appears
when there 15 Singleness of the Nominative, —in this case, the Nominative
and Singleness bearing to each other the relationship of tho qualification
and the qualified.
^ The former alternative is untenable ; as the tip cannot be related to
any one of them unless they are specified (or qualified) by the other.
Because, in accordance with this alternative, we would have the tip affix
6vyen in a case where we have more than one Nominative; as also when-
ever there would be Singleness, even in any of the Karakus

That is to say, if it be held that the tip affix is laid down as to be
used, in connection with the Nominative, or with Singleness, each of these
beg independent of the other, then, at the time of actual usage alsv, we
would have the same independence; and hence we would have the ‘tip
also in cases where we have two or niore Nominative agents; us also
when we-have Sinyleness, even in connection with the other Karakas

Consequently (in order to avoid these anomalies) we should, at the
very outset, admit of the fact of the Nominative. and Singleness being
related to each other by the relationship of qualification

And this relationship is by coextensiveness, because of thé two taking
the same oase-ending (the expression being ‘ékusmin kartart’). And as
for the relationship by Vatyyadkikaranya (difference in the substrata),
masniuch-as uo such relationship is, directly expressed by the words, it
could only be due, either {0 the process of indirect Indivation (by one or
the other), or to the modifying of the case-endings (the form being
changed «into ‘Rartuh ékatvam’), Tn fact, in: the case of the said

1336 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. UL—PADA IV—ADHI. (4)

oexteusiveness 2180, for the sake of the established predominance of the

Number, it is the word ‘ Kartr’ (Nominative) that betakes itself either {0
the indirect indicating (of ‘kartrguna,’ the property of the Nominntive), or
to the attributing of non-difference (between the Nominative and the
Namber relating to it);—and not so the word ‘éka’; because if this latter
did so, then the Substance related to the Namber would become the
predominant factor. And hence we conclude that in the expression
¢ 1214000 @katvé’ we have the Genitive (in ‘kartuh’) in the subordinate
factor, simply with a view to show, by direct denotation, the object that
is related (to the predominant factor of the Number) by coextensivene $3,

Or, we may explain the expression ‘karturékatv@’ in the following
manner: Inasmuch as the two words denote two distinct things, they
cannot be coextensive; and when there is no coextensiveness, they
cannot have the same case-ending; nor could the desired relationship be
expressed by any other ending save the Genitive; and withont such a
relationship, the seuse that is desired to be conveyed would not bo
possible. And hence, the changing of the case-ending of one of the two.
being inevitable, inasmuch as the Number has already been shown to be
the predominant factor, and as it 18 10 connection with the qualification
that we always have the Genitive ending,—-it is the case-endiny (the
Locative) of the word ‘karfart’ that is changed into the required ap
tive,—and this provess gives us the expression ‘karturébatvée’ (in t
place of ‘ékasmin kartari’)

In any case, there is not the remotest possibility of the moditication
vf the case-ending of ‘ékatvé’; as any such modification would give us
the idea of a wholly different object; because if we have the expressiv1
ˆ ékatrasya kartari karmani ca,’ then the sense would be something wholly
different, viz: ‘One who does the Singleness, and whose action that is"!

Thus then, the upshot of the whole set of Satras comes to be that the
Numbers—Singleness etc. as qualified by the Nominative or the Objective—
are denoted by the Conjugational Affixes; and hence there is no incompati
bility in our theory with the verbal authority of the said grammatical rules

The said Siirss being explained in the above manner, the conclusion
that we have arrived at by a course of reasoning—viz., that ‘there is no
denotation of the kdrakas because of their being indicated by the Bhavana
-—would be found to be quite in keeping with the sense of the Nitras
And the words of the Sifrus also—such f.i. aa ‘doyékayok’ and the like
—would have their scope limited by the said ressonings; and as such
would be in keeping with the reasonings relating to the qualifications, the
qaulified,- ete, ebe :
| The sentence in the Bhashya ~~‘ LaukikanydyAnugatagea sutrdrtias ~~
may be explained in y different sense also, which would be as follows: In

PROHIBITION OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS 10 SACRIFICE, 1337

ordinary experience we find that the Namber (denoted by the Conjuga-
tional Affix! is always recognized as qualified by the Nominative or the
Objective; and the sense of the Sifras would be in keeping with this fac

of ordinary experienco, if these were explainod in the way shown above

Otherwise, if each Sutra were interpreted by itself, independently of the
other, the Vitra would come to mean that the Conjugational Affix denotes
the Number and the karaka, each independently of the other, which would
be totally contrary to the aforesaid fact of ordinary experience

Nor would this be all; in fact the sense of the Satras would become
incompatible with those reasovings that are put forward by the Vary#-
karanas themselves, While if the Namber is taken to be denoted i by the
Conjugational Afix) as qualified (bv the Noninative or the Objective),
then all things become duly reconciled to one another
५ Against what has been s:id ५००९९, the opponent might bring forward
the following Objection: ‘The above interpretation of yrammutical rules
“ig the mere outcome of the ingenuity of tre Mininaaka, who is excep-
tionally. ciever at the manipulation of senten:es and their constructions
“and interpretations. The view that the Vacyitarunas themselves take
“is not such as has been shown by you.”

Reply: The authority of the Grummiutical writers also points to the
same conclusions that we have arrived at; the declaration of Putunguli himsecf
being to the effect, that ‘ When Singleness etc. form the denotatios of Affixes,
the Objective aud the rest become their qua'ificutions.” The sense of tiris 18
that in treating of ‘ Plurals,’ and ‘ Anabhihita Nominatives and Objectives,’
the authors of both the {77८2 and the Bitahys, having diseus<ed, in
preat detail, the two theories of the ‘Objective’ and the ‘Singleness’
(being the denotation of Affixes), are found to have come to the following
flawless conclusions: What is denoted by the Affixes are Singlen-ss, atc. ;
otherwise, we could have the Plural Number in any and every word
(without restriction); and further it would not be necexsary to lay down
the rules for the use of the Nom.-native and the Objective terminations on
the condition of the Nominative and the Objective being ‘not expressed ’
(‘Anubhthita’) for the appearance of the Nominative or Accusative
terminations; as even in other places (1.6. where we have not these
terminations, but only verbs, like ‘ pucatz,’ which latter, according to you,
would denote the Nominative or the Objective), we woul not have the
denotation of that which has been already denoted. For if the Objective.
were already denoted. by the Conjugational Affixes, Nominal affixes or
Compounds, then there would be left no reason for any farther denoting
of the Objective by the Accusative (or the Nominative terminations), with
a view to which we should huys had the conditional Satra =" Anablihité
[preceding the Sutras laying down the case-teyuinations]. On the

168 क Oe | 9

1358 Ss TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. TH—PADA 1V—ADBI, (4)

other hand, when tho Objective ०४८. are uot denoted. (by. the Conjugationa}

‘Affixes, eto.), then, unless we had the Sd#tras specially laying down
the Accusative terminations, with reference to the Singleness, ete. of that
Objective, we could not have the Accusative ending in such cages. [And
hence it is only in accordance with our theory that we can justify the
conditional Sutra ‘anabhifité’}. Specially as it makes no. difference in
reasoning, whether the Objective etc. are‘or are not denoted. = |

It is in view of these facts that, in recapitulating the position taken
np by the author of the Varttka (Katyaéyana), Patanjali has declared.
‘It is only when the Singlenes., etc. are denoted by the Conjugationa!
Affix, etc. that the-conditional Satra ‘anabhihité’ becomes necessary ;
while if the Objective, ete. were denoted by them, the 676१0 would be
absolutely meaningless

Objection: “In the Muhadbhashya, we meet also with this declaration
‘(to the contrary): ‘When the Objective, etc. are denoted by the Affixes
“then the Singleness etc, appear as qualifications’ [and hence we cannot
“admit the fact of the Mahdbhashya lending unqualified support to the
^“ position taken up by the Mimdnsaka|.”

Reply: The sentence quoted by you represents the position opposed
to Patanjali’s own; and though, as such, it did not deserve a place in the
Mahabhashya, yet Patanjali has put it forward, simply by way of admit-
ting the opponent's view, for the sake of argument. The sense of the `
whole being that, even when the Objective etc. happen to be the objects
qualified (by the Number), and as such, being the predominant factors,
form the denotations of the Affixes,— even then, Singleness etc. are actually
denoted, as their qualifications ; because they could not serve as qualifica-
tions, unless they were themselves fully denoted (or expressed); and as
for the gualified factors, they are got at by other means; and it is a
well-known fact that, under such circumstances (where the qualified is
got at by other means) the Injunction betakes itself to the qualifying
subordinate; as we find in the case of the Injunction ‘ lohitoshpisha
riviyak pracarunti’ (where the Riviks and their pracarana being found to
have been laid down elsewhere, the Injunction contained in. the sentence
is taken as applying to the subordinate factor, the ‘red turban’ only)

Or, we can take the word ‘artha’ (in the phrase ‘vibhaktyarthah }
ns signifying ‘purpose’; the sense being that ‘when they (the objective
etc.) constitute the purpose, then the case-termination is used for the sake
of them
| Or again, inasmuch as both the above declarations of Patanjali are
“equally in keeping with the nature of things, we can take both of them
“as.equally true, bnt limited in their scope,—the former pertaining to the
_Conjogational Affizes, and the latter to the Declensional Affixes; and

PROHIBITION OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS TO SACKIFICE. | 1339

ertainly we do admit the denotability of the Objective etc. by these latte:
affixes. —

Objection: “ Inasmuch as the rules regarding the Plural ete. are the
“same with regard to both (the Conjugational and the Declensional
“ Affixes), there must be an uniformity in thom; and hence just as the
५ Conjugational Affix (according to the Mimansaka) would denote the
^ Number qualified by the Objective etc. and not the &arakus themselves,—
“go would it also be in the case of the Declensional Affixes. And in that
“case, your theory would be incompatible with such expressions as——
“‘yatkarandbhidhayinya irtiyavibhaktya samyugys nirdigatt, ‘tadaigamé
“hi tad drgyaté, ‘tasya jidnun’ etc. (which are found in your own
“ Bhiishya).”

To this some people make the following reply: Inasmuch as we find
that it 18 quite possible for the same rule to be taken differently, in
accordance with the different purposes served by it, with regard to
different objects,—and that the nature of the qualifying relationship is
found different in different cases,—we speak of the Number as the qualified
factor, iu the case of Conjugational Affixes, and as the qualifying facto
in that of the Declensional ones

If however this explanation should not satisfy you, we offer you
nnother: Though the Rules do not accept the denotability of the Objec-
tive ete., yet they spoak of such denotability, only for the sake of the
accomplishment of that which has been accepted as the denotable (i.e. the
Number).

That is to say, we find that the grammatical rales often speak of
the ‘denotability ’ of certain factors, merely as a conventional technicality,
for certain definite purposes. But this mere technicality can justify our
acceptance of such denotability, as an actuality, in ordinary parlance.
Nor have we any rules laying down that the Objective and the rest are
never denotuble; what they do lay down is that these Objective etc. aro the
qualifications of the Numbers, Singleness etc. which are the actual denota-
tions (of the Conjugational Affixes),—as we have already explained above
Hence it must be admitted that the Objective and the other karakas always
‘serve as qualifying subordinates (in the case of Conjagational Affixes)
Thus then, in a case where the Objective etc. are not found, either by
reasonings, or by Verbal authority, to have the said denotability,—they
are at once recognized as absolutely undenotable. In that case, however,
where it is found that unless themselves denoted, they could not serve as
qualifications, —we must, for this reason, admit them to. be denotable. Or
again, on the ground - the Apparent Inconsistency (of the denotability
of the Number, which would not be quite possible without a denotation of
108 qualifying. subordinate, in the shape of the Ohjective -etc.), we can

1840 = TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADB. 11I-—PADA I¥—ADHI. (4)

accept the denotability of these to be laid down by the grammatical rules
also

In the case of Conjugational ^ 7९२, however, we find that the Nomi
native (or Objective) is indicated hy the Bijvand, and as such, quite cap-
able of serving as the qualification (of Number); and hence, in this case
(there being no Apparent. Inconsistency) it is not necessary to admit. its

ctual direct denotability. But in the case of the Declensional Affixes, we
find that either the denotations of the hasic words, or the Singlenens ete., are
not invariably concomitant with the kdrakas,—inasmuch as they appear
both with and without these latter; and hence their capability of indi
cating any of the karakas is set aside (by the said non-concomitance)
then again, in this case, we do not find the word denoting either the
Bhavani or the Boot-menning, or any other factor indicative of the
_kftrakas; hence, inasmuch as without the denotation of the karaka itself,
it would not be possible to have the denotation of the Nuwber qualified by
thut karaka, we must (on the ground of this last Apparent Inconsistency )
accept the kdraka also to be directly denotable.

Objection: “Inasmuch as the Noun is never used by itself, it is
‘necessary that it should always be accompanied by a Verb; and as this
“Verb would denote a Bhivand, it would be as indicated by this Bhirand
“that the kfrakas, in this case of Declensional Affix also, would be
‘connected with the Number denoted,—exactly as in the case of the
“ Conjugational A ffixes

Reply: How could it be so, when, as a matter of fact, we find that in
sentences, whereof the order of sequence among the words is not fixed.
the Noun is used before the Verb, (eg. in the sentence ‘Vrksham chin-
dhi’); aud in-this case we find that the cognition of the kd@ruku—‘Vrk-
sham’ —appears before that of the Verb; and certainly this cognition (of
the tdraku) would not be possible uvless the karuka were denotable, inde
pendently ‘by itself |

Objection: “ Even in this case, as the ka@raka would not be a true
“ kdraka, unless connected with the Verb, the karaku-endings would not
“appear until the relationship with the Verb were distinctly shown
‘And hence in this case also, the (वमढ would be preceded by the Verb
‘(and hence the conditions would be exactly the same as those in the
‘‘ case of the Conjugational Affixes .” —

Reply: This 18. quite true, as regards the speaker ‘of the sentence
‘Vrksham chindht'); ‘but.as regards the person to whom the sentence 15
addressed, at the time that he hears the first word ‘ Vrksham,’ he has no
idea of any Verb or of its-connection (with the word heard) ; consequently
‘what he does is to recognize the kiraka alone as expressed by the word
- € Vrkshum ` ).-- कात्‌. then, through Tuference,. or. though: Apparent: .Incon

PROHIBITION OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS ‘CO SACRIFICE 1341

sistency (of the k@rake-character which 18 not possible without a Verb
denoting an action), he comes to have an idea of the Verb which the
speaker. may have previously determined upon

If.it were not so, there would be a mutual inter-dependence. Because
the Verb would indicate the. kfraka, and this latter would indicate the
Verb; and neither of these would have an independent basis of its own
In all cases of two. things related together, it is necessary to accept one of
them. to have a basis independent of the other. But in the case in ques-
tion, if the Karaka were to be indicated by the Verb, —then it.would be
necessary to explain by what the Verb is indicated. Then, we find that
the basic Noun ‘Vrksha’ (in the sentence ‘Vrkshum-chindhi’) cannot
indicate the verb; because what the word denotes is the Class character-
ized by-the presence of branches etc. Nor could the denotation of the
basic Noun indicate it; as this is quite possible even without the action
expreased by the verb (and as such there could be no Apparent Inconsis-
tency justifying the indication)

The following might be urged by the opponent: “ There is no such
“thing as is absolutely devoid of some sort of an action; consequently in
“the case of all Nouns, we would always have the indication of some such
“Verb as ‘18’, ‘exists’ and the like. Or again, the indication of the
“Verb would be by means of the ka@raka, which 1s always accompanied
“by a Verb, in accordance with the rule that ‘the Verb zs in the Present
“Tense Singular is always understood even where it is not actually
‘“uttered.’"’ |

But this is not possible; because even when such intransitive verbs,
as ‘is’ and the like, are avtually uttered, what they indicate is only the
Nominative (which alone is its necessary concomitant), and not neces-
sarily the Objective and the other karakas. That 1s to say, the Verb
that is indicated by the denotation of the basic Noun, is only some such
generic one ५8 ‘1s’ and the like; but this Verb is not capable of indicating
all the kavakas ; consequently we should look out for some other agency
for the indication of the Objective etc.. Then, we find that the case-
endings do not signify the Verb, by which the Objective could be indi-
cated. Nor is the Number (denoted by the ending) capable of indicating
any particular Verb or karaka, as we have explained before. Conse-
quently, we can find no other indicator of the Verh, save the idea of the
kéraka itself. And such being the case, if the Verb also were to be the
indicator of the -kftraka, then this would be a clear case of mutual inter-
dependence, which would make both (the idea of the Verb, as also that
of the kavaka) equally devoid of a foundation |

For these reasons, it. must be admitted that, in the case of: the
Declensional Affixes, it is the Karaka (Objective or Nominative) that is

1342 | «—»-s TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, 111—PADA Iv—apBt. (4).

denoted by the Affix; and the karaka indicates the Verh, in keeping with
its own character, through the relationship borne by them to each other,

Objection ; “In the case of a sentence in which the Verb precedes the
“Noun (eg. (वाद्या orkeham’),—inasmuch as the Verb, capable of
“ bearing the relationship of the kdraka, would be recognised before this
“latter,—and 88 in this case the Verb would have the capability of indi-
“ cating the karaka,—the Affixes would denote the Number only.”

Reply : Such would certainly have been the case, if the sentences had
always begun with the Verb. As it is, however, we find that there is no
fixity in the order in which the words of a sentence might occur; as we
have sentences in the form of ‘yam pagya, as well as in that of ‘ pacya
gam

Hence it cannot be denied that, in the case of Declensional Affixes,
the Objective and other kdrakas are denoted by them. |

Objection: “If such be the case, then there would be no fixity in the
“ denotative potency of Affixes (as it would vary with the order in which
“the words in the sentence would be fonnd).” ` वि

Reply: This could not be; because when the denotative potency
(that of the Affix with regard to the karakes fi.) will have been once
definitely ascertained, in connection with the sentence in which the Noun
precedes the Verb,—could it ever be set aside in the case of another
sentence? Specially as the relationship between words and their deno-
tations is not transitory; and it has already been shown above that this
relationship is conditioned by the mutual limitation imposed by the
potentialities (of the Word and its Denotation) upon each other.

The opponent might bring forward the following counter-argument:
“When, in connection with the sentence in which the Verb would precede
“the Noun, it will have been definitely ascertained that the Affix is
“imeapable of denoting the kdrakas,—inasmuch as it would be necessary
“ for the potency of the Affix to be of one kind only, it- would follow that
‘the Affix is absolutely without the capability of denoting the karakas.”

‘But this is not admissible; because, as a matter of fact, there is nothing
incongruous in the fact of a potency, though existing, being inoperative ;
as such inoperativeness may be due to its purpose having been already
fulfilled. On the other hand, when the potency does not exist, it. would
be absolutely useless to seek for its effects |

That is to say, in all cases we find that a certain thing may be exis
tent or non-existent. And as‘it would not be possible for both existence
‘and non-existence to be accepted at one atid the same time, wo must
accept only one of them; aud under the circumstances, it. is the’ existence
that; should be accepted; because when something exists, even if we do.
not perceive any of its:effects, there would be uothiug incongruous in ths ;

a PROHIBITION OF TBLLING LIES PERTAINS 10 SACRIBICE. 1348

ag it is quite possible that.this absence of iis effects may be due, either to
certain: obstacles in the way of its due functioning, or to the absence of
ihe necessary auxiliary causes, or to the fact of the effects having been
‘already brought about by other causes. When, on the other hand, the
thing does not exist, even when its supposed effects would appear, it could
not be. got at even by the gods themselves; and as such we would have
to admit: the appearance of an effect without a cause (an absurdity ),—as
we have already explained in course of our explunation of the eternality of
the relationship (between words and their denotations; wide Cloka-
Vartika, section, ‘ Sumbandhakshépiparthara’).
Consequently when the denotative potency (of the Affix with regard
the kdrakas) has been definitely ascertained, it will operate, to its
fullest extent, in the case of the sentence in which the Noun precedes the
7610; while it will be indifferently inoperative in the case of the
sentence where the reverse is the case (i.e. where tho Verb precedes the
Noun); or even in this latter case, it would serve the purpose of settiny
aside the idea that the k@rdha 18 inferable, and uot directly denotable, by
words,
Thus then, it is established that the Declensional Affixes denote the
Objective ete
As for the Conjugational Affixes, masmuch as their order of sequence
is wlways fixed, the Nominative and the Objective are always indicated
by the Denotation of the Root and the Bhdvand; and it 18 only subse-
quently that those two (the Nominative and the Objective) come to be
connected with the Number (denoted by the Conjugational Affix); and
there 18. no occasion for admitting of any denotative potency with regard to
the karakas (the Nominative, the Objective and the rest). Consequently
it is fully established that the Nominative and the Objective are always
the objects of Inference (or Apparent Inconsistency ) fin the case of
Conjugational Affixes. ]

At this stage of the discussion, a certain Varyiikurana, very
clever at ingenious argumentation, comes’ forward with the following
arguments :—

“Tnasmach as we find a verb in the Singular when there is one

“ Nominative Agent, in the Dual when there are two, and in the Plural
when. there are more than two,—we must conclude that it is the
" Nominative that is denoted by the Conjngational Affixes. That is to say.
as a matter of fact we find that the verb—‘pacati’ f.i.~—always follows,
“in all. things, the word —‘' Dévadattak’ f.i.—that is used to point out the
particular Nominative. Agent;. and this could only -be due to a

1944 YANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, Ul-——PADA 1V—-ADHI, (4)

५५ eoextensiveness between the two ; ` coextensiveriess too 18 - possible only

५५ when the two factors concerned pertain to the same object. Conse.

“ quently, in fie case in question, the necessary coextensiveness could be

“ obtained only if the word ‘pacati,’ in general, denoted the Nominative
Agent, Dévadatta. ` |

“It might be argued that the word ‘pacut:’ may indicate the
“Nominative, in the way shown under the Akrtyudhikarana (I—iii—33
“ e¢ seg.) and the Arunidhikarana (II1—i—12 ०८ seq.)

“But this could not be, because the Nominative (in the senteuce
५५ ‹ Dévadattak pacati’) could not be indicated by the ‘ cooking ` (‘ Pake,:
‘which subsists in the Bice; in fact the ‘cooking’ conld indicate. only
“the sduyleness etc. inhering in the Rice, and not a thing that imheres
‘in another substratum

©The following might be urged: ‘Inasmuch as the actions of
“Jaying the pot on the fire and the rest (that go to make up the action of
(4 ८००४४ ) inhere in Dévadatta, these actions might be taken as meant
“by the word ‘ piku’ (‘ cookeng ’)

“Tt is true that these actions are called ‘cooking’; but the co-
“ordination (between Dévadatta the Nominative and the Verb) could
“not be through those actions. The case of the Aruntdhikarana is
‘different from this; because in this Intter we found that the class
“Scow’ and the Property of Redness brought about, in regard to the -
“object qualified by them (i.e. the individual cow:, ideas in keeping
“with their own characters; and hence we admitted the Elimination of
“the Possessive Affix (by taking ‘arun.’ as ‘arunavat’) and the Im-
“position of Identity (of the class on the Individual); and it was on
“account: of these two causes, that the words were found - ४० lave
‘brought about the necessary coordination. Inthe case in question,
“ however, we. find thut the sontence does not give rise in us to any idea
“of such actions of Dévadatta, as the laying of the put 61९. ; and honce
“we cannot admit of any such facts as the Elimination of the Possessive
^ Affix and the Imposition of Identity. Consequently, just as we neve
“ find the word ‘Danda' to be coextensive with ‘ Devadatta’, in any sach
“sentence as ' Dando Dévaduttuk’,—or just as we have no such expression
“as ‘ Adhipruyanidayo Dévadattah’, or ‘ 200 Dévadattuk,—so, also, we
“gould ‘not have the expression ‘pacati Dévadattuh!? = ` =

` “Thus then, we have the following (inferential) arguments ‘in sup
“port of our view: . |

“(L) The word ‘pacatt’ ‘is. denotative of the Nominative and the
““ Objective,—because it is coextensive with the word expressive of these
just as in the case of the words ‘ pukif@’ and pakouk!: - | - --

-“ By the expression: ‘coextensive ‘with the words expressive. of these

PROMIBITION OF TELLING LIS PERTAINS TO SACRIFICES. 1345

‘we mean the ‘identity of substrates,’ The sense of the Instance is that.
“in the case of the Nouns formed by प्रह affixes,—which are admitted
“by all parties to be denotative of the Nominative, etc —ée.g., in the
५ sentences ‘paktd Devadatiah, ‘ pakva odanak’ and the like,—we actually
‘find what we hold to be the case with the expression ‘pacafi
^ Devadattah!

“(2) In a case where there is no word denotative of the Nominative

“or the Objective, we do not find any coextensiveness; e.g. in the case
“of the word ‘pakak’ (i.e. we have never such an expression as ‘ pitko
` ^ Devadattak’ ; which shows that the very presence of the expression
"४ १ {0067 Devadattak’ shows that there is a coextensiveness between the
‘denotations of these two words, and that therefore the word ‘ pacate
“must be taken as denoting the Nominative).
* (3) Then again, the word ‘pacati’ must be denotative of the
‘ Nominative,—because it is found to follow the changes of Number that
“are made in the word expressive of the Nominative,—just as is the case
“with the two words cited above (‘paktd’ and ‘ pakvah’).

“That is to say, we find such expressions as ‘pacats Devadattah,’
“Suacato Devadatiayajiadutiau, ‘pacanti Devadattuyajiudattavrehnu-
‘“ dattak’; and from these we infer that the Number of the Verbs is
“exactly the same as that in the words expressing the Nominative.
“Wherever we find such to be the case, (1.6. such keeping in accordance
“with the Number of the Nominative word) we find the word to be
“actually denotative of the Nominative; e.g. in the case of the word ‘ pakta,’
“in connection with which also we have such expressions as ‘ pakta
“ Dévadattah, ‘pakt@rau Devadatiayajiadatiau,’ and ‘paktarak Deva
“ dattayajiadatiavishnudatiak.’ So also in the case of the Nominative,
“we find the expressions ‘pacyaté odanah,’ ‹ pacyété odanacdkau, ‘pakva
“odanah,’ ‘pakvau cakaudanau,’ and so forth,—all of which serve as

instances similar in character to the minor term of the syllogism (1.¢, the
“word ' pacate’)

“ (4) [The word ‘ pacati’ denotes the Nominative and the Objective]
“ Because it is found that the rules of grammar lay down the dropping
“off of the Nominative and the Objective endings, on the occasion of
“these being denoted (by other words—e.g. the verb) ; for the corrobora-
“tive instance of similarity, we have the same that have been brought
“forward before; while that of dissimilarity we have the sentence ‘ Déva-
“datténa pacyata

“That is to say, for the following reason also the Verb must be
“regarded as denotative of the Nominative and the Objective: Because
“we find a dropping off of the case-endings whose appearance 18
“conditioned by the fact of the Karakas being ‘ not denoted —eg: 'pacaly
` 169 |

` 1346 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I1f—PADA (V-—ADHI. (4).

५ Devadatiah’ and ‘pacyaté odanah.’ If the Verb were not denotative of
‘the Nominative, then there Would be nothing to justify the dropping
| off of the affixes laid down by such sittras as ‘ anabhihité karmani dvitiya,
“(Panini), ‘kartrkaranoyostrtiy (Panini) fas the Nominative, etc.
“would always be ‘anabhihita,’ not being ‘abhihita’ or denoted by any
“other word, such as the Verb] ;—such as we. find in the expression
५५ ४ macyat® Devadatléna,’ ‘pacatyodanah. As a matter of fact however, in-
“asmuch as we find that these affixes are actually dropped off, we con-
clude, from this, that, like the words ‘ [वते ` and ‘pakvah,’ the Verb —
“ (‘macati’) 18 denotative (of the Nominative and the Objective). This
“instance of similarity having thus been shown, it becomes necessary
१” ४0 sliow that of dissimilarity; and this we have in such sentences as
“ macyaté Devadatléna, etc.,” in which we find that, inasmuch as the Verb
‘does not denote the Nominative, there is no dropping off of the Nomina-
“tive ending

“(5) The Verb denotes the Nominative and the Objective ;—because
“it expresses the qualifications of these,—just as the Ear, being the
“indicator of the letter ‘a,’ is indicative of Sound in general.

“That is to say, if the word ‘ pacati’ did not denote the Nominative
“and the Objective, then how could it denote a particular qualification of
“these, in the shape of Number (which you also accept as denoted by :
“the Verb)? To assert that it does not denote them, and that it denotes
“their qualification, would involve ४ self-contradiction. For instance,
“the Ear is not found to be non-indicative of Sound in general, and yet
‘indicative of the particular sound of the letter ‘a.’ And for words,
“there can be no other indicativeness than that of being denotative. If
“the Nominative were indicated by the Bhavana, then the indicator of the
“Nominative would be something (ie. the Bhavana) which is itself
‘denoted, and not a word. And for this reason also, the Verb must be
* regarded as denotative of the Nominative and the Objective
| “(6) Lastly, the Nominative and the Objective are denoted by the

५८ Verb,—because of the connection of these with qualifications,—as that
‘which is itself not denoted could never be connected with its qualifica-
** tions

`. “That is to say, for the following reason also, the Verb must be

_“yvegarded as denotative of the Nominative and the Objective: Because
. “we. find these connected with their qualifications,—e.g, in the sentences
“Seobhanah pacati,’ ‘cobhanah pacyaté.’. Whenever we find them con-
~“neoted with their qualifications, we find them to be denoted; ‘e.g. 10 the
. “expressions ‘pobhanah. pakid, ‘ramaniyah pakvah.’ On the other

“hand, where there ig denotation of these, there we. do not find them to
` “he connected with any qualifivations,—o.g. in the expression *cobhana-

PROHIBITION OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICES. 1347

५ masyat@’ (where the Verb does not denote either the Nominative or the
“ Objective). Nor could the connection with qualifications belong to
“that which 18 indicated (by the Bhavana, fi.); eg. though the word
‘smoke’ indicates the Fire, yet it does not indicate it as connected with
“the qualifications of Heat, Brightness, and the like

५ All these arguments the Bhashya has indicated in the single argu-
“mont—‘ 200४ karturékatvidékavacanam, etc.; and hence it. has not
“shown them in detail. The sense of the Bhashya-argument is that the
“relationship of the Nominative with the number of the Verb could not
“be possible, unless there were, between them, coextensivoness, ९४९. etc,

“In view of the above arguments, it must be admitted that the only

‘reasonable theory admissible is that the Nominutive (and the Objective)
“are directly denoted by the Verb.”

_ To the above, we make the following reply: [८ has been urged above
that ‘the word pacat: is denotative of the Nominative and the Objective,
because of its coextensiveness with these’ (I and II).

(1) If by this argument, you seek to infer the existence of the
particular denotative poteucy,—then, inasmuch as the way, to such a
potengy, of all means of right notion is blocked by the -aforesaid
explanatian of Apparent Inconsistency, you would be contradicting the
authority of Negation. And it is a well-known fact that of all potencies,
Apparent Inconsistency is the only means of cognition; aud inasmuch as
in the case in question, this Inconsistency is capable of being explained in
another way (1.e. by means of Bhaivand), it could not justify the assump-
tion of a distinct poteucy

(2) Your argument is also contrary to the followiug Inferential
arguments :—(a) The word ‘pucaii' is not denotative of the Nominative
and the Objective,—because it denotes something with which they are
invariably concomitant (i.e. the Bhavand),—and that which denotes
something with which another thing is invariably concomitant can never
denote this latter,—e.g. the word ‘ gingapé,” being denotative of the class
। 72202 › which has the class ‘tree’ for its invariable concomitant, does
not denote the latter. (6) Similarly, the Nominative and the Objective
are not denotable by the Verb,—because the Verbal Affix does not abandon
its own denotable object; (c) also because they are coguisable, even
without the operation of the Verb,—just like the substance; or like the
class ‘Tree’ by the word ‘ (वद. (d) They are not denotable by the
Verb,—because they are kdrakas,—like the Instrumental and the rest
(७) The word with the Verbal Affix is not.denotati १९ (of the Nominative
‘and the Objective),—because it is a Verb,—like the word ‘ @syaté.’ |

1348 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, I1f—PADA IV—=ADHI. (4).

‘It might be urged here that—" Your arguments are as opposed to णण
versally recognised facts as the assertion that ‘the moon is not-moon.’”

But it 18 not so; if wé had absolutely denied the fact of the Verb
signifying the Nominative, etc., or that of these latter being signified by
the Verb, then alone coukd we be accused of asserting something contrary
to universally recognised facts. As it is, however, what we do is to deny
the absence of the capability, in the Verb, of directly denoting the Nomi-
native and the Objective, and that, in these latter, of being denoted by the
Verb; and certainly in this denial there is nothing incompatible wit.
any commonly recognised facts. Because ordinary people rest contented
with the fact of having the mere idea (of the Nominative and the Ob-
jective) brought about by the Verbal Affix; and they do not take the
trouble to make any distinctions as to what is directly denoted, indicated,
tmplied aud what forms the subject (of the Verb).

If what you have sought to prove, by the aforesaid series of argu-
ments, be the mere fact of the verb giving some sort of an idea of the
Nominative and the Object,-—then all your effort is absolutely super-
00708 ; as we also admit of a cognition of these being brought about by
the Verh, through the Bhavana.

In fact it is your theory that is contrary to popular notions. Because |
what is got at by any other means, is never attributed, by ordinary- men,
to the action of denotation; for instance, the form of the word, being
cognised by the Ear, is never held to be denoted ( by the word itself).
[Hence inasmuch as the idea of the Nominative, etc. is found to be got at
through the Bhavana, people cannot attribute it to the denotative action
of the word].

The other fallacies, pertaining to the conclusion, could also be
brought forward against the Vatyaikarana, by putting forward the various
alternatives as to the denotation of word being based upon the letters
themselves, or upon the sphota, or upon the class, etc.,—and also as to
whether the denotable object consists of the potency of the word, or the
substance, or the kdarakas,—and lastly, by putting the question as to
whether the denoted is different or non-different from the denotative
word,—as we have explained before (in the Clokavartcka)

Then again against each inferential argument, we can bring forward
the following objections

I, As regards the ‘ coextensiveness’ urged in the first argument, we
ask,—is this coextensivencss (a) directly denoted or (b) indirectly indi
ated 7 -
_ (a) As for its being directly denoted by the Verb, such cannot be
admissible for either:of us. “ Why so?” Well, because, for‘ us all that
the Verb denotes 16 the Bhavani: and for vou, the ’@raka is nothing

` PROHIBITION OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICES. 1349

more than 9 mere potency; as it is only such words as ‘ Dévadatta’ and
the like that denote substances, and not potencies; consequently, if the
Affix would denote the kdraka, it could denote it only in the form of the
potency, and in that of the substance, as the substance is not the karaka;
while for one, who holds the karaka to be the substance, it wonld be neces- `
sary to admit the potency as its necessary qualification;—as without
potency, there can be no functioning of the substance. Consequently, in
accordance with the Akrtyadhikarana (I—iii—30), the denotation must be
accepted to be that of the potency (and not of the substance) ; and as such
no ‘coextensiveness’ with substance would ever be possible.

Nor do we find any word, mentioned along with the Verb, that could
denote the potency,—and with which word there could be a directly denoted
.coextensiveness. Because such a word could only be in the form ending
with a case-ending; while as a matter of fact, we find no such case-ending
in the case in question. |

In the case of one who holds the kdraka to be a substance, that sub-
stance, which, somehow or other, would be recognised as having the
character of the k@raka,. would wholly lose its character, and would,
therefore, pervade over all the kdrakas that there might be in the sentence,
just like the Class (which pervades over all individuals) ; and as such
it could be spoken of as all these other kdrakas also. Nor can it be urged
that “the same would be the case, even if the denotation consisted in the
potency.” Because when a number of potencies exist in a certain sub-
stance, each of these is expressed, or not expressed, in accordance with
its appearance and disappearance (and hence in this case there would be
no possibility of all of them being expressed all at once); while as for
the substance itself, inasmuch as it can be of one form only, there can be
no ground for the exercising of any option with regard to it; and as such
there could never be any chance of its being spoken of in any other way
(and thus the objection urged above does not apply to our case).

If words with the Conjugational and the Declensional Affixes be
accepted as denoting substances, then, on account of their being connected
with definite genders, etc. they would have the character of ‘ Sativa’
(४.९, a ^ Being’ or ‘ Entity’ which is defined as that which is capable of ५
definite Gender, etc.),—just like the words with the ért affixes. That is
to say, just as in the case of the word ‘Pdcaka’ (which 18 formed with a
krt affix), we find that, inasmuch as its denotation consists of the
substance as the principal factor, we have the notion of its being an
‘Entity,’—so would we also have in the case of the words with Conjuga-
tional and Declentional affixes (if these also had the substance as the
“principal factor in their denotation), And henge, just as we have such
@xpressions as ‘ picakam brah,’ ‘pacakéna krtam, ‘ pacakdya déhi’ etc., the

1350 -—S»«s TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADB 1i—PADA IV—ADHE. (4), `

word ‘pacaka’ taking many other karakas (case-endings),—so also we
would come to have in connection with the sentence ‘ pacat: odanam’ (the
word ‘pacati’ also taking along with it all the k@raka endings, which 18
an impossibility ) | |

Consequently in accordance with the theory of the denotation (of words
with the two kinds of affixes) being that of the Karaka with a certain
wotency, it must be admitted that the Conjugational and Declensional
Affixes denote the factor of the potency alone, as abstracted (from the
denotation of the whole word } |

And in that case, when the substance will have been taken up by one
potency that will have appeared first, it could not, at the same time, be
connected with any other potency. And thus it becomes established that
the Verb ‘ pacaii’ differs from the word with the kré affix, which has the
substance for the principal factor in its denotation,—on account of the
following facts: (1) It is not capable of taking up more than one Karaka
ata time (while the latter is); and (2) it 1s devoid of Gender and
Number. |
Thus then, it is proved that the directly-denoted ‘ Coextensiveness ’
is not possible for any of us, |

(४) If, on the other hand, the ‘coextensiveness,’ upon which your
premisses are based, be one that 18 indirectly zndicated, or without any
qualifications,—then inasmuch as even in the case of such expressions as
‘the lion of the boy ` we find such a ‘ coextensiveness,’ though that does not
make the word ‘lion’ directly denotative of the Boy,—the ‘ coextensive-
ness’ could not be accepted as invariably concomitant with ‘denotative-
ness’; and thus your premiss would be ‘ too wide.’

Then again, even in the case of the directly-denoted ‘ coextensive-
ness, we would ask—what do you mean by this ‘coextensiveness’? It.
means ‘sameness of substrate’; and this must mean ‘sameness of
denotation’; as in no other way could the denotation be the sub-
strate of the word; as iu reality, the word can have no substrate
(according to the Mimdneaka) ; or, even if it has, it can have only the
400 for its substrate (according to the Naiydyska and others). As for
the denotation, it is spoken of as the ‘substrate’ (of the word), because
16 18 cognised as its object. And this (‘substrateness’) also will have to
be qualified by the epithet ‘primary,’ with a view to preclude such
indirect significations of it as indication and the like. And thus the word
‘coextensiveness ' . (‘ Sdminddhikaranya’) comes to signify ‘the fact of
the directly-denoted substrate being the same,’ which. means that the

object’ or “denotation’is the same, - = - ध |

For these reasons your. argument comes to mean this: “The word
pacaty’ is denotative of the Nominative Dévadatta,—because it-is synony- .

PROHIBITION OF TRLLING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICES. 1351

mons with the word ‘ Dévadatta,—i.e, because it denotes Devadatta ”
aud this reasoning would be exactly like-—‘ Sound is transient, because it
ia transient,’—the premisses being contained in the conclusion (thus in-
volving the fallacy of Begging the Question, Petitio Principit)

(८) In accordance with the Zadbhitadhikarana (I—i—25), and the
Adhikarana at the close of Adhyaya VI,—we can raise the question aa to
whether the ‘coextensiveness’ meant is that of the two words (‘ Deva-
datta’ and ‘ pacati’), or that of their denotations,—at the time of the.
actual utterance (of the sentence ‘ Dévadattah pacati’); and then we can
show that neither of these alternatives being possible, the premiss becomes
absolutely uncertain (or impossible); and also that, the words in quostion
not being different in character from the words ‘ Go,’ ‘ Agua,’ etc. the
premiss would he too ‘ wide. '

(d) Then again, by the same reasons that have been shown above, in
connection with the inferences brought forward against those of the
opponent, it can be shown that ‘ coextensiveness’ in the primary form is
impossible ; and this also would make your premisses absolutely uncertain.

II. Then again, we may show your reasoning to be subject to
another fallacy,—that of having counter-arguments to the contrary
(which shake its validity).

Ill. As regards your Instance also,—(a) if it be taken as cited with
regard to the denotation of the potency, then it becomes inapplicable to
the Major Premiss (of your syllogism); because the words ‘ 76240 ' and
the rest (that have been cited as instances) do not pertain to any potency ;
they pertain to those possessed of the potencies, because they are incapable
of being connected with any other potencies,—as we have already
explained above

(6) If the words ‘pdcaka, etc.’ pertained to potenctes, then, the
instance would not be applicable to your Middle Term,—just as has been
found to be the case with ‘ coextensiveness ’ in its primary form.

(c) If the case of the word ‘pacati’ were similar to that of the word
‘picaka, etc.’ then, like these latter, it could not denote the potency that
forms the principal factor; and hence your argument would prove quite
the contrary of the particular property (in the word) that you seek to
prove

[V.. And further, inasmuch as the directly-denoted ‘ coextensiveness
18 impossible, while the indirectly-indicated is found to exist in the case
of non-denotative words (e.g. in ‘lion of the boy ’),—your argument would
be *gontrary’ (to what is sought. to be proved). Specially as we have
shown, under Satras J-—IV—~23 and IIll—ii—1, that there is no denota-
tive potency either in the case of indication, or, in that of. secondary
Signifieation, | 2. - ; - @

11. 4 1-१-14. ADH. (1 Pipa 1४ ---+ पा. (4),

„ ९19} +

el

hus then if cannot be said that your argument is nnchallengeable,

Me fallacies shown above, in connection with your first argument,
may be shown to relate fo your other arguments alsa,

fa) for instanee, with regard fo your therd argument, it may he
shown that, the taking ap (by the Verb) of the Number (of the Nomina.
tive) ix not possible, in connection with the potency (in which the Marck:
{01151518}. ‘That is to say, no one accepts the number as belongme to the
Kiirakes whieh have heen shown to consist of eertan: potencies ; as
wumbers always belong to sxbstaaces Cand not to potenctes), TE then, it be
held tliat the Verb would be denetative of that snbstance whose number
it would take up,--then there would be a contradiction of what has ber,
admitted before; as ihere is no Vulyaikarana who adits of the faet of
the Vorb being denotative of a sulsta nee,

(hy Tf then, the ‘taking up of the number’ be meant to be that of
the namber helonging to that which is dadfeated by the Nona, either by
an imposition of identity, mo by the process of secondary signifiaation \ --
and as such, your premiss be one that is to be taken 11) 118 seconilary
signifieation,—then, omsmuack as sneh would be the case with tie
words ‘lion’ aud ‘boy? also, —as we have such expressions as ` Sino
Deraduttah?! * Simian Dévadatlayag tadatiaa, and “Sika Dévudatiayay iu.
datlacisaumitrah,--vony premiss would become too 6 wide.’

(£) In the case of the word ‘piieakuds (that has been etted as an
mstance i support of this argument alsoj, we find that that part of :
winch denotes the 11011274 / छ. op ( ]६, ८८ ' ine. the basie nouni, does nat
take the varying wembers of the noun (* (हदवव); as does the कर
(and not the basic word} that signifies the Simba. And thos yow
instance does not apply to your Middle Term.

(it) And that part of the word which does teuke 0 p the varyiug 11111:
bers,-~/.e, the Affix, —-is not found to be denotative of the Nominative .
and thns, in this case, the instance is inapplicable to the Major Term.

(ei For these reasuns, it is n ecessary that a certain word with the
instrmental eucding should he cited as the eorroborative matanee of your
syllogism. Bat this ton wonld be open to all the vbiections that have
been urged above, against ‘ Coextensiveness ` : and xo this too could nes
Surve JOULE purpose.

(f) There is yet. another ‘ nocertainty ’ attaching to your argument :
As a matter of fact we find that though the word । Go’? does not devate
the snbstanec ( bnt the Chass j, yet it takas np 1 he varying numbers of tle
snbstance (as we tind in the words ‘Gaus, ‘Gavaw? and | (10:04 `). [And
this shows that if a word take ap the varying numbers of a certain sab-
stance, 16 is not RECESAAT that it shovld be denotative of that substance ;
wa you seck to prove by means of your syliogism], If you retort by (1111

PROUTNEON OF TELLING Lbs PRETAINS PO SACRIFICES, 395

hat the instance (of the word ‘ (+त ' ) that we have cited does not go against
your arenment,—then (with a view to convince you) we shall explain to
you the whole of the Akrtyadhikaruaa (I—ti--280) ;—wherein we have
found that the Bhashya has raised the qnuestion-— which ones of the various
reasons are capable of rejceting the Inference ?—and in answer (o this,
his brought forward the presence of counter-arguments—-and thereby
having shown the oppouent’s argument to be unecrtain, it has come to its
own couelusion, in the words ‘just as the word in the denotation of the
lusz,' ete. ete.

The fourth syllogism that yon havo brought forward is that based
upon the fact of the Nominative and other allixes d opping off on account
of their {611१4 denoted (by the Verb). (@) Aud if what is meant by
the ‘dropping off of affixes’ be the dropping oft of all वितल then it 1४
not true (as vegards tho sentence in question * f@vadatiah pacity) ;
beeause the Nominative affix that we find (in ‘ Vévudultah’) is a Denoled-
Kiraku-Affic. (9). 1, however, the ‘dropping off’ meant be that of any
Afhx, then, masnuch as there iw such droppray off of those affixes that
serve the purposes of mere dental, and yet these ave not denotative——the
premiss would be too wide. And we find that, on account of the exclusion
mm the Sutra ‘ubhayapraptaw karmani’ (Panini L£~-m-—66) the Genitive
pertaining to the Objective does not denote the Norminative—though
if dees being abont the dropping uff of Nominative-Gemtive Endings,
tiat are connected with the action denoted by the word with the krt afiz
| कत thus the mere ‘dropping olf of atlixes* cannot serve as the reason
for denotability of the Nominative,

८

| lt bas been-arened above that Cin the seutence ०८५८५८४ Dévadattah !
wid Devadatlena pacyalé edanah) we would lave those Acensative and
Instramental Wudings that are laid down as appearing in the case of non-
iehotation (of the Objective, ७८९, by the Verb). But this is not possible ;
because as a matter of fact, we know that wherever an flix AP PCs, it
toes so with the purpose of hringing aboat au idea, either of Number or
of the Kédraka: while in the ease in quastion, we find that both of there
ithe Number and the Nominative) are fully established by the Bhavand
and the Declensional affix.
That is to say, in the sentence ‘pacati Dévadattak,’ the Nominative
1; found to be sienified by the ततक्ष; and as for the Number, it 1४
svnified by the verbal Conjugational Affxes; and what 18 then left un-
expresses, for the sake of which we could have another Affix ?
fJuestion: , ^“ When, as a matter of fact, there is quite & group of
* Karukas Gin the sentence ander question), how is 11 that the Bhavana
should indicate only the Nominative character of Devadutta, and not the
character of any other kdrakat” | | |

170 - | | | | 9

1354 TANTRA-VARTINA, ADEE 111.“ PATA 1 -- 1), {+}.

Some people explain thus: “This is dac to the peculiar capability
‘Davadatta,’ whereby he is recognised as the Nominative, ‘That is
‘to say, he is capable of being the Nominative of ‘cooking,’ and not of.

‘bomg its Objective or Instrumental, or any other kd@raka. And the
<Vopb is never related to anything that 1s nota kdraka, and it is for this
“season that ibis his Nemiuative character that is taken up.”

Bit this explanation wonld not apply to the case of the sentence
‘histhind pacanél’; beeause the ‘fuels’ ave ‘ capable,’ not of the Nomina-
tive character, but of the Instrumental, as is well known. [And hence
the Nominative endmg in ‘ késtidni? would not be jnstified on the afore.
said ground |.

The followme myeht be urved tn faveur of the aforesaid explanation :—
“In the senfence ‘Adsthane pacante’ the kdstha (Mell is not indicated
“(by the Bharani) to be the Nominative agent, (of tha veokins), bat as
“the Tnstramental, the said ground of ‘capability’; and this zastrument-
“ality boing mdieated by the Bidrand, the verbal affix (Gin ‘ paciunsa’?) would
‘signify the Number (plural) of that Tnstrumenut; and hence, Quast as in
“the ease of the sentence ° Dévadatiah pacule’), the Nominative character
“ol + (ददर ` does not bring in its specific ease-ending (that of the
‘Nonunative-Lustramental, in the forna of ‘ Déradutléna’),—-s0 tn the sume
“omanner, the Instramentahty of the ‘Fuel? also does not bring in its own
“ense-cuding (that of the Instrumental) tand the reason for this is that
“the effect, in the shape of the mdication of the number of the Karake,
“bas been already brought abont, just hke the Nominative, by the
“ Bhiivand and the Verbal Affe]. ty the same manner, in the sentence

‘sthali pacatt, the containing-character of the sthali (cooking pot) does
“not bring in the Jiocative ending; in the sentence ^ (वकष pocautt, the
“abjective character of the ‘Riee’ does not bring in the Acensative

euding ; au the sentence ‘ Kugulak pucals,’ the character of the ‘ Nugita

“ (erranary) of being the source from which the rice is ¢ot, does not bring
“in the Ablative ending; and in the sentence ‘Brahmamik pacants,’ the
“fact of the BruAmenas bemg the recipients of the cooked rice does not
“brive ithe Dative ending. 19 all these cases, it is only the capability that
serves as the reason for the appearance of the particular case-endinse

But this as by no means possible: becanse in all the sentences cited
all men recognise the nouns as Nominatives
| Says the apholder of the explanation in question: “In the sentences
‘“eited, there 1s no cognition of the Nominative: the cognition that we
* have 1५ of the VATTONS kirakas ( the Objective, etc,); but this Appears to
‘he the cogmtion of the Nominative, beca use, on account of the persist-
tng idea of the well-known character of the Nominative signitied by the
ध Verbal Affix, {छान्द |? २11} idea, of all Late nouns in question being COs.

PRONIBLTION OF TELLING. LLES PERTAINS 10 SACRIFICES. 14:95

:४ (५ {8118108 with the said Nominative nb when one comes to cavefally
look into the matter, he can fally distinguish the preseuce of the several
“hdrakas. For instance, even in a case where the ‘coukiug vessel’ is coe-
“yised as the Nominative (as in the sentence ‘ sth31i pacati’ ),--the funce-
‘fioning of the vessel towards the cooking is in no other way save in that
“of containing the rice cooked, That is to say, that function, whieb
‘it performs while serving as the vowtadner of the नाः, is exactly the
‘same which 16 performs while it is eognised as the Nontinative. And
“heuee it is far more reasonable to accept if as simply spoken of as
* Nomustive, while it really serves the purposes of (he coiutatner
“When, however, the Nominative is denoled by the Lakfras (the
conjugational forms),-—-inasmuch as these forms do not appear in
‘eonnection with tha Container (Adhiharana), ete..~-and hence no ‘co-
“extensiveness’ (of these with the Nominative) would be possibie in
^ this case,--and ag the Verbal Aftix would vot donote the Number (per-
“taining to the stialz),— une would necessarily expect the appearance uf
“the 140८९८४८ ending, ete.; and hence it will have to be admitted that it
“is only with a view to explain the actual presence of the Nominative
“ending (in ‘ sthal@’), thal we speak of the Cosiainer and the rest as
“having the character of the Nominative, sivuified by the verbal affix,
“When, however, the Nominative is not denoted by the conjugational
“forms, that which is meant to be spoken of as being related to the
number signified by the Verbal Ath wonld be duly coguised, even if
“did not bring in its special case-ending ; because it will have obtained
“its result, and the Kndine is only one such result; while the other
“ kévakas (६.५. those that are not meant to be spoken of as connected with
“the said nuaber) would certainly bring in them respective case-eudings,
Oljection: "Tf such be the case, then, inasmuch as all the kirekas
“would be tndicatable by the Bhké@vand, and equilly capable of boing
“related to the number (denoted by the Verbal Affix), there could never
“he an appearance of the Accusative and other case-endings.
Keply: This objection does not apply to the case in question:
‘ because, thoagh the Adrakas, being indicated, in their forms, by the
^ Bhfivand, could not bring about their respective case-endings for that
“same purpose (of indicating those forms),—-yet the number signified by
“the Verbal Atix becomes fully utilised by being connected with any one
of the said kfirakas; and hence for the sake of the other numbers (2.९
‘those belonging to the other k@rakas), it wonld he necessary to make
use of the other case-endings. |
‘Objection; ‘That number alone, which is sigmfied -by the Verbal
Affix, would be equally related to all the Karakas (and lence the use
f 110 case-endiugs would be necessary ) ^

1356. -TANTRA-VARTIKA, = ADH: IEA DA: Ty—-ADHE, (4) ate Tk wit

“ Reply: How could that number, being ०४९ only, be related to all;
“Tf it did become connected with all of them, different numbers would
--thave to appear (in regard to cach Karaka). As for the. possibility of.
“the various numbers being optional alternatives,—we accept it as nothing |
undesirable for us. Because even this option would be limited. by
` “actnal usage; and the assumption could not. be carried. on just as one.
“might happen to wish at the time of using the word. ` Consequently, it
must be admitted that it is the word that has been used, at. the very.
-“ outset, with the Nominative case-euding, which ts meant to be spoken of
ag connected with the Number denoted by the Verbal Affix; and hence
‘the other words would stand in need of the case-endings belonging to
“the several Karakas. | |
. ` “Objection: ‘But in a case where the number denoted by the Verbal
“Affix is the Plural, inasmuch as there would be enough numbers to be
~“eonnected with every one of the Karakas,~-there would be no necessity,
‘in this case of the case-endings pertaining to these Karakas.’

““Zteply: This also is quite acceptable to us,—in a case where all
“the Kdrukas are spoken of as equally related (to the Verb), as in the
‘ease of the sentence ‘ Kasthddini pacantz’ (where every one of the.
` (^ १ Kasthads’ is similarly related to the action of cooking).. When however,
“the Verbal Affix denotes the Plural Number pertaining to the Nonii-
“native only,—while the other Karakas are directly spoken of as mere
: “subsidiaries,—then, inasmuch as, on account of the fact of the Nomi-
“native being the first to be mentioned, and also of its being the predomi
“nant factor, the Number would be connected with the N ominative,—and

as there would be no reason for passing over this Nominative,—the
“Number could not betake itself to the other Kérakas; consequently 1 `

becomes: wholly swallowed up in the Nominative ; and as for the Num
. ‘bers of the Karakas, they are expressed by their own respective case
“endings
| ^ 00०८400 : ‘If such be the case, thon in all-cases, the Numbet
“denoted by the Verbal Affix would never pass over the Nominative; and.

in that case, how could we have the expression Sthali pacati (where we
‘find the Number. signified by the Verbal Affix betaking itself to: the
~" Container (of the Rice)?’ ॥
` “Tu reply to the above, we put the question :—Which of the following
“two alternatives is more reasonable to accapt,—whether that the Nam-
“ber. (denoted -by the Verbal Affix in Sthali pacati ' ), for some reason or
“other, passed over the Nominative, and betakes itself to the Container ?
Sor that the expression actually speaks of the § 9thdli’ itself as Having
“the character ‘of: the Nomidative, which is, by itself, capable of ‘being 1
1,911.11 व 05 oes. | :

PROHIBITION OF TELLING: LIES PERTAINS 76 SACRIFICES 1357

“There can be no question as to the latter alternative being the more
paasonable of the two,—namely, that the ‘ Sthalz’ is meant to be spoken.
= of-as possessing the character of the Nominative. Because we do not
{nd amy reason, by which the principal factor (the Nominative) should.
the passed over (by the Number in question) ; and as for the Nominative’
‘character being meant by any person to be expressed, there can be
+ nothing objectionable in that. Asa matter of fact, we find that where-
+ aver two. meanings are possible, it is only right that we should desire
“the one or the other to be conveyed by the word; and in the case itt
| question, we find that, all the Kdrakas are endowed with the character of
the Nominative, with regard to their own respective functions; specially
as the diversity of the Kdrakas, with regard to the principal Verb
could not be possible, if they were wholly devoid of the Nominative
character, in regard to their own respective functions. Consequently,
it-is only right that this Nominative character should be accepted as
that which is desired to be spoken of (by means of the word ‘ Sthali’) ; .
“and’as such the Verb (‘ pacati’) cannot be taken as denoting the num- |
bers pertaining to the other Adrakuas
- “Thus then, the same reason would also apply to the case where the.
“Verbal Affix denotes the number of the 0! mective (e.g, 71) the sentence
‘*tandulak pacyaté’) [1.e. in this the Rice is endowed with the character.
“of the Nominative]. But the same reason does not apply to the other.
‘ Karakas (besides the Objective and the Nominative); and as such there
“is a distinct limit to the application of the said reasoning. = |
“And thus, the ‘ anabhihita’-rules would be explained as follows:—
“*When we have the singleness, duality or plurality, of the Objective not:
“mentioned, (then we have the Accusative Ending), etc., ९६९.) etc.’ The
“‘quahfication ‘not-expressed’ (‘ anabhthita’) could rightly be applied to
“that alone with reference to which we find the case-endings laid down;
“and 16 cannot be applied to the qualification of this latter. Because no.
“qualifications could apply to that which is the subordinate factor (४.6 `
‘tthe Kdrakas). As a matter of fact we find. that ‘singleness’ and the
‘vest are what are qualified, and as such, being the predominant factor,
“ gannot: brook the connection of any other qualification. It is for this
“reason that.we have a declaration, in connection with compounds, to the
“effect that—‘ even if the Primary factor be wanting in certain elements,
“it-gan.form a compound.’ . Consequently the siira ‘anabhihité’? (Panini
“iiii—1) must be explained. as ‘when. the singleness, 6६९, are. not `
“explained: a | |

But .in-.accordance witl this interpretation, we would: have प्ल
Accusative. Ending. in both words, in the expression.‘ Krtah katak'; 88 7 `
both of them we havé the sénglencss of. the Objective ‘not-expressed? It:

“1358 TANTRA*VARTIKA: ADE. 11S PADA IV-aput. (8)

| might be argued: that inasmuch as the singleness is expressed*:by the:
. Nominative Ending, there could. be no Accusative Ending (* non-expres. -
sion’ being the necessury condition for the appearance of this latter). . But.
this is scarcely.correct; because the posstbility of the appearange. of the.
Accusative Ending precedes. that.of the Nominative. ` 7
Then again, in the sentence ° Katam karote bhigmamudaram dargani: |
yam,’ the number of the Objective having been expressed” ‘by the Accu.
-gative Ending in ‘Xatam,’ we could not bave that ending in the other:
words (‘ Bhisma_ ete.) 7 | 1
Objection: “The same might be urged against one who holds that
“the Accusative and other endings denote the objective, etc. (because in.
“that case also, as the objective character will have been expressed by the.
—Aceusative in ‘katam,’ the same affix could not appear in connection
‘with the other words) =
Reply: Not so; because he takes ‘ anubhthité’ as a preclusive sitra,
meaning that ‘ when the objective etc. are not expressed by Verbal Affixes,
or Nominal Affizes, or Compounds’; and in the case in question the Accusa-.
tive in ^ Kafam’ is not included in any of these three; and as such the
objective character expressed by it could not preclude itself from the
other words |
| Objection: ‘For me also, the s#éva would serve the purposes of the .
“said preclusion |
| Reply: . This could have been possible, if the number were denotable-
by the Art and other affixes also (४.९. the affixes other than the Verbal.
and the Nominal). Asa matter of fact, however, we do not find any शाल `
Affixes, either laid down to be expressive of the number, or actually
expressing 1t, in any sentence. Consequently it is the Verbal conjuge-
tional Ajlix only that can be ac cepted to. be expressive of number (the Nom!
nal Afhixes and Compounds not expressing the Number by themselves)
As for the Objective, ७।९. on the other hand, they are expressed by all `
(४,९. the Verbal Affix, the Nominal and Krt Affixes, etc., etc.) ; and this
constitutes a great difference between the denotation of Number and that.
of the Olyective, ete.. Aud hence it is quite possible for the Acousativ: i

katak’ ) {and hence there ` दिप्‌ not. be any Actusative Ending {ओं the
sénterice] ee ea es | :

PROMIBITION OF TRILING. LES PERTAINS 10. SACRIFICRS 1359.

For one for whom the Karakas, the Objective, and the rest, are denoted .
{by the Verbal Affix),—-as also for him who regards the singleness, etc.
qualified by these (Objective, etc,) to be denoted by it,—the fact of.
160 yot-expressed ' (‘anubhihita’) must be taken as qualifying the
-Objéehive and the other Karakas; the meaning of the sitras being—that-
‘whet the Objective is not-expressed we have the Accusative,’ or that ‘ we:
have the Accusative Hnding in connection with the. singleress, ete. that.
“yeside in the. Objective that 18 not-expressed.’
<: Though. the Objective and other Karakas are the subordinate factors,
6४ they. become counected with qualifications. .It is only when the
‘subordinate factor forms part of a compound that it does not remain
; apable of any relationship with words outside the compound; when
‘however, ‘it appears as a distinct part of the sentence,—as in the sentenc
(Rddhasya 72/90 purusak —we do find the subordinate ‘ Raju’ being
-actually related to the qualification ‘Rddha’ (Rich), This is what
-would constitute the difference between a compound and a sentence, 48
for the Objective, etc. we find them appearing in sentences; and hence
even though they be the subordinate factors, yet they are capable of
being qualified by the conditional ‘not-expressed’ with regard to their
“own respective case-endings |
` , 0४०४; “If such be the case, then, in the sentence: ‘ pacati Déva-
“dattuh, we should have the Instrumental-Nominative ending for the
“expression of the Number of the Nominative, which is not-expressed. It
“cannot be argued that, ‘on account of the Number having been alrendy
incladed in the denotation (of the word ‘ pacatz’), it' would not be neces-
‘“sary-to.have the Instrumental ending.’ Because this reasoning would
“not: be compatible with the case of the words ‘ bhismam,’ ete. (in the
“sentence ‘ Kutatkarol: bhigmimuddram, ete.’), where it has been shown
“that even though the Objective has been signified by the Accusative in
| ‘“‘kafan,* yet we have it also along with the other words (‘bhismam'
“and the rest). Ifthe Instrumental Ending would not appear, for the
“mere reason of the Instrumentality: having been already indicated
“then, inasmuch as the-Number signified by the Nominative Ending
“would ‘also have: been already indicated, there should be no appear
1 ance of the Nominative Ending... It might be argued that ‘the Nomi-.
“native: Ending would appear, simply. because the mere basic Noun
«could nag. be used by igself (without a case-ending).’ But: this could not
“bes -becdaae .in that case what we. would have would-be the [प~
stramenal-Nominative, which is: the case-ending, laid down as per-

च taining tothe Nominative agent,—and not the mere: Nominative End-

4360 coe TANTRA-VARTIKA. “ADH, पा-क 1V---ADHE. ° (4)

। any Reasonings, but through Verbal authority ; and a Reasoning. धानः.
contradictory to Verbal authority 1s not capable of doing anything

For these reasons the word ‘ anabhihité’ (in the siitra, Panning WT—iii—

) must be taken in its secondary sense, indicating the fact of not bein, Cog: ©
nised in a particular form: Thus.then, in the words ‘pacati’ and ‘ pacyaté,’
‘we find that, on ‘account of their paying special regard to the. relationship.
of Number, we do cognise the Nominative and the Objective respectively, |
in their particular forms, and as such they do not take ‘these case-endings
` the Ingtrumental-Nominative in the case of the former word, and that of
the Objective in that of the latter (as both these characters have been `
found to be ‘expressed’). As for the other Kdrakas however they ar
‘never cognised in the aforesaid particular form and as such they always
bring up their respective case-endings
We have already expressed before how, though all are equally
* Karakas, yet the- Bhavana (denoted by a Verb) indicates only two of.
them, the Nominative and the Objective, and the Number too (that is
denoted by the Verbal Affix) is related to these only (and not to the
others)
It has been argued above that—“‘ in the case of such Impersonal forms
“ag—'néha bhujyaté, ‘ néha. pacyaté,,—we find that all that is denoted
“by the Verbs is.the mere action of ‘eating’ or ‘ cooking,’ and there is 110
indication of the Nominative or the Objective; and as such the Root
“meaning and the Bhavani cannot be accepted to be invariably concomt
ध “tant with these (4,4, the Nominative and the Objective) ; and as such
“the Bhavana cannot be regarded as necessarily indicative of them.”

To this we make the following reply: Inasmuch as this non-coneom
tance (that you bring forward) rests upon the word, it applies as much to
-our theory (of the Nominative being tndicated by the Bhavani) as to that.
of its being directly denoted (by the Verbal Affix); because the non-con-
_comitance of the Denotative is as undesirable as that of the Indicative
That is to say, you have shown that in the case of Impersonal forms the
* Verb 18 found to be non-concomitant (with the Nominative and the Objec-
tive); and from this you have argued that it cannot be indicative of these
latter, But, inasmuch.as the word (Verb) does not denote the Objective
“we would. not liave any desotativeness in the case of the sentence ‘odanah
_pacyaté, Kven though non-concomitant, if the Verb, in this latter. case,.
“Were yet to: perform the denotative function,. by beipg aided ‘by. some other
“agency,—-then for us also, it could: similarly perform ‘the function of
‘Indicating the same thing. And hence, just as. for the Vaiyakarana, the
-denotativencss of the Vorb is. cognised through such agencies—as the Tras:
saitive and Intransitive ‘Verb, the presence of interniediate - affixes other
then yan,. and certain particular prefixes,~-so: would algo its dadiéative

PROMIBITION: OF TELLING. LIS PERTAINS 10 @acntFfoRS, “1361

“ea {a8 held by us); and hence the above taunt could not be reasonably”
“directed against us oo |
3: Otherwise, we find that.the particle‘ ह ' (that we find in pacyate’)
ge found.in.all the three forms of Verbs—the Active, the Passive and:
the Impersonal, (e.g. ‘édhaté,.’ “pacyuté,’ and ‘ bhiiyaté’); and as for.
’ the.-particle-‘ yaéé,’ that too is common to all such forma, as that caused”
“by. the Intermediate affix ‘yan’ (‘mrsyaté’), that due to the ‘ Yak’.
“affix-of the Atmanépada (‘kandiiyaté’), the ‘kya’ affix (krgndyaté); con-
| ‘sequently, the signification of the Nominative would be extremely doubt
<fal if it were to be denoted by the Verb

१ For these reasons, both the theories, yours.as well as mine, could be.
equally justified only in the way in which the denial of Concomitance. and |
" Non-concomitauce has been refuted before, under the Tudbhitadhikarana
क 1-1-25). But, in view of various other reasous shown above, adherence
“should be accorded to the theory that the Nominative is ¢ndicated (by the
Bhitvané) |

`... Or, we may take the word ‘ anabhihité’ in its direct dénotative sense. -
Question: “ Bunt, in that case, why should not we have the Instrn-
mental (Nominative) in the sentence ‘ pacati Devadattah'?” —

1. Anawer: Simply because its appearance has been negatived (i
precluded by. the condition of being not-expressed)

"Question: “ How has it been precluded ? " | ॥
` Answer: {+ has been precluded by the fact of the Nominative having
been expressed by the Verbal A flix |
Question: ‘As. you now admit the fact of the Nominative heing
“denoted. by the Verb,—wherefore should you have taken all the trouble.
'“ you have, to show that it is not so denoted ?”’ - न
498९८ We. did that for the sake of (with reference to) ordinary
parlance of the world, and for the Veda,—and not for grammatical .
- purposes, ` | ्.
. Question: -'* Are the purposes of grammar something different from
-thoae of ordinary life and the Veda?” oe |
Answer: Certainly ; for instance, such technical words as ‘ Vrddhi’.
and'' Guna’ are not.found, either in ordinary parlance or in the Veda, to `:
“Menote dt-aic and at-8% respectively 0 ४ %,
oo. Question: ^ 1 may be possible for such technical names. and postu. `
“lates as you have: cited to. be something unconnected with ordinary `
““;parlance; but that. cannot.be said’ of the siguifications of. Basic words |
भाव fixes; because these latter that are used in grammar, are not :
Wholly apart from ordinary. parlance and the Veda.” 2°. om
कत. How. can-you siy that no such are need, when we find such |
१108 ‘as: Lab-karmani: ca; etc.’ (Panini), where we meet with :-the:

136 oe PANTRACVARTIKA, “ADH. [1-980-91 (4)

word ‘Lah’ used as signifying the Nominative and. the: Objective, while `
there {8 no such word either.in ordinary parlance or in the Veda...
Objection: . “It is only natural that the word ‘la’ should. be uséd ‘for `
“the ‘ladécas ’~-the substitutes: for ‘la, 7.¢ the 20388. “2 ' and the 168६;
‘as it ig a general rule that the attributing of a certain meaning: ‘to the
“ original (i.e. * {८ ') is always for the sake of the substitute १. |
Reply: This is scarcely: admissible ; - (1) because in that cage by
taking the letter as signifying the substitutes, we have recourse to the
indirect process of Indication ; (2) and it coultl be only an indirect, Indica...
tiveness that.would pertain to the substitutes through the orjginal.. That
is to say, though the word we hear is only ‘la,’ yet, we would take it ४8
signifying the substitutes; and this would involve a vejection of Direct
Denotation. Then if the Objective and the rest also be said to form the
denotations of the letter ‘Ja,’ then, inasmuch as they are not actually
denoted by it, they could not be recognised as so expressed, until the
substitutes had been brought in. And yet, all this would be qnite contrary
to reason. Thus then, it being absolutely necessary to. assume a cer-
tain unreasonable fact, it would be far better to assume that ‘la’ is the
conventional. technical name for the Nominative and the Objective;
because what should be admitted as denotative of something with which
it is invariably concomitant; for while in the condition of mere ‘ fa’ it
could not denote anything, unless such-denotatiyeness. were conventionally
and technically attributed to it. And thus when we come to consider the
question,—as to whether the attributing of the pacticular signification
to the letter ‘la,’ by the siirva ‘luk. karmam, etc., is done through the
substitutes. (‘ fap, etc.’), for the sake of ordinary parlance and the Veda, or
‘only for the sake of certain technical uses to which the name might be
put in the grammatical works themselves,—we find that we can accept it
as being for the sake of ordinary parlance and the Veda, only if it could
be shown,’ by proper reasoning, that even in such parlance and the
Veda, the. Nominative and the Objective ‘are actually denoted by the
Verbal Affixes; and if .this cannot be shown, then it mnst be regarded as
‘being meant only as ४ technical nomenclature adopted for use in gram-
matical works alone. We have already shown above. that..the-name in
question does not serve any purpose in connection with ordinary - parlance
‘and the Veda; and: hence it must be admitted that 11.18 only meant for
use: in ‘grammatical works, Thus then, the sense’ of: the ‘sitra: (lak
‘karniant, ete.’ comes to’ be:.this:-' Kor me, Pantind; the Nominative: aid.
the:Objective should be taken 98 १९००६6९ by the letter‘la, °°
५ Question: ८ What is the ` परः of this: nomenclature, when: it is‘ not
satilised in ordinary parlance and tlie. Veda??? ooo ^ |
Answer: Thoug®: it is: एठा - -ntilised-in these, ‘yet’ 06586 many:

PROHIBITION -0 TRLLING LAKS: PENTAING TO SACKIFICS, : ` ` . 1368

yaeful purposes.in grammar itself. For instance, unless tlie Nominative:
“and the Objective were accepted as to be denoted by the term ‘la,’ we:
gould not: have the preclusion of the case-endings. relating -to these, by
means of the conditional sdtra ‘anubhihite” |
: “ans then, ‘even. though the Nominative and the Objective are not
getually denoted by the Verbal Affix, yet, inasmuch as in grammar itself,
they are technically admitted to be so denoted, the case-endings, whose
: appearance. is conditioned by the Nominative and the Objective being ‘not
~. expressed ‘could not come'in. . And thus we have shown that there is no
ehance of the appéarance of other Karaka-attixos (१.९. of the Instrumental
Gu the expression ‘pacat: Dévadattak ’)

Now, there remains the fifth syllogism brought forward. by the Oppo-
— nent—viz: “The Verbal Affixes nre denotative of the Nominative and the
“Objective, because they signify their partienlar qualifications.” But: this
-peasoning is found to be too wide, in view of such words कष ८204222 ` and
. the like. Bocause, we find that the word ‘ givgapa ’ is not denotative of
the classes, ‘ tree,’ ‘ earthy,’ ‘ substance,’ ‘ entity,’ ‘cognisable,’ and ‘ kuow-
` able,’—though it is found to denote a particular phase of these, the class
`." (0. And just.as in this case (1) we find that the denotation of
the particular is not inconsistent with the non-denotation of the general
~.--(2) and as in the case of the Hye we find that its non-perceptiveness of
` the generic fact of ‘Impermanence,’ is not inconsistent with its percep
- tion of Colowr,—and (3).as according to you also, though the Verbal Affix
_. does not denote the generic element of ‘substance,’ yet.it denotes a particu-
`. Jar-phase of it, in the shape of the ‘ Nominative character,’"—so exactly,
: in the same manner, even without the denotation of the Nominative itself
<: (by the word ‘ pucati') there would be nothing mcongrious in the denota-
_ “tion of its particular qualification (in the shape of Number) |
"48 for the argument that—“ that which is indirectly indicated cannot
. be: connected with any qualifications; and hence from the fact of the
i. Nominative bearing certain distinct relationships, we must conclude:. that
` fis directly denoted,’—this must. be rejected at once; simply because
; shown

@entendes aa‘ Madhuro-rasah anigdhah gito gurucca.’. In this sentence we
"find that: the‘ sweet taste’ being a property, and: ad such incapable of
“being related: to:-other properties..of ‘ snigdha *' (soft) and. the: rest,—it is
“: Hie ००४ object. indicated by the words ‘ Madhuro rasak’. that is regarded
9816526. to. those’ properties: and certainly:the word “rasah’ can. nover

(1364 WANTRACWR WRIA, ADM पण णकाः (4).

denote tlie sibstance directly. Similarly, too, we often come across such
॥ entences 96 SApvasahasrénu nagaram mushitam (The city was’ sacked
by » thousand horses'), wherein what ‘are connected. with . the’ action
of ‘sacking’ are not the ‘horses,’ but the sders indicated by the word
horse.’ The mere fact of a certain particular indicated object not. being
connected with qualifications,—as in the case of :Smoke,. ov in: thatiof
-Oslour,—~cannot justify the assertion that such would be the case every
where | | | ae
For these reasons, we conclude that the Nominative is. not directly
denoted by the Verbal Afilx व ` | “
| ; >And thus, inasmuch as (in the sentence ‘ nainrtam ४५५९८ ` ) the Nomi:
‘native would not be directly denoted by the Verb, the connection of the
“Human Agent with tho ‘telling of lies’ would not be directly expressed by
the sentence; and as sach there would be no Direct Declaration to set
aside the indications of the Context, to the effect that the Prohibition of
“telling lies’ pertains to the Sacrefice—the Darga-Purnamisa |
| There has been another argument to the effect that if the. Prohibi
tion contained in the sentence pertained to the sacrifice, then, inasmuch
as it would have been laid down by means of the one Collective Injnne-
tion of the Darga-Purmandsa, a separate Injunction for its sake (in the
shape of the sentence ‘ndurtam vadét’) would be wholly. useless
To this argument we make the following reply: So long as the
‘telling of les’ has not been touched by the Injunction, there is no use
-forit; and im the absence of such use, the Root-meaning (of the word
-‘vadét ~) would not be recognized as belonging to the sacrifice. That is to
say,& Root-meaning, devoid of the Injunction, becomes itself the object to
be accomplished; and thus, not being of any use to any other result (such
“as the Apdrva. of a sacrifice), it could not be taken up by the Procedure
of the Darga-Pairnamisa ; and not being taken up by this, it could not he
included in the Collective Injunction. of those sacrifices ase
` Thus then, it must be admitted that the distinct Injunction serves,
-in.the first instance, to-point out, either directly or indirectly, the fact of
the ‘Prohibition being of use to the human agent; and. then, -having .
1660४186 to the instrumentality of that which is denoted by the verbal
_ Root,—and thus standing in need of something apart ‘from ‘that, ‘as the
object to be accomplished,—it comes to: be recognized as related: to the
« Darga-Purnamasa sacrifices, which are. mentioned in ‘close proximity to.the
- gentence in question, and as ‘subsidiary to these.: Otherwise there would
0९8 mutaal inter-depondetice: the subsidiary character. being based upon.
the: Injanetion, and the. Injunction upon the subsidiary:character And
thus we find that the Injunction of: the subsidiary (Prohibstion ‘of telling
‘dtes) serves.A distinctly useful purpose १ 4

‘ PROWIBETION “OF कणत -PERTAING 10° BAQRIFIO“S: 1365 `

Thus then, the various factors of the Injunction (‘ndurtam vadet')~
some to°mean 88 follows:— ` ©. :
(1). The word (४५4९८ ` means that ‘a.certain help should be accorded to.
the Darga-Pirnamdsa sacrifices by means of ‘telling or sneaking.’ (2) The
force of the word ( 2074 imphes—‘ that which is to be done by speaking —
‘should be done by false apeahiny (3) The presetice of the negative ”
(‘na.”) signifies-—‘ that the help should be accorded by false speaking is not.’.
And thus we find that the sense of the sentence as a whole turns out to be
‘the Prohibition of that falstty that ts possible in the talking as-done for the -
sake of the Darga-Piiruamdsa ; and this leads us to the general rule—' We
should avoid falsity in all the talking that is done for the sake of the sacri-._
fices.’... That is to say, when the Adhvarya priest has once said ‘make the.
cakes of barley,’ ho should not contradict himself by saying later on—‘ the
parley will be of use in making the Suktu, make the cake of the Vrihi
corn! _ ` |
` -cIn'showing this use of the Adhikarana, the Bhashya says—‘ Vrthi-
wayah sankalpya na yavamayah pradéyak’, and the word ‘ sankalpya’ indi--
ates the saying ;—because the action of sankulpa (conveying of the’
offering) 18 always preceded by -the saying of the words; or it may be
taken to mean ‘ having, by his words, made the Adhvaryu priest to do the.
senkalpa’,—-the word ‘satkalpya’ in this case being explaived as formed.
by two.causative affixes 7
Says the Opponent: “ Whether the sentence in question be taken
“as descriptive of something laid down elsewhere, or as.an Injunction, on:
“account of its connection being different;—in any case the factor in
question——‘should not tell lies "—would be equally present; and as शालौ
“what is the use of the discussion as to whether the sentence is descrip.
“ve or Injunctive ? ” |
Reply : ` If the sentence were merely descriptive of what has been laid `
‘down in. the Smrti, then: the Expiatory Rite would be that which is laid.
down in the Smrtis; while if it be Lnjunctive, then, inasmuch as 1६.
‘would-be an Injunction contained in the Yajurveda, the iixpiatory Rite
‘attendant upon its infringement would be one that ig laid down in that
Veda. [And in this discrimination of the Expiatory Rite lies the use of
‘Adhikaranu]. . That is to say, if the sentence be merely descriptive, then
the.-telling of Wes (during the Darga-Pirnamdsa also) would necessitate
‘the performance. of that Expiatory Rite, which is laid down in the
Smrtve In. connection:.with Lying; while if it. were an Injunction, then.
88: it ocours-in the Yajurveda, its infringement, during the sacrifice would
"1168 a. discrepaticy in it through the Yajurveda ; and tience the Expiatory ;
Rite to’ be performed. would be the pouring of libations into the Anvtiharya-.
१04 Bite, with.tle:ManivaBhyvak svdha’ (which is the rite lad. वणक.

1366 PANTRACVERTIKA. सण व्राः (4)

= in the Yajutveda, as Expiatory of Lying). As for the अकष 8४०6 wo
` would not know in which particnlar Veda it may have-its 01 gin, there `
would be no. certainty as to the Veda, :in accordance’ with which the -
` Expiatory Rite should be performed. Thus then, even if we grant that `
the sentence in question (‘nanrtam vadét’) 1s the origin of. the Smriti- .
Injunction (‘ satyam briyat’), as its meaning, as-well 86 308 infringement ५
will have-been followed up by the 609, the Expiatory Rite:too would be .
that which is laid down in the Smriis | -
` Olyection: “ When’ we would be. sare of the fact of the Smriti being |
based upon the sentence in question, which occurs in the Yajurveda, the ;
.“ Expiatory Rite performed would. be that which -18 laid down in that
“Veda.” - ष 1
Reply: It 18 not so; because the Rite laid down in-the Yajurveda, .
pertaining to such sacrificial fires as the Ahavaniya and the like, distinetly
1818188 to such a performer as ‘laid the fire’ (performed the Aynihotra); `
while the prohibition of Velléng lies (contained in the Smptz) pertains to |
all men; and as such would relate also to one who has not performed the
Agnihoira; and hence the latter would certainly atand 1) need of some
other equally universally applicable expiatory rite laid down in the इक. .
And’ when this would be found out,—inasmuch as the occasion for the :
Rite wonld be the same, in the case of one who has. performed the
Agnihotra, as well as one who has not performed it, the former also would
perform tho Rite that is laid down in the Smrti; ‘so that there would
` 06 no performance of that expiatory rite which is laid down in the Veda, .
And further, in the case of sacrifices, the Veda lays down distinct =
‘expiatory rites to be performed for discrepancy in any of the details of
the sacrifice; and hence when there would be no discrepancy in any of
the sacrificial. details, there would be no occasion for those rites _
That is to say, in all such sentences as ‘yadrkto yajiia Grtimiyat, etc.”
-we find that certain discrepaucies in.comnection with the Sacrifice are
laid. down as occasions for. Expiatory Rites. .The sentences. however ot
occur in the context of the च yotishioma; and. 28. such. would. appeat,. by ` ।

Context, to be related to that sacrifice: but this Context would-be puper-.

-8646 by the superior authority of Syntactical Connection, in accordance - :
with the ठ T11—iii—8 ;. vor is there any reason for the said sentences - :
“abandoning all connection with the sacrifices other than the Jyotishtoma ae
“And.-hence’we ‘conclude that.even inthe case of those: Smirtis whose: -
“source in the‘particular.. Veda.-is distinctly traceable, ‘if these happen to.
“pertain to certain qualifications. of the human agént; then their infringe:
ment.could ‘not 1684 to the performance of the expiatory rita laid down-in
# the. Veda si ae
Jf howover, on adiount'of avoiding. the nocessily of asanming a result in

क = "se Fo

SpROWIBITION GP CTRELING “tks “PRRTAINY ‘YO SaCRIVICRS, 1367"

“pnd: beoduse. ‘of the indications of the Context, the Parvapaksha stand-
; point : 06. that such prohibitions as that. contained in the sentence in .
“question belong. to the human agent as connected with tho sacrifice,—then
‘the corresponding Siddhanta would be. that they belong to the sacrifice `
2 nirely by‘ttself... But in the case of both these theories, the expiatory rite -
“attendant upon an infrmgement would be that which is Jaid down in the
: Yajurveda ang hence we should find:some other use for the AdAikarana -
than the one. noted above. . | | |

: And in this case, the use of the dis¢ussion would be this: In the case
of the Parvapaksha, the Injunctions too would become relegated to the
: region -of ^ Purificatory Rites’; and as snch they would all pertain to the
Yajamdna, exactly like the actions of the kind of 00101700; | |
. ` कषः 218 to. say, in accordance with the Pirvapaksha, all the sacrifices
¦ 6f the Samit, etc. (as laid down in the sentences ‘ samidho yajati,’ ete., ete.)
: when performed in the course’ of other sacrifices, as also the Repetitious of |
the Hymns and Prayers (Stotras and Castras), would come to be puri-
_ frcatory of the humun agent; and as such, they would all pertain to the
, Yajgamana, in accordance with Adhikarana under Satra [ [| ~viii—4, And’
in the case of the Samit-sacrifices,—as sacrifices, they consist of the action
of offering certain materials, and as such, like the Dikshuniyd (Luitiatory
Sacrifice), they would, in any case, pertain to the Yajamdna; and hence
even when there would be an increase in the number of Yajamauas, the
sacrifice: would be performed once only, as. tending, in common, to the’
_parification of all of them,—(with regard to these, there would not be
“much of a difference between the Pirvapaksha and the Siddhinta). But,
- In the case of the Stotragustra-japadi (the Repetitions of the Hymns and.
: Prayers), these could, like the actions of cleaning the teeth and the like,
‘pertain to the Yajamana only, only after they had set aside the indications.
of the Names ‘ Audydtra’ and the like, which are quite capable of singling
out the performer of the action, while quite incapable of putting any
restrictions upon the principal action; and then too, in the case of an
“increase in the number of Yajamanas, they will have to be performed by
, each of them;—as, in this case there could be no performance, applying in
. common to all of them,.as laid down in the law ‘ Yajamanavivrddhau.
~addhdranadravyatyagah.’ ` | ।
| If in the ‘case Prohibitions also, the elemontof Injunction (४.6. the part
^ कमः vudét’) be taken to mean ‘the telling of lies as helping the man
‘Related to: the sacrifice;’ then inasmuch.as the Prohibition would be of this
telling: as: qualified by falsity, ita meaning would come to be that~~‘ what.
8Vér-benedictory declarations the -Yajamana makes for: his‘own purifica-
‘-$ion,—~in these there, should be-no falsity, either as to any optional: matters, :
OP a8: to’ thevactual: forma: of the utterance; कप dther. -persons,:and the

“1388 “PANTRESVARTIRA,- ADH) TT-PEDA “TV ADHT, (4)

। Yajamanu alao in other cases, could speak just as one 11468 LhIS ‘is: in,
‘aeeordance with Pirvapaksha |

In accordance, on the other hand, with the Siddh@ata,—that the Pro: `
“hibition pertains to. the sacrifice purely by. tlself,—its meaning. would be
this: ‘In whatever speaking there is, in course of the sacrifice, tobe done by
the: Yajamina or by the Priests, all false utterances, that may be possible
‘should be: completely eschewed,’ because all these. persons are. equally
connected with the sacrifice: . And hence, just as when the Yajamiina has
“once conveyed by words the offering of the Barley-cake, he should not
offer, in deed, that of the Vrihi corn,—so, 1n the same manner, when. the
Adhvaryu and other Priests haye once determined upon & certain course.
of action, they should not stultify themselves by actually taking up
‘another course, for the suke of case, and. comfort, etc. .Hiven in regard ४५
those few actions that are dono for the purification of the human agent,
the lying would be eschewed, on the ground of those actions also form-
ing part of the Sacrifice |

Objection: “Asa matter of fact, in the Prohibition, the human agent
“tig the subordinate factor: and as such Ais agency would be conditioned
“by the name‘ Adhvaryava,: by which the Prohibition in question would.
““betake itself to the Adkyuryw priest only, exactly like the actions of the
"न Pranitapranayona and the like.” ` ५
Reply: True, it would betake. itself that way, if the sense of the
‘prohibition were something to be performed. As » matter of fact, it is of the
nature of non-performiunce (i.e. not-telling). and as such it does not stand
inneed of any particular Agent (for its performance). We find that the
Prohibition, expressed by. Direct decluration, is connected with such condi-
‘tons under which there may 16 ` 8 chance of what is prohibited bein
present; and as such it would betake itself to all. such. places, by ita-
‘inherent capability; and in this it could not be stopped by. the very
much inferior authority of the Nume (‘ Adhvaryava')

— Objection: “The Name could’ certainly restrict’ the Injanctive.
“element in the sentence (‘vudét’); and then, inasmuch. as the Prohibition .
‘also wonld follow in the wake of that Injunction, the latter too would
“be-restricted: by that Name.” «|: ne |
। Reply: 1४ is not. 80; because’ 1८.18 only मल the menning of the *
-whole scriptural sentencé has beer comploted,- that, there arises the.
‘question: 2s to ‘by whom:is to be performed that which the sentence has.
laid down; and it is only after:this that the use of the Name. comes in.
‘a8, indicating, the performer: And in: the case in question: we find:
that. the sense of ‘the. sentente does not ond. with. “vadéi’: ‘beeause this,
word served the purpose: of a: mere réference:{ to. speakeng);-in connection:
“with the Prohibition meant to be conveyed: and it.je well known that-that:

(PROHIBITION OF TELLING LIES PERTAINS TO SACRIFICES. 1369

which is thus a mere referenco is not qualified, even by that which is
directly declared, as we have. proved under the Grahddhikarana (If1—~i—
: 13 et seq.) ; and under the circumstances it is all the more improbable for
-it.to be qualified by the Name, whose sole function 1168 in pointing out the
relationship of the particular performer of the action that js enjoined, `
‘Thus then, inasmuch as ‘ telling’ is merely referred to, it cannot be taken.
as qualitied. (by the Name); while as for the Prohibition, that cannot be
specified as belonging to any particular person. |

`. Thus the conclusion is that the present discussion serves useful pur-
poses in all cases ; and as such, there can be no doubt that we did right |
in taking up this inquiry. | -*

ADHIKARANA. (5)

{The actions relating to the ‘yawning person’ should find १ place in the:
Context. | |

Sutra (14): ^ They pertain to the human agent as

. “they are for his suke; and as such, like the Ah UNA,
“(they should be taken apart from the Context).”

In the foregoing Adhikaranas, we have dealt with the question of the |
contradiction, or non-contradiction, of Context by Direct Declaration. We |
ow procced to consider its contradiction, or otherwise, by Indicative.
Power and Syntactical Connection
| In connection with the Jyotishtoma we find laid down the “ Tirtha- |
snana” (Bathing at a sacred place); and in connection with the Dar¢a-
Parnamasa, thero is laid down the recitation of the muntré, ‘ Mayi daksha-
krati, etc.’ as to be done with each yawning. And on the question as to,
for whose sake these actions are laid down, we can have all the alternatives
that we had in the Mivitadhikarann (III—iv—l1 et seq.). But out of
‘these we picked ont, in the foregoing Adhikarana, only three, as being
‘more reasonable than tho rest. These were—(1) that the action in ques-
tion pertains to the Ageut only, (2) that it pertains to the Agent as con-
nected with the sacrifice, and (3) that it pertains to the sacrifice only
And on the present occasion also we take up the same three alternative |

` theories, |

116 conclusion of the foregomg Adhikarana pointing out, on the
, Slrength ०६. the Context, that the actions im question. pertnin to the.
‘ saerifice,—we have, as against this, the following

PURVAPAKSHA

(4 Just as, disregarding the indications:of the Context, the Ahinw was .
_“fonnd to takesup the namber ‘ twelve’ (Adhikarana I1I—iii—15/16),— |
ga, in the same manner, would the two actions in question be. taken up ` `
< by the human agent | | | aa
“First, ‘as for the. Bath, inasmuch as it tends to the purification-of ` `
“the hedy, it is taken, by its very capability, as pertaining. to the human
“agent. As for the qualification of: Tirtha.” (the Bathing ina. Tértha),

“YAWNING PERSON’ RELATED TU CONTEXT. 1371;

inasmuch as the term signifies that which is easy of approach, it serves to
“preclude all places that are difficult to be got at ; and by this, they help
=: “the human agent, and not the sacrifice. As for the Smrtz rule regarding
“the fact of the Buth always preceding the Breakfast, that too pertains to
. ५ the Agent alone, and makes the transcendental result following from
“that restriction, betake itself to him. Thus then; the specification of
५ Virtha’ also, being connected with the Bath, whose use has been
“ definitely ascertained, comes to be regarded as pertaining to the human
“agent. One use of this specification,—that the place of bathing being
“such as is got at easily—is quite perceptible $ and even if it be necessary
“to assume certain transcendental results as following from observing the
“yale of uot bathing outside the river or tank, with water taken ont of |
then, which is not found to have any visible purpusc,——we find that that
¥ result too is distinctly laid down in the Veda itself, in the sentenco
“*Pirthaméva sajatanim bhavati’ (‘ He becomes great among his rela-
“tions.’) And certainly that which is so distinctly pointed out by
“Syntactical Connection as related to the purpose of the human agent, .
cannot be affected by the Context ; because of the Sara TI—iii—11.
“In the same manner, though the word ‘briiydt’ does not signify the
* Nominative agent, yet, the word ‘ janjyhabyamdna’,—being formed by the
“krt affix, and the Sra ‘ Kartari krt’ (Panini) indubitably laying down
“the fact of the kri affix being denotative of the Nominative,—cannot but :
१06 taken as signifying a particular performing agent. And the mantra
“being mentioned in the same sentence with it, as connected with the
“person thus pointed ont—it could not be taken up by the Context.
“Specially as we find a distinct result following from its connection with
“the human agent ;—the one that is mentioned in the text itself, ‘ prand-
“pandvadtmam dhatt8’ which signifies long life due to the control of the
“upper and lower breathing |
“ Kor these reasons, it must be admitted that the actions under con-
sideration pertain to the human. ayent (and not to the sacrifice)

SIDDHANT

Sutra (18) : But from the peculiarity of the Context,
they would constitute the purification of one con-_
nected. with it,—like the substance. |

We admit. that the Actions pertain to the human agent; but we can ५
accept. the statement that they pertain to the agent, independently by `
“himself, and as such they should be taken apart from the Context

Because, 89: dong as 1४ .18 ` possible for two means of knowledge to he |
sconciled, ‘it is. not. proper to have one set aside by*the other. Specially: `

“1872 PANTRA-VARTIKA,. AGH, THt-PADA IV—ADHE (0).

as, in the case in question, the mention, at a distance, of. the result, does
not constitute an actual ‘ Phalagrut:’. (Declaration of Results). In the
case in question, we find that if the Actions in question are connected —

with the human agent only, the indications of the Context are set aside

without any reason. `
Objection: “ The acceptance of the other alternative theory would
“ also mean the rejection of Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection.
Reply ; Timte, these latter would be rejected, only if we connected the

actions with something other than the human agent. As a matter of
fact, however, it 1s with the Ayent us engaged in a sacrafice, that we hold

the actions to be connected; and in this nota single means of knowledge |

is rejected... For if the ‘yawning person,’ as well as the ‘ bathing person,

were taken as-that indicated by the Context,—that would not be incom-
patible, either. with the sense of all the words of the two sentences (as
pointed ont by Syntactical Connection), or with the capability of things
(४8 indicated by Indicative Power}

Objection: “ The idea of the wuspecified Person (the Agent by himself
‘being related to the two actions), being based upon the superior authority

^“ (ग Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection), could not be set aside

“by that of the specified Person (one who is engaged in the performance
“of the sacrifice), which is based upon the inferior authority (of the

. ^ Context).”

Reply: The idea of the unspecified person cannot but be set aside

(even by you) ; because the ignorant and the incapable persons could not
be entitled to the actions in question (and so you cannot take all men to
06 connected with the actions)

Objection: . “In the way that you. suggest, the Context would ५०१९ |
“to be taken as the means of the necessary specification
ieply: It is not so; because in this case also, the Context remais

only a comprehender ; and it could not become the means of specifying the

yawning person that forms the subject of the sentence. . Nor do we find

the functioning of the Context, in the matter of the said specification ;
‘because the ‘How’ is always related to something other than the ‘Thus.
One who, seeking for the person mentioned in the Context, obtains, from
that.source, the necessary specification of that person,—for him, when
the Context has ceased to function, there only arises a desire to find that
-person mentioned in the Context; which, thus, १०६३ not come to be the
-means of specification, ` |

Question: .“ How, then, do you get at the idea of the Person indi

` “gated by the Context?” : ~

Answer: -Kvon withont the Context serving as the theans of specifica.

tivn, we vin, tv the Present'case, get atthe idea of the Person indicated

“VAWNING PERSON’ RELATED 10 CONTEX' 1373.

“by the Context. Because just as the ‘ Prokshana’ of the Vrihi corn for
‘ordinary purposes would be wholly useless, so also would the actions in|
question be (if they pertained to an ordinary person); and hence for the
sake of their usefulness, they must be regarded as pertaming to the -
Perso indicated ‘by the Context
| That is to say, the Vrihicorn, connected with the Prokshana, is not:
thereby specialised by the Context ; but what happens is that in order to
suve it from becoming useless, and on account of there being no reason 10)
assuming an imperceptible result,—and lastly, because as an auxiliary to `
the sacrifice, it has to serve a distinct purpose,—we accept the Vrihz
mentioned in the Context (to be the one to which the Prokshana is to be
applied). And in the same manner, in order to avoid the assumption of a
distinct result, and in consideration of proximity, we take that ‘ yawning
‘berson’ who is connected with the Context. And so long as this is pos-
sible, there can be no grounds for the assumption of any other result

Objection: “The result of the two actions in question is already
“definitely ascertained, and has not got to be assumed, as we have already |

explained above |

Reply: Itis true that you have explained it; but the result is never
found to be mentioned by such words as are found in the sentences in
question ; as their mention is always found to be accompanied by the word
‘Kama’ (‘desire’). This is what 1s meant by the assertion—‘ we do not
find any injunctive word here ;’—the sense of this assertion must be taken
_as—‘ such words cannot serve the purpose of enjoining the regults,’—as we
shall explain later on, Otherwise, inasmuch as we have an actual Injunc-
tive word in the shape of ‘ britydé,’ 16 would not be quite true to assert the
absence of the Injunctive word. Nor can the opponent be taunted with the
fact of the word ‘ dhatéé’ not being injunctive. Because in all cases, the
factor of Result never forms the object of Injunction. Consequently. the.
said sentence must be taken in the manner just shown. Specially as we
Shall show. under Satra 1V—iii—1, that such sentences are Arthavadas .;
and under Sdtra IV—iii—3, that the mention of the Result is only by
‘Means of such sentences as contain the word ‘ Kama’ (‘ Desire ’)
Objection: “ We might accept the actions to be purificatory of the
“human agent, By using ‘the word ‘Samskéra,’ it is meant to show that
we admit the fact of the actions in question pertaining to the human
agent; because an independent action, having a result of its own, could
--ROb- be spoken of as ‘ Sanishdra.’ But we do not accept it to belong to only.
that person who is performing the Darga-Pirnamdsa sacrifices. That is to
say, the repetition of the Mantra ‘mayt dakshakratd, etc: being recog-—
४१860. 8&8 belonging to the ‘yawning person, would be precluded from
such a: person in the ordinary .course of life, bedause of the repetition

1374 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. JTL—PADA 1V--ADHL. (5).

‘being of no use in ordinary life. But the person who would be.‘ yawn. :
“ing’ during the Jyotishtoma and the other sacrifices, will take the Mantra,
“with as useful an effect as one connected with the Darga-Pirnaméaea,

and there would be nothing to preclude the Mantra from these. Con.
“sequently we take the Mantra as pertaining to the human agent en gaged
“in any sacrifice, .

The sense of the reply that is given to tho above (by the Bhdshya) is
difficult to be grasped... 1४.18 this There is no useful purpose to be served
by his purification. Because, just as the Nivita has been found to have no
connection with the duties of adiending upon guests, ete., simply becauseé of.
its not being mentioned by. Direct Declaration, ete. (as related to those.
duties ),—-so, in the same manner, the re petition of the Mantra in question
‘would, for the same reason, bave no relationship with the other sacrifices.

‘That is to say, if the Mantra were laid down as to be used every.
where, and were precluded from the ordinary actions of the world, simply -
-bevanse it would serve no aseful purpose with regard to these, then what
you say would have been quite correct (i.e. it should have been related to
nll sacrifices). As a matter of fact, ib cannot be so precluded; as the
Injunctions that have once operated can never be precluded by anything;
-and in all cases of preclusion, the preclusion is recognised from the very
beginning; and this preclusion is made in the following manner: Inas-
much as, in accordance with Adhikurana ‘Drav yasankhyaihétusamuddyanca '
(VI--i—11), the mention of the mere form of -the ‘yawning person
would be useless,—the word ‘janjubhyamana’ ( 1८1४४1८4) should be taken
ai indicating the means to a certain Apéirva ; and as a matter of fact, we
find that this Indication would not be possible except through the Context
and as for the Context, we. have no other available save that pertaining
to the Apirva of the Darca-Pirnamdsa. Consequently, it must be ad
mitted that the purification, involved in the repetition of the Mantra
pertains to that ‘yawning person’ who. 38 engaged in the bringing about
of the Darga-Pirnamisa-Apirea. |
The same may be said of the Bath (‘ Tirthasnana’) also
` 16 above objection, as well as the reply to it, the Author of the
Siira will himself explain, under the Sutras [1I—vii—3 and 4
> Then, it has been argued: that, inasmuch as the Injunction. of the |
“Repetition of the Mantra would be. included in the Collective In janction
of the Darga-Pitrnamisa, that contained in the sentence im question would
tbe wholly. useless. ` | | :
In reply to. this it is said that it is very much more reasonable to”
. take the sentence in question as merely descriptive of the Injunctioy con-
‘tained in.the said: Collective Injunctian, than as the useless Injunction of
a) detail pertaining ‘ty thu humei agent ouly a oe | eae

< १ YAWNING PERSON”: RELATED TO CONTEXT. ` = 18°75

Objection: . ‘The objection of the opponent is that what the Bhashya.
: ‘has hare dealt with is exactly the samo as that dealt with in the preced- `
“ing Adhikarana,—but the replies given on the two occasions are:mutually
^. “eontradictory. Hor instance, on the former occasion, the explauation
“oven Was that it is only when a certain action has become subsidiary
` ~ 00 another, that it comes to be taken up by the Collective Injunction of
“<¢the latter Action; and until the former action has been enjoined, it does
: “not become subsidiary to any other action; while on the present orca-
“sion 16 18. held. that the seutence would not be an Injanction, but a mere
- Doscriptive Declaration. And in view of the contradictory character
“of these two explanations vouchsafed by the BAfishya, we inust consider:
“which of these two is true and which is false. In view of what has been
“said on {he previous occasivn, it would seem that the former was the
’eorrect explanation; while the latter is pnt forth simply by way of
“admitting the opponent’s position (for the sake of argument). But it
ig possible to show that this latter is the correct viow Inasmuch as
“there isa single Injunction that takes in all the subsidiaries collectively, |
“distinct Injunctions of them cannot but be said to be merely descriptive |
“declarations, That is to say, under the Sutra X—viii—16, it will be.
“shown that, on account of all subsidiaries tending to fulfil'a single
“purpose, there is a single collective Inj unction of all these; and this
“could be possible for only. those that are laid down in the Collective
“Tnjanction; because each of the distinct Injanctions of these sub-_
“sidiaries operates separately. An Injunction is that by which a man is
“urged to activity; and in the case of the Bharana that pertains to the
“principal as well as the subsidiary sacrifices, the man is urged to
“activity, all at once. Consequently, the distinct Injunctions must be
regarded as mere descriptive declarations | |
To the above we make the following reply: Both portions of the
Khashya are quite correct. Beaause the declaration contained in the
former is not wrong, for the reason that is.given therein—viz., that until.
an Action is enjoined, it cannot be subsidiary to another Action, specially
as it has been already explained. that if we do not admit the Injunction, =
only that which is signified by the Verbal Root would come to be the
objéct to be accomplished ; and as this would not serve any useful purpose,
it could ‘not be taken as subsidiary to any other Action; consequently
the sentence in question must be admitted to be an Injunction. It may
also’ 06 ` taken. ag a mere descriptive: declaration. Because the Action.
having been. ascertained, through the previous Injunction, to be the sub-. -
sidiary of a certain action, up to the time that it is carried along to be |
taken up by the-collective Injunction of this latter’ Action, it continues in `
the :position of the In junction, .when, however, it once becomes taken DD °.:

4376 PANTRA-VARTIRA: | ADH. I1f-—PADA. 1V*ADHT...(8)

hy the said Collective Injunction, inasmuch as ‘the ‘activity of the Agent
towards the Action would be accomplished by the mere fact of its forming .
the subsidiary of the other Action, its former Injunction would now come
to be taken as a mere Descriptive Declaration, Thus then, we find that

inasmuch as, prior to being taken up by the Collective Injunction, its per-
formance wonld not be possible, the sentence laying it down as a distinct
sacrifice, is taken as an Injunction; while snbsequent to that, as its: per

formance comes to be accomplished, through the Collective Tnjunction
‘of the Action to which it is the subsidiary, the former Injunction comes
to be taken as ‰ mere Descriptive Declaration. Thus both the declarations.
of the Bhashya are true, under different conditions.

Siitra (16): It could be taken apart from the Context,
only through the mention of a particular charac
ter.

In the case of the Ahina, we found that, it has no existence at all, in
the Context; and hence the mention of ‘twelvc-upasads’ in the sentence,
not being taken up by the Context, had to be taken apart from the
Context, In the case in qnestion, however, there 18 no such mention; and.
hence the example of the Ahina cannot apply to the present case.

ADHIKARANA (6)
hele [The threatening, etc. pertain to the Human Agent}

Sitra (17): In the case of the Camyw (we would have to
take it apart from the Context); because of the protect.
tion having been extended to all

` - "` he word ‘Gamyu’ is the name given ४0 सी sach prohibitions as those
“pertaining to the Threatening of a Brahmana, the striking of him and the |
shedding of his blood [that we hear of in the passage—' Déva vat Cumyum
Barhaspatyan abruvan havyanno vaha...... kimmé prajayad iti; t
‘bruvan (1) yo Brahmandydvagurél tam cgaténa yatayat, (2) yo nihané-—
tam sahasréna ; (3) yo lohitam karvat yavatak praskandya pringiin, etc., etc.’ |
Tn connection with this also we have the same alternative theories as in -
the previons Adhikarana. But from among these, we pick out only two, `
taking the two connections into one; and these two alternatives are:—.
‘these Prohibitions pertain to the sacrifice, or to the Man only
And on this, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA

“Tn accordance with all that has been said with regard to the Prohi-
“bition of Telling Lies, the Prohibitions in question must be taken as.
“pertaining to such Threatening, etc. ns are possible for the sake of the
“sacrifice. The possibility of these in course of the sacrifice may be

explained thus:. The Darcga-Purnamasa sacrifices require the help.
“Of four. Brahmanas; and for winning their acquiescence one could
“have recourse to the four ordinary means of Peaceful Request, Gifts
“Pivision भात्‌. Punishment; but we find the Veda distinctly laying.
“down that ‘one should win their acquiescence by means of the Anva-
“harya Gift’; but it is possible that they might. not be won over by.
“this: Gift; and. in that case one would be called upon to do all that he
“sould to win it out of them; and in this he could have recourse to the
“four aforesaid: means of. subjugation; and: hence as a punishment, ho.
“might come to-do the Threatening, ete.; and it is ‘these latter that are
prohibited by. the sentences in question ; the sense of these prohibitions
.:4 being—‘ These, threatening, etc., should uot be done ;.one should have.
"recourse to the other. means. of subjugating the Btahmanas.’ ” ee
43.

“1378 TANTRASVARTIKA,. ADH, 144 Vane, (6),

SIDDHANT

To the above, we make the following reply: (1) Because the sen.
tence points to the connection of all (Bréhmanas) ; (2) because the results
are distinctly mentioned; and (3) because the boon of protection was
granted to all of them ;—we cannot connect the prohibition in question
‘with the Context only.
| That is to say,—(1) the word ‘ yak’ (in the sentence ‘ yo Brahmanaya -
‘ete.’) distinctly points to Man.’ Nor can the Prohibition in question be
held. to pertain to that Man who is connected with the Couteat; because
what the sentence speaks of is not a purificatory action, but only a Prohi-—
bition calculated to save man from falling into hell, And as the falling
into hell pertains to the Afan, and not to the sacrifice,—and as the Prohibi-
tion for saving from trouble must pertain to one who 18 hable to that
trouble, (the Prohibition, in the case in question, cannot but pertain to the
Man, and not to the Sacrifice)

(2) We find the results mentioned, in the sentences ‘ paténa yatayat
suhasréna 2614401, etc. which means that the punishment that he would
suffer would be a hundred, and a thousandfold; or, inasmuch as the
sentence does not speak of any particular object to which the numbers
(‘hundred’ and ‘thousand’) would apply,—and as we find the ‘ samvat-
sara’ (‘year’) mentioned later on,—we must take the sentence ‘ sahasréna
yatayat’ as meaning that ‘he should undergo the punishment for «
hundred years,’ As for the result of the Prohibition, it connects itself by
being merely expressed ; and it docs not stand in need of the word ‘ kama,’
as has been shown to be the case. with the mention of the results ol
Injunctions; specially as no person ‘desires’ (k@mayaté) that which has
‘to be abandoned ; nor is there any other way of mentioning an undesir-
able result; and hence its mention should be taken as duly accomplished
by. the word ‘anubhavet’ (‘ho should enffer’); and this word we find
present in the case in question. Though the Bhadshya has explained the
word ‘ ydéayat’ as. Injunctive, yet that cannot be quite relevant ; because
_the result spoken of is not meant to be enjoined. That which is desirable
18 not enjoined ; while that which 18 not desirable can never call: forth
the activity of Man; and as. such the introduction of the Injunctive is
_wholly contrary to the nature of this latter Consequently all that we can
“rightly assert is that the Prohibition is accomplished by the mere mention
of the undesirable result,-—that the undesirable result pertains to the.
“Man,—aud hence the Probibition must also pertain to the Man (and not
‘ to the sacrifice) ति

(3) Then again we find.in the passage quoted that Qamyu asks—
‘What would happen.io my offspring if 1-offered the libations to you FP’

THREATENING PERTAINS 10 AGENT 1379.

` which shows that what he asked for was the protection of ull his offspring;
‘and the Devas also answer—‘ As thou desirest.’ And thus we find that.
Camyu made over all Bréhmanas to the protection of the gods; and the
protection that the gods extended was to all Brahmanas; and hence these:
declarations become reconciled only by taking the Prohibition to pertain
‘to Man in yeneral (and not to the sacrifice, or to the Man connected with

the sucrefice)

.ADHIKARANA (7).

[The Prohibition of conversing with a woman in her courses pertains to
| Man in general]

Sitra (18): Inasmuch as the woman tn her courses has.
been previously removed (from the place of the sacrifice,
the Prohibition cannot pertain to the sacrifice; it must
pertain to Man in general)

(Iu connection with the Darga-Pirnumdsa we find the passage—
‘Synulavadvisusd na samvadet, ‘udsya annamudyat’)|.. Though the latter
seutency occurs in a different place, yet it has been quoted by the Bhashya
along with the former, because it is to be utilised in the next Sutra, by
way of showing that 1b 1s for another purpose, ‘malavadvasa’ is the
woman in her courses; and in regard to the Prohibition of conversing with:
her, we have three alternative theories :—| (1) It pertains to the sacrifice
` (9) it pertains to the Manas connected with the sacrifice; and (3) it per.
tains to the Man in general]. And on this we have the following |
PURVAPAKSHA

“The Prohibition must be taken as pertaining to the words— paini
“ésha té lokuh, etc.’ —that are addressed by the yayamanu to his wife, im
“course of the Darga-Purnamdsa; (1) because in this we have not got
“either the word ‘yut’ (pointing to Man), or some such word as (107711५.
“ bhyamdna’ (which could indicate the relationship of Man) ; (2) because
“the conversing 18 as possible in connectivn with the sacrifice, as apart

from it; and (3) because of all that has been said in connection with
s the Proinbition of the Telling of Lies | 7

SIDDHANT

As:against the above, we make the following observations ; 411.
४ Prohibitions. are only of such. things. of whose occurrence theré is ४
“possibility; and. the possibility of: conversing rests in the Man;. and then

PROHIBITION. OF CONVERSING PERTAINS TO MAN IN GENRAL.- ` 1381.

be impure on the day of the sacrifice, should perform the sacrifice, after.
-yemoving her from there ’),—there would be no possibility of any convers-
-ing with the woman in course of the sacrifice. Because, in accordance with
‘the. sentence just quoted, she having been moved away from all sacri-
ficial performances, how could there be any chance for the ya/aména-con-
एल with that woman, in course of the sacrifice? As for the Mun in
‘general, on the other hand, inasmuch as his ways would be independent
(of all such restrictions as pertain to sacrifices), there is every possibility
of his conversing with the woman; and in reference to him, tle Prohibi-
tion would serve a distinctly useful purpose

Kven if we have Smrtt-rules prohibiting the said conversing, we
vould take those as having their source in the sentence under considera-
tion; and neither of them should be taken as a mere descriptive declara-
tion. |

“Siitra (19): Also because of' the prohibition of iiter-
COUrSE.

For the following reason also, the Prohibition must he taken as
pertaining to Mun in general |

It has been shown above (11-31-16) that all doubtful points are
settled by reference to a sentence abounding in the matter under con-.
sideration ; and in the case in question, we find that the phrase ‘ not have
intercourse with her’ is distinctly meant to pertain to Man.
: ~ That is to say, we have another Prohibition—‘ nasya unnamadyit,’
where ‘anna ’=abhyatjana, which, from the subsequent. portion of the.
sentence, comes to be taken as meaning ‘Intercourse. Among the Ldatas,
‘also, we find the word ‘ abhyanjana’ synonymous with ‘ mrakshana,’ which
-1s known to be synonymous with ‘Intercourse, And we know full well
‘that there could never be any possibility. of this intercourse, during the
performance of the sacrifice; while as regards the Man, there is always a
‘possibility of the said intercourse. And we have already explained that
the-Prohibition can. pertain only to one, for whom there is + possibility of
-that which is prohibited. And further, inasmuch as ‘celzbucy’ is one of
the necessary conditions imposed upon the sacrificer, there would never be
any poasibility of intercourse even for the sake of the Mam himself, during
the’ performance of the sacrifice; and hence the Prohibition could not
‘pertain to the time of tle sacrificial performance. = ` en
। Consequently, ‘we must pass over the Context, and connect the Pro-
“hibition with Man in general; and hence in accordance with the maxim
- Latsamainydditaréshu: tathatvam’, -we must take the Oonversing also to.
belong to: Mun in: general i ae ee | |

ADHIKARANA (8).
| {116 wearing of Gold, etc. pertains to the Man]

‘Siitra (20): Not mentioned in any particular Context
it must belong to the Man; because. tt differs from
that mentioned in a particular Context

We now proceed to consider the question as to whether, or not, Direct
Declaration, Indicative Power and Syntactical Connection,—not oceur-
ring in any particular Context,—come to a coalition with the Context

In regard to the sentence, ‘Tasma@t suvarnam hiranyam bharyam
durvarno sya bhratrvyo bahvatt’ [and ‘ sucdsasd bhavitavyam, ritpamévu
bibharti’]; there arises the question as to whether the sentence lays down

suvarnata’ (excellence of colour) with reference to the wearing of gold
during the performance of a sacrifice, and ‘gobhanatva’ (excellence) with
reference to the wearing of cloth during the sacrifice,—or it only lays‘
down the qualified weartng as pertaining to the Man in general

On this question, the Parvapaksha is this :—“ With a view to avoid a
“multiplicity of objects for the Injunctions, we must regard the sentence
“as laying down the excellence of colour and excellence with reference to
“the wearing of Gold and Cloth respectively, during the performance of
“the sacrifice

SIDDHANTA

The Injunctions must be taken as pertaining to the Man in general

because if the Injunction pértained only to the Gold and the Cloth, 16
would be absolutely uscless; while as for its connection with any parti-
cular sacrifice, we do. not find any ground for such relationship :
he one purpose served by the mention of something in the Context

_ of a ‘particular sacrifice, is to point out the fact of its being related as the -
subsidiary to that sacrifice; and under the circumstances, if even that
which is not mentioned in the Context of any particular sacrifice, were to”
be-taken as subsidiary to that sacrifice, then there would be no use 11
anything being mentioned in a particular Context. But inasmuch ae the `
Veda itself makes a distinction between a thing being mentioned and not-
: being mentioned in a particular Context, wo conclude that thosé:things |
~ that: are not mentioned in any particular Context, must’ pertain ‘to the
, ddan. tit genera?

SWEARING OF GOLD PERTAINS TO'MAN. , ~ 1883

Vitra (21): Objection: “Not having a substance, it
would be subsidiary (to the sacrifice).” ` "+=

Says the opponent: “Even if the sentence in question be a quali-
५ fed Injunction, it could not but be subsidiary to the sacrifice; otherwise
“it would be necessary to assume a distinct result iu connection with the
‘*Tnjunetion in question |
` “Objection: ‘Its connection with the sacrifice too will have to be
-“ assumed.’ ”
। “ Reply: True; bat this latter assumption would be fully authorised
` ५ Because when there arises the question, in regard to an Action, as to
“the purpose served by it, it is another Action that turns up as the one to
“be helped by it; and hence the connection of the Wearing with the
4 Sacrifice would be authorised ; but notso its connection with a Result, in
“the shape of Heaven 7 |

“What we mean is this:--No other action, save Yaga, Dana and
` ५ Homa, can ever be the principal action: and in the case in question we
“find none of these three actions,—as the sentonce does not coutain any.
“word expressive of the Recipient of the offering, yift, ९६८. ; and thus by its
“very nature the action of wearing would be a subsidiary, and that
“too to another action | |

“Or, it may be that the sentence mentions the wearing, and this
“action, by its very uature, is subsidiary to that which is worn. And as

any. such thing, that would be worn in ordinary life, would not deserve

“a purificatory rite, consequently, it must be admitted that the Injunc-
“tion im the sentences under consideration is of the wearing of that Gold
“and Qloth which form the auxiliaries of a sacrifice
Or, inasmuch as such an Injunction would involve a multiplicity in
“its objects,—and as, when it'is possible, the Injunctive potency should,
perforce, be transferred to the Property,—we should take the sentence
“Sas laying down the ‘ excellence of colour’ (‘sitvarnata’) with reference to
“that wearing of gol, which we find laid down in many such sentences
Naa! Hiranyam haste bhavati,’ ‘Atha grhnatt hiranyam hasté,‘’ Sampra-
“daya shodacind stuvaté’ and so forth; and the other sentence also should
“be taken as laying down ‘ escellence,’ with reference to the Cloth, the
`. Wearing whereof is laid down in the sentence ‘ Vdsak purcdhatté.’
«And thus we.find that it is this Injunction that forms the basis of
“ the definition of ‘ Hiranya,’ that is given in the Kalpasiitras, as ‘ that
न gold which bears its natural excellent colour.’ Otherwise (if the तीष
“ton Airanyam jatariipam pratiydt’ were not. explained.as above, but
“Only 85 ‘that which bears its natural excellent colour’), inasmuch as the -
“Word: * Hiranya’ would apply equally to the. golde and silver (as both.

1384 *PANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, 1U—PADA 1V-—-ADATY (8):

“these metals retain their‘ natural excellent colour’), it would be neces
“sary to look out for another. authority for applying the word to any one `
“of the two only | .
“The expression ‘adravyatedt’ (in the 679) means that, we find:
“the sentence in question laying down, not a substance, but a particular
“property of it, and hence the Injunction herein contained should betake -
“itself to that sacrifice where we do have a Substance. _ a
| “Though the Bhdshya las mentioned the ‘ Deity’ also along with
| ५ । Substance.’ (in the course of his explanation of the expression ‘ adravyat- `
wit’), yet. inasmuch as it ia something wholly unconnected with the `
“ Satra, and hence most improper. Specially as we have other actions
“also,—in the shape of Japa and the like,—which are neither Yaga, nor
“ Dina, nor Homa,—and yet which are performed as principal actions
“and hence there is no use of mentioning the Deity

80१८ (22): ^ Because of connection with the Veda.”

| ‘Tn case of the Weartny being subsidiary to the Sacrifice, we tind that —
“the name Adhvaryanu’ serves the purpose of pointing out the use to which ©
“it is to be put; while if the wearing pertained to the Man in general
“then the indication of that Name would be set aside. If the sentence 06 `
“taken as laying down ‘excellence of colour’ with reference to the Gold
thon, too, the said Name wonld be wholly inoperative; because that
“excellence of colour would be uuder the influence of certain.other
८ Tnjunctions, and it would not be of the nature of actions त
“The word ‘Védasamyoga’ (in the Sutra) means the fact. of. both
“ being equally Vedic; and hence, if some one were to argue that ‘ there 1४
a posstbility of the wearing of the Gold and the Oloth in ordinary life -
‘also, and hence the Injunction of the property (excellence of colour)”
could be.taken as referring to the wearing met with in ordinary life, --
“this argument too would be met by the said: reason of ‘ Védasamyoga

—“ Stitra (28): “Because the substance ia the principal .

` | factor (in the sentence)” ` = |. `.

o> “On the former. occasion (Teet, page 990), it has been said, that the’.
“Wearing is naturally possessed of the character of a purificatory. action ; ५
“and now we proceed to slow. additional reasons for:the same opinion: `
^ Becanse of the mention of the Objective character. Inasmuch as we: find -

tthe word ‘hiranyin’ with the Accusative Ending. ‘am,’ and .as. the
^ “Bhdshya speaks-of the presence of the. Objective, the Accusative Ending (ण -:
oe Chiranyan’) might be mistaken ‘to. be similar to- that inthe word —
® orihin. Batin 118 case in question we find-tliat the Objective -18. ex

‘WHARING ए GOLD PERTAINS 0° MAN 198 `

4 pressed (and. not‘ not-enpressed’—‘anabhihita') by. the Krt affix (in
“as pharyam"); and as such the Accusative that we see in ‘hiranyam' we |
: 4 षा take, -not in the sense of the Objective, but in that of the Nomi.
ative, the former being expressed by the ‘nyat” affix.in ‘bharyam
--&this is what is meant by the expression ‘ dravyaparatvat’. [* because the
“<gubstance ४5 the principal factor’) in the Sitra.,. That too is the reason
va why the Bhashya has spoken of the ‘ connection of the sense of the ©. -
+ {९८४९१ and not ‘the connection of the Objective
“Thusa-then the wearing, being of the nature of a purificatory act, -
^ “pust be taken as aubsidiary to the sacrifice.” ` `

Siitra (24): ‘Reply: But there would be a connection |
with the Result; just as in the case of the presence
(of words to that effect); and hence it is an Action,

as declared by Aiticayanda. |

As a matter of fact, we find that the Action (of weartny) is not con-. |
nected, by a sentence, with any sacritice. Because every sentence, that is -
not found to be mentioned in any particular Context, lays down.a sub-°-
sidiary, either by means of the connection of a sentence, or by that of on -
g invariably concomitant Indicative Power. In the case: in, question, |
however, we find that there is no connection of any sentence; nor is there. |
- ally such Indicative Power as is required; because the wearing of gold. 18
common to both (ordinary life and the Véda),. That wearing could have ©
been specialised by the declaration ofits performability; but if that. .
declaration be taken as serving the purposes..of the said qualification, —
` . “all its potency being spent up.in that qualification, it would cease to be —
injunctive. Consequently all that has the support of authority, is the ..
mere relationship of the substance in. question (i.e. gold). And as any.
purificatory action in connection with that would be wholly useless, we.
caunot accept the wearing to be. such an action, Nor. could the.
rélationship of the purificatory action with ‘the: substance be held to be: `
due: to the fact of its. tending to bring about a certain Apiirva,.as the `
character of bringing about the Apirva is pointed out by the Context त

Thus then, in accordance with the principle that—‘ when something `
accomplished is. spoken: of along with that which bas to be accomplished, ...
the’ former should be’ taken: as helping in the accomplishment of the . -:
lntter,*»—the. sentences in question should be taken to: mean that, ‘one. —
should perform the action of wearing with the help of.the-Gold, and with .-
thatof the Oloth’: And. when: we come to. look. for; thé:ase for gach...
wearing, we ‘come..to-assuine a cértain useful pyrpase: that’ it: servea’y
for the ‘Man; specially..asthere is’ nothing. ineongranus.in an Action

174

1386. aNtunvaRTIWA,* ADK. mPOA j1V—-ADBE: (B)

being related to an Agent that.is merely implied (and not directly men. `
tioned). In the case of the word ‘surdsasd,’ however, 6. have the Man
distinctly pointed: ont as the principal factor ;'as the word is a Bahuvrihi
compound, and in this compound the object other than those expressed by
the component words is accepted as the principal factor (४.९. . the word
means, He who wears good clothing) : S
Objection: “But in that case, it would be necessary to assume 4

| “yesult (ns following from the wearing) | | |
। Reply:. That. would. not’ matter; because’ when it has been as¢er- `
‘tained, in general terms, that the Action serves a useful purpose for the’
Man, the assumption of a particular result becomes an easy matter. As —
for the appearance of Heaven and the like, inasmuch as-~iuat would be
an action, and based elsewhere (in the case of the Darca-Parnamésa fi.)
upon the Veda,—both the sentences would be equally capable of pointing
to that (appearance); and hence there remains no chance for these sen- .
_tences pointing to any particular sacrifice, -4 |

_ . Then again, in fact we find the sentences themselves mentioning
the results,—in the shape of the ‘durvarnuta’ (spoiling of the Visage) of
the ‘ Bhratrvya’ (Enemy), and the keeping up of one’s own beauty (Rupa- —
dharana). Even though the sentences mentioning these results have the
appearance of Arthavida, yet inasmuch as they are not known to be sub-.
.servient to any other Injunction, they can, as such, be taken as the
‘Injunctions of : Results,—as explained under Satra IV—iii—18. And
Vall that we have got to do, in the present case, is to assume the merely
desirable character of that whose relationship. with the Action is. fully
established, and then to take the Action .as serving the purpose of
accomplishing that result,: If, on the other hand, we were to assume @
result, we would have to assume everything, beginning from its connec:
‘tion with the sacrifice onwards. Conseqnently, just as in the case of the
- presence of sach words as ‘desiring. Heaven’ and the like, so, in the sen
_.tences in question also, we have the connection of. results; and as such
“-eontaining qualified Injunctions, ‘these: must be.:takeh as laying down
- independent actions (of wearing the gold, and wearing the cloth; for. the
. Bake off Man 0 general), We have Smric rules also to-the same effect
. 6p. ‘One should ‘not. keep on himself worn-out, and dirty ‘clothing,’ ‘He
should hold a bamboo stick, ands pair of good ear-rings of ‘gold,’ ete:; etc
_sewhich are reconcilable with the Siddhinta theory 2

ADHIKARANA (9)
[The Jaya, etc. are subsidiaries to Vedic Actions]

970१ (26): “They would be subsidiary to all actions:
because of there. being no distinctiveness in the
“Context.” 2st |

We now proceed to consider the special relationships of:such factors
as have been ascertained, through Syntactical Connection, to be subsidiary
_to certain sacrifices

[We have the Injunction—‘ yéna karman4 irtstt tatra Jaydm juhuyat
~~ 06. should perform the Jaya sacrifice, if oue desires prosperity from
the action that he 18 performing.’ And with regard to this, there arises
the question as to whether this Jay@ is to be performed along with all such
actions—even those like agricultural operations and the like, or only with
those that are laid down in the Véda—e.g. the Agnihotra, etc. |

And though the opponent 18 fully cognisant of the fact of the Jaya
being connected with the sacrificial fire (the Ahavaniya), yet he thinks
~ that this fire is introduced into the Juyda, simply with a view to the Homas
that constitute the principal class of actions; and hence finding the
qualification of ‘that. whereby one desires prosperity’ applying also to
= ‘such actions of ordinary life, as Agriculture, Service and tle like,—he
<" ‘pats forward the following theory as the— z |

PURVAPAKSHA

। `. ..: “The Jaya and other such-like sacrifices are हक to all actions ;
"and. the sense of the Injunction comes. to be—‘ Desiring prosperity by
means of service, etc. one should perform. the Jaya and other sacrifices in
“the-Ahavaniya Fire.’ - Nor conld it. ba argued that. Service, etc. do. not
“require this. sacrificial Fire; because the purpose served by the mention
ae of this. Fire would be to preclude the possibility of the performance. of
othe Jay@ by those that have not laid the Pire;: while as for those who
a have done it, they should:-perform. the Jaya, even when going #0 -per-
oem ordinary actions in. accordance with their respective castes ।
eno hig interpretation: has.the advautage of being in keeping: with the -
E indisation: of the fact.of the ‘sentence in. question. occurring apart from.
‘the Context: of any particular action ;.as such actions,‘not being directly.

1885: = RAWERACWR Rava.” ADH. 31—PApA 1y—apar.. (9)

“eonnected with ‘any action as their primary, would not necessarily be
‘subservient to any such Primary. Nor would they abandon the: modi.»
“fications. for fear of there. being needless repetition.” Specially. in. the
““ case of Agriculture, etc. there being. nd: fear. of any: repetition,’ there
-“ would be no abandoning of the modifications.” ~~ |

SIDDHANT

| Sititya (26):. Being Homas, they would be restricted in
:. . - theity performance; because. of the connection of
the Ahavaniya Hire. ` - : ॥ i

These -Homas—-the Jay@ and the like-—would be restricted in their
. performaneée ; that is to say, they would be performed only.in connection
with ‘Vedic actions, -Beciuse: there is always a certain co-existence
desitable for the Subsidiary. and the Primary; and as a matter of
fact, we find that there could be uo such co-existence between the Jaya
and the Agricultural operations, etc. As.the telling (which is a part of
these operations) would be done in the ground, and service at the king's
“palace; while as for the Jay@ sacrifice, inasmuch as it is a Homa, and has
“no distinct substrate laid down for itself, it would always be done in the
Ahavaniya Fire; And thus, if this latter were subsidiary to the former,
‘then, there would be a difference in the positions of the two (the Sub
sidiary and the Primary) which cannot be allowable, without an express
authoritative sanction to that effect, and would create a discrepancy in
. the sacrifice itself | |
` This discrepancy would be all the more unallowable, because there
. ave cages where these sacrifices could be performed without such a discrep-
ancy; and consequently there is no Apparent Inconsistency which could
justify the unwarrantable difference of position referred to.. And wo
know that when ani action is performed. in a way not sanctioned by the
_ Scriptures, it does not bring about its proper results, Hence in order to
--mnake the sacrifice complete in all its details, the Jayd.should not be per
- formed in connection with actions other than the Vedic,—just in the same
- “way ag it. cannot. be performed by persons who have not latd the fire, or by
` those who are not.learned in the Scriptures, or by such agents 98.00 not
` belong to the human species |
5 Objection: |“ The Ahavaniya Fire might be carried over to the field
त ‘“and.the नवते Homa might be performed there, (and thus there would be
the -desired co-existence. of this subsidiary Homa. with the. Primary;
..““Apricultural Operations); > o.. |
Reply: : Kven.then,the Homa: would not 08.10 the same place: a8 the

furcows (made. dwing the.tilling and other agricultural operations): 98

2 SAYA, WTC. ARE: SUBSIDIARIES. “1889.

even if:we: were to carry ` ४6 Fire to the field all that we would have
would-be .a certain degree of proximity between the two, and there would
nit-be-any identity of their positions; specially as it is not possible for the.
Fire to. be taken to.every furrow, and the Homa performed there. In fact
eyen if this were possible, it would not constitute an identity of position
between the Homa and the Ploughing, ९६५, ` -

`~ <: Phe expression ‘homdstu’ (in the Sitra) contains a reason,—the
sense being, ‘because they are Homas, they would be restricted in their
performance 7 2

fi

. Sttra. (27): They are subsidiary (to Vedic Sacrifices),
a because of the Name
^, ` For the following reason also, the Jaya, etc. are subsidiary to Vedic
sacrifices: Because thus would they be in keeping with the indications
of the Name (‘ Adhvaryava’ which. is applied to the Chapter in which the
Jayaé 1s mentioned), As na matter of fact, we find that we have the
Adhvaryu priest in the Darga-Piraamdsa ; and hence it is only when the
Jaya, etc. are performed as subsidiary to this Darga-Pirnamdasa that they
could have the Adhvaryn for their performer. In the Agricultural
_Operations, however, there are no priests; and then too, m connection
with the Jayd, etc., we have no separate injunctions regarding the appoint-
“ment of the sacrificial priests (apart from those of the Darga-Parnamdsa) ;
. consequently, if the Jaya, etc. belonged to the Agricultural Operations, ctc.,
they would be wholly independent of the Darga-Parnamasa ; and as such
’» they could not take up any. details (in the shape of the Priests, etc.), out of
` ` those belonging to the other saorifice (such as the Darca-Pirnamasa)..
| And if an Adhvaryu priest we're appointed independently, for performing
. the Jaya, then, in that case, this latter would not be performed by the
~. same person as the Agricultural. Operations; as these latter are not per-.
‘formed by the Adhvaryu priest, Thus then, we find that on account of the
“flame Adhvaryava,’ and also of the fact of such subsequent sentences
(oseurring in connection with the Iujunctiou of thé वन्ते sacrifice), as ‘it
:Bhould be done by the Adhvaryu,’ we must have. the Jaya performed by the
“Adhvaryu priest, which would be possible: only if it were performed as
Subsidiary. to such. Vedic actions as the Darca-Parnamdsa and the like

ADHIKARANA (10)

[The Ish’ should be performed on ‘the acceptance of the Horse-gift in
| connection. with Vedic Sacrifices | ५4

Siitra - (28): “The Ishti. should be performed on the `
“aeceptance of the ordinary . Horse-gift; it. -is~
- “this acceptance that would be sinful; while there
qould be no sinfulness attaching to that of the

Vedic Horse-gift, which ts enjoined in the Scriptures,”

In connection with the discussion as to the relationship of the
Primaries: among the ordinary everyday actions, and those among the
Vedic actions,--we proceed to consider the case of those actions, with
regard to which it is doubtful whether their prompting cause consists of
80116 action of everyday life, or one of those laid down in the Veda
| [In course of the Injunction of the Agvapratigrahésti, we have the
` following passage,—~‘ Varuno ४९ étam 114100८८ yo’gvam pratigrhndti; yavato
goin pratigrhniyat tdvato Vdrunin catushhupG!an nirvapét.’| Hence we
‘find that the acceptance of the Horse-gift 18 the prompting cause of the
Isht in ‘questiou,—as is shown by the word “ydvatuk. But there arises ४
question, as to whether the performance of the Ishfc is prompted, (1 ) by
‘the acceptance of any horse-gift, (2) or by that of horse-gift received
7 ordinary life, (3) or by that of the horse-gift received during a Vedic
sacrifice |
| Question: “ What-.do you mean by. the ‘acceptance of the ordenary
“ Horse-gift,’ and the ‘acceptance of the Vedic Horse-gift’? The sense of.
“this question is that the acceptance of the Horse-gift.in ordinary life 1s.
, < distinetly prohibited ; and in regard to the Vedic Horse-gift 2180, we do.
` “not-find any auch Injunction 98 that.‘ it should be accepted’; aud. conse: .
“quently there is no‘ acceptance of Horse-gift.’ in either case | -
:. ~, In answer to this, the Siddhanti simply shows the forms of such ‘ac
_ceptances (of the Horse-gift) independently of Injunctions and: Prohibi-:
“tions; when the Horse-gift is made apart:from any sacrifices; and accepted.
. sinply.as desirable by the recipient,—this. acceptance 16 - what is called -
= the ‘ ordinary acceptauca of the Horse-gift’;. while when ‘the gift is made |
in connection with a sacrifice, ‘its. acceptance - 18 ‘called: that, of the ‘Vedic.
0 ०९७०-1 ` ie eee |

In regard to:the.fidint at iasue.iw the present Adhikarana, the current:

(are PERFORMED नहः प्रकाशन, 91.

idea. being that the acceptance of any sort of Horse-sacrifice is the
prompting cause of the Ishti, because of the Injunction of this sacrifice
riot specifying any pat ticular Horse-vift, and also because of the im-.
possibility of any qualifications for the subject of a. proposition,—-we have,
as against this, the Parvapaksha that —“ itis the acceptance of the ordi-
ary Horse-gift that is the prompting cause of the Ish{i.”
Phe Bhashya however has taken no notice of the theory that ‘the ac- `
| ceptance of any Horse-gilt is the prompting cause of the 811८ १; and with
a view to justify. the use of the word ‘ia’ (in the Sara), it takes the
36004 as brought forward (by the opponent) against a previous statement
` of the Qrddhdnia, in’ the following words: Inasmuch as the Ishty also is
“a Vedic action, and as it would not ‘be desirable to assume -a distinct
yesult for it, we must admit that it is the acceptance of the Vedic Horse- |
gift that is the prompting canse of the Ishti. Because when the enjoined
consequential action (the Ish{7) is a Vedic one, it indicates its prompting
‘cause also to consist of a Vedic action ; and as all requirements would be
_ falfilled by this latter action, there would be no need of the Ishti being”
connected with any action of the ordinary world. Specially as any such
connection would necessitate the assumption of a distinct result; while in
the case of the Vedic Horse-pift, it would be an easy matter to assume-

| tre fact of its helping in the sacrifice. in connection with which. it 18.

made.. — |

And against this representation of the Siddhiinta, we have the
following-— |

PURVAPAKSHA

“The Ishti would be performed at the acceptance of the ordinary
‘Horse-gift. Because the acceptance that is declared to be the cause of
“the Ishtd is that svhich is‘ sinful; and as a matter of fact we find that
sinfulness attaches only to the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift; in
the case of the Vedic Horse-gift, on the other hand, we do not recognise’
any sinfulness, as it is laid down in the Veda (and as such, cannot be -
आणि) ye a ध
“का 28 to say, the sentence‘ Varuno vd étam pratigrhnats yo’pvam
pratigrhuate.: distinctly shows that the prompting cause of the Ishti is that.
‘Woceptance of the Horse-gift which.ts sinful; and it 18 this stnfulness that’.
18. referred. to in the sentence, If this sinfulness were enjoined in this
sentence, then, perhaps, it could, on. the strength of this. sentence, be:
taken as applying’ to the acceptance of the Vedic Horse-gift-also. As it
48, however, it is not enjoined, as no results of actions (and sinfulness is
such. 4 -resnlt)}:can form the-object of Injunction. “Nor does the sen-—
tenes. contain. the Injunctiog: ofan action; as. ay action that would he

“1399 TANTRA-VERTIRA. “ADH. पाए 1 एः (10);

my enjoined could never result in anything sinful. Nox does the séntence |
4 prohibit the acceptance of the Horse-gift;'as we do not find any mention =
in it of that acceptance; and also because it serves the only purpose of.
-* pointing ont the prompling cause of the Ishti. Thus then, inasminch og
there -is.an absolute relationship been Sinfulness and Prohibition, the
` ५ ginfulness must be admitted only where there is. Prohibition. Then as.
“a matter of fact, we find that the Prohibition that we have is of the |
` ५१ aeceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift,~—e.g. in the sentences ‘no horses ।
Ware to be given,’ ‘no such animals are to be received in gift as have two `
_ vows of teeth,’ ॥ सि ।
` ५ Objection: ‘The Prohibition in these sentences is found to ke. `
“applying in common to both kinds of Horse-gift,—the ordinary as well
“as the Vedic | 7
~ . “Reply: True, it appears to be so; and it is for this very reason |
“that we take it as pertaining to. the ordinary Horse-gift; because the
«५ Vedic one forms the subject of another distinct Injunction ; and as such
“it could not form the subject of a Prohibition |
` And for this reason, inasmuch as the Jsh{i is mentioned along with
“the said sinfiulness, the former would be taken as pertaining to the |
“acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift |
1. ~ ^ Qbgection: ‘On account of the presence of the prompting cause,
“the acceptance of the Horse-gift would form the subject of the Proposition ;
“and 88 such could not be qualified by sinfuiness; and if the mention of
` ५6 sinfulness. were taken as a mere eulogy of the Jsht: that 18 laid down,
- “then the acceptance of even the Vedic Horse-gift would become the
“prompting cause of that Isht: "25
. ` “ Reply: In the sentence iu question, the 9४११0685 18 not taken as the
. “qualification; but from the very nature of the Jshfi which is performed
“for. the removal of the evil effects of sinfulness, we infer the fact of its
“being subsidiary to the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift. _
Phat is to say, we do not take the sentence to mean—‘that accept
“Gance of the Horse-gift which ts. sinful’; all that we mean is that when
ave look for the prompting cause of the Jshti, the sentence. puts forward
“the mere. fact of the acceptance of the. Horse-gift-in general (without any
~“ spocifications), . That is to say, when we-come. to look for the purpose
‘of the Bhavana of the. particular Lhfi, we find that there is neither
=“ proximity nor any need for such purposes.as the Heaven, nor: any:.other
"५9145 to the Action,—and that the aforesaid sinfulness is in closé proximity,
-- being spoken of in ‘the.same, sentence (as, the श in question); but
« “the. sinfulness by itself would 0९. no: use. in. the: Action, and “8
“such is incapable of: beiug.‘accepted: by itself. asthe ‘result aimed
‘ab by: the Ishii; and hence, for ‘the sakb‘of being compatible witli the

Chee Gs WSR PERFORMED APPER HORSE-GIPT. ` ` ` .. 1393
| ` gaid Injunction, it. stands in nevd of the mention of its ‘ removal,’ which
`: would be useful for the man; and it 15 thus that the sinfulness comes to

“be connected with the Action (Ishti), as something to be removed by. it.
And as the needs of ‘the action would be supplied by this one purpose |
“(the removal of sinfulnes), we cannot rightly assume any other purpose
=" for it.. Thus then we come to the conclusion that the Ishti is to be per.
| `" formed where the result songht after is ‘the removal of sinfulness, and -
“ “then we could have a Removal only in a placo where the svitfulness.
“would be present; and the senfulness too would be in accordance with
tthe Prohibition; and as a matter of fact, we find that the Prohibition
pertains. distinctly to the Acceptance of the Ordinary Horse-gift; and
““hence even without any qualification, from the very exigencies of the
“case, it must be admitted that it is the aeceptance of the Ordinary Horse-
"५ gift that is the prompting cause of the Ishti, This is what is meant by `
“the declaration (in the Bhas ya) that—The action consists of the freeing
“from the V arupa-tiness ; and this is possible only in the case of .the ac-
“‘ceptance of the Ordinary Horse-gift. a 7
"While pointing out the sinfulness, the Bhishya says as follows:
“Stnfulness proceeds from the acceptance of the Horse-gift from the Qidra or _
` ^ from some other sinful person. (Question) The acceplance of the gift from’:
“such sinful persons even in the course of Vedrc sacrifices would be equully
~ © sinful ? (Answer) Such would have been the case af the Ishti were performed `
“by the Receiver of the gift; as dt ds, tt ds performaél by the Giver. | र? 4
"© Against this last answer, the following objection has been raised :— `
““This last answer would apply equally to the case of the ordinary
oe ‘ Horse-gift: as even in this case, the Giver, the (7474 £.i.,.would not be
५ incurring any gin (by the giving of the Horse); then, as fur the sin -
‘attaching to the Receiver, that would be exactly the same in both -
“08868. ` | _ . ` | |
धि “That is to say, if on the ground of the Ish{i being performed by
‘the Giver, the prompting cause of that Ishti were said to be free from
‘any: sinfalness attaching to it,—even though there would be a distinct
‘ein ‘attaching to the Receiver, due to. his having received the gift from |
। “im proper Sources, or in return for havin gy officiated at the sacrifice of |
." " 8006 person not entitled to its performance,—-then, even in the case of |
“SS the ordinary Horse-gift, even though there might he a-distinct sin -
“Lattaching to. the Receiver of it from such improper sources as the Cadra._
“and the like, that would not bring any sin to the door of the Giver; _

and 80 in this case also the prompting cause of the. Ishti would be `
“(४1०४१ any sipfulness attaching to it. If, on the other hand, it be >
“held that it is the action of ‘the Receiver that is. the prompting cause | 2
of the Tshti, and that his action is certainly sinful,—then the samo could , -

1394 व$ पाए शप, ADH, 11--श0; - ए--+ एषा. (10)

“She said of the Vedic Horse-gift also Then if it be assumed that, in the
“6 case of the Vedic Horse-gift it is to be performed by the Giver, while in
“‘that of the ordinary Horse-gift, by the Receiver,—it will be necessary
“to show particular reasons for this distinction

“Phen again, the sinfulness that we are cognisant of in the case in |
“¢ question distinctly appears to be that which follows from the acceptance
Sof the Horse.gift; specially as the sinfulness that would be due to the
“unclean. character of the Giver, wonld apply equally to all Gifts; and
“Sin that case, any specification of the gift as that of the Horse would be
“ «meaningless. That is to say, if the mere Recetver of gifts from unclean |
“46 sources were meant, he could not be specified as one who receives the gift of
^ १@ horse; because the unclean character of the source of the gift would
“apnly equally to all gifts-(and not to that of the Horse only).

“Thus then, inasmuch ‘as we find the Bhashya, in the first instance,
«sneaking of the action of tle Receiver, and then latterly, of that of the
५ ‹ Giver,—the whole thing would be unconnected (and irrelevant)

“Some people offer the following explanation (on behalf of the
“Bhashya): Irrespective of the Siddhdnta of the next Adhikarana, what
“the Bhdshya has here brought forward is.the theory that the 1901४ is to
‘be performed by the Receiver of the gift; as in ordinary life it is the
“acceptance of the Horse-gift that is prohibited, by such sentences as one,
“should not accept the gift of such animals as have two rows,of teeth’:
“and under the circumstances, the receiving of such a gift from the Cidra
“is all the more reprehensible. On the other hand, in connection with
“ sacrifices, the receiving of such a gift is quite allowable for the Priests
“(in view of such Vedic sentences as lay down the Horse as the sactri-
“ficial gift). It might be argued that what such sentences lay down is
“only the giving of the horse, not its acceptance, But this would be moat
“improper ; as the Injunction of the gift implies that of acceptance also
“inasmuch as the ‘gift’ is not complete until the ownership of the
“recipient has been fully established by his acceptance of the gift. And
“then again, in the case of all actions, the Injunction is accepted as rest-
ing in the completion ot the action enjoined; and hence. the Injunction.
“should give the horse’ must be accepted as signifying the renunciatron
“of one’s ownershiy in the thing given, and the bringing about of the owner-
“ship of another person ; and thus we find.that the very Injunction of the
.* Gift. involves that of the Acceptunce also. -Anud further, when we find
“that.the Acceptance is made in the course of the Action, and is accom: `
“panied by AMlaztras and other restrictions, how can we believe that it is’
“not. pointed ont by the Injunction? Ifthe Acceptance itself were not
„^^ 601010९4, then why should we have the details of. ita procedure (in. the
“shape of the repetition. of certain Mantras, eto,) distinctly lnid-down in-

. oe ee

ISHTI PERFORMED AFTER: HORSE GIFT. ` 1395 .

‘the Veda? Or, why should the neglect of any such details have created —

+. “any discrepancy in the action of Acceptance itself ?

` “But the explanation that we have to offer is as follows: The sen-

` ५ १७०८९ --* ०76 should give gifts to the Priests’—lays down the giving; `
“while as for the acceplance, as its possibility is. already established by

“the covetousness of the Priest, and by the fact of its forming a part of —
“his livelihood,—-that does not form the object of Injunction. The ex- `
‘pression ‘should give’ does not mean ‘should accept.’ It might have
“been taken as necessarily implied by it, if the. Injunction. of ‘giving ह

“were absolutely impossible without that of the ‘ Acceptance.’ As a

“matter of fact, however, we find that the needs of the Injunction of |
“‘siving’ are fulfilled even by sach acceptance as would be dictated by

“the inherent covetousness of the Priests; and consequently, the former `

“ Injunction itself could not uecessarily imply that of the latter; specially

“as even hundreds of Injunctions could not urge the Man to activity, in -

“the way that his covetousness would. Then again, even if the Injunc-

- “tion pertatned to the actual completion of the action enjoined (that of ©
“* giving’ £.i.), yet the creation of the ownership of another person. (which
“is gaid to be the completion of the action of yiviny) would be the func-

ae

‘‘tion of the giver. We find that in such cases, there are two distinct

`. ““funetions,—one, that of the Receiver, consisting of the acceptance; and...

“another, that of the Giver, consisting of the making over of the gift to the

“person, and enabling him to accept it. And as a matter of fact, we find
“that it is this latter that is enjoined, and not the former. Hence, just

“as in the case of the Injunction of the Purchasing of Sona, we find

“that its selling (by the vendor), being possible by the mere covetousness

of this latter (for the object he would receive in exchange), does not for

“the object of the Injunction, nor does it form a part of the sacrifice (for

which the Soma is purchased),—so, in the same manner, in the case in

“question also, the Acceptance would neither be enjoined, nor form part of |

“the Action (of giving). ‘Then, as for the Injunction of the procedure to

“be-adopted in the acceptance of a gift,—that could be taken as being in

^ reference to sach acceptance as is ¢mplied (and not directly enjatned),—~
“the sense of the Injunction of the Procedure being—‘ when one accepts a

` `. gift-as a means. of livelihood, he should do it in such and such a manner

ie Objection: ‘If such be the case, then, inasmuch as the Acceptance:
would only be for the sake of a certain end desirable by Man, the Maxira, 1

` ^ 606. ४]89 in connection therewith would come to be the same

४ । .. “Reply; That. would not matter much; because the idea that we
`. ^ obtain from the Context is that “the gift that helps in the completion |

of the sacrifice is such as. euds in its acceptayce in such and such a.

i Manner.’ And thus, eventhough the Procedure be connected with the:

1 शि tawraa-viteriea, Dw. PDA 1v—AnaE. (10)

“« Acceptance, it would really belong to the. giving itself; and hence it is
- this giving that should be taken as the object of Injunction. Snch
“being the case, though: the Acceptance is not enjoined, yet, as regards
“the gifts of the Oow, ०८८.) we have uo prohibition of their acceptunce
“and hence there would be no sin attaching to the acceptance of such gifts
` ५“ Ag regards the acceptance of the gift of the Horse however, inasmuch 88
“we have a distinct prohibition of it; if one should be found willing to
‘disobey the Prohibition and accept the gift of the horse,—him alone
“should the sacrificer appoint as the Priest (to officiate at the sacrifice) in
which the sacrificial gift consists of the Horse. Just as-in the case of a
‘“ Bréhmana-hiller performing the Agvamédha sacrifice,—in accordance
with the Injunction ‘Brahmahd’¢vamédhéna yajéta,’—this Injunction
would certainly pertain to such a Priest as would be willing, and covet-
“ous enough, to officiate at the sacrifice of one who has ‘fallen’ (deep in
sin), But it cannot be believed that such oficzutcny is enjoined by the
“Apparent [nconsistency of the former Injunction. (of the Agvamédha)
‘In the same manner, in the case in question also, we cannot admit of
“there being any Injunction for the acceptance of the Horse-gift. .Tius
“then, inasmuch as the sinfulness attaching to the acceptance would be
‘present as much in case of the ordinary Horse-gift, as in that of the
.“* Vedic one, the sinfulness could not be taken as specifying the occasion,
"es for the performance of the [shti .
_. “There is yet another explanation of the Bhashya passage in question;
“it is as follows: In the case of the ordinary Horse-gift, the Ishti would
“be performed by the Receiver; while in that of the Vedic one, it would
“be. performed by the Giver; as in this latter, it forms part: of the
“ sacrifice that is beiug performed by the latter; but as for the acceptance,
“161s sinful in both cases ; as in the former, it is actually prohibited, and.
“in the latter also it is not distinctly allowed (or enjoined), But as for
‘the giving, it is actually enjoined in the case of the latter. And thus
“the explanation given in the Bhashya is the only one that is admissible
. “Or again, it may be that-in both cases, the Isht is performed by
“the Giver. Then as for the giving, we find: that this, in ordinary life,
. “ia distinctly prohibited, as will be:sliown under the Dakshinddhikarana,.
“where we find the declaration—' Horses would have been very useful, if.
“their gwing and acceptance. were not both prohibited ’;. and in connection
“with the Vigvaytt sacrifice, when one is said to give away all his property,
“the Horse is not given; simply because its ‘giving is prohibited: In the
- “case of the: Paundartke sacrifice however, we find it distinctly laid down
॥ “that the: sacrificial gift, should consist. of “a thousand: horses,’ .and:10
-“sonnection ‘with the Joytishtoma also, the giving of one horse: 28 laid
a down as. necessary ;: and:.hence: a8 tagurds these two particular: cases,

“ASHTY. PERFORMED AFTER HORSE-GIFT. 1397

“the general Prohibition is set aside by these particular Injunctions ;:and
“hence such gzviny 18 not considered sinful. And hence we conclude that
५ the Ish{i has to be performed only by one who, in ordinary life, makes a gift
“of the horse, in the way of a friendly present and the like; and algo by
५४ 076 who sells the horse; as in the case of selling 8180, we have the ele-
“ment of renouncing one's own ownership and creating that of another; and
“ag such it fulfills all the conditions of the denotation of the Verb ‘to
‘give. Nor do we accept that alone as ‘gift’ which is given for the sake
“of an imperceptible result; because it is after the character of the gift
‘has been established, that we come to ascertain whether it leads to a
“perceptible or an imperceptible result. Though the gift that brings aboitt
“a, perceptible result (in the shape of the money that he receives for the
“thing sold) is spoken of by means of the word ‘ selling’ (and not ‘ gift’)
“yet there would be nothing incongraous in the two words (‘selling’ and.
“* gift’), of which the former is only a particular form of the latter,
“applying to the same action (of ‘ selling’). In ordinary experience also
“we find that when a man has sold paddy, he says, ‘I have gzven away the
‘‘paddy,’ and he who has bought it, says, ‘I have taken the paddy’; and
“hence the selling also 18 a gift; and as such the selling also of the horse
“would constitute the prompting cause of the [शु

“Objection: ‘Inasmuch as we find the horse mentioned among the’
“things that should be given as sacrificial gifts, such for instance as
“Cloth, Horse, Land, etc., etc.,-we cannot believe the giving of the Horse
“Sto be sinful |

“Reply: The giving of the Horse would not be sinful, in a caso

“where it is laid down as the object to be given. In the sentence that
“you speak of, we have only an enumeration of the things to be given,

and not an actual Injunction of the giving away of those things. Thus
then, inasmuch ag the enumeration stands in need of the Injunction of -
“ giving away, we must conclude that the said declaration of the Horse as

an object of gift pertains to that action in connection with which. the
“Horse is specially enjoined as to be given away, while for the Cow and
‘other things, that are not prohibited even in a general way, they might
“be admitted as gifts even in those cases where what is laid down is the

mere ‘ geving ` in general | |
| ee ~ “Wor these reasons, we conclude that it is the acceptance of the

ordinary Horse-gift that.is the prompting cause of the 1902

SIDDHANTA

Siitra. (29):.. It is an Arthavada; because we do not
actually find. (the Varund-iliness) following (from the.

` 1898 TANTBA-VARTIKA. ` ADH. 11-24-1४ --4 णा. (10).

acceptance of the Horse-gift); consequently, the Ishtj
should be taken as to be performed in connection

with a sacrifice, |

If the Ishf in question were meant to serve the purpose of removing

the evil effects of an action, then, it might be taken. as pertaining to the `

acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift.. As a matter of fact, however, it

is not meant to serve that purpose. Because it is only when « certain

evil effect has been cognised by some other means that a certain action
can be held to be meant for the purpose of removing that effect; in the
case in question, however, we find that the evil effect that is here spoken
of does not exist |

That 18 to say, when we find an evil effect mentioned in the seutence

laying down a certain Action, we recognise that evil effect to be some- .

wh

thing to be removed; in the case in question, however, we find that the ~.
evil effect that is mentioned is not. cognised, by any means of knowledge, —

as existing in the case of the acceptance of the ordinary Horse-gift,—-even
though 16 is found to be prohibited ; as we find that ‘an attack of Dropsy’

18 the evil effect mentioned in connection with the action, by the word
‘Varuna’; bat in none of the works on Medicine do we find the acceptance.

of the ordinary Horse-gift as the cause of that illness; nor do we find this,

to be its cause, either by Sense-perception or by Inference, or by any other
means of knowledge; nor is it spoken of in the sentence—' One should not
give the horse,’ and ‘Ona should not accept the gift of the animal that
has two rows of teeth’; because the sentence says nothing as to the fact
of the acceptance of the gift being the cause of ‘an attack of Dropsy’;
specially as all that the sentence (enjoining the Esh{z) does is to lay down
an action for the removal of that evil effect, which is merely referred to as
already éxisting. As for the evil effect—in the shape of ‘fall into hell’

—thut is assumed on the strength of the said Prohibition; it is not
what is spoken of in the sentence in question; because the sentence, which -

18 In the form—Varund va eign grhnaic’—can néver express the fall -

into hell,’ `

If all evil effects be spoken of ag ‘ Varuna’—that which * covers?
(‘vrnoty’); and hence an attack of this were spoken of as the effect (of .
the acceptance of the Horse-gift),—then, in that case, we would be aban- -
doning the well-known fact.of the expression ° Varuna-grhita’. meaning: .

an attack of Dropsy.” And further, if we aceepted the aforesaid etymo-* ~
Jogical. signification: of the कणत." Varuna,’ inasmuch as in the case of ` -
the Vedic Horse-gi/t also, we find a certain pain consequent. upon- the. :
giving away, as also ig the.recéiviinj, which entails the’ trouble. of keeping - :
and feeding the liorse; there would. lie an ‘attack of Varuna (pain) * ;and™:

„ककम es" 3

ISHT! PERFORMED AFTER HORSE-QmeT,.. = :- ` 1399

-hence the mere presence of the ‘evil effect’ would not justify our taking:
‘the ishti as pertaining to the case of the ordinary Horse-gift, as also to that.
of the Vedtc one. The Bhdshya brings forward the pain entailed in the-
keeping and feeding of the animal, though belonging to the Receiver,—.
pecause it has not yet been proved that his action is not the cause for the
- Jehtt (because the fact of the Ishti being performed by the giver will be
‘proved in the next Adhikarana). Or it may be taken as said with refer-
-ence to the giver, who also, prior to his creating the ownership of another
-has got to undergo ail the trouble of keeping and feeding the animal. And
further, Dharma (Virtue) also is found to cover the man, while he exists
in the metempsychic current; as the body that ‘ covers’ the Person is not
‘made of sin alone
। Consequently, whether we take the word ‘Varwna in its elymo-
logical sense, or in that which belongs to it as a complete whole,—in any
case, the ‘ eval effect’ that it signifies cannot be cognised as belonging to the.
acceptance of the Ordinary Horse-gift; and hence there being no ‘follow-
‘ing of the principal effect, the sentence ‘ yo gudn pratigrhnal:, etc.’ must
_ 06 taken as a mere Arthavdida
And what this Arthava@da does is to eulogise, through metaphorical
imposition, the event, described in the passage ‘ Prajdpatirvarunfya, etc.,’
as holding good at the present time also,—the. purport of the eulogy being
this: (1) ‘Just as Prajépati was attacked by Varuna (Dropsy), 80 also
even at the present time, the same evil effect comes about whenever there
_is an acceptance of the Horse-gift ; (2) just as for Prajapati, the Varuni
Ishti proved the means of freedom from that disease, so also, at the pre-
sent time, 18 the same Isktv known to be a means of freedom from the
same; (3) consequently, just as being attacked by Dropsy Prajapati
performed the Varuni Ishtc for getting rid of that disease, so at the pre-
sent time, one who happens to be attacked by the same disease should
perform the same Ishte
And then, inasmuch as. we find no result mentioned in the sentence
‘itself: (as following from that 877), we could assume either Heaven (in
the case of the performance of Ishii, on the acceptance. of the ordinary
Horsé-gift), or the aid accorded to a sacrifice (in the case of its perform
- 9066-0? the acceptance of the Vedic Horse-gift), to be its result. But we.
‘find that it is very. much easier to assume its relationship with a sacrifice
than-that. with any: such thing as Heaven; as we find no.reason for the
“proximity of this latter.(to the Ishfz), while we find its proximity to the
“Vedic Action. (of sacrifice) established by the fact of its having the
common character of being Vedre, as also by the Acceptance of the Horse-.
Sift. - 4६16 the acceptance of the Vedic Horse-gift falling within the sacrifice,
‘that is recognised to be. the prompting ‘cause of the Ish{i; and aa such it |

1400. षाण -एवा 4. ADH. पा tv—~avHt. (10). |

brings up the Primary sacrifice (of which it forms part), which 16 included |
in the Procedure occupying the same place as the said Ishti: and thus
there being a. mutual want, this would. establish between these two (the.
Ishti and the Horse-sacrifice) the relationship of the Primary and the

Subsidiary, i ee eee कः
. For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Ishtt ta to be per-
formed. by one who has accepted the Horse-gift at t. Vedic sacrifice. ` `

ADHIKARANA (11)
[The Varuni Ishiv is to be performed by the Giver of the Horse]

Sutra (30) “Tt is not laid down (for the Giver); because

“of the difference in the functions (of the Giver and
the Receiver).”. - `

In regard to the Ishti dealt; with in the foregoing Adhtkarana, we now
“proeged to consider the question as to whether itis to bo performed by
“the Receiver of the Horse-gift or by the Giver of it
ose Question: “When we have the sentence-—‘ yo'svampratigrhnati,’ ete
'—distinetly laying it down for thie Receiver, wherefore should there
“arise any such question P ” :
i Reply: Because the beginning of the passage is found to begin with
‘a-.sentence that. points to the Giver,-~ie. the sentence ‘ Prayapatir
Variindya, etc.’—as we shall show later on
Question: .“ Well, in that. case, inasmuch as the rest of the sentence
“ports to the Giver, the question sought to be dealt with here will have
been fally settled bythe Law ennneiated in the Sitra l—~iv--29; and
“there would be no use of taking up the present Adhikarana at all.”
fieply: It is only a doubtful point that has been said in that sitra,
a8 to-be settled by the ‘rest.of the sentence’. (Vakyagésha); but in the
cage-In question, we find that when the matter is definitely settled by the
Object of the Injunction -itself,—what. else is there that could be done by
‘the rest of the sentence’? It is only when the. object. of the Injunction
48 doubtful that there can be nothing. incongruous in the doubt being
settled by reference to-the ‘rest of the sentence,’ In a case, on the other
hand; where the object of the Injunction is definitely known, tho superior
Luthority of the Injunction: would justify us in: rejecting the indications of
६116. Rest.of the Sentence:” - ~ , ` |
Thus.then, in the case in question, wo find that-the sentence ‘ Praji-
pony Varundya, etc.’ describes Prajapati as the Giver, and. Varuna as the
Receiver. of the gift; then again, the sentence ‘sa. 5९00४ Dévatim anayat’
points to: Prajdpati, by meang of.the word: ‘éa,” inasmuch as this word. has
tlie: daine case-ending (thé. Nominative). as ‘Praydpatih’ in the previous
6609006 and. as such the two:.are’ coextensive; and Prajaépati's ‘own
Deity > (Sea Dévatd’) would bo Varuna ; because.it is he that. has: been

previously: mentioned ns .the: Recipient. of the offering ;-and: Prajapatis
oe Tr a

1402: TANTRACVERTIKA, ADH yUfoePZDA Te; ADA (IL),

-own self could not be‘ his own Deity,’ beeause, if.the same thing had’ the
muatually, contradictory characters of the Nominative and Recipient; one
of these two will have to be taken as figurative:. Nor.can Varuna be taken”
‘as the Giver to Prajapaté; because that would involve a. reversing of the |

.case-endings (1.6, the Nominative in‘ Pragapatih’. and the. Dative in

‘y . ‘Varundya would have to change places) Corisequently the sentence must

- be taken to mean that—' Prajapati, having given the horse, got to (आ
. : ‘and thereby he burst’—i.e. the skin of his stomach burst owing to Dropsy
“and Oedema—' He saw the Catushkapdla-sacrifice, and performed it'~the
; णप्‌ he ' referring to 21920090 it is he that.is spoken of-as the Person’

ie that performed tho sacrifice; and not Varuna, as he has been previously `
shown to be the Recipient of the offering ; and certamly 1t 1s not possible :
“for Varnna to offer the sacrifice to hintself ; because the offering that would
; be made toone’s self, would not be ‘given.’ And thus we find that the
- ‘sense of the whole passage. comes to be this—' Prajapati, having given the —
_ horse to Varuga, and thereby being attacked with Dropsy, got rid of that |
.. disease by performing the Varuni Ish{t; consequently if one should happen |
-tomake the gift of a horse, he should perform the same Ishti, —which shows |
~ that the Ishti has to be performed by the Giver. Then again, inasmuch |
:, ‘as the accessories of a sacrifice are its subsidiaries, it is necessary that they
.. should have the same performer as the Primary sacrifice; and in the ९४९6 `
` प question it is the Performer of the Primary sacrifice that 1 the owner
: and the Giver of the Horse. ` | | |
Notwithstanding all this, however, inasmuch as we find the object of
the Injunction (‘yo'pvan pratigrhniyat, etc.’) and the Arthavada (‘ Prajapateh,
- ete.’) having contrary: significations,—there should be no doubt as to which `
. of these should be accepted (as-it is well known that the Injunction 1s more —
` guthoritative than the Arthavdda); and as such the law of the Satra I.
. iv—-29; and thns it would-be necessary to accept the signification of one `
: Of these two and reject that of the other, And to this effect, it would be
~ necessary to consider the whole of the passage in question, from begining:
_ to end (and reconcile the indications of its first portion with those of the .
last); and as. this could not be done easily, it id-absolately necessary that si
ay we should devote a diatinct: Adiikarana to this question
. And. on-this question; we have the following—. =`

PURVAPAKSHA

oi.“ Foasmuch as. the Arthavdda depends. for its: fanchionmng upon the .
“object: of the Injunction, it is subservient to: ite. purpose and . without “
६: it. would be absolutely meaningless,—-and ae. the. [ए] पपठ 18 quite.»
“capable of'serving its purpose, even without the Aréhardda,—as we have

vARUNT एता DONE bY THE HoRSE-cIVRR 1403

48 - @nlogy” of) -that- which is enjoined, and not the Injunction ` of .
» “that: which is eulogised, because-of the needs of the eulogy being |
“supplied: by the Injunction,—it must be admitted: that, in accordance
a withthe law of the Sdira ‘argagunavirodhé ca tadarth 0८ * (+ 1{--11-- `
44); it is the Arthavdda that should be rejected as inadmissible. 876. `
““elally as Arthavddas are always found to pertain to objects that have been:
“6 gabject: to other means of knowledge; and-hence it is only proper that -
“these should be taken in their secondary (indirect) significations, and -
"not that which forms the object of a Direct Injunction. Because such
" “Fnjunctions have for their object something that has not been subject.
tg any other means of knowledge; and as such an assumption, in the `
> 0986 of these, of any: signification other than the direct one..would be.
_ “wholly unwarrantable. For instance, we have already shown before that
“itis Arthavadas—like ‘urgudambarah,’ ‘ Gdityo. yapak,’ ete.—-that are:
“taken in their indirect figurative sense, and not any of the Injunctions; .
-:“and for this there could be no other reason except what we have just
` ^ pointed out
> “Gonsequently, even though the first portion of the passage—which:
"wean Arthavdda—is a distinct eulogy of the action of the Giver, yet it”
*“ghould be taken as indirectly (ण) atively) applying to its correlative,
~ the action of the Recetver; just as in the case of the sentence ‘ dpo vat
gantah’ (vide supra) | । |
॥ ` :. “Thus then, on account of the two functions, of Giving and. Receiving, -
“being. wholly distinct and different, this action (Jsht{i), that we find -
mentioned in connection with the Receiver, we can never accept as laid
“down for the Giver | |
“The word ‘ca’ in the sé#tra should be taken as used in placo of (८४

“just as in the sentence ‘ Kificéha bhavatah, ete ‘
“Or, the sétra may be taken as—we do not believe the yajamana to.
-“be-laid down as the Performer of the Jshti |
“Op it may mean—the action of the yajamana we cannot accept as
= “the prompting cause of the Ishts.” ^ ॐ —

rr on
` "9 `
४ ‘i

SIDDHANTA

-Sittra (34) : - On account of Indications, it should have | |
0.0 performed: by the.-Person .appotntiny | ६५९ -
Priests (for the sacrifice) .

sx Che: said “Ishti would. -be performed by. the ‘ Artutya’—i.e. by: the
क YayumAna,—the word being: explained.as ‘one. who is.the lord or appointer
of the “Rtvik’priests:’Or the word may. ;be taken as-applying to the...

त. ^= ब "3

“1404 ` TANTRA: प 0.0. eka ty. “aba, (11)

“Ag shown under the sitra प्र Vii OS ancl hence the offering made hy:
the yajumana also may be -spoken of asthe ‘ Arteija’. offering... Or
‘the sittra may be explained thus; There being «.doubt.as to whether
.the Ishte would be done.by the yayamana or the Rivik, we. should (ण्ण:
-it to belong to one, with whom it. would be pointed out by Indicative:
power to be connected Oe es | : f
| We now proceed to show-‘how the fact of the pronipting eanse-of. the.
_ Ishté consisting of a certain functioning of the yayamana is pointed ont by:
“Indications, ` First ofall, we hold that there is one Indicative Force in.the-
~ shape of the capability of the Action itself; and the second is that belong:
-ing to the sentence, and cognisable by looking closely into what precede

‘and follows it. _.. ` ` |
| (1) It has been almost proved in the previous Adhikarana that the
Ishti is to be performed by.the Giver of the Horse, and when it is definitely
“ascertained that the Ishfi.is a subsidiary of that. sacrifice at which the.
Horse is given and- accepted. as the sacrificial gift,—then, im accordance.
-with the Law, that ‘the Primary and its subsidiaries should all.be por-
formed af the same place, and by the same. person,’ it follows that the Ishti
is to be performed by the same ‘person that performs the said sacrifices;.
and the person. that performs is also the giver of the Horse-gift, in accord-
ance with tho saira IYI—viii—1; and hence there can be no doubt-as to:
‘the fact that the Ishti-should be performed by. the Giver of the horse.
There is a peculiar potentiality in the subsidiary, whereby itis only when
. 1# 18 performed by the same person that performs its Primary sacrifice,-
that it can help in the completion of this ‘latiter,—which it can never do,
‘if. performed’ by another person. .And hence, in the Ish¢i, the dutics that.
‘belong to the priests would be performed by them, just 98 in the case. of

the: Primary sacrifice; while. they could -not:perform that which belongs :
to the yayamdana :
(2) Kven though this is a:fairly well-established fact, yet, inasmush:
28 some people might. have: doubts ‘caused by certain misconceptions
arising out-of the ap का contradiction of .the first portion of the pas-
sage by the subsequent -portions, it is: necossary : to: consider the: present:
Adhikarana, for the setting aside of those doubts, : And as a matter of fact, :
। we find that the potency of the syntactical connection; “from beginning: to :
‘end, is stich as distinctly points: to. the fact of the Ishti being performed.
by the Giver.’ ‘Because the sentence does not.extend only so far as that--.
: “046 should. perform’: as” inary: catushkapale: sacrifices as there’ maiy’ be
“horses that. he aecepte:’; but: itis found to begin: with quite a different.
£ sentence‘ Pray Spatrvarindyacvanatayat, etc; ; and ib las already been
“explained. that. this latter points.-to. the fact, of the Ishi: being performed.
by. the: Giver Pp Bea ag NR POE ey RRR one ci Oe

पणा ISHTE, DONE BY THE HORSH-GIVER. 1409.

Objection." {४.18 true that-this-has been-explamed ; but. it has ulso-
“& beaa..explained: that the-indications of the first. portion of the passage.
&(y6.4 Prajdpatur varunaya; ete ) are rejected by the snperiot authority.
. “of the Injunction.(‘ yo gran pratigrinitz, etc.’ ) १ 7
oe! Reply: Ib isnot so; because the indications of the eulogy are set.
“aside, by. the: Injunction, only when this latter has fully obtained its 1004.
0६: in the case in question, however, the Injunction with repuid to the
“Receiver of the gift (for performing the Jshti) has not quite obtained its -
“footing, at the time that we come across the Arthavada
Af the Injunction in question had been fully established, as referring
to the. Recerver,—-then there. wonld have .been no need for the digscugsion-
“ab 811. : As a matter of fact, however, we find that it has not been so
established Because 10 18 only in a case where the Arthavadu appears ।
after the Injnnction, that the latter is fully established independently. by `
= itself: (before the Arthavdda comes to view); whereas when it is the

-.Arthavdda that appears before the Injunction, this latter is always based

upon, and conditioned by, the former. _
cas That is to say, even though the Arthavida is subservient to the Injune- `
+tion, yet there is another peculiarity in their mutual relationship, due to :
the order of sequence in which they appear. Jn all cases, the idea that
.i8 the first to appear easily obtains a. footing, by reason of the sccond -
“idea to the contrary not yet having appeared on the scenc,—as in accord--
“apeo with the stitra XIL—ii—23,. and ag shown under the Crutilingadhi-
< karana (11I—iii—14) ; while that which appears subsequently, docs so in
connection with an object that is-already pervaded over by a former idea
tothe contrary; aud as such being opposed from the very beginning, by.
“the former idea,-it could not but appear, in a form in keeping with that-
“idea and as such its character 18 likely to be reversed before it succeeds -
“tt obtaining a footiag | |
“-8"Consequently, in the’case in question, we reject that difference in.
the ‘bearings of the Injunction and the Arthavada which is based upon’
. their’ intrinsic character,—in view of the difference caused by the ‘order
“OF sequence in which. they are found to. appear: and then we find.
(2) that the first and the last portions of the passage, pointing, as they do, :
to the. performability of the shti by the Giver and the Receiver respective-
ly, have: mutually contradictory. indications ; (6) that under the circum-
68016 two cannot be reconciled ; (6) that if each of them be taken.
‘““dudependently. of the other, it would be ‘likely to become meaningless,’
M8 their mutual proximity: would not allow them to ‘have ‘the support:
Of: anyother Arthavada and Injunction (respectively), their need for such.
{& sapport. would remain ungupplied: Consequently, in-view. of the fact
£08: & reconciliation. between :them. being absolately necessary, when we.

त 1

` 00016 ‘to take them as pertaining ‘to the same subject, werdo १७४ 214 jt
: possible to completely abandon the notion of the Ishti belonging to the:
` Giver, which was the first to appear on the scene unopposed ; and hence:
in view of the superior clatms of this notion, we cometo.take the subseqierit
“notion of the connection of the Ishti with the Recetver, before it has quite
‘obtained its footing, as figuratively ( indirectly) indicating its connection
with the Giver, by reason of the Verb ‘ grhniyat’ (in the Tojanction)..
being taken as indicative of the Causal Verb ‘grahayét’ (offers) _
| And further; this’ way of taking the whole enables us to keep tho
form of the rest of the sentence intact (the only change necessary being
` that of the Verb ‘ grhniyat’ into grahayét, )—while in the other case (if
we were to modify the Arthavdda in accordance with the Injunction), the
whole of the former would be found entirely incompatible (and hence calling
for modifications). That 18 10 say, the Arthavdda, as modified in accordance
with the changes necessitated by the latter view, would come to have this:
absurd form:—‘Prajapati obtained the horse from Varuna, and then he
got to his Deity from whom he had received the gift, ete., ete.’: while in
accordance with my view, the only change that is necessitated is that of
the ordinary form ‘ grhnatc’ into the cansal form ‘ grahayatd
| ४ has been argued above that the Injunction is possessed of an
authority superior to that of the Arthavada., We readily admit that that
which is an Injunction is. of superior authority; but in the case in
- question, we have no such Injunction as that ‘the Ishti should. be per
formed by the Receiver of the gift,’ ` |
_. . In the case of all sentences, what is not signified ‘by the previous
words; or is required by them, that alone: 18 taken out. of the subsequent
“words ; and nothing beyond that, even if some such be found to be actually
signified by these latter. For instance, we shall show, in Adhyaya X
that, in the case of the. sentence ‘sufradudavasayu,’. the very presence of
the ‘ Kiva’ affix indicates that, in. the action following the said Udavasiva
also, we should have, just as in this action of the Udavasdna, many per-.
formers independent of one another, and not necessarily acting conjointly
{as no significance would be attached ‘to this.conjoint action;.on account
of their being the subject of the proposition) ; and then. follows. the yen-.
tence ‘prshthacamaniyanina: yajéran’; and'in this, the nominative agents:
“forming the Predicate, though their plurality and conjoint activit y are duly.
cognised, are not found to be required by the former ‘sentence, and hence.
they are not regarded to.be of any consequence न |
: Similarly, in the’ casein question, ‘aa soon as we-come to recognize
the Arthavada —‘ Prayapatirvarnaya,: eto.’—as eulogising the. ४ asthe |
‘means of freeing. the Giver of the horse from-the attack of Dropay,—ive
have an idea that there still remains something ansaid: which: rdquired to:

VARUNI ISHT{ DONE ‘BY THE HORSE-GIVER,’ © =. 1404;

£ said.on the subject; and this something is ascertained to be the Injune-
‘tion. of this Iehti. And then, one Person, who has been previously recog- `
11864 88 . the object.of the Injanction looking forward to the Inference of .
‘the: Injunction (as pointed out by the Arthavdda), stands in need. of that
‘fxjunction only, and nothing else besides that. And as for the Arthavada
‘and the Injunction, both of them are equally capable of. signifying. their
‘own. respective objects; and the only faculty that the ‘Arthavada does not.
-posseas, 1s-that of engovning; and hence 10.18 - only the element of Injunction
‘that it. would borrow from the subsequent Injunction ; but. by this bor-.
rowing, it does. not take.in all the other factors also of the Injunction ;
_as it १०९४ not stand in need of these. Consequently, inasmuch as the use
of. the Injunctive Affix for the sake of the mention of the prompting cause
fof the 4544६) would not be possible without a Verbal Root, it becomes
necessary to use some Verbal Root or other; and we find the root ‘ grhnati
‘used (in-‘ grhatyat’), which is however taken in the senso of the fanction-
ing of the Giver (and hence there is nothing incongruous in the use of the .
word ‘grhniyat’). If we did not take the two (the Injunction and. the
Arthavada) thus, the sense of the whole would be— because in olden times
the Giver of the Horse did so and so, therefore at the present time
the Itecewer should do likewise,—which would be wholly irrelevant and
absurd
For these reasons, it- must: be admitted that the Injunction also has
referred to the Giver as described in the Arthavada. All this we have
explained in detail, under the Sara 11-11-11 |
Objection: “Then, inasmuch as it will have been dealt with under that
“ Sitra, there would be no need of the present Adhikarana
Reply 106 ; it has been dealt. with under that अदद, Bat still,
we fiud it necessary to take up:the present Adhikarana, with a view to
setting aside the misconceptions produced by other Bhdshyas (on. the
Sutras) ’
«If this were not necessary, then, wo could take the two ३४८५8 (dealt.
With under the present Adhtkarana) along with the foregoing Adhikarana,
im: the following manner :—The Parvapaksha-siitra (90) may be taken as.
putting forward. the. following views: —" Just like the actions of Alambha.
“and Nirvdpa, the action of accepting the horse would be exactly similar in `
ordinary life’and in the Veda; and as such there being.no absolute con- `
“-comitance (between the said acceptance and a Vedic action), the. accept- -
ance-could not. be taken'as necessarily forming part of the Vedic sacrifice 5.
tid: henee: we: must conclude that the acceptance :is. notienjoined! 88
“belonging to the sacrifice, specially ag the two actions (of acceptance and...
mer tha) baing wholly. different,-thore is no cauge for such ascertain. ©
ment.

1408 TANTRACYARTIKA, ADH, Thi-PADA TW. + भा-क)

To the above argaments, the S:ddhanta sutra (31).may be taken as
. offering the following reply :°‘Sa lingddarivyé syat’s that. is:to Bay, the
` Ishté would be performed in the case of that Horse-gift which. is made to
the sacrificial. Priests, because’ of the indicative power pointing to the -
: Vedic and Saertficial character (of the action); as though the Injunctive
_ Affix-(in ‘grhpiyat’) serves the purpose of poimting out the prompting
“gause (of the Isht¢), yet it can be taken.as supplying the Indication in”
` question ; the sense of the Indication being that it is only the Vedic action
that is generally found to be connected with the Injunctive Affix, which
“never relates to any ordimary action of the world

: Or, we may have the Pareapakshu independently of the sitrus; and
““in-that case, both the sdtras (30 and 31) would be taken as supplying the
>“ answer to that Pirvapaksha ; the sense of Elis reply bemg as follows :-——
-Jnasmuch as the ordinary (Horse-gift) is not enjoined, there can be no
idea of that forming the prompting cause of the (य (as explained
before); as it might be argued that,—“ the action of the acceptance of the
__-Horse-gift being one and the same, there. could be no difference between
the Vedic and.the ordinary gift, and hence both are equally capable of
` serving as the prompting cause of the Isht,”—it is added (in the next
~ sutra) that it is not so; because there ४5. difference in the actions; that is
~to say, the Vedic Horse-gift differs from the ordinary Horse-gift, on the
following points: (1) the former is enjoined, while.the latter is not, (2
--they occur at different places, and times, ete, (3) they are distinct
, individuals ;.and on the ground of this differeuce there would be a restric
^. tion as to the capability of serving as the prompting cause (of the Ishti) .
` [प fact, the ordinary Horse-gift is distinctly prohibited, and hence there `
<. Would be an absolute absence of that, in all matters relating to tle Veda क
Consequently only that can be regarded as the said prompting cause, the .
~ existence of which is a certainty.” Nor is the. acceptance: of the Horse-gift .
“mentioned simply. with ४ view to the pointing out of the prompting cause ;. 98
` the mention ends with ‘the there pointing out of the particular relationslip
"between the two, ` Consequently, we come to the conclusion that: the [shh
. forms part of the procedure to be observed in the. giving away of the Horse ;
““and this use of the [कव shows that: the giving away meant is that con-
», nected: with Vedic ‘sacrifices. - Thus then’the. Ishté ‘cammot. be taken .as
-Telated to anything that isnot enjoined |

^: Thongh both the above interpretations of the two.eitras,were possible,
.-yebit: was for a special parposé that. the: Bhashya propounded a distinet
. Adhikarana;(out of these siitras) Be se os

“+. टो

aged in that form, in fhe sense of the: Cansative; it: might lead toe‘ mis-
- eontoeption ; and henod it should: be: taken in‘its indirect sense {as indicet-

„ ॐ ` =e

a ४५.

VARUNT ISAT! DONE BY THR HORSE-WiVER. , °°. 1409

ing the causative of accepting) ; special y as it is quito possible. for the

causative ta be spoken of.as the caused. Or, inasmuch as the Nominative
chaxacter 2681068 in the causa (४४५ also, when the causal character would
he -meant, {0 be spoken of; then, in that case, we would have the causative

fix, even in connection with the root signifying the functioning of the”
caused; While when the mere Nominative character would be meant 6 -
“be expreased,-then even without tho causative aflix,—an yono who, in somo.
oe way or other, helps in the- accomplish ment of the Acceptunce of the Horse: :
gift, we may speak as ‘ decepting ' (‘ grhnati.’). |
“> Ror instance, in the-sentence ‘he tills the ground with six ploughs,’—-
We vfiud: that,. though the word ‘tills’ signifies the makiny of the lines of :
furrows, yet through the force of the mention of the ‘six ploughs,’ we take |
tho Vorb as indicating the action of the Director of the Ploughing, as the -
:. ग्रत operating of stz ploughs could not be done by any single Plough- _
था; consequently we conclado that the Person, who directs the opera. `
_, tions of all the six Ploughinen,. is also the Performer of the tilling, through —
"these men ; and hence it is he that comes to be spoken of as " tilling the `
“ground with six ploughs,’ | (रि

“Similarly, the root ‘grhaaiz’ having its signification conditionod by

$ ‘the Arthavada, would come to be taken ag indicating the function of the -:
९. Person causing the grahana or acceptance (४.९. the Giver), As for Verbal: |
roots, ib isa well-known fact that they are endowed with multifariong -

2 potentialities (of signification ) ; and as such they could be used jn the

` situple. as well as in tho causal sense,—-as has beon . shown under tho `
- Bhitvdrthadhikarana (II—i—-1 & seq.); and it often happens. that, in
“view of the peculiar character.of their auxiliaries, they are taken even `

~“iw-such @ sense as ia not generally known,

. For: these reasous, we 00001५6 that the word ‘ pratigrhniyat’ in the .
-8entence in question, has been used in the 86116 of § dalyat’ (should givo) ;

~. ind hence the Ishti in question should be performed by tho Giver of the -

^. ~ 4४ the above conclusion, some people make the following objections.
"In the passage, as read in the text of the Maitrayuni Rescension of the
" Yajurveda, we find the first: sentence of tho passage in question read as ©

a
"४
Pi

auished by means‘of another soripiutal toxt, what ean edo?
But-this fear: of being * vanquished’ is wholly, groundless. Because. -

$a esho'guuk pratiyrhiyata’ ; and thus this being qiite in keeping with :

¢d .

‘the subgequent Injunction, ‘it is clearly cognisable that the Ishti 18 to 06 ष :

Pemmed by the Perso: receiving the Horse-gift.””
oy sTodthis some people. make: the - 0110 wing reply: Our position having - .

०९6४ prived, b y reasonings, to.be stronger than yours, if we.come to be: .

oa

Wa had another scriptural text distinctly laying down the perform. ~

1 re : ; 1॥. 11९4 - ४111113, “ADHS Dt PADA 1१.) पा. (11):

| ance of the Ishti by the, Receiver,—then too, all that: we would have to ~

‘admit is that it.would be performed by the. Receiver also; but that would :

‘not set aside its perform*bility by the Giver

. ‘Phat is. to sny, if has been proved tliat the text of the passage ag ;
quoted above,—which ig the one found in the text.of the Tadtitriya Res. `
‘eension of the Yajurveda,—distinetly points to the fact of the Ishi being. `
performed by the Giver. And this conclusion is not found to be set aside, -

: either by any other reasonings, or any soriptural text.. In fact oven if we

had a text prohibiting the performance of that Ishti by the Giver, we

would have two optional alternatives, and there would be no necessit y of

‘abandoning the conclusion once accepted before. As for the sentence `

(‘yo'gvam pratigrhniydt, etc.’) which lays down the performability of that -

Ishtt by the Receiver of the Horse-gift, if, by reason of its forming part of
the sacrifice, it be taken in a manner in keeping with the previous sen
tence,—without paying any heed to the particular way in which the
passage might open—-then, in that case, that sentence too would point out
the performability by the Giver, If, on ‘the other hand, through the pre
sence of the word ‘prategrhndiz,’ the sentence be taken independently by
itself, as laying down its performability by the Recciver,—then, in that
‘case, inasmuch as the previous sentence will have indicated its perform

ability by the Giver, it would come to be performed by both (the Giver as’

well as the Receiver); with this difference however, that the Isht per

९

formed 0 116 Receiver, being only calculated to serve the purposes of the -

Man (independently of any Vedic sacrifice), it would have to be performed
in the case of the acceptance of the Ordinary Horse-gift also

8006 people, taking their stand upon the word ‘ Artviyé’ in the sitiva,
argue that the previous sentence (‘ Prajapatirvarundya, etc.') also speaks
‘of tho performability of the Ishti by the Receiver (४.९. the Rivzk)

But the Ishi that wonld be performed by the Rtvik Priest, could
not form part of the sacrifice itself (which is being performed by the
‘Yajamina);:and henco the ‘relationship of the result of the Zsh{i would.
-be a8 possible for the ordinary man of the. world as for that Priest; con- :
‘sequently we would have the performance. of the Ishii even in the case of
‘the avceptance of the Horse-gift in-ordinary life; and under. the circum-.
stances, it becomes incumbent wpon those. persons, to explain what grounds -
“the sitra would have for declaring, as the conclusion ‘tasmat yajné prali-
. y8ta ` (‘consequently it would be. cognised १6. (0106 performed tn connection:

“qith the Vedie sacrifice)

: Thus then, from the mere fact of the Ishti: being laid. down 98 forming ।
part. of. the: sacrifice, we: conclude’ that it should ‘be’ performed: by: the.

Giver

ADHIKARANA. (19)

[The 90100409 40.04. ४४ is.to be. offered on the occasion of the vomiting of .
a that Some drunk at Vedic sacrifices]

Seta (32); “The case of the vomiting of the drink is similar.”

Apart from any particular Context, we find another sentence—_
—*Somaindran curannirvapél yak somam vamati. (‘One who vomits the
*sonva should offer the Somaindra caru’). And in regard to this, too, we |
` proceed to consider the same questions as those dealt with in the two pre- |
coding Adhikaranas,—i.e, (1) whether the Offering is to be made when .
the Soma vomited is that drunk at a sacrifice, or that drunk in ordinary
life as medicine; [and (2) whether it pertains to the vomiting of the |
yamiina ov that of the sacrificial Priests] | | |
And this being the question, € expression ‘tadvat’ in the sitra `
indicates the two theories (of the Pairvapaksha)—viz.: (1) that the Soma- -
drinking meant is both. that which is done at a sacrifice and that done &8
medicine ; and (2) that it is the latter only (as propounded in Sitra 28)
.. ` - Or the expression ‘tadvat’ may be taken as indicating the application
of the Siddhdntas of the last two Adktkaranas, to the present question also
And as the Pirvapaksha (of the present Adhikarana) differs a little |
‘from that of the last two Adhikaranas, we Jay it down, in the following `
_ words :-- ` । :
_..."Tn-the case of the Soma-drinking at a Vedic Sacrifice, inasmuch as
* the disposal of the substance (Soma) will have been done by the mere `
’\ drinking of it, if there were to be any subsequent disorders, in the shape |
“of vomiting and the like,—it would not necessitate any remedial
measures; and hence in that case, the laying down of the Ishti (the
“Somaindra) would be absolutely useless. While in the case of the Soma
"व्यत in ordinary life,—if.the.Soma happens to be vomited out, there
“would be १ £. of the medicinal effects desired; and hence in the case,.
‘“thére: woul 06 a possibility of. the -loss ‘of virility, etc. (mentioned as
“following ftom a neglect of the Somaindra Lshti); and there is no im-.
ae: possibility of such evil éffects, as. we found in. the case. of Dropsy (in the.
“ preceding Adhikarana) ; and thus as the evil effects woitld be. possible ,
“the. Somatnira अपा that is laid:down in connection with those effects,-
9180 comes.to be recognised “aa‘a remedy for thesd effects. Consequently,

1 TANTRA-VARTIKA, “ADH, 0. iv.” अण, (12)

© this ‘Ishti should be performed ‘at the vomiting of the Soma’ drank jn”

“ordinary life,” _

oe

“Sittra (83); It would de performed at the (vomiting of

` the Some drunk at the) Vedic sacrifice: as it is only
` at this that it creates an evil effect; while in ‘the -
ease of that drunk’ in ordinary. life, as this would
`, ` be done for a visible purpose, there could be ro

way, ` - ` `

` Thatis tosay, as a matter of fact, there are no ovil effects attaching to |

Ishi). - In the case of the vomiting of the Soma drunk ata Vedic sacrifice; ह
on the other hand; we havea definitely ascertained that the. Disposal, that
18 laid down for the Soma-remnant, is one ending with the proper digestion ~ `
of it,—as 18 distinctly shown by the words of the mantra recited for $hé- ।
ligesting of it ; and certainly this enjoined. Disposal would be interfered

with by the vomiting; and as such there would be 8 discropancy in the”
inal result.of the Princi pal Sacrifice (of which | the Soma-drinking forms: 8 ‘

g:.. (Spoken of in‘ yovamati’) indigates: the |

1 |
oh %
„ >

वि a
oF ०,

+ ष

=

० x
vt (

gees SOMAINDRA CARU AT SACRIFICTAL SOMA-VOMITING.” 7 1413-
4 indicates the Sacrifice (at which the कपण 18 laid down as the Disposal) ;
aud. ofthis. sacrifice, the Ishti would be a subsidiary; and hence in this’
gase..the relationship among all the factors concerned would be easily

established

ADHIKARANA. (13)

[The Somaindra Ishte is to.be performed when the vomiting 18. by the
| 00110114 |. = |

9014 (34) “(The Ishti) would pertain to all; because ther
7 “ig no distinction (made).” [वि ot

‘Though it is fully established, from the analogy of the case of th
Ighti for the acceptance of the Horse-gift, that the Ishfi in question also is ध
be performed by the Yujamina,—-yet it is still as undecided as to whethe
the prompting cause of tho Ishti is the vomiting by the Yajamana himsell
or also that by tho Priests. | |

And on this question, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA

“Tnasmuch as there. is no specification, the vomiting of both. (th

ajamina as well as the Priest) would be the prompting cause of th
“Ishtt. Because the vomiting of the Yajamdna causes as much discrepanc
“ia the Disposal, as that of the Priests, as the drinking of both is moan
‘to serve as purificatory of the substance (Soma). Consequently, whethe
“the Ishfi be meant. to be a remedy for the evil effects caused by th
“vomiting, ov an‘aid’in the accomplishment of the Api#rea (of the Prn
cipal sacrifice),—it has to be performed at the vomiting by the Yajaman
‘as well as at that-of the Priest.” ` _ aa ee | |

SIDDHANT

‘Siitra (35): ` ४ would. pertain to the Master only;
ने (the action) is performed for his sake. 2

`. "~ ` Hiven: though the: Iehti be really 9 mere indirect aid to the Principe
sacrifice, yet it would be performed only onthe vomiting by the Yujaman
Because, 98 the first portion of the. sentence (‘yak somam-vamét') -contait
‘the word.‘ yaQ,’ it is :not recognised as poititing out the prompting. cau
. (of the Ishii}; and when it does come to be recognised, through. the sul
Sequent appearance: of the word ‘sah’ (in. sa nirvapél”), we also.come 4
-recoguise the Perforntar to. be‘one only: =

SOMAINDRA ISHTL PERFORMED WHEN YAJAMANA VOMITS: 1415.

That 18. to say, in the sentence—‘ yah somam vamati su nirvapst’—we
tind that’ the two words ‘yah’ and ‘suk’ distinctly indicate that there
~. the performer of the Ishti and of the vomiting is one'and the same ; and thus
. there*can be no doubt that the action of the sacrifice (Ishti) is to be per-
` formed by the Master of the sacrifice (7.e, the Yayamina). And from this
“-eertain fact. we. come to a-definite.conclusion with regard io the doubtful |
५ ease of the ४0114000 also,—that it is only when the vomiting is done एष `
the. Yajamana that it serves as the prompting cause (of the Ishii)

_./ Nor is the vomiting, independently by itself, capable of serving 88.
“the prompting cause ; as the mere Verb (‘ camati’) is incapable of giving .
-any. idea of such & cause; it is only when it is accompanied by the word
- ‘yak’ that it expresses that Cause; and in that case, the fact of the two
91098 (of sacrifice and vomiting) having the same performer is cognised
~ before the fact of the vomiting being the prompting cause (of the Isht7)
Now then, if the Priests were to perform the Jsh{i on account of their
own vomiting, they would be offering substances cither for a Deity or in
` exchange for some services,—as they could not effect this exchange for
theniselves, it’ would be necessary for them to engage other Adhvaryu
end other priests. And on account of the Alman@pada affix in the word
` ‘adadhita’ (in the sontence ‘agninddadhita’), it is clear that tho sacrificial
fire can have no connection with any person other than the one who.
‘has. duly lighted it;.and hence it is necessary for all performers of
sacrifices to make. the offering in the Fire lighted for themselves
Consequently if the Priests perform the Ishti in question, with a view
-to help in the Sacrifice, the Soma drunk at which had been vomited
by them, then the Zshti which they would perform would be performed in a’
‘place, and at a time, different from that of the original Principal Sacrifice
: (As those Ishtis would be performed in distinct Fires lighted by each of the
’ Priests separately) ; and as such the help accorded by these Ishtis would not
accrue to the Original Sacrifice. Nor.is there any direct Injunction |
- tothe effect that the auxiliary Jshtis should be performed in a place and -
lume other than that of the Original Sacrifice,—in consideration of which
-dApjanction we could admit of even fanity Auxiliaries. As for the sen-
‘tence ~" yah somam vamati, etc.,—inasmuch as this has all its requirements
Anlfilled: by the vomiting by the sacrificer, it cannot be taken as permitting -
the difference in the time and. place of the Auxiliary Ishjze from those of. |
“the Original Sacrifice,’ Specially, how Gould it be possible for a single .
विद (‘yah somam,: ete.) to- lay down the sameness of the time and place
of the two (the: Auxiliary and the Original), in the case of the vomiting —
by the Yajamdna,—end difference of them, in the case of the Vomiting by.
the. Priests ? ५ :
If, then, they were to perform the [क for thtir own sake,—then, in *

SAG 1,

“that caso, inasmuch: as that, Jsht’,--which. lias- once (in. tha ‘éase’ of the
“vomiting by the Yajaniana) been ascertained ta be for the sake of & sag;
fice, could never be forthe sake of 09 himself, even if it-came to he per
formed as for this latter, such performance would be absolutely. useless
“And if, for the sake of justifying such performance, the Ieh#i be taken. on
the strength of. scriptural texts, tobe for the, sake of Man,~-then, that
‘would involve the abandoning of the ‘sacrifice’ that appoars in close prox
imitv to.it, as also. the assuming, for such an Ishfi, another result, in the
shape of Heaven or some other end, that would he desirablé by the Man

~ This same assumption of a result has been shown to be necessary, in
the case of the Ishii being taken as to be performed at the vomiting of the
Sowa drunk in ordinary life.” But it could not be said with regard to the
‘Ishti that. would be performed at the vomiting of that drunk during a
sacrifice; as we have. already shown that, in thig Jatter case, the assump
tion of a fresh result is not necessary (the effect of the Ishf: hemg simply
to accord help to the sacrifice, by the remedying of the discrepancy caused
by the vomiting)

Hor these reasons, 1८ must be admitted that the Ishti should be per

formed only when.the vomiting would be that by the Yajamana. _ |

. It onght be urged that, even in the case of the vomiting by the Priests
the actual offering of the Ishti would be made by the Yayamana himself
But in that case, we have the aforesaid anomaly of the two actions (of the
Offering of the [ehti, and - the vomiting ) not having the same’ performer
And for the justification of this, it would be necessary to take the word
‘yal’ (in ‘yah somam vamati’) in the sense of the Genitive ‘ yasya,’ and
hence to reject the co-extensiveness (between ‘yah’ und ‘suk’), And these
interpretations would make the text inapplicable to the case of the Vomit
ing by the Yajam@na, which therefore would no longer bo a prompting
cause (for the Ishi). Then if both (the vomiting by the Yajaméana-as
well as that by the priests) were to be accepted as the said prompting
ause, then that would necessitate the taking of the sentence in question
in two different ways, which would involve a syntactical split;—the sen-
tence being taken as ‘yah soutam vamati, yasya ca somam. Rivik vamald sa
_nireapet’ (‘He who vomits the Some, and he whose Suma the Priest. vomite
“Should. perform the 101४). Then, if, with ४ view to avoid this syntac
tical split, we have got. to accept only one.of them (either the vomiting by
the Yajamana, or that by the. Priests) as the prompting cause of the-Isbti,
10 is only right that we'should accept:the ‘former i. as:thatwould be in
keeping with the sense of the words of the text ४.
„` “The above applies’ to the: case, when we take the Zshti as inditectly
“helping the Principal Sacrifice.” When, however, it is-assurmed :that ‘the
` purpose served. by theTehti is: that it réemodies the incapacity.(of the Saecri-

a ee SOMAINDEA-ISHTI PERFORMED WHEN YAJAMANA YOMITS 1414.

806} of attaining the final result, caused by a discrepancy in the correct.
““pbaervance: of the Disposal of the remnant of the sacrificial substance,-
phe necessity of such Disposal being indicated by the subsequent words (of
the texts relating to the Principal Sacrifice),—then, in that case; inas-
प्रणा 98 it would be the Result accruing to the Yajamana (in the shape of
the Apiroa) that would be absolutely imperceptible, and as snch, capable
“sof being interfered with in its proper fruition (by the vomiting), 1४ would
become all the more certain that the Remedial Ishti would be performed
“py the Yujyamdna himself... As for the Result’ that accrues to the Pricste,
_ in the shape of the sacrificial gifts,-they are found to obtain it, in any
ease, whether there be a vomiting or not; and as such there being no fear
‘of this Result being interfered with (by any vometing), 1} would not atand
in need of the Remedial Ishti, and as such could not bring about: its per-
formance ह
|." पिला, it might be assumed that—“ the drinking of the Soma forming
part of the observances necessary for the Performer of the Principal
““ Sacrifice, is meant to serve the purpose of pnrifying the person that
“drinks; and hence any discrepancy in this drinking would create a flaw
-“in the Performer (४.8, the Priest), as the purification of the Soma, which
_. would consist in the useful effects it would bring to him, would not have.
“been duly nceomplished.” But even so too, (1) inasmuch as the said flaw:
only being an obstacle in the way of tho due realisation by the Yajamana,
of the Results (of the sacrifice), the Ishti would serve. the purpose of
removing that obstacle, and (2) as we have in the sentence the words.
yak? and ‘sah’ (which indicates the performer of both actions to be on
-only), it must be admitted that. the Jahti should be performed, at the
vomiting by the Yajaména only

¦: The same reasoning hholda respecting the view that the Ish{c is meant
: ४ affect the final Apirva (of the Principal Sacrifice) = `
. . ‘Some people hold that—“ the vomiting of the Soma does not mean
the neglect of an enjoined Duty, nor the doing of that which is prohibited
“and as such, there being no discrepancy in the sacrifice on its account,
“the performance of the Ishti could not be meant to remedy any discrep-
“aney; and hence the Ishti must be regarded as ४ subsidiary to the
Principal Sactitice, to be performed only. when the Soma drunk at it ४.
= happens ४0.06 vomited,” - ति |
कत that case also, inasmuch’ as we-find the word ‘yah’ distinctly
‘pomnting: to the Man; the Jsht/ must’ be regarded as 2%. purification of the -
Mav mentioned in the Context; in accordance with the:conclusion arrived .
At’ (ander: Stiras. T1—iy—14, 15). in. connection with ‘the. sentence
‘Jatjabhyamino' nubrila,’. And hence, in accordance. with the Satra IIT:
शा ib must be'takon.as. tobe performed: by the Yagaména:. And ay .

Lg

.-141६ १ 1१1१.)

the Ishii pertains to the same object na the vomilgng, ibis the vomiting by
“the Yajamdna that should be regarded as the’ prompting cause of the
_ 102
` ` ~ ‘Then as for the argumeut,—‘ the धनां of the Priests. also causes.
“either a discrepancy. in the’ proper Disposal of the Soma, or 2 total des.
-“truction of the purification of the Performer; and as such, that too
‘would: stand in. need of a remedy,’—the reply is that, even though it:
would require a remedy,-yet, no such remedial action could be ‘performed,
for the simple reason that. iio such has been laid down ; as we have already:
` शका that the Injunction of the Ish/i does not pertain to the vomiting by
the Priests,-~whether the Ishtz itself be taken as to be for the sake of the.
` Man or for that of the Sacrifice. Consequently we come to the conclusion
that if the vomiting by the Priest should be a fiaw in the sacrifice, the
whenever it should happen, all that we have to do is to quietly ignore it
altogether ; while if it do create a discrepancy in the sacrifice, then, in:
that case, we might perform some ordinary expiatory rite |
In connection with question under consideration, there is no use of
considering the question as to whether the Ish{z is for the sake of Man, ण
for that of the sacrifice, etc., etc. . But if it be necessary to learn the true
fact, then we must admit that theory which las been found to be appli-
` ९8016 to the case of the sentence ‘ faizubhkyamdno’nubrite, ete,” (1II—iv—
14, 195). . (That is to say, it must be regarded as being for the sake of. the:
: Man connected with the principal Sacrifice). It is in view of this that we
have the present siira-—' Svamino ४८ tadarthutvat

Sttra (36) : Also becawse we find certain indicative
| | (words) |

In connection with the sentence under consideration, we find the
sentence—‘ ésha vyrdhyat? yat somam vamati’ (‘He who vomits the Soma
loses his prosperity ’);:.and there can be doubt that this ‘loss of prosperity
` applies to him. alone whose prosperity 18 sought to be accomplished. by.
the drinking of the Sama, and for whom a discrepancy in this drinking vould
cause. a ‘loss of prosperity.’ And we find that both of. these apply to the
. Yajamana only ; and hence the Ishti must be taken as to be performed by

him ४.4 स Ao ee |

ADHIKARANA (14).

fOut of the Agneya-ashtakdpala-Caru it 18 only the Duyavaddna that 15 to
. be offered in Homa |} | `

51८ (87): “The whole should be offered; as the mate-
vtal is meant for that purpose.”

(In connection with. the Darga-Purnamisa, we find the sentence
४1001640 shtikapilo’ mivasydyam paurnamdsyancicy utd bhavate’; and in
regard. to this there arises the question as to whether the whole of the
material prepared is to be actually offered, or only ४ portion of it is to be
offered, and a little left as a remnant. And on this question, we have the
following—]
| PURVAPAKSHA
“The words. ‘ ash{akapdlak’ ‘Giaigqnéyuk, etc., distinctly indicate that
the whole of the material is to be offered; as itis only when the material
-*has been actually thrown into the Sacrificial Fire that it comes. to belong
“to the Deity,—as is clearly indicated by the Injunction ‘ dhavaniyé
““Sehoti,’ and by the Arthavddu स Agnimukha vai Dévak.’ [And hence the
५ material could not.be called ‘ Ayngya, until the whole of it had been
“offered to Agni]. Such being the case, if a part of the material were left
a behind, then that would mean the doing of something contrary to what
“has. been laid down (in the Veda). Hence it must be admitted that the
^ whole of the material is to be offered into the Fire.” |
Question: Does the propounder of this Pirvapaksha not perceive the.
Injunction of those actions that are done with the Remnants of the mate-—
rials -offered—such. actions, for instance, as the Qvishtakrt Offering, the
Idé-pragitra, the Sanyavitkakala, the Bhakshacaturdhakarana, and the like ? .
[That is to say, he must be. wholly ignorant of the Injunctions of these
actions, otherwise he should not have asserted that no ‘remnants’ should
be kept} इ |
In: answer to this, some,people declare that the Pérvapaksh: does १10४ `
perésive the Injunctions of these actions :
But that answer is scarcely correct; because if we were to lose sight.
of such palpable facts, as distinct Injunctions, in propounding the Purva-
paksha, there is no theory, howsoever absurd, that could not bo put
forward as one. . [That is-to’say, the Parvapakshu is. always such as has
all:the semblance of a reasonable theory, and not,one that; on its very
face, ‘bears the'stamp of untenability] Consequently it must bé admittéd:.

ह mantacvderigds 1)

that the opponent is fully cognisant ‘of. 06 said: Injunctions, and yet 16
puts forward the above Pirvapaksha, in view of the following arguinents : -
.. .“'The actions laid down as to be performed with ‘Remnants’ wonld
not jastify the bringing in of fresh supplies of materials, only in cases
"^° where there are ‘ Reninants’ of the previous supplies. When, however,
“the whole of the material has been offered (nnd there is no.‘ Remnant’.
। ^" 196}, those actions would certainly justify our bringing in fresh supplies.
“That is to say, in a case where only the ‘ Deyavadina’ (‘ Two.
. “shces’) are offered ont of the whole Cake, and. the vest.is left as ‘Rem-.
“nant, the Svisktakrt offering, and the other actions—erjoined by. such
‘ sentences aa ‘ont of the other half a slice is cut for Svishtakrt’ and the :
“like—would not justify the bringing in of fresh supplies of that material,
“as shown under Satra [V-—i—28, When, however, we come to recog.
“nise the necessity of offering the whole of the Cake (and the impropriety
“of keeping ‘Remnants’), then inasmuch as the Svishtakrt offering will
have no ‘already existing substance’ to be related to, there would be an
“impossibility of the carrying out of that part of the Tnjunction which
“refers to that, Offering ; and hence in this case, we do certainly recognise
“the necessity and advisability of bringmg in fresh snpplies of the mate-
“yal; and hence, other Cakes, etc., would certainly be prepared for the
“sake of the Svishtakré offering (and other similar actions) /
“Question: ‘Iu that case, how would you explain the word ‘Gésha
“in such Injunctions as. ¢éshat svishtakrte'vad ४५८४ ९ ' -<
“ Answer: In such sentences, the word ‘ (टद ' would he explained
-“as used in the sense of ‘another material,’ just as in tho sentences.
“Sagyéna gésham’ and ‘tacchéshéna | वाः
“That.is to say, in the sentence ‘ayéna gésham sarsthipayate’ (‘ He.
“finishes the rest by means of Butter’), we find the word ‘ ¢ésha’ used in
“the sense of an action other than, or similar to, that whose performance
“has been finished; so also, in the sentence ‘tatah géshéna vipishtadécaya-
“tytdimunto ganma ` pratipadyanté’ (Gautama’s Nydyasiitra——-),—the-
-“gense of which is that the action resulting in Heaven having been fully.
“used up- in: bringing about that result, and that action which. has: a
definite result of its own not being capable of being used for the sake. of,
«‘*another, it is by means of other actions that people take birth, etc., ‘ate.
<+ we find: the word. ‘césha’ in the place. of ‘anya,’ (‘other’) ;. and.
” “similarly. in the sentence - 4 ¢dshat: surshtakrté; the. word. ‘ (६९४८ would:
“tnean: 9 material .otherthan- the one offered’ at the. oriyinal Printary .
` “ Sacrifice, or another supply of the same materia} Bs ॑।
त “| ५07, the word - “eashat? ‘may - 06" taken in the sense: of a:seconilary:
“material, a, material other’ than’ that.used ‘at. the. Principal; Sacrifies,
“whieh; -however,-is: kept ready’ at it, as:a-subsidiary mnateriak:: Though:

OUT OF. AGNEYA CARB, ONLY DVYAVADINA TO BE OFFERED. 1421

ड. coy,

'
pees

«there. may be none of the‘Principal Matcrial left, yet all others have the
‘“chavacter of berng similar to it. Consequently at-all such sacrifices,-
“other. materials. would have to be used; as will be explained under
“ Saivea IV ~1—29 a

“Even if, im consideration of the word ‘¢ésha,’ there should be kept

sa a ‘remnant’ of. the same material (that is used at the Principal Sacri-
fee), —then too, there is another purpose served by the present diseus-
e “pion; 1b need. not necessarily. be that which is laid down by the
:: ^ Siddhanit; as‘the fyllowing also is possible; when, in accordance with
‘the sentence laying down the Principal Sacrifice, there comes to 96 tho.

possibility. of the whole of the material to be offereéd,—and yet ‘Rem-
“nants” of it are kept, for the sake of those actions that are laid down as

th to. be performed with such ‘ Remnants,’—then, these latter actions (the
“ Svishtakrt offering and the rest) would-be as instrumental in the bring

. ing: in of that material as the Principal Sacrifice itself; and hence if the
“slice kept for any of these actions, happen to be destroyed, spoilt, or -

stolen, 1४ would be necessary to prepare another supply of the material,

| > -——just as in the case of the Principal Sacritice. While, on the other
“hand, if these actions were to take in only the mere ‘remnants’ of the —

material spoken of in the Injunction of the Principal Sacrifice, then, |
inasmuch as they would depend solely upon the raaterial used. at the

“latter sacrifice, they wonld not be themselves instrumental in the bring-
८ ing. in of any materials on their own account; and hence even if the |
» slice kept for these actions happen to be destroyed, spoilt or stolen, there
“would -be a simple non-performanee of those actions. Thus then, even
‘though the fact of the whole not being offered at the Principal Sacrifice
~ “be aecepted by both (af us, the Purvapakshi. as well as the Siddhdantz),

yet there is a necessity of the. present discussion |

SIDDHANT

sa Sistra (38): There would be a ‘remnant’; inasmuch as

the slices are cut Sout of’ (the Cake)
If.‘ Agnéyo'shtakapalah, etc.’ were the only text bearing upon the case.

in question, then, of course, we could not but admit the necessity of the |
whole (Cake) being offered. Asa matter. of fact, however, we: find we:
४8५६ also thé texts—' duirhavisho vadyati,”’ ^ madhyatpirvardhacea dvira- -

“seal: of which lay down the offering of certain slices etit out of the Cake;.

and.all these texte taken together show that only a portian of. the Cake is -
Ee to ‘be -offered (at the: Priucipal: Sacrifice) ; and hénce-it follows that a
प्प should be kept

1422: परा, “ADH, पो -- न पा. (14)

_. Sittra (99) : . Objection: “These other texts merely: tay :
“down the method; and as. the. whole ts meant for.
~ “the Deity (the offerings are to be repeated)” ` ` ; :

Objection: “Ifthe sentences quoted‘ could not be explained otherwise’
: “than. by rejecting the necessity pointed out in the original injunction of :
- ‘the offering of the whole of the material,—and if they were in proximity
“tothe sentence laying down the Principal Sacrifice,;—then alone could they `
-- “set aside the indications of this latter, As a matter of fact however, the’
| “sentences in question .dealing with merely purtficatory actions ‘they
could be very ‘well reconciled with the original sentence laying down
“the Principal Sacrifice in qnestion; as it is quite compatible for the
“whole of the materinl te be offered, piece by piece,—cach piece, measur
“ing aninch (zt. of the size of the part of the thumb from the middle-joint
` “to its tip), being purified by a process of cutting, repeated twice over
` “ont of the middle and the former half of the material (Cake)
~ .. “hus then, the sense given by all the sentences (those bronght
_ forward by the Siddhanéé taken along with. the original Injunction of
“the Principal Sacrifice) comos to be this: ‘The offering of the whole
“Cake is to be done by such and such a method’ ; and thus we have:no
_ “prohibition of the homa of any portion of the Cake; from which it
"° follows that the whole of the Cake should be offered. -
| “Then, it has been argued that—'The Homa could not be performed
“all at once in the way declared in these sentences, as that would not
` “be a Homa of Two-slices (Dvyavadana).’ But then, the Homa of the
- “slices could very well be repeated (till the whole is finished), like the
‘“Jyotishtoma; the reason for. this being—<tadarthateat’—v.e. - because
“of the fact of the whole Ashtakapala. Qake being meant for the Deity, or,
“for the Sacrifice, or, for the Apirva (resulting from that Sacrifice), the
“injunction, contained in the original sentence laying down the Principal
_ “ Sacrifice, would not. be fulfilled by the offering of a mere portion of. it
~ ५0, the expression ‘tadarthateat’ may be taken in ‘the senze~
..“*hecausé the purificatory action of Cutting is meant for the material.’”

af Stitra (40): ‘Reply: It could be done once only; as. the
` कला will have been complete (in that single perform.
ance); spectally as the Material ts onty asubordinate
factor,

oes, Reply: . What has been urged above, by the Purvapakehi,—that ^ the.
.: Goo-cuttings, and the. corresponding Homa, should. be repeated ‘over and
over again "78 “not. possible.“ Beesuse,- though: it is, quite: posaible::for
tha: Oatting,: which :ia a subordinate-factor, to be repeated any wumber.of

QUT OF KGNGYA CARU: ONLY: DVYAVADANA ‘TO BE OFFERED... 1423 -

times, yet, the Home, being a principal factor, could novei undergo a
repetition + ~ |
8.6.18 to say, the sentence ‘cuts the material twice’ laying down.
the mere ‘Cutting’ as a purificatory action, it would be possible to carry
“it on, a8 long as there may be the material to be purified ; as for the Homa, .
however, it-is an action leading to a distinct result, and as such it is a
Predominant factor, as shown-under the Siitras Il—i—7 and 8: and henc
as ib would be completed by a single ‘ Deyavadina’ (Cutting into two -
Blices), it would not be proper to repeat it over again, simply because
there is a portion of the material left behind; and the Homa not being
repeated, there would-be no use for repeating the ‘ Cutting’ either; as it
is-only that substance which 1s employed in an action that takes np puri- `
fications, and not that which has got nothing to.do with the Action in hand
“in the case in question, we find that there is no other use for the material
“gave the said ‘ Dvayavaddna’ offering, und hence when that has been done
the material would stand in no further need of any purification (by the
-*Qutting’); and consequently there can be no repetition of the ‘Cut-.
ting |
. Tf the Homa were merely: for the sake of the material, then, on ac-
count of this latter, it would have to be repeated itself, as well as lead to
the repetition of the Cutting; but.as it is not for the sake of the material
it cannot be repeated. Specially as we find that the sentence in question.
does not mean—' yajyuhotiti hiyamdnasya dviravakhandanamupayo 11/17
` yaté!: (^ the twice-cutiing 28 the method laid down for the material offered
=the word ‘ yazjuhot? pertaining to the material offered); for certainly.
“the word ‘juhoti’ does not denote the material; uor has the Verb ‘ ५1010
the Passive Affix, by which it could be taken as pointing to that which
te offered in Homa (‘Hiyamana’). ‘The fact is that the sentence lays
down the twice-cutting with regard to the Action (denoted by the Verb -
. (11014 As {07.४06 idea of the material, that we have from the word
tyat!-in the phrase ‘ yat juhoti,’—it is based upon 9 misconception, and as
such, we cannot attach any importance to it; because the word is not
“found-in. the Vedie sentence, but has simply been put in by the commen-
- ators by way of a qualifying adjunct to the Verb, with a view to show the.
“fast-of the Homa being merely referred to in the sentence (for the sake of
-. fhe 'erijoining of the Dvyavadana.with regard to it), `, , <` ~ |
age ed for the argument,~-" The Homa should be repeated for the 88०
“Of the ‘utilisation of ‘the. whole. material, spoken of in the originative’
-An}gnetion of the. Principal: Sacrifice,—just as. we have. repetitions in con-
“mection with the Jyotishtoma,’’—it is wholly inadmissible: | Bocause if the.
“gecensity’.of the. offering.of the wiole material had been established, then:
alone could: there be « similarity with the case of” the Jyotishfoma-; as: a.

1424 aN TRACE RA, “abe. TH! epa. v—ADRL. (14)

matter of fact however, we find that, in the case in.qudestion, the offering :
of the whole is distinctly precluded ; and as such it can never be regarded”
to have been established | ५
That is to. say, in the sentence ‘ agnéyo'shitkapalah,' the relationship.
with Homa, of all parts of the Cake equally, would,-at best, be based upon ~
‘Inference; consequently, before this inferred relationship has had tinte to. ;
be duly accomplished, we find that.there is directly established, by means
of the sentence ‘ Dryavadanaiifuhoti,’ the relationship, with the. Homa, |
of a part taken out of the Oake, and when this latter direct relationship
has been once established, there is no appearance of the inferred relation-\
ship (ofthe whole cake), And hence we.find that the property of being dedi-:
cuted and offered to Agni (being Agnéya), which was spoken of.as belonging ।
.# all the parts of the Cake (in common), becomes restricted, in 1t8 appli- `
ation, to the ‘Dvayavaddana’ (T'wo-slices) only, by means of the Injunc-
tion ‘Dryavadanan jihoti’; just as the number ‘seventeen ` is restricted:
“by ‘means of the factors met with in the Context, And the meaning `
-eomes to be this; ‘One makes the two-slices Agnéya (४.८. dedicated and -
offered to Agni).’ Consequently, the Injunction not affecting the other |
portions of the Cake, there can be no Homa with these latter |
Then again, it is not necessarily the actual offering of the whole of the c
material. that makes it‘ Agnéya’ ; even if only ‘ Two-slices’ are taken out!
of it (for being offered to Agni), that alone would make the whole of it
™ Agnéya |
‘That is to say, all that the Nominal Affix (in ‘ Agnéya’). sigmifies 18
‘that the Cake is for the sake of Agni, and not that it is actually offered to —
Him; and there are two ways in which it could be for the sake of Agni:
(1) by being actually offered, and (2) by supplying the portion that +s
offered. For instance, in the case of the sentence ‘Vrihibhiryagata, . we.
find that the Vrihi-corn is not what is actually offered, but. it. serves as the `
original substance ont of which the offering material is made’; and. it is as.
uch that the Corn is laid down in the sentence. Consequently, even though.
the whole of the Cake is not actually offered, yet inasmuch as‘it would”
form the original substance ott of which the ‘ Two-slices’ are taken’ to. १६
offered,.it-would be ‘ Agnéya’ all the same ;. and hence it ia the offering ण `
the ‘ Two-slices ’ only that make the Cake‘ Agnéya Say E
"Phere. are two ways of explaining (the word ‘ Agnéya' as applying
tothe Two-slices,—(1) that the relationship of the Deity 1s transferred. `
from the whole Cake to tho.‘ T wo-slices,’ and, (2) that it isthe fact of the:
+ Two-slices ' (offered) bemg taken out of. the Cake that makes this. latter, :
‘ Agnéyas :. : ~ >
For ‘these 1608010 we vonclude that the whole is. not-ta be-offered in -
Homa

-
ai?

SOT "OR THE AGNEYA CARV ONLY DV¥YAVADANA TO-DE OFFERED. 1495 :

S#tra.(41): Also because we find the word ‘ Remnant.’ |

It is only when we accept the above conclusion, that we can justify .
-the use of. the word‘ Gésha’ (‘Remnant’), in its direct meaning of that
“which has been left after the offering has been made. Then again, we 916
paved from the trouble of assuming the existence of a second Cake, for the |
gake. of the ‘latter half,’ etc., out of which the slices for. the sub- | |
sequent Homas ave laid down as to be taken out. (This assumption would -
‘be absolutely: necessary for the Parvapakshd, as for him, the whole of the

former Cake having been offered, it would be necessary to find a second
‘Cake, out of which the slices for the subsequent Homas would be out). |

+ Against the above, the Opponent brings forward the following argu-
“ments: ‘It has been urged that, like the number ‘ seventeen ` the name of
“‘Agnéya’ 38 restricted to the ‘ Two-slices’ only. Butthisis not possible }
“because one ‘seventeen’ has been mentioned, without reference to any_

“ particular Context, in regard to the Sdmidhéni verses, and not to any

Naercfices ; and hence its relationship with these latter conld only be -
‘inferred, through that with the Samidhénis ; bnt so long as a direct re-
© lationship is possible, it cannot be right for us to accept one that could -

‘only be inferred ; and hence in this case, 16 is only natural that there

should bea restriction. In the case in question, however, we find that.
‘the relationship with Deity (Agni) is not far-fetched, being distinctly
‘signified by the nominal affix (in the word * Agnéyah’) ; 10 fact it would |
‘be the relationship of the ‘ Two-slices’ (with the Deity Aguz) that would
‘be far-fetched and indirect; as in the original Injunction, it is the whole

of the Ashtakapala Cake that is spoken of as related to Agni; while it 18
“only a aupplementary Injunction (‘ Duyavadanéna guhotz’) that connects
the ‘'Two-slices’ with Him |
| “The following argument might here be urged: ‘of the Ashta@kapala |
“Cake, the relationship with the Sucrifice is far-fetched ; while that.
“af the Two-slices is direct; and 80 long as this latter is possible, there can
: be no necessity of assuming a far-fetched one (that of the Deity Agni)
| * But this is not right; because in that case, the sentence Lvyava- `
“danaiiguholé would come to be accepted as the original Injunction of the
“Homa (and not the sentence ‘ Agnéyo'shtdkapalah,. eto.’); as if the `
“sentence Agnéyo' shtakapalak, etc. “were to be restricted in its applica-
tion, by the sentence ‘ Deyavaddnaijuholi,’ then 16 would. be this latter
“séntence that. would serve as tlie original Injunction of the Homa in.
“question ; and that would give rise to a Syntactical split in the sentence:
S Agneyo'shtakapilah; ete.’ as shown under the Satra, II--ii—6; as Ait.
“has been already explained that unless a Sacritice is inferréd, such sen-.

179

1426 TANTRASVERTIKA. ADH. TEE--PADA 1V,—-ADHE. (14);

५८ tences as ‘ Agnéyo'shtakapalah, ete.’ can neither stand in need of another |
“sentence, nor be related to any sacrifice. Consequently, even though
५ the connection of this latter sentence with a Sacrifice be an inferred one. :
‘yet, inasmuch as its signification would not he otherwise complete, it :
must be admitted that that connection has been already established (as -
“ without the sacrifice the Cake would not be offered, and as such itcould not `
+ be spoken of as ‘ Agnéya’), and thus this connection being once estab ष
“lished, it could not be set aside by any number of direct connections:
५ appearing subsequently :
7". ^ “Nor, in the case in question, is any such relationship as that of the
general and the particular possible; because there js no such relation.
“ship possible hetween the whole (Cake) and the part (the ‘ Two-slices’) .
“Asa matter of fact, we find that the sentence ‘ Aguéyahk, ete.’ distinctly
enjoms the whole Cake (as to he offered to Agni); and so also does the
“sentence । Dvyavadanam, etc. directly enjoin the ‘ Two-slices’; and:
“thence the offering of both is equally authoritative (and as such, the
‘former could not be set aside by the latter) |
^ Obyection : “ The offering of the portions other than the Two-slices
र would be laid down, only in a general way, by the generic word puro
“daga; and as such, would be less authoritative than that of the 1/0 ध
slices |
“ Reply: If the Cake had been laid down, with regard to its parts,
“then 21006 would the Injunction apply to the other parts, in a general
‘‘ way (as you say); as it is, however, the Cake is laid down directly by
“itself (88 one complete whole) ।
“That is to say, those texts that relate to Classes are taken as in-
dicating the Individuals of those classes, because of the fact of no action |
“being possible with regard to any Class; and in this case, inasmuch as
“they would apply to the Individuals only by indirect Indication, it is
‘only natural that they become a little weakened in their authority, on
“that account. In the case in question, however, we find that. the whole.
(Cake) itself is not incapable of accomplishing the action (४.९. of being
offered) ; and as such there can be no ground for having recourse 6 91111.
““ direct indication with regard to that word .(‘ Ashtakapdla’). If we were:
“to go on assuming such Indications, without sufficient cause (in the shape.
‘of Apparent Inconistency and the like), then, in that case, even those
texts that relate to the parts of the Cake (the ‘Two-slices’ f.i;) we:
could go on taking as indicating the other parts; and as such these too.
would become weakened in their authority. ` Consequently, we must.
_S admit that, just as in the case of the sentence * Dvyavadinatijuhots, *.
ete ^ Deyavadana’ (Two-slices) .is accepted. as being, by itself, in-”
dependently. of ita ‘parts, the material enjoined for.the Hona,—so, in the:

OUT OF THE AGNEYA CARU ONLY DVYAVADANA {0 BE OFFERED. 1427,

‘game mariner, the Ashfakapala. Cake also could be taken up as the
“4 material directly enjoined, by itself, independently of any of its parts”
<+ (euch as the ` Two-slices' and the like); aud when the Cake has been:
“taken up as a whole, if its parts come in ils wake, why should any one
“4 stop them (from coming in)? All that we insist upon is that these:
^ parts do not become related (to the Sacrifice) by reason of any inherent
“« gapability in themselves ; and that the Injunction in question does not
र्धा to, them. And as to the fact of the whole and the part not being
“wholly distinct from each other, that would apply as much to the other”
“parts of the Cake as to the ‘ Two-sliccs ° (and hence there could be no-
“thing to justify us in restricting the original Injunction ‘A gnéyak, ९(८. !
. ५ to the offering of the ‘ ‘Two-slices’ cut out of the Cake).
1 ~ “Thus by taking the two Injunctions (‘ Agnéych, etc.’ and‘ Deyavadi-
^ म nanjuhott’) together, we come to the conclusion that what they mean 1४
“that (1) ‘having offered the Two-slices we should offer the Remnants’; or
५“ (४) ' there is an option’, by which at times we could offer the whole Cake,
© and at others the Two-slices only ; (3) or, inasmuch as the whole Cake
“is enjoined in the original Injunction, the offering of that (like that of
“the क्त) would be more authoritative ; and as such the ‘ offering of the
५ Two-slices’ could not be accepted either as rejecting it, or as an optional
“alternative to it, or as to be offered conjointly with it; and hence this
latter offering (of the ‘Two-slices’) would have to be taken as a wholly
^ distinct action by itself, in accordance with Sutra II—ii—23 ; and at this
action, the material (of the ‘ Two-slices १) would be taken from elsewhere,
‘as 16 would have no connection with Ash{akapala Cake. For, even if this
“latter action were related to the previons action (at which the whole
^ Cake has been offered), as the ‘ Two-slices' would have to be taken from
^ elsewhere (as the Cake will have been wholly offered up),—there would |
“be all the objections due to the question as to whether this other sub- -
` ^ 69006 is to be taken conjointly with the former Cake, or-only as its
“optional alternative. (4) Or, lastly, when it has been duly ascertained
‘that the whole of the Cake is to be taken up, and we find that the In-
‘Junction with regard to the * Two-slices ’ is incapable of laying down
^ gnother action, on account of its laying down a mere accessory in the

““ shape of the material,—we come to recognise this latter action as per- `
“taining ‘to the aforesaid Ashtikapila Cake (as its purificatory rite) ; and
‘‘objeot to be purified, if would become necessary for the ‘offering of the

‘T'wo-slices’ to be repeated (just like the Jyotishtoma), for the purpose of `
prodacing, in the principal material (the Cake), the qualities laid down in
“the Veda; and this would become tantamount to the Pérvapakga posi-

‘then; inasmuch as the purtfidation has to be repeated as long as there isan.
tion taken up in Quéra 39--that the Injunctions in connection with the

1428 TANTRA-VARTIRA. ADH. U1-PADA Iv, abut, (14).

५ ^ ^ Two-slices’ etc., merely lay down the method by which the whole Cake |
is to be offered; as there would be no authority for the offerings to he `
made of the slices cut out of the. Cake, | 3
“In fact the offering of slices ०५८ out of the Cake would involve a
most objectionable Parisankhya (Preclusion), Because, in that case, the.
` ^" Injunction could not have the Restrictive character ; because all parts of `
“the Cake are equally capable of being offered. If it were yet tobe
“Known which one of its parts should be offered, and then in answer to
that we had the Injunctions as to the offering of slices ‘ from the middle’,
"fromthe front half’ and so forth,—then alone could the Injunction
serve the purposes ofa Restriction, Asamatter of fact however, the whole
of the Cake is known as the material to be offered; and uuder the cit
cumstances, the subsequent specification of the ° Two-slices’ could not
" but be taken as precluding the use of the other parts of the Cake; and as
such it would be open to the three usual faults of the Preclusive Injunc-
` ^ tion—viz. the non-signification of its own meaning, ete. ete. These
faults ave capable of being explained away only in those cases, where an
^ Injunction pointing to the taking of that which is sought to be preclud-
“ed by the Injunction under consideration, is not definitely ascertained, |
“and has got to be assuined (on the ground of Indicative Power, etc., etc.)
In the case in question, however, the Injunction of the whule Cake ( which
ig sought to be precluded by the Injunctions as to the offering of the
"^ " 1४० slices,’ etc.) is fully ascertained, and has not got to be assumed
aud when it is thus fully established, the said Preclusion could
never be shown to be free from the said objectionable features. Hence it
must be admitted that there can be no offerings of slices cut out of the
“Cake |
“Then again, if tho name ‘ Agnéya’, as mentioned in the sentence
^ १ Agnéyo'shtakapalak, etc, were to be restricted in its application to the. .
, * १ Twoeslicés’ meant to be offered in the sacrifice, then, in that case, the |
नि other portions of the Cake would cease to belong to any Deity ; and ध
“hence the ownership of the Yayaméina in these would continue intact; and —
‘in that case, we could never reconcile with this the Sutra III—iv—50.
“ wherein it is argned that all the sacrificial priests are equally entitled,
“with the Yayamdnu, to the eating of the ‘Remnants’,.as the latter has `
“ceased to have any ownership over them, after they have all. been _
“ dedicated to the sacrificial Deities ५
4 “The following argument might here be brought forward :—It is the `
*** Twoeslices ’ alone that is related to the actual dedication to the Deity ;..
“but itis the whole material that is spent; and the ownership ceases by ।
“mere expenditure, ang not by the connectiow of the gift with the Deity
= Consequently there can be no incompatibility of what we hold: with the
9

QUT’ OF THE AGNBYA CARU ONLY DVYAVADINA TO BH OvFERED, [429°

` assertions. as to the cessation of tho Yajamuna’s rights of ownership over,
“4 the + Remnants | -
~~ . © Bat this is not true. Because at the very time that the sacrificer is
` “ Jaying out the materials, he knows full well that such and such a quantity -
“of them would be offered; and we see no reason for assuming that he
spends more than what he knows he has actually to offer. ।
| “That is to say, at sacrifices, people spend the materials simply for:
“the purpose of making offerings to the Deities, and not by mere lavish->
“yess. Consequently, whatever they may have, in excess of what is meant’
“ to be actually offered to the Deities, would be as unspent as the materials
“that might be lying in the house of the Sacrificer. Nor, in the case in
= question, have we any Injunction for mere spending apart from the offering ;
“in fact, we find that the spending (even of that which is to be offered) is
“only imphed by the Apparent Inconsisteucy of the relationshep to the
- ‹ Devty (Agni) which is what is enjoined (by means of the word ‘ Agnéyah’
“in the sentence in question). And this Apparent Inconsistency can point
." to the expenditure of just that much of the material which would be
“yequired for the offering to the Deity; because there can be no 1160) -
^ graity or inconsistency in the non-expenditure of any material over and
“above that (which is meant for the Deities). Because in all cases what
, “18 desived is the proper completion of an Action ; and thus too, the said
“Apparent Inconsistency can point to the Injunction of the expenditure
“of only that much of the material as would be necessary for the proper
“completion of the Sacrifice, and of no more than that; consequently, just
‘aa at the time that the Corn is brought to the place of the Sacrifice, in ४
“carb, and four handfuls are taken and laid out near the altar, the
ownership of the master does not cease with regard to all the corn in the
, “cart (but only to those four handfuls),—so, in the same manner, in the
“brought up, the ownership of the sacrificer would cease with regard to the |
““““'Two-slices’ ete. only, and not with regard to the other portions of the
“Cake |
ध “The opponent might bring forward the following argument: ‘ At.
: “the time that the Cake is laid out on the altar, it could not have
“till then beon divided into the middle part, the front part, otc. and so-
(“कना though the whole may not be meant to be actually offered, inas
much as the parts to be actually offered have not been differentiated,
tig would be necessary, till sach differentiation, to consider the whole. as
“spent. (even though not offered), Because before such differentation, it.
: 18 not yet known from which part of the Cake the Two-slices, etc., would.
“be ent out for the actual offering; consequently if tho whole were not:
actually regarded as spent; it is just possible that thé said ग might,

“1480 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ` ADH. t1—pAba 1V¥.~-apnt.: (14)

be cut out from that portion of the Cake, which may not be that which ‘
_ “had been previously considered as spent (or given away); aud this would.
| “involve the unauthorised anomaly of offering that. which had प
“been considered as spent, and. not offering that which had been 80 `
“thought, Consequently the expending (though not the actual offering).
` "८ प्रप्र be.of the whole Cake (and as such the sacrificer’s ownership over
“Cit will cease all the same, whether the whole be offered, or only a part), -
“ But it is not. so; because when a general law has been carried into .
“effect, there can be no occasion for the particular one; consequently (if
“it ig to have any functioning) this latter must operate from the very
“beginning (i.e. before the general law has been actually carvied 110
. ५ action) |
1 “That is to say, when a general law onco becomes carried into action, —
_ “it can never be set aside by anything ; consequently if the Corn has been:
` “brought in and Jaid ont, in regard to the Duities, for the making of
` “the Asktakapila Oake, it has begun. to he looked upon as actually.
“offered to the Deities, and then if any portion of it be not offered,
. “with regard to that portion, we shall have committed the anomaly
“of not finishing what we had begun; and thus it is necessary that.
“the whole should be actually offered. If, however, 1४ be meant to
“qualify the said general law by the particular one, that ‘the Tvo-sleces |
~ “alone should be offered,’—then, this must be done from the very begin: |
“ning; and from the very beginning we must have it in our mind that~-_
“ont of the four handfals of corn that have been brought in for the -
“preparing of the Ashtakapdla Cuke, 1 am laying out, for the sake of -
“ Agni, only that much which would be required for the making of the
| ^^ Thyo-slices; and though we do not perceive any difference (among the
, ; ^ various portions of the Corn for the Cake), yet the words‘used for the.
conveying of the offermg may be such as—‘ Only that: much of they
‘Corn, as will be required for the Two-slices, is not mine” Just as in’.
.. “ordinary life, we find that when ont of a heap of substances, one is.
` "णत्‌ to take. ‘as much as he likes,’ ‘no particular portion of the Cake `
“ig specified, and yet the whole is not looked upon as spent away (by ~
“those words), 80, in the ९886 in question also (the whole heap of. the ©
|“ Corn brought in for the Cake, could hot be looked upon as ‘spent away)...
“That we do not bring in only that muck of Corn as would be required ..:
“for the Two-slices only, is due to such: express Injunctions as—' brings’ .
in four handfuls,” ‘the Cake is. made of the sizeof the horge’s hoof’; -.
““and.in view of thess Injunctions, the ‘Y'wo-slices.’. offered to the’ Deity. ~~
“ig recognized to be only that. which is taken out of the’ Cake ofthe.
specified size, etc.;. and hence the bringing iu of the Corn other than o
“that required for thd‘ Two-slices* must be looked upon 28 4०6 in meré

0107-0 THR AGNEYA CARL ONLY DPVYAVADANA TO. BE OFFERR 1431 `

५५ 00601668 to the said Injunctions as to the quantity of Corn and the
“size of the Cake, and nof for the purpose of actually spending away
“anything more than the aforesaid ‘ Two-slices |
-. Thus then, 16 must bo admitted that, just as in accordance with
4: the sentence ‘brings im the corn from the cart,’ which qualifies the
“« bringing in and laying owt of the Corn by the fact of its being brought in |
«the cart, though there is a large quantity of corn in the cart, yet the
‘ownership of the Sacrificer does not cease with regard to the whole
^ quantity therein; so, in the same manner, even though the whole Cake
५ would be Inid out for the cutting out of it of the ‘Two-slices,’ yet the
“ownership would not cease with regard to it (except over the slices); `
“and thus the ownership of the Sacrifice continning over the rest of the
५ Cake, he is quite entitled to execnte, by means of that, any exchanges
op purchases (of service, ete.) ; and this could not be reconciled with
“the declaration that the Sacrificer and the Priests are equally entitled
“to the ‘ Remnants

©The above reasoning also serves to set aside the theory that the
+, Ashtakapila Cake becomes ‘ Agnéya’ (dedicated to Agni) by the fact
‘of its supplying the ‘ Two-slices’ actually offered to that Deity
^ Because in that case, too, thera would be no justification for the spending
“of the rest of the Cake. Nor, like the Corn, could the Cake be spoken `
र्णा merely as the origin (or source) of the ‘ Two-slices. Because the
“Corn, by. itself, is inedible, (and as such not capablo of being offered hy
“ itself), and énjoifed in a wholly different sentence (‘ Vrthibhiryajéta ‘) ;
५ and as such it is necessarily regarded as laid down merely with reference
“Sto the Sacrifice, at which, however, the only material to be offered con-
“gists of the Cake, which is enjoined in the original Injunction (of the
* Sacrifice itself), and which reqttives a substance out of which it could be’
“made; and hence the Corn conld not be recognized as helping the
५ 89011006, except by serving as the substance of which the Cake is made. |
“As for the Ashtakapila Cake, on the other liand, it is quite ediblo by
“itself, and enjoined by the origimal Injunction of the Sacrifice; and as
“Such it is quite capable of helping in the Sacrifice, directly by itself ;
“Specially as it 18 not found to be laid down as subsequent to the [पु प्रा.
“tion of the ‘ T'wo-slices,’ which would be in need of the mention of
“substance ont.of which it could. be taken out; and hence the Cake
Cannot be regarded as helping the Sacrifice, by merely serving as the
“Substance out of which the. ‘ Two-slices’ is taken. | |
"Under these circumstances, we should like to know how the Sid-.

dhanti meets the arguments in favour of the whole Cake being offered.” |

, {442 ` rANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, . ा--04 IV.—-ADHE.. (14)

To the above, we offer the following reply: The above arguments
cannot be successfully met by those who are deluded into the belief that
Yaga and Homa are identically the same thing, As a matter of fact,
‘however, these are two distinct actions ; and on that we base our explana.
tion,

That is to say, if the Injunction ‘ Agnéyah, etc.,’ had also laid down
the actual throwing in of the offering, then, it could not be precluded by
the Injunction in-regard to the ‘'I'wo-slices’; and in that case we would
have the offering of the whole Cake. But this throwing ia could be
regarded to be laid down by tho Injunction ‘ Agnéyah, etc.,’ only if
‘Yaga’ and ‘ Homa’. were identicatly the same action. As a matter of.
fact, however, these two are wholly distinct actions, as we have proved.
under the Cabdintaradhikarana (If—ii—1); and as for the arguments |
propounded in support of this view by the Sara itself, we shall deal with
them under the Satra IV—ii—28; where we shall show that while
‘ Yaga’ consists in the mere resigning of one’s ownership in favour of the
Deity, ‘ Homa’ consists of the throwing in of the material, ownership aver
which has been resigned in favour of the Deity. Though there are certain
likely objections against this view,—such, fi. as that in this case, the
Darga-Pirnamasa sacrifices, not being ‘ Homa,’ shonld not be performed in.
‘the sacrificial fire, ete., etc., etc.; buat all these we shall refute under the:
same Silra |

Thus then, there being a distinct difference botween the two, we
come to the conclusion that the sentence ‘Aynéyah etc? enjoins just that
auch without which the Cake mentioned would not be ‘ Agnéya' (‘dedicated
to Agni’); and as a matter of fact we find that for this (accomplishment of
the character of ‘ Ayn@ya’) all that is necessary is that the Sacrificer
‘should resign his otenership, and that too in favour of the Deity Agni,—
nd not that the offering should be actually thrown in. Under these -
circumstances, if we had no other sentence (such as ‘ Dryavadananjuhoti’),
then the action enjoined would be regarded in the following light:
“Having brought in the. well-cooked and complete Cake, prepared 11.
“eight pans, and placed it in a clean place (as is necessitated by .usage),.

‘we should utter the words thes cz no.onger mine, thereby resigning our:
‘ownership (over the Cake) in favour of the Deity ; and in due obser.
“vance of this resignation, we should never again assert our. ownership.
© over that Cake ; for if we did assert it, we would undo the former offering
“and would be acting a lie; specially as in a case where. one. thinks.
‘from the very beginning, of asserting his ownership, he does not -प56 `
~<the words, this tg not mine,.it belongs to the Deity; but when we -have
` 006 resigiied our ownership in favonr of the Deity, we would not:.mind:
^ what happens to it subsequently,’ “This much having: been ascertained

OUT OF THE AGNEYA.CARU ONLY PYYAYADANA TO RE OFFERED. 1453.

to be indicated by the sentence in question, it would have nothing to -
yay vegarding what might be. done next (and hence in accordance with |
{his sentence the Yajamdna could have no further responsibilities with
regatd.to the cake) 7 | =
But at this stage we meet with other sentences,—sach as ‘ wepasir-
nati,‘ dvirhavishovadyati,’ ‘ abhighirayali,’ * caturavatlanjuhoti and 80.
forth : and these lead us te the conclusion that ‘ Two-slices ont of the.
aforesiid Cake should be thrown ४१10 the fire ’; in fact, every one of these `
sentences stands in need of a substance out of which the materials spoken —
of should: bo taken; and as such every one of them has reference to the
aforesaid Cake; and they do not lay down independent substances.
or instanee, iu the sentetice ‘ Caturavattanzuhoti, wo find that m-
‘asmuch as the Homa has not.been laid down in the previous Injunction,
the-sentence cannot be taken as laying down the material (Caturcatiu)y’
-bvregard to the Homa; but as for the material Caturavutta (Hour-slices),
brought about in accordance with the preceding sentence (D:irhunisho- `
vadyatz,) which speaks of cutting the’ Cake ‘twice’; and this twice-
cutting would givo rise to four-slices), we find that it stands in need of
some purpose for which it could be used ; and hence all that the sentence
an he regarded as enjoining 18 the ‘ throwing in’ (Homa) of the ‘ Kour-
slices’; and as such it cannot be taken as laying down the ‘ Homa as
qualified by the Pour-slices” As for the Homa, it consists of three
factors extending to its very completion [these factors being, (1) the
vesigning of the ownership, (2) in favour ef the Deity, and (3) throw
ing into the Fire]; and hence whenever the last of these factors (de., the
Throwing. in) is laid down, there arises the question, as to whether the
other two factors are to be taken as enjoined independently by Injunc-.
tions-assumed through Apparent Inconsistency, or they should be accepted é
as éujoined elsewhere (in connection with some other action). And 80
long as.:we can get at these in a simple way, there can be no justification
for having recourse to.a-more complicated method ; and henco, in accord.
ance with. Aynéyyadhikarana, it must be. admitted that the sentences
réfer to:the Ashtakapila Cake, with regard to which the two factors—of
१५४१0 ‘away, and that to a. Deity—are already known (being laid down
in ‘the satitences ‘ Agnéyah, etc.’), Nor would this involve any incompati-
bility:with the fact of this Cake having been originally laid down as
¥ ditect:anxiliary to the Sacrifice; as that which is thrown into the Fire,
lores nabhing of its character of being an auxiliary to the Sacrifice to Agni
There awould have ‘been incompatibility, only if the shees were thrown,
S-oferings to.a Deity other than Agni, or if they were used in an action.
‘ae y..to.the-natnre of. Sacrifices.: In-thetcase in quéstion, how-.

éfind none of these-two conditions: .

` 1434 TANTRA-VARTEKA, ^. र-2204 14. रा. (14)

‘Thus. then, the sense of the whole..comes to be. this: ‘The Sacrifice |
should be performed with the Ashtakapadla Cake kept in.a certain place,’
and ‘ Tivo-slices out: of that Cake should be thrown into a certain plac ।
-and then coming across the sentence’ ‘at the altar one keeps -the offering
material on the grass,’ we conclude that ‘the Sacrifice should. be per |
formed with the Cake placed on the grass at the altar’; and in accordance
with the injunction that ‘the Homa is offered into the Sacrificial:Fire,’ we
come to the conelasion that ‘the Two-slices offering is to be thrown into
the Sacrificial Fire ८ ध - : | =

Now then, there remains yet another question to be dealt with: Is
this Homa (of the Two-slices) something wholly different from the previons
Sacrifice (of the Cake), and forms a mere part of the procedure of this:
latter? Or ia it a part of the same Sacrifice, which, being stretched to
१ further point (to that Homa), becomes a little modified in its form ?

And on this question, we unhesitatingly declare that the latter
alternative 18 the correct one. Because if it were a wholly distinct action,
then it would have a wholly different material and Deity,—just as we
find in the case of the Narishtha and other such Homas. While in the
case in question we find that, in accordance with the Cabddntarddhtkarana
(If---ii—1), it must be admitted that it is the same Sacrifice that, being.
stretched furyther, develops into the Homa । ।
| Nor does this involve a disappearauce of the original sacrificial
character of the action, as the Homa. also is a particular form of Sacrifice ;
and though it is possible for the General to exist without the Particular,
there 1s however 10 Particular possible without the General. Just as,
when we say ‘ bring the tree’; if we add ‘ of the Gimcapd,’ this addition is
in no way contradictory to the original sentence,—so, in the same manner,
having said ‘one should: sacrifice, there can be no contradiction. in the:
subsequent addition of ‘Homa.’ Thus then, it must be admitted that
in. the case: in question, it is the Sacrifice itself that is performed 17 two'
forms,—with the whole Cake: the one, that is modified into the. Home,
being: performed with the ‘Two-slices,’ and the generic form (in. the .
form of an offering in a general way) being accomplished with the rest.
of the Cake,--and both these forms of the. Sacrifice—the General and the: ;
‘Particular—are accomplished at one and the same time; as-at the. very.
time ‘that the * Two-slice’ offering is. being thrown into the Sacrificial.
‘Fire, the Pajya and the Anuvakya Mantras (that are being recited at the -
time) keep on recalling the fact of the whole Cake having been previously.
Set aside for the Deities : 7
| Thus then, it must not be thought that, because itis the ‘Two-slice ` |
‘offering: only that.is contained: in: the. Juhi: (the: Offering Ladle), and
whieh is takon up, by. the operations known’ as::Agavana’ and & Praty4:

छ ^:

OUT OF THE AGNEYA: CAR. ONLY DVYAVADANA’ TO BE छग). © 1435. :

^ pravana,. for berg offeréd,—therefore, it is that alono that has been’.
< get wside for the Deities. Because what should be done by the Sacrificer. _
“and the Adhvaryu Priest,’ who are.both versed in scriptural lore, is that `
“jn accordance with the injunctions of the Veda, they should jointly per- `
form the setting uside aud the dedicating to the Deities, while the Adh-
: ५2110 should perform the additional operation of throwing the ‘ l'wo-
slice’ offering into the Fire, Nor docs this additional operation produce |
e any cliange of form or ugliness in the Sacrifice; because, on the strength —
“cof Vedic texts, we are led to believe that this additional operation adds to `;
the beauty of the Sacrifice. For, certainly, the fact of one foot of man:

having gone forward before the rest of the body does not make any differ. `
५ ence in the man : and in the same manner, in the case in question 11 the
, 06 foot (part of the Sacrifice), I'wo-shice’ offering, is made to go a
‘step farther, in the shape of being thrown 2nto the Fire, that does not
involye nn incongruity, Inasmuch as the enjoined fact of the Sacrifice
being performed with the whole Cake will have been duly accomplished, |
all the same. Consequently we might take the Principal Action (Sacri-.
fice) itself to have the said aforesaid two forms. |
`. : Or, the factor of ‘Yagu’ may be taken as the Principal, and that of —
§ Homa’ as the Subsiddary: inasmuch as in the sentence mentioning the _
result (४.९. the sentence ‘ Darga-Pirnamasabhyam svargaktmo yajéta’),
we find it mentioned in direct connection with the ‘ Yaga’; and as for the
© Homa, itis simply found to be mentioned im close proximity with it
whence it is regarded to be the subsidiary (of that Yaga)

Though the Homa is accepted to be out of the same material as the
“Yaga, yet the former could be very well taken as subsidary to the latter, .
Just like the washing, etc., of the Corn. Nor is it absolutely necessary |
‘that all actions that pertain toa common object should be regarded as:
equally. Primary in their character; as we actually find all. purificatory
‘rites (which are admitted to. be subsidiaries) pertaining to the same object
‘a8. the: Primary Sacrifice’; there being some of these rites that are per
formed: before, and some after, the performance of the Primary Sacri-.
fice;while‘some are done simultancously with this latter. =
क हिः e people declare thus: “The Homa under consideration (३.९
that'of ‘the ‘Two-slices’) is of the nature of those purificatory rites
108४. 816 ` done after the: Primary Sacrifice, as this Sacrifice, in the
“shape of dedicating the material to the Deity, is found to have been:
| ५०६7९४७१ 2.9. {16 time that the material is laid ont on the altar
“os But this is not correct ; because the Sacrifice, that.is to be performed
‘withthe “Cake, cannot be completed by means of the Corns in the

plished al: the time of the laying out of the Corn s; then, in thot-case, if ;

486. थत, “Apa. pox यकव)

after that, the material should be destroyed, spoilt or stolen, there could. -
be no-need of bringing ina fresh supply (as the Sacrifice baving been. |
‘completed there would: be no further need); and this would be a direct...
contradiction of what is said under Satra VI-—iv—2; and also of what the .
90881192, says in-connection with the animal that has been killed at. the -
‘Sacrifico—* it. is protected as belonging to somebody else, as it would, in |
time, be connected with the Deity. (to whom it. should be offered).”” Hence
it must be admitted. that, at the time of the laying out of the materials
all that is done, in the way of offering it, is the determination to give, in.
the words ‘I shall offer this to such and such a Deity,’—~and not the
actual Sacrifice ; as this latter, which has for its: procedure the aforesaid
offering, and consists of the making of that offering to a certain Deity, is :
found to be duly completed only at the time that the material is actually
‘thrown into the Sacrificial Vire; and hence 17. 18 only at this time that.
the Sacrifice is accornplisied by means of the whole Cake; and the ` 4‰८५- `
slices,’ परली is a part of that sacrificial auxiliary (in the shape of the
Cake), is purified by means of the ‘throwing into the fire,’ which is a_
subsidiary of the Principal Sacrifice | | |

— Thus then, inasmuch as the due accomplishment of the Sucrifice is
accompanied (or marked) by the said ‘throwing in’ (or Homa}, before this
latter is done the Sacrifice wust be looked upon as incomplete ; aud henec
if the material be destroyed, spoilt or stolen: (before the Homa has been
done), it is only right that another supply of the material should he
brought in. For even though the Homa is a sanctificatory rite, yet it is
‘not absolutely incapable of being the means of having fresh materials
brought in; specially as even such offerings as the Svtshtukrt and the
dike will be shown to be incapable of justifying the bringing in of fresh
materials, on the sole ground of the Sacrifice having been duly completed |
{even before these offerings)
If, however, this ‘throwing in’ (Homa) were the Primary action,
:then the Darga-Pirnamdsa would be spoken of as ‘Homa’ (and-not as
` ‹ Yaga’); and further, inasmuch as vo Primary actions are ever found
to be transferred’ to the Modifications of Sacrifices, there could be no’
* Homa’ in the Saurya and other modifications of the Darga Pirnamisa
-.and as such at these, the materials would have to be offered,. without.
being. thrown into the Sacriticial _Fire.. Whereas in case the Homa is
taken as subsidiary, there would be a transference of this into those modi-”
` fications, and so the offcrings at these would: have to. be thrown into: the
< Sacrificial. Fire. ` ae ४ : ।
| As for those -Injuuctious which -originatively lay down.the Hama
. itself, even though the factor - ‘ Sacrifice”. would: form -the “frat half
Of such actions, yet. it. would. be: this latter that would. constitute thew

‘OUT OF THE AGNEYA’ CARY ONLY -DVYAVADANA TO BE OFFERED... 1437.

Soul. Or, in these cases,. the ‘ Sacrifice” may be takon as subsidiary. to.
the Honea ;. 88 in these cases the factors of ‘giving away’ and ‘ dedicating
tothe Deity” may be taken as implied by the ‘ Homa’ itself. In the case.
“of the originative Injunctions of Sucrifices, on the other haud, inasmuch.
. 95४10 two factors of ‘ giving away’ and dedicating to the Deity’ are’
‘already: pointed ont by the mention of ‘Sacrifice’ itself, the subsequent
;mention of * Homa’ comes to be taken as pointing out only the third.
‘factor of. ‘throwing in,’—just as in the case of the sentences ‘ Ahavaniyé
-yupagakala hotavyth.” And thus it is established that the Homa is sub-
~gidiary to the Sacrifice. - 7 | =
. Such being the case, we find that tha Cake is mentioned in connec
ion with the ‘ Ydqa’ (‘Sacrifice’), and notin connection with the Homa ;
and the Homa also is laid down for the *Two-slices,’ and not for the.
whole Cake: and hence the Homa comes {५ be recognized as bemg done
-with the ‘'T'wo-slices’ only, and with no more of the Cake. Theu as
“for the whole Cake, inasmuch as it has been given awey (or dedicated) -
tothe’ Detty, even though it be not thrown into the Fire, if is ouly natural
that the Sacrificer should not look upon it as hig ‘own’; nor would there

. be any of ‘the objections attendant upon Preclusions ।
| Consequently, the operations, that are laid down as to be done with
the.‘ Renmants,’ would be duly accomplished by. means of the ‘Rem-.
nants’ left after the ‘‘[Two-slices’ etc. have been cut out of the Cake. =

` Ov, we might even go so far as to declare that there is no differenc

between the ‘ Yrga’ and the ‘ Homa’;as both form the fore and hind
parts of the same action; just as we find in the case of the God Narasimha
(Man-Lion, who has tho head of the lion and the body of Man).

ADHIKARANA (15)
[The Sewhtakr? should be performed out of. all Remnants]

Sutra (42): “Inasmuch as the Actions do not tend
. “to the bringing in (of materials), they should be `
“performed out of one (Remnant) only specially
“as the Remnant ts.a secondary factor.” a

We have found that after the offerings have been thrown into the
Sacrificial Five, there are left behind the Remnants of the materials:
and we now proceed to consider how, in what manner, the Suishtakri
and other offerings are to be made out of these Remnants

| The question is as to whether these actions should be done with
every one of the materials, or with only any one of them]

Inasmuch as the opponent thinks the actions in question to be
primary ones, he puts forward the following—

PURVAPAKSHA

‘They should be done with only one of the materials. Even though.

ˆ these actions are primary actions yet, 1f the materials had been brought

in solely for the sake of these actions, ‘then. for the sake of paying
^ tegard to all of those’ materials, even though the Sacrifice would be -
accomplished by méans of any one of the materials, like the slices. cut `

out of the animal body, yet we would have. connected the Sacrifice
with every one of the materials. As fu matter of fact, however. it is | ।
not 50; asthe actions in question do not tend to the bringing 111 of Fs
materials. (for the sake: of themselves); and hence, just asin the =
case of the ` ¢ ishopurvapa-kapala, so in’ the case in question also, the: . :
actions would be performed with an y one of the materials only;” ed

Yutva (43): ^, Also because, of the sanctification having `:
sae been accomplished’ . . alee
=. ^ The actions in question, even if they are merely sanctificatory-rites, :
Acoomplish only such ‘sanctification ofthe Principal Action; ‘as: is ‘not =
perceptible to the sense’ ; and inasmuch as. euch a sanctification would -
‘be duly accomplished by the ‘offering of thé. Remnant. out ot: single.
‘material, there would be no need of any: other. material . a
“ “Then as: for the.’ word 8०1". (inthe. ‘sentence: sakrt sakrt
suishtukrté cadyatt!) refers -to thie single: cutting ; obhe-wwise,: inasmuch. +

ye -

ay

SVISHTAKRY SHOULD BE PERFORMED OUT-OF ALL REMNANTS 1439.

4c ag: the: singleness would be daly observed onl y by the offering of all the.
materials, m 06 manner of a singlo action, there would be no need for’
the mention of ‘once’ (* sukrt’) | : a,
si Or, the Sadtra may be explained as that the offering of the Remnants
would have been out of all the materials, only if they were sanctificator y.
“actions ; as a matter of fact, however, they are not so, inasmuch as the.
- Remnants are already sanctified by means of other purificatory rites.
| “It might be argued that even if it were so, there wonld be nothing
‘wrong in having yet another purificatory rite performed. And in reply.
.“to this also. we have the Siitra itself, taking this to mean that, (that is
“not possible) as the time for purifications has passed 0/0) that is to say, the
““ material stands in weed of purifications, only so long as it has: not-
-“ been utilized ; consequently, after the completion of the Principal Sacri-
“fice (8४ which a certain material has been used), there can be no need
'“ for any farther purificatory rites performed with regard to that material ;
and as such there can be no farther occasion for auy such rites

SIDDHANTA

Sitra (44): They should be done out of all materials:
| , . ` 5 the reason applies equally to atl; and also he-
: - , €ause the sanctification is for that purpose

According to the. definition given in Sara IT —i—8, the Actions im
‘question: are merely purificatory in their nature; and among ‘ Purifica-
tory actions ’ also, they belong to the sub-class of ‘ Praéépatti’ (or Actions
‘of Disposal), in accordance with the Sdira IV—ii—19; and as शालाः
these. are required by all the materials concerned, as all of these have
equally ‘served their purpose in connection with.the Principal Sacrifice,
Though it is quite true that these actions do not tend to bring in any
Inaterials, yet inasmuch as these actions themselves are such as ४6
brought about by the substances (Remnants) under questién, they cannot -
“but, pertain to.all of these. Hven when the Principal Sacrifice has. been
‘duly completed, if we find the Remnants of the materials offered at it
there: arises a desire to know in what way these should be disposed of,
“aud as such it is only right.that we should have the Injunctions as to.
the: particular offerings through which the said Remnants are to be.
“disposed: of ot oe Mert foe त, |

Siitra (43);. Also because we find indications (by = `
oi ५ certain words) = |

Inthe ‘sentonce: ‘saket. sakrt soistakrté avadyatt, we find that the
repetition -of °* sakrt-’ (once) -18 explicable only:if the “eutting’. ( AES:

९ ० = 8

1440. “TANTRA=VARTIK A, ~ ADH. TH--PADA tv,—~abtti. (15)

.. dna ') be taken as to be done out of all the Romnants, and that-too ouly:
“for offerings, which are merely sanctificatory.in their character. ` - |
"hese इक also serve the purpose’of showing the - ४8९8 of 1116 -
, foregoing Adhikarana. Tliat.is to say, the question being, that—if for
the sake of the offeryngs of Hemnants, the Pirvapakshi also should admit:
of the fact of the whole material not being given away (at the Principal
Sacrifice), what would be the use of all the discussion in the foregoing.
Adhikarana P—-the answer to this is to be taken as supplied hy the Sdtras.
(of the present Adhidkarana); explained in. the manner shown above:
That is to say, inasmuch as, according to the Purvapaksha, the materials.
would not tend to bring about the offerings in question, these latter would |
have to be done out of a single matorial; and in that case, the material
of the Svishtakrt would .have to he wrested forcibly from the P: nepal
Sacrifice; and as the single offering would have completed the whole.
(offering (to Svishtakrt), the whole material would be purified by that,
and there would be no need of tho offering being made out of the othe
materials, Whereas, in accordance with the Siddhdnia, the fact of all.
the materials equally tend to the offerings in question, as also that of ¦
certain words of the Vedic texts being indicative of it,—distinetly point,
to the view of the Siddhfinta (that the offerings are to he made out of abe
the materdals), which appears as the useful conclusion arrived at by the `
help of the foregoing Adhikarana; just as in the Adhikarana dealing —
with the Paurnandsi Sacrifices | | |

ADHIKARANA (16)

ies [The Offerings of the Svistakrt and the rest should be made ont of
re. | | the First Material.]

५ ऋ PURVAPAKSHA.
Siitra (46): “If the offerings were to be made out of
. one only, then they could be done out of any one

| {क one might like; as all of them are equatly
“capable of being used.”

(Admitting, for the sake of argument, that tho said Offerings are to
` 6 made out of a single material, there arises the question as to whether
they should be done out of the first, or out of any of the Remnants that
we might like to utilise;—and on §his we have the Purvapaksha as laid
down in the Sitéra

Thongh the word meant 10 be used was ‘ yathikamyam,’ yet, inas-
much as it is meant to be a qualification of Buddhz (Idea), it is spoken of
in the Feminine gender; and as such we have the Feminine ending ‘ nish
` 17). accordance with the Stitra ‘ shidgaurddibhyagca’ (Panini, 1V—i—41) ;
and then there being an elimination of the ‘ya’ of the ‘shyait’ affix, im |
‘accordance with the Siira ‘ halastaddhitasya’ (Panini. VI—iv-——150), we `
get the form ‘ yathakami | |
| SIDDHANTA. |
- ७४1". (47): They must.be done out of the principal
material, as that is the first (to present itself)

"The Offerings of Remnants are due to the existence of the Remnants,
‘88 also to the necessity of doing what is enjoined in the Veda; and hence, |
“they come-to be related to that material which. happens to be mentioned |
first(before the other materials) in. the scriptural text bearing upon
“the question ; ‘and as,:at that time, there would be no incongruity in the -
<affering being made out of that material, it is directly made. And when
08.088 been done, the injunction has been carried into effect, and. hence its
Njunetive function ceases forthwith; and there being no. reason for the’
“offering ‘of any ‘otlier Remnants, if such offerings were made, they would -
“be incompatible with tho sense of the Injunction. -Gonsequently, they.are..
“not. to he performed नि
181

- ADHIKARANA (17). -
| (The division of the Cake is for the purposes of eating.’

Sitra (48): “Inasmuch as the ‘ Eating?’ is not found
. 6 ta be mentioned, the word ‘ Ding’ should be taken
“in the sense of ‘Purchase’ (or Exchange).”’

वि In connection with. the Quartering of the Cake, we find the parts
pointed out as ‘Idam Brehmanah’ etc, And there arises the question as to
how these parts come to be pointed out as belonging to the Brahma and
others ; and it being found that these sentences lay down giving of the
‘parts to the priests, there arises the question as to whether this Giving
is laid down simply as a means of purchasing the services of those
Priests, who could do anything they liked with the portions of the Cake
received by them,—or it is laid dojwn for the due fulfilment of the action of
Disposal (of Remnants), which is accomplished by their being eaten by `
the Priests.

And on this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

“The giving is laid down as the means of the purchasing of their.ser-
८ vices. Because in the case in question we do not find any such senten-
“ces as, ‘ Yajamdnapancamé idim bhaksayanti,’ laying down either the
‘Spredominance of the material, or the actual Hating of that. Conse
“quently, inasmuch as Materials are accessories to Sacrifices, and as: they
“are found to be given to only those that have been connected with: the.
“* performance of the sacrifice, it must be admitted that, even though there
‘‘is no direct declaration of Purchase, yet the giving of the-:Gakes, like.
‘that of the Sacrificial Fee, cannot: but be regarded as serving the purposes:
“of the said purchase : 7 1

-Stitra (49): “Also because of these being praised as
| | _ , 576. >
; “We find the Giving of the Cakes enlogised. as—'deh@ vat Dargaptir |
Me numisayordakshinad :Rivijam utsthakdrini’; arid there can be. no doubt
` “ that this pertains.to the purchase (of the services of the. Priests);

CAKB-DIVISION FOR EATING. 144
SIDDHANT

` Siitra (60) : ` It. must be for the purposes - eating ;
` because as regards the material, they are all equat, `

The Divison of the parts of the Cake among the Priests is not for the
ae purposes @i:the Purchase; because in all cases we find that a Purchase is.
‘effected by something belonging to one’s self; and when tho Cake has
been given away to. the Deities, there is no person having any sort of
` ownership over it |
“That 18 to say, inasmuch as the whole Cake has been given away
to the Deity, the Sacrificer is no longer its owner; and as such he has:
-as much ownership over it as the Priests, Brahma and the rest; con-
` sequently just as these latter could not make any gifts of the Cake, se
' too the Sacrifice Consequently if he were to effect a purchase (by giving —
ithe Cake in exchange for the services rendered), he would be asserting his
rights of ownership over it; and thereby he would be undoimg the gift that
_he has previously conveyed to the Deity. For these reasons, we cannot.
- admit the giving to be for the purposes of Purchase. —
_ Then there remains the question—" On what grounds do you take it.
“to be for the purposes of Hating P

And to this we offer the following answer : — |
. We have already explained that the Linga (or Indicative face) of a-
thing consists of its capability ; aud this is admitted, on all hands, to be
_ the means of ascertaining the use to which that thing is to be put; then
_ there can be no doubt that the Cake is capable of being euten, as it is found
to be so. by its very nature. = |
` : “The 8126८ has made the declaration —‘ We have never seen the Brahma |
Und other priests in any way helping the parts of the Oake.” But this is not
` 416 proper; as they aro actually found to help them in their: Disposal,
--Then goes on the Bhdsyu with another declaration—‘ On the other hand, we |
find the Parts of the Cake helping the Priests’; and this too is not proper: as.
“tn that case the givcng would come to be for the purposes of the Purchase ;
< ४8, (1) it is not by being eaten alone. that the Cake could help them,—it ©
“Taight help them, in some way or other, even merely by being taken
कणाद; (2) as it will be explained in all cases, that the Hating is meantas a
“ parificatory of the material (and not as helping the Priests); and (3) the
. Zating is not spoken of as boing left. off, on the occasion of any Penance,
“te, and certainly all things connected with the Mfun himself would cer- .
णु cease on such occasions ¦ | ।
2 For these reasons, we ‘must. explain the Bhagya_in the following:
7 Manner: There is-no donbt that there is 9 Disposal of the parts of the,

gh ५०

र Cake: but still; when we come to seek: forthe spetial: purpose served by ‘

1444 TANTRA-VARTIKA, - ADH, JH-—PADA 1V.~-annt...¢17)

: the vestriction of the performers.(of this Disposal, to the Priests only), we `
conclude that the purpose of this lies in the fact of the action bringing -
- about a certain purificatory power in those performers; because so long ag
we ’ean find a visible purpose, we can have no authority for assuming |
an-imperceptible one. And there cau be no doubt that the purificatory -
. vite that is most intimately connected with the performer is #he Hating; |
and hence even if they were to carry their shares home, unless they would
‘eat them, they would not bring about any effects in themselves; conse.
quently, howsoever far they might carry them, it is absolutely necessary
. that they should at last eat them
| Thus then, (1) inasmuch as there would be no reason for passing
over the first of such rites that is cognised,—(2) as the capability (of the
Cake itself), and the fact of the portions being pointed out as belonging to
such and such Priests, distinctly point to the necessity of the Hating that
` has been commenced,—we conclude that. it is the Eating that helps
the Priests, Brahma and otherg. As for the ‘Remnant’ that stands in
need of Disposal, its natural capability shows that the best manner of its
disposal consists of its being Haten.

| Sutra (51): As for the said Praise of the Giving, t ts
Pe | due to the said pointing out

| As for the above-quoted eulogy—‘ Hsha-Daksind,’ it must be ox-

. plained, as refering to the desirable effects that follow in the wake of the

` Hating, or as due to the fact of the portions being pointed out as belonging

.-to Brahma, and thus bearing some sort of a similarity to the Sacrificial

ee (Daksintt)

For these reasons, it must be admitted to be fully established. that

. the Injunction with reference to the Division of the Cake, is for tho pur-
ˆ pose of its being Buten (by the Priests)

Thus ends the Fourth Pada of Adhyaya III

` ADHYAYA IIL,
PADA प.
ADHIKARANA (1).

। (The offerings of the Suistakrt, ९६९६.) are not to he formed with the `
Butter in the Dhriuva-vessel, etc., ete. ]

‘Sutra (1): “(The Offering of the Remnants should be made) ०९४
Sof the Butter also; (1) because of the mention of
a 66 Il १,११

` , -We now proceed to deal with the suppression of the too oxtonsive.
application of the law propounded in Satra UT—IV—44,

- [Jn connection with the Darga-Pirnamisa, we hive the sontence
‘uttarardhat Svistakrté samavadyati,’ ' Idamupahvayatt,’ and so on, laying

down the various Offerings of Remnants. And with regard tothesesenten-

ces, thore arises the question as to whether the Svistakri ofering, herein

_ laid down, should, or should not, be made out of the Butter used at the

` Upamguyaja.} |

` ` And the Sitra recalls, from the Siéra III—iv~—44, the following— |

PURVAPAKSHA

` “(The offering in question must be made out of the said Butter), as
“jt ia only then that we could justify the subsequent description ‘out of
` ५ all materials,’ which mentions ail materials, without any exception (and
“hence the leaving out of the Butter would not be in keeping with the
+ "^ Description. )” .

ध ea `.“ Slitra (2): (2) ^ Also because of the reason,”

iio We: have a historical narrative in the Veda (“The Deities said to
>! Svistakrt, carry offerings. to us; ho replied, 7 crave the.boon of having:
“@ shave in the sacrifwial. offerings; they said-—name it; he replied— may.
«they offer to me, one by one, the slices out of the latter half ;)—-which shows -
“the reason for which offerings are made to Svistakré ; and there can be.
(^ 116. १0०७४. that this reason-is as applicable. to %hé case of Butter ४४ to.

1446 VANTRAAVARTINA, ADR, MimaPADA र्भाः. (1)

»“any other materials; as the reason given is that—‘because Soistakrt:
“carries. the Offerings to the gods, he craved the boon of a share in the.
“ offerings’ ; and as a matter of fact, we find that the Butter also has beer
“carried by him to the Deities of the Upameuyfja; and it-follows from this.
_* that he should have an offering out of this Butter also.”

Fa

Sutra (3): . (3) * Because.in regard to a certain (action
Swe find the word ‘samavatta’”? =
“Phe word ^ Hkasmin’=in regard to a certain action; or it may
“mean that, according to you, the Siddhantz, if a single matéerval bo
“out out for the offering to Svigtukrt, then there would be no sense in the
“word ‘Samavatia,’ which signifies ‘being cut out together with other.
“materials; whereas according to us, inasmuch as the Butter would also
“be cut out and offered to him, along with the other materials, the word
“* Samavatta’ would be quite relevant and compatible. |
“We now proceed to show where this word ‘Samevutta’ is actually
“found: we have a Sacrifice laid down in the sentence, ‘ Adityak prayani-
yagcarurbhavat: ~ ; ` and in connection with this same Sacrifice, we find
“the declaration, ‘@jyusyainam carumabhipuryaijyabhagak Pathyadayas
catasro dévata yashiavyah’, which lays down four sacrifices, which, by
“reason of their having the same material as the Updmeuyfja, must
“be regarded as the modifications of this latter; while the Sacrifice
“laid down in the first sentence—i.e. the Adityacurn Sacrifice—is- the
“ modification of the Aguéya Sacrifice; and in connection with this
“ [8६४ Sacrifice, we find the declaration, ‘Agnayé Svishtakrié samavadyati';
“and if only one part of the Varu were to be offered to Svistakrt, then we-
“ should have had the word ‘avadyati’; whereas if the offering be made
“also out of the original Butter used at the Upimeuydjya, then in this.
“latter case also the Sacrificial offering would have to be made; and this.
“necessitating the cutting ont (and offering) of both the Cart and the”
Butter, the use of the word ‘ Savadyat:* ‘becomes fully justified. . or
‘this reason, too, it must be admitted that the Offerings of. Remnants are.
“to 06 made ont of the Butter also.” | ध | '

8 द्र (4): (4). * Because we find an Arthavada of’
: Svistakrt with reference to the Butter.’ ~

+. “We-find the passage—‘ Avada@ya avaddya dhruvam .pratyabhighira-
2M yati, Svishtakpte.‘vaddya na pratyabhightrayati (‘ Having made each:
“offering, one refills the Dhruva vessel, but when he has made. the offeriag `
“to Suishtakrt, he does not refill it’) ;-and in, this the word: ‘ prats,’ (in-:
‘© ovatyabhigharayati ५. Refills ”:): distinetly: shows thatthe offerings | re- 5

NO SVISTAKRT. OUT OF ROTTER IN PARUVA, - -- 1447

ae famed to are those taken ont of the Dhruva vessel, as is also justified by `
“athe very nature of this vessel itself, which is apparently found to be meant `
.* to serve the purpose of holding the offering materials. And hence it.
४, follows ‘that the offering that is made to Svistaki?, is also taken out, of :
“the Dhruva ; as is shown by the prohibition (in the passage quoted) of -
“the Refilling of that vessel, after the offering to Svistakrt has been
^ made, And then again, the distinct injunction, that ‘there should be no -
ke offerings after that to Svzshtakrt’, also indicates that the previous 7९=
(11111 (spoken of as following after each offering has been made) were
solely for the sake of (being offered to) Sristakyt. Consequently, in:
‘accordance with the Sétra ‘Tatsima@uydl, ete” it must be admitted>
that the offerings of Rennants should be performed out of all the |
materials
SIDDHANTA.,

। Sutra (5): There being no Remnant (of the Butter), ९ `
~; ~ could not be so;—the absence of Remnant being
due to the whole of it having been taken up

| The offerings of Remnants are made only when there is a Remuant
left of the material used at the P: incipal Sacrifice, Asa matter of fact
We find that there is no Remnant left of the Butter used at the Updmeu-.
yaja; for the simple reason that the whole of it has been taken up by the
Sacrifice. _

By the next Sitra we proceed to show why. the whole of the Butter is
taken up |

Sutra (6) : There could be no ‘Remnant? in the Dhru-

va; because this belongs in com mon (to many actions), = `
~ In the Dhruva, there can be no *‘ Remnant’ of the Upamgu-yaja; (1)
-because the Butter that is brought in it is not related exclusively to any
‘particular action; and hence all actions that are to be done with Butter,
- ४6 done out of the Butter in the Dhruva; as is distinctly authorized by -
‘the sentence ‘Sarvdsmar vd étad grhyaté, — | क
: For the Tattiviyas also (though they have no such textas ‘ Sar ४८५९११८४
धते @tad grhyat@’), we find that the Upaimguyda7a is mentioned in the course of ।
‘the: mention of such actions as the .Upastarana, Abhighdrana and the `
“ke; and hence the. sentence ‘upastrnannabhighdruyanndjyasya yajan’ `
Shows that the Ajya (Buiter) is a material belonging in common to all’.
these actions | | `
“And then, in the case of 11 things that are commoh to many—f. 7. an

‘Assembly, a. Forest-picnic, Company-dinners, and such other. things,—we
find; that. when the share of one bas been taken away by him, hiseonnectioné

1448 TANTRA-VARIIEA. ~.ADH, T11I—PADA V.—abur. (1)

“with the material ends then and there; and to the rest of tlie. thing, the
‘remaining owners are entitled, and as such that cannot be spoken of as the
`" Remnant’ of the share taken away; and consequently, in such cases, the ।
rest of the material, not having served its purpose, could not stand jn
need of Disposal, When, however, all the persons entitled have taken np `
their respective portions, then. there does arise a need for Disposal, but
that too in keeping with the common character of the material. Thus then
in the case iu question, when a portion of the Butter in the Dhruva is
taken out for the purposes of the Upameu-ydja, there is no ‘ Remnant’
of the portion of that Sacrifice; as the rest of the Butter it: the vessel has
still got to serve its purpose in connection with the subsequent actions of
Upastarana, Abhighdrana, and the like; and it is admitted on all hands that
the Offerings of Remnants are merely meant to be the Disposal of mate
rials that have served all the purpose that they had to serve, and are no
longer required; and as such they could not take up those materials
which have yet to serve certain purposes. For these reasons it must be
admitted that there can be no‘ Remnant’ (of Butter) in the Dhruva.

As for the common ‘Remnant’ that would be left after all the said
actions have been completed, we have an altogether different Disposal laid
down for that,—in the form known as ‘ Samashtiyayuk.’ If this (* Samash-

_fiyajuh’) also be regarded as an independent Principal Action, just like
the Upastarana and the rest (and not as a mere ‘ Offering of Remnant’),
then, in that case, the presence of any ‘ Kemnant’ in the Dhruva would be
all the more impossible (as the ‘ Samashtiyaju’ is distinctly laid down as.
consisting of the offering of all the Butter that might be found in the
Dhruva, after the Upastarana and the other actions have been done). As
‘a matter of fact, however, we can quite reasonably take this Samashti-
yajuh os a mere Action of Disposal; (1) as, on referring to the text of the |
Taittiriya, we find that it is originatively related to another.action ; (2)
‘and as, being mentioned as ‘ Homa’, it cannot be regarded aaa Sacrifice.
-And then, inasmuch .as this Action is laid down as taking up all the
Butter in the Dhruvd, it naturally precludes the performance of all the
other Offerings of Remnants... Hence, too, it must be admitted that there
-can be no Remnant-in. the Dhruva. ae |

9.८. (7) Though tt is taken out ia the Juhi, yet at ts is
`. the whole of that that is connected with the. Homa. ~
.. Lhe opponent might argue, that-—“there is a portion of the: Butter.
\ ‘taken oat in:the Juhi, exclusively for being offered in the. 2714४400;
“and ‘there would be:a Remnant of that.attached to:the Juf,—just, as.
"४ there is of the Sorta in the yessela and cups.” ` 58४६ 15 is:not possible;”
“berause itis the whole of that Butter (in the Juh#): that is laid: down १8.

ty ug 7

“NO. SVISTARRT’ OUT OF ROTTER IN DHREVI, ` 1449

to be offered in the Homa, by the Injunction ‘ caturavattai juhotd’; and we
“have already shown, in connection with the Curu meant for the Upadhana,
that that which is laid down for one purpose cannot be rightly used for.
another.’ For this reason there can bo no ‘ Remnant’ in the Juha either

Sutra (8): Obj.:—** As in the cups (80 it would be possible
। ` .. 10 the म also).”

It is argued that—“ Though the Soma in the cups is laid down as to
५ 06 offered in Homa, yet we always find Remnants of it in those cups; and
“similarly, we could have a ‘Remnant’ im the Juhi also (in the case in
५ question )

And we have got to refute this argument (which we proceed to do in
the following 82८10)

Siitra (9): It is not so; because (in the case of Soma)
| there is no infringement of the Injunction: and
also because it ts brought up simply as an offering
material (and not as connected with Hom).

The case in question is not similar to that of the Soma; because in the
case of the latter, it is brought up into the Vessels and Cups, simply by
way of being laid out as mere offering materials; and as such there is no
Homa of it,—-as we shall explain in the Adhikarana on the eating of the
Soma-rennant (Sitras TI—v—L9 et seg.j. And hence for one, who would |
refute the inf? engement of Injunction brought forward in Satra TiI—v—.
19, there would not be a Homa of the whole quantity of the Soma; and as.
such, in this case, there would be no incompatibility, either with the fact
of the Offering of Remnant being found to serve another purpose, or with
the fact of its being taken from all quarters in accordance with such sen-
tences as ‘ Somasyfigné vihi, etc.’, or with the names given to the Cups, in -
“the sentences ‘ Sarvatak partharam agvinam bhakshayati’ (where ‘Aguina
ia the name of one of ‘the ten Cups); while every one of these facts would
“have been contradicted if the whole of the Soma were offered (and no
“Remnant was left) | |

s <, Or (‘codanavirodhat’ may be explained in the following manner)—~In
the case of tle Soma, the non-offering of the whole is not found to infringe
‘any Injunction ; and as such, in view of this ‘non-infringement, the
whole 18 not offered. In the case in question, on the other hand, we find.
-the: non-offering of the whole-of the Butter to be contradictory to a dis-
"106 Injunction. And itis this non-infringement (in the ०६86 of the Soma)
that 28 the reason. for there being a Remnant in the Cups. Such is the
“Sense of the Satra ca । # :

| 188

71450 “TANTRA-VARTIKA, °-ADH, S1T-SPADA ^. (1).

छ The Bhasya did not. एषह forward. the case of the ‘Cups,’ before i:
“: introduced the present Sitra; and hence, in that case, it is necessary to
: ` assume an Objection-Siutra,—showing that the existence of the materia]
4s not necessarily accompanied by the offering of the whole of it,—and then
`` to supply the answer to that (assumed - इद्र ४), Aud this answer is that
in the case of the Soma, we would have a Remnant in accordance with
` another declaration to that effect ; whereas in the case in question, we haye
no such other Declaration (and hence there would be no Remnant); and
thus the reason ‘ Homasainyoyat’ (‘because of connection with Homa’)
` being qualified by—‘ while there is uo declaration to the contrary, ’—there.
can be no flaw in the reason given |
Or.again, in & ८7८५ 7, we could substitute the word ‘ ca’ in the place
- of ‘tu,’ and then take the Sara as embodying an ‘objection brought for-
ward by the Parvapakshi; and those who would take the Sutra thus
7 would have to cite, in support of their contention, the instance of the
‘Cups’; and then Sitra 8 would be taken as recalling that instance:
+ And, in this case, the sense of Satra'7 would be thus:—The opponent hav
ing urged that—‘because of its being taken out in the Juhi, there
: would be a Remnunt, as in the case of the Cups’,—the reply is that, ‘ that
` . 28 connected with Homa’; and this has.already been explained above

. Sttra (10): The word ‘all’ applies to that which exists
: (in the case in question); because the word pertains to
those alone that have been mentioned in connection
(with the case)

As for the descriptive reference confained in the sentence ‘ Sarvebhyo

_ havirbhyak’,—areference which is based upon a previously indicated possi-_

` bility (of the offering of ‘all materials’),—we take the ‘all’ referred to
be that which we perceive in the case in question ;. because in any case tho
_ word ‘all’ can only be used relatively with reference to things that may 1
: appear in the present conuection ; as it is absolately impossible to speak `
anything of the Absolute All; and as such our view is not incompatible `
with this. use of the. word ‘all.’ Thus. then the words *Sarvebhyah

` havirbhyak’ must be taken to refer to those materials which, on account:
: of their being remnauts of those, are capable of Disposal, or those that _
exist “merely as Remnants of the original materials... [This Satra meets र.
the Pairvapaksha argument in Siitra (1)} oF ee

- Stitra (11) ; - 27८ other is. based upon'a particular genus. abe

- :.. Agin the previous. case, 80 in, the present one also, the, word * samava-
“dyatt’ “is 4: mere. descriptive reference ; and. 98 such. it“gould - apply, to~

NO: SVISTAKRE’? OUT.OF BUTTER IN pBRUVA..- `: ` 1451

“the: Butter ‘also; consequently, when the Garu would be cut up (for
भण्ड offered), that would inevitably involve the cutting up—even though -
“not desired—of its parts also, on account of these being intimately mixed
“up. Consequently the prefix ‘Sam’ (iu ‘ Samavadyati’) should be taken’
-४8:. & - 17676 descriptive reference based upon the fact of the two subtly.
“piixed up genuses (of Caru and Butter). [This meets the Parvapuksha’
-argument contained. in Sitéra (3)) _ 2%

“Satra (12): The last refers to the non-emptiness (of the
| | vessel)

The last argument that has been brought forward by the Purvapaksha

(in Sitra 4), is that based upon the Arthavdda with regard to the Svishtukrt
` 9४६ that is quite explicable in accordance with our theory also, as indi-
cating non-emptiness. That is to say, in the sentence ‘ Svishtakrte-vadayan `
ma pratyabhighdrayati’, the ‘avadinu’ (‘offering’) spoken of must be
“taken as that ‘ cutting’ which is made out of that material from which it
is actually made, or from which it ean be done. As a matter of fact, we find |
that this‘ Avadainw’ is capable of beiug done out of such materials as the
Cake aud the like; while what is done ont of the Dhruva is only the action
of Upastaruna and Abhiyhdrana. Nor do we find the Avadaaa out of the
Dhravt connected with the Dative (in ‘ Svishtakrté’). Specially as even.
‘though some other substance may have been offered to the Deity, yet
the Dhruva would stand in need of ^ Refilling’ (‘ Pratyabhigh@rana ') for
the sake of the actions of Upastarana and Abhiyh@rana, in connection with
“Which it has been found to be useful. And thus there would bea use for
the Dhruva, before the Svishtakrt offering, even after the other offerings
-have been made, and hence with each offering, it should be refilled ; but
when the Suishtakrt offering has been made, there is nothing more to be
“done; and hence there is no further need for refilling it. Nor can the e-
_ fillings be regarded as purificatory of the previous offerings ; as that would
-Hecessitate the assumption of an invisible result for them |
| As for the non-emptiness (of the Vessel), it is clearly for the sake’ of
“the action to be performed next; consequently without making the Artha>
vida, in question apply to the Suzstakrt, we could explain ib as referring to.
“the non-emptiness of the Vessel prior to the Svishtakrt offering ।

ADHIKARANA (2)

{The ‘ Offering of Remnants’ should not be’ performed in connection wit)
| | the Sékamprasthayya, |

` $" (18) : The performance of the Svistakrt and the
Ida in connection with the Sikamprasthayya, also
is like the above.

| In connection with the त्वण्व Sacrifices, we have always the per
` formance of the Svzstakyt and the Ida, out of the Saundyyu material
and the Sakamprasthdyya is a modification of the material (of the. San-
— ndyya); and hence there is an idea that those actions should be performed
out of that modification also; and on this point the case of the Sakam-
prasthayya differs from that the Butter in the Dhruva (though, in accord
ance with the rule‘ Prakrtivad Vikrtih’, the Offering of Remnants would
_ be performed in connection with the Sakamprasthayya, just as with the
~. Sannadyya), And hence there being .a doubt as to whether the case iv
question is amenable ta the reasonings of the foregoing Adhikaranu,—the
|. present Sutra serves the purpose of pointing ont the fact of the case of
.. the Sakamprasthayya being exactly the same as that of the Butter in the
Dhruva. . That 18 to say, just as in the case of the latter, so in the former

. also, there would be none of the offerings, on account of there beingno Remnant

—this absence of Remnant being due to the whole of tt having being taken up
` (Sutra 5). And in this case the fact of the whole of it having been
` . ` taken up 18 shown by the following : We find the sentence ‘ Homdrthé
५ :, prasarpatah saha kumbhibhik’, which lays. down the unpartitioned milk
--, 98 to be offered ‘along with the milking pots’; and this distinctly shows
. that the whole of the material:is offered (because when the pots also have
+ been offered, there cannot be any Remnant) ; and hence it is not possible
~ : for avy Remnant to be kept । | |

` ` ADHIKARANA (3).
(In connection with the Sautramani there is no ‹ Offering of Remnants ‘y. |

-Siitrva (14) ; So also in the case of the Sautramani (there
a ‘would be no Remnants) i2 the vessels. ak
` The phrase ‘ tadvat’ is to be supplied from the preceding Satra,

-. In eonnection with the Sautrdmani, we find mentioned certain vessels .
- of wene, and of milk, named ‘ Apvina’ and the like ; and inasmuch as these.
` ₹२९६३९}5 only.serve the purpose of keeping the various materials separate—
just as in the case of the Cups (of Soma), so in this also—there would be
“no possibility of the whole of the materials being offered up. And hence
_ inasmuch as this would lead to the idea of the case in question differing
` from those dealt with before (and hence not amenable to the previous
reasonings),—the present Sitra points out the wmenability of the case in
‘question to the reasonings of the previous Adhikaranas. ao

And each of these Vessels is taken up for Homa, in the same crder |
that it is held; and the Vessels as held are laid down as to be offered up,
in the sentence—‘ Yathagrhitan ८४0९ upddaddté, uttare § ५१८१४ payoyra- `
hin त / 11/11 1111111 (which shows that there can be no

“Remnants, as even the Vessels are offered up). | |

9६" (15): The mention of ‘Remnant? also is to be
cae explained as before.
.. The Prohibition, contained in the sentence ‘ ucchinasta, na sarvan.
- Puhott, which is not subsidiary to an Injunction, is a mere descriptive ..
reference. ‘ Ucchinashtd’ isan Inj unetion, and the subsequent Prohibition
18 a descri ptive reference to ib ; and this latter would point out the im possi-
bility of the ‘ Offering of Remnants,’ through the fact of the whole of the -
“Material being offered up in Homa. Then as for the ‘ Remnant’ that is...
- Spoken of, there may be some other action, either in the shape of a distinct. .
Disposal, or in that of another Principal Action. And for these reasons,
the. Svistakrt and the Ida should not be performed (out of the Sautra-.:

01007). ~ :. -

_ ADHIKARANA (4)

“{In connection with the Sarvaprshthésfi, the Svistakrt, the Ida@ and ‘the.
` ` , other ‘Offerings of Remnants’ should be performed only once}

“Sittra (146): The material being one, and the Actions
| ‘diverse, the actions tin question should ७८ per-
“formed with each action.” |

lt having been established that there are certain Offerings of Rem
nants’ to be performed, we now proceed to consider the case of particular
- * Offerings. of Remnants | |
| In connection with the Survaprshthésh, we tind the passuge ‘Indraye
` Rathanturdya, Indraya Varhataya, Indraya‘Vatrijaya, Indraya V airdj aya,
Indraya Cakvardyn, etc.’ ; and we find that .this passage speaks of six in
dependent Deities, shown by the six words with the dative ending, and
` 16066 also six different connections of the Deity and the Material; anid. as
in the Sacrifice occupied by one Deity there could be no room for the
other Deity, the distinctive feature of the Deity cannot be revarded ४४.
` pointing to six different actions, For some of these actions there are व). |
- tinct offering matevials laid down; while for some of them, there is laid
‘down a single material, in common, in the shape of the Ouke of the 5४६९ of
the Oart-wheel. And when we accept this fact, we come to the considera:
tion of the question, as to whether the ‘Remnant-Offering’ would. be
different for each of these latter Actions, or, on account of the material
“being the same, there would be a single offering, ‘in common amongst them.
Objection: “The question forms ‘a subject of. Adhyjya XI, and as
“such would be dealt with in that Chapter, under the Sitra, ‘ ékadravyé
“ete” (XI--iv--42); and consequently. it need: not be taken ‘up for.
~ consideration, in the present connection.” `. | |
: Reply: ‘Inasmuch ‘as, in the case in question, the material has to be:
.. Disposed of, it bears the Action distinctly; and as it is piece by piece that.
‘the. material is subsidiary to the Principal Actidus, there can be no: single:
performance in.common ;. and hence, though the discussion really ‘belongs.
to Adhvdaya X[-yet, inasmuch: as it involves the consideration of the Rem--
gant and: the Original; itforms:a fit object to be dealt: with. in connection:

And on the:above question, we have the following-—

in Sarvaprsthésti ony” ONW -KEMNANT-OFVERING, 1465.

PURVAPAKSHA,
co 8t is only when the Material is one, that there would be a single:
‘s€performance common to all the actious. concerned; specially. in a:
: tease where if is in. the same condition that the Material helps in all the:
<‘8aetions; the more so as, in-such cases, we do not perce've any reason for:
4 making any difference; in fact no such difference can ever be made. In
: “the caso in question however, the Material is found to help in the:
. & 88619८8, piece by piece (and not as one complete whole) ; and the sanctifi-:
“i “gation of the Material also les only jn the help that it accords. to the
“it Saerifiee ; and hence a difference in the Principal Sacrifice would make
tq difference in the said Sanctification (the Svistakri offerine, the Ida,
ete.) ; - कात्‌ 28 such these could not be performed once only, as common to
“all the Principal Sacrifices. As a matter of fact, we find that, even though
“one part of the Cake (that is offered at one action, f.1.) may have been dis-
“nosed of, yet there conld he a Disposal of another part of it. TInasmuchiés
@the exact places ont of which the various offerings are cut out are
“different, it is quite natural that there should be a differentiation into
`. “the ‘Northern half’, the ‘Southern half,’ ot¢., ete. And hence we
se “conelude that the Svistakrt offering and the {da are to be repeated
“with each action |
~ SIDDHANTA. |
- Stitra (11): The Remnant of cach action not being dis-
a tinguished, it would betong equally to all (and hence

there can be but one Disposal) :
he. Suishtakrt and the Ida are to be performed once only ; because
«these offerings are not purificatory of the Sacrifice, nor of the material
. that is offered in oma; then 98 for the ‘Remnant of the Homa’ (that
--which has been left after all the Homas have been performed), that. is
> काठ only (for all); and as such it is only right. that the ‘Offering of
<: Remnant’ should be done once only, which would apply, in common, to
2 all the Homas | |
॥ That is to say, if the offerings in question were purificatory of the
-- Sacrifice, or of the Matertal that is offered. in Homa, then, the differenc
5 émong the Sacrifices, and among the Materials, would have led to a diver-
sity::.in ‘the offerings in-question. As a matter of fact, however, we find
that: they: avo. purificatory of the Remnants; and we also know full well.
क) the case in question, there is a single Romnant, common to all the
~ ` Homas :-and-it-is the ‘Northera ’-and ‘Southern’ halves of this common
। fe Remmant:that ave. taken up for the offerings in question; and they are
hot the parts of that, slice which has been cut out and offered atthe Princi-
a Mt :Badvifice.. as no :such parte have been spoken of-in connection with

1456 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH.’ J11-~PADA: ¥, ADB. (4)

the ori ginal Sacrifice; and as. such we can certainly assert the fact of its
“specifications not. being cognized. For if one could take up the ‘ Northern
half’ for the sake of one of the Principal Sacrifices, that would suffice for
` the due fulfilment of what has been enjoined; and hence the other. Prin.
cipal Sacrifices also will come to have all their needs supplied by that
very slice |
| For these reasons it must be.admitted that the offerings in question
are made only once, as common (to all the Homas concerned )

.. As for the excesses left after the Disposal-Offerings, they would be
. utilised in a subsequent Disposal-Offering, f.i. in. the Caturdhdkarana
`. (Quartering of the Cake) : |

ADHIKARANA (5

fut of the Indra-Vayu Vessel, the Eating of Remnant should be done
* - भ twice. | | ।

1 (18): In the case of the Aindravayava, there
7 should be an Eating with each action, because of «
distinct declaration to that effect.

: [At the Jyotistoma, we have several vessels containing Soma, and
each vessel 18. dedicated to a distinct Deity ; one of these is dedicated
jointly to Indra and Vayu; this. is called the ‘ Aindravdyava-Graha ; as

। . the Remnants in every one of these vessels has to be eaten, with regard to
this. dindraviyava vessel, there arises a question as to whether the
. Remnant in it is to be eaten once only, asin the case of the other vessols

४ or twice, in view of the fact that out. of this two offerings. have been
made, one to Indra and another to Vayu ; and as such it practically con-
` .fatag two Remnants, | |

`. ` Though the proper place for this discussion would havo been after
Stitra 19, where the question of the Hating of Soma in general has been dealt
.with—yet it has been introduced here, simply because, being an excep

_ tion tothe conclusion of the foregoing Adhikarana, this presents itself to us
- more quickly than the said general question

ne ६ On-this, we have the following Pirvapaksha, based upon reasoning

‘the material. being one and the same,.a single Hating would suffice for
si the due. carr ying out of the scriptural Injunction |

SIDDHANT

^ In: view of & distinct Declaration that to the effect,—-' 0४५१०५१५
| ५१४०५००५ bhaksayatt,’—we must admit that the Remnant should be eaten
ee {1.08 | | |
0 Though it is quite trae that we have certain Adhikaranas where, as in
tha présent case, the Purvapaksha is based upon reasoning, while the Sid-
< Ghahta:in reply is based on Verbal Authority,—yet that does not appear
tobe -quite 2 inethod ;'-because in such cases no Doubt is possible.
ह Such at @alhikarana is put forth only ina case where a certain thing,
having been: found ta be posetble on the ground of Reasoning, 18, however, .
ib si क on the ground of Verbal ‘Autliority ; aud hence.the thing in qnos- ।
eC ERG Se | :

: 14.56. 4१ ADA HABA रभा)

‘tion not: being ‘admissible, sueh-an Adhikarana would be-of use in al] CARES ..
‘that. might be found:to be amenable to: the. said Reasoning (In. the care:

in question however we fitid the reverse tobe the case. ag the eT wis

Hating” ‘was not.possible, on the ground of any Reasoning ; but 1462680

found to be made possible by: Verbal Authority.] “And as this Reasoning
In question has-been already shown.-in thé foregoing Adhikarana,: there E

‘would not be much use for the present discussion. ˆ . - . `

=^ + Pree Ce

<... Conseqnently we must explain‘the Adhikarana, not aa it has been done -
above (in accordance with the Bhasya), but in’ the following «manner : |
‘The Opponent brings forward the following arguments against. the Sid: -

dhanta-of the foregoing Adhikarana,—-and this we might take as—~ ` - ` oo

PURVAPAKSHA (B)

“At the Sarvaprstha, the Svishtakrt and the Ida should be performed _.

“with each action; 88.91] these principal actions are wholly different from .
one another. For example, we find that; in reference to the Aindravayava, -

“where the Principal Actions are admitted ly distinct, we have as many -

“ Parificatory Remnant Offerings ४8 these Actions, in accordance with `

such declarations as— Dutraindrava yavasya bhaksayati’, ‘ Deirhyétasya.
“ vashatkarott:'; and hence it must. be.adniitted that there should be asi

many purifications of the Remnant as there are Vashatharas.”.

For this reason, the present Sitra (18).we should take-as explaining: `

the case of the Aindravayava (that has been. cited by the Opponent

support of his view in regard to the Sarvaprstha), and then supplying the -

Answer to these arguments, - And this Answer we can represent as— - `

SIDDHANTA (B)

In the case of the Aindravayava, though. the. Eating should. have hee -
५१००९ .. once: only, ‘it. is done twice, \because.‘of the direct’ Declaration to.
that effect,-and not because of the diversity of the Principal ‘Actions.
concerned Specialy as we have shown under.the पर éivadhikarana (I ®
—eli~-28 ९८ seg.), thata Vedic sentence cannot be taken as giving the Reason’.

for any thing ए ee

In: this way, the present Adhikarana comes to: boa. mere supplement: .
lo. the’ previous one: and -inasmach. ae 1८ .9180. serves the purpose of:
reminding ws of the. Digsussion - {५ regard. to. the. Hatirig of Soma,: there:
would be no incongruity in’ the. order of the Adhtkaranas’ (sought.td:-be.-:

explained away at the beginning of the present Adhkikarana}

ov . ५ = [र ' "

ADHIKARANA (6)
[There shouldbe an Hating of the Soma-emnunt.}

$ (19); “There should be no Eating of Soma, as there is.
| ` ` "6 Declaration to that effect.” - ` `
In. the Gage of the Arndravayava, there might be an eating, even ot.

¦: there isan Eating of those |
`: Though among these also, the case of the Somas referred to in the:
peritences ‘ Sarvatahparihdram “Acwinam bhaksayati’ and the like. would’
“be amenable ४०.८06 same reasoning as that in regard to the dindraviyava
. 6४, with gegard to these also, we have to consider the question as ४0.
whether these sentences merely serve the purpose of laying down qualifi-.
-“¢ations with regard to the Huting whose per formability 18 already fully
4 recognized, or they lay down the qualified Hating itself, |
` Question: “ What difference does this make or |
7 Answer: If these sentences themselves are also the Injunctions of the
“‘Hattig, then this has to be. done only in the cases specified in these sen-
“tenes; while if the Injunction of the mere eating:1s got at elsewhere (and
the sentences quoted be. the Injunction of mere qualifications), then, in.
“that case, 6१6४. though the Indicative Force of the words might point.
~ directly to only.a part of the Soma, yet it would apply to all the Somus.. `
ut In regard..to this Question, then, there are three probable alternative.
». theories, . viz. (1) Inasmuch as the sentences that are found to serve the
“wholly different purposes of laying down qualifications, they stand in need
; ग an Injunction,—and as there is no Injunction there can.be no Hateng ; :
(2) or, those vory sentences may be taken ‘as Injunctions, and accordingly, -
thers is to bean Hating out of those vessels only that are specified io.
them ;. (3) or, there is to be an Mating, on the aforesaid grounds of the |
Name (that is, given ‘to: the Cups and Vessels, as -‘hotuccamasrh कपप the:
lik), the performing of the Vashatkara, the Homa, and. the Abhigava. on
व And out of these, we having the following as +ल `

धि
. ae, «ofl ४
। जि नः
. wre —
# 1
: =

५ PURVAPAKSHA, 8s
ere a All:the. Goma in ‘the ‘vessels and cups being entirely, take up by

“the Homa,—jast as in. the case. of -the Bulter (Adi. L), the Satkanpras-.

“4460 CANTRA:VERTICA. “ADH, “1it—-PADA:V.—-absE (6),

<6 thayya (Adhi.:2) and the Sautramani .{ Adhi.:3),—there ‘would’ be no
^ Remnant ; whence, then; could there be any Fating P The Hating can.
“not be said tobe implied by any Original. Primary Sacrifice. (as: the |
44 Jyotistoma, in which we have all. the Vessels and Caps under con.
=‘ sideration, is its own Original. Primary): “Nor 60 we find any direct In
. “junction ag to the. Hating in question ; tle Injunction that wo have-refers
toa wholly different thing ; and as such, is incapable of laying down the
-“ Hating. For these reasons, there can be no Eating of the Somu.” ` ।

SIDDHANT

: Siitra (20): Lhe Hating should be done ४८८५८56 we
jind tt mentioned in connection with thesther pur-
poses. 5

| (There should be an Buting of the Soma; because we find sentences,
“really mentioned in other connections, pointing to such Hating,—such sen-
_tences, for instance, as ‘ Sarvatahkparihdram Agvinam bhaksayate’; ‘bhak

-gilapyayitanecamasdn dakstnasydnaso ‘valambé sddayanti’ ;.as certainly,
if there were no Dating at all, how could there be such specified Hatings
as those mentioned in these sentences. ] |

‘Satra (21); , These (sentences) would be direct declara

.. téons (of the Eating itself); as they lay down some
thing new; and hence the Eatings should be in
accordance with these Injunctions. `=

If these.sentences were merely meant to serve some other purposes,
‘then we should have sought for other reasons (such as the Name, etc., etc.)
for the Hatings in question; as a matter of fact, however, these sentences
are direct:-Declarations (of the Hating) ; and 6006 116 Hating should be
done, only in accordance with the Injunctions contained in these sen-—
tences,—and not elsewhere. - wes 7 | = ~

ADHIKARANA (7)

(The Remnant-Huting is to.be done by the Priests holding the Cups. |

| : Sutra (22): Inasmuch as the Cups are named . (after

the Priests), (the Hating should be done by these), special-.
ly as the connection (of the name ‘ Camasu,’) ts due to.
that (Eating) | |

We admit that the Hating would be done, in accordance with the In-

` Janctions; but these Injunctions are to be followed as qualified by the

aforesaid Name; Vashaftkara, etc., and not merely as mentioned in those
_, sentences

. Though in regard to the Cups, we do not find any direct Injunction

; Go the Brahmanas) of the Hating, yet such Injunctions are inferred from tho .

names contained in the Directions (* Praitu hotuccaumasah ’, ete., etc ).; that is:

„ = ~

to say, we find the Directions for the fetching of the Material accompanied

` 07 such. names as ‘hotugcamasa ’ (the ‘ Hotri’s Cup’) and the like; and these
-mames could not be applicable, if. the Hotrs.and other priests did not
actually Bat (‘camanti’) outof these Cups. , Because the word ‘ caniasa’ ig
` formed out of the Root ‘ camz’=to eat, with the Loéative affix ‘asan’ of the
- Unddi class (the word: being etymologically explained as ‘ camanti asmin iti,

_¢tamasah’);. and hence at the time that.the Direction (‘Pradtu hotugeama-

` '8dR") 18 ` heard, the name .‘camasa’ indicates the connection with actual:
` Hating, either in. the past, or in the future, or in the present; and as we-
“da not perceive any Hating in the past or.the present, we conclude that the.

| Eating indicated is that in the future ; otherwise, the Direction, ‘ Praitu

7 hotugcamasak’, could not be carried into effect

For these reasons, it must be admitted that there should be an Hating ।

एः the Hoérs and other priests, —

Then, inasmuch asthe Cups that.are brought forward (in obedience to

“the said Directions) are those that contain the Soma,—and as it 18 the Soma
“thas stands in. need of “Disposal, and-is most proximately related. (to the
! Cups 9
29. 6 have such declarations as, ‘ Sagésagcamaso hdyaté, dlpam juhoti. `
Nor:do:we cogniza-the: presénce of any other substance; sich as Rice and’:
“be hike; the Hating: of which: could justify the ‘nar

नह Hating is'to'bo of the Soma contained in the Cups; specially

ante of “ camasa’; nor.
Would the Hating of any other such material form: paft of the Sacrifice ; and:

1469 11

hence such: Hating (of ‘some extraneous material) wonld 06. कभ) to: the:
following: anomalies ;.(@) the indioatidns of the Context would be contra. -
dicted ; (b) the: Direction in question would have to be removed from its
Jogitimate context; (c) thename of ‘Somacamasa’ would be incompatible ; `
(¢)... the. material eaten were. ‘Rice’ or (anything other thar Soma); the:
Cups would become impure by the Hating, and as such no further offerings.
could be made by those Cups ‘(as is ‘laid down) (the ‘case’: of - the.
oma. is different, inasmuch as the Veda distinctly declares that. thers 18 .
“no impurity attaching to the Hating of the Soma); (०) if, for the sake of `
‘purification, we were to scratch out certain. portions of the Cups, then, the `
‘particular Oup that had been named hotrigamasa’ will have eeased to: `
“exist, and the: newly repaired. one, and. the material contained jn it, -.
could not bear.the said name (of “hotrcamasa );, and as such, there would:
be a contradiction. of the Injunction of the Homa as to be performed with -
the material specifically named (as ‘ hotricamasa’) 7
The same reasoning holds respecting the taking up of other Cups;
as the bringing in of such would involve an infringement by exceeding —
the exact. number of the Caps laid down. Nor (in the case of the Hating:
being of Fice, etc.) could we perform the subsequent Homas with the :.
Cups made impure by the Hating, on the sole str ength of the Injunction ` ,
(of the Homa); as this Injunction has the chance of being carried into \
effect, in the case of the eating of Soma, which would not involve any
infringement of the rules of conduct with regard to impure Cups. . Nor can `
it be urged that “ the infringement would be exactly the same in the cage `
of the Hating of Soma.” Because in reeard to the Soma, we have the: `
distinct Declaration. that—‘ there is no impurity attaching to the Kating —
of Soma.’ | “
For these reasons, it must. be admitted that the Priests holding the.
Cups should. eat the Soma . i
~~ The Bhasya also .must-be taken in the ‘above manner,—-and: not &8 it be
ippears on the face of it; for if one Proof becomes inter: upted by another:
Proof, its comprehension becomes an exceedin gly difficult matter. “There-°.
ore all that. the text brought. forward by the Bhasya does 38 to prohibit..:
he: Hating of Sonia by other than Brahkmanas. If the name:.‘Prayaja-' :-
nanasya’ does not indicate-the # tong of thé Soma, then::we could: not pat
‘xplain, either the declaration—* Sa १/०. somam vibhakshayisét ’-—contained Pee
n the Injunction of the Phalacamasg; 0 the: Prohibition: na Somam.! 03.05:
Hence it must be admitted that.the Priesta holding the (४8 80010; - :-
at the Soma 1 ee Tr are

. 2am च
eee ee |
. «

०१ = 7५, "० = ed
7.

‘on = ->= >

Pra .

ADHIKARANA (8)

“fhe Udgitri Priests are to eat, together with the Subrahmanya Priest, |

as Satra (23): "I. Only one should eat out of the Udgatri-

‘‘camasa (the Cup: held by the Udgatri Priest); because

ao .. “ofonly one such being directly mentioned.”

Before explaining the Hating consequent upon the performance of.

the Vashatkara, the Homa and the Abhisava, the Author proceeds to
~ shaw: that-particular Hating which is based upon Name. _ |

In the Direction referred to in the foregoing Adhjkarana, we meet.

| with the name ‘ Udgdirrntm camasah’; and with regard to this, there |
. ‘arises. a fourfold doubt: (1) should the Hating be done by only one Udgatr ध
` ` Priest; ‘or (2) by all the Priests ; or (3) by only those Priests that do the’
~.Hymning; or (4) by all the four Chandogas (Samavédi Priests) ? Some —
people take the (2) and (4) together, on the ground that the word:

the Indication in question is applicable to the Ohhandoga Priests alone

Question : “ Wherefore should there be any doubt in regard to the

`. taatter in question

Answer: The reason is this: In the word ‘ Udgdtrrniim’, we find

: 8 distinct incongruity in- the siguifications of the basic word and the affix,
-~“ (de, the: basic noun denotes naturally only one Udgatr Priest, while the ।
affix denotes plurality) ; and hence it 18.only natural that there should be-
--@ doubt as'to the acceptance of the signification of the one or the other
os Onthe point under consideration, we have the following— =

1 PURVAPAKSHA (A) ध
“In accordance with the.Parddhckarana,—and with the law धाद" it. ;

Mg ln pegard to the secondary factor. that an illegitimate assumption can
he made,-~it is the. denotation of the basic noun that forms the pre--
’ dominant factor ; and then again, ia theoriginal Injunction of the appoint- 7
‘aentofthe Udgaty Priest—‘ Udagataram. vrnita.’,—we find the Singular
pumber, which distinctly shows that the Cap in question is to. 06 given.
90 हि one Udgatr Priest; and hence it. is only one Udgaiy, Priest that.
“would-eat out of it; and-as for the denotation of the Plaral-number, snags,”
‘much’ aé we donot find it compatible with that of the basic noun, we

= tan not but-disregard it.as not-meant. to. be si gnificant.” = 2.

464 VANTRA-VERTIKA,: 01/11 11)

- PORVAPAKSHA'(B)

- Stra (24) : “IL AM should eat tt, because of the con
| oS nectton Of a. oo. :

‘< 7 “ Tt is not right to wholly disregard the plurality. Beoauae’ in the |
„ “case of the ‘ Pégamantra', we disregard .the Plural “namber:-becanse.
“there:is no room for any - plurality. In the Context, in which ‘it ocenrg
. “Tn the case in question, however, inasmuch as an Indirect Indication
_ “(of all Priesta ‘by the word ‘ Udgftr’) is found to be quite compatible,
“we can. have no reason for disregarding the Plurality. Consequently it
“must be. admitted that the Cup in question belongs to all the Priests:
“Qr, by sub-division (7.¢. inasmuch as all Udgatr Priests aré Chando- `
“gas; the term * Udgdtr’ would indicate all Ohandogas, the Stra ‘may he
: “taken as referring fo ‘ all Ohandogas’.” ` ` |

४4 1 _ PURVAPAKSHA (6) oo
” Sittra (28) ** The. Hymn-singers (should do it): as they
“are connected with that (‘singing’); specially as we
oo “have the distinet declaration of Plurality”?. 9 _ `

+ “Tnasmuch as the Priests other. than the Udgitr are not denoted
: “by the basic noun (‘ Udgatr’), the plural number (in ‘ Udgatrradm’)
-“¢ould never have any connection with those other Priests. Nor can we
“have recourse to an Indirect Indication; withont very special reasons: `
ee specially as, in the case in question, by not having recourse to such an-
"Indication, we do not find any meaninglessness (which could justify.
“our having recourse to it) ; because we find the word ‘ Udg@iy’ ( = singer)
“quite applicable, etymologically, to’ the Hymn-singers, Consequently, `
‘by reason of their connection with ‘Singing,’ the three H ymn-singers..
-“ should eat of the Remnant in question.” ` ==. | 1 ce

SIDDHANT

` 82६1" (26) : 4८4 (four should do it); because of thetr con- a
nection with the :(Sama-) Veda; but for other ङ €= ~
cial reasons, it would pertain to some of'them only.”

| So long as a basic noun can be taken in its conventional signification ,
-{as.@ complete word); we. cannot accept its etymological signification.”
As % matter of fact, however, we do not-find the word एए ` ` applying, `
even elymologically, to: the. Hyimn-singers ; because. the Hymn-sioging |
Priests, the Prastotr and the: Pratihartr, ara nerd’ 6) (‘Singers `);
and. not: ^ Udgatr’..(‘ Higheaingérs’); ‘and ‘hence. the : plural. number {in
Udgaitrnam) is ‘acthally incompatible: (as. there “is only one! Udyfte :

त PRIRATS 0 Bat दाहे With suaKANMANYA. PRrest, 1465

Priest): This:is chown by the further fact of only the second part of the:
(एवय being spoken of as.‘ Udgdtra
oe Bhagya- should have used the word ‘bhakti’ with reference. to.
» the parts ‘of the Sama ; and the use of the word ‘ parva’ is due to mere.
“oversight ¢ |
वृह then, we find that, there cannot be many Udgatr Priests, either
ehycactual appointment as-such, or by the connection of ‘Singing’; and:
chenes the Plurality of the Udgatr must be taken as based upon the connec.
“tionswith the Veda (the 9ama Veda) ; because as a matter of fact, we find
det the teaching of the Samaveda is spoken of as ‘ Audgdtra’.; and thence’
‘algo the action inhering in that Teaching (comes to be spoken of as
“Audgdtra’).; aud from this it is an easy matter to infer that, through
their connection with these two (the Teaching and the Action), in tle
gapacity of the Teacher and the Performer respectively, it is the Men
(thus connected) that are spoken of as ‘ Udgdty,—in accordance with
. the reasonings pertaining the Audamégh: |
ध Objection: ‘* This reasoning that you have brought forward has al
-“ peady been refuted under the Avégtyadhikarana (II—iii—3). And in the
44 ९856 उ) question we find that it is only after the addition of the nomi-
“pal affix (‘an’) to the word ‘ Udgatr’ that this latter gives rise to the
“word ‘Audgdtra’; and the word ‘ Udgdir ’ cannot be explained as having”
"ats etymological origin in the word ‘ Audgdtra.’ That is to say, in ac- |
“ dordance with the rules of Grammar, the word ‘ Audgéitra’ is explained
“““ ag formed out of the word ‘ Udgatr’ with the nominal affix‘ an’: .and in.
"no, way could any rule explain the word ‘ Vdgdtr’ as ‘ the performer of
“the Audgatra functions,’ which would mean an elimination of the affix
"Cap"; in the word ‘Udgdir’). Consequently the name ‘ Udgatr
-*“gannot be taken as based upon the word ‘ Audgdira’; but it must-
^ regarded as based upon the actual appointment of the Priest as such
~ "as. will be explained later on. For these reasons, the above explana- -
“tion ig not admissible.”
` Reply: . In avy. case, the word ‘ Udgdir’ will have to be taken in its
<Mdirect sécondary signification ; and. hence it would have to be taken as’
- &pplying:to the Priest, by means of a backward process (of etymology : as:
khe:“performer. of the Audgitra functious.’) ; just 88 ` we find the word :
ag Raya." applying to. the Braihmana (which is possible only in the sense of.
péridrmer of kingly functions) |
र connection. with the -word ‘ एकाक" it has-been shown, by the.
Sentences ‘in’ ordinary parlance the word is used in its etymological sense, .
"66 ete. ate, (in the Avéstyadhikarana, I1—iii—-3), that, in the first in- `
atende, the word-‘ Raja ’.is used in the sense of the caste (Keatiriya); and |

3 Genes, throuzh: connection with that caste, the functions of. protecting १०१
184

1466: ^^. ADH, तश) 99 (8)

- “06 ‘rest. come ‘to 6 spoken of as“ Rajya’; and (९6, through the 0०."
* © nection or presence of these functions, the Brdhmana,. eto:, also.come'to be
ee spoken of as. ‘ aja,’ this. word being applied to these, either. on account: `
. Of their being substitutes for the Kgattriya, or through Inforexee (based: `
क pon the presence of the functions of Protecting and. the like).. “In the
“game manner, in the case in question, though, by actual appointment, - -

~ there is only one .Udgair, yet through. his connection, hig -tonotions of

teaching’ and performing being spoken of: as audgitra,’ the Hyms-ssngers: ।
also would be spoken of. as ‘ udgair by reason of these. priesta being.
. related to those functions, But, inasmuch as one word cannot have-there
. than one direct signification, this latter application of the word Tits, =
- be regarded to be indirect (or secondary); and we have already explained:
~. that this secondary signification would. be admitted, for the sake of tho
“» compatibility of the plural number (in. ‘udgatrrnam '); 16 was only the —
` ground for this signification that we -did not point out before; and.-this.
“` awe have done now, by showing it to be based upon the functions of: -
Teaching (the Sama-Veda) क + क
~ Thus then, we must admit, on the ground of there being no incongruity
involved in this, that the eating 18. to be done by all the four Chandoga
priests (the Udgatr and the three Hymn-singars)
The above explanation is not quite. admissible. Because as a matter:
of fact, those that are found to be operating, at the time of the Hating, as
-Well as those accompanying these operators at the time of the Di: ection,
. come to be connected with the Hating ; and we find that the Subrahmua
` nya (who is one of the Chandoga priests) does not perform any operation
at the time of Hating, and ४8 there is no proximity of this priest, either in
` the Outer Assembly Room, or inthe Inner Court, there is no reason
~by which he could be entitled to the Hating. And hence, just as
. In the-case of other Ohandogas we find that though they perform the
, Teaching of ths Sama Veda, yet, not being in any way connected with the
_ 89०११०९, they have no Hating to do, so would it be in the’case of the `
< Subrahmanya Priest also.Then as for the plural number (in! Udgatrr- :
nam’) that might be taken as resting with three Priests only, just.as in the `
ease ‘of. the word ‘Kapitijalin? (vide: Sutra. XI—i-~38 et weq:),. Nor 1s:
_ the Hating a purification of the Perfornior whereby: it should: bé-neces-:
Sary to make it apply to the Subrahmanya. also, for’ fear ‘of leaving him.
“anpurified, .In reality we find it ‘to bea purification of the material, as -
"we shall show in several Adhikaranas eae
` : - Honce. it’ must be admitted thatthe present: Sttra- sete’ aside;: by
“means-of the word ' tu,'-only the argument in Sitra 25;.and pute forward.
the same view, of the Seating pertaining’ tothe: Aymn-singers, though’ for ”

UDGATRE PRIESTS TO Rat TOGkTHER WiTH SUBRANMANYA एश ` 1467.

“-yeagoné totally different from those propounded in the previous S#ira..
“And thus..the sense of the Silra comes to be this: Though all of them.
` are ‘denoted by: the word `" Udgatr,' and not the Hymn-singers only, yet,
for reasons shown, it should be taken as applying toa part (४.6, some)
“of these only,—2.¢.° to all except the Subrahmanya; just as in the case of .
the’ sentence ‘ Upantshadyodgatarah 50१0140 stuvanti 1 .
“Qn: we: can take the Satra as accepting, by means of the words
100४ the Second Purvapaksha (Stra 24),—and then, by means of the
‘senience,"' Keranaddekadégé syat’, laying down the theory of the word

-applying to the Hymn-singers only ।

ADHIKARANA (9)
[The Gravastut should also eat the Soma. |

७८1, (27): “Thereis no eating for the Gravastut ;
| “as & ts not laid down.” नः i

“ , We have finished the treatment of the. Hatings based upon Name ;
* ‘and the Author now proceeds to explain those based on Direct Declara-
tions to that effect 7
<: We have the Declaration—‘ Yathacumasamanydagcamasasdiccamasino
. bhagayant, athattasya hariyojanasya sarva ava, ete,’ (‘The other cups of
` Soma are eaten by those persons holding the Cups, but out of the Hariyoyana
.. Cup, all of them wish to obtain’); and with regard to this there arises the
- question as to whether the sentence, pointing to the Eating by all priests,
‘Jays down that of the Gravasiut Priest also,—or pointing only ‘to the
. ` Hating of the Priests holding the Cups, mentioned in the sentence, it does
` not lay down any for the Gravastit Priest, =
. The Parvapaksha is that “ there is to be no Eating by the Gravastit
` ` Priest, for reasons just given.’ । | |

te oes SIDDHANTA ee
: 6214 (28): (He should eat) out of the Hariyojana, as it
ae’ is mentioned as related to ‘all,’ | `

~ ` The word ‘all’ denoting a?) Priests connected with the performance
. Of the sacrifice, we can not restrict it to only a few out of those (४५, only
६, those that hold the Cups), unless we have very special reasons for doing

es Consequently, 1४ -must be admitted. that the Grdvastut Priest: alao is
to éat ont of the Hariyojana Cup Tae | :

af 92४10. (29) : . Objection: The eating would be done ‘by
“those holding: the Cups because of their proxt-
2. mity

go, Dhis- Sitra explains ‘the: sense .of “the: Parvapakeha : “The former
portion of the passage quoted ‘above—' Tha Oups of :Soma ave eaten by:
„01086 holding: ths Cups ’—served:no ‘other purpose save the restrictive
qualifying of the ‘word “all; specially as the words: ‘atha’ -and: ‘ere

THE GRAVASTUT ALSO.HAT THE SOMA, 1469

“état the more point to the fact of the Lating belonging to those Priests.
4 gloné::a8.the word .‘éva’ can apply to those alone that are specially:
“mentioned, Hence we concludg that the sentence does not point to any
“Hating by the Gravastut Priest.” _ os

51८. (50) Rep ly: The eating would belong to all, be-
“645९. the Injunction; as for the mention of the
‘camasins’, that ts meant to be merely subservient.

to that,

“s°“—nasmuch as we have the word ‘all’, which denotes every one of
the persons concerned, and which, boing once restrictively qualified by the
“stibstrates (Hariyojana), cannot be restricted and qualified again, by the
“word. camasin’, which serves a wholly different purpose; because every
time that we limit the scope of a word used in the Veda, we are setting at
nought. the direct Vedic Declaration. Hence we conclude that the ^ cama.
gins’. are not mentioned for the sake of showing the relationship of each <
“Priest: with each Cup; but they are spoken of as having a very much
“limited scope, with a view to eulogising the Hartyojana as having a much
wide scope. Consequently it must be admitted that what the sentence
‘means is that ^ out of the Hariyojana Cup, all the priests should eat’ (and.
‘thas.the Gravastut Priest also eats out of that Cup) |

ADHIKARANA (10).
(The performance of.‘ Vasatkdra’ is a ground for eating. |

४ 6८10 (31): There should be an eating, due to the
st i+ Pasathkara. ` `

॥ Another sentence in the same connection is—‘Vasatkartuk parthama-
. bhaksoh.’ And. with regard to this, there arises the question, as to
^ . whether ‘it lays down the First Hating (Eating qualified by First), as due.
~ to: the Vasatkdéra,—or it lays.down merely the character of being First
: with reference to the Hating. And onthis question, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA

~~ “Tn accordance with the law—'‘nacédanyéna gistak’ (I~iv—9), 50
~~“ long as the qualification can, in some way or other, be taken ag a mere des-
_«“eriptive reference, we. cannot rightly take the sentenco as a qualified
“Injunction ; and then, the character of the First is something that has |
"not been got at by any other Injunction; hence it is not possible for
“the Hating to be enjoined with reference ‘to that; consequently,. the
-* sentence must be construed as—‘yo Vasathartuk bhaksak sa pratha
=“ mak’ (‘The eating of the performer of the Vagatkdra should be the
first?)
` “ Question: ‘Inasmuch as the. Eating too 088 006 been enjoined.
~. “ before, we cannot take that as mentioned merely by way of deseriptiv®.
- “yeference (for the Injunction of ‘ First’) |
4 ५ Answer: Inasmuch as the Injunction of the Hating. is involved m
. “the very: name (of the Oup belonging to the Vasatkarta), it is quite pos-
“gible for it to be mentioned merely by way of descriptive reference... “One
~ fof the Cups ia named | Vagatkartuccamasah,’ and as the: very name
. *Seamasa’ implies Hating, this can very well be spoken of by way of des-
=< oriptive reference; and hence the sense of the sentence comes to be. that.
is “whoever does the. Vagatkara has the First Eating a ।
= “The following argument might be brought forward -here: {088
<S-much as in-connection: with the Vessels and the other Caps (except.that.
“ belonging to the Vasatkarta), no Zating has yet been found to have been”
enjoined (as the ssid: name indicates the eating out of that one Oup only);
no such: could be mentioned: merely byway. of descriptive reference

VASATRARA -A GROUND FOR. EATING 1471:

१2970; That-does not matter: as it is not necessary: that’ what ‘is.
a ^ gnoken of ‘by. way of descriptive referctice must. have been recognized as:
` - ५ {५96 performed 10 शो cases ; as all descriptive references stand in neod `
oa: of only: that much of recognition ag is possible. Nor, in the cage in
“question, is‘there any harm in the Vasatkartr Priest not eating out the.
«4 yegsels-and: the. other Cupa. It might be urged that, ‘such non eating
it would leave Disposal unaccomplished,’ But, in the case-of there being.
` ^ 0 Disposal laid down in the Veda, we can have one as in ordinary life ;..
` : ५ छः we could have the eating also, through reasons to be shown below.
` `. ५ The following argument might be brought forward: । The possibi-*
„ ५ lity of the eating, by reason of the Name, being very remote, it. cannot
_*be-spoken of, by way of descriptive reference, by the very much more
**quickly-operating Divect Declaration; and hence while the former 18
`. yet -to bea pointed out as to be performed, the Direct Declaration will
‘have begun its functioning, and denoted, without any specifications, the
५ ^ Hating. wherever there might be the Vasatkara (i.e., it will have laid

- “Sdown the Hating, and not the First only with reference to any parti-
< ५ ^ cular Eating), "
oo“ But this is not admissible; because proximity and remoteness are
_ “sought after only in cases where there is somo sort of a contradiction
“Tn the case in question, we find that the Direct Declaration, in order to
“avoid the chance of an Injunction of more than one thing, stands in `
. “need of the Hating being already laid down by some other means; and

«when it 28 found that itis not laid down by any means, it has to admit —
™ the Tnjauction ‘to be of the Hating quultfied (by First); as we do often ;

“admit. Direct Declarations to be injnnctive of 96068801 y qualifications -

~ with reference to such things as have been laid down by even such :
: “remote means as those of the Context and the like 7
“`... And thus, inasmuch as the sentence lays down the character of .
0 First-only 98 the condition for the Hating, the Vasatkara cannot be -
“regarded asa ground for Hating.” | 2

1 atte | SIDDHANT |

To:.the above we make. the following reply: Inasmuch 88 there can
96 09. descriptive reference of only oue factor: extracted out of the com+ `
pound: G6. of. the Hating asextracted from the ‘compound ‘ prathama- ~
‘ bhakean 23: Just 88. 70 the case of the expression ' tryanga,’—the sentence .
णप be-taken as laying down all the factors (i.e. the ‘First Eating,’ as.
“due tothe Vagatkara) as
oe Bhat ig to say, just asin the caso of the sentence“ tryangath svistake- ` :
tam yayatt,’ we १०४०६ find the ‘three’ laid down with yeference to. the ‘ subsi- ve
Miation 's but-what islaid down is that which is expressed by the whole. com- -:

1479. TANTRA-VARTIRA ADH. 1.1; १, 10)
“pound (ie. the three subsidiaries); so, in the same manner, inagmich ०३ `
‘itis always the whole word:-that is connected. (syntactically) with: anothoy :
_word,-and as the withdrawing of one: factor would: deprive the com..:
‘pound of its expressive potency,—we cannot take that withdrawn: factor
` 98 that with reference to which something is Jaid down ; 1.6, we cannot |
eonstruct the sentence as—‘that - whichis. the Hating of. the Vaga;. `
-kartr should be the first.' - Specially as before the compound: (‘ pratham.:
bhaksah’) has. been accomplished, the ‘ Hating ` cannot be connected with |
the.‘ Vasatkartr’; because in that case the former would'be dependent
‘mpon the latter (not a factor of the compound), and as such could not he:
compounded (with the word ‘prathanta’) छ :
, ` Objection : ^ We often find that even though the principal factor of the
-“eompound be dependent upon some extraneous factor, it forms part of a
“compound; and hence in the case in question also, even. though the
‘¢ ating’ would be connected with the ‘ Vasafkartr,’ yet it could. be
compounded (with ^ prathamak’).”

Reply ; It could be so, if the ‘ Hating’ were the only factor dependent.
on an extraneous factor; in the present case, however, we find that the
‘first’ also is so dependent, on account of the relationship of the Vagat. .
kartr; as the cause of the ‘ first.’ is not the ‘ Hating,’ but the character '
of the Vagatkarir;; and. hence. the syntactical connection would” be
*Vasatkartur prathamah’ (‘the first wf the Vasatkartr’) ; and that:
“would involve a distinet-incongruity. While, if we were to take. the in-
_janction (of ‘ first’) as with reference to ‘that which is the Eating of the
-Vagatkartr’ (‘yo Vagatkarturbhaksah’) we would have the anomaly
~ot having ४ qualified reference (the reference being to the ‘ Eating quali-.
fied by the Vasatkarir’); as more. ‘Hating’ could not indicate the.
_Vasatkariy ; and as for the character of the ‘ Vasatkartr. that is found
to be concomitant with actions other than the Hating (and as such: could not.
necessarily indicate it). If the reference were to any one of the two only.
i e. elther the ‹ Hating’ alone, or the ‘ Vagatkartr’.-alone),- then: the’
- first’ would be enjoined. for all. Hatings (if the. reference were to Hating.
only), 98 also of all the operations of ‘the Vasatkarir (if the reference were:
“to the .Vasatkartr only); and: both of these would’ be equally. absurd.
“ Gonsequéntly, the sentence must be taken as laying down the ‘first Hating:
-of the Vasatkariy.’ And: 98. both,. (‘ first’ and * Vagatkartr’) qualifying.
‘each other, would be related to the same object (the action of Bating),.
Where woe would have’ Vasatkdra; there.alone we: could have the“ first:
Eating ।
2°.) Question: “TInasmuch:'as the ¥ asatkara is:the causal’ condition; how
*-could it be enjoined P And if if-is.not enjoined, how ¢ould there bea
“restrictive qualification (by means: of this)?! °° Sore o.c Usk

बि, Gel on Slee At Le

VASATRARA + GROUND: HOR RATING, 1478.

49006 Mutual restriction is always-due to the two being related

`. {5 the: same.action-; and it. does not. make any difference: whether the :
faotor 18 engotned or not. enjoined (vide Sutra ITI--i-—-12), Asa matter.

ef. fact, however, the ‘ Vasatkarirtva’ is not wholly incapable. of being

+ enjoined Because the fact.of ‘the Vasathdra being the causal condition `
“4g nob. Bignified by such agencies as the word ‘ yadi,’ the Locative ending, ’
- gud ‘the like: but the: fact is that the Vasatkartr having been enjoined `
ag pecessory to an action, the fact of its being a causal condition is only -
0 10701६4; - . Hence the objection urged above does not affect our theory

Objection “Tn the sentence ‘ tasmadskam 56100172 0/8 stoty-:

8 yam, we find the ‘three’ enjoined with reforenco to the ‘Rk,’ even
“though this occurs ina compound ; and in the same manner, we could.
: + have the Injunction of the ‘ First’ only.” |

Reply; Not so; because in the sentence quoted by you also, what is

“held. to be enjoined is what is signified by the compound (‘trea’); as what

is-taken ‘to be enjoined. by it are the ‘three. verses’ for all the Hymn-~

. ` ¢imas...Bub, then what happens is that the whole (‘ three verses ’) could
06 accepted. as the object of the Injunction, if both the factors (of the com-

pound) were such as are not got at by other means; but as a mattor of

_ fact, wo find that the factor of the ‘Rk’ is already got at by the general
“Injunction of Sama, ag also by the order of the text ; and hence, in accord

anes With the Satra I—iv—9, they are not taken as enjoined by the sentence

~ 19. question (whose injunctiveness is taken as restricted to the number

_ ‘three.’ only). In the sentence ‘ Vagathartuk prat hamabhaksah’, we find

, that what.is signified by. the compound is enjoined only to the extent

. Of the’ Vasatkara, and hence if, like the ‘Rk’ (in the case of the other

“santence), the ‘Eating’ (of the present sentence) also. were already en- `

joined and known as.existing everywhere, then it would be. abandoned.

»-by the Injunctive potency (in the sentence), As a matter of fact, we find
“that it is not known or enjoined as existing in regard to the nine cups and
the: vessels’; and being (in the sentence in question) presented only as the

Causal: condition, it. could not be-abandoned (by the Injunctive potency) ; `

“Mor could it be taken. as merely spoken of by way of 9 descriptive

> Refekence In the case of the other sentence also, if the‘ Rk’ were not
~ Rntown.to existin any place, then, inasmuch as there would be no difference

in, the nature’of the: compound, we should have had to admit the fact of

७१००५

0९ Tajonction-applying to the Rk verses also; but as a matter. of fact
“they are alreaily known to. exist in connection ‘with all the Hymnal
~ Sémas(and hence ‘these cannot be, taken as enjoined by the sentence)..
Then again, the. sentance enjoins the: member ‘three’ of the Rk verses;
and as the 2k" forma the principal factor. in the: compound ८ 7८2 )8
ap: ven. though it be dependent upon an extrancons factor, there. would be

185

L474 ANTHA-VARTINA, (ADR: गा क aT (10)

nothing incongruous in .its being compounded (with ‘ three’). In ‘the:
case in question, however, we: have. already explained that the-' First.” is
not-related to all‘ Hatengs | ।

For these reasons it must be admitted that the ‘ अद ^ -0 the
: ` Vagatkarty Priest, to be done first, is that which. is due to his faving
“performed the Vasatkara; and then that Hating to which he 18 entitled by
-.renson of the name (of the Cup) ;.and it 18 not the latter that. 18. to be.
done first of.all a
~ `. [Thus there are two ‘eatings ’ for the Vasatkartr Priest. |

VADHIKARANA (11). |
[The actions of Homa and Abhisava also are causes for eating. |

9८१५. (82): Homa and Abhisava also (entitle to drink)

"Those enumerated above are not the only causes for Hating; as the
. ४00 of Homa and Abhisava give rise to another Eating; because of
the ‘sentence ‘Havirdhané grivabhirabhisutya, Ghavaniyé hutvd, pratyai-
: cah parétya, sadasi bhaksdn bhaksayanti.’ (‘Having, in the storeroom,
: pounded the Soma by means of stones, and offering it into the sacrificial
- Fire, and coming back into the Assembly Room, they eat of their portions ’).-
7°. (1) Inasmach as the actions Homa and Abhisava themselves, with |
„ all ‘their accessories are already laid down elsewhere, they could not 06
“taken.as being enjoined by this sentence (which, therefore, must be taken .
08 laying down the Hating due to these actions)
“Objection: “Like the Dikg@vdkya, the sentence might be taken 9 |
` ^" laying down the order (in which the actions of Homa and Abhisava and.

4 Hating are 0 06 performed)
Replys But this is not possible; as the order of sequence is implied
; by the very nature of the actions themselves ; as there could be no Abhi:
‘gava (pounding and extracting) of that which has been offered into the fire,
“tor could there be an offering of that which has been Haten [hence the
order of the actions must be—(1) Pounding, (2) Homa, and (8) Hating]

“os QY And then as for the ‘coming back’ (‘pratyaticah parétya ’)

‘that also'is implied by the very nature of things ; as in coming from the
“place of the Sacrificial Fire to the Assembly Room (snch is the way in.
which the houses are constructad, that) one could not but ‘ come (or walk)
. bok”: (and. henoe the sentence cannot be taken as laying down this coming
: back) :
cei(8)Inasmuch as the Hott and other Priests aro performing their
: Operations in the Assembly Room, it is necessary to bring the Soma into.
that: Room, for-the sake of those Hatings of it that are due to the per-:
‘Yormanse of Vagatkara, and to the names (of the various Cups); and here.
it is 0180 necessary. for the Adhvarya Priest to convey the invitation for.
‘Mating: (to the various Priests concerned) ; and hence the mention (in the
dentence) of the 1 Assembly Room’ is only by.way of d descriptive reference:
(and: hence: thig. too cannot be taken as‘ the object. enjoined by. the.

ny oe F धि tone oi rut
ह (६
wee

a
a ॥ र (५.1 ay "yt
८५ HET dey vt 2 `

1476 TANTRAVARTiCA, “Abe: 1173 ~+)

| And thus ‘we find that the ‘only. factor, spoken ‘of in: the: ‘dentence.
_which is not ‘already implied or got at: by other means, is that of Hating; :
“and honce it is this alone that can-be regarded as the object of Injunction,’
| And the purpose served by the mention-of the. actions of ‘ Homa’
(‘hutod’) and: ° Abhisava’ (‘ Abhigutya’) is simply: ४6 show. that: the
- Hating enjoined in the sentence is to. be done by the same persons that.
perform these two. actions. And these two actions, of Homa and Abhi-
80४५ haying been found ‘to serve distinct purposes of their own, they can-
not be taken as mere accessories. to thé Mating. As for the Hating, we
have already found that it serves as the purification of the material: and
hence the mention of the relationship of other. things (Home and - Abhi
३५४९) is not for the purpose of showing its subsidiary character. Hence.
it must be admitted, from the very nature of the things concerned, that
‘the Homa and the Abhisava are the causal conditions of Hating. |

, , And for this reason, it. must be admitted that the Performer of the
actions of Homaand Abhigava should also eat the Soma. ° =

ADHIKARANA (12)
(The Vasatkartr and others should eat the Soma out of the Cups.]

a 2 tra (38) : ` ^" Because of the direct declaration with
¦ “regard to the Cups, the general declaration would
“apply to the others.’

‘ | We find the sentence ‘ Praitu hotugcamasah, pra Brahmanah, prod:
~-gittrnam” ; and then there arises the question as to whether the Performers
` ` of:the-Homa, Abhisava and the Vasatkara should oat of the gaid Cups or
, 7 That 18 to say]. [1 9. ९986 where we have a coalition of 1116 21076. -
< saidcausal conditions of Hating,—(1) should we take the two HKatings
` conjointly, (2) or as optional alternatives, (3) or as one setting aside the.
| ध other ? | |
‘The common notion being that, inasmuch ४8 they would all sorve the
game purpose, they should be taken as optional alternatives,—against this
--we have the following -- |
न . PURVAPAKSHA

| ` ^. ४ Inasmuch ag the sentencos, prattu hotuccamasak,’ ete., speak of the
_Cups.as specifically related to the Huty, etc., the generic declaration, as to
“the Hating consequent upon Homa and Abhisava should be taken as.
“duly observed by the Hating of these out of the Vessels; and as such the
» €Onnection of these with the Cups must be regarded as set aside by thie:
` -"" former specific declarations; And hence the eating (by the Performers
“of. Homa, eto.) should be out of the vessels (other than the aforesaid
SOupay er
6010, (34)! There should be (eating by the Performers of
vee oma, 600. out of the cups); because there is equal:
“2 Ouse for this; specially as the sentences quoted.
ame net ‘meant to. specify the Performers (Hol-:
oo ders): of: the Cups. (to. the preclusion of. all others);:
^ because they merely speak. of these (Holders, as also, -
among. others, related to the Cups) 4 ee

9 ०9 ० o 9 ०७०

a There would'be a possibility (of the ष्क, in question eahng out ४.
OE the Cups) ;. because.of tho presence of the causal conditions; In ४५१86:

1478. TANTRA:VABIINA, रा Vera Bi. (12)

where we: have. the causal‘ conditions; in the: shape ‘of ‘the Vasatkdra, we.
would have the said possibility, by Direct Injunction, bearwg. upon the:
relationship of the Vasaikdra, - Nor doés this Injunction operate only in.
a general way ; as it is directly laid down, in 9 specific form, inrégard. to.
the Soma for which the Vasatkdra has been performed. In fact: the: Name:
(‘ Rotugcamasah, etc.) would certainly be weaker in authority, ow. aceount of
its extreme remoteness from its objective; but with all that, we do accept
the indications of that Name to be authoritative, as we find that thero is
no other function to be served by it. And such being the ९०६6, णा that
the. sentences (‘ padiw hotuh, etc.’) must. be regarded, as Jaying. down. ‘the
eating of these priests, and not as setting aside anything else, in the shape.
of the Hating by the Performers in question, being out of the said Cups,
And then agai, in. the case of a material that consists of various parts, it
is quite possible for many persons to eat out of the same Cup; specially.
when the substance that is eaten is the bitter and hot Soma. In fact we
have a direct declaration to the effect that ‘ only a little should be eaten’;
and certainly if one were to eat up all that would be in the Cup, it could
ot be said to be‘ a little’; while if he leaves a little in the Cup, that little
woald stand in need of Disposal.; and as such there would be.rcom for.
another. Hating (out of the same Cup). Hence it is necessary that there
should be room for the eating, by the Performers in question, out of :the
8610. Cups -
| [Though the Bhasya has another 80170 here, yet. the Vartika does
: not take it up; and the reason for this omission seems to lie in the fact
.of.the Siitra not being found in the Sfitra text.) |

ADHIKARANA (13)
[The first Hating is that by the Hoty Priest.}

Stated (88): There being a single vessel, it ts. the
ok“ Adhwaryu that should. eat first; as such is the.
a **order of sequence.” _ | [र

: 1४ has: been proved ‘that more than one person should eat out of the
game 88861 ; and we now deal with the order, eto, in which the Rating
-2is-to be-done-by them. (And on the question, as to which Priest. should
< eat.the Soma first of all) we have the following— |

PURVAPAKSHA

"STF the Adhvaryu eats it first, then there would be no disorder in the
“performance, due to an unnecessary increase in the number of the pass.
0 ings from hand to.hand; otherwise (inasmuch as it is the Adhvaryu who.
“holds the Cup after the Homa has been offered), if he did not have the
- ५ fipgt Rating, but had to. pass on the Cup to others, then it would be neces:
“sary for the Cup to be offered back again to him (for his own Eating out.
“of it) (and then it: would be passed on to others) ; and this would involve.
“a deal of unncessary disorder. Hence it must be admitted that it is the
~": Adhvarys priest. who should do the firat Hating.” |

elle ss. 6 श्र | ॥
Sutra. (9) :. The Hoty priest (should eat first); because
ele of. the words of the Mantra. — | |
i, Inasmuch as, after the more authoritative proof has been put for-.
<Ward, the introduction of the weaker becomes very difficult, the Anthor.
héging ‘with the: putting forward of the words of the Mantra, . |
th Mantra that ig vecited in praise of the Stone shows that the first `
Mating is tobe done ‘by the Priests performing the Hautra operations.
This Mantra is.as follows :—' 88 vadanis [at the time of the Pounding they ~
emit'the sound) gatavatsahasravaccdbhikrandanti. [this qualifies the afore- -
said: sound | haritébhirasabhik [with faces made blue by the touch of the :
Soma} vistetharmant: *gravdnah: sukriah [behaving well]: sukptyaya (by:

Shis-pood ‘behaviour) hotugeit: purvé haviradyam acata [ate up the portion -

1480 TANTRASVARTINA ADA HH Pa 9 Vo apa 13)

‘that was to have been: eaten: by the Hotr-first-of all}; and the: Mantra dis
tinetly .shows. that the -‘ first’ Hating is. to be.done by. the: :Vaserkart,
(he. being one of. the -Hotr. Priests) (and this “is also. pomted out hy the
sentence -.“ Vasatkariuh ‘‘praithamo -bhaksah’).-- Yndicative -of- the ‘same
thing we have also the Mantra, ‘ Hoténa nah prathamampahi’—i-e. just.
, 88 the. Hotr is the first to: drink’ the Soma, so, etc., ete~-which, by ‘the
simile put in, distinetly shows that the Hoty is the first to eat an

Ss Sitra (38): Also because of a distinct Declaration (to
| ` । that effect) |

We have already spoken of .the qualified Injunction ‘Vasatkdirtuh
prathama bhaksah’; (and this distinctly declares that the first eating
is to be done by the Vasatkarty: who is one of the Hoty priests). “And as
the. several factors have been laid down before, there can be no incon
-gruity.in the fact of the sentence enjoining more than one thing. In
fact, the compound (‘ prathamabhaksahk’) supplies a further reason. (fo1
the multifariousness of the Injunction) ; that is to say, inasmuch as the
Compound lays down a single Karaka. which has been mentioned in the
‘same word with auother,: the present case is not subject to the law
enunciated in: Sutra IT—ii-~-6 | ।

‘4 Sutra (39) : .4750 because of the order of sequence in
: the prompting causes |

The effects always appear in the same order. as their causes; and
‘we find that the prompting cause (of eating), in the shape of the
performance of a certain action .in. connection. with the sacrifica which
is the first to appear is the Vasatkird (a function of the Hotr Priest);
which is followed by the Homa, the function of the Adhvaryu ;—as is.
-distinetly pointed out by the Injunction ‘Vasa thria juhoté.’. [And as such
tho. eating of: the Vasatkartr—~Hotr would necessarily precedo:that of
the Adhvaryu: |
; Objection: “ The action of Pounding ( Abhisabha by the Adhvaryn)
` ५ preceded ‘even. that of the Vasathara.” = ` - :
: Reply’: Trae, it: did appear before ; but that alone did: not’ make’ it.
‘the prompting cause. of. the Hating of Remnants yas it is:the: Pounding
as taken along with the Homa that constitutes the prompting canse:(of
_ the Eating),—as. will be ‘shown under Sutra VI-—-iv-—25. [And “though.
=the ‘Pounding: be done: before the .Vasalkdra, yet .as.the.-Homa ‘is done
vafter this latter, the Eating due to the two-actions of Poundiig and Hon.
. would: necessarily come after that'due to the Vagatkdra] calle RE oe

Some. people: mi ‘i 10९ led ‘away, by the sentence ‘ hobugoté parve .

हण EATING: BY HOTRE: 1481

oJ @ a = १

“denoting the: Vasathart:

ADHIKARANA’ (14),
[The ating should be done after the Permission has been given. |

““Siitra (40) Lhe Hating should be done only when
“permitted; because of thé direct declaration to.
that Effect i

(In the case ‘of many persons eating out of the same vessel there -
~ aplses a question as to whether every one of them should éat only after the
“permission to do 80 has been given, or without any such. permission ‘and ‘for.
“simplicity’s sake, the Pirvapaksha is that “there should be no restriction —
a8 to this”; but the Siddhanta‘is that the Fating should be done only when:
' permitted ; because of the direct declaration to that effect--viz.. ‘ Tasmat:
8०१५० ndnupahuteaa ९४46 ` ( Therefore the-Soma should not be drunk by
‘one who is not invited todo it’):}) ` |
| (hig Sittra has been put in, simply for: the: purpose of explaining the ।
sense of the sentence ‘ tasmat, ‘etc , and for that. of preparing the ground |
for the next Adhikurana: - +.

-ADHIKARANA (15). |
[The Permission should be by the words of the Veda. }

. Siitra (41): Zhe Permission should: be conveyed. by
means of. the words ‘Upahiita upuhvayasva’;
because of the indicative force of these (words).

In. answer to the question as to by. means of which words the Permis-
- #100, .18--to- be conveyed, it is declared that. it is to be done by the words
:. 4 Upahata -upahvayasva.’ Both. of these words have been put in witha
view to ‘show what is to be said by the Person conveying the Permission
or: Invitation), as well as by one who is permitted (or invited). (The
“पपत: Upahtita’ = you are invited, being the former, and ‘ Tpahvayasva. ’.
“= please invite, being the latter.] | |
1: 48 sense of the Sdtra is that, in कष्‌ case, the Invitation should not
be conveyed by means of the words of ordinat y parlance

ADHIKARANA (16)
` [1116 Acceptance should.also be by means of Vedic words. ]

Sittra (42): The words conveying the acceptance (of
` ` the Invitation) ave implied in the same (that: have
been quoted before)

<. . [In the place of ‘ vacanam’, some people read‘ vadanam.’] .
"The Parvapaksha is that “either both the Invitation and its

: Acceptance, or only one of these should be made by means of the words

~* of ordinary parlance os

`, ` And in reply to this-we have the Siddhanta as follows 2
_... Inasmuch as the mero verbal order is always set aside by the order of

its Denotation, the word ‘ Upahata’ should be taken as the one conveying
the Permission (and the word ‘ Upahvayasva’) as the one signifying the
Acceptance. | |

a

-ADHIKARANA (17).
[The Permission is necessary for those Eating out of the same vessel, |

- Sittra (43): The Permission should be for those who
| eat out of the same vessel; as tt is onty those that
are associated together (in that Eating)

| If the Permission herein laid down were such as had not been fonnd -
ध elsewhere, then it might have been obtained from any person; as a mattei
of: fact. however, we find that the ‘ Permission’ here. restricted (as to’
` 06: given by means of Vedic words) is only such as is generally found in
ordinary life.- And hence its possibility could never be set aside in a case
_ where it is found to exist, It is only among the priests cating out of the
Aa same: vessel that the shares being equal (in accordance with the Satra:

“ig to: be done by mutual Permission (or Agreement). Even though the
~ Eating. by one person. would not cause any impurity in the Soma, and ०8
-gueh there:is no imperceptible (supersensacous) harm done by such Kat-
dng, yet. the fact of a number of people eating together out of the same
“vessel, is actually found to give rise to such perceptible disagreeable
“resulte,.as the hurting of one another's feelings ; and as such, there 185, in.
हए 09868) a necessity for the said Permission. Hence it mast be admitted `.
thatthe Permission is necessary ouly for those eating out of the same ९.
avesgel ee | 7 7

ADHIKARANA (18). |

[The Sacriticer himself should also eat the Soma.)

“ Siitra (44): “The transference of the Tajya-mantras

‘‘from the Hoty) does not transfer the Hating.

: `: “(from him), just like the Appointment,’ |

2 | ws In connection with the Riugrahéjyas of the Jyotistoma, we find that.
the appointment of the six Priests with the Sacrificer.as the seventh is laid

.down-for the performance of the Ydyya; and we also find it declared that:

«the ^ Yajy@ belongs to the Sacrificer ’ ; with regard to the last there are two

. alternatives—the Sacrificer himself reciting the Yajya mantras, or relegat

` ing-the reciting to the Hotr Priest. And in case he should do-it himself,
‘there arises the question as to whether, or not, this taking up, by. the
Sacrificer, of the Yayyt-recitation (which might have been done: by the
` Hoty Priest), leads to the transference, from the Hoty, also of the per-
-: formance of the Vagatkdra , and the Hating consequent upon this latter

And on this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA. ` # om

~ . «Phere can be no such transference of: the Eating ; because theres

। “no. Vedic declaration to that effect; अत्‌ ‘certainly the removal of one.
_ “thing does not necessarily imply the transference of the other; as there

is no.sort of connection between the. two ; 80 in the case in question what

eect = च ि = च 2 :
= अ + + . ` - नि eld श" -

. “ we find laid down is the transference of the Yajya only, and-not-of the.
- “ Vagatkdra and the Hating also. Corisequently, just as the transference
“of the Yajya does not transfer the appointment of the -Hotr, ao: in: the
game manner, it would not transfer his Hating

“Objection; “At.the time. that the Sacrificer performs: the: Yayya:

~ ५ himself, there is.no transference (of it’ from’the: Sacrificer),-—becatse of.
` the declaration—the Yajyd belongs to the Hotr ; but when. he directs:.the
“Hotr: (to do.it’ for him), then, certainly,-there. would. ०९. 9 transference ;
“and as such what. we have to consider isthe question, as to: whethdr; or:
“not, the transference of the Yajyd from. the Sucreficer involves: thé trans-
oS ference of his ating also ne "9

^ (9010: The: 1 4 ya; the. Hating: and. the’: Vasatkara are: found : +0

belong’ to. the: Hoty, ‘on aceount. of “the nuine:“Hautra:!:(given: to all the

SACKENIORR 4186: FO. RAT SONAL: 1487

three) ; and: ont of these it ie only the Fayya that bas’boon set aside,
“and transferred to the Sacrificer, by the declaration ‘ the Fajya belongs:

shat ie. to say before the appearance. of the sentence ‘ the 110४0 :
“ belongs to:the Sacrificer,’ the name ‘ कद्व ' indicated all the three ‘ta .
‘helone tothe Hotr ; and when the said sentence did. appear, it trans.
ferred. the -Yajya only to the Sacrificer, and left the Vasatkara and”
« Bading in the same position a8 00016 (i.e. connected with the Hotr). If:
“wa, were to explain the ‘ transference’ as being from the Sacrificer (to the
^ Hotr, and not. as: from the Hotr, to the Sacrificer, as explained above) |
++ (लः the only factor that belonged to him (1.9. the Yajya) would
be. tratisferred from him; and as such, there being no idea of the.

~+ possibility -of the Vasatkara and. the Hating belonging to him, such.
“there:could -be ०0 ` question as to whether these. latter should he
transferred from him or not, Consequently, we niust explain thug: `
“The sentence—‘ the Fayyi belongs to the Sacrificer ’—having transferred -
“the: Yajya-only (from the Hofr to the Sacrificer),—the Vasatkara `
“being something wholl y distinct from the Yayya, and hence there ‘being —
““no-poasibility of the relationship (betweon these two) of the primary _
“and the siibsidiary (a whole and part),-—the process adopted wonld. be
६ ^ that: after the sacrificer has finished the Yajya, the Hotr would ‘do the :
" Vagatkara and the consequent Hating, Inasmuch as the Eating is due -
tothe performance of the Vasatkara and not to that of the Yajya, it

“eannot. be transferred to the _Sacrificer by the transference (to him) `

“ofthe एक्क = ` , रि

4 ` ` -शणफ्ठदवप्ा. Sn aor
99110 (45): (The Eating) should belong to the Sacrificer, `
. because of the transference of the cause (of Eating, `
४0.906 Sacrificer). 4A ee, # 8

= =

र he completion of all that is denoted by the verb रम! (to sacrifice), —
Mere should: be: 20 resting by the Performer यत्‌ as a matter of...
PR th if the दुक धाते. the Vasatkara ‘were .:,

r
ग
ae

2
०,

1488: TANPRAVA RICA." ADH. HU BRB Vat ADEE. (18)

“performed. by: two. different -persons (the Sacrtficer and: the. ‘Hotp).. And
‘for..this réasotiy.it, must be admitted ‘that. the Vagathdra, and the Hating.
-stiould belong. to the same. person to. whom the Yajya belongs,—even
‘though the actions be not ‘one and the same, and there he no relationship.
of ‘the whole and ‘part; and hence we conclude that there shoul be 8
transference. of the. Vasathdra and.the Hating also (from. the Hotr to
the Sacrificer) | ए 9. Se at

। Sutra (46) :. As for the Appointment, it cannot be set aside.
~ _. 0668186. it has been already made |

7 Tho Purvapaksin has argued. that “ juat as there is no transference of
‘the Appointment, so far there can be none of the Vasatkdra and the Kat
ing”. And to: this we make. the following reply :— - |
The Appointment having been already made in the past there is no
transference of it at the time of that of the Ydajya; while as for the
Hating, 1४ hasyet got to.be done; and hence we accept the transference
of that
` That is to say, a transference of the eause would lead to the. trans-
ference of that alone which would be capable of being transferred from
one thing to the other. -As a matter of fact, we find that, at-the time of
the transference of the Ydjya, the Appointment of the Hotr is not cap
able of being transferred or set aside ; nor would the Appointment, even
if done in. connection with the Sacrificer after its proper time has 1092860
be.in the correct form. As for the Hating on the other hand, we find
that 16 is both capable of being transferred, and of being connected with
‘another person, without any incongruity; and hence there can be no
analogy between the case in question and that of the Appoiniment

--. “There is, however, something to be said against the above explana
_tion ; 11.18 this: | “ Why should the Appointment be. incapable of being
“transferred, when, asa matter. of fact, we find that it is.after every- one
“optional alternative. has been definitely fixed upon, as to be :follawed,-—
“that the performance of the sacrifice is‘begun? It is quite. possible, at
“the. very time that the sacrificial appointments are ‘made, for: us_:to
“decide as to whether the Yajya would be recited by the Sacrificer.or by
“the Hotr; and. when this. has been done, the. Appointment: could. be
“made accordingly,—any one of ‘the two persons being appointed.’ If
the Recitation: of the Yayya. werd.a conditional action, like: tha -Uru-
krama, the Visauydga andthe like; then in that. case, ingsmnch’ aa; me #
: "to the appearance. of the condition; the Recitation’ कन्त not: haverctc-

SACHIFICHER ALSO TH RAT SMA, | LAK

on quired an existence, it might not being about the said Appointment
“Ags a matter of tact however, the Reeitation is not conditional, but
‘absolutely secessary,—andas such could always bring ahout the Appoint-
“ment in accordance with itself,

“Then, it has been argued that ‘(the Appointment could not be set
‘aside from the Hofr, beeanse how could i be set aside from the Hofp
‘savhen it is absolutely Necessary for the sake of his own पुति ६ But
‘then there is no distinet Appointment solely for the sake of the Yrgya
“the transferenee whereof world be suspected. .As even fora thousand
‘recitations of the Yajgya we coald have asingle Appointment, in common
“for all of them. And this Appotutment ts done with a view to certain
"ज sipersensnous results; and then, inasmuch as it is done after the
^ Appointment for the whole performance of the Joytishtonie has been
‘made, there would be no difference perceived in it, and as such it
‘could be done in common for all (the Recitations).

‘Then, it has been urged that ‘the appointment of the Saevifieer
“being made after the proper time for th has passed, it would be
“defective” But this argument is contrary to what has been said
“in the Sééra (५ (006 mukhyesya® {11 -- 1८). Spectally as in
“that case there is no distinet pevtormance of the origimal Primary and
“its Modifieation,

‘As for the declaration, that tin the original sacrifice everything
“should be done in weeardanee with the direct declarations bearing apon
“the subject,’--this is contrary to the Swrvushakiyadhikarana, where
“it 16 shown that anything ean be done aceording as the time for
“it presents itself.”

In view of these arguments, we must explain the Safra in the (0110१
ing manner: At the very outset (in stra 15) we have shown that ‘the
transference of one thing doca nut necessarily imply that of the other ,' --
this dietum being taken for granted, as qimte well known and based
upon other reasons; and in the present Gara, what ts pointed ont 18 that
‘there can be no transference of the Appotntment as 1६ has been
uready made,’—that is to say, done for the sake of a different Yuzyd.
Consequently, when the Sacrificer would perform the sacrifice, and
would give directions (to the Hotr,) then too, there would he an Appoint-
ment fur the sake of a different Yajyi. But there is this difference
(between the Appointment on the one hand, and the Vusatkhira and the
Huting on the other), that the Appointment dues not like the Vasat-
५१८५८ and the Hating, follow the trend of the Yay.

187

ADHIKARANA. (19)

[The Phalacamasa constitutes a modification. of the material . for
Sacrifice. | | | | ` `

Stra (41): “The Phalacamasu that is prepared under
Seertain conditions constitutes a modification
‘Sof the KEating-mnaterial; because of the Direct
Declarations.”’

In connection with the Jyotistoma we find it laid down that under
the condition of the sacrifice being performed by the A'sattriye or the
Vaishya,—instead of the ‘Qup of Soma,’ we should prepare the Phala-
camasa (the ‘ Fruit-Cup ’),—which is thus laid down:—‘ Having pounded
the sprouts, or the fruits, of the vata tree, we should mix it with the
curd, and then offer it to the Ksattriya or the Vaishya sacrificer, for eating.
And with regard to this Phalacamasa, there arises a question, as to
whether it is a modification of the material for Hating, or of that for the
Suerifice (i.e. is it meant only for being eaten, or for being offered in
Sacrifice)

And on this question, we have the following

PURVAPAKSA

^ (1) Because we have the direct declaration—" sf he wishes to eat
“ then the said pha!acamasa should be given to him for eating’, —(2) because
“the direct declaration of the pronoun ‘tam’ (in the sentence ‘ tamasamat
“bhaksam prayacchét’)} points to that which has been: mentioned be
५ fore,—(3) because we have the direct declaration of the eating,—(4)
“ 0660088 it is the eating (of Soma) that is spoken of immediately before
“the sentence under consideration,-(5) because the. Soma (for eating). 18
“mentioned in the same sentence as the Phalacamasa;—therefore we
“gonclude that the Phalacamasa becomes an object, for eating ; and. there
-“by taking the place of the Soma, it would replace only that Soma which
“is eaten, and not that which 1s offered in sacrifice, Because that which is
"declared in regard ४०.०06 thing. cannot set aside the Soma: which is with
“regard to: something else. oe
| “Then again, the ponnection of the Phalacamasa with. the Saersfice
` ^ 18. ghowi by the fact ‘of its appearing in the. Context ‘(of ..the Jyotts

`. PHALACAMASA + MODIFICA'YON OF SACRIFICIAL MATERIAL, 1491

“ (0081) ; and the indication of the Context is certainly much less authori- |
“tative; and as such it could not set aside the Soma, which is directly
“Jaid down in the original Injunction, from.the Principal action of the
"८ Sacrifice (and as such in regard to the Sacrifice, the Phalacamasa could
‘not be substituted for the Soma)

‘As for the neglect of the Disposal of the Soma (caused by the ४५४.
“ stitation of the Phalacamusa for it, at the time of the Desposnl-eatiny),
“it would not be very sinful, even if there were no Vedic text authorising
“sach'substitution ; and hence it is all the less so, when we have a Direct
“Declaration (of the Phalacamasa as to be substituted for the Soma at
“the time of eatzng).

“For these reasons, the Phalucamasa should be regarded as a modi-
५ fleation of the material that is eaten (and not of that which is offered
‘in sacrifice).

SIDDHANTA.
Stitra (48) : It ts a modification of the material for
Sacrifice; as all purification is for the sake of that

The Bhasya begins with showing the Indicative force of the words.
It is only when the Phalacamasa is a modification of the sacrificial
material, that it can obtain a relationship with the Soma-sacrifice. And
it is only when the presence of the Soma is set aside by the fact of its
place having been taken by the Phalacumusa that we can have the phrase
‘na sonutm’ by way of a descriptive reference; just like the expression
‘nu gird giréti’ in the sentence, ‘Acram kriva udgayati-, na gird gireti.’

Objection: = ५ Without connection with a sacrifice how could the
“ Phalucamaga be a modification of the sacrificial material ८ That is to say,
“the Indicative force (of: the expression ‘na somam’) could not be
“applicable to the case in question without some sort of connection with |
‘a sacrifice.”

In reply to this, the connection with sacrifice is shown by the quoting
of the whole passage——' sa yadé Rajanyam vt Vaishyam va ydjayél, nyagro-
dhastibhih, etc., ete:—tabhirydjayét.’ (‘In case one be called upon to
०७18८6४६ ४ sacrifice performed by the Agattriya or the Vaishya, ho should
fetch the Vafa-sprouts and have the sacrifice performed by means of
these’). It is not. necessary that the connection must be with only such
2 Verb“as appears afterwards specially as it is not the mere fact of the.
verb oecurring in the -first part of the sentence that forms the basis of
the signification of.‘ precedence in time,’ by the affix ‘kévd’ (iu the words
apaniyojya,’ etc., etc.); as we find in the sentence ‘gucchati puktvd =
_Whege the precedence, in time, is that of the ‘eating, in comparison with the
“gotny’ sand. hence in the-case in question, the connection with a sacrifice -

14.92 ` TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. Ul—PADA, v-—aDuT-: (19).

is shown by the sentence itself. Though the actual word used in the
-sentence 18 the causative (‘ yagzayét’), yet the connection should be taken
ag being with the simplo ‘ sacrifice,’ just as in the sentence gramakamam
yajayét ; because as for the subsidiary performer (who would be: the
nominative of the causative ‘ ydjayé’), he is already known, and not lead
ing to any result, cannot form the object of Injunction

Such being the case, the expressions ‘tamasmat bhaksam’ and
‘na xomam’ would thereby serve the purpose of a descriptive reference to
the ‘offering of the Phalucamasa’ and the ‘absence of soma,’ both of
which are previously laid down.

The above explanation is not admissible ; as it involves the following
anomalies: (1) Remote syntactical connection; (2) the rejection of the
signification of ‘tamasmue’; (3) absence of injunctive potency; (4) the
assumption of the injunctive potency for that which serves the sole purpose
of pointing ont the prompting cause; (5) assumption of the sense of the
Instrumental ending ; (6) rejection of the Accusative; (7) the removal
of all Soma; and (8) the assamption of the factor of simple ‘sacrifice
from the causative ^ yajayét

That is to say—(L) though between tho latter ‘yAjayét’ and the
former conditional declaration ‘ sa yudz, etc.’, we have the sentence ‘ sa yad?
somam vibhaksayisét,’ yet we take the former two as syutactically con-
nected, irrespective of the interruption. (2) Thongh the Pronoun in
‘tamasmat ’ is, by direct declaration, known to have the power of referring
to the person spoken of in the context, the above explanation would neces-
sitate the rejection of this power, as also the immediate sequence.
(3) The presence of the conditional ‘if’ in the sentence ‘sa yadz, etc.’,
sets aside the injunctive potency of the sentence; and hence it could not
be taken as laying down the sacrifice as connected with the Phalacanasa
(unless we were to assume an injunctive potency in the sentence), (4) The
sentence ‘sa yudi, ete’, having served all its purpose by having pointed out
the conditions, any further assumption of the injunctive potency would be
most incongruous. (5) It will be necessary to assume the absolutely
non-existing word ` (7401 ' (with the Instrumental ending) along with
the latter ‘y@juyat.’ (6) Though in the expression ‘tamasmai,’ the
word ‘tam’ (with the Accusative ending) signifies the predominance
(of the eating-material), yet that would be lost: sight of; and further, the
word ‘prayacchét’ being clearly found to have the character of the -
injunctive, it would not be correct to take it as a mere descriptive
reference. (8) Nor is it quite wdmissible to extract the subordinate factor
of the mere ‘ sucrificc” from the causative ‘ y@jayée’ and then connect it

PHALACAMASA A MODIFICATION OF SACRIPICIAL MATERIAL. 1493

with the Pialecamusa, (7) Inasmuch as the Phalacumisa would be
recognised as connected with the whole of the Jyotistuma, the Somu would |
be wholly rejected, and the whole of the sacrifice would be performed with
the Phalacamasa., All these right anomalies are most incongruons and in-
admissible.

The author of the Bhisya also says—' yAjyayitumiti gamyaté,’ and not
that there 18 ४ connection with the causative ‘ yijayét.” Aud the author
of the siitra also has put forward the reason because ull purification 7s
for the suke of the sacrificial material’, aud not that ‘ because it is connec-
ted with ydyuyé.’ And for these reasons we cannot admit the above
explanation.

Some people explain thus:—‘ Inasmuch as there is a sacrifice
“mentioned in the Context, the sentence in qnestion dors not establish
“the necessary relationship with the sentence (of that sacrefice) ; and
‘hence on meeting with the sentence ‘tum prayacchét, when there arises
“a question as to for what purpose, this should be yiven (prayacchét) ;
“the answer to this is that it 18 giveg for the purposes of ११५५५
“(officiating at the sacrifice of the Kesattriyw), as is shown by the
Context.”

Bat this explanation also is open to the following objections: (1) All
the Soma in the sacrifice would be replaced by the Phalacamasa; (2)
the absence of connection (of the Phalacamasa) with the eating, which is
expressed by the word ‘tam’ and as such is cognized by means of the
same sentence as the Phalacamasa itself ; (3) and in that case (there being
no such connection, we could not explain the Masculine affix in ‘fam’
(as the Pronoun would apply to the ‘ nyugrathashthivik, which is not
masculine); (4) and the ‘tam’ would be construed along with ‘ praya-
०८७९८)! notwithstanding the intervention of ‘bhuksam’ (the construction
being ‘tam ydjayitum prayacchét’).

For these reasons, it becomes necessary that the Siddhanta should be
explained in such a way as would not do away with connection of
‘bhakgam.’ Because at the very ontsot we have to consider these
questions—(1) Is the ‘eating’ that is enjoined (in ‘tumasmai bhuksam
prayacchét’) one that has not been laid down before; or isit the same that-
has been spoken of before? (2) Is the ‘eating’ enjoined as a purt-
ficatory rite, or an independent action by itself, or as a purificutory rite
auaillinry to the sacrifice 7

If it be an altogether new ‘eating’ that is enjoined, then it comes to
be an indirect aid to the sacrifive, which is not admissible; as (1) that
Would involve the assumption of a transcendental result (following from
tho eating); (2).the use to which it wonld be put would be very far from.
that indicated by the Coutext; and (3) it would be aiding something with

1494 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, UI-—PAiDs V—~apHt.. (19)

hich it has no direct connection. Then again, the Accusative ending j,,
‘tam’ distinctly shows that the material to-be eaten is something to be
purified ; as otherwise. we should have had.the word ‘/ému’; and: hence
the ‘eating’ must be regarded as a purificatory action. It is in the
vel y nature of pureficatory actions, that, they take up substances:-that have
been used, or those that have to be used; but as that which would
be ‘eaten’ could not possibly be used again, the ‘eating” must le
agarded as pursficatory of thal which has been used. Thus then, when the
Phalacamasa would be betaking itself to the purificatory eatin,, it could
be thus addressed—‘ thou couldst be purified by the eating, only if thou
wouldst be used for some purpose or other, and not otherwise’; and
thus looking for its being used, the Phalucamusa becomes, through the
Context, taken up as ananxilliary to the Sacrifice. And then, before it has
been used, and thereby become capable of being purified by the eating of
the sacrificer,—-it becomes related to the sacrificial portions, by means of
the Apparent Inconsistency (of its being eaten by the sacrificer); and this
fact having become duly ascertained, the Phalacamasa would be taken as
forming the material for the repetition of the offering oat of the Cup of the
Sacrificer ; 06081186 the fact of its not being used in the other vessels or
Cups would not interfere with its being eaten by the Sacrificer (and it is
only the apparent Inconsistency of this that has been made the ground of
its connection with the sacrificial portions), And in this manner, use
would be found for the Soma also (as the other vessels and Cups would
contain the Soma, only that of the Kguttriya or Vasegya sacrifiver being
filled with the Phalacamasua). |

Or, it may be that the word ‘ Bhaksa,’ pronounced in connection
with the context of the Jyotisfoma, would be based upon the original
‘bhaksa' of the Soma; ‘and as this latter Bhaksa is known as purificatory
of the remnant of the muterial used at the Sacrifice, the bhaksa (eating) of
the Phalacamasa too could be purificatory of it only as the remnant of
that which has been used in the sacrifice; and it- could not: be taken as
serving any purpose other than that purification; nor, lastly, eould it be
taken as nn independent action by itself; as we find none of the.
causes ~such ४७ ‘other words,’ etv., described in Adhyaya Il -that would
show it to be an independent action |
` , And further, the clause —‘sa yadt somam vibhakgayisét’—distinetly
shows that the ‘eating’ of the Phalacamagu is correlative to the-‘ eating of
: Soma’, which is thus mentioned in the same. sentence with. itself; ax
otherwise, the mention of ‘ Soma’: wotld-be absolutely meaningless:

Nor 18 it possible for the clause ‘na. somam’ to be taken’as-a mere
descriptive-reference; ,because.if-the ‘ eating of the Phalucamasa” that 18
1919. down-ig. the sentence. were & wholly different: ‘eating, "laid down as

PHALACAMASA A. MODIFICATION OF SACREFICIAL MATERIAL, ` 149;

an indirect aid to the sacrifice, then, in that case, it wonld not oust the
Soma; as the.two would not have the same functions to subserve (the eating
of Soma being a Disposal, while that of the Phalacamusa, being, according
10 this view, an indirect aid); and when the Soma would not be ousted
there.could be no mere descriptive reference of its prohibition. |

Nor can the. clause ‘na somam' be taken as an Injunetion; because
that would involve a syntactical split, and the assumption of a transceden-
tal result; and further, the sentence would become wholly irrelevant
nid absurdly out of place; as the construction of the whole would be
something like this:—‘ yadi somam bhaksanéna samskurtumicchét (if one
should wish to purify the Soma by eating), tatah phulacamusobhakgana-
maradupakdrakam kuryat (then he should do the cating of the Phalacu-
masa, Which is an indirect aid to the sacrifice), phalacumasam छि samskur-
yat (or he should purify the Phalacamasa)!! And if the sentence is
construed as——‘ yéna bhakshanéna yathabhilum somam samskartumicchét
ténu tdthdbhiituméva phalucamasam samskurydt’ (‘one should purify, by
eating, the Phalacamasa in the same character, and in the same way
18 he wishes to do with regard to the Soma’),-- then, in that case, by
Apparent Inconsistency, we wonld come to take it as the Phalacamasa as
related to (and forming the material for) the repetition of the offering made
out of the Cup of the sacrificer.

For these reasons it must be admitted that the Phalacamasa
constitutes a modification (substitute) for the Soma, as regards the
offerings. at the sacrifice

Says the Bhdsya: ‘Satsi vyavadharanakalpand.’ That is to say,
just as in the case of the sacrifice performed for the Acceptance of the
Horse-gift, though the assertion was ‘as many horses as he should accept.
yet it was taken in the sense of ‘us many as he should give,’ and
accordingly the Isfi was taken as to be performed by the (tiver,—so, in the
same manner, in the case in question, though the declaration is to the
effect that ‘zt should be offered for eating’ (‘ bhaksam prayacchét’), yet it
18 taken. in tho sense that ‘it should be offered us the material to be
offered in sacrifice |

The same reasoning holds respecting such sentences putikama-
bhisinuyat’. (‘one should pound the putika, if Soma be unavailable’) and
the rest (where the putikd is to be taken as laid down, not simply as an
object to be pounded, but.as one to be offered)

Siitra. (49): Because of the Homa. |
The Injunction of the™* kuga-sprout,’ with reference to the Homa.

of the material in the ‘other cups’ (in the sentence , yada anyamecamasan
‘Vuheatt athaitasya darbhatarunakénopahutya juhvati'), distinctly show,

1496 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 1T-—-PANA V—ADHT. (19).

that the Phalacumasa is meant to he a substitute for the amalertal to 4,
offered at the sacrifice,

Satire (80) : Because we find (the Phaulacaimasa) spoken of
as to be held ap atthe same time as the other caps.

It is only when the Phalacumasa is similar, in character, to the
other cups, that we can explain the fact of its holding up being spoken of
along with that of the other cups, with regard to which latter there is
no doubt as to the materials contained in those beimge offered at the
sacrifice,

Sutra (61): Also because of the indicative force of words.

We have already explained how the reference to the prohibition of
Soma (111 the words ‘na somam’) indicates that the Phalacamasa is to be
dealt with im the same way as the Soma—that is to say, by being offered
ati the sacrifice.

ADHIKARANA. (20).
[The R@janya-cups should be eaten out of by the Bradhmanas.]

Stttra (62): “In regard to the ‘ Anuprasarpana,’ (the Eating
“should be regulated by Caste.”

In connection with the Dagapéya (which is a part of the Rajasiiya
sacrifice), we have the sentences—‘Catum Brahmanih somam dhaks-
ayant,’ and, ‘ Dugadagaikaticamasumanuprasarpéyuk’; and in regard to
these, there arises the question as to whether the RBajunyu-cups also should
be eaten out of by the ten Braihmanas, or by Ksattriyas.

Question : ‘‘ What is the ground for this doubt P ”

In answer to this, some people put forward the diversity of construc-
tion that the sentences admit of. For instance, if the sentence ‘ daga-
dagaikam, ete.,’ be an Injunction, then, ten men of each caste having been
enjoined by this Injunction, the sentence ‘ gatam Brahmanak ` would be a
mere descriptive reference to those therein enjoined,—the name of
‘Brahmana’ being used in view of the fact of the number of that caste
exceeding that of the other castes ;—just as we find in the case of the
expression the ‘ Braihmana-village’; and in that case it would be ten
Ksatiriyas that would eat out of the Itajanya-cups; on the other hand,
if the sentence ‘ catam Brahmandh were an [njunction, then, in that case,
the other sentence ‘ daga, ete.,’ would be a descriptive reference ; and inas-
much as there is no possibility of an indirect secondary signification in
the case of an Injunction, it would be the Brahmanas alone that would
eat out of all the cups; and hence out of the ten Rajanya-cups also, the
eating would be done by ten Brahmanas.

Thus then, on the above question, we have the following

PURVAPAKSA.

“Tnasmuch as the word ‘ anuprasarpéyuh ' (in the latter sentence)

“has the Injunctive form, while the word ‘ bhaksayanti’ (in the former

"८ 86167166) has the descriptive form, we must take the sentence ‘daca

‘ dacaikam as the Injunction; and then there arising the question as to

“which ‘ten’ should do the eating, we are led, by the fact of the

“number always pertaining to homogenous things” to conclude that the
188 | (म |

1498 ` | “OPANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. 11 --द्7॥ ¥—~ADHI, (20)

“gating out of the Brahmana-cups shonld be done by fen. Brdhmanas, while
“that out of the Rdjanya-cups, by ten Ksdtiriyas
“The word ‘Sdmanydt’ in the Siilra may be explained in three

“different ways: (1) The Injunction having ceased to operate after
‘having laid down the number ‘ ten,’ it becomes necessary to find out the
“individuals that would make up that number; and the individuals to be
‘accepted should be only those of whom we may have some indications
“(in the text itself); as a matter of fact, we find that for persons
‘‘ belonging to the same caste, we have an indicative agent in the shape of

one ‘class’ or ‘commonality’ (‘simdnya’),. whereas for persons of
“different castes we have no such indication. (2) Or, the ‘ stmanya

meant might be the ‘commonality of objects’; that is to say,
"५ Inaccordance, with the Sitra LII-—i—12, ‘the number ‘ten ’ and the caste
“* Ksaltreya’ should be taken as qualifiying each other, on the ground of
“both of them bemg laid down in regard to the Phalacamasa; and this
“would mean that the ‘ Ksatlr’ya’-hood extends only over those objects
‘‘that are contained in the number ‘ten,’ and vice versa; and on the
“strength of this, we must admit that ten Ksatiriyas should eat out of the
< Rajanya-cups. (3) Or, ‘sdmanyat’ may be taken to mean that when
‘two things beloug to the same class, or happen to have the same function,
‘‘the one sets aside the other; and hence in the case in question, we find
“that the caste ‘ Ksattriya’ is already laid down in the Injunction of the
“ Ragustiya gacrifice (‘Raja Rajasiiyéna svdrajyakatmo yajg8ta’), which
‘‘also lays down the number ‘one’ only (by the singular number iu
“ ˆ 0 `); and as the Rajasiya forms the original primary of the actions
“ spoken of in the sentences under consideration, the number ‘ one’ comes
“to be taken as pertaining to these latter also; but we find these
“sentences distinctly laying down the number ‘ten’; and this latter 1s
“taken as setting aside the former number ‘one’ on the ground of its
“having been laid down in a general way, ‘simanyat’ (while the number
“ten ` is specially laid down), and on that of its applying to the actions

in question merely by way of implication (and not by direct Injunction)
“but that does not set aside the ‘Ksatiriya’ caste also.. Hence we
“are led to the conclusion that the sacrificer’s cup, without beg
^“ 0181016 from the caste ‘KX sattriya,’ should be connected with the
“number ‘ten’; that is to say, it is the ten Kgattriyas that should eat out

of the Rajanya-cups. =

^“ Objection: ‘ The sentence having laid down the number ‘ten, mnes-

“much as the reference would be a qualified one, the sense of the
“Tnjanction being ‘yadekaikam camasamanuprasarpanti, ९४९.) ete.” (1.6
“¢ those that eat out ofegch of the vessels. should be ten’), there would be
“a distinct syntactical’ split,’ = > | |

“>. BAANYA-CUPS TO BE TaStaD BY RWRAHMANAS. = 149)

“ Reply: That would not affect our position ; because it is only the
“cup that is referred to by mcans of the word ‘camasam’ with the
“ aceussative ending ; and all that this shows is that the cup is the.
“object to be purified; and as for the ‘cups,’ we find that they aro
“ capable of no other purification save that by means of eating ; and hence
"५ 1४ is this eating that should be taken as indicated by the word
“ anuprasarpéyuh ` ; and as that cating 1s found to pertain to every onc of
“the cups, this eating also comes to be mentioned in the sentence in
“ question, by way of reference; and as such there can be no syntactical
split,”

SIDDHANTA.

Sttra (63): The Brahmanus should do it; because of the
same word, .

Tho Kesuttriyas should not eat out of the Rajanya-cups ; becanse iy
the case in question, we find the Injunction speaking of ‘hundred Rrah-
manas,’ which would have to be taken in its secondary signification, if wo
did not admit the fact of the Brihmanas cating out of the enps in
question

That is to say, the connection of the Brahmanas with all the cups is
shown by the same word ‘ Brahmana’ being used. And as such the
Brahmanas should not be disconnected from any of the cups. Nor do we
find any ground for taking the word (‘ Brahmana ’) in its secondary senso ;
(as indicating the Ksatiriya) ; specially as we do not find the Ksatircya
mentioned by any more authoritative means of knowledge ; and if the word
were taken in the said indirect sense (and the Injunctive character were
attributed to the sentence ‘dacu, etc.’) the whole of the sentence ‘ guéam
Brahmanah etc.’ would be a meaningless repetition ; while in accordance
with our theory, the Injunctive potency of the sentence ‘ gatum Brahmanak
etc,,’ being inferred from the nature of the declaration in regard to the
performance of the sacrifice as a whole, if would enjoin ‘the hundred Brah-
mapas’ ;.and this being done, the repetition contained in the sentouce ‘ वकल)
etc.’ would serve the purpose of pointing out the various shares

Or; if may be that, in accordance with the 6८1८ X-—ii—53, it would
be by direct signification that the ‘tens,’ enjoined in the former sentence
would be spoken of by way of descriptive reference, in the sentence
‘daga, ete.’ (and thus in this case, there would be no recourse to indirect.
secondary signification). ` And as all the ten cups would be occupied hy
the ‘hundred Bréhmagas,’ in ten parties of ten Bradhmanas each, there
would be no room for any Ksattriya, Hence it must be admitted that
ten: Brahmanas.should eat out of the ten Rajanya-Cupy. ` -

1500 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, UI—-PADA V-—ADHI, (20), —

The above representation of the Adhikarana however, 18 not admis.
sible. (1) Because, in the first place, if the sentence ‘Catum Brdhmanah,
ete.’, were the Injunction, then, inasmuch as the descriptive reference
would be the eating which is implied by its presence in the Original Pri.
mary (the Aajasdya sacrifice),—and as no qualified Injunction (of thy
Braihmana qualified by the number ‘hundred’) would be possible —it
would be necessary to take the Injunction as pertaining to one of these
only (either the Brahmana or the number ‘hundred'); bnt if the Injunc-
tion were applied to the number ‘hundred,’ then the word ‘ Brahmanah’
would be absolutely meaningless; (2) while if it were applied to the Brah-
mana, the word ‘Catam’ would be meaningless. (5) If then, the sentence
be taken as enjoining the Brahmana with veference to the number ‘hund-
red,’ then it becomes necessary for you to point out the authority for de-
claring the eating as to be done by hundred persons. (4) Further, if the
Injunction be taken as that of the number ‘ hundred’ with reference to the
Brahmana, then, through the preclusion of the Kgattriya, the mention of
the Bradhmana would become a qualifying adjunct; and as such the re-
ference being to a qualified object, we would havea syntactical split;
and there would be nothing done in connection with the Rdajanya-
Qups (as the Injunction wonld be restricted to the Cups out of which the
Brahmanas eat), Then again, inasmuch as the sentence ékatkam, etc.
could not be taken as a mere reference, in regard to the Rajanya-Cups, it
would be taken as enjoining ten Ksattriyus, with regard to those cups; while
for the other cups, we have the Injunction of ‘hundred Brahmuanus’ in the
sentence ‘Catam Brihmanah, and we do not know how the nine cups are
to be divided among the ‘hundred Brahmanas. (5) If, on account of the
connection of the Soma, the word ‘ Braéhmandkh’ were taken as a mere (65.
criptive reference, then too, inasmuch as that would involve a preclusion
of the Phalacamasa (by the ‘ Brahmana- Soma’), thore would be the anomaly
of a qualified reference; and further, as there would be no functioning (of
the Brahmanas) in regard to the Phalacamasa, we would, as before, have
the possibility of (the eating by the Ksatiriya). That “the two words
‘Soma’ and ‘ Brahmana’ are never found to be used in the sense of the Phala-
camasa and the Ksatirvya, respectively ’"—cannot be regarded.as any au-
thority. (6) Then if the reference be taken as to the unqualified eating,
then we would have the number ‘hundred’ applicable even to those eut-
inys that are done out of the aminal body, the cake, etc. Because it is
` not only the ‘eating at the Principal sacrifice’ that.is spoken of as ‘ Bhak-
80 ` ; and as. such, being a purificatory act (of the Remnants), it would
‘pertain equally to all Primaries and Subsidiaries, as shown under the ७ ८१५
TiI—vii—2; and further, in this case, the word ‘Soma’ would be abso-
lately meaningless. (As what would be laid down would be mere eating

RAJANYA-CUPS TO BH TASTED BY BRAHMANAR. 1501

in generat). (7) Ifthe number ‘hundred’ be taken as enjoined with re-
ference to the Soma, then, in that case, beginning from its Purchuse, all the
rites that would be done in connection with the Soma would have to be
done by hundred persons; and in that case the word ‘ Bhaksuyanti’ would
be meaningless. (8) If with reference to ‘eating,’ the connection of the
‘handred’ Brahmagas,’ bo taken as enjoined,—then too, this latter would
apply to the case of the (cating out of the remnants of the) Aminal Body,
and the cake, ete. ;—and hence the use of the word‘ Soman’ would be ab-
solutely meaningless. (9) Then, if the ‘hundved Brahmanas’ be taken
as enjoined with reference to the Some, this would be absolutely impos-
sible, because of the word ‘Soma’ not being expressive of the Action; and
hence there would be no preclusion of the connection of the Ksattriya with
the Phalacamasa, in the form of the ‘ Vata-sprout, which is not Somu.

For these reasons, it is uot possible for the sentence ‘Cutam Brah-
manah’ to be taken as an Injunction.

Then again, there would be no use, or authority, for taking, as a
mere descriptive reference, the sentence ‘dacudagaikuikum,’ etc., whose
Injunctive Potency is intact, and which has been ascertained to be pos-
sessed of an independent injunctive character. How, far could the
former sentence (‘Catam Brahmndh, etc.’), which bas its verb in the
Present ‘lense, be taken as an Injunction ? Consequently if must be
taken as a mere descriptive reference. Nor, in the xbsence of the condi-
tional character, etc., is it possible for several verbs to be syntactically
connected (and forming a simple sentence, which would be necessary tf
the sentence ‘dara, etc.’, were taken as a mere descriptive reference).
Nor do we find any idea of the conditional character in a sentence that is
Wholly devoid of such couditional words as ‘if’ and the like. Nor is the
sentence ‘daga, ete.’, found to contain an eulogy, for the sake whercof the
Sentence could be taken as a descriptive reference, und as syntactically
connected (with the Injunction; in accordauce with the Sutra l—--1i—?7).
Consequently, inasmuch as the whole of the senteuce ( Duga, ete.’), which
18 Wholly distinct from the other sentence, cannot be rightly taken as a
‘mere descriptive reference,— we must take it as enjoining something.

Thus then, if, in view of the absence of any limit as to ‘ hundred.’
the sentence be taken as enjoining the various parties of ten, then, in that
case, the mention of ‘ Hkackam’ would become inexplicable (incongruous) ’;
specially ag the Injunction of this latter would involve a syntactical split.
And, inasmuch as the (Vasatkartr and tho other Priests are entitled to
several Cups, the ‘ Hkaikam, ctc.’, could not be a mere descriptive reference ;
and as their eating out of the vessels also is pointed -out by the previous
Sentence, the specification of ‘Camasa’ (Cup) would be meaningless; and
if this word were taken as qualifying or specifying (the material as that

1502 TANTRA-VARTINA. ADH, 11—PADA v=-apat. (20). |

contained in the Oups), it would give rise to a syntactical split, Nor,
as a matter of fact, is it possible for the sentence ‘daca, etc.,' to be taken
as a mere descriptive reference; because the number ‘ hundred,’ which is
laid down for the sake of the purification of the Cups, would appear to
be applicable, as a whole; to each of those Cups. . If it be taken as men
tioned for the sake of the purification of the Performer (of the eatiny),
then there would be a possibility of Diviston, as in the case of the Sacri-
ficial gift ; and hence, in accordance with the Stra X—1ui—53, we would
have the Division as ‘ parties of ten to each one of the Cups.’ And in this
vase, even though there would bean Injunction, yet it would have the char-
acter of Preclusion; or, it might show that with regard to a single Cup
there may be ten persons eating out of it; or that with regard to a
single Cup, ten parties of ten cating out of the same Cups; in any case
the eating out of the Cup would be done by huudred persons, in parties
of ten each

Thus then, we find that neither of the two sentences in question is
compatible with the above explanation (and as such both are incapable of
being taken as independent Injunctions). Consequently, we must explain
the Adhikarana as follows :—

Both the sentences are injunctive ; because both have the form of an
Injunction. And then too, in the first place, it is the sentence ‘ Duca, etc. ;
which, asin the Pirvapaksa, is taken as the Injunction; because, as shown
above, no other order of sequence is possible. The word ‘ Anuprasurpant:
indicates that eating, whose existence is already implied by Atidéga (the
Implicatory Law that ‘the Modificatory Action is to be done in the same
way as the Original Primary’); and as such, it indicates the Suacrefice,
just as the eatiny of the Phalacamasa has been said to do; and hence, in the
sentence ‘ daga, ete.,’ the portion ‘ camasamanuprasarpantt’ should be taken
as a descriptive reference, because of the relationship of the qualification
and the qualified (between the ‘Camasa, Cup, and the ‘ Anuprasurpana,
eating), based upon the fact of either one of these boing in need of the other ;
while the portion ‘ daca, etc,’ is to be taken-as an Injunction ; and the
repetition of the words may be explained as being due to the fact of the
number ‘ten’ differing with each ‘one’ (Cup), as would be indicated by
the predominant character of the ‘Oamusa,’

Thus then, the number ‘hundred’ having been completed (by the
repetitions of ‘Ten’), the other sentence (‘Cutum Brahmandh) 18. to be
tuken as enjoining the ‘ Brahmana’ with reference to that hundred,—the
‘construction: being ‘yacchatam. soman: bhaksayants ` tad . Brihmanah
(‘ The Jiandred that eat out. of the Somu-cups should.be Brahrmaygas’). So
long a8 any portion of the sentence-is capable of being taken as an Injunc-
tion, 16 18 not proper to take the whole as a mere descriptive..reference

| RAJANYA-COPS TO RE TASTED RY RRJHMANAS, 1508

nor, under the circumstances, would it be right to take the word ‘ Brah-
mana’ as indirectly indicating (the other castes); as it has all its needs
supplied: by being connected with the number ‘hundred’ (and thus there
is no Apparent Inconsistency in it that could justify our having recourse
to aseoondary signification with regard to the word ‘Brthmuna’). Then,
ns for the words ‘scomam’ and ‘bhaksayanti, they are not meant to be
significant ; and as such there can be no anomaly of qualified reference.

Nor would the mention of the Soma be wholly anomalous; as all
that it is found to do is to indicate something used at the sacrifire, and as
such, it could be taken as pointing to the Phalacamasa

Consequently, while we would be still on our way to the assumption
of the Ksattriya, for the making up of the number ‘hundred’ (enjoined
by the sentence ‘daga, etc.’),—the other sentence (‘QGutum Braihmanah
ete,”) will have supplied the want by laying down another object (the Brah-
mana) {01 making up that number. Nor wonld this extend to the case of
the vessels also; ‘as the sentence ‘dacu, ete,, refers distmetly fo the Cups.

Thus then, we find that, even as regards the Rajunya-Cups the In-
junction having pointed ont the eating as to be done by the said ‘ party
of ten,’—the place is taken up by the ‘ party of ten Brahmanas,’ (as shown
above); and thus the material in question having all its needs of purifica-
tion fulfilled by being eaten by these latter (and thns being duly disposer
of), it is the Sacrificer (the Ksatiriya) who would linve no eating to do,

Thus it is established that it is ten Braihmanus that should cat ont
of the ten Rayanya-Cups

In the Bhadsya, we find that the question has been raised as to the
prohibifition (and consequent impropriety) of the Bradhmanas and Kesa-
ttriyas eating together out of the same Cup,—and answered by the declara
tion that ‘ there is no impunity attaching to the eating of the Soma

And against this portion of the Bhdsya, some people nrge the follow
ing objection: “Inasmuch as there would be no Soma in the Phala
camasa, how could there be any impurity attaching to the eating out of
that?”

But this does not affect the situation ; because the Phalacamasa, be-
ing substituted for the Soma, becomes endowed with all the properties of
this latter; as we shall show under the Satras, ‘ Naimitiikum, ete.’ (TII—
vi~36), and ‘ Dhdrmasyartha-kriatvat' (IX—ii—40).

~ Objection: “The absence of impurity is a property of Man; and as
“soch-it could not be attributed to the Phalacamusc merely by reason of
“ite: being substituted (for the Soma).” ‘

Reply: It would certainly be not attributed, if it really were a prop
erty. of ‘Man.. As a matter of fact, however, it ig nota property of Man
as-that would involve the assumption of a distinct result (im connection

1504. VANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. I11T—PApA १--4एप्रा, (20).

with the sentence, ‘no impurity attaches to the eating of Soma). Spec-
ianlly as we find that the ‘absence of impurity’ has been spoken of in
answer to the possibility of an impurity attaching to the ‘eating of th
Soma’; and this shows that the said ‘absence of impurity’ is a property
of the Action. Consequently, it must be admitted that, just as the Soma
when it purifies (by eating), does not bring about an impurity 111 the wer
former,—so also would its substitute, the Phalucamuasa, do.

Aud thus, on the strength of the aforesaid reasons, it must be ad
niitted that the eating out of the ten RAajanya-Caps is to be done by ६५
Bréhmanas. र |

Toes 1६18; (क Kiera Papa or 47१८१ 11}.

ADHYAYA III—PADA VI.
ADHIKARANA (1).

[Such Injunctions, as that of the Sruva being-made of the Khadiva wood
pertain to the Original Primary Sacrifice.]

Stra (1): “© It pertains to all; as it does not occur
im “any particular Conteat

In regard to those declarations that do not oceur in the wake of any
purticular sacrifice, and which contain indications of the Original Primary
Action,-—we come to consider the question as to when they beeome con-
nected with a Context, they do so with the Context of the Original Primary
Sacrifice, or they pertain to all sacrifices. Even in the absence of any of
the six means of Cogintion, in the shape of Direct Declaration, etc., we can
establish a connection with sacrifices, just in the same way as in the case
of the Agvapratigrahésti.

In connection with the Sruva and the Juhi, we have the Injunctions
of the ‘ Khadira wood’ and ‘leaves’ respectively ; and the Srava and the
Juha, ave laid down, as accessories of sacrifices, in such sentences as—(1)
` Sruvéntvadyati, ‘Sruvéndghtramaghdrayati, ‘Sruvénn parvanan juhati ;
(2) ‘Juhvi juhoti,’ etc., etc. And as soon as the ‘ Khadira wood’ and
leaves’ are shown to be related to the Sruva and the Juha, they become
wt once taken up by the sacrificial procedure relating to the Gruva and
the Juhi ; as they do not serve any other purpose (than that of helping in
the sacrificial procedure) ; as we shall explain later on, in Adhydya IV.
Because no result can follow from the class (‘ Khadiratva’ denoted by the
word ‘ Khaddirak’ in the Injunction ‘ Khddirah sruva bhavati’), which 18
absolutely without. any sort of function; nor do we find any Action put
forward, calculated to bring into play any activity in that Class; nor is
any ruch action actually mentioned in the sentence itself, Nor can we
take the sentence '‘ Khadirah sruvo bhavuti, etc.,’ as enjoining the Sruvo
also; as such an Injunction would involve a syntactical split. Conse-
quently we must take the sentence as laying down the ‘Khddira wood’
With reference to the Sruva; and inasmuch as the material form of the
Sruva would be accomplished even without such lojunctions (as the Sruva
is quite capable of being made of many woods otMer than the Khadtra)

` 189 |

1506 PANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, 111-- 20) vi—apat. (1).
the said Injunction of the Khadira wood would be absolutely 0861658 ; and
it is this Apparent Inconsistency of the Injunction that points to some
` sort of a connection of that Injunction with a Sacrifice

Thus then, in regard to the question spoken of, we have the follow.
17

PURVAPAKSA..

‘Because of the Injunction not occurring in connection with any par.
“ticular sacrifice, the Sruva, being equally connected with the all Pi imary
“and Subsidiary Sacrifices, it should be taken as pertaining to ail

sacrifices

SIDDHANTA.

Sutra (2): Tt should pertain to the Original Primary
alone; as there would be no (needless) repetition
(in that)

Inasmuch as all Injunctions pertain to only such factors as havc

not been got at by any other means, the Injunction of the ‘ Khadira wood ’
must be taken as pertaining to those sacrifices, in connection with which
it is not cognisable by any other means. And as 4 matter of fact, we find
that it is only in regard to the Original Primary Sacritice, that the ‘Kia
dera-Sruva,’ is not cognised by any other means, as being connected
whilo as for the modifications of the sacrifices, the connection with the
aid Sruva would be cognisable by means of the Implicatory Injunction
(that ‘the Modification is to be done in the snme way as the Original’)
the assumption whereof would be absolutely necessary for the sake of the
bringing in of the other accessories (from the Original to the Modifica
tion); aud as such the modifications do not stand in need of any direc
Injunction of the said Sruva; specially as it is only when there is no such
Injunction, with regard tothe modifications, that we are saved from the
Kemtition (that would be inevitable in ९४86 there were such an Jnjonc-
tion; as the connection of the Khadira-Sruva with these modifications
would, in that case, be expressed by this Injunction, and it would also be
indicated by the aforesaid Implicatory Injunction)

We can read the Sutra as ‘dviruktatvat, or as ‘adviruktalvat,’ the
sense of the former being that the view of the Parvapaksa involves
needless repetition,—and of the latter, that there ts no repetition involved
an the view of the Srvddhanta. | |

` 8071" (8) Objection . “(The Implicatory Injunction). would
“apply to (the accessory details) other than the one

KHADIRA SRUVA PERTAINS 10 ORIGINAL PRIMARY | 1404

“in question; as this lutter is found to be taid
“down by Direct Injunction.”

[The Sitra may be read as ‘ Vacanaprdapti,’ ov as ‘ Vacanapraptih.’)

Objection: “ A needless Repitition would certainly be inadmissible
“But we do not understand why the indication (of the Khdaddra-
“ Sruva) by the assumed Implicatory Injunction should be taken as close-
“ing the way of the Direct Injunction in question,—and why it is not
“held that this Direct Injunction itself does not allow of the application
“of any Implicatory Injunction. In fact the proper course would be not
“to admit of this latter in face of the Direct Injunction; becanse there
‘is no doubt that an assumed [mplicatory Injunction is very much farther
“removed from its objective than the Direct one, which latter should be
“accepted, on the ground of the proximity of the objective, as also on that
^“ of its being naturally very much quicker in its operation (than any assumed
Injunction). It might be argued that—‘ inasmuch as the Direct 111-
“junction 18 geueric in its application, it would be weaker than the assumed
“one which has a particular application to the case in question.” But this
“argument could be turned against the [mplicatory [ujunction also; as
“that too applies to all the Accessories of the Original Sacritice; and as
“such can have no particular application to the case in question. For
“those reasons, it must be admitted that the Injunction that does not

occur in connection with any particular sacrifice, applies to all sucri-

(^ fices 99

Stora (4): “(It might be urged that) ‘in view of a percepti-
“ble fact (we must regard the Implicatory Injunction as more
‘authoritative than the Direct one).’”

“Against our conclusion, the following might be urged --' 11 the
“*Direct Injunction were stronger in authority than the Implicatory
“‘Tninnction, then, in that case, inasmuch as the way would have been
“* previously blocked by that, there would, certainly, be no Implicatory
““Tntunotion at all; because in that case, the Khddvra-Sruva, applying in
“‘eommon to the Original Primary as well as to its modifications,—and
“* having its capability of aiding in the Original Primary distinctly per-
“‘ eeived,—could fulfil the requirements of the Modification also (snd it

would not be necessary to actually apply it separately to the case ०६ `
‘the latter), But this would be directly contrary to the distinctly per-
“ceptible fact.of the Accessories of the Original Primary—in the shape
“*of the Praydjas,—actually entering into the very constitution of the
““modifications. Hence (in view of this fact) itmust be admitted that

1508 TANTRA-VARIIKA, ADH. It--PADA VI---ADHL. (1).

“tthe said Ahadira-Sruva finds a place im the Original Primary only,
^" which is entirely free form the Implicatory Injunction.’ ”

Stitra (8) : “Reply: It ts not 50 $ because the Injune-
“tion can have only one object.”

“Reply: The argument brought forward cannot set aside the fact
‘‘ of the Injunction in question applying to all sacrifices. Becauso the re-
“jection of the Implicatory Injunction with regard to one factor (1.6., the
“* Khadirva-Sruva’ fa.) does not mean that it is rejected in regard to all
“the factors ; for instance, in connection with a certain modificatory sacri-
‘fice, we find the Injunction to the effect, ‘in place of the ordinary Kuea-
“grass one should use the Guru’; and though this Injunction sets aside
“the application of the Kuga (which finds place in the Original Sacrifice,
‘‘and which would come in accordance with the Implicatory Injanction),
‘‘ vet it does not reject the presence of the Prayajus and the other Acces-
“sories (pertaining to the modification in question, in accordance with the
‘said Implicatory Injunction); as we recognize a rejection in cases
“where the two Injunctions are found to have the same objective. Simi-
“larly in the case in question, the Injunction under consideration would
‘preclude the application of the Implicatory Injunction, only so far as
“the factor of the ‘ Khadira-Sruva’ is concerned. Nor is the ‘ Khadira’
“capable of supplying the requirements of the modifications ; inasmuch
“as it does not partake of the nature of an action. And further, inasmuch
“as it would operate with regard to both the Original Primary and the
‘Modification, at one and the same time, it could not, at the time of the
“performance of the latter, be recognised as having already served a use-
^^ पप purpose in connection with the Original Primary. Then again, we
“find that the Injunction of the ‘ Khadira’ is wanting in certain elements,
“inasmuch as the Sruva has not been found to be applicable; nor can this
“be recoginized as applicable, without the operation of the permission
“conveyed by the Implicatory Injunction; specially as the Injunction
“under consideration cannot be regarded as laying down the 6१४०० also;
“because there being no Principal Action mentioned in it, no qualified
‘Injunction would be possible; and as such, there would be an inevitable
“syntactical split. For these reasons, it must be admitted ‘that the In-
junction under consideration having laid down the ‘ Khadira-wood’ with
‘reference to the Sruva, the Implicatory Injunction (that ‘ the Modifica-
“tion should he performed in the same manner as the Original) should
“be taken as applying to all the Accessories except the wood of whech the
“Sruva is made |

KHADIRA SRUVA PERTAINS 10 THK ORIGINAL PRIMARY. 1509

Satra (6): “Objection: ‘But the origination (of this is similar
“to that of the other accessories of the Original Sacrifice.)’ "

“The Naiyfyika comes forward with the following reasoning in his
‘favourite syllogistic form: ‘The Injunction that does not occur in
“teonnection with any sacrifice pertains to the Original Primary Sacri-
८४ ‹ fice,—becanse it lays down things in an abbreviated and in an extensive
"५ ‹ form,—just like the Prayaja aud the rest,’

Sutra (1): “Reply: not so; as the reason applies
“equally to both cases.”

“ Reply: In the firat place we have already shown that subjects like
“what we are dealing with are not amenable to any Inferential process
“of reasoning. And secondly, the inferential argument brought forward
“is not quite admissible, as the reason is too wide, inasmuch as in regard
“to Moditications also, we often find Injunctions in abbreviated, as well as
“in extensive forms.

“The following argument might here be brought forward :—In such
“१ ‹ cases, either the abbreviated Injunction alone, or the extensive Injunc-
‘*tion alone, having enjoined the Action, the other could not exercise an
“injunctive function.’ |

“ Reply: But that objection would apply equally to the case of the
“ Original Primary Sacrifice also; and so, in any case the aforesaid inferen-
“ tial argument would be fallacious (and doubtful). Consequently, in order
“to avoid this, what should have been brought forward as the reason is the
“mere fact of the brief and extensive declarations, irrespective of the In-
‘“junctive or the descriptive character; and we have already shown that
“this reason would be much too wide.

“Or, the two Sairas (6 and 7) might be taken as emanating from the
“ Mimdnsakas themselves: In that case, the former Siitra (6) may be ex-
‘plained as embodying the following objection: ‘If you take the Injunc-
“* tion in question as pertaining to all sacrifices, you are very much mistaken.
“* Because in a case, where the vessels and implements are laid down as
“f calculated to be utilised in a certain way,—in such cases, it is possible
“*for the vlass, subsidiary to those vessels, etc., to be enjoined. As a
“* matter of fact, we find that the Originative Injunction of any such ves-
° १ 86], ete., is not found in connection with any modificatory sacrifice; and
“ “as such, the sacrifice being. devoid of such vessels, the subsidiary class
“* Khadira could not be enjoined in regard to it, Specially as the con-
{nection of the Khadira with the Original Primary is far more easy and

1510 ` ss WANTRA-VAQYIKA. ADH. i—PaDA vi—ApHt. (1).

“ ‘direct than that with the Modificatory Sacrifice, If the vessels, et¢
५८ 18४ been enjoined equally, in connection with the Original Primary
“and the Modification, then, in that case, we could have taken the In,
““junction of the subsidiary class Khadira as pertaining to the sacrifices
५५६ 11) all conditions (1.6. the Original as well as the modified states). As
“Sa matter of fact, however, they are not so enjoined; and hence we can
“*not but take the Injunction as pertaining to the Original Primary
५ * Sacrifice.’ ”

“ And in reply to this we have the next Siira (7), the sense of which
‘would be this: All such Injunctions as do not occur in connection with
“any particular sacrifice stand in need of a previous Injunction; and as
“for such an Injunction, it is all the same whether this be a Direct or an
‘Implicatory one. Though it is quite true that the Direct and the In-
“direct (Implicatory) Injunctions differ from each other, on the ground of
“the former being more proximately related to its objective than the
‘Jatter,—yet it is only within their own respective spheres that tho said
“ proximity and remoteness differ in their authoritative strength; and they
“do not make any difference in regard to an Injunction that does not
‘occur in connection with any sacrifice; because, inasmuch as it is only
“through the vessels, etc. (1.6. the Sruva) that such an Injunction betakes
‘itself to the Sacrifice,—it is always remote from its objective. For these
‘reasons, it must’ be admitted that the Injunction under consideration

pertains to all sacrifices; and that the Implicatory Injunction applies to
all other accessories except the Khadira-Sruva

Sutra (8): Reply: Tt must pertain to the Original
Primary; because the object of the Implicatory
Injunction is one complete whole; and because
the application of the Principal (Direct Injunction,
to the modification) would be incompatible.

The only admissible theory, in connection with the present quostion
is that put forward in Quéra (2). As for the objection urged in Siatra
(3), that is not tenable; because if the Implicatory Injunction had applied
to each of the Accessories of the Original Primary,—then alone could
be possible what is said in that Satra; as a matter of fact, however, we
find that it applies to all the accessories at one and the same time.

In accordance with the theory that the Implicatory Injunction ap-
‘plies to the objects, or to the scriptures,—inasmuch as these factors are
found to differ from one another, it might be possible to make a distinction
among the objects amenable to the Implicatory Injunction. In reality
however, what forms the object of Implicatory Injunctions is the operation
relating to the Sacrifice,—as we shall explain in Adhyiya X. And as the

| ~ : KHEDIRA SRUVA PERTAINS 0 THE ORIGINAL PRIMARY. 1911

sacrificial operation is one impartible whole, it could only be implied all at
once, and that too, as one complete whole. And this sacrificial operation,
for itsown accomplishment, takes up, all at once, all the Apirvas relating
to the Praytjas; these 49725, in their term, take up the Praydja and the
rest; and these latter take up their own Injunctive texts (in the shape of
the Implicatory Injunction). Thus then, the Implicatory Injunction,—
in the form of ‘ Prakphivad virktih kartarya’—being ove only, it would
apply or not apply, equally to all accessories, and not to portions of these
In the case of the substitution of the Gara for Kuga also, what the Direct
Injunction sets aside is the Kuga, whose existence has been already pointed
ont by the [mplicatory Injunction, —as we have already shown under the
Adhtkarana dealing with the comparative authoritative strength of Direct
Declaration, ete. (III —ii—14)

Thus then, if, in consideration of the Direct. Injunction under question,
the Implicatory Injunction be set aside from the factor of the Khadiru-
Sruva,—then it would cease to apply to the other accessories also; and
that would lead to the total rejection of all the accessories (of the एन.
mary sacrifice) in the Modification. And this would not be admissible or
desirable, as we have already shown above. But if, in consideration of
the accessories of the Original Primary, the Implicatory Injunction were
accepted as applying to some of these accessories, then it would come to
apply to the ‘ Khadira-Sruva’ also; aud thus there would be a distinct ‘ Re-
pitition,’ in the ense of the Pérvapakga theory (as shown under Sutra 3).

Then again, we shall have occasions to show, later on, that, inas-
much as the Modification stands in need of the operations of the Original,
Primary, it often abandons the accessories mentioned in its own context,
and takes up only that which belongs to that Primary. It is for this rea-
son that it is necessary to admit the priority of the functioning of the Im-
plicatory Injunction to that of the Injunction that does not occur in the
context of any sacrifice. |

And further, it is absolutely necessary to seek for an injunction of
the Sruea, in connection with the Modifications; and the effort that would
be necessary for getting at the Injunction of the Sruva would be suffi-
cient for that of the ‘ Khadira wood’ +180 ; and 80 this latter need not neces-
sarily be taken as forming the object of a Direct Injunction (in connection
with the Modifications)

Nor: is’the connection, with the sacrifice of such Injunctions as those
under cousideration, very distinctly perceptible. In fact it has to be ns-
sumed, through the Sruva, on the ground of Apparent Inconsistency, But
one who takes the Injunction under consideration to apply to all sucrifices
accepts the existence of a certain connection of it with a sacrifice. And
the uselessness of the Injunction being thus set aside (and explained), .

1512 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I—PADA आ --+0प्ा, (1).

there would be no Apparent Inconsistency (of the Injunction) that could
justify us in connecting the Injunction with the Modifications, While, on
the other hand, the connection of the Injunction with a sacrifice established
by the Implicatory Injunction is based upon a very much: stronger ay.
thority. |
Those Injunctions (not occurring in the context of any particular
sacrifice), whose connection with sacrifices is distinct] y perceptible, would
always pertain to all Sacrifices, even though they may not be found in the
context of any particular Sacrifice ; just as we find in the case of such sent-
ences as—‘ Hsa vai Prajapatih saptadacn yajné ‘ nvityattah.’

Thus then it must be admitted that the Khadira-wood, ete, are laid
down, in regard to the Original Primary Sacrifice,

ADHIKARANA (2).

(The number ‘seventeen’ of the Sdmidhenis pertains to the Modifica-
` tion}.

` [An exception to the foregoing Adhikarana.]

Stitra (9): (The number) being contrary (to that of the Ori-
ginal Primary), एं would apply to the Modification:
specially on account of the particular Context.

{Independently of any Sacrifices, we find the number of the Séa-
mithénis, laid down in the sentence ‘Saptadaca Samidhéniranubriyat: ;
and with regard to this there arises the question as to whether this num-
ber (‘seventeen’) refers to the Original Primary, or to the Modification. ]

And on this question we have the present Adhikarana, calculated to
set aside the idea of Option, created by the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

“In accordance with the foregoing Adhikarana, the Injunction of
“ˆ seventeen Sdmidhénis,’ which does not occur in connection with any
“ sacrifice, pertains, for this very reason, to the Original Primary Sacrifice ;
¢“ while in the Context of that Sacrifice itself we find the number ‘ fifteen’
“laid down in connection with the Samidhénis; consequently we conclude
‘that the two numbers are optional alternatives.

^ Question: How can that which is laid down by an Injunction, not
‘occurring in the Context of the Primary sacrifice, and which is weaker
“in authority, be taken as an optional alternative to that which is parti-
“cularly laid down in the same Context with it. ? '

‘“Answer: The Particular sets aside the General, only in cases where
“the Particular denotes a distinctly preceptible connection. That is to
“say,it 18 only when the Particular is equally authoritative with the
“ General, and not when it is based upon a weaker authority, that it sets aside
“this latter. As a matter of fact, the Sa@midhénis (i.e,, the recitation
“of these verses) have no placo outside the performance of the sacrifice ;
“and this makes the chance of both the numbers (‘Afteen’ and ‘ seven-
“teen’) equally possible, in connection with the performance of a sacri-
“fice. Such being the case, what more than t [18 would the Context

` 190

414... PANTRA+VARTIKA, ADH, 1-+PADA Vi—abat. (2)

indicate (in regard. to the number ‘fifteen’)?. For it is‘only when two
“apparently equally authoritative means of knowledge are found to con
‘tradict each other that we are to draw our conclusions in accordance
‘““with that one whieh is found, upon due examination, to be possessed of
“ereater authoritative strongth ; and it is never possible for the Context
‘ta be possessed of an authority higher than that of. Syntactical Connec-
“tion; consequently, while the indications by the Context have yet to be
“ made, the equally authoritative Syntactical Connection will have estab-
“lished the fact of the two numbers being optional alternatives. Such
‘*being the case, even if a thousand Contests were to help the Context
“in question (in laying down the number ‘fifteen ’), we can pay no atten-
* tion to it. And we conclude that the number ‘seventeen ’ also pertains to
“the Original Sacrifice (and honce the two numbers must be taken as
९" optional alternatives).”

SIDDHANTA.

To the above, we make the following reply: Even though both the
‘numbers are equally related to the Samidhénis, yet,-innasmuch as there is
a distinct difference in the degrees of their relationship to the Sacrifice,
the two cannot be taken as optional alternatives

: (1) The mention of number not being of any use, in connection with
the Sémidhéais only, we must take its relationship to the Sacrifice based
npon the fact of its helping in the accomplishment of the. sacrificial
1111४ ; and this fact of helping in the accomplishment of the sacrificial
Apiirva cannot be indicated by any other means, save by the Context
ns wo shall show in Adhydya IX. Thus we find that the connection
of the number ‘fifteen’ is much more authoritative than the Syntactical
Connection, on account of the former being more nearly connected with
the 82९1" 70181 Apiirva | |

(2) An Injunction always, in the first instance, prompts the person

to that cause of action which serves a distinctly useful purpose; and in the
case in question, there is no doubt that ^ fifteen ` 1s more directly and easily
recoginsed as useful (because of its direct relationship to the sacrificial
Apltirra) ; and hence, there being a difference in the time of the appear
ance of the Injunctions relating to the two numbers, they cannot be re-—
garded as equally authoritative. ` |
| (3) Then again, the action of man is calculated to perform the sacri-
-fice in such a way as not to leave it doficient in. any point; and it is not
Meant to give ont perfect Samidhénis, And as for the number: ‘seven-
teen © appertaining to a sacrifice, we do. not. find it to be pointed out by
any of the six menns,of knowledge—Direct Declaration. and: the: rest
though we find these pointing to the fact of-the number ‘fifteen’ pertain

NUMBER ‘SEVENTEEN. PERTAINS TO THE MODIFICATIONS, °1516

ing to the sacrifice. And thus we come to the conclusion that the number.
‘fifteen’ belongs to the Samidhénis as well as to the Ducgupirnamdsa ।
sacrifices, as pointed out by Syntactical Connection and Context respce-
tively; whereas the number * seventeen ' pertains to the Samidhénis only
as pointed out by the sentence under consideration: and with a view to
set aside the. apparent: uselessness of this latter number, wo could have
assumed its connection with the sacrifice,—just as in the case of the
‘ Rhadira-Sruva, —if the sacrifice had stood in need of such 9 connection ;
as @ matter.of fact however, we find that the sacrifice has its requirements
already supplied by the mention of another number (‘fifteen’); and as:
such it does not stand in need of the connection of uny other number:
Thus we find that the Samidhénis have their deficiency supplied by
means of both the numbers ‘fifteen’ and ‘ seventeen’; whilo the sacrifice
has its wants fulfilled by the number ‘fifteen’ only. We find that
even if the accessory attendant upon the subordinate factor were to.
modify the character of the Principal also, there would be no incongruity
in this, a8 this would be in keeping with the ‘law of the Ka@msyabhoji’ (ac. -
cording to which the observance of the Popil modities the conduct of the
Teacher); and it is all the less incongruous in a case where what is dis-
tinctly perceptible is only the incongruity of the subordinate factor of the
Subsidiary ९

Thus then we find that the number ‘seventeen’ 18 precluded from all
conneetion with the sacrifice, by the number ‘fifteen,’ which latter ix
strong in its prior relationship to the sacrifice; and as for the niodifica-
tions of that-sacrifice, while the namber ‘fifteen’ will be still on its way
to being. connected ‘with them, by the extremely round—abont agency of.
the Implicatory Injunction (‘ Prakrtivadvikrtih, etc.'),—they would, long
ere this; become connected with the number ‘seventeen,’ which is men-
tioned in the Direct Injunction ; and thus ‘fifteen,’ being thrown aside from
these modifications, comes to be recognised as pertaining to the Original
Primary sacrifice only

In regard to the above differentiation however, we have got to say
something; and it is this: The directly enjomed ‘seventeen’ has no
greatar'aathority. for pertaining to the modifications, as all that the Direct
Injunction under considération—which does not occur in the Context of |
any particular sacrifice—shows is that the number ‘seventtcn ` belongs to
the:Sdmedhénis; and as for the modifications taking the number ‘seven-_
teen’, there-appears to be no authority whatever. In fact itis the ‘fifteen’.
thatia‘shown. to: pertain to the modifications also, by the Implicatory In-:
junction. And hence. just as the connection of ‘fifteen’ with the Orginal |

1516 TANTRA-V ARTIKA. ADH. I—-PADA Vi—ADHI. (2).

Primary, is based upon the superior authority of the Context, so too would
its connection with the modifications be,—being applied to these, as it is,
by means of the Implicatory Injunction

As a matter of fact, we find that until the Samidhénis themselves
have been shown to be connected with the modifications,—and this can
only be done by means of the Implicatory Injunction,—the number ‘ seven.
teen’ could not enter into these, as it is only through the Sdmidhénis that
it could enter mto the modificatory sacrifices, And when the operation
of the Implicatory Injunction has once been admitted, with reference to
the connecting of the Samidhénis with the modifications, it would, along
with the Samidhenis, take the number ‘ fifteen’ also, the usefulness ot
whose connection in a sacrifice has beon already recognised in regard to
the Original Primary; and thus having obtained, along with the Samid-
henis, ® prior entrance into the modifications, just as in the Original] P»j-
mary, it would block the way of the ‘ seventeen ' entering into them.

Hence we must conclude that the number ‘ seventeen’ would pertaiu
to only such modifications as the Pagu, the Mitravinda, the Adhvarakalpa,
etc., the connection whereof with that number is distinctly pointed out by
the Context, and inthe case of which, therefore, the number would set aside
the connection of the number ‘fifteen,’ which could be indicated only by
means of the Implicatory Injunction. And it does not enter into all the
Modifications, on the sole strength of the fact of its Injunction not occur-
ring in the context of any particular sacrifice; because in regard to the
Modifications other than the Pagu, the Mitravind4d, etc., its entrance would
be blocked by the prior entrance of the number ‘fifteen’; as all these
would be pervaded by this latter number, on the authority of the Implica-
tory Injunction; and as such they could not take up the ‘seventeen
which is laid down only as belonging to the Saémidhénis. This we shall
explain in detail,in Adhyéya X. Consequently we can admit the connec-
tion of ‘seventeen’ with all Modifications to be more authoritative (than
of ¢ fifteen’), |

The author of the Sutra also has used the words—‘ Vikrtam, virodht’
which shows that all that be meant was that the ‘seventeen ’ did not per-
tain to the Original Primary.

_ Though as regards the Sdmidhénis, both the numbers are equally ap-
plicable, on the ground of Syntactical Connection, yet there is this much
difference that ‘fifteen’ is related to the Sacrifice, by Context (while
‘seventeen’ has no sort of connection with any 88011006). . Hence even
though Context is weaker in authority than Syntactical Connection, yet,
inasmuch as the two apply to two distinct subjects (the Context connect-
ing ‘fifteen’ with the, Sacrifice, while Syntactical Connection connects

seventeen with the Siimidh&nis); it is the former that serves the purpose

, NUMBER ‘SEVENTEEN’ PERTAINS 10 THE MODIFICATIONS. 1517

of pointing out that which is to be done in connection with the sacrifice,
‘It is only when both of these apply to the same object that the former
is weaker in authority than Syntactical Connection. As regards the
‘sacrifice ’ however, inasmuch as the Syntactical Connection (as not apply-
ing to the sacréfice) would not be contrary to the Context, it would not
reject this latter. Specially as the difference between the two is that the
number ‘fifteen’ is specifically singled out as pertaining to the sacrifice.
And hence, even though Syntactical Connection shows that the two num-
bers are equally subservient to the Samidheni,—yet as regards the sacri-
fice, the case of ‘fifteen’ is different from that of ‘seventeen’; and as
such, the former would always set aside the latter, because the number
‘seventeen ` 18 not found to be spoken as belonging to the sacrifice, cither
directly by means of Direct Declaration, or indirectly, by means of the
Implicatory Injunction. Thus then, we conclude that ‘ fifteen’ is enjoimed
in connection with the Original Primary, as also with those Vikriis (Mod1-
fications of Sacrifices) with regard to whom we have not the Direct In-
junction of ‘seventeen.’

ADHIKARANA (3). |
‘The milking of the Cow pertains to the Original Primary Sacrifice. ]

61. (10): All that is ‘conditional?’ finds place in

the Original Primary ; as tt brings about a change
only on account of the special relationship (of the
Original Primary with the condition). _

{ (1) We have the sentence—‘ For the Vuigya, seventeen Samidhenis
should be recited.’ (2) 179 connection with the Darcapirnamasa, we find
the sentence—‘The water should be brought in by means of the milkiny
vessel, by one who desires Cattle.’ (3) And in connection with the Jyotis-
toma we find the sentence‘ one who desires Brahmic glory, should have
the post of the Bilva-wood.” And with regard to these there arises the
question as to whether they find place in the Original Primary, or in
the Modifications. |

The Injunction of the number ‘ seventeen,’ as pertaining to the Sami
dhénis recited for the Vaigya, would find a place in the Original Primary
itself, setting aside the number ‘fifteen’; as for such use of this Injunc
tion, we have the same authority of Oontert, as in the case of the ^ fifteen;
and it possesses the superior authority of the mention (and presence) of
the condition that the sacrificer is a Vateya; and as such sets aside the
original details (as to the number being ‘fifteen’). Because until the
original (nitya) number ‘ fifteen’ were set aside, the conditional (Nadmit-
tika, due to certain specified conditions) ‘seventeen’ could not obtain a
footing, as we find this latter to have been enjoined in the face of. the fact
of all the number ‘fifteen’ appertaining to all performances of the action
in question. While on the other hand, inasmuch as the-‘ seventeen’ has
been laid down only. with regard to that performance which is done
by the Vasgya, the original number ‘fifteen’ has a place in the perform-
ances of the Brahmana and the Ksattriya, in which latter we could have
the number ‘fifteen’ without setting aside the conditionally enjoined
‘seventeen’ (and hence the Injanction.of ‘fifteen’ would not justify
the rejection of ‘seventeen,’ while that of the latter could not but lead to
the rejection of that with: regard to ‘fifteen,’ specially .in connection
with thoso cases where the action is performed: by the Vairya)

Thus there being a difference in the potentialities ofthe: two In

“MILKING PERTAINS TO THE PRIMARY. 1519

junctions, the two numbers cannot be regarded as optional alternatives.
Nor could: the two be used conjointly, at one and the same time; because
both serve.the same purpose, with regard to the Samidhénis; as at any
one performance, when these Sdmidhenis are recited as qualified by one
number (‘ fifteen’ f.c.), they could not, at the same time, be qualified by
the other namber (‘seventeen’). |

Nor can the Original (Nitya, pertaining to all performances in
general) number (‘fifteen’) be taken as having the potency of setting
aside.the other, on the ground of Apparent Inconsistency (as it has its
place in the performances not touched by the specified conditions ).

Then again, just as in the case of one Injunction appearing after the
other, it is the former that is taken as rejected,—so, in the same manner,
it is the Nitya (Original) that is always set aside by the Kamya (that
which is laid down as leading to a particular desirable end) and the
Naimittika (that which is laid down with reference to certain specified
conditions), And the reasons for this are as follows: (1) At the time
that the Nstya is enjoined, it has no opposing factor (which it would have
to set-aside to obtain a footing for itself); while as for the Navmettika
this is always enjoined with reference to something that is already per-
vaded .over by the previously enjoined Nitya; and as such it always
comes into existence in opposition to this latter; and when there is
this opposition, due to the fact of both the Injunctions referring to the
same object, it is the Nitya that is always set aside by the other. And
inasmuch ag the opposition does not appear simultanoously with re-
gard. to both, both cannot be accepted as optional alternatives, (2) All
the Nitya accessories are enjoined with regard to the performance in
general (of the action); whereas the Naimstitka is enjoined with regard
to 9 particular performance ; and for this reason 8180, this Intter, being the
more authoritative of the two, always sets aside the former. (3) The in
junction of the Nitya accessories is always prompted by (due to) the
remote Apiirva of the Principal Action; and the highest authority for
that (Apirva) has been found to lie in the indications of Context; where-
as for the Kamya and Naimittika accessories, we have the prompting cause
mentioned in the same sentence; and as such being more quickly prompted
(by the quick functioning authority of Syntactical Oonnection), ` these
latter always-set aside the former. |

Then. again; as between the Kamya and the Naimittika, it is the for-
‘mer that is possessed of greater authority, and as such sets aside: the lat-
ter ; (1). becanse the former is more nearly related .to the end desired by
‘aan, while the latter. has its result remote from itself; and (2) because
the former ts much quicker: in its functioning than the latter; because.
88 regards an action cognised as bringing about an. end desired ‘by man,-

1520 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, I—PADA ए---+ प्रा, (3). |

the man is quickly prompted to its performance by Direct Declaration
itself: whereas in regard to the Naimztiika, inasmuch as the result is
found to be remote, the prompting of the man takes some time.

Thus then, though it was the Natmittzka that was spoken of in the
Sutra, yet the Bhasyu has dealt with the Kamya only; and the reason
for this is that both the Nac¢mittika and the Ka@mya are equally contrary
to the Nitya; while there is no contradiction between the Natmitiika and
the Kamya

As regards the question of the present Adhikarana, the foregoing
Adhikarana indicates the following—

PURVAPAKSA.

“Tn the case in question, there is one point of difference between the
“ Nitya and the Ka@mya, viz.: the ‘Cup’ and the ‘ Khadira-wood’ are
“laid down (by the sentence ‘camasénn apih pranayét,’ and ‘ Khadiré yitpo
“bhavati,’ respectively), as for the sake of the Sacrifice; as for the Kamyn
“ accessories of the ‘ milking vessel’ and the ‘ Bilva-wood,’ these, as Kamya,
“are laid down (by the sentences ‘ godohéna parukdmasya pranayét,’ and
५५ ‹ Bailvo 11106 brahmavarcasakimasya, respectively) for the sake of the
५ Man; [And as such the former would be more authoritative than the
“latter |.

“Then, it might be urged that, ‘through a desire for the desirable
“result, the Aamya would always set aside the Netya.’

‘But such a course would lead to the same disastrous results as in
“the case of the fool who fell upon the beehive, being led to it by a sight
१० the Honey (and not noticing the bees). Because a rejection of the
“sacrificial accessory would certainly cause a discrepancy in the due ful-
“filment of the result of the sacrifice; nor could any desirable result be
“obtained from the Naimittika or Kadmya accessory either, as this would
“rest in a sacrifice which has been. bereft of its own natural (Nitya)
‘accessory ; because as a substitute for the Kamya or Naimittika acces-
“sory, if is always necessary to have a sacrifice which is exactly like the
“ Original Sacrifice in question; and this Original Sacrifice is always re-
“cognised as the Nitya with connected accessories of the ‘Khadira-wood
‘ etc., etc

‘And thus we find, that, inasmuch as it is only the Modification (of
“that sacrifice) that is not already pervaded over by those Nitya acces-
“sories, the Kdmya ones must be regarded as having a place in this
“ Modification only.” |

५ As for the sacrifice, it is found to be more intimately related to the
“ Context, and to that,which is laid down for its own sake;-and for this
“reason, it always takes up that which is for its own sake (i.e.,, the Wstya

MILKING PERTAINS TO THE PRIMARY, 152]

“accessories), and never the K@mya ones; because, inasmuch as all that
‘the Context seeks is the details of the procedure, it does not take in
“that which 18 60076606 (with the result, 1.6, the Kimya) [vide Satra
“ T]T—iii—11]; and as such that which is indicated by the Context (i.e.
‘the Nitya accessory) is possessed of authority superiur to that of one
“which is counected with the Result (1.6. the Kimya); specially as tha
“Context is found capable of pointing to the employment of the Kamye
‘accessory.

“Lastly, it is not possible for the Kamya to obtain a steatrate that
‘wonld be for the sake of the Sacrifice (and not for that of Man only);
“as such a substrate is already pervaded over by its own (Nityw) acces-
“ sories.

“Thus then the conclusion arrived at in the preceding Adhikurana
“must be regarded as applying to the Nazinittikd aceessories also {that
“is to say, these, as well as the Kamya, accessories should be regarded as
“having a place in the Modificatious, and not in the Original Pranary
* Sacritice, |”

SIDDHANTA

To the above we make the following reply : The Naimittika (Condi-
tional) always pertains to the Original Primary, setting aside the Nitya
—reasons for which we have alvendy been shown befote (कय. Page
1079). The only ground for the Nuimittika not setting aside the Nitya
is non-counection (as has been shown to be the case with the Injunction nob
appearing in the Context of any action), In the case in question however,
we find a distinct connection of a performance qualified by a particular
performer (the Vazgya',—a performance which, being calculated to ac-
complish a desirable end of Man, is not capable of betaking itself to any
other substrate. The superior anthority of the Naimitttka being thus
established, it must be admitted that it pertains to the Original Primary
Sacrifice

Objection: “It is not proper to assert the rejection of that which 1s
“for the sake of the Sacrifice (the Nitya) by that which is for the sake of
“Man (i.e. the Kamya), when these two do uot pertain to the same object ;
“because when they pertain to two different objects, there can bo no oppo-
“sition between them, Consequently we ndmit that in all cases, apart
“from those that are for the sake of Man, the fetching of water 18 to be
“done by means of the Cup; as the Apirva of that sacrifice can be accom-

plished by that means alone. And just as the Cup, which helps the

sacrifice, does not accomplish such desirable results as Cattle and the

“like,—so, in the same manner, the Milking Vessel, which helps in the

“accomplishment of a different purpose (in the shape of some end degir-
191

1422 = TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, I—PADA Vi—ADHI. (8).

‘able by man), can nover help. in the fulfilment of the sacrifice, No,
“oan the Milking Vessel be .aken as serving both the purposes (of help-
“ing the fulfilment of the Sacrifice, as well as the accomplishment of the
‘purpose desired by Man); as that would involve a syntactical split.
‘Nor is there any Injunction syntactically connecting the Result and the
“ etching (whereby the syntactical split could be avoided); because thie
“syntactical construction of the sentence would be totally different in the
“case of its being an Injunction of the Fetching with reference to the
“ Result, from what it. would be in. the case of its being an Injunction of
“the Result with reference to the etching; and hence the sentence could
“not be taken as enjoining both simultaneously (without mvolving 9
“syntactical split), Specially as the connection of two remote factors is
“not admissible, unless that of the proximate ones is found quite impos-
“sible; and hence (of the Fetching) there could not be at one and the same
“time, possibility as well as impossibility. For these reasons it must he
“admitted that, imasmach as in the sentence ‘gadohéna pacukdmasyi
“ pranayét, the Injunction is found to be taken up by the word ‘Kama-
“ (desiring), the senlence cannot serve as an Injunction of the Milking
“Vessel with reference to the Fetching; and hence not. being enjoined.
“and as such not having the character of the sacrificial accessory, it con-
“not set aside the use of the Cup which is a sacrificial accessory. And
“thus being not set aside, it would he absolutely necessary to employ the
“Cup in connection with the Sacrifice; and when the purpose of the
‘Sacrifice has been served by one accessory (1.6. the Cup), there cau be
“no room for any other (in the shape of the Afilking Vessel). Conse
“quently in view of the accessory (Milking Vessel) that is laid down with
“reference to a particular desirable end, it would be necessary to repent
“the action of Fetching (as the Fetching by means of the Qup would also
“have to be done). Just as in the case of the Vessel dedicated ४० India-
“Vayu, inasmuch as the connection of Mit@verunna and other.deities with
“that Vessol is not possible, the Injunction (‘ Muttravarunan 0714060५, etc.)
‘as taken as laying down further repetitions of the Vessel,—so, in the
“same we would have the repetition of F elching, with a view to.the par-
“ticular Result desired by Man. . This would have the further advantage
~ of causing no discrepancy, either in the Sacrifice, or in the Result desired
“by the Agent. Nor do we find the purpose of actions served by them,
“‘whea they abandon their own accessories, and are accomplished by the

“help of extraneous accessories ;— specially when that purpose is not in-
“dicated by the Injunction of those Actions.” $e,

.". To the above we make the following reply: That Accessory,—which
being laid down with reference to a particular desirable result, is not
taken up by that which helps in the xocomplishment of the Sacrifice, --

_ MILKING PERTAINS ‘TO THE PRIMARY | . 159;

betakes itself, for the accomplishment of its own purpose, to that action
which does:‘help in the accomplishment of the Sacrifice. Because an Acces-
sory, wholly devoid of functioning, could never fulfil any desirable result;
as when devoid of functioning, it can have no Instrnmentality towards the
fulfilment of that result; consequently it is absolutely necessary for it to
have taken up a certain Action (or functioning) which is authorised by
the Scriptures; and in the case in question, we find that the Accessory
is supplied with such an action, in the shape of the Metching. But then,
we find that in regard to this action of Fetching, there isalready an en-
joined accessory in the shape of the Cup; and inasinuch as this cannot
he set aside, there can be no lnjunction of the Milkiug Vessel, etc. We
find that the Cup has been laid down without any view to the rejection
of the Milkiny Vessel; but of this latter, we do not tind any Injunction,
without the rejection of the Cup, The action of Fetching too is
tuwken up by the Accessory pertaining to the desirable result ; and hence
it could not keep up its own Original Accessory, which is remote from
the desirable Result. Theu again the non-acceptance of the original
(Nitya) accessory would constitute an excellence; while its acceptance
would be a defect; just as in the ease of the connection of what is dis-
tinctly prohibited.

Even though the Accessory (कध Vessel), laid down with a view
io a desirable result, serves quite ४ distinct purpose (from what is served
by the Nitya Accessory), yet, on account of the intermediate action (Ketch-
iny) being the same, it is capable of establishing the falsity of (i.e. reject-
ing) the idea of the other accessory (i.e. the Cup). Because the Kamya
accessory (Milking Vessel) also brings abont the accomplishment of the
Sacrifice, though indirectly (i.e.4s the means of accomplishing the result
for which the Accessory is laid down) ; aud in that case, the Sacrifice, hav-
ing its purpose seryed by that, does not take up its original (Nitya) Ace
cessory (Cup); as all things take up their Accessories only for the
sake of certain purposes served by them; and lence when that purpose has
been served by an Accessory, which, in reality, had been meant for another
purpose (the bringing about, through the Sacrifice, of a certain desirable
result.) ,—-what would be the use of taking up the original Accessory at all?
Thos then, in the case in question, the Fetching of water, that is done for
the purpose of the Kneudiny, ete., of the sacrificial material, having been
accomplished, by means of the Kamya Accessory (the Alilking Vessel) ;
would not lead to the bringing in of its original Accessory (the Cup),
and hence the Cup cannot be regarded as an Accessory of that perform-
ance of the Fetching of water (which is done with a view to the obtaining
of Cattle) ;.and’under the circumstance, the non-employment of the Cup_
could not cause any discrepancy in the Sacrifice |

1§24 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH, JI—PADA VI—ADBI. (8).

Thus, then, there could not be a repetition of the Fetching (for the
sake of the employment of the Oup), even for the sake of the Sacrifice
itself; as any such repetition would be absolutely useless; and hence in
one performance, at least, of the Sacrifice, there would bea rejection of the
Nitya accessory. Because it is only when the Fetching is actually accom.
plished that it serves as the substrate of the (use of the) Milking Vessel.
Consequently, in course of that performance of the Sacrifice which is done
with @ view to the obtaining of Cattle, the Fetching, —having been accom-
plished by means of the Milking Vessel, which has laid down for it a pur-
pose other than the mere accomplishment of the Sacrifice,—could not
take up the Cup. Becanse in all cases, the accessories are taken up for
the accomplishment of certain actions, and not for the bringing in of
the mere presence of the accessories themselves. And in the Twelfth
Adhyaya, we shall show that the Animal, the Cake and the other offering
materials, when accomplished by means of other accessories, do not take
up their own specific ones, and this abandoning of the aecessories does not
cause any discrepancy (either in the materials or in the Sacrifice} ; in the
same manner, the abandoning of the Cup would canse no discrepancy in
the case in question. Because, even thongh a certain accessory be such
as belongs originally to the Action itself, yet, if it happens to be aban- .
doned by the Injunction (of the actual performance), it ceases, for that
occasion, to be an accessory of that action; and certainly there can be no
discrepancy in the abandoning of that which is not an accessory ; in fact
it is its employment that would cause a discrepancy. Nor could there
be a repetition of the principal factor, the Action of Fetching, for the sake
of the secondary factor, the accessory, in the shape of the Cup; nor 1
the Cup an absolutely inevitable accessory of the Fetching; and we
actually find that in the case of the Fetching having been done by the Onp,
there arises no question as to the necessity of doing it by the Milking
Vessel also; and under the circumstances, we see no reason why, when the
Fetching las been done by means of the Milking Vessel, there should be
any question of having to do it over again, merely for the sake of employ-
ing the Cup, |

Question: “ How is it that the injunction of the Milking Vessel is
possessed of an authority superior to that of the Cup?”

Answer: (1) Because the Milking Vessel has been laid down as 4
special case ; (2) and hence its Injunction would become absolutely useless,
if evenin that particular case, we were to employ the Cup only ; and (3)
because if 19 enjoined in proximity to » result desired by man ; therefore
it sets aside the use of the Cup. |

That is to say, (1) and (2) the Injunction of the employment of the
Cup is a peneral one, indicating the: possibility of its employment in all

MILKING PERTAINS TO THE PRIMARY. 1525

performances (of the Fetchiny of water); while that of the Melking Ves-
sel 18 a particular one (laying it down as to be employed under certain
conditions) ; and hence it 18 possible for the former to have a place with-
out necessarily setting aside the latter (i.e. in those performances where
the specified conditions are absent). ‘This however is not possible for
the Milking Vessel, which can find no place without setting aside the Cup
(as this latter is connected with all performances), (3) The Cup is very
much farther removed from the result desired by Man, than the Milking
Vessel (whose use is directly connected with the acquiring of Cattle); and
it is a well-known fact that all Scripture tends towards the fulfilment
of some end desired by Man.

As for the difference between the two (the Cap and the Milking Ves-
sel), consisting in the fact of one serving the sacrifice, which the other
does not, -~ that has gut nothing to do with the case in question ; a8 we shall
show under Sutra, ‘ Arthasyfivikrtatvadt’; nov is there much use in such
specialisations as, that ‘a generic accessory helping in the sacrifice can
be set aside by a particular one only when this latter also 1s such as helps
in the sacrifice,” And thus, on account of proximity, the two (the Fetching
and the Milking Vessel) must be regarded as affecting each other's potency
and thereby restricting the utility or applicability of each other. For
instance, the [etching which has obtained its existence in another per-
formance, loses its potency of bringing in its original accessory (the
Cup); while the Milking Vessel also loses the potency of prompting any
other Fetching.

And thus, it 18 only in such performances of the Fetching, as are not
related to a ‘desire for Cattle,’ that the employment of the Cup could
be accepted as authorised by the Scripture ; and hence it must be admitted
that the ‘ Milking Vessel’ (which is laid down as to be used in perform:
ances connected with that deszre) is a ‘ modification’ of the Cup.

That in the Modificatory Sacrifices the Cup alone could be employed
will be explained in Adhya@ya VIJI under the Sutva VITI—i—24. Hence
we conclude that the Modification (of the Cup, in the shapo of the Mulking
Vessel) is employed at the Original Primary only.

ADHIKARANA (4).
(The Adhana is not subsidiary to the Pavamdnésti.]

Sitra (11): “The laying of fire is for the sake of the
[sti; “because of the Context,”

In course of the treatment of such Injunctions as do not occur in the
Context of any Sacrifice, the Author first of all proceeds to show that the
Laying of Fire is enjoined without reference to any particular Sacr-
fice.

The fact of the Injunction of the Laying of Fire (‘Vasanié Agninada-
dhita’) occurring in the Context of the Pavaméinésti (which 18 laid down
in the sentence ‘ Agnayé pavimindydstika pilannirvapét, ete.) indicates
that the suid Laying belongs to that Isti; while from Direct Declaration
it appears to pertain to the Sacrificial Fire purely by itself (and not as .
connected with any particular Sacrifice); hence there arises the question |
as to whether, or not, the Laying of Fire belongs to the Pavamadnést: in
particular.

And on this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSA.

‘In accordance with the Siltra T1I-—iv—15, the Laying being a pari-
“fication of Agni, for the purposes of the 1४, we conclude, through
“ Direct Declaration, Syntactical Connection, and Context,—all of which
‘are quite compatible with one another,—that the Laying is of that Pure
“which is connected with the Isfi. [This view is not incompatible with
‘ Direct Declaration, as all that this declares is that the Laying is of the
“ Fire; and this is not infringed in the case of the Laying being done for
“the Fire of the Isfi.] The Laying of the fire by itself (without refer-

ence to any Sacrifice) would be absolutely useless; and it is this
S {86६ of its belonging to the Fire,that makes it capable of being taken
“for the Fire in connection with the Js#i; and hence we must admit
“ that the general statement (contained in the sentence ‘ Agninddddhita `)
“rafers to the 19 ;. and then too, the Context distinctly shows that it
*“‘ pertains to the Puvafrinéstr |

et oa ` ADHANA ON AUBSIDIARY ‘TO PAVAMANESTI. 1527

SIDDHANTA.

54८14 (12): not so; as it is the Ishtis that are for the
sake of the Laying of Fire.

If the Laying were meant to be an indirect aid to a Sacrifice, then,
through Context, it could have been taken as being for the sake of the
18८1, Through Syntactical Connection, however, we find that the Accnsa-
tive ending (in ‘ Agnin ddadhita ` ) clearly shows that the Laying is meant
tO be a purification of Agni, Under the circumstances, if the Ayni were
solely for the sake of the Paruménésti then, m that case, through the
Agni, the Laying also would be for the sake of that. But we have already
shown that not bringing about any definite results, the Jst7s themselves
ave for the snake of (subservient to) the Agni; and hence, in accordance
with the Sutra VI--iv—13, the Laying and the Isfi could not bear the
relation of subserviency to each other (as both are accessories of Agnz),
Nor have we any reasons for making the Context set aside the denotation
of the Accusative ending. |

Sutra (13): Also because we find indications to the
effect.

The sentence ‘ Ténaivam punurnavannavam kuroti’ (where ‘tena’ re-

fers to the Laying) shows that the Laying is meant to be the purification
of Agni

ADHIKARANA (5).
[The Laying is for the sake of all Sacrifices. ]

Siitra (14): “"It is for the sake of the Original Pri.
Smary sacrifice; just as are all injunctions not

“oecurring tn the Contexrct of any particular 56.
4५ ri fice.”

The question being as to whether the said Laying of Fire is for the
sake of the Original Primary Sacrifice, or for that of all Sacrifices,—we
have, upon this, the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

“It having been established that the Injunction of the Laying does
‘not occur in the Context of any particular Sacrifice, it must be admitted
“that, like the mjunction of the Khadira-Sruva, the Laying is for the
५ sake df the Original Primary Sacrifice, entering into this latter, through
“the Agr.”

SIDDHANTA.

Sutra (16): It is for the sake of all sacrifices; because
the Laying has its own specific time (distinctly sub-
joined) [Or, BDecause the Laying is laid down inde
pendently by ttself |

The sense of the Siéra appears to be as follows :—-If the Layzng were
done at the time of the Oriyinal Primary Sacrifice, then it could be taken
as being for the sake of this latter; as a matter of fact, however, we find
that the Laying is done at a time that is laid down for itself,—such time
being the Vasanta, etc. (laid down in the sentence ‘ Brahmano vasante
Agninidadhita, etc.’); and thus not being connected with any particular
sacrifice, we must conclade that the Laying is for the sake of ali Sacri-
fices (the Original Primary as well as the Secondary Modifications).
Specially as the fact of the performance of the Laying being common to
all sacrifices will be fully established, under Satra XI—iii—2. Ie it
were for the sake of the Original Primary alone, then its performance
would belong only to the Darga Parnamasa; and in that case, inasmuch
as its performance would depend upon that of this Principal Sacrifice, it

LAYING OF FIRE FOR ALL SACRIFICES, 1529

would from 108 very nature come to be performed in its own time in the
Vasenta, as well as on the Amfmasy& and the Piirnamdasi days. And in
that case, such declarations, as ‘Vasante Gdudhita, ‘ Darcu-Pirnamasya-
yorddadhita, would become absolutely useless. Kor these reasons, it
must be admitted that the Laying is for the sake of all Suc ifices

This position however could not be maintuined, becanse we have
no authority for connecting the Layiny either with the Original Primary,
or with the Secondary Modifications. We have found that, notwithstand-
ing the indications of the Context, the Laying was not admitted to be for
the sake of the Pavamanéstz; and then, how could we take it to be for
the sake of any other Sacrifice, when we have none of the six means of
knowledge — Direct Declaration and the rost,—pointing to that fact ?

Objection: “In that case, the present Adhikarana will have been in-
“eluded in the last (and as such there would be no need of treating of it
“ separately ).”

Reply : True, it would certainly have been included in it, if the Durca-
Pirnamdsa also were as devoid of results as the Pavumanésti. As a
matter of fact, however, the Darga-Piérnaamdsa ave found to lead to dis-
tinct results; and as such not being a aubsidiary action, it could not be
subject to the law of the 67८१५ VI—iv—13; and bence it is quite possible
for the Laying to be taken as being, through Agni, for the sake of this
Sacrifice. The Laying being devoid of any results of its own, it becomes
necessary to find out some use for its performance; and just ag in the
case of the ‘ Khadira-Sruva,’ 80 in this also, the Layzng would como to be
recognised as being, through Aguz, for the sake of the Sacrifice. Specially
as the fires, appearing in the course of performances, are quite capable
of accomplishing the Sacrifices. We have found that the washing of the
Vrihi-corn is not for the sake of the mere form of it,—an so also the
mention of ‘ Khddira’ is not for the sake of the mere form of it,-——and that
both of these are meant to be the means to the accomplishment of the
Aptirva (Transcendental Result) of Sacrifices ; and exactly in the same
manner, the Laying of Fire would be not for the sake of the mere form of
Aguz, but for the bringing about of the Sacrificial Aparvu. If the Laying
were merely meant to be the means of bringing abont the form of the
Fire, then, in that case, tlie Sacrifice would come to be performed even by
those who may not have laid the Sacrificial Fire (performed Agnyadhana).
Asa matter of fact however, what the Man requires is the Sacrifices to be
complete in all its details, and not the mere Fire ; and hence the connection
of some Sacrifice being absolutely necessary, it must be admitted that the
Laying is for the sake of the Original Primary, in order to avoid a useless
repetition, as shown under Sutra [1I—vi—2
““ -48 for the injunction of a distinct time for the Luying,—tbhat could be

192 | |

L530 TANTRA-VERTEKA, ADW. 1I—~PADA VIL—-ADHT. (5),

taken as pertaining to the common character of the performance; jns{
like the Outting of the Sacrifictal post laid down by Direct and Indirec

Injunctions ; and hence that could not justify our taking the Laying to he
tor the sake of all Sacrifices. Then, as for the mention of ‘ Vasania,’ ete

(as the time for Laying), that could be taken as serving the purpose of
pointing out a time that has not been mentioned elsewhere. For certain),
the Laying of Fire that would be done in connection with the Darca-Pin

namiisa could not always be performed in the Vasanta, as that Layiny
has got to be performed every fortnight (on every Amd@vdsya and Pu:

namisi). But this time of the Dargu- Pirnamisa would not apply to
that. Laying which is done in connection with the Darvi-Homa, apart from
the Agnihotra. And for these reasons the common character of the Lay-
ing could not be cognised without the declaration of its own time (Vasau-
ta); and hence this declaration 1s not found to be useless (which would
cause an Apparent Inconsistency that could justify our accepting the
fact of the Laying being for the sake of all Sacrifices. )

In view of these reasons, we explain the Sitra as follows :—The
Laying is not subsidiary to any Sacrifice; it 1s for the sake of the Agni
only, as is distinctly shown by the Accusative ending in ‘ Agnin.’ And
inasmuch as the Agni is related to all Sacrifices,—as shown under Sutra `
1lI—vii—39,—we speak of the Laying also as being, through the Agni:
tor the sake of all Sacrifices.

The clause ‘Svakdlatedt’ (in the Sitra) is to be taken in the sense
of * Svdtantryamndndt,’—i.0. because the Laying is laid down independently
by 28९

It has been argued that, “from the Analogy of other Injunctiona that
do not occur in the Context of any particular Sacrifice, we must infer the
fact of the Injunction of the Laying also to-pertain to all Sacrifices
But to that we offer the following reply: In the case of those other In
jnuctions, we took up the question of the actions to which they pertained,
alter it had been taken for granted that they were subsidiary to some
such Sacrifice. In the case in question however, you have no authority
for taking the Laying to be subsidiary to any Sacrifice. That is to say;
as for the ‘ Khddtra,’ etc., though they are connected with the Sruva, ९६९.
yet they are not recognised as to have been laid down merely for the sake
of the form of the Sruva, etc» because the use of the word ‘ Sruva,’ which
is expressive of the Class, would. be quite possible, even without the ‘ Khe
diva’ GQnasmuch as the Sruva could be made of other woods also), - - 4.8 {01
the Khadira, that also, on being connected with the particular shape (01
the Suva), comes to be spoken of as.‘ 6१५४८. And. before the Sruva has
been recognised as being Accessory to a Sacrifice, there ia no necessity of
restricting the Class ‘ Sruva’. (to that which is made of. the Xhadira wood

LAYING OF FIRE FOR ALL SACRIFICES L521

only); and hence it 18 only right that we shonld pass beyond the making
of the mere shape of the Sruva. In the case in question, on the other
hand, we find that the use of such words as ‘ Ahavaniya’ and the like:
depend, for their denotation, upon the due performance of the sanctifica-
tory rite of the Laying; and as such, they are not applied to the Fire,
until that rite has been duly performed; and hence the Luying comes
to be recognised as having its use in the supplying of the basis for the
denotation of the said words (‘ Ahavaniya,’ etc.)

Then, it has been argued that,-—“‘even without the Laying of fire,
there would be no discrepancy in the Sacrifices.” But the diserupancy is
due, not to the absence of the Laying itself, but to the non-accomplish-
ment (without the Laying) of the Ahavaniya Fire (which 18 £ necessary
factor in all Sacrifices). If all tho effect of the neglecting of Laying con-
sisted merely in the non-fulfilment of the Laying alone, then, there would
be no discrepancy in the Sacrifice (by such neglect). As a matter of fact
however, we find that without a due performance of the Laying, no Ahwva
niya and other sanctified Fires are possible; and there can be no doubt as
to these Fires being very necessary Accessories of Sacrifices ; and as such,
the non-accomplishment of these would surely cause a discrepancy in
these. Then again, if the Sacrifices were connected with the Fire alone,
(without any sanctifications) then, inasmuch as the mere form of the Fire
would be accomplished even without the Laying, this Laying could not be
accepted as due to (necessitated by) the performance of the Sacrifice
But, as a matter of fact, we tind that such Injunctions, as ‘yaddhavaniyé
juhott? and the like cannot be duly carried out, without the performance
of the Laying. And hence it must be admitted that one who would per-
form the Sacrifices must perform the Laying also

For these reasons, we conclude that the Laying is for the sake of the
Hire

As for the Sitra ^ Dravyasyakarmukilanirpatith’ (1-11-2), which
might be quoted against the present Siddhantu, we shall explain, undex
that Sutra, that it puts forward a theory only by way of admitteng for the
sake of argument, —

The above reasonings also tend to show that the Paraméinéstzs also
are for. the sake of (the due preparation of) the Fire. The further ques-
tions, in connection with the relationship between the Pavamanést: and
the Laying, we shall deal with in the following Adhikarana.

ADHIKARANA (6).
[The Puramanéstis should be performed in the unconsecrated 0116. |

Sutra (16) : “The Fire for Pavamanéstis showld be
obtained from the Original Primary; just like
the Prayajas.”

The question that we proceed to deal with is, that as to whether,
or not, the Parama@néstis ave performed by means of the Fire consecrated
by the Pavamana-offerings, in accordance with the Sitra ‘tasyantu syat
praydguvat’ (K—i—6).

And on this question, we have the following

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘Tn accordance with the declaration—Jstis« Darga-Pirnama@sayoh
“ pravritih,’ we are led to the conclusion that the Darca-Pirnamasa
५ sacrifices, form tho Original Primary of the Paraménéstis; and hence
“inst as the Prayajas enter into these latter, on the authority of the
‘‘Tmplicatory Injunction (‘ Prakrtivadvikrtth’ ),—so, in the same manner,
५४ the fact of their being performed in the Fire consecrated by the Pavam@na-
४५ offerings would also enter into them, by reason of the same authority.

“ Objection: ‘The Ahavaniya and other Fires become recognised as
“ occasions for all sacrifices, by means of Direct Declaration ; and as such
‘itis not right to assert that they are obtained (for the Pavamana Istis)
“from the original Primary.’

¢ Reply: This does not affect the case; as it is only in cases where
“the ‘Homa’ is directly mentioned, that the relationship of the Homa
“would be recognised as the same as that with the Original Primary.
“In cases, however, where it is the mere ‘Sacrifice’ that is assumed.
“ from the relationship of the material and the Deity,—while the ‘ Homa
“ig obtained from the original Primary, through the sentence ‘ Qatura-
“yattam juhott, —inasmuch as the means (in the shape of the Homa)
५ would be obtained from the Original Primary, the Ahavaniya Fire also
“ should be obtained from the same source;—and it is only right to assert
“that it ¢s obtained from the Original Primary.

“ Objection: ‘Those Pavamana I[stts that are performed for the
“sake of mere ५0 4९८९८८00, would stand in need of other such Isfis for
“ their purification ; and those of others ; and so on and on, ad infinitum.’

PAVAMANESTI IN UNCONSECRATED FIRE. 1533

“ Reply: This objection does not affect our position ; in all cases of
“ such regressus ad infinitum, we can proceed only so far as is justified by
“due authority ; and hence the Jsfis would go on heing performed ouly
“so long as the time wonld pernut, without trespassing on the prescribed
‘time, such as the Amdvasya, the Parnamdasi, and the like.”

SIDDHANTA.
Sittra (17) : Not so; because the Pavamana Istis are
performed for the sake of (the consecration of) the Fire.

It is only the accessories of the Original Primary, such as the
Prayaj@ and the like, that are transferred by Implicatory Injunction.
The Pavamaina Istis however, are not the accessories of sacrifices, as we
Lave just shown in the Adhikarana on the ‘Laying of Fire’ Hence
what is transferred by Implicatory Injunction, is the mere form of the
Ahavaniya and other Fires, and not the [g//s,—as shown under the Suira,
‘ Ripam vA acésabhiitatvat’ (VII—iii—29),-:

As for the Arambhaniya Isti however, it is the accessory of a sacri-
tice; and hence to the question of this Isf/ we shall devote another
Adhtkarana ; and the law arrived at in connection with that Isfd would
apply to the present case also. Hiven if the Pavamana Istis were
accessories of the Darga-Pirnamdsa,—until they are actually enjotued,
they are not seen in connection with the Original Primary; and until the
Bhavana is fally supplied with its three constituent factors—of the object,
the Iristrument and the Procedure,—the Injunction would not be operative.
Hence the Original Primary being without the Puvamdna Istis, the
procedure that these latter could take up would be only that which is
laid down by sentences other than that enjoining the Oviginal Primary,
Otherwise, in one and the same sentonce we would have the thing veferred to
as already enjoined, and also as enjoined as if not already enjoined ; and this
would involve a self-contradiction in the very form of the thing, Hence
it must be admitted that the Ahavaniya and other Sacrificial Fires
necessary for the Pavaména Istis, are exactly the same as those that
existed before those Isfis; and hence it is only when the Sacrificial Fire
has been duly accomplished, and stands in need of some purpose to
serve, that we could take it as an accessory pointed out either by Direct
Injunction or by indirect Implicatory Injunction As a matter of fact
however the Isfis serve the purpose of accomplishing the said Sacrificial
Fires $ and as such could not stand in need of any help from these latter
and that which is not wanted could not be laid down, either directly, or
by Implication |

For thege reasons we conclude that the [इ are to be performed in

1584 TANTRA-VARTIKA.: ADH. H—PADA VI—ADHL. (6)

connection with the Fire which has undergone the simple consecrator,
vite of the Laying (without. being subjected to the farther purificator,
rite of the Pavaména Istis themselves). = =

Om, ee ye, SS, wt Pan, ele gt वी ॥

ADHIKARANA (7)

The Upakaranu (Killing) and other accessory details belong to the
Agnisomiyu animal only.]

Siitra (18): “The Injunction with regard ६० the Pacu-
“Sacrifice would have pertained equally to all ani-
Smalts, tf they had all been mentioned in the same
Context.”

‘We now proceed to consider the contradiction and non-coniradic-
tion of Posetzou (or Order) by Context, as well as by the former three
(Direct Declaration, Indicative Force, and Syntactical Connection).

In connection with the Agnistfoma-Terminus ( Samstha), of the Jyotis-
toma Sacrifice, there are laid down three Animal-Sucritices, of the
Agnisomiya, the Saranfya and the Anubandhya animals. All these ani-
mals stand in need of certain accessory details, in connection with the
procedure to be adopted in those Sacrifices. We find that there are cer-
tain details,—such as Killing, elc.,—laid down as to be porformed on the
Aupavasathya Day (the day previous to the actual performance of the
Sacrifice), after the Agnisomiya animal has been brought in,

With regard to these accessory details, there arises a four-fold doubt:
(1) Are the details laid down for all the three animals; (2) or, for the
Savaniya, only; (3) or, for the Savaniya, and the Agnisomiya ; (4) or,
for the Agnisomiya, only ?

And with a view to the relevancy of the Satrus ‘ Sthinacca pirvasya
and the rest, the Author propounds the Pirvapaksa that “they are laid
down for all the three animals.”

‘But if this theory were put forward by the Sitru, then the next
७ ४1५ would be wholly irrelevant; as the ‘ previous,’ ‘Pirva,’ being included
in the ‘all,’ what would he the use of this second Sitru, when the present
Sdéra will already have pointed out the applicability of the Details to adj
the three animals P—specially as the applicability of these tu the ‘ Previ-
ous” animal also would be due to the non-differentiation of the Context.
Then again, how could we connect the whole thing with the preclusion (con-
tained in Stra, 20) of the fact of the Details belonging to the Savaniya
only,.which has not been declared by the mention of the absence of Con-
toxtP—and this Siddhdnta Silva, being found to be irrelevant, would make
‘all the subsequent accessory 82045 irrelevant also |

1536 YANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, L—PADA VI.—ADHI. (7).

Or, it might be possible for us to take what 18 put forward in the
present Stitra as the first Pirvupaksa; and as the second Pérvap.ksq
we would have the theory that the details belong to the Savaniya only
(which has not been put forward in any Sitra) ; and then we would hare
the Seddhanta put forth in Sitra (20). But this procedure has not heen
adopted by the Bhdsya; which has recourse to the much simpler method
of putting forward the first of tho aforesaid alternatives (i.e. the details
belong {o all the three animals),—but, as not contained in the present
Sitra. Inasmuch as the assumption, for the sake of the relevancy of the
subsequent ७41८5 of an extraneous Puarvapaksu, 11 between the two
Pirvapaksas put forward in the Séfras, would throw the charge of
negligence (or absent-mindedness) on the author of the Suiras,—we take
the assumed extraneous Pirvapaksa, in the very beginning of the Adhi-
karana. And in support of this Parvapaksa we have the following argu-
ments, which we put forward as—

PURVAPAKSA (A),

“The accessory details in connection with Animals, that are laid
“down in the Jyotistoma-Context, are not found to be related to any
“yarticular animal. Because, though, through Syntactical Connection, it
“is the Agnisomiya animal that 18 recognised as to be dealt with in the
“same place as the accessory details in question,—yet at the place of the
‘actual appearance of these, the Context of the Animal would be in
“proximity to the Purchase. |

“That is to say, in connection with the Initiatory Sacrifices we find
“the Agnisomiya animal laid down, in proximity to the Purchase of
“Soma; and though, through the force of Syntactical Connection, it
“would appear that this animal is to be dealt with in proximity to the
‘details relating to the animal,—yet it is not found to be so dealt with
“in view of the Context; because all Contexts operate in regard to the
“place of origination (or appearance). As for the Savaniya animal, the
“time for its appearance is that of the Sutya (Pounding of the Soma) ;
“and as for its declaration in connection with the Previous Day, that 1s
“simply for the purpose of pointing out certain details; but, this declara-
“tion does not constitute the Context; as it occurs at a distance from the
“ Anubandhya animal, which is dealt with at the end of the Soma (Sacri-
‘“ficee). Aud thus we find that the Details im question belong to the
‘‘ Jyotistoma itself, and to none of the animals concerned; as. the indi-
“cation of the Position of the Agnisomiya, being at a distance from its
‘‘ objective, would be rejected by those of the Conteat of the Jyotistoma,
“which is not interfered by any Sub-confext or Syntactical Connection
“But, in view of the fact of the material employed at the Jyotisfono

‘PAN DETAILS DO NOT BELONG TO THR SAVANIYVA. 1537

«“heing the Soma (and not the body of any animal), we come to take
‘the said 4९15 as belonging to its subsidiaries (in accordance with
‘the Sitra 1TI—i—18); and as all the three Animal-Sacrifices are
“ equally subsidiaries to the Jyoltstoma, we take the details to helong
“to all the three animals. .
As for the क्म Isti, however, even though that too isa
subsidiary of the Jyotastoma, vet the details do not pertain to it; for
‘¢ the simple reason that itis ineapable of utilising them. Nor do they
“nertain to the animals that come in as accessories of the Dikshaniya
"< Tstt; hecause evon though they are capable of taking in those details,
‘vet there is no sort of general relationship (between these animals
‘Cand the said Detaus). For these reasons, it must be admitted
‘that the Details in question apply equally to all the three animals.”’
In reply to this extraneous Pirvapaksha we have the present
Nitra (18), which embodies the following—

PURVAPAKSA (70).

‘What has been said would be possible only if there were no
‘difference in the Context, through the Jyolistoma. As a matter of
‘‘fact’ however, we find that there is an actual difference in the
‘Contexts of the Animals ; masmuch as the Savantya is mentioned in
‘connection with the Previous Day ;-—the appearance of Savraniya
‘animals having been laid down, in proximity to the Details of the
‘Animal-Sacrifice, 7 the sentence— Agnéyam ajam Agnistomé,
alabhéta Aindragnamukihye dvitiyam. [161८6 we conclide that the
“ Details in question belong to the Savantya animal only.”

। ‰# ।

[In reply to Pirvapaksha (2), we have the following-—|

PURVAPAKSA ((),

११/१८ (19): “Through Position, they should be taken
Sas belonging ta the previous aufiel (Le. the Agni-
*somiya) also,”

` न Question: ‘How is it that this Sara declares something in

* direct contradiction to the Law of the Cruta-lingadhikarana ((1L—iii—

14)? For certainly, the conclusion therein arrived at is not in the

‘form that by Conteat Vidévana, ete., ure subservient to the Rajasiya,

sohale- by Position they ave subservient to the Abhishécantya ; or that

“` by Direct. Declaration the Atndri belongs to the Garhapatya, while by

^ Indicative Porce it pertains to Indra (and thi? is what is declared
~ 198 ` ` ` | ह = |

1538 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, UI-—PADA VI.—~ADHI. (7)

“in the (८, that by Conlext the Details tn question belong to th;
“ Savantya, while by Position they belong to the Agnisomiyal.” ` |
^" Answer: In the case of the Videvana (dealt with under the
¢ Crutilingadhtkarana), it was found that all requirements being ful-
filled by means of the superior authority of the Conteat, there would he
<: 70 occasion for the operation of the inferior authority of Position ;
‘and as such it was only right that both alternatives should not be
‘‘ accepted conjointly ; specially as in such a case, the non-assump-
‘ tion of the further relationship (shown by the inferior authority) does
“ not cause any discrepancy either in the nature of the Accessory (the
८ Aindri Mantra) in question, or in that of the Primaries (Indra, Agni,
०५ ete.); because they are capable of being recalled to the memory by
° other means (than the J/antra in question). In the case in question,
< however, though the requirements of the Accessory Details in question
‘are supplied by their connection with the Savaniya animal, yet,
‘inasmucn as the Agnishomiya is found to be incomplete without
“ these Details, it becomes absolutely necessary to recall them again
“(by some means or other, for the accomplishment of the Agni-
८५ shomtya) ; specially as there would be no incongrnity in the accept.
‘“anee of both at one and the same time. As a matter of fact, with-
‘out the Details in question, the Agnishomiya could never form part of
“ the Darca-Purnamasa sacrifices as that which forms the origin of the
‘+ Animal-Sacrifices, viz.: the Agntshomsya, is a modification (or part)
‘of the Darcu-Purnamasa, while others, having the common character
of having for their material a living being, are modifications of the
Animal sacrifices themselves, and then when we come to consider the
question. as to whether the Agnishomiya (not taking in the dedails di
rectly by itsolf) is to obtain them out of those belonging to the Save
‘‘niya, through the Indirect implication based upon similarity (of the
“ two animals),—or it is to obtain them by means of some sort of 4
“direct Injunction,—we come to the conclusion that the Details find
ˆ place in the Agnishomiya by means of Position, which forms a part
“ of Direct Injunction; as it is only when all the six. methods of Direct
८८ Injunction (in the shape of Direct Declaration, Indicative Power and
‘the rest) have ceased to operate that we can admit of any Indirect
‘“ Tmplication. Consequently, just as in the other case, the operation
“ineluded in the sacrifice: comes to be taken as. subservient to the
_* Original, as well as to the modifications through Direct Injunction and
“Indirect Implication, respectively,—so, in the same: manner, in the
case in question, ‘she Details in question are subservient to the

` ष्पे. DETAILS DO NOT BELONG TO THE SAVANTYA. 1539

। Aqnishomiya, as well as to the Savantya through Position and Conlext
respectively.

८ As for the Anubandhya animals, however, inasmuch as we do not
^ Gnd-any the slightest Direct: Injunction to be applicabie, the Details
‘+ could come in only through Implication.

०५ And as such there can be nothing objectionable in the “Sara.”

SIDDHANTA
Siitra (20): According to some people, the accessory
detatiis belong to the Savaniya; bat the previous
declaratton only serves the purpose of pointing
out an accessory.

We quite readily admit of the fact of the Details belonging to the
Agntishomiya, through Position; bub we cannot aceept the assertion of
that they belong to the Savantyu, by reason of the Context, Because
the re-mention of the Savantya animals in connection with the Previous
Day serves the purpose of pointing out an accessory ; while as for the
appearance of those animals, which actually occurs after the Holding o/
the Acvina Cup (on the day following tne sacrifice), 1६ is pointed out by
the Context.

The originative Injunction of the Savantya Animals is contained in
the sentence—‘ Taking hold of the Agvina Vessel, and tying a three-
fold string round the sacrificial post, one should kill the Savaniya ani-
mal.” And as for the word ‘ cuzh’ (* to-morrow ’) used on the Auptnasa-
thya Day, this refers to the Sutym (the day after the sacrifice) .

Question: “ What is that accessory (for the srke of which we have

the previous declaration) ? We do 1107 find any mentioned in the
“ sentence dealing with the Savantya itself {`

Answer: It is this; with reference to all Savantyes. we find the
deprecatory declaration: Yatha va matsyah, etc., efc,.’ the meaning of
which is this: ‘ Just as when a lish is moving about in the water its exact
position is not known, and the man looking for it is kept moving this
way-and. that,—so, in the same manner, with regard to these Savant ya
animals it isnot. exactly known where they should be dealt with, and
this. keeps the Performers in ‰ state of suspensée,’—and the previous
mention of the Savantya is in connection with this deprecation, and not.
for the sake of an Injunction of it. The said deprecation also 18 taken,
a8 explanatory of the following question: ‘{n what way are we to
employ the animals known as Savuniya in connection with Savana
offerings?’ .,And this question again is in corfuection with another

1640 §$TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, III—PADA VI.—ADHI. (7).

Injunction,—‘ Vapaya pratah savané pracarantt,’— which has the form
_of an answer to the previous question

And thus we find that the previous mention of the Savaniya is fo
durpose of pointing out this accessory (the Vapa, Fat) of it, as to be
used in the offerings and it gives us an idea of the Context

Question : *' Whal are the words by which the Accessory is laid down १
That is to say, the sentence quoted—- acvinam graham grhitva, etc.,’— is
found to serve the purpose of pointing out the order of sequence of
certain actions; and 88 such it could not serve as the originative Injunc
tion of the Savaniya.

In reply to this, the Author of the Bhashya shows that it is only
the dynéya animal, out of the many Savantya animals, that is spoken
of as appearing * to-morrow

And some people explain this portion of the Bhashya in the fol
Jowing ways: (|) No significance should be attached to the specification
01 the ` dgnéya’ Savuntya. as it is spoken of simply with a view to show
that the accessory belongs to all the Savantyas. (2) This is meant to
show that there are many such sentences ; but in any case, it is the men
tion of the Agnéyu only that serves any useful purpose. Even though |
the Aindragna and the other Savaniya animals have their original ap-
pearance on the Previous Day, vet, inasmuch as they are used in thie
subsequent ‘ 7'erminuscs’ (the performance whereof is not absolutely
necessary) ,—they have not the power to take in (utilise) those १८८८४.
sory details of animals, which are laid down as absolutely necessary.
And thus there could be no doubt as to the superiority of the authority
of the Postion of the Agnishomiya. As for that Savantya, which, being
necessary, is capable of utilising the said details—we have already
shown that the Context does not point to that

For these reasons, we conclude that the details do not belong to the
Savaniya

१४८१०८८ (21): Objection: “The latter declaration would
“only serve the purpose of laying down the time for
“that which ts transferred (to a subsequent occt-
^ sion),

The whole Adhikarana turning upon the due ascertainment of the
exact sentence that serves as the orivinative Injunction of the Suvanzyd,
the Opponent brings forward the following arguments :—

“Tf you think that there is no Context of the Savanitya, then you
“are very much mistaken; because as a matter of fact, the original ap-
pearance of the Savaniya animal is due to the previous sentence

THE DETAILS DO NOT BELONG TO: THE SAVANIYA. 1641

‘ ( agneyamajam, etc.’); then the sentence (" Vapay@ pracarani’) trans-
‘ {७178 the ‘fat’—portion of the body of that animal ito a subsequent
‘occasion; and lastly, the exact time being still unknown. the Jast
‘sentence (‘ asvinam, etc.’) points out the particular time

‘That is to say, the sentence ‘ Vapaya prétak savané pracaranti

‘transfers the chief of the details in qnestion—namely, the ‘ pracara
‘of the Fat’; and inasmuch as the subsidiaries always follow the
‘ Principal, the other Detatls—-of killing, etc..—also are transferred :
‘ but with all this there remains an uncertainty as to the exact time

and the ‘time immediately after the Holding of the Acvina Vessel’ is
‘then laid down (by the sentence ‘devinan grhiled, etc”). ence it is
` this last sentence that serves the purpose of laving down the acces-
‘sory (of Time); otherwise there would be a syntactical split ; because
‘if the sentence were not taken as Jaying down the time for the
‘ Savaniya-sacrifice, it would be taken as laying down the time for
‘the Parivyana (Tying of the rope round the Post) and the Upakarana
` (Killing), as well as the Sacrifice together with its Deity and Materia!
‘(and this multiplicity of enjoined objects would certainly cause a
syntactical split).

‘Objection: “The T'ying of the Rope, being already related to the

‘ sacrifice through Implication, the sentence can be taken as laying
down the Sacrifice as to be performed al the seme time as the Tytng,—
‘the mention of this latter being merely by way of a desertplive refer-
ence (and in this wav, there would be no syntactical split).’ `

“* Reply: 1६ is quite true that the connection of the Tying of the

Rope is pointed out by Implication; but as a matter of fact it is not
actually done at the time of the Savantyu: for the simple reason
` that the Sacrificial Post renaining the same (at all the Animal sacri-
` 7668), all the aid due to the said 7'ying, becomes accorded to the
Savantya also, by the Tying that has been done previously at the
` time of the Agnishomiya,—in accordance with the law ‘ V'atkalastu.
ele,’ (NJ—iti-—-6).

"Objection: ‘In that case the ‘ying of the Rope would be ap-
‘plicable through this commonality of the Post; and as such could
be taken as spoken of (in the sentence Acvinam. qrhitva, elc.) merel y
by way of Descriptive Reference.’

“Reply: No such descriptive reference is possible; tor the simple
reason that the Tying is not recognised to be the same that is
spoken of by way of descriptive reference which is recognised tu be

‘in the same form in which it had appeared ow the previous day ; and:

1542 = TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. ILI—~PADA VI—ADHI. (7).

certainly that which will have been.done on the Previous day could
not be referred to as existing on the day after the Holding of the
‘* Agvina Vessel : nor is there any Tying of the Rope done on this latte
"° १६४४ ; and as for the T'yig that may have been done on the previous
* day, that could nét be spoken of by way of reference by such words
as by the word ‘paryayinikyia’ and the like; because the: Tying is
“limited by limits of the two actions performed at the two points of
‘time. ` | |
“Objection: ‹ 11 that case we can take the sentence (४101490 , , , , .
° Yupam pariwiya, etc. as referring to the Tying of the Rope which is laid
“ down in the sentence-—agvinam graham grhitva upanishkramya yiipam
^" parveyayalt.’
“ Reply: But this also is not the case; for the same reason of
‘ nou-recognition. That is to sav the Tying of the Rope, in ९6०1१८८
^^. tion with the Savansya, which is not the same as the Z'ying origin-
‘ally done, is found to be laid down (in the sentence ‘yiipam parivyayali,)
‘in its base form (i.e. without any mention of the substance that is to
‘be tied round); while the Original Z'ying is distinctly spoken of as
`" done by means of the Rope; and hence if the former Tying were done
by means of some such other substances, as a piece of Cloth and the
“ like, there could be no reference to the ‘ three-foldness’ (which could
‘apply to the Rope only); and as such 1 would be neccessary to
take this ‘ three-foldness’ also to be an object of Injunction by the
“sentence ‘ dcvinam..... 1८/17 yipam pariviya ,’—over and above
“the Tyeny itself; and this would involve a syntactical split.
‘Thus then, the sense of the Bhashya comes to be this: If it
“ were not as we say, then, it would be necessary for the sentence to
‘“lay down, in regard to the Tying, something, in connection with
‘“ which the ‘ three-fold’ substance and the particular time (after the
‘ Holding of the Agvina Vessel) could be enjoined ; and the clause
^“ ‹ upakaranasya ca’ also would lay down the Time for the Killing, as
“ well as the Action qualified by the said Substance and Deity. . And
“hence, inasmuch as these sentences are found to serve the purpose
‘of laying down accessories, it must be admitted that there is ४
“ Context of the Savaniya Animals.” | |

Sutra (22): Reply: Lt cannot be so; as. that (which is
transferred) is only a pert (of the Animal)

When the Savaniyas with. all their accessories sre laid down in
connection with the Previous Day, we are led to. beliqve that all

THE DETAILS DO NOT BELONG TO THE SAVANTYA. 1543

actions (offerings) In connection with the Savaniyas are to be performed
on that-dame day ; but out of these the ‘ Vapa-pacara’ (the carrying of
Fat) is transferred to. the next day,—hy reason of the direct declaration
10. that effect (' Vapaya prataksavan? pracaranti’),-~and not the other
actions of Killing and the like.in accordance with the Suira V--~i—24. the
sense of which is that, ‘ those actions, that are to be performed, either
after, or along with, the Fat-offering, are to be transferred, and not those
that are performed before it,—such as the Killing and the like;’ and
as for those subsidiaries the exact time whereof is not known, they are
to be performed at the same time as the Principal Sacrifice, as we shall
show later.on; but as regards the subsidiaries of the Pacu (Animal)
Sacrifice, it is fully known that thev are to be performed on the previous
day; and hence these do not come to be performed at the time of the
Principal Action.~ Thus then, it would be necessary for you to hav
recourse to a transference,—by the sentence ‘ Acvinam, etc... of the
Navantya; which, however, is not transferred along with the ‘Vapa-pra-
cara’; and this sentence (‘Acvinam, ९८९, '), in that case. becoming a
secondary Injunction, there would be a syntactical split involved in
it3 being taken as laying down many accessories. Qn the other hand,
if this sentence be taken as an Originative Injunction, there would be
no such anomaly; hence we conclude that the sentence is an Origina-
tive Injunction. | |

Objection : ^ As a matter of fact we find that the Bhashya has
‘shown that the sentence contains the Injunction of many objects ;
‘‘as we find in it, the assertion, that the senlence serving the purpose of
“ potniing out accessories, there would be a syntactical split. But the
“ syntactical split is capable of being avoided by taking the sentence
“to be an Injunction only of the transference of the Killing which had
"` been taken as to be performed on the previous day.”

Some people seek to justify the Bhashya, on the following grounds
In the case of the sentence ‘ Aynéyya Agnidhram, we find that what
are enjoined are the general relationship of the Jyotishtoma, and also a.
particular phase of it; and hence it was asserted, on a previous
occasion, that there was a multiplicity of objects enjoined ; and in the
same manner, in the case in question, the sentence can be taken as
having a multiplicity of objects for Injunction, in that it lays down the
transference of the Killing, which has not been transferred along with.
the Vapapracira, as well-as 9 particular phase of it

“But the case of the sentence under consideration is not similar
^“ {0 ४06 sentence ‘ dgnéyya Ggnidhram’; because in the case of the

1644 TANTRA-VARTIKA ADH, Ill-—~PADA VI.—-ADHI. (7).

“Jatter, the Injunction was found to pertain to a particular phase of
‘the relationship (of the Jyotishtoma); and hence we were led to seek
“for an Injunction elsewhere, of the general phase of that relation-
‘ship; and then, finding this latter already inhering in some of the
८८ dgnéyia, we found the force of the Apparent Inconsistency of its
‘“non-injunction considerably weakened; and hence there being no
“such Inconsistency to justify the assumption of Injunctions of the
“said general relationship with regard to the other Agnéyts, such an
“assumption would certainly involve a most objectionable Syntactica|
“Split, inasmuch as such an Injunction is not found to be admitted hy
“the Veda. In the case in question on the other hand, we have no
‘such contrary element, in thé shape of an Injunction of transference
४ in general, which could weaken the Apparent Inconsistency pointing to
“the Injunction of the particular Transferences. If, in the case of
‘“the dgnzyi also, there were no such contrary factor, as the exis-
“tence of the general relationship, which weakened the Apparent
“ Inconsistency,—then, in that case, there could be nothing to set
*‹ aside the fact of the sentence laying down the relationship of every
८ Agnéyi; as it has been already shown, in connection with such
¢: words as ‘ Gona’ and the like, that even though the Action may be an
‘already enjoined one, there is nothing imcongruous in having a
multiplicity of enjoined objects, if these happen to be expressed
‘by means of one and the same word. Consequently, though the
¢“ sentence ' Acvinam graham, ete...” enjoins the Pratahsavana (the morn-
‘ing offering), as well as the fact of its being performed after the
५ Holding of the Acvina Vessels, vet, inasmuch as the Injunctive
‘* Agency 18 confined to a single word. there is no case of these being |
‘* wholly distinct Injunctions for each of the factors concerned, as shown
“under ७1170 {{--1--6 ; 1n fact it is.only of one factor (1.९, of the dune)
९ that we have an actual Injunction, which, however, implies that of
‘the other (i.e. the Pratahksavana) also

“It is for this reason that the Bhashya, in the course .of pointing
‘out the objecticnability of a multiplicity of enjoined objects, has
“declared, that many things could not be enjoined (by the same Injunc-
“ tive), unless they were relaied to -one another: this declaration has
‘been made in full recognition of the fact that when there are many
“things related to one another, the Injunction of any ‘one of these
“implies the others also, without any furthér effort in that direction.
‘Hence if the Injunction of one could imply that of a thousand other
“things, there could be no incongruity in this, nor any extra effort on

| ay
om

THE DETAILS DO NOT BELONG TO THE SAVANIVA. = 1545

+ the part of the Injunctive agency ; and hence we readily admit of such
‘tan implication. The only way to make such an implication untenable
“ig to show that the Injunction (sought to be implied) is otherwise
“obtainable (and as such there is no Apparent Inconsistency to.
“justify such implication). But as a matter of fact, in the case in
‘question, we find that there is no such alternative as would admit

of the Injunction pertaining only to the sequence (of. the Navaniya)

0 the Holding of the Acvina Vessel, without pointing out anv sort of

relationship between that (Sevantya) and the Suty@ and the Morn-
“ing-offering. And henee there can be nothing objectionable in the
‘aforesaid Implication.

‘In fact, the objection is applicable to you (who have sought to
justifv the Bhashya in the aforesaid manner),—who take the InJune-
“fion to be one of an Action qualified by many Sabstances and Deities.
^: Then again, it would be necessary for vou to make a still further
‘assumption, of the relationship, of the Action, with the Jyolishtoma,
“the Sulyd, the Morning-offering and the particular time (after the
* Holding of the Acvina Vessel). And it is a well-known fact, that in
‘all cases of Transference and Subtraction, there is involved an incon-
^ gruity in the shape of having a general and a special Injunction ; and
“hence. in view of this incongruity there could be no Injunction of
"° Accessories with reference to a previously enjoined दणि ; and as
“sach the sentence vould come to be taken as enjoining a distinct
“action altogether. For instance (1) in the case of the sentence
“* Mahéndrasya stotram pratyabhishicyate,’ inasmuch as the Injunction
pertains to the Mid-day-offering, the Mahéndra Hymn and the Tame,
5° Abhishécantya Manira comes to be taken as serving many purposes ;
“(2) and the same may be shown to be the case with the sentence
““Tishthantam pagum pratt prayunjant.’

८ And further, when there is a single object that is both enjosmed
“and dealt with in aclion, any other object coming in could do so in
“ two waya: either by reason of a distinct effort with regard to such
“an object, or as following in the wake of some such object. As for
‘* instance, in the case of the Injunction of Hating (of the Remnants),
^“ the iaking up of the Vessels belonged to the former, while the satisfac-
‘tion, (or pleasure due to the Hating) to the latter kind. Out of these
‘two ‘kinds of objects, that which is due to a distinct effort, is found
‘to: be’ such that unless it is done, that which is enjoined cannot be
“done; and hence with regard td that we have to. assume, on the

round of that Apparent Inconsistency, anothes Injunctive agency,— =

1546 =. TANTRA-VARTIKA. . ADH. 11I-——-PADA VI.—ADAtl. (7)

“but just to such extent as is.found t° be based upon scriptural
~“authority.. While as regards that which follows in the wake of
‘ another object; it is found to be accomplished, even though there be
“very many of it, without any distinct effort on the part, cither of the
“human agent, or on that of the Scripture

‘In the case in question, we find that the sequence o/ the Savaniya
“to the Holding of the Acvina Vessel being enjoined, it would not

necessitate any distinct effort to establish the connection (of that
५८ Savaniya) with the Sutya, the Morning-offering, etc.; and hence
‘there is nothing that enjoins Transference in general. And when

what is actually enjoined is the mere sequence to the Holding of the
‘* Alevina Vessel which is distinctly mentioned, what would it matter
“if in the wake of that sequence there should appear the attendant
‘“ factors of the Sudya, the Morning-offering, the partivular part of the
‘‘ day, the particular hour, minute, second, etc., the generic characte!
“of Time, Substance and Entity (that is to say the implication of
‘these would not involve a Syntactical split) १ —For if there were to be
“a syntactical eplit in such cases, there would be one in the case of the
‘* sentence ‘ bring the Cimcapa’; because in this also, we have the word
‘* Cimeapo’ implying the generic factors of ‘ tree,’ ‘Earth,’ ‘ Substance.’
“and ‘Hintity.” Consequently it must be admitted that all that the sen-
५ tence (Acvinam, etc. ), lays down is another time,—in the shape of
` ^° that following after the Holding of the Acvina V easel, —for the Killing
‘which has been previously laid down as to be done on the Previous
‘* Day. And there can be nothing objectionable in this.”

II. In view of the above, others seek to explain the “ Syntactical
split’ spoken of in the Bhashya, as that which is caused by the fact of
both the Tying of the Rope and the Killing being transferred by means
of the same sentence.”

‘But this also is very easily refuted: as it is only the 24४9 o/
“‘ the Rope that is transferred by the sentence; the transference of the
५ Killing being implied by the same transference, in accordance with the
"° Sutra V—-i--24 |

‘The following might here be urged : ‘ It is only the Accessury that
“ig obtained from the Original Primary, and not that which is altoge-
४ ther new, which, being transferred, brings in the others in its wake, a8
. “spoken of in the said Stra (while in the case in question, the T'ying of
‘+ the Rope is found to be an altogether new accessory, not mentioned
^ before. |
But: this. cannotebe admissible ; because, in. the Sitra V—ii— 21>

_ THN DETATLS DO NOT BELONG TO THE SAVANIVA 1647

‘we find described the. fransference of even such accessories as the
०८ Pidévana, etc., that are not obtained from the Original Primary
‘and as for the Siira ‘ Tatha piirvam’ (V—i—29)_ which lays down the
‘fact. of a new Accessory not being transferable), that too has been
“ explained as referring to an accessory with certain qualifications. Or.
‘oven if we have the transference of the Killing onlv, as the sentence in
“question could be taken as referring to the T'ying of the Rope laid
‘down in the sentence ‘sa vas Acvinam, elc..’ it would involve no
‘‘ syntactical split.

“Tt might be argued that, ‘inasmuch as the sentence Sa var, ele.,
‘mentions the ६02८ withont any qualifications, the mention, in the
‘sentence under consideration, of threefoldness could not be taken as
० 9 mere descriptive reference to a previously-enjoined object.

‘ But this is not quite tenable; because the reply to this argu-
“ment would be exactly the same which the Siddhantin would give
‘later on to a question put to him by the Parvapakshin.

Objection: ‘Inasmuch as the Siddhantin holds the sentence to
‘“eontain the Injunction of a new Action, it is possible for him to
“admit an Injunction of more than one thing; while as for the
`` Parvapakshin, this cannot be possible for him (a3 he takes the sentence
“to be an Injunction of Accessories); and as such the Injunction
‘of more than one Accessory would involve a syntactical split.’

‘ Reply: That does not make any difference ; becanse in a case
where several qualifications are mentioned in connection with one
action, an Injunction of all those is quite possible, as through that

"° Action; and hence such cases are quite in accordance with the Law
“of Qualified Injunction (which dogs not involve a syntactical split) ;
‘but in cases where the Action enjoined is without any of its quali-
fications, if becomes necessary to bring in, for the sake of that
Action, the gualifying accessories of other actions; and for this
purpose it would be necessary to repeat the Injunctive word (and
“this would involve a Syntactical split). For instance, when the
* Sacrifice is enjoined along with its Deity, it is only its own qualifying
accessories that it could imply (and bring in), and not a qualification
“of the Tying (in the shape of threefoldness). Hence even in the |
“case Of the Injunctions of new actions (not previously enjoined), it is
necessary to differentiate.its own qualifying Accessory from those of
“others: Thus then, inasmuch as the objection brought forward is `
` ` equally applicable to both of us (the Parvapakshin as well as the
* Siddhantin), it should not haye been urged agamst one only

1548 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. iI—-PADA VI.—ADHI. (7)

“Then again, the only reply that the Siddhantin could give to the
०८ said objection, would be that—‘ the Rope is common to both Tyings
“ (parivyana),’ as is actually declared in Suiza II--vi—3l. And this
“ would indicate that the 7'hreefold Rope spoken of in the sentence under
“consideration (* frvria yitpam pariviya),’ would apply to any aud
‘‘every ‘ Tying’ of the Sacrificial Post; so that, in the case in ques-
‘tion, the mention of the ‘ Tying’ (in the sentence under considera-
‘‘tion) is only by way of reference to that previously enjoined (in the
‘sentence ‘sa vat acuinane, etc.’) ; and hence there would be no Syntac-
tical split

“Or, the sentence may be taken as laying down the wnmediat
“ sequence to the Holding of the Acgvina Vessel, in reference to ५11९
‘ sequence of the Killing to the Tying, which latter has already been
-“ enjoined in connection with the Previous Day,—the sentence, 10 this
“case, being construed as ` yal trurla yipam pariwiya updkarott tal
“ dcvinagrahavanantaram karyam’ (the Tying of the threefold Rope
"५ round the Post, as laid down in regard to the Previous Day should, on
‘‘the second Day, be done after the Holding of the Acvina Vessel) ’
“In this way we avoid the Syntactical split complained of, and cer-
* tainly any far-fetched construction 13 more acceptable than a Syntac-
“ tical split.”

In view of these arguments, we explain the ‘Syntactical split,
spoken of in the Bhashya, as follows :—

It must be admitted that of the Savantya sacrifices, one sentence
should enjoin the originative appcaranco, while the other lays down
its accessories. As a matter of fact we have no grounds for taking the
sentence speaking of the Previous Day as the originative Injunction (01
the Savaniya sacrifices)

Objection: ‘‘Nor do we find any grounds for taking the other

sentence either, as the said originative Injunction

Reply : Though it is so, vet, inasmuch it is not possible for the
two sentences to be taken either as optional alternatives or con-
jointly, it becomes necessary to find out which of the two could,
through a certain peculiarity in it, be accepted, by preference, as the
required Originative Injunction. And hence we proceed to find out
such a peculiarity. , It has already been shown above that it is only a
desirable Accessory that can be laid down with reference to an Action
-laid down in the recesses of a remote Injunction. Because an accessory
that is not desired (in connection with that Action) would, if brought
in. make it an altogether different-action, like the Homa in connection

: शष DETAILS DO NoT BELONG TO THE SAVANIYA. 1549

with the Kundapaytnamayana. Thus then, in the case in question, we
find that it is the Vapa-pracara, (the Fat-offering) that is the desired
accessory, which is capable of being enjoined with reference to tho
Savantya occurring at the time of the Suly@; and when the declara-
tion of the Morning-offering brings about a recognition of the Savaniya
appearing along with that Offering,—and it having been found to
serve a useful purpose in connection with another mention of it in
connection with the ‘ next day ,’—it cannot be regarded as bearing the
relation of subserviency with the Holding of the Agvina Vessel: and
the sentence (‘ Acvinam grhtiva, etc.) being found to be meant to
point out the Zime,—and TJ'ime, by its very nature, not being an
object desired to be acquired, could not be enjoined with reference
to an Action; and hence it is necessary that a certain Action (the
Vapapracara) be enjoined with reference to the 4४00८ thus pointed
out. Even if the Injunction (of this action) be as subsidiary to the
Agvina Vessel, then too, inasmuch as the principal mamber (Time of
the Acvina) is not capable of being desired as something to be
acquired, the sentence could not but be interpreted as before.

Thus then, inasmuch as the sentence cannot be taken as an In-
junction of accessories ; and hence the peculiaritv, whereby, the origi-
native Injunction not being interfered with, the coguition of the
original appearance of the Action would make it a distinct Action, in
accordance with the Law of the Difference of Actions being due to the
difference in the Contexts,—that same poculiarity. would make the
sentence an originative Injunction with regard to the time thercin
pomted ०४. ` And thus the other sentence, naturally, comes to be
taken as the Injunction of Accessories; as under the above ciream-
stances, there would be no justification for a syntactical split.

16. was for this reason that we considered the question as te
whether the ‘ Vapapracadra’ does, or dovs not, lead to the transference
(of the Savantya). Because in case there be such a transference, inas-
much: as the idea of the Savaniya mentioned in the previous sentence
would be still present in the mind (at the time of this transference), .
wid as such it being recognized to be the same, we could not but take
the other mention of it, as being for the sake of enjioning it in regard
to the particular time therein pointed out ; as we have explained under
the Sdira ‘ Sannidhuntvavibhagat ` (I1—iii—26). And when the Action as
well as the {70106 is found to be cnfoined, —the operation of the Injunc-
tive affix always pertains to that which is in closer proximity to it; and
in. the case in question, we find that the Time of fhe Vapapracara is the

1660 TantRd-vinTika. abs. 1I—~eADa vi.—~aDEt (7)

qualification of an action other than the Originative appearance of the
Savaniya ; and as such it would be impossible to take the sentence 88
a qualified Injunction; and hence a Syntactical split would be inevj
table. And as to how the two sentences are reconciled and taken alone
with each other, in accordance with our view,—that we have explained
already

Thus then, the sentence could also speak of the subsidiary charac
ter of the Z'ying--a3s shown by the Context—by way of descriptiv:
reference ; otherwise it would have to refer to it, as enjoined by the
remoter agency of Position
For these reasons, 1४ must be admitted that the originative In
junction of the Savaniya is contained in the sentence ‘ Acvinam
graham, ele

Question : ‘‘ How could you reconcile the above explanation with
‘‘the mention of ‘ Syntactical split’ made in the Bhashya ?”

Answer: What the Bhashya means by the expression ‘ Vakybhéda’
is the difference of actions (and not ‘Syntactical split’); as even if there
be many factors, if they happen to be related to one another, the
whole is quite capable of being taken as a single sentence syntactically
connected. | |

That isto say, all that the Bhashya says is ‘ Vakyum bhadyéta, —
which means that the sentence in question could not be syntactically
connected with the other sentence; just as in the Siira ` Karlrgune
te karmusamavayad ortkyabhédak syat’ (111--1-- 19) though there is
no actual vakyabhéde (Svntactical split,) vet what is meant by the
word ‘vakyabhida’ is the want of mutual connection; and in the
Sttra ‘“Sakaikshanivikavikyam’ (1-1-20), the expression =" eka.
vakyet’ has been used in the sense mutucl connection ; and in the same
manner in the case in question, what the Bhashya means is that—
‘When ‘the sentence in question is taken as an originative Injunction,
then it can be connected (syntactically) with the other senten¢e,—this
connection being possible only if the sentence is not taken merely as
laying down accessories | | ।

Sebi (23) : . Objection: (The Transference). could be
dopa plied,” s “a By oe

_ {Objection : “ The sentence may be taken as containing an implied

“Injunction of the Time for the transferred Savaniya ; that is to say,

“we find the declaration—‘ One should cover the Tat ‘with his closed

“fist”; and certainly thoro could 66 0 covering of the Fa} extracted

(SHE DETAILS DO NOT BELONG TO THE SaVANIYA. ` 1561

“on the. previous day ;. as that would mean that the man should stay
‘with his fist. hiding the fat, for fully two days; which would be an
‘impossibility ; hence the sentence quoted must be taken as implying
‘the presence of the Savantya on the next day also; and it is for this
४८ Savaniya that the sentence in question would lay down the Zime.”]

Siitra (24): Reply: This cannot be: becaase (such im-
plication could be possible only) (f we had «a contradée-
tion of the Direct Declaration.

[The said transference could have been implied by the Apparent
Inconsistency of the sentence quoted, only if there were an actual
inconsistency ; as a matter of a fact, however, we find that the ‘ Cover-
ing ` spoken of could be done by means of the ‘ handful’ of leaves or
grass ; and this could certainly continue for four days. |

9170४ (25): But, through Position, (the Accessory details in
question) belong to the previous (animal, the Aqgui-
shomitya); spectatly asthe purification pertains to
that.

Having thus set aside the fact of there being anv Context pointing
to the connection (of the Details) with the Savantya, the Author recapi-
tulates the Siddhanta view, by means of the same arguments as those
shown before

Or, the great Context (of the Jyotishtoma), being found to be not
interfered with by any sub-context (of'!the Savaniya), would point to
the Details as belonging to all three animals; and as such: would
set aside the indications of the Position (of the Agnishomiya) ; and
it is with a view to preclude this view, that we have the word ‘tw’ in
the Stira

Though it is quite true that Context is superior in authority to Posi-
1८1, yet, in accordance with the Law of the Upamcuyajanumanirana
(11—-ii—9 € seq.), it is the Position aided by Indicative Force which,
lu the present case, becomes more authoritative than the said Context
‘Through their inherent capabilities, what the Accessories of the Ani
mals want is the Animal Sacrifice, and not the Sacrifice of Soma. And
that which is not wanted cannot be taken up by Context; as the
bringing in of that which is not wanted would be all the more remote
from. the. sense of the Direct Declaration. Nor can the Law of the
Siira + Anarthakyat tadangéshu’ (1-1-18) ,be applicable, unless

1552 = TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II[—PADA.VI.—ADHI. (ध).

there is a direct relationship expressed by means of the Genitive
Ending,—as we have already explained before

Objection: “Inasmuch as the Agzeshomiyu has no other acces.
“gory detail laid down for itself, it actually stands in need of some
“such accessories; being brought in, from another place, tc the place
“where the Accessories are laid down; and thus being in close
“nroximity to these Accessories, the Agnishomsya would take them
“un, through Context ; and under the circumstances, it should not he
‘said that it is through Position that it takes them up.”

Reply: This objection is not applicable to the present caso ;
because in a case where the Modificatory Sacrifice is completed by
means of the subsidiaries obtained from the Original Primary, and
eertain new subsidiaries are also introduced into it,—there alone we
have the Modification taking up the Subsidiaries, through Context. In
the case in question however, we find that the Agnishomiya has
originally appeared in another place; and im that place, it has all its
requirements supplied by means of the subsidiaries obtained from the
Original Primary (the Jyotishtoma), which have had their usefulness
previously established, and which have nothing to oppose them ; and.
then, being brought up to the place in question, the Agntshomiya
finds certain other Accessory Details, apparently without any other
purpose to serve, and standing in necd of something (to which they
could belong) ; and then, having its procedure (with regard to these
details) inferred from other facts, the Agnishomsya becomes connected
with them ; and it is in the nature of Posttion alone that, finding the
Accessories in need of a relative, it creates a procedure for the
Principal factor, and thereby establishes the relationship of those
details with this latter; and hence it is only right that the Sutra
should speak of ‘ through Position.’ (Specially as we could have Context
only if the Agnishomiya also stood in need of the Details, just as these
do in that of the former). | |

Siitra (26): Also because of Indications

We have the sentence—* Vapaya pratahasavané caranti, puroda
céna madhyandiné savané’—which speaks of the Pacu—Purodace
(The Animal Fat, and the Cake) in connection with the Savantyd
offerings ; and this could not.be explained, if the Details in question
belonged to all the three, or to two of the animals. Because it- will be
shown later on that the Cake-offering is meant as a purification. of the
Deity; and as.a matter of fact, in the case in question, the Deity

THE DE&TAILS DO NOT BELONG TO THE SAVANIYA. 1553

that the Cake-sacrifice could purify, is the foint Agni and Soma (those
connected to the Agnishomiya), and not Agni alone (which is connected
with the Savantya),—as is shown by the Tndicative Force. In case
both (the Agntshomiya and the Savaniya) were equally related to the
Details, there could be no such (ha, as we have in accordance with the
Siddhanta. Hence, inasmuch as we find the quoted text speaking of
the ‘Purodaca,’ we conclude that it is only by Indirect Implication
that any accessory details can belong to the Savantyn.

9201८ (21) : It ts no Injunction: as it serves the
purposes of an Arthavada.

Objection: “lt is true that the Cake-offering that is done for
‘the purposes of the purification of the Deity, could not apply to the
“ Savansya; but as a matter of fact, that is not the only purpose
“ served by the Cake-offering; as we find it spoken of as serving the
“ purpose of ‘ covering the hole,’—in the sentence ‘ Sushero va élarhs
OCU ,.....,... chidrapidhanartho’ ‘pr’; and hence, even though
"` there is no Deity in connection with the Savaniya, yet the Cake-offering
^: would be made for the purpose of Covering the hole of the Savantya ;
‘and as such there would be nothing incongruous in the fact of the
^“ Details belonging equally to both (the Savaniya and the Agni-
‘* shomiya).”’

It is in reply to this that we have the present Sutra (27); the
sense of which is as follows: As a matter of fact the Cake is not laid
down for the purpose of ‘ covering the hole ’; as we have already shown
under the Arthavida Pada, that all such sentences, as have the
appearances of Injunctions, and also those that appear as argumenta-
tive in form, are mere Arthavadas. Nor, asx a matter, do we find the
Sacrifice standing in need of a ‘covering of the hole’; nor do we find
any hole covered, even after the Cake-sacrifice has becn performed.
Hence it must be admitted that the Covering of the hole is not the
purpose served by the Cake-offering ; and as such the Indications
shown under the previous Suira, remain fully established

195.

ADHIKARANA (8)
(The Fetching of the Branch, etc., belong to both Milkings. }

Siitra (28) : “Inasmuch as the two Mitkings ave done
‘at different times, the mere Milk would be pre-
‘pared without connection (with the Accessories.”

Having shown the non-contradiction of Position, we now proceed
to deal with its contradiction (by Direct Declaration, etc.).

[There are two Milkings, the Evening and the Morning; and as
accessory details of the Milking, we find laid down—the Fetching of
the Branch, the bringing in of the Cows, making the Cows to vield
milk, the actual milking, and so forth; and with regard to these there
arises the question as to whether these pertain to both the J/ilkings, or
to the Bvening Milking only]. And on this we have the following :—

PURVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as the Details in question are found mentioned in
“ eonnection with the Previous Day, they would pertain to the making
“of the Curd, because of the similarity of Position, and of the Sub-
“ gontext (that is to say, as it is the Milk drawn on the previous
“ Day that is made into Curd, and as the Details too are mentioned in
“connection with that Day, these latter would belong to the Hvening
५ Milking only ; while the mere Milk, which is used in the form of
“pure milk, and which is drawn in the Morning, would be prepared
८ independently of the said Accessory details)

SIDDHANTA

S@tra (29): Inasmuch as both appear in the same
Content, the Text only lays down the time (the Pre-
vious Day) for the details connected with both

_.. When the Principal is performed in the place of the Accessory
. Details, it becomes subject to the authority of 7206109 (or Order) ;
while. when it is only found to € mentioned in their place, then it 1s
‘enbject: to the anthority of Sub-Context.. As for the OCurd-Sacrifice, we

THE. FETCHING OF THE BRANCH BELONGS TO BOTH MILKING. 1655

find that it is both spoken of, and performed, in connection with the
Amavasya Day ; and as such the Curd is, in all respects, equal to the
Milk. And though it is true that, for the purpose of making the Curd,
yome of the details are done on the Previous Day,—yet those details
do not include the Fetching of the Branch and the rest enumerated
above; as has been shown under the Sutra II—i—22, that ‘ there
can be no connection between two accessories.’ Hence it must. be
admitted that the Fetching of the Branch, ctc., ete., that are done on the |
Previous. Day, in accordance with the Direct Injunction to that effect,
are done as related to both Milkings; and not for the sake of the Curd
only ; and there can be nothing objectionable in this.

ADHIKARANA (9).
[The Sadanua, etc., belong to the three Savanas.]

Satira (30): Sintilarly the mention of the Vessels is
connected with the other Savane also.

[In connection with the Morning-offering of the Jyotesktoma, we
tind ten Vessels, the Aindravayava, elc., mentioned ; and with regard to
these we find mentioned suchsaccessory details as, the Seating and the
Cleaning. Then again, we find other Vessels mentioned in connectiou
with the Midday-offering, and others again in connection with the
Evening-offering ; and there arises the question as to whether the said
details should be performed in connection with these latter Vessels also,
or only in connection with thoge of the Morning-offering. And on this
question, we have the PurvaraksHa, that—‘ They would belong to
“ those of the Morning-offering only ; as they are mentioned in their
‘* Position (or Order).’’] `

SIDDHANTA.

Though the fact of the Accessory Details of the Vessels, and the
Morning-offering, being mentioned, as well as performed in the same
place, would give rise to the idea that the case of these Details is not
similar to those dealt with in the foregoing Adhtkarana, yet the Sulra
lays down that the case of these is similar to that of the former ones.
And the reason for this is that there is one and the same Context.
that of the Jyotishioma, including the Three Offerings. There can be
no Sub-Context of the Morning-offering by itself; as there is no result
laid down as following from this offering. Then as for Postion, it
cannot, when contradicted by Context, serve the purpose of indicating
the use of things. Hence it must be admitted that the Details should
he done in connection with the Vessels of the other Savanas also.

The same reasoning holds regarding the fact of all the accessory
details of the Cake being common to the Agnishomiya, and to the
Agnéya, and the rest. | ॥ |

ADHIKARANA (10).
(‘The Threefolduess of the Rope pertains to all the Animals. |

Sittva (381): The Rope atso (as well as its accessories) (is
applicable to all); because of words indicative of this.

Having mentioned the Tying of the Rope round the Sacrificial
Post, in connection with the 4 gutshkomtya, the Veda goes on to make the
declaration-—' Having held the Agvina Vessel, and having tied round
the Post, ete., etc.’—in connection with the Savantya ; and inasmuch as
this latter is a mere repetition of the Tying, without any mention
of fresh accessories, the two 14745 must be regarded as distinct actions.
And then, it becomes necessary to have some material for these two
Tyings. The Rope is the material that is universally known as the
material to be used for all Tying, whether in the course of a Vedic
Sacrifice, or in an ordinary Action of the world. And hence we come
to the conclusion that it is the Rope that should be used in both cases,
as being the only thing could serve the purpose.

And then, there arises the question, as to, the material that the
Rope is to be made of, and also its distinguishing features.

` And on this question, we have the following :—-

PURVAPAKSHA.

“In the Context assumed on the strength of the Position of the
‘‘ Agnishomiya, we find a special declaration to the effect that the
^“ Rope ts to be made threefold, out of well beaten grass; and these
“ peculiarities pertain to the Tying of the Post in connection with the
^“ Agnishomiya, and not to that in connection with the Savantya.
‘ And hence, like the other accessories of the Animal, the said details
“of method, etc., with regard to the making of the Rope pertain to the
‘ Agnishomiya only

॥ SIDDHANTA. |
To the above we make the following reply: Because of Indi-

cations, the said Details must be regarded as applying to all animals.
Because a reference to the threefoldness of the* ope, in the originative

1568 | TANTRA-vARTIKA. ADH. Ili—PADA VI.-~ADHI. (10)

Injunction of the Savanitya (‘truria yipam pariviya savaniyana
pakarott’), could not be possible, unless the details in regard to the
making of the Rope belonged to both.

The Author then proceeds to show how these Details become
connected with the Savaniya also: The sentence above quoted (layin
down the method of making the Rope) distinctly shows that these
methods pertain to all Ropes; while it is the mere Position of the
Agnishomiya, that points to the fact of the methods applying to this
latter alone; and there can be no doubt as to the superior authority
of the Sentence (and hence it must be admitted that the said methods
belong to all the animals)

Objection : “Inu accordance with what will be shown under कद्र
‘+i ng tadvakyam hi tadarthatvat’ (I1I—vii—4), it must be admitted
‘‘that the said details of method tend towards the accomplishment
‘‘of the particular Apérva of the Agnishomiya only (and as such they
‘ cannot belong to the other animals)

Reply: It 18 1100 80 ; as the Rope is not a direct subsidiary of the
Animal, but that of the Post, as will be shown under Sutra—‘ yt pargam
va tatsamskarat’ (IV—iv--—-23) ; and hence the Syntactical Connection.
would have to be explained in the following manner: ‘The details in
question belong to that by which the two Tyings would be done’; and
the way in which the Tying of the Post is done in connection with the
Agnishomiya, is exactly the same in which it is done in connection
with the Savaniya; as the Post remains one and the same in both
cases. Bocause both these 44/४5 are recognised as a means to the
accomplishment of Apirvas ; and they could not be taken as resem-
bling the Darca-Pirnamasa grass, in counection with the Pindapitr-
yajna. Thus then, on account of the difference from the Details
of the said grass, the Details of the Rope should be taken as belonging
to all {16 animals

ADHIKARANA (11).
|The Amcu and the d4dahhya belong to the Sadana, ete.

Sittra (32): “That. which is laid down at a distance is not
“related to the other qualifying Accessories: because of
“non-proximity

In connection with the above, we proceed to consider the question
of the contradiction and non-contradiction of Syntactical Connection
and Context

[For the Jyoteshioma, we find laid down. at a certain distance
(1.९, in a different context), certain Vessels in the shape of the 422८1
the Adabhya and the like. And there arises a question, as to whether,
or not, the qualifying accessories, laid down in connection with the
Vessels of the Jyotishtoma, should be performed in connection with
those Vessels. |

And on this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA

“The qualifying accessories of the Vessels must be regarded as
‘pertaining to. those mentioned in the same Context,-—notwith
‘‘ standing the indications of the Position; and as such, they cannot be
“regarded as pertaining to those that are not mentioned in the
‘Context (such, for instance, as the Amcu and the Adabhya). Conse-
‘quently, the performance of the acts in connection with these Vessels,
cannot be related to the qualifications in question.”

| SIDDHANTA.
Stitra (93) : 1६ is related to these accessories; as they
are laid down for the sake of the Vessels (of the
Syotishtoma); and the accessory is always die to
those. — | |
Inasmuch as the Context does not serve the purposes of differen-

tiation, the qualification must be regarded as pertaining to those
Vessels that,help in the accomplishment of the Transcendental Result

1560 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH: II—PADA VI.—ADHI. (11).

of the Jyotishtoma ; and as such, being dissociated from the Vessels of
Wine, they become confined to the Context. Consequently, even thoxe
Vessels, —-which, though not mentioned in the same Context of the
Jyotishioma, are yet found to help in the accomplishment of the said
Transcendental Result,---come to be connected with the qualifications
in question, in accordance with the previous reasoning based upon
Syntactical Connection. And hence the Amcu, the Adabhya, and such
other Vessels (of the Jyoltishtoma, that are not mentioned in its
Context) must be regarded as connected with the qualifying Accessories
(laid down in connection with the Jyotishtoma-Vessels).

97/८८ (34): (In the case of the Maétrivaruna) the vrestric-
tion world be due to Syntactical Connection (which
is not the case with the case in question).

In the case of the preparation, etc., in connection with the
Maitravaruna Vessel, we had the Context indicating the fact of the
accessories belonging to all the Vessels; and hence it was only right
that we should have taken them as restricted to that particular Vessel
only, as indicated by the superior authority of Syntactical Connection.
In the case in question, on the other hand, we have the Conlc2!
indicating the fact of the details being restricted (to those Vessels alone
that are mentioned in the Jyotishioma-Context); while the fact of
their pertaining to all the Vessels is indicated by Syntactical Connection
(and hence it is the letter conclusion that is accepted). Consequently,
the case of the Maitravaruna cannot be cited as sirailar to the one
under consideration.

ADHTKARANA (12).
[The Cttrint and other Bricks belong to the Fire.]

S@tra (35): The qualifications (of Bricks), as pertain-
ing to the Sacrificial Fire, would belong to those also
that are not mentioned én the same Context: just like
the qualifications just dealé wetth.

[In a Context, other than that of the Sacrificial Fire, we find such
Bricks laid down as the ‘ Cvtrin7,’ the ` Vajrint’ and the like; but in
the Context of the Fire, we find mentioned such qualifications of the
Bricks, as that ‘they should not be black, they should be entire’ and
so forth; and there arises the question as to whether, or not, these
qualifications belong to those Bricks that are not mentioned in the
Context of the 1५१८. The Pirvapaksha being, that--‘‘ they do not
belong to those Bricks, for the simple reason that they are not in close
proximity to them,’——the Siddhanta is that, inasmuch as these
qualifications are laid down as pertaining to the Ifire, they must be
regarded as belonging to those other Bricks also; as these latter are
as well connected with the Sacrificial Fire, as the Bricks that are
imentioned in the same Context with it. |

196

ADHIKARANA (13). —
[The Mana, Upavaharana and the rest belong to the Soma only. |

Stiitra (36): The Conditional, not .being equal (to the
Nitya) would not take in all that is laid down ¢1
connection with the Nitya (obligatory):

[In connection with the Jyoltshtoma, we find the sentence ‘ Sa yadi
Rajanyam va Vaicyam va Yajayét, sa yadi Somam vibhakshayishit.
nyagrodhastibhivahriya tak sampishya dadhant unmrjya tamasma
bhaksham prayacchinna Somam.’ Then again, in connection with the
Jyotishtoma, we find certain accessory details with regard to the Soma
~-such as, its Mana, Upavaharana, Ksaya, Abhishava, and soon. And
with regard to these, there arises the question, as to whether these
details belong equally to the Soma, and its substitute, the Phala-
camasa, laid down in the former sentence, as to be given to the
Kshairiya sacrifice, or to the Soma only.}

And on this question, we have the following :—

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘* In the last two Adhikaranas, it has been shown that the Details
‘being due to the particular purpose served, belong to all; and the
५ Phalacamasa also being a substitute for the Soma as the sacrificial
“material, serves the same purpose as the Soma; and hence the
‘‘ Injunction of the details of Soma must be regarded as common
‘to both (the Soma as well as the Phalacamasa) ; just as the Injunction
५९ ‹ Vrihan prohshati’ pertains to the Vrthi, as well as to its substitute,
“the Yava.” `

SIDDHANTA.

[tis only right that the Details of the ए should be done in
regard to the Yava; because both are equally optional alternatives ;
_and as such are equally transient in their character. As for the Details
of the Soma however, they are taken up, as. necessary. factors, by the
‘Transcendental Result of the Jyotishtoma ; and as such, it is absolutely
necessary that they shtuld rest in’ an equally necessary and unchanging

` . Mana, &€., BELONG TO THE somA ONLY 1563

Substrate. And as a. matter of fact, it is the Soma. and not the
Phalacamasa, that is a necessary factor in the Jyotishtoma ; because the
latter does not appear when the Sacrifice is performed by the Brahmana
while as for the Soma, it is present in all performances of the J uotish
toma; even in that by the Ashatriya, its substitute, in the shape of
the Phalacamasa, is brought in simply for being eaten by the Sacrificer,
and for no other purpose. If the substitution of the Phalacamasa had
meant the total setting aside of all Soma from the Sacrifice, then,
inasmuch as the Soma would be absent in the performances by the
Keshatriya and the Vaicya, it would not be a necessary factor in the
Jyotishtoma ; and as such it would equal, in that respect also, the above-
mentioned Phalacamasa. Asa matter of fact, however, we find that
the Soma is absent only from the Cup of the Sacrificer (in the case
of a non- Brahmana-Sacrificer) ; and it is present in all the other Cups ;
and hence it must be regarded as a necessary [actor in the Jyotishtoma;
consequently the Details can never have an existence apart from
the Soma (and-thence from the Jyotishioma),.

Question: “Tf such be the case, then, how could the accessory
‘‘ details due to the Soma be applied to the Phalacamasa १ `

Answer: By reason of the latter fulfilling the functions of the
former.

Question ˆ ‘Is this reason—the fulfilling of ils functions—some-
"° thing apart from, or included in, Direct Infunction and Implication ?”

Some people hold it to be something wholly distinct; but, if it
were so, then it could not be recognised as authoritative ; consequently,
we must regard it as included in Implication.

Question : ^ How could there be an Implication im regard to the
“ Original Primary Sacrifice (of the Jyotishtoma itself) (as it is only
“with regard to the Subsidiary and Modificatory Sacrifices that

generally we have recourse to Implications) ?”’

Answer : It is quite true that we could not have Implications in
regard to an Original Primary; but that is the case only when the
accessories of one action are attributed, by Implication, to another
Action ; for the simple reason that one and the same Action cannot |
by itself, ‘be taken as an Original Primary, as well as a Subsidiary
Modification. In the case in question however, we find that it is the
Accessory detail of the Substance that is attributed, by Implication ;
and 1६. 38 a perceptible fact that there may be different substances for
the same Sacrifice (for the sake of the different castes of Sacrifices)
And just as a Sacrifice standing in need of certain accessor) details

1064 TANTRA-VARTIKA, 4101, - 11--1474 Vie-—ADHL (13).

takes up these latter, from out of those belonging to another 90001. --
so, in the same manner, it could take up the Substance also. Thus
then, the Injunction being—‘ One should make the Sacrificial Material
out of the Phalacamasa,’ there arises the question as to how it is to be
done; and the answer to this is that—‘ it should be done in the same
way as the Soma ;—this answer presenting itself to our mind, by
reason of the presence in our mind of the previously-conceived Soma
as also on account of similarity; and thus it is that the Accessory
Details of the Soma become applied to it

Question : “ When, in accordance with the Parvapaksha as well as
the Siddhania the accessory details of the Nema come to be attributed
“to the Phalacumasa,—what would be the use of the present Adhi-
^ karana ?”’

Answer: Even though they are so attributed, yet, just as in
other cases, what is Directly Enjoined finds a place in the performance
whereby a certain definite result is sought to be obtained by means of
a particular substance, while what is Implied does not find a place in it
80; in the same manner, in the case in question also. Then again, we
could bring forward the Satra ‘ Nivytiavad dravya bhédal’, as showing:
the use of the Adhikarana. That is to say, these accessory details of
the Soma, that are based upon its Pounding, Measuring, ete., and which
are known as leading to a distinct result (in the shape of the Apiirva of
the Jyolishktoma, could never accomplish this Result, when inhering in
the Phalacamas« (and not in the Soma), All that the Phalacamasu is
meant to accomplish, is the mere form of the Sacrifice ; and as such, it
could take up only such details of the Soma 98 are calculated to help
in the fulfilment of that end, and not those that tend to the accom-
plishment of the Result; and hence, these latter details could not
apply to the Phalacamasa.

The above reasoning also shows that there is to be an Uhe
(change in the Maniras, in the case of the Phulacamasa) ; that is to say.
the Context of the Action being the same, inasmuch as there 1s 110
Injunction with regard to any Substance in general, there could always
be substitution of the substance actually employed; and as such the
word ‘ Soma’ is changed into other words (‘ Phalacamasa’ and the like),
because of the incapability of the word ‘ Soma’ (being used in connection

with a Sacrifice at: which the Substance emploved is Phalacamasa and
not Som) . | |

ADHIKABANA (14).

[The accessory details of the Principal are to be employed in the
case of the Substitutes also. |

Satra (371): “Similar is the case with the Substitute.”

{The Veda lays down certain substitutes for sacrificial materials ;
f.i. the Navara as a substitute for the (^ ४7, in case this latter be stolen
(and no other alternative substance such as the Yava be available); aud
with regard to these there arises the question as fo whether these
substitutes are equally related to all the accessories laid down tn
connection with the original substance, or not. |

And on this question, we have the following-—-

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘ What has been said in the foregoing Adftkaruna applies to the
‘ present case also (i.c. Just as the accessorics of the Necessary do not
‘belong to the Conditional, so also those of the original substance
‘do not belong to the Substitule).”’

SIDDHANT A.

Siitva (38): Lé is not so; the Substitute would be like the
Original, as ff serves excactly the same purpose.

If the Nivara had helped in the Action, by ifs own inherent capa-
bility, then it could be connected with the accessories, only on account
_ of its fulfilling certain functions of the Original substance (and as sach
४ could not be equally related to all the accessories of the original, as
we have found in the ease of the Phalacamasa and the Soma), As a
matter of fact however. we have no authority for taking the Navara as
a direct auxiliary to the Action as the substanee that is laid down
as such an auxiliary is the Vrihi: and people take up the Nivara, only
When no Vrihi (or its enjoined alternative, Fuod) is available ; and that
too, : because of the presence, in the Nivara, of certain properties
that bolong to the Vrthi, and which properties are what the perforiner
18 anxious to get hold of (in the absence of the &xact Vrehe) ; and it is

1566. TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. IJI—PADA VI.—ADHI. (14)

only as the inevitable concomitant (a substrate) of those properties
that he is led to take up the species of corn, called ‘ Névara,’—which
latter is not taken up as a Direct Auxiliary, to the Sacrifice. The said
accessory properties of the Vrtht are enjoined directly ; and hence the
Nivara must be regarded as equally related to these; specially as we
shall show later on that we do not cease to have the idea of ‘ Vrihj°
with regard to the Nivara, under the Sttra ‘ samanyantaccthkirsha hi’
(VI—iii—27). Itis with a view to all this that we bave the declaration
in the Sutra, that the Nivara would be like the original (1001.

Satria (39): Also because of its not being laid down
by a Seriptural Injunction,

Some people take the Sura to mean that the substitute, not being
enjoined by the Veda, is brought in, only through its similarity to the
substance that is enjoined; and hence too, it cannot be spoken of as
fulfilling certain functions of the Original

But as a matter of fact, the substitute is not altogether devoid ou!
scriptural authority ; because it is actually laid down for the supplying
of the deficiency in the Original substance (caused by theft, etc.). If it
were wholly devoid of scriptural authority, it could never be taken up;
nor would its abandonment cause any discrepancy in the Sacrifice (even
though the Original may have been stolen or otherwise spoilt).

For these reasons, we must explain the Stra in the following
manner: Inasmuch as the species ‘ Nzvara’ is not laid down in anv
Scriptural Injunction, it cannot be regarded as fulfilling the functions
of the Vrihz'; while as for the Accessory details of the Vrthz, we find
that it is impossible for all of these to be brought in their complete-
ness, 98 laid down by the Injunction of the Principal; and hence only
a portion of them has been brought in, as resting in the Nivaras, through
the Injunction of the Vrihi; but this is done simply because there was

no other purpose to serve, and not because they fulfil the functions of
the {2472 | |

ADHTKARANA (15).

(Even in regard to those Substitutes that are directly laid down,
the qualifying accessories of the Original should be applied. |

Sutra (40): The declaration of the Accessory ts meant
to preclude the bringing in of other substances as
substitutes.

[We have the sentence—‘ If Somu be not available, one should
pound the Pultka’; and with regard to this there arises the question
as to whether, or not, the details laid down in connection with the
Original Soma, are to be applied to its substitute, Pultka. |

And on this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

“Tf by the mere fact of the Nivara not being enjoined by

“ scriptural texts, it cannot be regarded as fulfilling the functions (of
“the Vrihi),—then, as regards the Puttka, inasmuch as it 18 found to
“be directly enjoined, and as it is not @ constant concomitant of the
“ Sacrifice (being laid down as to be employed only under certain
^^ vonditions),—it must be regarded as fulfilling certain functions of the
‘“ Soma, just like the Phalacumasa (and as such, according to
“ Adhikarana 13, the accessory details of the Soma could not be
‘ applied to it).”
SIDDHANTA.

If the text had pointed out the Pultka as the means of accomplish-
ing the Sacrifice, then, we could take it as fulfilling certain functions of
the Soma: as a matter of fact however, such is not the case.

That is to say, the text lays down the Putska as the substance to
be employed, in case the Soma got for the sacrifice should be stolen or
spoilt; and it does not lay it down as actually helping in the per-
formance of the Sacrifice. Consequently this serves the purpose of
limitting the choice of substitutes,—the sense being that ‘if all the
properties of the Soma cannot be obtained, and it be necessary to

bring -in'evep a portion of those, we should call 4n those that are found

1668 § TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. III—PADA VI.—ADAT. (15).

to exist in the Putika’; as will be explained later on, under the Sitttras
‘ Niyamarthah kvacid vidhih’ (४1-11-16), ‘ Tannttyantacetkiresha jh;
(VI—iti—~17) |

For these reasons, the species of ‘ Pultka’ cannot be regarded as
subsidiary to the Sacrifice ;—it being brought in simply as the substrate
of the properties of the Soma. Consequently, even though it is directly
laid down, its case must be regarded as similar to that dealt with in th.
foregoing Adhikarana.

Consequently the purpose served by this Adhtkuranw is the same
us that by the previous one; hence, inasmuch as the notion of
Soma is not wholly absent from the said substrate of its properties
(i.e, the Pulsha), even those who would desire certain results as follow-
ing from the particular accessory substance (Some) could take up (in its
absence) the Pultka also.

Others hold as follows: ^ The said desire for results is dependant
‘upon all the individual propertres of the particular accessory (Soma) ;
‘and as such people could not take up the Puttka, which does not
‘contain all those properties. Inasmuch as it is absolutely necessary
८ {0 begin the performance of a necessary action,—and as it is equally
“ necessary to finish what has been begun,—-it 18 quite possible, tn the
‘* case of a necessary action, to speak of 1६ as duly completed, even though
‘it mav be wanting in certain stnall details. In the case of the
“ Kamya Action, on the other hand, inasmuch as it is never begun with
“° 9 substance that is only laid down as a substitute for the original
substance, it could not be spoken of as complete, unless all the
^“ properties of the original substance were present. And for this reason,
“it must be admitted that the Puttka can never be employed hy
‘ persons desiring certain results to follow from the use of Soma.”’

As a matter of fact, however, when we have begun the performance
of an action with a certain definite substance calculated to lead to the
desired result,— if that Substance should become stolen, or otherwise
destroyed,—we do employ a substitute which is laid down only for
such contingencies. Thus then, inasmuch as it would be necessary ४0
finish the Sacrifice (that has been begun), it would be completed all the
same, whether the remaining portion of it be done with a substitute
or a modification of the Original substance. And the present Adhi-
karana also serves the purpose of showing whether there is to be an
Uha (modification in the Mantra) or not (in cases where we employ
the substitute). [That is to say, if the पश्चि were regatded as 4
substance wholly. distinct from Soma, then there would be an Uha,—
while if it were not so regarded, then there could be no Uha.} .

ADHIKARANA (16).

od

[The Acoessories of the Dikshantya, ete., belong to the Agnishtoma.]

Stitrva (41): 66 The Samsthas (Leriminuses of the Jyotish-

‘Stoma) are all equally related (to the enjoined

०८ secessorties): as all of them occur ina the seme

०५ Context,”

The Jyolixhioma has been held to cousist of four Terminuses, made
up of several repititions of the many offerings of Vessela and Cups;
and over all these Terminuses pervades the character of the Jyolish-
toma. Just as whether he be sitting, or wa!king or slecping, Devadatta
all along remains ‘ Dévadalia’; so, in the same manner, the disappear-
ance of one Terminus, and the appearance of another does not make
any difference in the applicability of the name ‘ Jyotishioma.’ As for
the Terminuses themselves, they are incompatible with one another;
but the character of the ‘ Jyofishtoma’ is compatible with every one
of them. This Jyottshioma has been laid down as to be performed
for the acquiring of a certain desirable result,--im the sentence—‘ one
should perform the Jyotishtoma Sacrifice for the acquiring of Heaven.’
Similarly, the Terminuses, the Ukthya and the rest, also are laid down
with reference to distinct results,—in such sentences as ‘ one desiring
cattle should get hold of the Ukihya,’ and so forth.

With reference to such a Jyolishtoma, the Veda lays down such
accessory. details as the Dikshantyd and the rest. And with regard to
these details, there arises the question as to whether these have been
laid down with reference to the Jyofishicma as constituted by all the
Terminuses, or only to that consisting of the Agnishtoma Terminus only.

-©Phis propounding of the question is not quite proper. Because
“nat the time that the Details are laid down with reference to the
Jyotishtema, it is not spoken of as qualified by any of the Termi-.

` ^“ nuses. Even if-some such qualifications were mentioned, no signifi
cance could be attached to them, as they would be qualifications of the
subject of a proposition (i.e. that with reference to which something
° 18 laid down). Nor could the fact of the Términuses, the Ukthya
“and the rest, taking’ up an accessory justify our speaking of the

OF `. - ~. ` ` ~ |

1610. ‘TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. Ill—PADA VI.—ADHT. (16).

०८ Jyotishtoma itself taking up that accessory. Because these Teri}
५५ nuses also lead to distinct results of their own, and as such every one `
“of them would have itsown procedure wholly to itself; and as forthe
(८ Jyotishtoma, it could only serve as the substrate of all these, and as
‘such would occtipy only a secondary position ; and as such it could
‘‘not be recognised as capable of taking up any accessories. Then
५ again. inasmuch as the sentences—‘ one should ‘perform the Jyot?sh-
“toma, for the acquiring of Heaven’ points to the fact of all the details
‘of the Jyotishtoma being equally related to all the Terminuses, any
“ specification of the ‘ Agnishioma only’ would be absolutely meaning

५: less

In view of these arguments, we must put forward the question in
the following words: Are the Details laid down meant for the Jyolish-
toma only, or for the Ukthya and other Terminuses also? ‘The Bhashyu
also may be thus explamed as really patting forward the question in
this same form.

Though the Details are taken up by the ‘Terminuses, yet inasmuch
as these themselves have not the character of action, it is the Jyotish-
toma which, serving as their substrate, becomes the means by which.
they take up the details ; and it is with a view to this fact that the
Bhashya says: ‘ Kim sarvasamstham Jyotishtomam prakrtya ’;—the sense
of the question being whether the Details are laid down with reference
to that which serves as the means and leads to a desirable result (i.e.
the Jyolishioma), or to that which simply leads to a desirable result
(1.6. the Terminus). When the details are laid down for the Jyotish-
toma only, then it comes to belong to its particular terminus of the
Agnishtoma, which is the one Terminus peculiar to it, and which is the
only one of the Terminuses that remains behind; and it is for this
reason that the name ‘ Jyotishioma’ is applied to that Sacrifice as
resting in the Agnishtoma Terminus. In the case of the Ukthya and
the other Terminuses, though they have the capability of taking up
the Jyolshtoma, yet this capability is not clearly indicated, as tc
whether the Details taken up by the Ukihya, etc., belong to, the Jyo
tishtoma, through the fact of this latter serving as the means of the
former, or only through its own capability of bringing about the desired
result. As for the Agnishtoma Terminus, however, it is the one par
ticular subsidiary that specially belongs to the Jyotishtoma; and hence
the fact of the Agnishtoma taking up the Details can be spoken of as
the Jyotishioma itself taking them. Consequently the putting forward
of the question in the Rhashya cannot be said to be altogether improper

Inasmuch as the fact of the Accessory belonging in common to 9);

_AOORSSORIES OF DIKSANIYA BELONG 0 JyorTistoma. 1571

the J'erminuses is admitted by both parties,—the Purvapakshi holding
them to belong, by Direct Injunction, while the Siddhanti holds that
they belong, by /mplication, to the Ukthya, etc., while to the Agnish-
toma alone they belong by Direct Injunction,—the question speaks
of ‘ Direct Injunction ` (as the difference of opinion is with regard to
this alone)

On the question above stated, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

“The Details are laid down as belonging, in common, to the
“ Jyotishtoma and to the Terminuses; because all of them belong to
‘‘the same Context. The Jyolishioma leading to a distinct desirable
‘ result, there arises. with regard to this, a desire to know its procedure ;
“and hence it takes up, in its procedure, the Details, on account of
“ their being laid down in close proximity to it,—and not because of
“ the tact of its being Jyotisktoma. And inasmuch as this proximity
“is found to apply equally to the case of the Terminuses also, they
“must be regarded as equally related to the Details in question.
‘And as it is only when there is no trace of Direct Injunction that
‘“we have recourse to Jmplication, we must regard these Details as
‘‘applying to all the Terminuses by Direct Injunction.

Satra (42) : * Also because all of them are spoken of
as equal.”

“ff. The Vedic text, laying down the Disposal of the Remnant of
Butter, distinctly indicates the fact of all Terminuses and the
“Sacrifice (Jyotishtoma) as equally related to the Context. For
“instance, we have such sentences as—* Yadyagnishtomo juholt;
` yadi Ukthyah, ténaiva céshéna paridhimanakt: : yadt Attratrah, tiadéva
" Homayajuryamagné prisu martyam iti japan havirdhanam pratipa-
“dyéta. All these specifications with regard to the said Disposal

distinctly shows that all Injunctions of accessories pertain equally to
^“ the Jyotishioma and its Terminuses.
` "05 however looks like an Inference from Analogy, and as such
“not quite admissible. If, through Syntactical Connection, something
laid down in the Context (of the Jyotishioma), be taken as related
to the Terminuses,—then, can there be a connection with a relation. `
ship that is wholly unconnected? We have seen, on a former
occasion that the mere fact of the Dvaducaha being related to the
` Ahina did not lead us to take the details in connection with the

1572 ‘TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. SII-—PADA VE.—ADHI; (16)

‘“ Remnants, as belonging (being subservient) to the Ahina; specially
as the force of all declarations is spent up over what is direct};
expressed by the words, |

ˆ“ Hence, we have recourse to the following explanation: If that
which is laid down in regard to the Jyotishtoma in general, belonged

‘to its one particular Terminus of the Agnishioma only,—then in that
case, the Disposals laid down would have been recognised as subsi

“diary to the Agnishtoma, even if this latter were not mentioned

“specially. As a matter of fact however, we find this also mentioned

"“ (just in the same way as the other Terminuses); and this leads us to

‘the conclusion that the accessories (such as the Disposals spoken of.
are not laid down with specific reference to the Agnishtoma only)

‘And this (specific mention) would not be possible, if the Context
belonged equally to all the Terminuses. If however, the Context be

‘* taken as belonging to the Jyottshtoma only, then there would be no

‘sense in the re-mention (of the Agntshioma, in the sentence laving

‘down the Disposals) [as ‘ Jyolishtoma’ has been spoken of as synony-

“mous with =“ Agnishioma’|. While if the Context belonged, in com-

“mon, to the Ukthya and the other Terminuses,—then it would be.

“only right to speak of the Disposal with regard to each of them,

° with a conditional ‘3/’; on the other hand, if the Context did not

belong to these 'erminuses, then, even without the word ‘1’, the

‘relationship of every one of them (with the particular Disposals)

‘would be readily recognisable; just as in the case of the sentence

“4 Dvadagahinasya’. With regard to details laid down in the Context

‘of the Jyolishtoma, we could not have such conditional declarations

‘as that ‘yadi Jyotishtomah, etc.’; As such conditional declarations

“are possible only when there are several things available at hand

“(equally connectible with the Details in question). For this reason
“also, we must regard the Context as belonging equally to all the
‘« Terminuses
^ 1. There is yet another sentence indicative of the same conclu
sion: `" Agnéyamajamagnishtoma Glabhéta, Aindragnamukthyé दण
yam, Aindram Vrishnim shodacini क. This mention of the
“second ` and ‘ third’ is explicable only when all the Terminuses are
“equally related to all the enjoined ‘accessories, as it is only in that
` “ease, that all the details divectly spoken of in the previous part of
“context would be connected with. all the Terminuses: mentioned. in
“the latter part; otherwise if the 'Terminuses were regarded as second
‘ary. modifications, then, inasmuch as there would be only one such
“detail (the Aindragna £i.) laid down in connection with one Terminus

- ACOMSSORIUS OF DiksaNtIVd BHLONY 10 1९010५4५, 1524

(Li, the Uiihya), it would bar the applicability, to the same
८, ‘ferminus, of all the other details, the Agnfya £.i.: and hence there
“would-be only one such Deiatl with each Terminus. [While, in
“pooordance with the sentence just quoted, we should have the
५ Agnéya goat only at the Agnishtoma, the Agnéya as well as the
"° Aindragna goat, as the second, at the Ukthya, and these two, together
‘with the Aindra Vrishni as the third, at the Shodact]

०५ Objection : ‘ Even though these Details (of the goat) are directly
४ mentioned (in connection with all the Terminuses), yet, inasmuch as
“one Terminus could not be present in the other, the Detail laid
‘down in connection with the previous Z'erminus could not enter into
‘the other. Because what is called ‘Agnishtoma’ is that sacrifice which
‘‘ends with the Agnishioma-Hymn, and not that which merely contains
“that Hymn; and similarly that which ends with the Ukthya Hymn
‘gould never be finished at the previous Terminus ; and hence, in that
‘‘case, we could not justify the use of the words ‘second ’ and ‘ third,’
‘in accordance with any theory (either the Purvapuksha or the
“ Siddhania).’

५ Reply: True, it would have been equally inexplicable for both
५ of us if the Goats had been specialised by the Terminuses only. Asa
“matter of fact however, they are based upon the presence of parti-
“cular Hymns; and as such it is quite possible for the details to be
‘taken together. It is this what the Bhashya declares as a well-estab-
‘lished fact, in the sentence ‘ Dvé hi talra 2400111८, Aqnishlomastotram
‘ Ukthyastotranca

‘ Question : ‘When all the words, Agnishloma, Ukihya and Shodagi
“are equally spoken of as applying to the Terminuses as well as to the
‘* Hymns,—how is it that you hold the particular goats to be prompted
“by the Hymns, and not by the Terminuses १ Asa matter of fact, we
“find that it is the Terminuses that, as serving the useful purpose of
“bringing about distinct results, are more readily capable of being
“ taken as the prompting causes of the goats

‘To this question, some people make the following reply
“ (1) Even though the words are common (to the Hymn as well as
‘ to- the Terminus), yet, it is with a view to a more extensive scope of
“ the seriptural text, that we take them as specified by the Hymns.

: (2)-Or, the words are applicable to the Terminuses as qualified
“by ‘the particular Hymns; and hence so long as we can. take the

animals as*prompted by the previously-cognized. quelifications
‘“(Hymns), we cannot rightly take it to be due to the subsequently-

cognized Terminus | |

1574 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. ITI-—~PADA VI.—ADHI. (16).

^“ (3) Or, in accordance with the Abriyadhikarana (1—iii—30 ९1.8९4).
“the words denote the Hymns directly, while the Terminuses, they only
‘indicate indirectly ; and it is only when the acceptance of the directly
‘ denoted is incompatible, that we can have recourse to what is indirect-
‘‘ ly indicated. And the Hymn also can be taken, through the presence
“of the Locative affix (in the sentence ‘agnishtomé alabhéta’), as the
“prompting cause. Even though the Hymns may not bring about
" distinct results, yet, on the sole strength of Direct Declaration, we
° could, quite reasonably, accept them as prompting causes,— just ax
‘in the case of the ‘breaking’ (in the sentence ` bhinné {41014 `).

^° (4) Or, lastly, we accept the Hymns as the prompting cause, i:
‘accordance with the Sutra‘sandigdhéshu cakyucéshat’ (I—iv—-29): Kven
‘though the Terminuses from the Principal Denotation (of the words
‘** Agnishtoma,’ etc.), yet we accept the Hymns as the prompting
‘cause, through indirect interpretation, based upon the Vakyacesha
‘‘(Le. subsequent sentences bearing upon the subject). That is to say.
‘in continuation of the sentence, ‘agnéyamajamagnishtoma alabhéta’ we
‘‘ find the words ‘ Agntyo hyaginshtamah ’; and the meaning of this is
"° that the Agnéya goat is to be employed at that Agnishtoma which is
८८ Agnéya (that which belongs to the Deity of Agni); and then we find that
“it 18 the Hymn, and not the Terminus, which belongs to the Deity o
‘¢ Agni, which is the Deity to whom the Hymn is addressed. As for the
‘* Terminus, it consists of the cessalion of operations ; and as such it isa
‘ negative entity ; consequently it could not be required by the Deity.
‘Then again, as for the Deities appearing in connection with the various
० repititions of the Sacrifices, those also pertain to the Hymn, and not to
‘the Terminus. Nor could the Repitition itself be taken ax the
५५ ‹ Nerminus’; because what is signified by the root ‘ san + stha’ is the
“ state of indifference that follows after the completion of an Action.
‘“ Nor could one thing (the Terminus) be spoken of as connected with
‘the Deity of another (the Hymn) -

“ The same may be said with regard to the Ukihya and the Shodact
‘In fact by certain sentences, such as ‘ dindragnani Ukthyans ` 1 is
‘clear that these refer to Tymns, and not to the Terminuses, because
‘ these latter are never spoken of as ‘ Ukthyant

“Thus then the specification of the Goats being due to tl
^ˆ Hymns, it is only right that they should be employed together

Objection: ‘Kiven if we regard the Ukthya, ete., as mere second

ary modifications, inasmuch as the sacrifices of the animals (the
“Agntya goal, etc ) lead to invisible (transcendental results), they could
“never be performed in the place of-one another; and hence it would

` . AOOESSORIES OF DIKSANIYA BELONG TO TYOTISTOMA. 1575

८८ be only natural for all the animals to be employed together. Because,
“6 it is not necessary that a Direct Declaration should always set aside
‘that Declaration whose existence can only be a matter of Inference ;
‘+ &8 a matter of fact, there can be such a rejection only when there is a
‘contradiction between these, and a contradiction is possible only
५४ when (both the Declarations, Dircct and Inferential) pertain to one and
“the same subject. That is to say, if the mere fact of one Declaration
“ heing directly mentioned in the Veda were the sole reason for the
“getting aside of all other declarations bearing upon the question, there
‘ would be nothing that would not be set aside,—no matter whether it
“ pertain to the same Sacrifice or to others, whether it bring about
“ visible or invisible results, and whether it occur in the same process
‘or not. And certainly this is very far from desirable; and hence
* the joint employment of all the goats is quite compatible with both
* theories—-as will be explained under the Sara‘ Prakrlilingasamyogal’
“ (X—iv—1), as also under the Sttra ° Prajdpatyeshucamnanat’ (X—
" iy—6), where it will be shown that those that are not incompatible with
‘one another can be taken conjointly.

८‹ {0 the above, the following reply is made: We have, in the
“name ° Savantya, a word indicating the connection of these with
“the Original Primary, all these (several Goats) being spoken of by
^“ 1068118 of the word ‘ Savantya.’ And hence, through this common
“ Name, all of them come to be regarded as performing the same
‘function. And as such there is a distinct contradiction, which tends
‘‘ to one being set aside by the other.

“५ Objection: ` If such be the case, then, even in a case where certain
‘‘ things are equally related to a number of enjoined details, there
“would be a possibility of the setting aside of the General by the
Particular because the Animals spoken of first, being recognised as
having a more extensive scope, come to be taken as general, while those
‘spoken of later on, being more limited in their scope, are taken as
` particular; and certainly the general, which is more extensive in its
“scope, is always set aside by the Particular, whose scope is limited.’

“To this some people make the following reply : It is only the last
“of all which, having no scope at all and thus being the most particular

of all, would set aside all the rest ; and the middle one could not have
any such rejective potency. Because oven though their scopes may
vary, their authority and means of cognition remains the same. For
instance, the Aygnéya goat, being employed at the four Terminuses
is ‘common’ (or general); and so is the Atndragna also, which
“belongs to three Terminuses. And the effort necessary for getting

1576 = TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. T11—PADA V1.—ADRT. (16).

‘at the former .is just the same as that for getting at the latter. A.
“for the Awe (the last.of the animals mentioned), however, it does nor
matter even if it be due wholly tothe Terininus itself; because there
is no other Terminus of. the Jyolishtoma beyond that (at which the
° Bwe is employed) ; and as such, there could be no refection of this
“last one —
“This explanation however is scarcely admissible. For even
‘though there be no rejection, yet it could be taken only as an option-
‘‘al alternative ; because we do not find any case where two things,
“ serving exactly the same purpose, are both employed at one and the
“same time (according to the law ` T’ulyarthanam vikalpak). And thus
“ you have a most undesirable Noose, as it were, on each side of yourself.
०४ That is to say, if, for the sake of their being taken together, you admit
“of even the slightest difference in their functions, then this conjoin!
“appearance would be quite possible, even in accordance with the
‘ theory that the Terminuses are mere modifications of the Jyotishtoma:
‘and then, if, for the sake of showing that in this latter case, there is
‘a rejection of the one by the other, you admit the functions of the
“two to be exactly the same, then, even in accordance with the
“theory that all the Terminuses are equally related to the enjoined
“ details, there could be no conjoint employment at all; just as in the
५ 0886 of the Vrihi and the Yava; nor would the declaration of conjoint:
‘employment support the Pdarvapaksha only; the Stddhants also
“will speak of it--in 6४114 45,-—only on the strength of an Indica-
“tive Force, which he puts forward as Direct Declarateon, simply
‘* because there is no other way for it
‘* Hence, it becomes absolutely necessary for us to indicate some
“guch point of difference as would show the Pérvapaksha, and
‘not the Stddhania theory to be supported by the said ‘ Declaration.’
‘‘And this point of difference is as follows: In accordance with the
^ Piirvapaksha, all the Animals would be equally present in all the
subsidiaries; and the mere name (‘Savantya’) could not preclude
‘them, as they would have been brought in by reason of. that. fact
“ That is to say, all the Animals would be liable to be employed at all
‘the Terminuses ; and hence, the absence, in the previous.Terminuses
‘of the Animals mentioned subsequently, would be dye to the simple
“fast of there being no cause for their presence at. these: but the
“previously mentioned Animale would certainly. be employed at the
"^ subsequently mentioned Terminuses ; as there would bea direct cause
for this ; specially asthis is distinctly indicated by Syntactical Con-
_.““neotion.. And then, the question being as to--(1) whether we should

` ACGORSSORIES OF DIKSANIYA BELONG 10 syorigpoma., = 1A77

< take all of them. to be syntactically connected, by the mame (‘savaniya’)
‘and then take them either as setting aside one another, or as optional
‘+ alternatives, or (2) in view of the fact of all of them being employed
“conjointly, as indicated by Syntactical Connection, we should take
‘every one of them as serving distinct functions.---we cannot but
५ gonclude, on the strength of Syntactical Connection, that they should
“be all employed together. Just ay, in the case of the ’rayajas and
“the Anuyadjas, even though they have a single name, yet, on the
strength of Syntactical Connection, they are taken as having distinct
*‹ functions, and as such, to be employed cunjotntly.

‘In accordance with the Siddhan/a theory, on the other hand,
“they would have to be taken as having the same function, in accord-
“ance with the indication of their common Vame; while by Implica-
“ tion, they would have distinct functions, and as such they would be
‘employed conjointly ; but, inasmuch as the Name, forming part of
“the Direct Injunction, would be endowed with superior authority,
“it would be necessary for us to take all of them as serving the same
“function ; and then, there being a contradiction amongst them, they
‘would set aside one another. Asa matter of fact, every modification
“(as the Siddhanti regards the Terminuses to be) stands in need of some
“ words indicative of its Original Primary ; and hence the animals could
‘be taken as serving the functions of one another. In the case of the
‘* Pirvapaksha however, every one of them being equally related to the
“Injunction, there can be no presence of words indicative of any
“ Original Primary ; and hence, in this case, there is nothing that could
“lead us to take the Animals as serving the functions of one another.

‘Some people explain the point of difference between the two
“ theories, in the following manner : In accordance with the Purvapak-
`! sha, we regard the actions to be distinct, on account of their being
“related. to such Deities and Substances as are independent of one
“ another; while in accordance with the Siddhanta, what is done by the
sentences is merely the laying down of certain accessories, with
^ reference to the sacrifice pointed out by Implication ; and hence there
“would be only one sacrifice, and no second, or third. |

“ But, though this Injunction of Accessories may be possible, in
7 the case of the Aindragna Animal, yet, it could not be possible in the
“ 0986 of the Aindra Sarasvati ; as the Injunction of several Substances
“and Deities would involve a syntactical split ; and hence in this case,
‘the Actions could not but be regarded as distinct.” | |
` . ` ^ कताः, this reason, we offer the following explanation: The
त question being as to+-(1) whether the d istinot action laid down should

1578 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH..1f1-——-PADA VI.—-ADHI. (16)

०५ be regarded as leading to a distinct Apirvw, or (2) only as helping in
“ the accomplishment of the A ptrea of the original Suvaniya Sacrifice, —-
‘‘we are led to the conclusion that, inasmuch as the only use of the
०४ Action possible is that with reference to the previously ascertained
“ Avirva, it is not proper to assume another Apérva, and then to take
“the Action as bringing about this latter. Similarly, in the case of
“ the Aparva of the Suraniya, the liability of whose performance is shown
५९ by Implication,—.at the time that it would be seeking for the means to
“its accomplishment, it could not abandon the directly-enjoined Sava-
“niya, and take to an altogether different Suvantya ; as in all cases.
५५8, new factor is admissible, only when the original is found to be
‘‘absolutelvy inadmissible. As for the operation contained in the
‘* Sacrifice, it has its relationship definitely ascertained by means of the
“Original Apirve ; and as such, it cannot be taken as related to anv
° other Apiroa. |
Question: ‘How could the other Savuniya, not having its
potency definitely ascertained, help in the accomplishment of the
‘Original Apurva ¢
‘* Answer: Exactly in the same manner as in the case of the
"° Péirvapaksha, the other Apirva leads to the operation of the Sacrefice.
Question: ‘What then would be the difference between the two
८८ theories ! | | |
^“ Anawer: When the Sacrificial Operation stands in need of
“ Aptrvas, then, in that case, the Apirva of the Modificatory Savaniya
^“ 18. not duly recognised; and hence the said operation could fall
“in with this Aptrva. When, however, it is the Apirva that stands
“in need of the Action (Sacrificial Operation), then, inasmuch as we
‘obtain the idea of a distinct Action, connected with the word ‘ Sava-
‘“ntya’, which is indicative of the Original Primary,—it rejects the
“ Original Action. As regards the Original Sacrifice, there are opportun-
^" ities, in it, for assuming distinct Apirvas ; and hence we assume four
“ distinct Apirvas as following in the wake of the four Savantyas that
are laid down. And among these it is not distinguishable,. which of
“them is assumed before the other, and which, for this reason, could
“be related to another means (Action).. Specially as, at the time that
we are looking into the Actions, what we are cognisant of are the
mere forms of the Actions themselves; and, sintultaneously with
“these comes. the assumption: of the corresponding Apirvas; and
` ^ thus also no differentiation is possible. . In the case of the Siddhanta
‘however, it is. disténotly recognised that. it is the Original Apurve
that, is the first to be assumed ; and hence it being. absolutely.noces

. । AUCESSORIES OF DIKSANIYA BELONG tO JYorstomsa 1670

‘sary to abandon some one of the Actions, it is the Original Action
“that is found capable of being abandoned ; and hence, in this case,
‘+ we would have the rejection of this Original Action

“ Objection: ‘In accordance with the Siddhanta also, we find that.
“the subsequent Terminuses are mere modifications of the Agnishloma
“Terminus,—and not that they are modifications of one another : and
“as such it is only the Agnéya goat (connected with the Aqnishtoma)
‘that would be set aside by the others; and hence, in regard to all
‘of them, what should have been asserted 18 that—no sevond could be
“ merceived ; and hence, wherefore should it have been declared that
^ 110 third is percepiible.? ’

^° Reply: This objection does not affect the case ; because if what
‘the Bhashya meant to declare were the non-perceplion of mutual rejeciton,
‘in the case of the Aindragna and other Animals, laid down with
‘regard to other Actions,—then such a declaration would be wholly
‘‘ groundless (as there is no rejection of the subsequently mentioned ani-
‘mals). As a matter of fact, however, it speaks of a mere ‘non-
“ perception’; and this is quite applicable to all the three animals,
“as the first, the Agnéya, is actually rejected, while as for the
‘‘middle ones (The Aindragna and the Aindra Vrishnz), there is no
^ possibility. of the presence of these (and so there would be non-
““merception of all the three). And thus too, the Agneya would
० 06 refected; and this is what is meant by the doclaration—‘napirval
“ purvah paréna, etc

` ५" Wor these reasons, it must be admitted that all the Terminus-
‘eg are equally related to the enjoined Accessory Details.

SIDDHANTA.

Satya (48): The Terminuses are mere modifications
(of the Jyotishtoma); because, being spoken of in
~ connection with distinct desirable results, they are

equal to the Nitya, —

The Ukthya and the other Samsthas, being so many particular
Terminuses, being laid down as leading to distinct desirable results
stand in need of a substrate with an end; and as such they enter
into. the Original Jyotishtoma, by modifying 1ts inherent Terminus
of the. Agnishféma ; and it is for this reason that they are spoken of as
-Its.‘ Modifications |
_. Objection : “It as it is only when the Ukthya, etc., have become
‘cendowed with the character of Verminuses, that they stand in need of |
‘< something with an end Asa matter of fact, we find:that, they have

1580 = rantRA-VARTIKS., ADH. U1—PADA VI.—ADHI. (16)..

‘no such character of ‘Terminus,’ before they have been connected
‘with the Jyoltshioma ; as the word ‘Terminus’ stands in need of a
५८ begunning and a middle. Then, if that Connection with the ‘‘ Jyolish-
‘toma be the first to be established, then, in that case, they would.
‘from the very beginning, come to be recognised as being subordinate
‘to the Sacrifice; and as such they would have no connection with
‘any result desired by man; and as this would constitute an equality
“with the Nitya (‘ sa nityasya samatvat’) they would cease to be known
“as ‘modifications.’ Then again, the Holding, etc. (of the Vessels),
‘being distinctly laid down with reference to a distinct Result, how
‘could we recognise any connection between the Terminuses and a
‘‘desirable Result ?”’

1. To this some people make the following reply: Even if there
be a connection of the Holding, etc., with the Result, the present
Adhtkarana would be quite explicable and reasonable ; as the question.
in that case, would be as to the Injunction of Details being for the
sake of the Jyotishtoma or for that of the Holding, etc. And as
for the word ‘Terminus’ (‘Samsth@’), inasmuch as these Holdings,
ete , are laid down at the end, they have a distinct relationship with an
end; and as such, the name ‘ Samstha’ (Terminus ’) can very well apply
tothem. That is to say, we have the Injunction of these, in the passage
‘ One desiring Cattle should hold the Ukthya; one who desires power
and virility should hymn by means of the Shodagi, etc.’, etc., wherein
we find one action (Hymning f.i.) laid down as appearing at the end of
the previous Action (the Holding); and as such these Actions come
to be spoken of as other ‘ Terminuses.’

IJ. Other people offer the following explanation : In the case in
question, the Holding, etc., are such as are already known to be perform-
able, as subsidiaries to the Hnd leading to a distinct desirable result
and hence, the sentence quoted being only meant to be an Injunction
of the relationship between the particular means and consequences
the Holding, etc., are mentioned, merely by way of reference, just like
the actions of ‘ nirvapaté’ and ‘dlabhatt.’ Because when the Injunctive
potency of the Affix (in ‘ grhniyat’') has been transferred (to the
Name), the root is used simply for the sake of that affix (being
used); and hence the Result would follow from (and belong to) the
_ Name,——just as in the case of the ‘ Desire for sense efficiency
। Objection : `“ In the sentence, ` ukthyan grhniya@t’ on. account of
` -^ the distinct expression of the co-extensiveness (of the Name ^ Ukthya

«with the aetion of Holding, ete.), the Name would belong to these
` २ Holdings, ete:, only.” J ke Ee FS

` ` AQOOKSSORINS OF DIKSANIYA BELONG TO JYOTISTOMA 1581

Reply : 1४ 18 not so ; it is the Hnd itself, which, through its connec-
tion with the Ukthya Hymn, 18 called “ Ukthya ;” and. this is applied
figuratively, to the Holding, which is connected with that End. And
so long a8 ® word can be taken in its direct sense, we cannot take in
it in any secondary or figurative sense. And asa matter of fact, we find
that the words ‘ Ukthya,’ etc., are always used as co-extensive with
the word ‘ Yajna’ (Sacrifice),--e.g. (1) ‘Ukthyéna yayéta’ ‘ Okthyo
४017008 ` ; (2) ° Shodacgina yajate’ ` shodact 201८८40 ' ; and as there is
no such sacrifice as the Shodact, the use of this name in the last
sentence is based upon the fact of its denoting the End (or Terminus),
which is not altogether distinct from the sacrifice itself, and not upon
that of its denoting either the Holding or the Hymn. Then again,
the Masculine gender of ` Shodaci could be explicable, only if it
denoted the Terminus (` samaptr’); as it is onlv a word in the Neuter
gender that could denote the Hymn (Stotva). As for the Masculine
yender that we sometimes tind used in connection with the Hymn,—
e.g., ‘ Hkavimeah shadace ’—that should be regarded as 9 figurative use
Consequently, inasmuch as, in the case in question, we find the word
ˆ shodaci’ (in the Masculine gender), in the subsequent portion of the
sentence, we conclude that it denotes the Terminus. (3) Then again,
we have the sentence—‘ Aliratrénu prajakamam,' —where the word
‘Atiraira’ is found to be distinetly denotative of the Terminus.
Because there is no other action mentioned in this: as for the root
‘yajt’ (to sacrifice), that too is used only as subservient to the
signification of the Causative affix; and it would involve a deal of
trouble to take it as the predominant factor. Consequently the
sentence cannot but be taken os pointing out the connection of the
particular Result (obtaining ol offspring) with that Terminus which is
` reached after the night is over. {Tf the Result were connected with the
Holding and the Hymn, then, inasmuch as they are independent
‘actions in themselves, they would not stand im need of any other
action; and hence they would have to be performed independently
by themselves. And in that case we could not find any use for their
mention in the particular Context; nor could we find any explanation
for the use of the words ` (7kthya,’ etc. For this reason also it is the
-'Terminuses that lead to the particular results.
, -. Question How could there be a Terminus, before its connec-
tion with the Sacrifice ?”’
| 1, In answer to this, some people quote the Smriti text-—‘ There are

seven Terminuses of the Soma, (1) the Agnishipmu, (2) the Atyagnish-
toma, (3) the Ukthya, (4) the Shodaci, (5) the Atiratra, (6) the Vajapéya,

1582 TANTRA-VARTIKA. | ADH. Ill-—-PADA: VI.—ADHI, (16)

and: (7) the Aploryamé,’-—which -distinctly shows that the word
^ Samstha’ signifies the Terminus of all Soma offerings ;. and as such it
excludes all other Sacrifices, save the Soma sacrtfice, and there tov
through Context, it comes to rest in the Jyotishioma

II. Others, however, offer the following reply: In the course of
a certain particular Repitition of the Jyottshtoma, we come across
another Terminus, which, as soon as it appears, comes to be known
by the names of ‘ Ukthya,’ etc., and becomes connected with certain
definite results, And through the superior authority of Direct Declara-
tion (which connects the Terminus with distinct desirable results),
we reject the fact of these being subservient to the Sacrifice, which is
indicated by the Context. As for the relationship of the Container
and the Contained (subsisting beween the Terminuses and the Jyotish-
toma Sacrifice). that is accepted, on account of its being quite compat-
able with the aforesaid Direct Declaration.

III. With regard to the present question, there is yet another
theory ; it is as follows: At the very outset, a certain action, spoken
of by the words ‘ Ukthya,’ etc., becomes connected with a certain
desirable result (by means of the sentence ‘ Pacukama Ukthyam
grhniyat’). And then, on seeking after this particular action, we come
to recognise, through another Direct Declaration, a particular Terminus
of the Jyotishioma as that Action

IV. Or, the Ukthya is a particular Repitition of the Jyotushtoma
itself ; and, through another Declaration, it enters at the close of the
Jyotsshtoma ; and as such, comes to be laid down with reference to a
particular desirable result ; and then it comes to be called ‘ Samstha `
(‘Terminus’), by reason of the fact of the Sacrifice being completed
in, or by, that particular Action

V. Others hold that ‘ Samstha’ (‘ Terminus’) is the name of
that cessation of action which follows after the last Repetition of the
Jyotishtoma Sacrifice; and inasmuch as that céssation has not the
nature of an action, it could not be the means of bringing about
a desired result; and hence the sentence laying down the Samstha
must be taken as enjoining the sacrifice characterised by the presence
of that cessation ५

Vi. There is yet another explanation offered by some; it is. this
Inasmuch as there is nothing too much for Direct Declaration, there
could be no incongruity in. the fact: of a negative:.entity (the cessation
of action) being laid down as the means of leading. to a definite result
Tw -fact, we do often find such. declarations’ as that--' the.aot-doing
of the enjoined, as. well as the doing of the prohibited,’ ete.—which

we ACCESSORIES OF DIKYANIYA BELONG 0 JYOTISTOMA, 1583

distinctly speaks of a negation, the nol-dving, as causing sinfulness
Or, we can regard the cessation from action as involving a positive
mental action, in the shape of a determination to remain inactive: and
thus there can be no such incongruity as urged above

Then, as to how a definite result follows from an accessory detail
and how the Nitya action is modified by the Accessory calculated to
bring about a definite result,—we should refer to the ‘ ludriya kama
dhikarana ` (11-11-29) etc.) and the ‘Goduhanddhikarana’ (111 vi—10)
This is what is meant by the Bhashya-declaration—‘ [n such cages w
find results following from the Accessories.’ In fact, the Vedic declara
tion also that we have is that ‘une desiriny Cattle should get hold of
the Ukthya,’ and not ‘ one who desires the Jyoltshtoma the holding
of the Ukthya.’ And this distinctly shows that the Ukthya (as bring -
ing about a definite desirable result) cannot be regarded as subservient
to the Sacrifice. Because, if it were subservient to a Sacrifice, then,
even without the word ` Kama’ (‘ destring’), the Ukthya would be
recognised as something that should be done, for the simple reason of
its helping in the accomplishment of the Sacrifice. 11 what is meant
to be done is the mere getting hold of the Ukthya, then it would be
implied by the very nature of things that the Injunction is meant for
one who desires the holding of the Ukthya;—that is to say, for one
who would be seeking for the due bringing about of the mere holding |
of the Ukthya. But both these contingencies are avoided by the addi-
tion of the word ‘ kama

Thus then, being meant to bring about definite desirable results
the Ukthya and the other Terminuses must be regarded as modztficalions
(of the Jyotishioma) ;—in accordance with the Law relating to the
Milking. Vessel (III—vi—10). And when we come to consider the
question as to the process by which they should be performed, we find
the process of the Jyotishtoma pointed out. by Implication, as that to
be adopted in these cases.

Question: “In what way is the process of the Jyotishioma
“taken up by the Terminuses ? (1) If it is by Proximity, then all of them
“ will have to be regarded as equally connected with the enjoined
"^ details (and this would not be acceptable for the Siddhant:). Nor is
“mere Proximity enough reason for the Implication (of the presence of
"+ the accessories of the original sacrifice at its Modifications); as such
‘* Implication will be shown later on to be due to Similarity. -(2) If it
५.6 by reason of their serving the functions of the Joytishtoma,—then
‘all that we can say is that the causal efficiency ofthis fact has been.
‘Salready set aside... Nor are the Dikshaniya, etc., details belonging to.

1584 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. Ul-—-PADA Vi.—ADHT. (16)

‘the Terminuses; and hence they could not be transferred from one
४४ Terminus to the other serving the functions of the former. Nor do
“the Ukihya and the other Terminuses serve the functions of ‘the
“ Jyottshioma; aud as such they could not obtain the accessory details
‘of this latter sacrifice. (3) The same reasoning serves to set aside
“ the view that the Process comes in by Implication: that is to say.
९५ 0116 who holds that the Details of the Jyotishtoma would come in at
“the Terminuses, by [mplication, for him also, there would be no
“ similarity, to serve as the basis of that Implication. Though the
“ Agnishtoma has a certain similarity with the other Terminuses, yet
‘there is no sort of similarity of the Jyotishioma to the Ukthya and
“the other Terminuses ; and hence the -/yolishioma cannot be regarded
“as the Original archetype of these 'Terminuses—(and hence the Pro-
“ cedure of that Sacrifice could not come into those latter, through the
‘Implicatory Injunction that the Modification should be done in the
* same way as the Original’). It is for thexe reasons that the Author
“of the Bhashya has kept silent with the mere declaration that it
८८ was due to Proximity. And hence it hecomes all the more incumbent
‘upon you to explain the difficulties raised above.” ।
Answer: That this is a case of Implication we have already shown
above. Nor is Similarity the only ground for Implication. That is to
say, we have already shown, in connection with the sentence ‘Dadhnéndri-
yakamasya juhuyat,’ (under Sutras [1-11-26 et. seq.), that even without
sunilarity, we have an Implication (of the accessories of Homa),. for
the simple reason that, without the Homa the result spoken of could
not come about. All that Simzlarity could do in such cases, is to point
to the particular Original Sacrifice (whose Accessories would come into
the Modifications in question) ; and it could not do anything in the
shape of bringing in any transcendental aid to bear upon the sacrifices.
Hence in the case in question, even without similarity, the Jyotishtoma
comes to be regarded as the substratum of the Terminuses, on. the sole
ground of Proximity. It is this ‘ Proximity,’ and not the Proximity of
the Dikshantya, eto., that has been spoken of in the Bhashya. .. Because
when the Jyotishtoma has been accepted as the substratum of the Ter-
minuses, 10 can very well indicate the presence of such of its operations
as are due to the 418१४05 of the Dikshaniya and the other details; and
this establishes the fact of there being an Implication of these. =
` . Question: “ How is it that the Procedure in question is taken as
“belonging to the Nitya (Jyotishtoma): only, and not as belonging to
“the Kamya (Terminuges) only, or to both, in common?” = `
The theory held by the Questioner is that the Procedure. belongs to

ACORSSORIES OF DIKSANIVYA BELONG TO JYOTISTOMA P5885

hoth<in common; the ‘alternative--that it belongs to the Kamya |
only—-has been pub forth simply by way of a bold assertion, made on
account of the unbearable character of the aforesaid Siddhanta theory ;
the sense of the Question being as follows: ‘If without any reason
“you declare that the Procedure belongs to the Nitya only then, why
‘should you not stick to the more reasonable theory that it belongs to
‘the Kamya only १ If you do not accept this latter view, because of its
« not having any reasons in support of it,--then you should accept the
‘only reasonable view, that the Procedure belongs, in common, to the
“ Nitya. Jyotishtoma as well as to the Kamya Terminuses If with-
out any reasons, you should persist in holding that the Procedurs be-
“longs to the Nitya only, simply because you wish it so,—well

८८ {86 case, why should not it be taken as belonging to the Kamya
“ only, because we wish it so? If this latter view be rejected for want
“of reasons in support of it, then you should accept the strictly
‘ raasonable view that it belongs to both.”’

The Author of the Bhashya,—not -brooking this swaggering ex-
aggeration, and thinking that the Arguments, brought forward against
the theory of the Procedure belonging to the Kamya only would be of
use in the refuting of the last alternative theory, that it belongs to
both,—proceeds to refute the former theory, in the sentence—‘ yaira
yatra guné kamah, tatra tatra kriyayam sadhya-manayam nanyatha.’
The sense of this is that, if the Accessory, could, by itself (indepen-
dently of all Action), take up the Procedure (made up of the Dikshaniya
ete.),—-then what you say would be possible. Butthe Accessory could
take up the Procedure, only if this latter were connected with the
Instruments only, or if the Accessory itself were the qualification of
the Bhavana. As a matter of fact, however, we find, that the Pro-
aedure is not connected with the Instruments, as has been shown above
and at the beginning of Adhydyas VII and [X also, it will be declared
that—with regard to the Bhavana, there arises a question as to ‘ how
it is to -be accomplished,’ and not as to ‘ how, by means of the Instru-
ments; it is to be accomplished.’ That Bhavana, in which the Instru-
ments consist of that which is denoted by the Verbal Roots,—in suck
a. Bhavand alone, do the Instruments, independently of everything
else, attain to the subsequent relationship of the Procedure, indicated |
in-accordance with the Law. of the ‘ Arunaikahdyant’ (Stiras {JI—i—
‘12, 6४८... - But in the case of that Bhavana where the Instrument. con- ©
sista of the Accessories,—inasmuch as there could be uo Instru-
‘Tnentality without a particular Root-meaning, there is always a need.
forsomething definitely expressed hy the verbal Root, which would `
199 & ५ ॥ + ee SB

1586 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. UI—PADA VI.-—ADHT. (16),

serve as the object to be accomplished ; because mere wclivity in general
could not be brought about by the Accessories. Nor is the Accessory
capable of serving as a genernl Instrument, unless it has served to
accomplish a particular action. Consequently, at that particular
Bhavana, wherein the existing Accessory takes up the Procedure, the
denotation of the Root is found to take the very first place. And
thus, the two—the Rool meaning and the Instrumental Accessory—come
to be regarded as restricting or qualifying one another, just as in the
case of the ‘ Arunakahayant’ (Sutra 1. 1-1-12). Lf the Root-meaning
were not capable of taking up the Procedure, then it might not take
it up. Asa matter of fact, however, we find that the Root-meaning
leads to a distinct desirable result, and serves to qualify the Bhavana
which is the way to the taking in of the Procedure: and as such.
it could not but take up the Procedure.

And thus all the following four agencies lead to the taking up of
the Procedure by the Root-meaning : (1) without the particular Root-
meaning the Bhavana is not-capable of taking up the Procedure ; (2)
the Accessory also is not capable of doing so, until it has brought up
the Root-meaning ; because there can be no Bhavana wholly indepen-
dent of the Root-meaning ; and because it is absolutely impossible for
the mere action ‘to do’ to be performed ; and lastly, because the Acces-
sory itself is not an aciton; (3) the Procedure also, betaking itself to
the Accessory, cannot reach it, after having passed over the Root-
meaning ; and as such it falls into this latter; (4) the Root-meaning
also, being, by itself, in need of the Procedure, is quite capable of
taking it up, even though it may have been meant for the Accessory ;
and as such why should it abandon that, Procedure ?

Thus then, in the case in question, the Ukthya and the other
Terminuses that are laid dawn with reference to distinct desirable
results, being recognised as resting in the Jyotishtoma,—when they
stand in need of a Procedure, they find presented before them, by the
Context, such details as the Dikshanty@ and the rest; and inasmuch
as these latter have no other way of reaching those, they inevitably.
enter into the Jyotishioma. Because the Ukthya, ete., being of the
nature of Terminuses, cannot, independently of the Jyotishtoma, take
up those details; nor does the Jyotishtoma give them. up when they
come to enter into it. This is what is meant by the Bhadshya declara-
tion—‘ nasau sadhyasyabhavantt sadhanéna sambandhyaté.’ The parti-
cular Procedure is enjoined in this way : ‘ For the sake of such and such
results, the means employed should be the Ukthya, etc.,.and that in
such and such a way,’—i.e. in such a way as to make it lead.to the

ACCESSORIES OF DIKSANIYA BELONG ‘TO SYOTISTOMA. L587

fulfilment of those results ; and hence there being a touch of the verh
‘to do,’ there is a distinct relationship with the Bh@vund. Under the
circumstances, there is no such way by which the Procedure could
make the Ukthya, etc., efficient means of accomplishing the result
independently of the Root-meaning

Though the word used by the Bhashya (page 385, line 7) is asadhya-
manayam kriyayam, yet what is meant is ‘ ancnugrhitdyim ’— the
action not being aided.’ ‘Some people explain ` t#nn sadhyaminayam
8 = ' Ukthyadina sadhyamanayam;’ but inasmuch as this would in-
volve an abandouning of the previously-mentioned Provedure. the
whole would become entirely irrelevant; and further, the mention of
‘fatra tatra kryayam sadhyamdniydm’ would be a useless repitition.
Consequently one who requires a Procedure for the Ac ceasory which
would serve as the means. must admit that the Accessory belongs to
the Rool-meaniny, which is what has to be accomplished.

Having thus laid down the general definition, the Author applies
it to the particular case under the consideration :—‘ Sadhyacca Jyotish-
lomak’ (16 is the Jyolishtoma that has to be accomplished ’); and
hence the Accessories cannot be regarded as belonging to the Kamyu
(Terminuses) only.

The opponent then puts forward the more Authoritative second
alternative‘ Why then should not the Accessories be regarded as
‘belonging to both (the Nitye Jyotishtoma and the Kamyu Ter-
"° monuses) १ '

The Siddhantavadi replies—Becuiuse they ure laut down as Nitya.
In all cases. a common relationship is possible only when there is
some sort. of uniformity ; in the case in question however, we find no
sort of uniformity in the relationship borne by the Jolishtoma, and that
borne by the Terminuses, to the Accessories in question, Because the
Accessories, not being connceted with any particular desirable results,
are laid down as Nilya;—and that would clearly show that the
Dikshanty@ and the other accessory details should be performed only
when we have the Jyofishtoma. And even though the /yotehtoma is
present, yet if there be no desire for Cattle or other desirable results, |
there. is no possibility of the Ukihya and other ‘Terminuses. For
certainly, it is not necessary to have one ‘terminus while we are having
the other. Nor are these Terminuses ever devoid of the /yotishtona + as
this inheres, in its entirety, in every one of them,-—~just as the Class does
ml every one of the Individuals. Consequently. it. must be admutted
that: the 6 0068807५ Details as laid down are related to the permanent:
Jyotishtoma, and not to the fleeting T'erminuses =

1688 TANTRA-vARTIKA.. ADH. II—PA DA vi.—ADHI. (16).

Objection : “‘ Even though the Terminuses are transient, yet, in
‘‘asmuch as they: would: have, inhering in them, the Nitya (perma
५ nent) element of the Jyotishtoma, there would be no incongruity in
‘the Details, which are Jaid down as Nitya (being related to the Ter
८५ minuses) ; as the Injunction of these as Nitya would be duly observed
‘‘in connection with the inhering element of the Jyottshtoma. And
‘while this condition (of relationship with the permanent factor of
(५ Jyotishtoma) is duly fulfilled, there would be no harm in the Details
‘being, at the same time, related to certain transient factors (the
‘¢Terminuses) also. Because it is only when that which is laid down
८८ && transient is related to the Permanent that, that there is an
५ incongruity, and not in cases like those we are dealing with.”’

Reply : It isnot so, because this would mean an abandoning of the
theory of common relationship (of the Details with the Nitya and. the
Kamya); because the Kamyas are not capable of prompting the said
Details. In acase where, without belonging to the Nitya sacrifice,
the Details cannot be laid down as permanent,—when the fact of its
belonging to the Nétya being ascertained, the requirements of the text
are all duly fulfilled,—their relationship with the other (i.e. the Kamya)
comes about by itself; and thus too all of them (Nitya and Kamua)
cannot be regarded as equally related to the enjoined accessories.
Otherwise, the Injunction of the Accessory details would be in some
such way as that—‘ These Details should be always done in connection
with Jyotishtoma, and at times, also when there should be a desire for
Cattle, etc.’; and this would involve a self-contradiction, with regard
to a single Injunction

‘Objection : ^° We can resolve the Injunction into two parts—
‘* one inferred from the Context, and the other from Direct Declaration ;
‘‘and of these one would lay down the details as permanent, and
‘the other would enjoin them as transient.” |
| Heply: True, the contradiction might be avoided by the difference
in the Injunctions of the Performances; but there would be a distinct
self-contradiction in regard to the prompted (details); inasmuch as.
they would be following in the wake of both the permanent and the
transitory. Thus-then, with.a view to keep intact the permanent
character of these Details (the Dikshantya and the rest), we must
regard the taking up of the procedure also to be permanent. And
thus those Details should be regarded as belonging to the Jyotishtome
a8-it.is with this that they are. invariably concomitant 2
` 's:Qbjection <. ‘The Agnishtoma Ter minus aleo. is Kamye, and hence
“Call the Terminuses must: be regarded as transitory (on the ground

ACOUSSORIES OF DIKSANIVA BELONG TO JYOTISTOMA, ` 1589 `

of their being Kamya) ; and as there is no permanent form of the
“ Jyottshtoma, apart from these Terminuses,—when the Jyotishtoma
‘would take up the Nitya Details, all these would, through that
“sacrifice, become equally related to all the Terminuses: and thus it
‘cannot 06. ascertained where (in which Terminus) we should have
“the Netya performance of the / yotishtoma ; and hence we are faced,
“by. the Law of Option, to the conclusion that, the Details in question
"* belong to the transitory (Aa@myn) performances only.”

In reply to the above it is declared—‘ Sa nityasya samutvat.’ That
is to say the two Injunctions—that of the Details pertaining to the
Sacrifice itself, as well as that of those relating to a desired result—are
both equal; and hence looking into these two, we conclude, in accord-
ance with the law ‘ ékasya libhayalvé sanyogaprthakvam’ (IV~—iii—S),
that it is as Nitya that the performance ending with the Agnishtoma is
related to the Desire; while that which lays down the others (४.६. the
Ukthya, etc.) being merely related to the particular Desires, are dis-
tinctly transitory (optional); and herein lies the difference between the
two Injunctions.

[Seto 44: Because of repetition, they would occur
in the Original, ]

Thus then, though the Ukthya, etc., are transient, as regards their
performances, yet on account of the Milya character of the Jyottsh-
toma, and of the fact of the Agnishtoma 'lerminus also being Nitya, as
invariably accompanying the /yoltshtoma,—which makes the Agnish-
toma obtain the subsequent portion of the Details taken up by the
Jyotishtoma,—the Details in question come to be spoken of as ‘ be-
longing to the Aynishtoma.” Or, as regards the two-fold presence of
the Details at the Ukthya, etc.. that which would pertain to the factor
of the Jyotishioma would be enjoined directly, while that which would
pertain to the factor of the Ukthya and other Terminuses would be got
at only by means of the Implicatory Injunctions; and this would con-
stitute the difference (between the case of the Agnishtoma Terminus and
that of the other Terminuses).

` प्र (45): [The goats] could be encployed together; `
because of the Direct Declaration to that effect
[This meets the objection urged in 4 ल, Page 1110, Line 20,]

There is nothing too much for a qualified Injunction

1500 TANTRA-VARTIEA. ADH. Wi—PADA vI-—aDRt. (16).

Sutra (46) Because of the preclusion of previous
Indications

We have the text—‘yadt Agnishtomak, juhoti; yadi Ukthyah,
paridhivanakli, na juhots’ (‘Tf it is the Agnishtoma, he offers in Homu
the Butter-remnant ; while if it is, Ukthya, he paints the Paridhi stick
with it, and does not offer it in Homa’),—where we find that, among
the Kratu-karanas (the Instruments of Sacrifices), the Injunction of
the subsequent is accompanied by a reference to the negation of the
previous one (‘ na juhott’); and this would be explicable only in ac-
cordance with the view that these Terminuses are modifications of
the Jyolishioma ; because what is done by the text quoted is that it
precludes (in the latter Sacrifice) what is found to be applicable to it by
{mplication (that is to say, the Homa has been precluded, ‘ na juhoti
in regard to the Ukthya, chiefly because the Homa was liable to being
done in accordance with the law that ‘the Modification is to be done
like the Original’). If the 'Terminuses were all equally connected with
the enjoined Details, then, inasmuch as the Direct cause (of Homa, i.e.
the Agnishioma) would be in close proximity to the Ukthya, and this.
proximity of the Cause would necessarily bring in its wake the effect
(in the shape of the Homa of the Remnant and Butter); and thus at
the Ukihya, we would have both (the Homa as well as the Painting of
the Paridht) ; and in that case, the subsequent Preclusion or Prohibi-
tion (‘na juholt’) would be that of the previous distinct Injunction ;
and that would give rise to a syntactical split (in the sentence ‘yadi
Ukthyah, etc.,, which would contain an Injunction of the Painting of
the Paridhi, as well as the prohibition of the Homa which has been
enjoined in the previous sentence, and whose connection with the
Ukthya has been established by the Implicating Injunction). Nor can
the sentence in question be regarded as containing a qualified Injunction,
like the sentence ‘ Agnéyamajam...... Aindragna Ukthya Dvitéyah,
elc., eéc,,’ as the Injunction and Prohibition. are of such contradictory
characters (that the one could not be taken along with the other) ; nor
18 it possible for the sentence to be taken as a Paryudasa (a mere pre-
clusion of Homa)

Then again, all that the Paérvapaksht has said iv regard to the
Savansya animal can be used with advantage, in favour of the Sid-
dhanta view. As it is only when the actions (of Homa and Pastnting)
are due to the Terminuses, that we can explain, on the ground of the
absence of the cause {the particular Terminuses), the mention of
negation (‘ na juhott’), even if all of them were equally related to the

. AQOKSSORTES OF DIKSANIVA BELONG TO JYoTISTOMA. 1591

enjoined Accesgories ; and in the case of the Siddhania also, inasmuch
as the two actions in question would be such as serve only imperceptible
(trancendental) results, there would be a liablitv of both of them
(Homa and Painting) being done; and in support of this we would have
the Indications of the Name ‘ Kratukarana,’ which would distinctly
point to the Original Sacrifice. |

` 80106 people argue as follows : “‘ The Home. that is laid down in the
‘text quoted is one that serves as the disposal of the Butter that has
४५ 06611 left behind at the Pracarant Homa; and hence when this Dis-
५५ nosal will have been eflected by the Painting oj the Partdhi, there
“would naturally be a negation of the other Disposal (by means of
“ Homa) ,—even if the Terminuses were equally related to the enjoined
` details (that is to say, the said Preelusion 18 quite compatible with the
“ Pérvapaksha also).”’

But when we find the sentence laying down the Homa as an inde-
pendent action, it should he explained how we could regard it a3 a mere
Disposal of the Remnant. Then again, even though the Disposal may
be effected by the Homa, yet it would be quite possible for us to per-
form the other action of ‘ Painting the Paradhi’ also, in so far as what
is directly denoted by the word ` Partdhyanjanu” (and hence the per-
formance of one Disposal would not necessarily involve the Non-per-
formance of the other). Consequently, the mention of negation
(‘na quhote’) must bo taken as indicative of what we have shown above.

१०१८८ (47): The specific mention of one is due to the
presence of particular Accessories.

It has been agreed that—‘t that which is not an original Action
‘(but a mere modification), could not be spoken of with the conditional
८ ‹ 1, --8.8 in the case of the Dradacaha.’’ But the case of the Ukthya
and the other Terminuses under consideration is not similar to that of -
the other: modifications. Though in the case of these, on account of
the incompatibility of the connection of the Nitya and the Kamya
the Context cannot take upthe Procedure (of the Nitya, with reference
to the Kamya), yet inasmuch as that would be in close proximity with
it, it becomes necessary to make use of the conditional ‘if.’ Or, it
may be that, it is just possible for the unheard of Accessories to
be brought in as.if they were heard of, through the introduction of
a heard of Action to which those Accessories belong ; and in that case,
the ‘mention of the, Agnishioma (in ‘ Yadyagnishtomah, etc.), whose
presence is already indicated by the Context, would be by. way of a.
reference to the Nitya action. Ot, its mention may be taken as laying

{6909 .: ` TANTRA-VARTIKA.. ADH. +) VIL—ADAT (16)

down the fact of the particular action (‘Homa’) being due to tly
presence of the particular Hymn (of the Agnishtoma-Sama) ; and there
can be no incongruity in such a mention

Then, there arises the question. as to what is the use of all this
Discussion (in the present Adhikarana) PH

Some people declare that the use is exactly the same as in the
case of the Phalacamasa (Vide sutras T1i—v—47 et. seq.).

‘But with regard to this view we have got to say something; and
it is this. It is quite true that that is the use of the present Dis
cussion ; but this would not be applicable to the case of all Accessory
Details. For instance, all the details of the ‘Sadomana’ and the like
which are laid down with reference to particular desirable results,
even though there be a likelihood of the presence of the other details,
bv reason of the Implicatory Injunction, yet inasmuch as the parti-
cular Details would be found to have a substrate (the Jyotishtoma) which
is enjoined by Direct Injunction, these latter could not be totally set
aside, as in the case of the other Modifications. Because at these other
modifications, inasmuch as there is no substrate in the shape of the
Jyotishtoma, it is readily admissible that the Actions, laid down as
bringing certain desirable results through particular Accessories, are
found impossible to be performed. In the case of the Terminuses,
on the other hand, though the Results, spoken of as following from
certain Accessories, are not applied by Implication,— yet, inasmuch as
the Man desiring those results would naturally. wish to do that action,
and hence long after the particular Accessories (laid down as bringing
about those results),—there would be a possibility of the presence of
the enjoined substrate (in the shape of the Jyotishtoma) ; and as such
there would be no improbability of the Actions leading to definite results
through certain Accessories
For these reasons we conclude that the use of the Discussion lies
in the following fact: There are certain accessories, not belonging to
the original Jyoltshioma,—such as, the holding of the Ukthyai Vessel,
the particular Ukihya Hymns and Praises,—-which are due solely
to the presence of the particular Terminus (the Ukthya); and in
accordance with the Purvapaksha, it would be possible for us to have
in this ‘Terminus, the other details of actions calculated to bring about
definite results by means of certain. accessories introduced by thé Im-
-plicatory Injunctions of such details as belong to the other (Shodagt)
“Vessel and Hymn ; whereas in accordance with the Siddhania, this would
10.06 possible: =.

There is: yet another use of the Discussion ;. it is as follows: If all

` :: . ACORSSORIES OF DIKSANTYA BELONG TO JYOTISTOMA, 1698

the ‘erminuses were equally related to the enjoined Details as (held
by the Pérvapaksha) then, at those Sacrifices which are recognised
Modifications of the Jyotishioma (in accordance with the law ‘ Vyaklasu
1४ samasya’), we would have all the Terminuses as optional alter-
natives; while, in accordance in the Siddhanta, it is the Agqnishtoma
Terminus alone that could find a place १६ those Sacrifices; while aa for
the Details connected with the Ukihya and the other Terminuses, they
could be possible only in a case where we would have distinct Injunc-
tions of these Terminuses. And herein 1168 the rea] use of the present
Adhikarana.

Thus ends the Sixth Pada of Adhyéva U1.

200

ADHYAYA ILI.~PADA VII.
ADHIKARANA (1).

[The Grass, etc., belong to the Darga-Pirnamasa as well as to
their Subsidiaries. |

Stttra (1): “ Because of the particular Context, that
Sewhich is not connected (with Direct Declaration) ‘ be
‘longs to the Principal Action only.”

In continuation of the subject of common or uncommon Injune-
tion, we proceed to consider,—through the question of contradiction
and non-contradiction of Svntactical Connection and Contoxt, --tho
question as to whether the Altar spoken of in the Darga-Pirnamasa
Context, and the Details of Digging, etc., laid down in connection with
that Altar, as also the Grass and the Details of Chopping, etc., laid
down in connection with it, belong to the Principal Sacrifices (of the
Darea Purnamasa) or to the Subsidiary ones

And on this. question we have the following-~

PURVAPAKSHA.

“Though the fact of the Details in question belonging to the

“ Principal as well as the Subsidiaries is distinctly shown by such
general declarations as—‘ Védyam havimshi,’ ‘ Varhstht havimshi
‘<¢ Varhirluna,’ ‘ Vedim Khanati,—yet if the Details belonged to the
grass, etc., independently, then they would have to be per formed in
०, eornection with the ordinary grass also, 1.6.) that which is used for
‘such ordinary purposes as the thatching of houses, etc. ; but inas-
^“ much as such performance of the Details would be absolutely useless
‘ the connection of those with the Grass should be regarded as due
“to the fact of the grass bringing about a transcendental result
“¢Apirva). And as this fact of its bringing about an 41:४0 is not
^^ indicated by Syntactical Connection, it must be regarded as indi
“cated: by Context. And inasmuch as the Context pertains to the
© Psincipal Action only, the Details must be regarded as belonging to
*. this latter only. Even though the Context cannot serve the purposes:
“ “of specification, vet it is only through the particular character of being.

1506 ‘TANTRA-vARTIKA. ADH. ili-~PADA VIT.—aDAt. (1).

“ the Partaker (gr@haka) that it serves to prompt the particular factors of
‘actions; and as such becomes the cause of restricting the Declaration
‘to a particular Action,—as we have shown (under S@ira I1J—1tii-—1])

“The word ‘asamyuktam’ (‘not-connected ˆ ) means that, even
‘ though Syntactical connection indicates the connection of the Havi
“and the Varhi, yet there 18 no connection with anything that is con
“trary to (not in keeping with) the Context. That 18 to say, in the
‘case in question, the words ‘ Havish’ and ‘ Varhth’ are quite capable
“ of being taken in connection with the Context, and are not unconnected
“with it, like the AAtna (and as such they cannot but be taken as con-
“nected with the Principal Action, to which alone the Context be-
longs) ”’

SIDDHANTA.

Sutra (2): They belong to all; because the character of
the Accessory is not based upon the Context

It has been already shown that all the Details are equally related
to Syntactical Connection. |

It has been argued above, that “the Context would serve the
purpose of prompting the particular factors of actions.”’ It is in re
ply to this that we have the clause ‘ atatprayuktatvat’ ;—that is to say,
the Context does not serve the purposes of the specification.

Question: ‘‘ How can you set aside the well-established fact of
‘‘the Context serving the purpose of prompting the factors of actions ?
‘* How, too, can you accept the much faulty explanation of the character
“of the Ceska (Subsidiary) as being in the form of Help, and not in
“that of being for the sake of something else ?”’

Reply: In cases like the present, the Context can serve the purposes
of the prompting cause; because it has been shown under 67110
TIJ—iii—11, that it is only that which js not connected with the other
means of knowledge that is controlled by Context (while in the present
case we have the Connection of Syntax)

Then again, it has been argued above that “there is no contra-
diction (between Syntactical Connection and the Context) |

But why should there be no contradiction, when we find that, in-
wsmuch as due predominance attaches to the Havish and the Varhr
if these accessory details were related to everyone of the Actions, they
would come to be recognised as belonging to the Subsidiaries also ; and
this has got to be set aside in view of the Context | |
“~ . The opponent puts forward: the reason by which he took the
Context to be non-contradicted: (by Syntactical Counection), on account

@RAsS RTC., BELONG TO THK DARSHAPORNAMASA & SUBSIDIARIES. 1597

of the too extensive application of this Syntactical Connection having
been precluded : “ The Details would come to be performed in connec-
tion with the Varhi, ete., employed in ordinary actions also; and at
these, they would be absolutely useless.” ।

To this we offer the following reply : The Syntactical Connection
in its natural functioning, can be set aside from that only where it
would be actually useless. As a matter of fact, we find that the
Details performed in connection with Varhi at the Subsidiary Sactri
fices are not useless; and hence the Syntactical Connection would
certainly apply to the case of the subsidiaries, and there would be no
improper application involved in this.

It is with a view to this that the Bhdshya has declared ` Upakara-
lakshanam ht tat,’ which indicates the subsidiary character as consisting
of being for the sake of something else (tadarthya) ; as one thing is taken
as being for the sake of another, when, with regard to the latter, the
former is found, by reason of according a much needed help, to be of
use.

The Bhashya has used the word ‘ prakaranat,’ with a view to
avoiding of the too extensive application of the Syntactical Connection
But this declaration, at the present stage, would bar the way of the
objection contained in the next Sara; and hence it must be regarded
as put forward too soon; and as such to be disregarded on the present
occasion.

Sittrva (3): Objection: “They could be take themselves to remote
| “actions.”

"° Objection : ^“ 11 the Details in question were to be precluded from
“the grass, etc., employed in the ordinary actions of the world, simply
on account of their being useless in that Counection,—then, there
would be every possibility of these Details being introduced into these
“ Actions in connection with which they would not be useless,—f.i. the
^“ grass employed at the sacrifices other than those of the Darga Pirna-
“ masa (and certainly these sacrifices would be helped by the transcen.
“ dental results brought about by these Details). If there be some reason
‘for precluding the Details from such other actions,—then, the same
reason would apply to the case of the Subsidiaries (of the Darca.
Pérnamasa) also (and hence the said Dotails could not be related

^^ ४9. these ` Subsidiaries)
" -* Ag for the Saurya and other such Subsidiaries of the Darga
‘* Pirnamasa, even according to the Pirvapakshp view, the presence in
them of the Details are indicated by Luplication ; and tence it is the

1508 $$ TANTRA-VARTIKA.. ADH. IN-~—PADA VII.~~ADHt.. (I)

4 ‹ Pendapttryajna’ {of the Darca Pirnamasa) which, as being entirely
^“ devoid of the Details, either by Direct Injunction or by Implication
‘should be taken as the basis of the present Discussion. That this
“ Pendapitryajnia is an entirely new sacrifice, and is not a subsidiary
“ will be shown later on (in Adhyaya IX); and hence the acceptance
“of the Stddhanta view (with regard to this yajfia) would lead to
`" most undesirable consequences.”’

Sutra (4): Reply; Not so; because of the sentence (being
Syntactically connected with the Daren Purnamasa),—as
Shown by the fact of its being subservient to it

What vou say would have heen quite possible, if the sentence
(‘ Vedyam varhth’) were an independent one. As a matter of fact
however, the sentence, that lays down the Grass, the Altar, and their
various Details, is syntuctically connected with the Darca Pirnamasa
that 18 to say, with the sentence laying down the Darca Ptirnamasa
And for this reason the Details laid down in these sentences must be
regarded as belonging to those Grass and Altar, etc., which are spoke)
of in the sentence that is so connected, and with those mentioned in
other sentences. As for the Pindapiiryajiia, it is not found to be
mentioned in the sentence laying down the Darca Pirnamasa; and as
such it could never be related to these Details

Objection : ‘‘ If the sentences be regarded as syntactically con.
“nected with the Darga Pirnamasa,—such connection could not be
“got at by any other means save the Context; and inasmuch as this
‘Context would pertain to the Principal (Darca Pirnamasa) only, the
^“ Subsidiaries could have no connection with the Details in question.”

Reply :. That does not affect our position ; because the Details of
Chogging, Digging, ९४५. cannot be directly connected either with the
` Darca Pirnamasa or their Subsidiaries ; they can be present only in
those places where we would have the Grass and the Altar ; and these
latter again are related to the keeping of the offering materials ; aud
_ lastly, this keeping of the material also must be that which is spoken of
in the sentence laying down the performance of the Darga Pirnamasa
Sacrifices, as a whole. And the keeping of the offering materials in
connection. with the Subsidiaries also would be included. in that
, Sentence, because all the Subsidiaries along the Primary: Action go to
nake up a single performance (and. as such the Details: would be as

__-sidiaries)

०1488, BTC., BELONG TO THE DARSHAPURNAMASA & SUBSIDIARIRS. 1599.

` .. Objection: ‘In the case of the Praydjas we find that even though ©
“they. ate all included in the single Injunction of Performance
“yet; in aceordance with the Sara ILI—i—22, they are not regarded
‘ag subsidiary to one another; and in the same manner the Grass
‘gould not be related to the offering materials of the Subsidairy Sacri-
“fices (inasmuch both would be equally Subsidiaries to the Darca
‘ Pirnamasa)
Reply: It is not so; because just as the keeping of the offering
aterial of the Primary Sacrifice becomes connected with the Details
in question, so, in the same manner, that of the material of the
Subsidiary Sacrifices also becomes connected with them as the Subsi-
diaries of the Subsidiaries. If the meaning of the sentence ‘ Varhishi
Gsadayatt’ (‘keeps upon the grass’) were assumed to be that ‘the
material is kept upon that grass which has been brought in for the sake
of the Darca Pirnamasa,’—then atone could the Details be taken as
belonging to the Darca Pirnamasa only. As 2 matter of fact, such is
not the cause. As when, in order to avoid the uselessness of the Details,
we make it step beyond the mere form of the Darca Piirnamasa Sacri-
fice, should we take them as referring to ‘ that grass which is brought
in for the sake of the Darca Piirnamasa,’ or to ‘ that which helps in the
accomplishment of these Sacrifices ?’ If we accept the former alterna-
tive, then the sentence would become too limited in its scope; while
the latter alternative affords it a more extensive scope; and it is
incumbent upon us to accept that theory which should give the
greatest scope [00881116 to the sentence in question. The Subsidiaries
of Subsidiaries also are regarded as helping in the accomplishment of
the Primary Sacrifice, even though they may not be directly for the
sake of this latter; and we have seen that it is the mere fact of helping
and not that of its being for its sake, that constitutes the ground of
relationship ; as when a detail is contained in that which does not in
any way help the Sacrifice, it cannot accord any help to it; which can-
not be said with regard to that which is not contained in that which is
not for the sake of that. This we shall explain latter on, under the
Sutra ९-1-44. As a matter of fact, even without being for the
sake. of the Primary, we find the Curd and the Milk merely helping»
in: the. Abhyudtteshti ; and yet they become connected with the Details:
Of the Pransta, = |
For these reasons we accept, on the ground of Context, the fact
of the: sentené in question being syntactically connected with that
which laye. down. the Darga Pirnamasa,—tpe construction being
explained as follows: ‘Those, without the peformance’ whereof the:

1600 TANTRA-VARTIKA.. ADH, IN—PADA VIl.—ADHI, (1).

transcendental result of the Darca क्तात is not duly aceon.
plished—in all these, the Details in question should be performed,’
And inasmuch as we find the imperfections ॥ the materials of Subsi
diary Sacrifices causing discrepancies in the Result of the Primary
Sacrifice, we rust admit the connection, with the subsidiaries also, of
those Details which are due to the transcendental result of the Primary
Sacrifice.
Sativa (5): Also because of Indications.

It is only when such Details, as those in question, are accepted as
belonging to the Primary as well as to the Subsidiary,—that the
' Abhigharana,’ spoken of in the sentence ‘ Prayajaceshéna havimshye
gharayati,’ could be taken as belonging to hoth the Primary and the
Subsidiary; and then alone could we fustify the declaration ‘Sa vai
dhruvamévagré, etc,’ wherein we have an Order spoken of as a well:
established fact, and hence appearing as a ‘ Héluvannigada’ (giving
reasons for a certain Injunction,—Vide 1—1i—26 el, seq.). Because
stich a declaration could be possible only when there would be an
Abhigharana of the material of the Ajyabhdga also (which is a Subs.
diary Sacrifice), Otherwise, for the Dhruva also, we could have tlie
Abhigharana only as connected with the Upameuyaia ; and in that case
there could be no further Abhigharanas; and as such, it would be
absolutely useless to put forward the reason—‘ T'ato hi prathamavajya:-
bhagau, etc.’

For these reasons it must be admitted that the Details belong to
all (the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries),

ADHIKARANA (2).

(The Purifications of the Master of the Sacrifice belong to the Primary
| Sacrtfice.|

Sitra (6) : That which is related to the Master of the
sacrifice belongs to the Primary: because of the
mention of Results.

The Details which are found to belong to the Master of the Sacri-
fice, in accordance with the Sara Il]—vii—4,—with regard to these
there arises the question, as to whether they belong to the Muster, in
his. character of the Performer, and as such pertain to the Primary
Sacrifice as well as its Subsidiaries ; or they belong to him, only in the
character of the expertencer of its results, and as such pertain to the
Primary Sacrifice only

And on this question wé have the following---

PURVAPAKSHA.

“ According to the foregoing Adhikarana, they must be regarded
‘as pertaining to all (the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries)
Specially. as belonging to the Master, who is equally related to
all Sacrifices, they could help in the accomplishment of all these
and there is no reason for precluding them from the Subsidiaries

| SIDDHANTA.

To the above we make the following reply : The very reason that
proves the fact of the Purifications belonging to the Master, would
also serve to show that they pertain to the Primary Sacrifice only

That is to say, if the Details in question belonged to the Master
in the character of tho Performer, then they could be taken as pertain
ing to all the Sacrifices. As a matter of fact, however, we find that
they belong to him in the character of the Hxperiencer of the Result of
the Sacrifice. Then again, we find that a neglect of the Purificatory
would’ interfere with due experiencing of the Result : whereas
¥en without these details, there is no discrepaycy in the character of
a"'Merformer. And (if the Details belonged to the Performer), they.

५५० “ae
ee + ”

1602 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. Il[—-PADA VII.—ADHI, (2).

would belong to the Priests also, as these also would be the Performers.
of certain Actions in connection with the Sacrifices. Then again, it is
only with reference to a certain desired result, that one wishes to
create certain. capabilities (or powers) ; and that too only in a place
where these capabilities did not exist before. And as a matter of
fact, what is desired is not the Master's Character of the Performer :
nor was this Character non-existent, in him, prior to the performance
of the Purificatory Details. It 18 only the Actions bringing in certain
capabilities that are called ‘Samskaras’ (Purifications) ; and as such
they always betake themselves to the factor of the Hupertencer of the
Result |

Then again, when the result of a certain Action is experienced by the
Master, the Purifications pertaining to the character of the Hxperience
help in that Action alone, in none other. And as a matter of fact, it
is the result of the Primary Sacrifice, and not that of the Subsidiaries.
that is enjoyed (or experienced) by the Master; as the Subsidiaries
affect the Sacrifices only (and do not bring abeut any results for the
Person performing them); and hence it must be admitted that the
Purifications in question belong to the Primary Sacrifice only

Objection : “ If the Purifications did not fall within the character of
the ‘ Performer, then they would become Subsidiaries to the Result
(and “ that would be against the Saira ‘ Phaladevatayocca [X—i—14’).”

Reply : This does not affect our position ; because the help that is
accorded to the Primary Sacrifice consists in that the Performer is
made capable of experiencing its Results. Consequently, just as there
are many other Subsidiaries bringing about imperceptible results which,
while creating a capability for experiencing results, do not fall off
from their subsidiary character,—so, in the same manner, we would
have in the case of the Purificatory Details under consideration.

The use of the present Adhikarana is that, in accordance with the
Puirvapaksha, there would be,—and according to the Siddhania, there
would not be-—the shaving of the head and such other actions for the
Master, at the Agnishomiya and other such like subsidiaries of the
Jyotishtoma.

ADHIKARANA (3),

[The Saumeka Vedi, etc., belong to the Primary as well as to the
Subsidiaries. |

Sutra (1): “ Because of connection with the ‘desire to
‘do,’ (they should be regarded as belonging to the Pri-
mary only).

[In connection with the Jyotishtoma we find the sentence -
‘Shatlymealprakrama pract, Caturvimeatiragréna, trincajjaghanéna wyatt
cakshyamuhé’; and with regard to this there arises the question as to
whether the Altar, the Details of whose moasurements are herein
laid down, belongs to the Primary as well as its Subsidiaries, or to the
Primary only]

And on this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘In accordance with the conclusion arrived at in the foregoing
“ Adhikarana, the Saumika Altar is regarded as belonging to the
Primary Sacrifice only; specially as the sentence */yate cakshyamahé
" syaikarlua’ distinctly shows that it is laid down for that which one
‘desires to do.’ Because what one ‘ desires to do’ is the Primary,
“which leads to a desirable result,—-and not the Subsidiaries, which,
“though not directly ‘desired to be done,’ are yet done as helping
“ the accomplishment of the Primary.”

Before having completed this Adhikurana, by putting forward the
Siddhania, the Author starts another discussion.

ADHIKARANA (4).
[The Touching belongs to the Primary as well as the Subsidiaries. }

Siitra (8): 80 also (on account of connection) with Name, (the
‘Touching should be regarded as belonging to the Pri
mary only).”

[In connection with the Darga Purnamasa we find the sentence—
‘Caturhotra paurnamasimabhimrgét, pancahotra Amavasyam’ (‘ Catur-
0112 ` is that name of the Mantra ` Prthivt hota, etc.,’ and Pancahotr:
of ‘ Agnirhoia, etc., etc.’). And with regard to this there arises the
question as to whether the Z'ouching herein laid down belongs to the
Primary as well as the Subsidiaries, or to the Primary only.]

And on this question, we have the following—

- PURVAPAKSHA

‘Inasmuch as the words ‘ Paurnamast’ and ‘ Amavasya’ apply
“to the Primary Sacrifices only, even though they might be applicable
‘ to the Subsidiaries in accordance with the Sttra III—i—18, yet—they
‘are applied to the offering materials used at the Primary Sacrifices.
‘‘ Consequently it is the Offering material used at the Primary Sacrifice

“only that is to be touched with the Caturhoiyi and the Pafecahotri
‘* Mantras

SIDDHANTA (of the former Adhikarana).

Stitra (9): The Result is deciared as following from the
Primary as performed along with the Subsidiaries ;
and hence the ‘desire to do’ would be related to all
of them. .

, In as much as the Altar is a particular place, and place and time
are laid down for the Primary together with its Subsidiaries, the Al/ar
(the details of whose measurement are laid down in the sentence
^ Shatipmeatprathama, etc.’) belongs to all the Sacrifices (the Primary as
. well.as the Subsidiary)

As for the mention of the ‘desire to do,’ that too must be taken
a8 pertaining 00. the Primary together with the Subsidiatios,. as the

o> POUCHING BELONGS TO PRIMARY AND SUBSIDIARY 1605

fulfilment of the Result depends upon the due performance (of the
Primary together with its Subsidiarios)

Consequently, the Altar being regarded as belonging to the
Primary as performed along with the Subsidiaries, it might belong to
these latter also. And hence the making of the Altar would be
necessary at the Niriidhapacu and other such Sacrifices, which are tho
Subsidiary Modifications of the Agnishomiyu.

SIDDHANTA (of the latter Adhikarana).

Siva (10) : Because the * Touching? is spoken of as an
accessory, tt must be regarded as pertaining to all
(Sacrifices).

(There should be a Touching of the Materials of the Subsidiary
Sacrifices also, with the Caturhotri and the Pavicahotri Mantras ~ hecause
he Accusative gnding in ‘ Paurnamasim ’ and ‘ Amavasyam’ indicates
that the ‘ Touching’ is an action done as accessory to the performance
of the Paurnumast and the Amavasyd Sacvifives ; and as such it should
be done at all Sacrifices whereat it would help in these two Sueri-
fices; and as a matter of fact, all that is connected with these two
Sacrifices are regarded as helping in them; consequently the J'ouching
should be done in connection with the offering materials of the Pri
mary as well as the Subsidiary Sacrifices. |

Against this explanation of the Bhashya we have the following
objections : ‘‘ The Declaration,-—- that ‘ because the Accusative ending
‘indicates the Touching as an accessory action, therefore it must be
‘regarded as belonging to all Sacrifices ` ---18 not quite relevant,
‘‘ Because the discussion itself was started on the very supposition
“ that the Touching is an accessory ; and as a matter of fact also, the
* Accusative ending, whose denotation follows that of the basic nouns
‘<§ Paurnamast’ and ‘Amavasya’ (which denote the two Primary Sacri
“ fices), shows that the 7'ouching is of those materials that are used at
“the Primary Sacrifices, and as such it could not prove what is desired
‘hy the Siddhanti. Then as for the fact of the Touching being for the
‘sake of the Amavasya and the Paurnamass Sacrifices brought
‘forward by the Bhashya,—that only supports the Pirvapaksha view

In view of these objections, we must explain the Siddhanta in the
following manner : In the sentence—‘ Paurnamasimabhimrcet what the
word ‘Paurnamasi’ directly denotes is either the particular point of
Time, or the Sacrifice, or the Sacrifice as qualified by the Tume ; but as
none. of these can he ‘ touched,’ the word must P taken in its secondary .
signification. . And then, though between tho denotation of the Affix”

1606 =. TaNTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. U11—PADA ‘ViI.—apHI. (4), _

and the Basic word, it is the former that is the predominant factor, and
as such the basic noun becomes the subordinate factor (the word
‘Paurnamast’ being taken .as indicating the Sacrifice qualified by the
particular point of T'vme),—yet, in as much as the latter also is not
recognized as capable of being touched, there arises a confused sort of
an idea as to the Zouching applying to all such Sacrificial accessories as
the Sruva, etc. (which are found to be capable of being touched) ; and
hence it becomes necessary to seek, somewhere else, for the means of
ascertaining to which particular object the T'ouching applies; and, for
the sake of arriving at a definite conclusion, we must take the denota-
tion of the basic noun (* Paurnamasi’) to be the principal factor. as
standing need of the other factors, and as being the first to be cognised
(and hence incapable of being taken in the secondary sense); and
hence it is the subordinate factor of the Accusative ending that has to
be taken in the secondary sense of the Locative, the word ‘ Paurna-
masim’ being taken in the sense of ‘ Paurnamadsyam’ ; a8 it is. the
Locattve, that is wanted by the Principal factor,—the particular object
to be touched heing the Offering Material as indubitably pointed out by
the fact of the sentence occurring in connection with that. Conre-
quently the sentence must be taken as restricting the Vouching to the
particular tyme or performance (of the ’aurnamasi Sacrifice as a whole) -
and consequently there should be a 'vuching of every one of the
materials used at that Sacrifice (whether in connection with the
Primary or its Subsidiaries).

Even if the word ‘ Paurnamast’ were to indicate the offering
material, then too, in as much as it would indicate the help accorded
to it (by the Touching), this Touching could not but be regurded as
belonging to all the offering materials. |

नि वि 1), a

ADHIKARANA (5).

(The Initiatory 121 and the Suertficial Fee pertain to the Primary
only.]

Sitra (11): The Initiation and the Fee pertain to the
Primary onty: because of the Direct Declaration to
that effect.
fin connection with the Jyottshioma there are laid down “ three

Initiations,’ and also the “ Sacrificial fee of a hundred and twelve ” -

and with regard to these there arises the question as to whether these

Initiations and the Sacrificial Fee pertain to the Primary together

with the Subsidiaries, or to the Primary alone. And on this point we

have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘In as much the Men (performing the Sacrifices) are equally
“related to the Primary and the Subsidiaries, the Initiations and the
“ Sacrificial Fee also pertain to all of these. |

‘“ There is an initial objection to the form of the Pirvapaksha, on
“the ground of the case of the Initiations being subject to the law
“ enunciated in Sutra I111—vii—6. But some people support it in the
‘following manner; In all such actions, as the Purchase of Soma, ete.,
‘we find the Agent laid down as ‘dskshita’ (‘ Initiated’); and it is a
“ well-known fact that the Initiations serve the purpose of bringing
‘about this character of the ‘Initiated’; and this character is laid
“down as an Accessory for every one of the actions ; hence the Initia-
ˆ^ tions come to be regarded as pertaining to the Primary as well as the
ˆ" Subsidiaries. |

** As for the Sacrificial Fees, they serve the purpose of obtaining

the good services of the Priests ; and this winning of their good will
helps in the performance, by reason of there being a desire, on the
part of the Master, to obtain the aid of such Priests. And hence, in
accordance with the Law of the S#/ra 1I[—vii—7, the Fees come to be
related to the Performance of the Primary along with the Subsidiary
(88018688 ; and hence they -must be regarded as belonging to all
‘of these,” ` ee | | a

1608 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. IT1—PADA VII.—ADHI: (5)

“Then again, it.is a perceptible fact that the Priests, obtained
‘by means of the payment of the Sacrificial Fee, perform the Subsi-
‘diary Sacrifices also ; otherwise if the Fee pertained to the Primary
‘only, the Priests, being paid for performing the Primary only, would
“* not have performed the Subsidiaries; while as a matter of fact we
‘find that the Master does not pay them for performing. the Primary

only (as that would not serve his purpose) ; hence it must be admit
‘ted that the Fee is related to every one of these Actions, which
“the Priests are made to perform by means of the payment of the
“Fee. This fact of the Performer being common to all the Actions
‘* will be fully explained in Adhyaya XI. For these reasons, it must
‘“be admitted that the Sacrificial Fee pertains to all the Sacrifices
(Primary as well as Subsidiary)

SIDDHANTA

The Initiations and the Sacrificial Fee belong to the Primary
92011066 only, because of such direct declarations as—‘ Dikshah soma
sya, ‘ Dakshinak somasya.’ As for the Injunction with regard to the
‘ Initiated ’ in connection with the Subsidiaries, it must be-taken as
referring to the Person who has been ` initiated’ at the Primary
Sacrifice ; as otherwise we would have to have recourse to a most
useless Secondary Indication. We shall show later on (in Adhyaya
XII) that the Fees, while really pertaining to the Primary, help in
the Subsidiaries, only incidentally (by ‘ Prasanya’}.

Sutra (12) : Also because of texts showing the absence of
these ‘at the Subsidiaries).

In connection with the Niriidha paguyaga we have the sentence
yat shadho juhoti sa ‘sya Diksha, —which says that the factor of
Initiation is supplied by the Shadhotrihoma ; and this distinctly shows
that there is no real {nitiation at this yaga (which is a Subsidiary) -
while if the Initiation were equally related to all—the Primary as. well
as. the Subsidiaries,—-then we would have the real Initiation itself
applicable to the Niridhapuguyaga; and there would no need of a
inakeshift as declared in the text quoted १ |
01९८078 ~ ^† As no Initiation would, according to you, be required
“(by the Ntriidhapaguyfaga) the laying down of any makeshift
“regard to it, would be absolutely useless,~even if it were not. a
“Subsidiary Sacrifice [वी , |
Reply . ` This does not affect our position ; because, in as much as

INITIATION AND FEE PERTAIN TO THE PRIv ARY 1609

at the Original Sacrifice of the Niridhea pucuyaga, the Initiation. which
was due to some other Actions, was found to be of use,—if it were to be
wholly. absent at the Niridhapacuydga, by reason of this latter not
being the means of the appearance of Initiations, there would’ be
suspicions regard the perfect completion of this latter Sacrifice; and
hence there would be a distinct use for the declaration of the makeshift

202

ADHIKARANA (6)
(The Inner Altar is not related to the Post.}
Sutra (13): ^“ The Altar is related to the Post.’’

In connection with the Jyotishioma we find the sentence—‘ Ardha-
mantarvéds minoti, ardham vahirvédi.’ And with regard to this there
arises the question as to whether it lays down a part of the Inner
Altar with reference to the Post, or it only indicates that point
where the Inner Altar meets the Outer

Objection: “In as much as the fact of the Allar pertaining to all
‘ Sacrifices has been already established (in Adhi., 3), it is not right to
“ imtroduce the present Adhikarana here.’

Reply : The former Adhikarana should be taken as preceded by the
present one; because when the Altar will have been cognized, through
Syntactical Connection, as subservient to the Post, wherefore should
arise any question as to what the Altar is subservient. Whereas,
when the mention of the Altar has been shown to be indicative of a
particular place (as is done in the present case) then naturally arises the
question (considered in Adhi. 3) as to what the Altar is Subservient to.

On this former question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA

‘Setting aside the indication of the Context, the Altar must be
‘‘ regarded, through Syntactical Connection, as belonging to the Jost
‘ otherwise it would be necessary to have recourse to Secondary Indica
“tion. And so long as we do not find any incongruity in the word
«Inner Altar’ being taken in its direct primary signification, we have
‘no reason to have recourse to Sccondary Indication.: Consequently,
“the general declaration—‘ Jyati cakshyamahé, etc.’ being taken as
^ pertaining. to the particular case of the Post, the Altar should be
‘taken as subservient to the Post
` ^ Or, in accordance with the previous. Adhikarana (3), the Altar
“being taken as Subservient to the Jyotishtoma together: with all its
Subsidiaries, there would arise the question as to whether,-or not it
“ia subservient to the Post. .(And on ‘this. too, we wold have the
game Pirvapaksha) oF | 7 oa

INNER. ALTAR NOT RELATED TO POST. — 1611

Objection; ‘ The very fact of its being subservient to all shows
०५ that 10.18 subservient to the Post also; and as such there can be no
^ yse in any-enquiry on this point.’

Reply: The Subservience to the Post. 18 not proved by the
‘subservience to the subsidiaries of the Jyotishtoma: as the Post is
“subsidiary to the Pagu-sacrifice (and not to the Jyotishtoma); and
‘“what has been proved in the previous Adhikarana ia that the Altar
‘is subservient to the Jyolishtoma together with its subsidiaries, and
‘not that it is so to the Pagu-sacrifice.

1 Objection : ‘ It may be that the Altar is subsidiary to the Pacu.
^ Sacrifice itself, which makes it over to the subsidiaries of the Jyotish
“ toma.”

^ Reply: This would have been possible if the Altar, by itself,
“belonged to the Pacu-Sucrifice; as a matter of fact, however, it
“comes into this latter, through the Primary Sacrifice; and hence it
‘‘ must be taken as resting in the Pacu-sacrifice itself (and could not be
‘‘ relegated to the Subsidiaries). And when it is found that an Altar
‘is necessary at the Pacu-sacrificc, it is the Altar of the Soma-suacrifice
‘* (Jyotushtoma) that enters into it, through Implication, after having
‘“ precluded the entrance of the Altar of the Darca-Pirnamasa. And
“ this Altar of the Soma-sacrifice is used only for certain purposes in
‘connection with the Original Primary sacrifice. The measuring of the
^^ Post spoken of in the sentence in question, is not, in any way, con-
“nected with the Primary sacrifice ; and as such, it could not pertain to
‘the Post. Consequently, in as much as there would be no possibility |
‘of the. entrance of the sacrificial Altar (at the Pacu-Sacrifice), the
‘‘ measuring, spoken of as inner or outer, would apply to the ordinary
“conception of place; and hence the sentence in question must be
“taken as laying down the Inner Altar as the particular place (where
‘the measuring of the Post is to be done) [and as such the Altar must
^“ be regarded as subservient to the Post].”

_ To the above, we make the following reply :-—

7 SIDDHANTA. |
SRtra (14): (The Sentence must be taken as laying down)

merely a particular potnrt (of space); 0९1८165 tt 5

syntactically connected with that which ts not.

meant to be enjoined (according to you) |

--- 706 - कण words ‘ Antarvédi’ and ‘ Vahirvédi’ indicate the middle

06301 : ` and: the sentence does not lay down any relation of subser-
“Mienoy -(bétween the Allar and the Post १३९८१०७८ in all cases’ the.

1612 TANTRA-VARTIKA. “ADH. III—PADA. VIL.—aADbHT. (6).

mention of that which has already served its purpose is accepted
as being for the sake of the specification of ‘Time and Place; and
in the case in question we find that both the Altar and the Pos;
have already served their purposes elsewhere. If the sentence in
question had laid down the relation of Subserviency, then we could take
either the Altar to be subservient to the Post, or vice: versa. As
a matter of fact, however none of these is possible; (1) because
each has had its requirements fulfilled ; (2) because any such relation-
ship would involve the assumption of an imperceptible result; and
(3) lastly, because of its occasioning a syntactical split. That 18 to say,
the Post which is used for the tying of the animal does not stand in
need of the Altar; and the Altar too, being used as the seat of the
Performer and as the place for the keeping of the offering material
and its accessories, does not stand in need of the Post, which occupies
only a thousandth (very small) part of its space. Nor are these two
capable of producing any visible effect in each other. Then again, the
factor of ‘ Ardham vahirvéd:’ cannot be meant to be enjoined; as
according to you, 1६18 capable of neither Injunction nor a descriptive
Reference ; while according to you it is necessary to take this also
as Enjowned; because until we have both (‘Ardhamantarvédi’ and
‘Ardhamvahirvéds’) distinctly enjoined, we could not get at the specifi-
cation of the particular point in the Post (i.e. the point where the Inner
meets the Outer Altar). Specially as (according to you) the whole of
the Post being recognised as to be measured either inside or out, the
sentence ‘Ardhamantarvédt ` serves to enjoin the measuring of half of
1 as to be done at the Inner Altar; and then the measuring of the
second half being doubtful, the other sentence could not but be taken
as serving the.same purpose with regard to this other half; and thus
there being a multiplicity of objects enjoined, there would be a distinct
Syntactical Split ; and also there would be the further complication of
connecting the verb ‘ ४101४ ' both ways; and lastly, a part will have
to be taken as a mere clesoriptive reference to what already exists

Objection: “The connection of one half of the Post with the
“Inner Altar having been enjoined by the former sentence, there
‘being no Injunction with regard tu the other half, it would come
“to be dealt with at the Outer Altar.” |

Reply : This would have ‘been the case if there wore a possibility
of the Post being dealt with either at the Inner Altar, or at the
Outer Altar, exclusively.. That is to say, if.the whole of it. were
-coguised as to be dealt with at the Inner Altar, then the mention
of the other half over again would serve to preclude thé other. halt

INNER ALTAR NOT RELATED TO Post. 1019

from the Inner Altar, and connect it with the Outer one; and
conversely, if the whole were cognised as to be dealt with at the
Outer Altar, the mention over again of the other half would connect
this with the Inner Altar, to the preclusion of the Outer ono. Asa
matter of fact, however, we find neither of these to be the case; and
hence the sentence ‘ Ardhamanlarvédt’ must be taken as‘ Ardhaman-
tarvedyéva’ (‘half of it is dealt with at the Inner Altar only’), and
not as ‘Ardhaméva antarvedi’ (‘ only half is to be dealt with at the
Inner Altar’). And thus nothing definite being known with regard to
the other half, this latter could, sometimes, be dealt with at the Inner
Altar also; and hence there could be no dealing with the Outer Altar
exclusively.

Objection: “In case the whole of the Post be dealt with at
‘the Inner Altar, we could not have the Injunction in the form of
“* Ardham, etc.’ (which mentions only ‘ one half ’).”’

Reply: Why could we not have it in this form, when what it
lays down is the fact of one half of the Post being dealt with
always at the Inner Altar, while it docs not preclude the Outer
Altar (with regard to the other half). |

For these reasons we conclude that both the sentences together
lay down @ particular point of space, qualified by both (the Inner
and the Outer Altar),—i.c. the point where the one meets the
other—(as the place where the Vost is to be dealt with). And
in this manner, there would be no Syntactical Split.

ADHIKARANA (7). `
[The Havirdhana 18 not subsidiary to the Samidheni.)

Sttra (15): In as much as the Havirdhana Carts
“are mentioned in the sentence--' Samidhenistada
“nvahuh,—they must be regarded as subservient
“to the Samidhenis.”

In connection with the Jyotishtoma we find the sentence ‘UE! yut
sunvants Samidhénistadanvahuh’ (the meaning of which is that ‘ out
ot the two Havirdhana carts that one should be connected with the
Samidhénis neat which the Soma pounding is done’). And with regard
to this we have the same Question, the same processes of reasoning and
the same conclusion as in the previous Adhikarana. [That is to say,
the question being as to whether the sentence lays down the Havirdhang
as subsidiary to the Samidhénis, the sense being that ‘ the Samidhin
verses are to be recited as qualified by the Havirdhana,’ or the men
tion of the Havirdhana only marks out the place for the recitation of
the Samidhenis,—we have the former alternative as the Parvapuksha,
and the latter as the Siddhania. |

Objection : ‘‘ Under the circumstances, why should not the present
‘case have been included in the previous Adhtkarana ?”

Reply : Because in the present case the two alternatives are not
distinctly mentioned. ‘That is to say, in the present case we do not
find that the factor in question is ‘énjoinable’ for us, and ‘not enjoina-
ble’ for our opponent

Question: ‘“ In that case, how do you establish your Siddhanta ?”

Answer : In the following manner

Sitra (16): (The sentence must be taken as laying down) 2742८
place; as the Havirdhana serves a distinctly vistble
purpose for the Soma, ` | |

` 486 a matter of fact we-find that the तत्का has its use
justified by its serving the purpose of holding the Soma... As for
‘the Samidhéni verses, the purpose that they serve is already known
‘to consist of the kindling of the fire at the Original Primary Sacrifice;
send hence these too do not stand in need of any relation ‘of sub

. HAVIRDHANA NOT SUBSIDIARY TO SAMIDHENTs. ` 1615

serviency (between the Havirdhana and the Samidhénis). Then again
if. we. were to take the sentence, which lays down a particular
relationship of Havirdhana, as indicating its capability of a general
relationship,—then, we would have the same Syntactical Split that we
found in the Agnéyyadhikarana (I1--iii—25). If we were to avoid
this Syntactical Split by taking the genera relationship to be implied
by the. Particular,—then we would be faced by the fact of there
being no Apparent Inconsistency of the general relationship, which
is got at by the method of the Srddhania (and thus in absence of this
Apparent Inconsistency nothing could justify the said implication
of the general by the Particular). That is to say, any one of the
two Havirdhana carts are recognised as making a place in connection
with the original Sacrifice, (and in this way the said general relation-
ship is:duly established) ; and hence it becomes a comparatively easy
matter for the sentence to lay down merely the specialisation of that
relationship. For this reason also, we must take the sentence as
indicating the place.

Stitra (11): The name also points to the same fact (as
before). —

The name ‘ Havirdhana’ can apply to that which serves no
other purpose than the holding (of the Soma); and hence the Hawr-
dhana cart comes to be regarded as belonging to the Soma; otherwise
(if the cart were related to the Samidhénis) we would have the name
‘Samidhénidhana.’

ADHIKARANA (8)
[The Subsidiary Sacrifices are to be performed through others. }

Sitra (18): “ 720 (८5 much as the Result laid down per-
“tains to the actual Performer,—as pointed out by
“the Scriptiure,—the Result could accrue only when
“the performance would be done by the Master
“himself.”

Henceforward we shall treat of the question of contradiction,
or otherwise, of Name to the other five (Direct Declaration and
the rest),—the main question to be dealt.with being, in what way
such names as ‘ Hota, ‘hautram’ and the like serve the purpose
of pointing out the particular Performers and Actions. But before
taking up this question, we first take up an introductory discussion ;
because it is only when we have many such Performers (at a Sacrifice),
as the Hoty and the like, that we can have any discussion as to
how thoy are to be employed at the Sacrifice. For if all the actions in
connection with the Sacrifice were to be done by the Master himself,
then there would be no room for other performers; and hence there
could be no occasion for a discussion as to the compatibility or other-
wise of the fact of certain Names indicating the fact of certain other
persons performing certain actions in connection with the Sacrifice.

As the basis of this Discussion, we can take such Sacrifices
as the Darca-Purnamasa and the like, which lead to distinct results,
and at which certain Sacrificial Fees are given. And in regard to
these, there arises the question as to~(A) whether all actions are
to be done by the Master himself; (B) or it is the Primary action
alone that has to be performed always by himself (while the others
might be performed by himself, or by others); (C) or, the Primary
Inust necessarily be done by the Master, the rest are to be as
` necessarily done by others (and never by the Master himself)

On this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA (A)

| - A) the actions should be done by the Master himself ; because.
^ the Aimantpada ending (in. the word. ‘ Yajéla’) found in the Injunc-

r | |
SUBSIDIARIES PBRFORMED BY OTHERS 1617

४८ tion of the Performance of the Sacrifice as a whole, distinctly shows
“that it is the Person desiring the result that is the Performer in
“connection with the Bhavana (of the Sacrifice as a single whole)
८ with all.its accessories ; and hence if he should leave off the perform-
‘ance of the slightest action, he would not receive the aid that
“that action would be calculated to impart; and (inasmuch as this
‘would create an imperfection in the final Result) it is necessary
“that it should be performed by himself. Then again, of the
“Result that is being brought about (by means of the Sacrifice),
“it is the Master that is spoken of as the ‘Producer,’ ‘ Prompter.’
“Then as for the names ‘ Hoty’ and the like, they belong to the
“Master himself, as performing the several actions in course of the
‘ Sacrifice,—in accordance with the Law of the Suira (I1]—vii—23).”

PURVAPAKSHA (B).

Stitva (19): ^^ It isontly the Primary Action that must
“be nerformed by the Master; while as for the Sub-
८५ sidiaries of that Primary, they could be per-
“formed either by the Muster, or by some other
** person.”?

“The affix (Aimanépada), appearing after the Root which signifies
‘the Primary Sacrifice only, points out that Sacrifice alone as to be
‘performed by the person desiring the Result (1.6. the Master) ; as for
‘* the other Sacrifices (the Subsidiaries) it indicates the mere accomplish-
‘‘ment, without pointing to the necessity of their being performed
‘by any particular person. Consequently these latter might be pet
“formed either by the Master, or by the Priests (there being no res-
‘ triction as to who should perform them)

“ Objection: ‘Inasmuch as it is necessary for the Subsidiaries
ˆ“ £ be performed by the same Person as the Primary, we must regard
‘ the Master himself as the performer of these also.’

—“ Reply: Not so; because in regard to the Subsidiaries, the
^" Master is spoken of as the ‘ Performer,’ on account of his being the
^“ Director of their performance. If the (mental) ‘ giving away ’ of the
“materials (in connection with the Subsidiaries also) were done by
‘somebody else, there would be nothing that would be done by the
^^ Master; and hence this much is always done by him. And when
“he has :done this much, if he gets the other details performed by
v,spther persons paid for their services, he does not altogether lose the |

५.८ Apecter of the ‘ Performer | < |

(1618 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. III—PADA VIIi—ADHI. (8).

“ Some people offer the following explanation: ‘The Atmantpada
“always denotes the operation of the Director (and not -that of the
‘ Performer). That is to say, the Atmanépada ending, which is laid
* down as to be used in the case of the result of Actions pertaining ६८
‘the actual Performer of that Action, has always the sense of the
^ Causative (yajeta-yajayatt),—its denotation consisting in the paying
“ for the services that the other person is direcled to render. Thus it
“is that, in the case of actions performed by persons directed to do
° them, we find the Parasmat pada, expression yajantt yajakah ; while
‘in the case where what is meant to be expressed is only the operation
‘Sof the Director, we have the Atmanépada expression yajaté
(° yajamanah.’ | |

“This explanation, however, is not admissible ; because if such
‘were the case, then the Primary Sacrifice also would, somehow or
‘other, have to be performed through others; as the Master would
‘not obtain the Result of that which he would perform himself (as on
‘account of the special explanation of the Aimanépada, the Results
‘accruing to him would be only those of the Actions of which he would
“be the Director, and not the Performer). Then again, if the Master
‘should perform the Primary Sacrifice, such performance would be
‘aided and prompted by the operations of the Priests; and as such
“the Parasmatpada expressing the operations of the Priests, as
‘ prompting the Action of the Master, should have to be taken in
‘ the sense of the Causative,—and not the Atmanépada word (express-
“ ing the operation of the Master himself). Consequenily, it is on the
‘strength of the former explanation, that we conclude that the Actions
“ other than the Primary, could be done either by the Master himseli
‘or by other persons engaged by him

५ But in that case also, it will be necessary to explain, how it is
‘that the Bhavana being expressed by the (Injunctive) Affix, and
“ recognised, through Proximity, as to be performed by the person
^^ desiring the Result (the Nominative, as well.as the Bhavana, is denoted
^^ by the affix, and hence the proximity),—the Nominative agency (with
“regard to the accomplishment of this Bhavana) is. restricted to the
८ Instrumental factor (of the yaga) only. =.

‘In view of thie difficulty, we must explain as followa: The
“ Atmanépada does not lay down the. fact of the Action being per-
“ formed ‘by the Person desiring the Result ; as the Person, wlio becomes
- pelated to the Result; is one the fact of whose being the Performer is
“implied by the Bhavana ; and. hence. the Result could not betake it-
“self to any person. other than the actual Performer; but at.the-game

- SUBSIDIARIES PERFORMED BY OTHERS | 1619

‘time, there could be no incongruity in certain actions being done एक
“ persons other than the one who desires the Result. And this absence
‘‘of incongruity shows that with regard to the Subsidiaries there is no
“ restriction as to their being performed either by the Master himself
‘or by other persons engaged by him.”’

SIDDHANTA.
Sutra (20): Other persons wold perform (the Subsi-
diaries); because of the declaration of * Purchase!

(‘Payment for services to be rendered '),—vchich could not

apply to the Master himself.

We find the Veda laying down the gifts of the ‘ Anvaharyu,’ the
‘hundred and twelve,’ etc., etc., as fees paid for services rendered in
connection with Sacrifices,-as will be fully explained under Sétra
‘Parikrayartham va karmasamyogat’? (X—ii—23). The ‘Purchase’
(‘ Payment ’) is, by its very nature, done with regard to another Person,
and not to one’s self; as it is not possible for payment to be made to
one’s self. Consequently, if, at sometime, the Master himself should
perform the Subsidiaries --there could be no ‘ Payment for services ’ in
that case, as any such would be an absolute impossibility ; and this
would be a direct infringement of the Injunction of this ‘ Payment’
as & necessary factor in connection with the Subsidiaries. Hence with
& view fo preserve the universality and necessary character of this
Injunction, it is absolutely necessary to get hold of such Performers
(for the Subsidiaries) as are capable of being pid for the Services they
would render. And thus it must be admitted that in certain cases (i.e
those of the Primary Sacrifices) the Master would perform directly by
himself, while in others (1.6. those of the Subsidiaries) he would per-
form, indirectly (having them performed by others), by paying for
their services. |
As. for the Atmanzpada, it should bo taken as resting in the
Bhavané connected with the said ‘ Payment for services’; and hence
there could be no.incongruity in the Result of the Actions pertaining to.
&. Performer such as has been just pointed out (as performing some
actions directly, and others indirectly through others)

ADHIKARANA (9).
[The number of the Priests engaged at Sacrifices is limited. ]

Stitra (21): “ The number of the performers would be im-
“nlied by the nature of the Action itself ; and hence
“there can be no specification of the exact nuncber ;

specially as no special purpose could be served by
“such specification.”’
[On the question of the exact number of Persons to be engaged
for the performance of the Subsidiaries, we have the following]—

PURVAPAKSHA.
‘As the ‘ Purchase’ could be done by the engagement of one as

“ well as two Priests, hence there can be no restriction as to the number

८४ of such Priests |
“ Or again, the fact of having the same performer as the enjoyer of

“ the Result being found, through co-extensiveness and the Aimanepadu

० affix, to be applicable to the performance of the Sacrifice as a whole

८ -- € can set aside only that much of this fact, as would be necessary

“for the due observance of the Injunction of ‘ Purchase.” And as

८ this Injunction would be duly observed by a single Person perform-

“ing any one of the Actions (for ‘ payment’), we cannot set aside

‘‘any more than that.”

SIDDHANTA.

Sittra (22): There should be only as many performers
as there are actions with numes (indicating special per-
formers); because of the direct declaration of every
one of then being different
Inasmuch as the Injunction that we have is that of the Bhavana

connected with Actions whose performers are distinctly pointed out by
means of different xames,—it should also be taken as laying down that
there should be an engagement (or appointment) of as many Priests as
there are such names. ‘That isto say just as the Name aerves the pur-
pose of differentiating Actions,—as shown under Sutra I1—ii—22,—s0
would it-also.serve to differentiate the Performers; and hence it must
be admitted that the number of the Priests to be engaged should be the
same as that of the names (of Actions)

NUMBER OF PRIESTS LIMITED. 1821

Siztra (28): Objection: * A single person could be taken
“(as the Performer of all the Actions); as the acames in-

` § dicate a diversity of actions only (and not of the Per-

` ` .“formers).”

| ‘The names are found to apply to Persons, as employed in certain
“definite operations, and not by ordinary convention: and hence,
‘like the Yépa, etc., they are always to be taken as characterised by
“these operations. And hence, the names ‘ Hoty’ and the rest,
being similar to the word ‘ pacaka,’ etc., they could apply to one and
“the same person, as performing the various Actions (indicated
‘‘by these Names); and as such there could be no diversity of
"^ Performers (on the ground of the diversity of Names).’’

Sitra (24): Reply: Not so; as (the Performers are distinctly
mentioned) 222 the Ovriginative Injunctions (of the
Actions, prior to the actual appearance of the Actions them-
selves).

Jf the Names in question were found, either at the time of
the actual engagement in the Action, or after such engsgement,
then, in that case, they may not serve to differentiate the Performers.
As a matter of fact, however, we find that the Appointment, being
of such persons as are sitting unemployed consists of a request to
take up the performance of a certain action; and it 18 in connection
with these Appointments, that we find the Names (of Priests) men-
tioned,—e.g. in the sentences ‘ Brahmanam vrnila,’ ‘Holaram vnita,’
and so forth. And at this juncture we do not find any other reason
(than the diversity of Performers) for the diversity of these names ;
and then again, the Appointments too, laid down in the aforesaid
Sentences, are to be taken as distinct and diverse,—according to
the Stitras Il--ii—-2, and 11—ii—23. And on account of the diversity
of these Appointments, we must admit of a diversity among those
that. are appointed; and hence the number of the Priests appointed
should be regarded to be the same as that of the Appointments
Then, as for the Names, in as much as they are not found to .
apply to the Persons, before the Appointments, as they are used as
well-established names only after the Appointments have been made,
it must be admitted that the Names are due to (and based upon) these
Appointments only. And it is only natural that a diversity of the
Cause (Appointment) should give rise to a diversity in the effects
(the Appotnied Priests) # a
Then again, inasmuch as the Appointment of a Priest serves

1622 © ‘ANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. U1I—PADA ViI.—aDHI. (9).

only a visible purpose (and does not bring about any transcendenta)
results), several Appointments could not be made with regard to
one and the same person ; because one who has been once appointed
(engaged for service) need not be appointed over again. Then again, in
as much as the various persons, laid down in the originative Injunc
tion. as to be Appointed can neither be rejected nor. taken as
optional alternatives, nor as all at once conjointly,—one sentence
(laying down the appointment of a certain person) could not be
connected with the Person appointed in accordance with another
Sentence; and for this reason also, the Appointments must be regard
ed as distinct and diverse.

Then again, we find all these Appointments. laid down simul
taneously by the Sentence laying down the performance of the Sacrific
as a whole,—just like the Holdings of the various Vessels dedicated to
Indra, Vayu and the rest. And the mention of these appointments
means the mention of all the Priests (appointed). And thus it is
established that there should be as many distinct Priests as there are
Appointments.

The Bhashya says— Tasmadéshim varant sankirtanam, na
vidhih.’ But this statement does not seem to be quite proper.
as there could be no restriction (of number) with regard to those
Appointments that are not conjoined. Nor could this justify our
taking all the Sentences (‘ Brahmanam vpnita, ‘ Hotéram vrnita,’
etc.), as syntactically connected, and leading to a result in the shape
of the cognition of the Number—which is obtainable by the much
easier method of taking the Sentences collectively. Consequently
it must be admitted that the Number is laid down, at the very outset,
by the Injunction of the Appointments themselves, as following in
the wake of these (Appointments); and there is no use of differen-
tiating the Number (from the Appointments). . = `

ADHIKARANA (10).
[The Camasaidhvaryus are distinct Priests. |

१2/1४ (26): The Camasadhvaryus are different (from the
aforesaid Priests); because of their being named as
such |

[At the Jyolishtoma, we have certain priests called the ‘ Camasa-
dhearyus’; and with regard to these there arises the question as
to whether these are included among the Priests dealt with in the
previous Adhikarana,—the Hoty, etc., or they are distinct from them. |

And on this question we have the following--

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘Inasmuch as they are named ‘ Adhvaryus,’ they must regarded
“to be the Appoinled Adhvaryu priests themselves, as connected
'" with the Cups (Camasas).”

SIDDHANTA.
To the above we make the following reply :—

(1) Inasmuch as all Names are based upon distinctness, — (2)
as the Camasadhvaryus are mentioned as equally distinct from all the
other Priests,—-(3) 98 there is a distinct Appointment laid down for
these Camasadhvaryus—they must be regarded as distinct from those
other Priests, as shown on a previous occasion

Though, in reality, the Camasadhvaryus are appointed by. the
Master himself, yet, they are spoken of as ‘ appointed by the Principal
Priosts,’ because of their being subordinate to these latter

ADHIKARANA (11)
[There should be a plurality of Camasadhvaryus.]

Siitrvet (26): They must be regarded as many; because of
their being spoken of as many, in the Originative
Injunction. |
[With regard to the Camasadhvaryus there arises the question

as to whether it is necessary that there should be many of them, or

it may be that there may be either one or two, or many of them.

And the latter alternative being the Parvapaksha view, we have the

former as the Siddhanta, on the ground of their being spoken of, in

the Originative Injunction, as ‘ Camasadhvaryavah,’ in the Plural.|

ADHIKARANA (12).
[The number of Camasadhvaryus must be Ten only.]

Siitra (21): Their number should be Ten; because of
Indications to that effect.

On the question of the number of Camasadhvaryus, we have the
following—
PURVAPAKSHA.

‘There being no restriction as to the exact number of the many,
‘we must accept their number to be Three only, in accordance with
" the द्वद ‘ Prathamam va niyamyéta ’? (XI—i—43).”’

SIDDHANTA.

In connection with the Dacapéya Sacrifice, which is a modifica-
tion of the Jyotishtoma, we have a reference to the Camasadhvaryus as
being ‘7'en’ in number; and from this we conclude that at the
original Sacrifice (of the Jyotishtoma) also Ten of them are appointed.
And further, the fact of these being Ten is always shown by the
number of Possessors of the Cups, as well as of the Cups themselves,
being 70 only.

204

ADHIKARANA (13).
[The Camitr priest is not distinct from the Principal. Priests.}

Sutra (28): °° The Camitr is different from the others,
^“ because of a distinct name being applied to him.”

[With regard to the Camity priest, there arises the question as to
whether he is included among the Priests enumerated before, or he is
distinct from them. And on this question we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA

‘Inasmuch as he is spoken of by means of a distinct word
“Camila, he must be regarded as distinct from the rest. (2) Then
again, in as much as the mention of the Caumiir is found to cause an
increase in the number of Priests, he must be regarded as a distinct
‘¢ Priest. (3) Lastly, we find the sentence—Klomava........ yadya-
“brahmanah syat,’—which shows that the fact of the Camitr Priest
“being a Brahmana is doubtful ; and-no such doubt could be possible
‘if he were one of the Principal Priests (as these are all always

Brahmanas—Vide Sutra XIl-—-iv—4l1, et seq).’’ |

SIDDHANTA.

Sita. (29) : (He is distinct from the rest) ८८८५१५७८ of the Con-
text; speciatly as the name does not appear in the
Originative Injunction

It is only when a Name appears in the originative Injunction
that it serves the purposes of differentiation; and as a matter of
fact we do not find the name ‘ Camitr’ appearing in any such
Injunction ; and consequently this name must be regarded as another
name for one of the previously enumerated Priests, applied to him on
account of his performing some action other than his previous one
(as shown in Sutra I11—vii—23) |
` ` 00८1४०५; “ In the course of action we find that the Camiir holds
“ the neck of the animal, at the time that all the other Priests are
“busy performing other appointed. duties: and for this’ reason. be
१९ प्र be regarded as distinct from these latter.” 2 -: `

GAMITR PRIMST NOT DISTINCT | 1627

Reply: This does not affect our case; because the neck of the
animal could be held by any one of the Priests that may, at that time
have nothing else to do; specially as, at that time, we do not find
all the Priests to be engaged; this will be explained in detail under
Sutra—' Itaramanyastésham yato viceshah syat.’

Then, as for the indications of the expression ‘ yadyabrahmanak
etc., that cannot prove what is held by the Pirvapaksha, as there is
absolutely no chance of any but Brahmanas officiating at Sacrifices; and
hence the expression cannot but be taken as referring to the Master
of the Sacrifice (the sense being that ‘if the Master of the Sacrifice
happen to be a Non-Brahmana, ctc., etc.’). Specially as on account
of the duties of the Gamiy being mentioned in the Context of those of
the Master, they could never be recognised as belonging a Non-
Brahmana. It might be argued that—<the duties of the Cumity
consisting of the killing of the animal, they could not be accepted
by the Brahmana.” But the same might be said with regard to
the Non-Brahmana also (who may be as unwilling to do the Aifliny).
In fact, the Non-Brahmana has not many remedies available for
clearing. himself of the sin attaching to him by reason of the killing ;
and he would be more liable the Sin (and as such much more unwilling
to do the act). For these reasons, we conclude that, just as the
Cidra (and other Non-Brahmanas) are forced to do such actions,
even against their will,—iu the same manner, the Brahmana, won over
by various gifts, would do them ; and there would be no incongruity
11) this

In fact it is for these reasons (of the Priest having to perform
questionable actions) that the Priestly ,Dultes are spoken of depre-
catingly.

ADHIKARANA (14).
(The Upaga Priest is not distinct from the others. ]

Sutra (30) : The Upugas too are not distinet from the.
rest: because of Indications to that effect. |
[We have the sentence—‘ Na adhvaryurupajayét,’ which prohibits

the Adhvarya officiating as the Upaga; and this shows that the duties

of the Upaga are to be performed by one out of. these Principal

Priests themselves. } |

ADHIKARANA (15).
(The Seller of Soma is distinct from the Priests. |

92८८६2८ (31): The Seller is a distinet person; because the
Action (of selling) is 210६ directly enjoined (in the
Veda).

[The Purvapaksha is that the Soma-vendor must be regarded
as one of the Principal Priests, as he is spoken of along with them.
The Siddhanta is that he is a totally different person; because his
action is not enjoined. |

ADHIKARANA (16)

[The Name ‘ (४४ ` does not apply to al] the persons engaged
at the Sacrifice. ]

Sutra (382): * Inasmuch as the Action is performed by
— “all, the name ‘ Rtvik’? applies to all equally.”
[The question being as to whether all the Persons, that are spoken
of as engaged in connection with the performance of the Jyotishioma,
are ‘ Riviks’ or only a few among them].—we have the following—-

PURVAPAKSHA.
“The word ‘ Rivik,’ being laid down as an arbitrary form (in .
«५ Panini’s Siitra T1I—ii—59), is used in the sense afforded by the
«^ Prefixed word, the Root and the Affix, collectively,—i.e. the word
“is explained as ‘ Riauyajantt yé t@ Rtvijah’ (‘those who perform
‘Sacrifices at appointed seasons’). And if the application of the
“name ‘Rivik’ were based solely upon this fact (of performing
‘* Sacrifices ab a certain time), then it could not but be regarded as
‘“ applying equally to all the persons engaged in the Sacrifice ; and as
such all of them would be Atvrks (or Priests). Aud for this reasons
“the mention of the Number of ‘ Four,’ ‘ Five,’ ‘ Six,’ ‘ Seventeen,’
५ etc., with regard to these, must be taken as mere Artharcada, meant
‘to show that there are many parts of the Sacrifice (performed
“by various numbers of 0116808}. र +

SIDDHANTA

Sittra (83): It cannot be so; because of the preclusion (of
others besides the Seventeen)

The expression ‘ Partsankhyanat’ in the Sdira has been explained
by the Bhashya as referring to the fact of the sentence ‘ Saptadaca
Riviyah’ being a Preclusive. Injunction. There being. a possibility
of the Seventeen persons, as well as the others, being engaged: (as
Priests), the repetition of ‘‘Seventeen” could not. have been made
‘simply.for the purpose of laying down that number; in fadt ib is
“for the purpose of indicating. the absence of others besides. the

ALL BNGAGED IN SACRIFICE are No? ` Rlvik.’ 1681

Seventeen; In all. cases, we find that whenever two things are spoken
of as bearing some sort of a relationship to each other, the following
three factors are therein involved: (1) the mere forms of the things
(2) their mutual connection ; and (3) the preclusion of a third thing ;
and a sentence is always meant to convey the idea of one of these
factors (according to the wish of the speaker). And in a case where
either the’ form of the things or their mutual connection is not
meant to be. expressed, (as in the case in question), we cannot but
take the Injunction as serving the purpose of precluding the things.
other than those mentioned. And such cases of Preelusion sare
` entirely free from the aforesaid three Objections (of Svarthaparityadga

pointed out as applying to Preclusions); because the direct
denotation of the declaration (the mere luying down of ‘Seventeen
Rtviks’) cannot be accepted as the object of Injunction by this
sentence; as they have been already enjoined clsewhere; and
hence as we did not take it to be an Injunction of what it implies
(१.९. the Preclusion of others besides the Seventeen), the [njunction
itself would become absolutely meaningless.

The Opponent however still accepts the performance of the
Sacrifice to be the sole condition of the application of the name
‘Rivik’; and hence concludes that whoever may be found to fulfil
that condition must be spoken of as ‘Rivik’; it is with a view
to all: this that we have the passage in the Bhashya “ Nunw prats
shidhyanyéshvaps, etc

In replying to this, the Siddhanti begins with showing that it
is the Action that is denied. That is to say, in all cases, the form of
the Agent being incapable of being denied, it is only his action
or functioning that is denied; for instance, the sentence, ‘he is
not my son’ simply means that ‘he does not perform the duties
ofa.son.’ And in the same manner, in the case in question, the dental,
that. is made with regard to others besides the ‘seventeen, must
be taken to be a denial of the fact of these other persons functioning
(towards the accomplishment of the Sacrifice),—and not that of the
mere existence of these other persons
At-might be argued that—‘ it is the fact of being appointed
“that.is the condition or basis of the applicatoin of the name;
and as such the citing of the instance uf the junctions pertaining to
“the Rietk is wholly irrelevant.’’
| Butitis १०६8० ; because, in accordance with this theory, the use 9
the word (‘Rivik’) is accomplished, solely thpough the presence of.
theese fanetiona, >. eG

169 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. II—PADA VII.—ADHI. (16).

Says the Opponent: ^ How could the persons ‘ performing the
^“ sacrifice at particular seasons ` be dented 10 be ‘Riveks’? ` That is to say
‘‘inasmuch as there can be no denial of the mere existence of these
“ persons, the functions too cannot be very easily denied.”

With a view to offer the correct reply, the Siddhant: begins with
the declaration—IJn that case the word ‘Rivik’ comes to be of two
kinds—one based upon the ‘ performance of Sacrifices at particular
seasons,’ and another upon Appointment, ९1८. The sense of this js
that if the application of the word ‘ Rivik’ were dependent upon its
literal etymological meaning (‘one who performs sacrifices at certain
seasons,’) then, in that case, it could not but apply to all the persons
engaged in the sacrifice. As a matter of fact however, its application
is found to be conditioned by certain purificatory rites and these
‘rites’ are none other than the Appointment and the offering oj
certain gifts; and hence those persons, who, while performing the
functions (of sacrifice at particular seasons), bave not had _ these
purificatory rites done to them, cannot be spoken of as ‘ Riviks.’
And as a matter of fact we find that the Master of the Sacrifice
appoinis, and offers the gifts, to only Seventeen persons; and conse-
quently, we could explain the repetition of ‘ Seventeen Riviks’ as
a descriptive reference, only if we accepted the application of the
name ‘ Rivk’ to be based upon these two facts (of Appointment
and Gifts); otherwise this repetition would come to be a partial
descriptive reference to the «Seventeen Riviks,’ in a form that would
not be quite true. Consequently the word could not have an unduly
extensive application (if it were based upon the aforesaid two facts of
Appointment and (fi). |

Objection: `“ {1 that case, we would have a most undesirable
‘* mutual interdependence,—inasmuch as we would have the Appoint-
“ment and the giving of gifts, of those that are Riviks; and these
‘ would be regarded as ‘ Riviks,’ who would receive these Appointments

and Gifis.” =

Reply: This does not affect our position; because at the very
outset, we are at once faced by the declaration—‘ Those that are
Rtviks are to be appointed and offered the gifts’; but when it
18 found that the Riviks are not so well known in ordinary parlance
as the Tree, etc., then we come to understand that ‘the Riviks are
to be created by Appointment’ just as in the case of the sentence—
‘weave a piece of cloth out of this yarn,’ in as much as it is only
‘by weaving that the Cloth is made, we have the name ` ' Cloth `

uséd 10 view of something that. is.yet:to come,.and yet there 1

ALL ENGAGED IN SAORIFICE ARE NOT ‘ Rivik.’ 1633

nothing objectionable in this,—so too we would have in the case
in question

| The same reasoning holds respecting sentences—‘ Adhvar yum
vynita, ele.’ which lay down the appointment of particular Rtvik

Thus alone could. we justify the Accusative ending in connection
with the Riviks that are being appointed. As for the Appointment,
etc., bringing about the Réviks that would perform the sacrifices
it would be serving a distinctly visible purpose, just like the Laying of
fire (which serves the purpose of bringing in the Sacrificial Fire)
And it is in view of the order of sequence among the Vedic texts
bearing on the question, that we come to speak of the Riviks as
‘created by Appointment’; and hence this statement cannot be
regarded as wholly unknown.

As a matter of fact however, it is not proper to reject the
well-recognised fact of the application of the name ‘ Riviks’ being
based upon the ‘ performance of Sacrifices at particular seasons,’
on the mere ground of the word being laid down (by Panini) as
an ‘ arbitrary form.’ Then again, in as much as the ‘ Appointment’
and ‘the giving of gifts’ are formed, as related to the well-known
Rivtks, to be directly laid down with reference to those Rtviks,—it 18
not right to subvert the natural order of sequence of the sentences (by
taking the ` Rtviks’ as to be ‘created by the appointment and the
` न); far the argument that, until they are known, the ‘ Rtviks
“would 68"findergo any purificatory ritcs,—the same may be said
of the ‘ Appointment’ also; as no person could comprehend an
Injunction where he would be told to do something which he
does not. know. In fact even while the Appointment would be in
course of operation, the name ‘ Rivik’ could not be recognised as
based upon that Appointment. If, however, it be held that the
Kiviks are known by means of the particular order of sequence among
the Vedic texts, then, in that case, the purificatory rites (of Appoint-
ment, etc.) could be very easily cognised as pertaining to the (८४1८5
duly known by the said means. One who is making the Appointment
has’ the following idea present in his mind at the time: ‘The Rtviks
are entities that are well known in the Veda; but for me they are
created by means of Appointment; as prior to this Appointment,
no one has recognised them as.‘ Riviks.’ Or, we might go even निष
ther, and declare that for the Appointer also, the Hiviks have already |
& prior. existence, in the general shape (of the Class ‘Rtvik’). It
is the case with every thing that in whatever particular form ‘it |
may be known, it-helps in the operation all the. ६8406 ; specially

` ~. 85 ` . - oa . . 8

1694 ` TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. I—~PADA. VIL+—ADHI.. (16)

as it is not possible for a thing to be known, all at once, in all: its
forms | |

Thus then, we come to the following analysis of the matter under
consideration ; (1) ‘Those that perform the Sacrifices at particula
seasons, and. who perform the Duties of the Adhvaryava, oetc., are
Rtviks’; (2) ‘Those that are capable of such performance are such
persons, as those devoid of capability are not entitled to. the perform-
ance of any action; (3) in as much as this does not. give us any
definite idea, we come to take them to be ‘those that. are obtained
by means of Appointment’; (4) then again, ˆ those to whom the gifts
are given, And it is through all these grades that we arrived at the
real denotation of the word ‘fRivik.’ Thus we find that though
the original denotation of the word consisted of ‘one who performs
Sacrifices at various seasons,’ yet in as-much as this 18 found to
be. inadmissible, it goes on being specialised, until we come to one
that. 18 admissible and compatible with the rest of the Context ;
and hence the character of the ‘Riviks’ must be regarded as a duly
established entity, even prior to its being created (by the Appoint-
ment)

Then again, we should like to know whether the Appointment
and the gift create the Riviks themselves, or the character of the
` 1४1८. As for the former, they have been already created or
produced by their parents, and as such do not require to’ be: produced
again. And as for the character of ‘ Rivik,’ it consists of a particular
capability, which is brought about by study and hearing of the Veda;
and as such this too does not require to be brought about again.
we shall show, under the Suira III—viii—4, that the Master does
not create the capabilities of the Priests. Specially as in all cases
what is created or produced is what does not exist already; and
with regard to the Riviks all that is non-existent, prior to the
Appointment, is their being won over to perform the actions connected
with the Sacrifice

_ Objection : ‘The Character of ‘ Rtvik’ also does not: exist with

regard to the particular persons concerned.”
| Reply - . (€ ; but that character we do not find to be produced
even after the Appointment. If 1४. be urged that whatever 1s
produced by the Appointment is. the Character of.‘ Rivik,’—then
‘tha. would be nothing else besides their being won over. Nor is
the. Rivik-character an. imperceptible entity ; as that alone can be
_Yégarded as imperceptible. whose functions. are found to be so... The
“fanetions. ofthe Rivik, which consist of the accomplishment ‘of the

<ALL ENGAGED IN SACRIFICE ARE Nov ‘ Rlvik,’ 1635

Action, are’ quite perceptible ; and how could this perceptible effect.
he brought about by means of an imperceptible agency ? Specially
as-all that is found to bring about the accomplishment of the action
is quite perceptible,—in the shape of Brahmanahood und the rest.
The only imperceptible element that there is (i.e. 42724), is taken
up, through the context, by the sentence laying down the performance
of the aotion as a whole; and as such it is found to help directly
in the Action, and not in the bringing about of the character of
the Rtviks (Adhvaryu and the rest), Nor is this imperceptible
element (of the Aptrva) produced by means of the Appointment
or Rewarding of the Aivtks; and hence these two (the Appointment
and the Gifts) cannot be regarded as the basis (of the signification
of the word ` Rivik’)

As for the Ahavaniya, etc., on the other hand, (1) in as much
as their production is not spoken of in the (present) Context,—(2)
as the help that they accord is always of the imperceptible (or transcen-
dental) character,—(3) and as the purifications laid down for them
are all such as pertain to them before they have been brought into
existence,—it is only right that they should be spoken of as ‘to
be produced.’ Then again, in the case of these consecrated Fires, the
Homa and other actions do not stand in need of a substrate to hold the
materials that are offered; and hence it must be admitted that the
presence of these consecrated [Fires brings about a certain transcen-
dental result; and as such a result could not be obtained from the
ordinary Fire, we require, for the fulfilment of that result, the imper-
ceptible (transcendental consecrated churacter of the Fire, Ahavaniyatva).
For these reasons the case of these 11165 cannot be analogous to the
case In question.

And further, if the imperceptible Rivik-character were produced
bv the Appointment and the Gift, then at the Salira also (at which
all the persons engaged are Musters), it would be necessary to produce
that character in the Masters also ; and in as much as in the sentence,
laying down the Initiation of these by one another, the persons
referred to (as to be initiated) are the Masters themselves, as occupy-
ing the positions of the Adhvaryu and other Priests,—-it would be
nevéssary to have Appointments and Gifts in this case also; which
is absurd. Because asx for the Appointment, in as much as it ig
dote:.simply for. the purpose of winning the co-operation of. the.
Priests, it could not: be done at the Sattra, at which every one of the
Priests being Masters, it is his own business for every one of them; (and
“aa Buch no winning. over is necessary); and any such Appointment

1636 =TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 11I—PADA VII.—ADHI. (16).

would be directly contradictory to what is Said under Sétra (X— jj
35). | |
For these reasons it must be admitted that it is for the sake of tho
Action that we have the restrictive rule for the engaging of such persons
(as Priests) as have been previously ascertained to have the capability of
accomplishing that Action. And as for the word ` Rivih,’ that too
comes to be restricted to such capable persons (as have been obtained
by Appointment and Gifts) ;—as it is only this much that is necessary
for the perfection of the Action; and it does not refer to Persons
other than those, even though they be endowed with the necessary
capability. At the Satira however, in 88 much as it is the Masters
themselves that officiate as the various Priests, there is no need
of Appointments and Gifts; and hence these are not admitted; and
the absence of these does not create any discrepancy in the Sacrifice;
and consequently in this case, the character of the severa] Priests—
Adhvaryu and the rest—is accomplished, solely through Capability
Just as at the Paurnamast Sacrifice, even without the Cakhapari
vasana, any subtance, that is found capable of removing the Fire-
embers, comes to be accepted as the ‘Upavésha,’ and the absence
of the Cakhaparivasana docs not create a discrepancy.
Thus then, Just as the case of the sentence * Yaipasya svarum
karoti,’ will be explained under St#ira IV—ii—6 (that the word
‘ karott,’ means ‘creates ` or ‘ produces’ obtains or acquires), so would it
also be in the case in question, according to the Bhashya (i.e. the
‘Varana’ and ‘Bharana’ would be explained as equivalent to
‘ obtaining’). |

Sttra (34): Objection: ^ It might be a partial
alternative.”’

[‘‘ The sentence ‘Seventeen Priests’ may. be taken as laying down
“the particular number as an optional alternative.’’|

Sutva (35): Reply: It is not so; because all do not form
the subject of treatinent

It is in connection with the Vatyvanara-Dvadacukapala that
we have the declaration of the numbers ‘ Eight,’ etc. ; and as these
numbers are not found: to be of. any direct use in the Actions
they can be regarded as. referring to the different parts of the number
(‘Seventeen ) of Priests employed ; and they serve the purpose of
eulogising them. In the case..in question however, we do: not find
niestioued any number beyond. ‘Seventeen,’ -of which “this num bet

` ALL ENGAGED IN SACRIFICE ARE Nov ‘ ण. 1637

(‘Seventeen’) could be regarded as a part, whose mention could
serve the purposes of eulogisation. Hence it must be admitted that
the declaration ‘Seventeen Pricsts’ only serves the purpose of recapi-
_tulating the number of Priests employed. ।

ADHIKARANA (17)

[It is only the Brahma, etc., mentioned in the sentences laying
down the Initiations and the Sacrificial Fees, that make up the
Seventeen Priests.’]

Sutra ( 36) : (The number of the Priests) ts liméted by the
direct declaration of the sacrificial Fees

[With regard to the declaration of ‘Seventeen Priests,’ there
arises the question as to which are these sevenieen.| |
On this question we have tho-——

PURVAPAKSHA

“that, any of the Priests employed at the original Sacrifice may be
‘taken as making up the ‘ Seventeen

SIDDHANTA.

The number of the Priests is limited by the sentence expressing the
Co-ordination (of certain Priests with certain factors in the Sacrifice) ;
and as a matter of fact, we find this Co-ordination, expressed in the
sentence laying down the order in which the Sacrificial Fees are to be
paid, pertaining to the Brahma and other Principal Priests, and not to
be the minor ones, the Camasddhvaryu, ete. Though there may be an
idea that the well-established character of the Rivtk, being referred ४0;
cannot be thus limited in its scope,—yet the specific limitation in the
case in question may be accepted as based upon the particular declar-
ation of the number ‘ Seventeen’; and as this number is found to be
restricted, by the Veda, to the Brahma, etc., only, we cannot but admit
that it is these alone that make up the ‘ Seventeen Priests

१४८९८ (87): Also because it is the Imitation of these that

is laid down, immediately after that of the Muster
has been enjoined |

We find the sentence ye gieijasté yajamanak:’ showing that the
-two-words “ytutk’ (Priest) and ‘ Yajamana? (‘ Master.of thé Sacrifice’)

_ BRAHMA AND THE REST MAKE UP THE ‘SEVENTEEN PRIESTS.’ 1639

apply to: the. same Persons; and then, the rest gocs on to speak of
the Purificatory Rites of Initiation of the Master as pertaining to the
Brahma, ete.,—by way of showing the Order in which these are to receive
their Fees ; and this distinctly shows that the two words are applicable
to the Seventeen Priests, Brahma and the rest.

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the character of the
‘Rik’ (ie. the priestly character) belongs only to such persons as
are capable of performing the duties of the Brahma, ete., and * perform
the Sacrifices at particular seasons’: and the basis of the denota-
tion of the word ‘ हए hes in the ` performance of sacrifices at
particular seasons,’ as done by these persons. Just as though the
word ‘Go’ (Cow) literally means ‘that which moves’ (§ gacchatl
sauk’}, yet its denotation is restricted to that moving thing which
ix characterised by the Dewlan, etc. Or again, just as the word ' Dhayya,’
lnid down by Panini (Sutra [Y[—i—129) as an arbitrary form signi-
fving the Samidhénis, is restricted to these only and not to any other
verses, even though the etymological meaning of the word (‘ Dhayya’)
may be found applicable to these latter also,—exactly in the same man-
ner, in the case in question, it must be admitted that the word ‘ Rivik `
is applicable to the Brahma, etc., alone as performing Sacrifices at
particular seasons, and not to all that might perform such Sacrifices.

ADHIKARANA (18).
[It is the Master tht makes the Seventeenth of the Priests.

Svitrv« 38): The seventeenth of the Priests is the Master:
becuase of the sineiturity of thetrv functions.

Sixteen of the Priests are found to be mentioned in the sentences
laying down the Initiations and the Sacrificial Fees ; and it remains to
be learnt who is the Seventecnth. The persons engaged at the Sacri
fice, apart from the aforesaid sixteen, are the Sadasya (the Assembled
guests). the Yajamana (the Master of the Sacrifice), and the Cama-
sadhvaryus. As for the Camasadhvaryus however, as there are many
of them of equal status, we find no grounds for fixing upon any one of
those as the required Seventeenth. Hence there remains the question
as to whether the Sadasya or the Master makes the Seventeenth. |

On this question, the PURVAPAKSHA—being that, ‘‘ inasmuch
“as it is the Sadasya that renders services similar to those rendered by
“the other sixteen Priests, in connection with the Sacrifice, it is he
‘that must be regarded as the Seventeenth,”’—we have the following :—

SIDDHANTA.
The Master would be the Seventeenth of the Priests

Objection : “In the previous Adhikarana, it has heen denied that
“the application of the name ‘ Rivk’ is based upon the ‘ performance
‘‘of sacrifices at particular seasons’; and then, how is it that on
“the present occasion, you declare the Master to have the functions
‘fof the Rivik, on the ground of his performing, like the other Priests,
‘‘ the Sacrifices at particular Seasons? ‘Then again, inasmuch as
“we have a distinct originative Injunction of the Sadasya, in the
‘sentence ‘ Sadasyan vrnita,’ we must regard the Sadasya as a dis-
‘tinct Priest, like the Adhvaryu and the rest (and as such it would
‘be more reasonable to take the Sadasya as the Seventeenth Priest)
‘Nor could the name ‘ Sadasya’ be taken as applying, etymologically,
“to the Brahma. Priest; because such etymological application is
precluded by the well-known denotation of the word. Nor could
- the sentence ‘Sadasjam. Vrnita’ be taken as an. Injunction, ot

BRABMA & THE REST MAKE UP TILE ‘SRYRENTREN PrtTeEsts,’ 1641

+ Reference, of a second Appointment for the Brahma; as in that
«case we could have second Appointments of the Adhvaryu and other
« Priests also. Then again, in all the Recitations, we find that the
“* Mantras, 1810 down as to be recited by the Sudasya, are distinct
“from those that are laid down for the Brahma&; and hence if the
“ Sadasya were the same as the Brahma, we would have to accept the
‘‘ objectionable fact of the two sets of Mantras being optional alterna-
‘tives. Nor could the mention of the Brahma as the ‘Sadasya’
“be of any use, in the matter of his conncetion with the Soma-Cup
‘(consequently the Sadasya cannot be the same as Brahma. And
“lastly, the Sadasya must be one who is found to be capable of
-* Keeping an eye on the performance; and, through this action of
“ Keeping an eye on tt, he can be spoken of as ‘ performing the
‘¢ Sacrifice at particular seasons.’ And further we find that all Sacri-
“fices appoint the Sadasya separately. for all these reasons it is
‘not right to exclude the Sadasya from the ` Seventeen Priests.’ ”’

Reply: We do not exclude the Sadasya from all connection with
the Sacrifice: all that we mean is that, like the Camasadhvaryu, he
cannot be called a‘ Rivik’. The Sadasya is certainly to be appointed
separately. Nor is the Brahma spoken of as ‘Sadasya.’ But, the
Sadesya:is not spoken of as a ‘ Rivik’;—because though the name
apples to one who has been appointed and who performs the Sacrifices at
particular seasons, yet he is not mentioned among the Recipients of
the Sacrificial Fee, nor in the sentence laying down the Dwadacaha
Initiation (for Priests). Just as even though the Caumasadhvaryus fulfil
the two conditions of being appointed, and performing the Sacrifice, etc. .
inasmuch as they do not fulfil the other two conditions, they are not
spoken of as ‘ Rtviks.’

As for the Master, on the other hand, though he is not appointed,
yet, inasmuch as he fulfils all the other conditions, it is only right that
he should be spoken of as a ‘ Rtvik.’

It has been urged above, that—“the Sadasya may be spoken
“ of as ‘ performing the Sacrifice,” on the ground of his witnessing
^“ १४. But, though it is true that he is formally appointed, yet this is
done simply in obedience to a direct Injunction to that effect ; and asa
matter of fact, we find that there is no special function attached
to him in connection with the Sacrifice, whereby he could be spoken
of as ‘performing the Sacrifice.’ The mere witnessing is no action
connected with the actual performunce of the Sacrifice; and as such
that could not be any ground for his being taken as a particular

Performer’ (of the Sacrifice). Hence it must be admitted that, even
- 206 C= | ५ | र 7 .

1642 - TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADU. It-—-PADA शा. ---4 (ता. (18)

though we have the Sadasya, it is only right that the Master should
be spoken of as the Seventeenth ‘ Rivek.’ :

The Bhashya said something to the effect that there is no Sadasya
but this must be regarded as a much too sweeping declaration made
with a view to deny, most emphatically, the fact of the Sadasy,,
being a ‘ Rivik’; and much significance cannot be attached to such a
sweeping declaration

ADHIKARANA (19)

[(2) The Adhvaryava and other Actions must be performed by the
ddhvaryu ete. respectively. (b) The Fire belongs to the Original
Primary Sacrifice, as well as to the Modifications. |

Sutra (39): “The Priests would perform all Actions,
as they are appointed for that purpose.” As for
the Fire, that also betongs to all Sacrifices as they
are laid down independently by themselves,

Having dealt with the diversity of Performers, the Bhashya next
proceeds to doal with the matter of the employment of things being
governed by Name. [And oa this point it raises the question as to
whether all Actions, in connection with the Sacrifice, that can be done
by men, are to be done by all the Priests, or there is any restriction
as co certain Actions being always performed by certain detinite Priests,
~-and also the question as to whether all the functions of Fire are
to be performed by all the three Sacrificial Tires, or there is a certain
restriction as to the functioning of these also.]

On this question, the Bhashya puts forward the Pirvapaksha,
that—‘‘ They would perform all the Actions, because ९८. etc. |That
“is to say, when the Priests are appointed, they must be appointed
“for doing all that can be done by man; and similarly when the
^“ Fires are prepared, they must be prepared for performing all the func-

tions of the Fire.’’]

But we do not quite understand whether the question refers to the
doubt as to the Priests perfor ming only the actions pertaining to the
Sacrifice. or those pertaining to the Sacrificer algo, or it refers to that
as to their performing all actions pertaining to the Sacrifice or all the |
actions (those pertaining to the Sacrifice as well as those pertaining to
the Sacrificer). Then again, we do not understand whether ‘ all actions
spoken of are those only that are mentioned in connected sentences or
those that are not so expressly mentioned

lf the meaning he that the ‘Actions pertaining to the Saerificer? |
aiso (are to be performed by the Priests),—that would be wholly in-
admissible: inasmuch as the fact of the A ppointnient and the gift of
the: Priests being. laid down in the context of the Sacrifice, distinct],

1644. TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. TII—PADA VIL—aDHt. (19).

shows that the Priests are appointed only for the sake of those actions
that pertain to the Sacrifice only ; as has been explained in the Sara
(1-1-16, and also under the Siira ‘nirdécadva etc.’ (XII—ii—3). For
these reasons the expression ‘ sarvarthah’ cannot be taken as referring
to the actions pertaining to the Sacrificer. Nor could any actions, that
are not mentioned in the sentences ‘ Tanpurah Adhvaryurvibhajati `
etc., be included among those that are mentioned in these sentences.
And as for those actions that are not expressly mentioned in such
sentences, these, being found to be laid down at random anywhere in
the Veda, could be performed by any persons capable of such perform-
ance, without restriction ; and as such with reference to these alone the
Priests may be spoken of as ‘ sarvarthah.’

The phrase ‘prayuktatvat’ means—‘“ because all the actions are
capable of prompting the appointment of the Priest ; and also because
all the Priests are capable of performing all the actions ”’.e

Says the Bhashya—‘ sarvam purushaka@ryam’ ; and this refers to
those actions which the man is capable of performing, aud which he
would perform, if certain direct declarations had not pointed out
only some of them as to be performed by him; and it cannot be taken
as referring to the Actions pertaining to the man (i.e., those calculated
to bring about certain results desired by him).

As for the sacrificial fires, Ahavaniya, etc., any mention of thei!
being ‘ sarvartha’ is wholly irrelevant. Nor could it be taken as de.
clared by the way, because the reason that is given—‘ svakalaival '
not applicable to it. Nor do we find any mention, later on, of the reply
or the arguments in favour of the reply, to the Parvapaksha put for-
ward by the Bhashya in this connection (of the Fires)

Then again, if the Fires be held to be spoken of as ‘ sarvartha-
with reference to the ordinary actions of the world, then, inasmuch as
this would be fully dealt with under the Satras ‘ viharo laukikana-
martham sadhayét prabhutvat,’ (XII—ii—1), and ‘ nirdégadva vatdik-
anam syat’ (X{I—ii—3),—there would be no need of dealing with the
question in the present connection. Even as regards the mention of
‘ sarvartha’ being with reference to the fact of the original primary and
as wellas the subsidiary modifications being for the sake of all those
functions of the Fire that are laid down in the Veda—that too, having
been fully dealt with, in connection with the sentence ‘ agnimupasama-
dhaya stivaté,’ wider the Siitras ‘ Vicayé laukikan syat, etc.’ (VI{—iil
—30), ‹ na vaidikam, ete.” (VITI—iii —31), and 'Tuthotpaltirtlésham, ete.’
(VU—iii—32), where ‘ éésham’ =‘ of the Dhaishnya Fires,’—should not
, have been discussed on the present occasion |

. £ADHVARYAVA’ ACTS PERFORWVED BY ADaVARYU. . 1645

For these reasons, we must take the latter assertion in the 5171140
(‘ Agnayacca svakalatvat’) as a declaration of the Siddhanta: as. we
do not find, in the Sitra, any assertion negativing the one herein
made, And with a view to this, we explain it in the following manner:

The fact of the Fires being ‘ sarvartha has been put forward, not
asa Pirvapaksha, but as a Siddhanta in reply tu a Pirvapaksha in-
ferred from what has been laid down in a कद of another Adhikarana,
the present Stra thus containing two distinct utterances (one from the
Pitrvapaksha and another from the Siddhanta standpoint. Nor does
‘sarvartha’ refer to the functions of the Fire; but it refers to the
Primary Original and the subsidiary modifications.

And it 18 In acecordance with the laws of the Anarabhyavddas
(Vide TTI—vi-—1 et seq.) as pertaiming to the Laying of Fire, that we
should put forward the Parvapaksha and the Siddhanta in conncetion
with the question under consideration ;—this question being as to
whether the Sacrificial Fires belong to the Primary Original Sacrifice
only, or to all sacrifices.

And on this question, we have the followng—

PURVAPAKSHA (A).

‘The Fires must be regarded as belonging to the Primary Original,
“Just like all details not laid down in any particular context ;—in
“accordance with the Siira ‘ Prakrtan va duiruktatvat (UIT—vi—2).”

In reply to this we have the following —

SIDDHANTA (A).

The Fires would belong to all the sacrifices, the Primary Original,
as well as the subsidiary modifications ; because they are laid down in-
dependently, by themselves.

Objection : ^° But this has been already established under the Sara :
“sarvartham va adhanasya svakalatvat’ ({1[—vi-—-15) [and as such it
‘should not be discussed over again, on the present occasion].”’

Reply; The ‘sarvartha’ mentioned in the present Sara cannot be
the same as that spoken of in connection with the Adhana. Because
if we rested on the former Adkikarana only, such things as the Fire |
in question would appear in accordance with the appearance of those
things the means whereof is dependent upon something else, and
not when they would be independent (as in the case in question) ;
and hence the Sacrificial Fires would belong only to those Darvi-Homas:
that are laid down in their form by the seriptures,—aid not to the

1646 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. III—PADA VII.—rADHL. (19).

Sacrifices ; as they would not be enjoined with regard to these. That
is to say, the Vedic declaration that we have 18 in the form—‘ yajjuhoti
tadahavantyé,’ and not ‘ yadyajéran tadahavaniyé’ ; and. this injunction
of the Ahavaniya (Sacrificial) Fire must stand in need of some such
means (for its appearance) as are enjoined, directly or indirectly, in
such sentences as—‘ yavaccaturavatianjuholi,’ ‘ Yad grahan juhoti

yaccamasan juhoti,’ and so forth. And hence in this case, the Layiny
would, in accordance with the Sara [1]—vi—2, come to be recognised
as appearing, through Implicatory Injunction, along with the Fire itself,
And it is with a view to this that in Satra ITI—vi—16, it has been as
serted as a well-established fact that the Fire belongs to the Jshtis.
So also, with regard to the Caru and Purodacas used at the Modificatory
Sacrifices, there being no Direct Injunction of the Preperation of the
offering material, there would be no direct means available for the
appearance of the Garhapatya Fire; and hence it becomes necessary to
seek for the Preparation together with the Garhapatya Fire, to appear
from out of the Primary Original Sacrifice.

Thus we have dealt with that portion of the Stira which refers to
the Fires; and as for the other (former) portion, embodying the
Pirvapaksha (B), in regard to the Priests performing all the Actions,
the reply to it is given in the following Stra, which embodies—

SIDDHANTA (B)
{which 18 put forward in the Bhashya as Adhtkarana (20) |.

Satred (40): There would be restriction of actions (to be
performed by each Priest); because of the mention of
ames ;—these being mentioned for that purpose,

Because of the presence of Names (of the Priests and the Actions
performed by them), there must be a restriction. That is to say the
name ‘Hoty’ would be wholly -useless, if the Priest bearing that
name did-not perform the actions that are named ‘ Hautra’; and
conversely unless the actions were performed by the Priest called
‘ Hot’ it could not be named ‘ Hauira.’ Consequently, on the ground
of this Apparent Inconsistency of the Names, we must regard them as
serving the purpose of pointing out certain actions as to be performed
by certain persons |
In ‘this connection some people declare as follows >.‘ The two
names (‘Hoir’ and‘ Hautra’) are applied independently of each
“other, to the Performer and the Action respectively, by mere conven

| © ADHVARYAVA’ DONE BY THU ADAVARYU. | 1647

“tion (and, not through the etymological signification of the words)
‘and itis by reason of the mere similarity of sounds that the word
Hoty’ comes to point to the fact of the priest bearing that name
being the performer of actions bearing the name of ° Hautra (and nol
because of the word ‘ Hautra’ signifying ‘ that which is performed by
‘the Holy Priest’). Because it is only when the relationship (be-
‘tween a certain word and a patticular thing) has been previously
“ established, that it serves as the ground of that word being taken
“as the name of that thing; in the case in question, however, we find
‘‘ that before the recognition of the names, there is no relationship
‘(between the words ‘ Holy’ and ‘ Hauira’ on the one hand, and
“the Performer and the Aciion on the other)
‘* That is to say, the word ‘ Moly’ is not based upon the perform-
ance of the Hautra action; because, as in the case of the word
^` ‹ Raja’ (not being based upon the ‘ performance of the Rajyas, kingly
‘duties ’), so in the present casc also, we have no declaration (of
‘ Panini) authorising the elimination of the affix (‘an') and the redupli-
‘gation of the basic noun (both of which contingencies would be in-
“volved in the word ‘ Hotr’ being taken as equivalent to ‘ Hatnlrasyu
५ karla’, the Performer of the Hautra actions). And though in the case
‘of the words ‘ Raja’ and ‘ Rajya,’ the converse holds gocd,—-i.e,
. : Rajya ’ is ‘ Rajah Karma, the Duties of the King ’—vet that
‘ could not be the case with the words ‘ Holy’ and‘ Hautra’; that is
‘to say, the word ‘ Hautra’ cannot be taken as ‘ Holuk Karma, the
“ Duties of the Hotr’; because in the case of the word ‘ Rajya’, we
° find that there are certain definite actions, such as the protecting of
‘the people and the like, laid down, by Manu ang the other law-givers,
‘‘ as the ‘ Duties of the King,’ and these being known as such, can be
"° taken. as constituting the denotation of the affix in the word ‘ Rajya’
‘while in the case of the word ‘ Hautra,’ we tind that there 18 no
‘other means (save that afforded by this name itself) by which we
“ could recognise the actions, of the Recitation of the Samidhéni verses
and: the like, as to be १००९ by the Hotr,—oun a recognition whereof
‘we could base the name ‘ Hautra.’ And from all this we conclude
“that the names cannot serve the purpose of pointing out which
actions are to be performed by which Priests
‘ Question ~ ‘The words not being taken in their etymological.
sense, what would be there to point out the fact of certam Actions
“ being done by particular Priests ? |
Answer: We have already explained above that this is done by
‘ the similarity of the words (i.e. the Hautra Actions arc recoghised aa.

1648 © TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. UI—PADA VIE-—ADHT, (19).

४८ {0 be performed by the Holr, simply because there is a similarity
‘between the words ‘ Hotr’, and ‘ Hautra’).”’ | |

Reply: All this is not quite admissible ; because if the word
‘Hauira’ be not taken as signifying ‘ the Duties of the Hoiz,’ then, in-
asmuch as, even without the signification of auy such relationship as
that of the Performer and the Action (between the Holy and the
Hautra), the Names would be capable of pointing out the performance,
by means of the conventional meanings of the words, based upon
the similarity of sounds between them; and as such, there would be
no Apparent Inconsistency that could lead to the assumption of a
Direct Declaration to the effect. Then again, the mere similarity of
sounds between two words does not always point to any relationship
(between their cdenotations) ; c.f. in the case of the words ' ala
(house) and ‘ Mala’ (garland); as we 81184]. show, later on, that there
is no relationship between the Rathantara and the Kanvarathantara
(though the two words resemble each other.)

It has been argued above that—‘ the word ‘ Rajya’ is used only
when the King ( Raja’) has become connected with certain definite
duties.” But this is not so; as in that case, the relationship (of the
word ‘ Rajya’ with its denotation) would come to have a beginning
(and this would be contradictory to what hag been said, in the T'arka-
pada, in regard to the eternality of this relationship). Consequently,
it must be admitted that, what happens in the case of the word ‘ Rajya’
is that ita relationship with its denotation is eternal, and this eternal
relationship is recognised from the scriptures, and when we come to
comprehend the correctness of the form of the word, we explain the
word ` Rajya’ after the word - Raja’ has been explained (the former
being explained as ‘ Rajiah karma’); and as such it comes to be
taken in its etvmological sense ; and hence even though the significa.
tion of the word ‘ Rajya,’ is thus spoken of as based upon that of
‘ Raja,’ yet inasmuch as this basis too is eternal, the said relationship
doés not 1086 its eternal character ;—exactly in the same manner, inas-
much as in the word ‘ Hautra,’ we find the vowel-sound of the first
letter broadened (from ‘6’ into ‘au ’), we come to explain it as formed
from the word ‘hotr’ with the affix ‘an,’ in accordance with the
Sttra ‘tasyédam karma’ [and this does not affect the eternality of the
word and its denotation]

Question: ‘ But by what means is it known that that particular
Action constitutes the Duty of that Person ए ”’
| Answer: From the presence of the names (‘ Hoty’ and“ Hautra’)

` ADHVARYAVA’ DONE BY THE ADHVARYU . 1849

we shall infer the existence of a Text to the effect (that the Actions
called ‘ Hautra’ constituie the Duty of the Pricst called ‘ Hoty ’)

Objection : ‘‘ Under the circumstances, there would be a mutual
‘ interdependence ; the Text being assumed from the Names. and the
“application of the Names being based upon the Text declaring the
‘‘ fact of the actions as to be performed by a particular Priest.

Reply : That does not affect our case: because the Names are
distinctly perceived to be applicable (to the Actions and the Performer):
and when we come to look into the basis of their application, we find
that they could not stand in need of a basis for their application, simply
because of their having been previously applied (to the Action and the
Performer) ; and as we do not find any other basis for this, we con-
clude that there must be a Text to the effect that ‘the action called
Hautra is to be done by the Hotr’; we have explained above that the
assumption of such Texts ts made in this manner, even In the case of
Indicative Force and the rest: and thus there is no mutual inter-
dependence in the case in question.

Objection: ‘In that case, the present case will have been dealt
‘‘ with under the Séira ‘ Akhya& caivantadarthateat’ (11-11-13) (and
‘ as‘such it should not have been discussed over again, on the present.
५ ocossion).”

Reply : True, it has been dealt with on the former occasion; but
on that occasion we did not discuss the question of the contradiction or
non-contradiction of Name with Direct Declaration, etc. In the present
Adhikarana, however, we find that Capability and Context indicate
the fact of all the Actions being performed by all the Priests promis-
cuously,—while the Names show that certain actions are to he per-
formed by particular Priests only,—so that there is a seeming contra-
diction between these two (Context and Name); and this contradiction
is explained away in the manner shown above. Or, it may be that the
present Discussion has been introduced on the present occasion, simply
by way of an introduction to the following Adhikarana + and hence it
cannot be regarded as a mere uscless repetition

207

ADHIKARANA (21).

[{n certain cases we have to reject the indication of Names, as to the
particular Priest performing a certain action. ]

920६0८८ (41): The Action is spoken of as to be performed
tn accordance with the Direct Injanetion and the
Specific Nume.

[The question being as to whether the conclusion arrived at in
the foregoing Adhikarana, is to be accepted as universal—the Ptirva-
paksha is that it 18 so; and on this we have the following Stddhanta.}

A specific Name, like a specific Direct Injunction, is much quicker
in its operation than a common Name; and as such sets aside the
indications of this latter.

Svtra (42): Such too are the Indications.

The sentence that the Bhashya quotes as affording the Indications
spoken of, is-—‘ Yatra hotuh prataranuvakamanubruvata etc.’; but this
indicates the performance of actions by certain Priests as pointed out by
a Common Name; and hence we should look out for another sentence
that could afford the Indications as to the performance being: pointed
out by Specific Names |

ADHIKARANA (22).

[The Anuvacana (Recitation) and the Prazsha (Direction) are to be
done conjointly, by the Maiiravaruna Prtest |

Sttra (48) ; © All Reciting and all Directing isto be done
“by the Maitravaruna, because of the Direct In-
junction to that effect.”’

It having been established that the indications of Name are set
aside by Direct Injunction, we now proceed to consider the question,
as to whether they are set aside wholly, or only partially.

In connection with the Jyotishtoma, we find the sentence-—‘ Y’asman
Mditravarunah preshyati canucaha ca’; and with a view to show the
exact place where the sentence occurs, the Bhashya mentions the
‘Agnishomiya.’ The two actions spoken of in this sentence (ie,
Reciting and Direrting) are found to be named ‘ Adhvaryava’ and
‘ Hautra’ respectively; and these names distinctly indicate the fact of
all Reciting being done by the Adhvaryu, and all Directiny boing done by
the Hoty; whereas we find the sentence quoted direotly laying down
that these two actions are to be done by the Mailravaruna Priest.
And hence there arises the question as to whether this Direct Injunc-
tion rejects the Indications of the two Names, with regard to all
Recitings and Directings, or only with regard to only a few of these.

And on this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

. Inasmuch as we find the sentence distinctly laying down the
“ Maitravaruna with reference to the Recsting and the Dtrecting,
- no significance can ‘be attached to the words expressing the fact
० of the two actions appearing conjointly ; as all that the word ‘ca’
ˆ" expresses is that the two actions might be dealt with conjointly, or
“ separately (one following in the wake of another), and not that they
“ qualify, or.are dependent upon, each other,—these two facts being
‘always expressed by means af compounds; nor do we find any
०८ grounds for taking one of them as following in the wake of another;
“as both sare found to be equally importan®; and hence it must. be
‘“'admitted that both should be done. And as this would be possible,.

1652 = TaNTRA-vARTIKA. ADH. II[-—PADA VII.—ADHI. (22).

‘even in the case of all the Recitings ००१. Directings being dune
^“ separately, we conclude that, inasmuch as the sentence makes the
‘‘ declaration in a general form, it must be taken as pertaining to all
1 (९८९४1045 and Directings

+
SIDDHANTA.

Stitra (44): The Direct Injunction would apply to the
case of the (Reciting of the) Puronnuvakyd only; be-
cause Of this latter being accompanied by the Direc
tive words

The sentence in question could not apply to all Recitings and
Directings ; it must be taken as applying to the Reciting of the
Puronuvakya verses only; as it is only these verses that end with
certain Directive words; and it is in connection with these verses that
we find the Direct Jujunction under consideration.—‘ Tasman maitra-
varunuh etc.” And the Puronuvakya verses ending in Directive words
are found in the section of ‘ Hautra’ Actions; and hence, on account
of this name ‘ Hautra,’ thev would be recognised as to be recited by
the Holy only (and hence it is with regard to these verses alone that
the sentence in question sets aside the indications of the Name). ।

At the end of the Puronuvakya verses, we find the word ‘yaju’
(‘ Sacrifice,’ in the Imperative) ,—and this sacrificing is found to belong,
by Implication, to the Adhvaryu, in connection with subsidiary modifi-
cations of the Jshli—sacrifices. And as regards the Soma-sacrifices,
the word ‘ yaja’ is precluded (from the Adhvaryu), as shown under
Sttra IlI—viii—22, and relegated to the Maitravaruna, as shown
under Sttra ‘Tesham yato vice-shahk syat’ (III—viii—2l). Or, inas-
much as the Directing person would do both (the Reciiny and the
Directing), we could take the Muitravaruna to be the person directed,
in accordance with the law to be explained later on (vide Sutras ILI—
vili—22 et. seq.) : and in that case the Directing would be done by the
Holy himself. Similarly, inasmuch as with regard to the Adhvaryu
we find a distinct Directive word laid down in the sentence--‘ Adh-
varyok praishyah etc.’,—-we must preclude the word ‘ya@ja’ from all
connection with him; and hence in this case, it would come.to belong
to the Pratiprasthaty Priest, As for the other Recttings and Directings
(than those dealt with above), inasmuch as the particular persons
who are to perform them are already known, they do not stand in
noed of any Injunctions with regard to their performers; and-as such
the Injunction with regard to the Mattravaruna Priest cannot apply
to: them |

- ANUVACANA AND PRAISHA DONE BY MAITRAVARUNA L65

As for the Puronuvakytis however, they are to partake of the
nature of both (Recitation and Direction), on account of their ending
with Directive words; but even then, their recitation constituting a
single action, they could not be performed by more than one person
consequently they become precluded from all connection with the Hotr
as well.as the Adhvaryu (with whom they are connected by the names

Adhvaryava’ and ‘Hautra,’ the former belonging to the portion mado
up of the Difective words, and the latter to the Mantra-portion) ;
and as such they stand in need of an [njunction as to the Priest who
should do their recitation ; and then. on account of the close proximity
(of the mention of these) to the Injunction of Maitravaruna (in the
sentence in question),—it is only right that we should accept tho
Maitravaruna as the person who should recite the Puronuvakya verses
(and also address the Directive words accompanying them).

And in this manner, the word ‘ca’ also (in the sentence) comes to
be taken in its direct sense of the concomitance (or aceruing togcther)
of the two actions of Rectting and Directing,-- which is possible in the
case Of the Puronuvakya verses only; as it is only these that are
found to end in Directive words also. But it does not follow from
this that the Directive words ‘ Praishya’ and the rest also belong to
the Maitravaruna himself.

92८9८ (45): Also because we find the Hoty mentioned
in connection with the Prataranucika (the Morning
Recitation ).

[As a matter of fact, we find a distinct Injunction laying down the
tact of the Morning Recttation being done by the Hoty Priest; and
this would be contradictory to the sentence 7Jasmat, etc., if this latter
were taken as laying down all Recilations as to be done by the
Maitravauruna Priest. This contradiction is avoided by taking this
latter sentence as laying down the Recitation of the Puronuvakya
verses only as to be done by the Mattravaruna.|

ADHIKARANA (23).
(The Camasa-Homa should be done by the Adhvaryu.]

Stttra (46): “ The Camasa-Homa should be done by the
© Camasadhvaryus,—because of their Name.”

[With regard to the Camastidhvaryu Priests, there arises the
question as to whethor the offering of the Cups in Homa is to be done
by these or by the Adhvaryu. ] |

And on this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

८ All that is done by means of the Cups, are the actions of—(l)

“ Unnayana (Fetching of the Soma), (2) Asadana (keeping of the Soma),

“ (3) Homa, and so forth and though there 18 a likelihood of every enc

« of these actions being relegated to the Adhvaryu,—yet on account

“of the specific name (that is given to the Camasadhvaryu Priests, we

‘cannot but conclude that all these actions are to be done by these
“ latter.”

SIDDHANTA.
Sttra (41): The Adhvaryu should do them; because of
the Law relating to the Adhvaryu.

The indications of the generic Name are set aside by those of the
spucific one, only when the latter operates independently of the former,
As a matter of fact, however, we find that the name ‘ Camasadhvaryu’
only denotes the fact of the persons thus named acting like the
Adhvaryu (with regard to the Cups), (and so this name is not indepen
dent of the ‘ Adhvaryu.’) And under the circumstances, if the Adh
varyu were not to perform the Homa, the other Priests performing it
would not be ‘ acting’ like the Adhvaryu ; in fact it would be only by not
performing the Homa that they would be acting like him. While if the
Adhvaryu perform the Homa, then it might happen that ou certain
occasions, the Adhvaryu being otherwise engaged, the Homa might be
done by others, who would thus come to be acting like the Adhvaryu
Hence. it must be admitted “that the Homa is performed by the
Adhvaryu... | |

, ~. CAMASA-HOMA DONE BY ADAVARYU. 165

Sutra (48): Also १९८८1696 of other Priests being spoken of
| 22४ connection with the Cups.

[We have the sentence—‘ camasanccamasadhvaryavé prayacchatt.
tan sa vashatkartré haraty, which shows that it is some other Priest,
who, having performed the Homa out of the Cups, hands over these
Cups to the. Camasadhvaryu|. Because the sentence distinctly speaks
of the Camasadhvaryu as the person carrying the Cups to the Vashat-
karty Priest; and as a matter of fact, the Cups could be carried to this
latter for no other purpose than that of eating the Remnants contained
in the Cups; thus then, inasmuch as there could be no ealing of that
out of which no Homa had been offered, it is clear that the person
handing over the Cups in the first instance for eating, must be the same
that performed the Homa; and as the Camasadhvaryus would be en-
gaged in the mere holding of the Cups handed over to them (by the
person who has offered the Homa),—the sentence must be taken as
showing that the Homa is offered by some one other than the Comasa-
dhvaryu ; and this can be no other than the Adhvaryu Priest.

Sitra (49); It is only in cases where the Adhvaryu
would be unable to perform the Homa, that the
Camasadhvaryus could be recognised as his sub-
stitutes.

[It is the fact of their acting in place of the Adhvaryu, upon which
the name ‘ Camasadhvaryu’ is based.|

ADHTKARANA (24).
[The Cyéna and the Vajapeya are performed by many Priests. |

Sutra (50): * On account of the Vedic Injunction (Name),
‘even in cases where the actions happen to be
“mentioned in different Sections of the Vedaus,—they
“should bedone in accordance with the Injunctions,
‘Sas in the previous case.”

[We have the Cyéna sacrifice laid down in the section on ‘ Audgaira,’
and the Vajapéya in the section on‘ Adhvaryava ;’ and with regard to
these there arises the question as to whether all actions in connection
with the Cyéna are to be done only by the Udgatr Priest, and those in
connection with the Vajapéya by the Adhvaryu only, or, in both cases,
they should be done by the several Priests. |

And on this question, we have the following —

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘It has already been explained, under Sitra IL{—iii—9, that the
८“ subsidiaries are always named after that section of the Veda in which
‘their Primary Original is found to be laid down. Consequently, all
५१ 8010108 laid down as to be performed in connection with the Cyéan
^ have to be done by the Udga@ir Priest only (as they would be named
८ ‹ Audgatra’ on account of their Primary, the Cyéna being laid down
८ 111 the Audgatra section of the Veda).

SIDDHANTA.

Sittra (51): Because of its taking in the details of the
Primary Original, the Action, along with its Sub-
sidiaries, should be done, as connected with its own
accessory detatls, as laid down by the (Implicatory)
Injunctions ; spectatly as (the particular performer
is) not distinctly indicated (by the Nume), tts in-

dteation can be accepted only in cases (where there

.- ave no Injunctions to the contrary) |

॥ =. [४ has been shown, before, and will also be shown later on, that
. the sentence, assumed as injunctive of the performance of the Sacrifice

GYENA AND VAJAPRYA PRREFORMED RY MANY PRIESTS. 1657

as one complete whole, is always weaker, in its authority, than the
Implicatory Injunction (' Prakphvad Vikrtitt’) + because the former
appears long after this latter. ‘Then, as a matter of fact, we find that
the Name (` Audgaira ’) of the Primary would apply to the Subsidiaries
only through the said assumed sentence: and even though this is
directly perceptible, yet it is weaker than the (inferred) Implicatory
Injunction. Because until the Subsidiaries are laid down by this
latter Injunction, whose performer would the said assumed sentence
point out १ (Hence being preceded by the Implicatory Injunction,
the assumed sentence becomes very much weaker in authority). Then
again, as soon as the subsidiaries are laid down, they are always recog-
nised ag having a particular Performer, and as such they do not stand in
need of any mention of their Performer: and hence there is nothing
that the name (‘ Audgatra’) could do for them. Nor is it possible, in
the present case, to take the name as setting aside what has been pre-
viously pointed out; because inasmuch as it is necessary for the
Name to assume a corroborative Direct Declaration, it is very much
farther removed from its objective than the Implicatory Injunction ;
specially as we have already explained above that only those means of
knowledge that have their basis duly ascertained, can set aside what
has been laid down before and not those whose basis has still got to
be ascertained.

For these reasons we conclude that, on account of its taking up
the accessories of the Primary, by the fact of the Injunction, the
Action (Gyéna) should, like the Jyotishtoma, be performed by many
Priests. Though at the Primary Original also, multiplicity of Per-
formers is due to the Names (‘ 01} ` and the rest), yet, inasmuch as
in this case, the relationship of these Performers with the performance
is duly ascertained, the Indication of Name is accepted to be as
authoritative as Direct Declaration itself.

As for those details mentioned in connection with the Cyéna which
do १०४ belong to the Primary Original, the performer of these would be
pointed out by the Name of the Primary Sacrifice. It is with a viey
to this that the Sara adds— Avyaktah Gésé.” That is to say, in
the case of such Details, inasmuch as the relationship to any particular
Performer has yet got to be assumed, it is ‘ not clear’; and as such
this could apply to actions other than those with regard to which this
relationship has already been ascertained.

But we do not find any case that would be quite amenable to this
law. As for the case of the ‘ Kantakavitodana’ etc., cited in the
Bhashya, it would be natural to ask whether thev are mentioned in the

208 9

1658 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. UI—PADA VIT.—ADHI. (24).

section of the Veda named after the Primary Sacrifice, or in a wholly
different section. If the former, then, in that case, their Performer
would be pointed out by the Name, and not through the Primary Sacri.
fice. If the latter, then, even though this would be directly applicable.
yet it would be set aside by the former more authoritative specific
Name. If the aid of the Law of the Primary and Secondary (Sttra 111.
iii—9) be called in, then the Stotra-Castra ot the Jyotishioma, bemg sub-
ject to the name ' Adhvaryava’ would come to be done by the A dhvaryw
(which would not be desirable). Nor have we, in this connection, at
our disposal the explanation that was given in regard to the sentence
‘ Mandram pratahsavané, ete’ (Vide, 1 11-11-26).

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Names of the
subsidiaries are not set aside by the Primary. Because the Name of
the subsidiary is due to its uniform relationship to the Performer, —and
as such, is not caught hold of by the Primary. Nor is it possible-for
the subsidiaries to bear, through the Primary, the names of ‘ Adh-
varyava, etc. Nor again is it possible for the Primaries to be related
to such names as ‘ Adhvaryava’ and the like; because the operation
of such names rests in the accessory detail of the Performer. And
that Name which is not operative in connection with the Primaries—
how could that Name apply to the subsidiaries through those Primaries ¢
As for such names as ‘ Rgveda’ and the like, these are compatible,
with regard to the Primaries as well as to the Subsidiaries ; because these
names are based upon the fact of those Actions being ‘ done by means
of these (Rgveda), etc.’ and this fact being capable of being enjoined
by the assumed sentence laying down the performance of the Action
as a whole, it is quite possible for these Names to apply to the Subsi-
diaries also (as these are also included in that sentence). As for the
names ‘ Adhvaryava’ and the like, however, these are based upon the
fact of the sentences mentioning these Actions being found in those
sections of the Veda; and as such they would apply precisely in accord-
ance with the actual mention of the Actions (and as such they could not
apply to the Primaries and the Subsidiaries alike). Nor is there any
thing objectionable in the acceptance of the Law of the (Primary and
the Secondary) (Stiira I1]—iii—9) in the present connection.

Then as for the Kantakavilodana, etc., they should be taken as
having their originative Injunctions in the same Veda (as the Primaries) ;
and hence with regard to these, the declaration,’ Avyaktah Céshé,’
becomes quite justifiable.

Nor is it absolutelyeneccessary that it is only that Name which
comes through the Primary, that can be accepted (in connection with

CYEN A AND VAJAPBYA PERFORMED BY MANY PRIES'rs. 1659

the Subsidiaries) ; because as these namex would have their require-
ments fulfilled all the same, there would be nothing incompatible in their
being accepted, or not accepted, directly, with regard tu the subsidia-
ries themselves (without the intervening agency of the Primary).
Consequently, 1४ must he admitted that the Name is operative towards
the pointing out of such accessories only as are distinct from those
belonging to the Primary (the subsidiarics having their needs supplied
either directly, by themselves, or indirectly, through the गना कए)

Thus ends the Seventh Pada of Adhvaya LI.

ADHYAYA [ 1 |.
PADA VILI.
ADHIKARANA (1).
(The Purchase is to be done by the Master. |

Sttrva (1): The Purchase (of the Priest’s Services) as to be
done by the Muster; as the sacrifice is performed for
his safe.

By way of an exception to the Indications of Name. we proceed to
take up the following question: ‘Is the Purchase to be donc by the
Adhvaryu and the other Priests. on account of its being mentioned in
the Adhvaryava and other sections of the Veda,—or is it to be done
by the Master of the Sacrifice 2° And the Stddhania represented in the
Sitra ; © Anya va syat parikrayamnandal’ (LL —vtt-—20) could be possible
only after the Sidhhanta of the present Adhikarana has been fully
established.

On the above question we have the following --

PURVAPAKSHA.

“What should be done by the Master ts that he should have
` recourse to some such ordinary method (as imploration ete.) asx
“ would induce the Adhvaryu to effect the purchase of the services of
“the other Priests, with the property of the Master; and in this way
“alone could we Justify the name of ' Adhraryava’ (of the section in
` which the Purchase is laid down).”’

In reply to this, we have the following—

SEDDHANTA.

An ordinary wordly method can have had recourse to, only in a
case where no other Vedie method is available ; in the case in question,
Inasmuch as we have the distinct Vedic method of giving the Sacrifi-
cial Fee, why should recourse be had to the worldly methods of (winning
the co-oper&tion of the Adhvaryu) ! ¢

1662 TANTRA-VARILKA. ADH. ILI—PADA ए —-ADHI. (1).

That is to sav, it is only through his having purchased the services
of all the other Priests, that the Master has been shown to be the
actual ‘ Performer ’ of the sacrifice, and if he were not. to do even thc
Purchase of the others’ services, then (all other actions being performed
by the Priests), he would not be the ‘ Performer’ of any action. [1
might be argued that he would acquire that character by having re.
course to certain ordinary worldly methods. But that could not be.
Because in the absence of a Direct Declaration to the contrarv, we can-
not set aside the fact of the Master himself being the ‘ Performer.’
And hence it must be admitted that the Purchase is to be done by the
Master himself.

Stitra (2): It could be done by others, only in cases
where we would have «a direct declaration to that
effect.

In the sentence ‘ elam ishtakam upadadhyat satruvarandadyat, the
Parasmavpada ending in ‘ Upadadhyat’ distinctly shows that the action
referred to in this is not to be done by the Master (the enjoyer of its
Result) ; and hence from this it follows that the ‘ giving of gifts ` here-
in laid down is to be done by the Priest. But if the Priest does this
work, on account of his services having been purchased by the Master,
by a method laid down in the scriptures, then in this case also, we have
the Master himself as the ‘ performer’ (indirect) of the action (of the
giving of gits); if however the Priest refuses to do it, for the payment
he has received for doing the other actions, then it becomes necessary
for the Master to have recourse to the ordinary worldly methods (for
securing his necessary co-operation).

ADHIKARANA (2).
[The Purificatory Rites of Shaving. cte., pertain to the Master.

१7700 (3): © All purificatory vites resting upon the
“capability of Mar (to undergo them), they should be
“done just like the Sacrifice, in accordance with the
“name of the particular section of the Veda in
‘Swohich they are laid down.

[In this connection we find laid down the &haring of the Head and the
Beard, the Cleaning of ihe Teeth, and the Bathing. And with regard to
these there arises the question as to whether these are to be done by
the Adhvaryu, or by the Master. And on this question we have the
following—]

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘* Inasmuch as without these purificatory rites, the Priest would
‘“not be a perfect Performer,—it must be admitted that they should
“be done by the Adhvaryu, in accordance with the Name, ‘ Adhvar-
‘yava,’ of that section of the Veda, in which we find the [Injunctions
‘of the Rites in question.”’

SIDDHANTA.

Sutra (4): They belong to the Master ; as their principal
effect consists of the enabling of the Master (to ex-
perience the Result); just as the Principal Action (of
giving away belongs to the Master.

Inasmuch as these Rites tend principally to the bringing about
of a capability in the Man, they must be regarded as belonging to the
Master. It isonly when the Performer is looked for as a secondary factor
that the Name is accepted as indicating which action should be done
by which Person. As for the Master however, we find that he has been
indubitably recognised as the Principal Performer (of the Sacrifice).
Nor are the Rites in question meant to create in him the character of
the Performer; this character is found to be’ possible even without
these. Then what is not duly accomplished, without the due perform-
ance of these Rites, is the Final Result of thé Sacrifice. ‘Then again,

1664 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. TH—PADA VITI.—ADHT. (2).

as for the result accruing to the Priests, which consists of the obtain.
ing of the Sacrificial Fee,—we find that this is duly accomplished, even
without ६ performance of the Rites in question. But as for the Result
accruing to the Master, we find that this is not duly accomplished,
unless the Rites are duly performed. For this reason 16 must be ad-
mitted that these should be performed by the Master; just as the
Principal Actions, being calculated to lead to certain results desired by
Man, are performed by the Muster (and not by the Priests who perform
only those Actions that are caleutated to help in the performance of the
Sacrifice).

Then, inasmuch as these Rites belong to the Master, exactly in
the same form in which they are done in ordinary life,—it cannot: he
held that the Adhvaryu is to get hold of the tooth-brush, and clean the
tecth of the Master And as for the shaving of the Head and Beard,
these are always done by the Barber: and the Master is spoken of as

8 ‘ Performer’ simply because it is he who directs the Barber to do
it; and hence in this case also, there is no chance of the Razor being

held by the Adhvaryu.

Satra (5): Also because of the mentiou (being in that
form).

[Inasmuch a8 in the case of the Action being one that is done by
the Adhvaryu, we have the Tjunction in the Parasmarpada form —e.g
‘tamabhyanakti, —whenever we find one in the Almanépada we 08110100

but conclude that the action is meant to be performed by the Maste
himself.

Sitra (6); Beeause the action is spoken of as subser.
vient to the Person (it cannot be regarded as having its
performer pointed out by the Name, assigned in Satie 5).

It has been argued above that—“ like other actions, these Rites
would have their Performer marked out by the Name of the Vedic
section in which they are found to be mentioned.” But such a name
can serve the purpose of pointing out the Performer, where the Injunc-
tion stands in need of the mention of one; and the need is found to be
present only in the case of those Actions, for the performance whereot
the services of the Priests are engaged ; as this engaging (Purchase) of
services is done with a view to making the Performer subservient (to
the Main Action), and not with a view to a purification of him, With
a view to this, it is said—‘ 171 (he case of the actions of shaving,’ etc

PURIFICATORY र PERTAIN ‘TO YASTER. 1665
that is to say, in the case of these actions, we find that the action is
mentioned as subservient to the Person, and as such their Performer,
being already marked out, if we were to assume their relationship
with other Persons, this would have to he assumed without. the Actions
standing in need of any such relationship; while in the case of the
actions that are spoken of as the principal factor, such relationship ts
already established by the fact of the Injunetion standine in need
of the mention of the Performer. |

Siitra (1): Also because of the Rites being laid dawn
with reference to the resultant Apitirea,.

Inasmuch as the Purificatory Rites are laid down with reference
to the resultant A parva of the Principal Action, they must belong to the
Master ; as it is only when belonging to the Master that they could be
taken up by the Apéirva ; because this latter is most intimately related
to the Master. Or, for the sake of the accomplishment of the Apirva,
the Rites must belong to the Master.

Sutra (8): They could not be regarded as betonqging
equally to both (the Waster and the Priests); beeatise
of dissimilarity.

Objection: © By the above reasonings the Rites are found to be-
‘long to the Master; while by Name, they are shown to belong to the
* Priests ; and hence we could take them as belonging to both; as
"ˆ there would be no incongruity in this. Specially as the Rites being
` purely purtficatory, and as such of a secondary character, there
‘would be no incongruity in their being repeated (performed over and
“over again), with reference to each principal factor (of the Persons,
`" the Master and the Priests).”’

The Reply to this is as follows: This cannot be; because of all
actions in connection with the Sacrifice, there are some that have to be
performed by the Master himself, while the rest are to be got done by
him, through the Priests engaged for the purpose. Even if the Punfi-
catory Rites were performed by the Adhvaryu, etc., inasmuch as
they would in that case be incapable of being done by Purchase (of
services), they would neither be done by the Master himself, nor got
done, by him, through the hired services of others; and as such
they would cease to be auxiliaries to the Sacrifice. Consequently
they cannof be regarded as belonging equally so the Priests and the

Master.
®

209 ४

ADHIKARANA (3).
[The Penances are to be done by the Master. |

Sutra (9): The Penance also (belongs to the Master) :
because it ts done for the sake of a particular re-
silt; just as in ordinary life.

[In connection with Sacrifices, we find certain penances laid
down.—e.g. ‘should not eat for two days’ ‘for three days,’ and so
forth ; and with regard to these there arises the question, as to whether
these are to be done by the Priests. or by the Master. And on this
question we have the following—].

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘As the doing of Penances is always painful (and is not de-
‘‘ sirable for its own sake), the person doing it must be regarded as the
‘‘ subservient factor; and as such it must be accepted as pointed out
“by the Name (of the Vedic section in which they are found to be
‘ mentioned).

In reply to this we have the following—

STDDHANTA.

Inasmuch as, like the Purificatory Rites, the Penances also
serve the purpose of creating a capability of experiencing the Results
of Actions,—and as the unobstructed capability that has to be created
is that of the Master, and not that of the Priests.—they must be re-
garded as to be done by the Master.

Capability, in all cases, is of two kinds: one that removes un-
desirable qualities, and another that brings about fresh desirable ones.
As a matter of fact we find that Purificatory Rites belong to the latter
category, while Penances belong to the former: Whoever sets about
performing the Jyotishtoma and other sacrifices is bound to have, in
himself, certain undesirable qualities, due to his having, either in the
present or in past lives, done something sinful, in the shape of the neg-
lect of his necessary duties, and the performance of prohibited actions.
And if these are not removed they would surely bring about results
contrary to the accomplishment of the Final Result of the Sacrifice ;
and hence they would obstruct the fulfilment of this Result, even

PENANCES DONE BY MASTER. 1667

though the sacrifice may be performed perfectly, without any discre-
pancies. And consequently, the Sacrifice stands in need of some agency
for the removal of these obstacles. And then, inasmuch as we find
the Penances laid down in the same Context, we must regard these as
according some aid to the Sacrifice And the aid accorded by them is
taken, on the grounds of Mutual need, Provimity and Capability, to be
in the form of the removal of the aforesaid undesirable qualities.

Specially as the Penances bring some pain to the Performer,
it ean, by that Pain, set aside the aforesaid sins that tend to obstruct the
accomplishment of the Apirva, Just as the slight pain, caused by
the performance of the Expiatory Rite, ts accepted, on the ground of
Direct Declarations to that effect, to set aside the Adharma (sin) tend -
ing towards the bringing of much greater pain;— so in the same
manner, we could also have in the case in question (the Pain caused by
the Penances setting aside the sins tending to obstruct the realisation
of the sacrificial A piirva).

As for those Penances that are laid down distinctly asx accessories
to sacrifices, or as leading {७ desirable results,--inasmuch as it is not
necessary for them to accomplish any other results,—and as there 1s
no need of the removal of any obstacles,-~they must be regarded ag
leading to such desirable results as Heaven and the like. But those
that are laid down by way of Expiatory Rites, can lead to no other
result, save the removal of the obstructing Sin. And so all the Pen-
ances cannot be regarded of one and the same form and character.

Sutra (10) : The subsequent declaration also is to the
scaiee effect.

In continuation of the Infunction of the Penances, we have the
declaration ‘atha medhyatamah’ (‘he becomes capable of performing
excellent sacrifices’); aud this mention of the ‘ capability of perform-
ing sacrifices’ must be regarded as pointing to the fact of the Pen-
ances being performed by the Master (who is the actual Performer of
Sacrifices).

$ (11): They could be done by others, when there
would be a divect declaration to that effect.

. As in the case of the ‘ giving of gifts, in the foregoing Adht-
karana, so in the present ease also we have the distinct declaration of
‘the Priests fasting’; and in view of this Direct Declaration, this
particular Penance of Fasting cannot but be regarded as to be done
by the Priests. ध

ADHIKARANA (4).
|The ‘ Red Turban’ etc., belong to all the Priests. |

Stra (12): Inasnech as they are Accessory Details,
(secondary factors: their performance could not be
regulated by the Name of the Vedie section tn which
they happen to be mentioned.

[Some people explain this Sutra, as shown in the Bhashya, as
embodying a reply to the assertion that the Penances should be done
by persons indicated by the names of the Vedic sections in which they
happen to be mentioned. |

But.as this reply has already been given in Sutra (6), the
Bhashya proceeds to give another explanation. There are certain de-
tails which, though having the character of Purificatory Rites, are
distinctly laid down as pertaining to the Priests,--e.g., the ` Red Tur-
ban for the Priests’ ‘at the Cyéna) the ‘ golden necklaces for the Priests’
(at the Vajapéya) ; and with regard to these there arises the question
as to whether these belong to the particular Priest indicated by the
Names of the Vedic sections in which they happen to be mentioned
or to all of them.

And on this question, we have the following—

PURVAPAKSHA.

“The ‘Red Turban’ ete., are found mentioned in particular
sections of the Veda, named the ‘ dudyatra’ etc. ; and as such, even
‘though they are Purificatory in their nature, yet, imasmuch as they
‘are done to the Priests, in accordance with the Direct Declaration
"“ (* Lohiloshnisha Rtvijah’), they cannot but be regarded as having their
“ performers marked out by the Name (of the Vedic section in which
‘* they are laid down).”

SLDDHANTA.

The amenahilitv of such accessories as those in question being set
aside by the fact of their being distinctly puriticatory in their nature,
the Declaration, by which they would be transferred (from the Master)
to the Priests, would also connect them with all of them. That. is to

“RED TURBANS’ &©, BELONG TO ALL PRIESTS. 1669

say all that the sentence ‘ Lohitoshnisha Rtvijah’ docs is to lav down
the ‘Red Turban‘ with reference to the Priests; and as such there
would be no incongruity in these being repeated with each of the Priests,
in accordance with the Law of tho Repetition of the Secondary with
each Primary; and hence the presence of the * Red Turban’ with all
the Priest could not be set aside by the Indication of the Name (of the
Vedic section in which the sentence occurs). And hence there could be
no restriction as to the Details in question belonging to any particular
Priest only.

ADHIKARANA (5).
(The Desire for Rain belongs to the Master. |

Sitra. (13) : The Desire also (belongs to the Master) (८५
it is he who ts related to the purpose served by the
Sacrifice,

[In connection with the Jyotishioma we find the sentence—-* Yad:
kamayét varshét parjanyat nicaissado minuyat ; ` and with regard to
this there arises the question as to whether ‘ Desire for Rain’ pertains
to the Master or to the Priest. |

As the desire for the Principal Result is definitely ascertained ,—
(1) on account of the Atmanépada ending in ‘ Yajéta, (2) on account of
co-extensiveness, and (3) because of the Aimané pada affix in Adadhita,’—
as belonging to the same Person who performs the Principal Action ,
hence what remains doubi/ul is only the particular person to whom the
Desire for the Minor Result belonys ; and on this question we have the
followmg—

PURVAPAKSHA

“The Desire for Minor Results, such as those mentioned in con-
^" nection with the Sadomana, are pointed out--by the Parasmaipada
८८ ‹ afix in ‘minuyat '—as belonging to the same person who does the
^“ Sadomana ; and hence there can be no doubt as to that person being
‘pointed out by the name (‘ Adhvaryava ` of the Vedic section in
‘ which the sentence occurs), as the Adhvaryu.’

And in reply to this we have the following—

SIDDHANTA,

The Atmanépada ending in the word ‘ Yajéta,’ which occurs in-
connection with the Principal Action (to which the Sadomana is subsi-
diary). distinctly shows that all the desires connected with the whole
Performance belong to the Master only. That is to say, from the Con-
text it is clear that ` yadi kamay#i’ is always to be taken as ‘ yadi
kamayél yajyamanah’ ; and hence the Result cannot but be regarded
as belonging to the Master. :

In fact the Ponasmaipada ending in‘ minuyat’ also, which denotes

DESIRE FOR RAIN BELONGS TO MASTER. 1671

an action of the Adhvaryu, is quite explicable in accordance with
the Stddhania view; as otherwise, if the Result, following from the
action expressed by the root ‘ Dumii’ (to throw) (in ‘ minuyat’),
were meant to belong to the same Person that would do the Mana (i.e.,
who would be the nominative of ` winuyat,’ the Adhvaryu Priest) ,—
then, inasmuch as the Root is a ‘at!’ one. we should have had the
Atmanépuda ending (in accordance with Panin’s Silra: ‘srarda nitak
kartrigamini kriyaphale’” Andas this Direct Declaration (in the shape
of the Parasmaipada ` minuyal’) would set. aside the co-extensiveness
(1.6 the fact of the Desire and the Sudomana pertaining to the same
Nominative) indicated by Syatactical Connection, there would be
nothing incongruous in this. Or. we might retain the said co-exten-
siveness indicated by Syntactical Connection, as quite compatible
with the Siddhanta, by taking it as based upon the Adhvaryvu’s Desire
being in the form—‘ may the Master obtain the Rain that he destres.’

The word ` lntha@’ (‘also’) in the Siva is meant to show that the
conclusion—‘ samakhyaud na myamyaté’ (‘the Name does not res-
trict the performance as being done by a certain Person ')— arrived at
in the previous Adhikarana. applies to the present case also.

Sutra (14): The Desire would betong to others, wher
it would be spohen of as such.

In the other Adhikaranas the Sttra has had ‘in cases where we
have a direct declaration to that effect ’; but inasmuch as there is no
such Direct Declaration in connection with the subject of the
present Adhikaranu, we have the Sitra simply saying ‘in a case where
it is spoken of as such.’

The sentence— Udgala Glmané® va yajamanaya va yam kamam
kimayelé tamagayati’—clearly indicates the fact of the Desired Result
belonging to both (the Udgaiy as well as the Master) ; (1) because of
the mention of the word ‘va’ (‘or’), and (2) because of the Dative
(in ‘Gtmanz’ and ‘yajamanayc’) distinctly pointing to the fact of
the Action being for the sake of both. |

ADHIKARANA (6).
(Lhe Mantras beginuing with Ayurd@’ belong to the Master. |

Siitra (15): The Mantras also, that are not instrumental
in the perforneance of any actions, are like the
Desire.

[In regard to such Manlras as—-’ Ayurda agné ayur mé déhi.
‘yarcoda agné asi varco mé déhi’ etc., ete.,—there arises the question
8 to whether these have to be recited by the Priests. or by the
Master. And on this question, we have the following—|

PURVAPAKSHA.
“These Benedietory Maniras, not being connected with any
‘“ action, must be regarded as to be recited by the Person indicated by
“the Name (of the Vedic section in which they occur). Because
‘“ there are no results to follow from them: because the Mantras are
‘not injunctive, and there can be no reason for the assumption of
° results following from what is not enjoined. As for the Hope ex-
‘‘ pressed in the Mantras, that could serve the purpose of encouraging
“the Adhveryu, as much as the Master.”
In reply to this we have the following—

- SIDDHANTA.

They must be regarded as to be recited by the Master. Because,
having no distinct results of their own, they could not but be express-
ing the Hope for the Results to follow from the Principal Sacrifice.
And there can be no doubt that this latter Result 1s to be hoped for
by the Master, and not by the Priest; as the Result accruing to the
latter,—viz., the obtaining of the Sacrificial Fee,—would be accom-
plished even without the due fulfilment of the Principal Result ; and
because this Result (the Fee) being obtainable from the Master, could
not be asked for from Agni.

If the Priest should ask for these Results, from Agni, for the sake of
the Master, that would not be compatible with the expression ‘ mé d2ht,’

which distinctly shows that the Result is asked for by the speaker for
himself. : १

MANTRAS BEGINNING WY'TH ‘AYURDA’ BELONG TO THE MASTER. 1673

Hence if must be admitted that it is the Master himself who is to
recite this Manira.for the purpose of encouraging himself, by the
delineation of the desirable Results to be obtained from the Principal
Sacrifice.

Sutra (16): Specially as we find the Mantras recited
duying his absence (from the place of Sacrifice).

We find that these mantras appear along with certain other Wantras,
—such 88 ‘Iha éva san tatra santam, etc.’—which are to be recited by the
Master, by way of a worshipful address to Agni; and the words of the
latter Mantra distinctly show that it is to be recited by one who is
absent from the place where the Agnihotra is actually performed. And
this shows that the Recitation belongs to the Master, and 101. to the
Priest ; because a Priest that would be absent from the place of Sacrifice,
would no longer be a Priest; as he would not be connected with the
Sacrifice. As for the Master, even during his absence, the materials
offered in Sacrifice must be those that belonged to him and which he
had set aside (mentally given away) for the Sacrifice; and as such he
would continue to be related to the Sacrifice, as its Master (even during
his absence).

And inasmuch as the other Benedictory MWanlras—‘ Ayurda, etc.'---
are similar in character to the Mantra ‘ lha éva san ete., just treated
of, they too must be regarded as to be recited by the Master, and not
by the Priests.

210

ADHIKARANA (7).

| Mantras mentioned jn two sections of the Veda are to be recited
by both the Priests indicated by the names of those sections. |
Smtra ll): Mantras mentioned twice ave to be vreeited
by both: as thus atone could the repetition be
Justified, |

In connection with the Darca-Pirnamasa we find certain Wanlras
mentioned in two parts of the Veda-—-e.g. that with which the Butter is
taken up, ‘ Pancananivaratanan, elc.’ is found mentioned in a general
way in the Adhvaryava section, and again more specifically in the Faja-
mana section. And with regard to this there arises the question as
to whether this Mantra is to be recited (1) by both conjointly, (2) or by
one or the other, optionally. (8) or by the Adhvaryu alone, or (4) by
the Master alone. And on this question—the Pareapaksha is that—
It should be recited either by the Adhvaryu only, or by the one or
‘ the other. ophonally.”’

In reply to this we have the Siddhania, that both (the dAdiwaryu
as wellas the AZasier) should recite it.

Objection < ^ Inasmuch as the Mantra is more specifically men-
‘tioned in the section named ‘ Yajamana,’ it should be recited by the
‘* Master only.”’

Reply : A specific Name is accepted to be more authoritative, only
when the Mantra is mentioned but once. When however it is mentioned.
separately, in the generic and as well as the specific section,—if we
were to accept the indications of the Specific Name, then the mention
of the Mantra in the other section would be absolutely purposeless.
Further, when the specific and the generic pertain to the same object,
the former sets aside the latter. Andin the case in question though
hoth treat of the same Mantra, vet as its mention is distinet in
the two cases, the two must be regarded as pertaining to diverse
ubjects. ‘Then again. we must find some use for the two distinct men-
tions of the Wantra+ and there can be no other use save that it should
be recited by both persons. Consequently it must be admitted that
hoth (the Master and the Adhvaryu) should recite the Manira.

Objection ~ “ Of the two mentions, one may be taken as serving the

MANTRAS MENTD. IN TWO SECS. TO BE RECI'TED BY BOTH PRIESTS. 1670

५ purpose of showing the form of the Mantra, and the other that of
“pointing out the use to which i¢ should be put. And then, inas-
‘much as Mantras are meant to verve the purpose of indicating the
‘actions to be performed,-—and as the primary action aud its subsi-
‘diaries have all one and the same performer, -the Waatra should be
recited by that Priest who gives his name to the Vedie Section in
‘which the «ction of holding the bulter (which is indicated र the
** Mantra) may be found to be laid down. Beeause it is only in such
‘cases that the Jlantra, being eoguised as to be used, comes to stand
in need of a Person who should use it. And as for the mere pointing
out of the form of the Mantra, that could be done. even without its
‘ being used at the time of the performances of an Action, by a mere
reading of the Vedie text. As a matter of fact, we find that the
‘© Holding of the Buller is distinctly found to be laid down in’ the
८ Adhvaryava section ; aud as such the Muntra should be recited by the
Adhearyu only, and not by the Master.”

Reply: The mention of the AMrtulre tu the Yayamana section also.
—even though it be meant merely as showing the form of the Mantra,

and not as connected with any action, —-leads us to belteve that it ts

$ ¢

to be wed: and as such (शला) in this case, it stands in need of ४ person
who could ase it: and the fact of its being mentioned in the Yajamana
section shows that ib is to be used by the Jajamana (Master).

Question: «` What special purpose would he served by such use of
`` the Mantras 7”

duseer: 1६ is necessary for the Jaster tu examine (keep an eye
on) the actions, just in the same manner as tt is necessary for the
Adhvaryu to perform them. And in cases where no Mantras are laid
down for the Jlaster, the examining would be done in olher ways ; in
the case in question however, we find the Wantras distinctly laid down
for the Sacrifice ; and hence the cxamining would be done by means of
these Mantras. And the use of the Wantras would lie in their serving
as the means of examining the ddhvaryu’s doings.

ADHIKARANA. (8).
[It is only the Learned that is to be made to repeat Mantras. |

Siitra (18): 7८ {$ only the learned that is to be made to
repeat (Mantras); as an ignorant person ts not
spoken of (in connection with Sacrifice).

We have certain sentences laying down the fact of the Master
being made to repeat certain Mantras ; [and with regard to these there
arises the question as to whether the Jearned and the ignorant master
alike are to be made to repeat them, or the learned only. And on this
question, we have the following |

PURVAPAKSHA.

“The Ignorant too can be made to repeat the Mantra, in parts:
“and as such it is both the Learned and the Ignorant that ate to be
‘“made to repeat the Mantras; or, inasmuch as the Learned would
‘himself know the Manlra, there would be no need, in his case, of
‘ another person prompting him in the repeating of the Mantra,—it ts
‘the Ignorant only who is to be made to repeat.”

In reply to this, we have the following --

SIDDHANTA.
The Ignorant person is not spoken of (in connection with sacrifices).

That is te swy, if the study of the Veda had been laid down along
with the declarations of certain actions as to be performed with a view
to vertain desirable results,—then, it would be possible for the Igno-
rant Master tu be taught the Vedie texts, even at the time of the per-
formance. Asa matter of fact, however, the study of the Veda is laid
down, without reference to any particular action, in the sentence
‘tusmal svadhyayo dhyétavyak.’ And as, in accordance with this, there
would be many persons, knowing the Veda, available for sacrifices,
there would be no Apparent Inconsistency (to justify an Ignorant
Master repeating the mantras); and consequently all sacrifices would
‘pre-suppose a knowledge of the Veda as a well-established fact, just
like the Laying of Fire; and they could not point to the fact of the

THE LEARNED ONLY SHOULD REPEAT MANTRAS. 1677

Veda being taught at the time of the performance. Nor would the
texts, taught at the spur of the moment, be called ‘ Veda’ (as the
proper study of the Veda has to be made under certain very rigid
conditions). Consequently, only those Mantras that have been got up
before the performance of the Action commenced, could be accepted
as accessories to that Action ; and hence no Ignorant person can be
entitled to the repetition of A/antras at sacrifices.

Evon in the case of the Master knowing the MJentras, we could
have a person urging him to repeat the Mantras; just as we have the
Priests addressing the several Directions to one another (though every
one of them knows quite well what is required to be done); because
even though the Master might be quite capable of reciting the Alantra,
yet he cannot do it until urged to it (bv the Adhkearyu). And as
for this urging or prompting, this can be done in two wavs: (1) the
prompter could go on repeating the Mantra part by part (and the
Master would be repeating it after him), or (2) he would simply ask
him to recite (and the Master, knowing full well which Mantra was
meant to be recited, would go on with the recitation).

The Bhashya puts forward the question : ` " Knowledye of hoiw much
of the Veda ts necessary for a person being entilled to the repelition of the
Mantras ?’’ This question is caleulated to clear the question raised by
the upholders of the Va¢ieshtka and other systems of philosephy as to
a knowledge of their own philosophical systems being necessary for a
person befvre he is entitled to the performance of sacrifices.

The reply to this question, given in the #hashya is-—‘ Knowledge
of that much of the Veda is necessary, as would render him capable of
performing the duties devolving upon him, —this reply being based
upon the fact of the knowledge atfording a perceptible help to the
Sacrifice through creating (in the Performer) a certain capability (tend-
ing to the proper accomplishment of the Sacrifice). That is to say,
though the whele of the Veda is included in the ‘ svadhyaya’ (° Vedic
study › laid down by the Injunction ‘ svadhyayo’ dhyclavyah), yet inas-
‘much as the Mantra and Brahmana portions dealing with the Jyolish-
toma could be of 110 use to one performing the Dargu-Pérnamasa, the
absence of a knowledge of those portions could not incapacitate the
person from performing these latter Sacrifices, Similarly inasmuch as
a knowledge of the /shti portion of the Veda would make a man cap-
able of performing the Jshtis, only that portion of the Veda would
constitute the ‘svadhyayu’ for one who would be performing them
But the whole of the Veda is studied, because it is not known which
action and at what time, one wight be called upon to perform,—as all

1678 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH III-—-PADA VIII.—ADHI. (8).

actions, the nitya, the naimittka and the kamya, are performed as occasion
presents itself (there being no fixed time for these). Consequently, if
he read only certain portions of the Veda, there might be occasions
when he would be called upon to perform Sacrifices with a view to
certain results,—the Vedic portions relating to which he may not have
read: and not knowing these he would be incapable of performing
these Sacrifices; and as such, would be excluded from its performance
Then again, the reading up of these portions at the time of the per-
formance would not be counted as ‘ Vedie study’; as this has a fixed
time for it. like all observances ; nor would such a reading be accepted
at Sacrifices, which have all their requirements fulfilled by the Veda
studied in the right style (as done during a period of Brahmacarya, etc.,
ete); and hence the employment of such a person would create a
disurepancy in the performance. Then again, inasmuch as ° Vedic
study? is not included in the texts laving down the performance of
actions with a view to certain desirable results, all sacrifices stand in
need of the Veda as studied in accordance with the generic Injunction
of Vedic study, not laid down with reference to any particular Action -
२10 as such it is necessary for the whole Veda to be studied during the
period of Brahmacarya. Uf through some inherent Incapacity, one
could not read up the whole at that tinie,—and he manages to get up
the portions relating to the Agniholra and the Darca-Parnamasa, ther
this much of knowledge would not fail to entitle hin to the perform-
ance of these Actions.

Such being the ease, the knowing of the branches of knowledge
other than the Veda (i.e. the various systems of Philosophy etc) would
bo very far from being necessary (for the performance of Sacrifices).
As for the knowledge of Self, however, inasmuch as without such
knowledge one could not take up the Sacrifices (which are always
done with a view to certain transcendental results accruing after
death),-—it must be regarded as necessary for the performance of all
Sacrifices (Vide Clokavarttuka-—section on “ Atmavada ’).

ADHIKARANA (9).

| The Twelve Drandvas are to be performed by the 1 Ahraryu . |

Sata ( 19 ¦ : ** Being wmcutioned inthe 1 76/40/7141 section
“Of the Veda, the Actions should be done by the
oe Master

[In connection with the Darca-Pirnamasa, are laid down the
twelve actions---" Valsamupavasrjati’ and the like; and with regard
to these there arises the question as to whether these Actions are to be
done by the Adhenryu or by the Master. And on this question, we
have the following|.—

PURVAPAKSILA,

“The twelve Dvandva-Actions in question are found meptioned
“in the Fajamane as well as the Adhvaryava section of the Veda: and
‘as such, being like Alaniras mentioned in the two sections (dealt, with
‘under Sulra 17), they could not Le performed by both (the Master
“and the Adhvaryu) ; and hence, through the name ‘ Yajama@na’, the
‘Actions in question should be regarded as to be performed by the
‘* Master.’

SIDDHANTA.

41/11. (20): The Adhvaryu should perform thems as it is
jor the sake of these (that he ts appotnted): the
Indications of the Name (* FYajyqamana’y too world
justify that procedure.

Until the Actions have actually made their appearance, thev do not
acquire the character of ‘Dvandva’; and as there are no words in-
junctive of them (in the Yajamann section), they cannot be regarded as
having their original appearance in that section; as a matter of fact,
they have their appearance in the dAdhvaryava section. And with
regard to the actions thus originatively mentioned in this section,
there arises a desire to know who their Performer is: and the fact of
the services of the Adhvaryu having been engaged for the performance
of these Actions marks out the Adhvaryu ag the required Performer
of these Actions ; and hence there would be no further Jesire to find out

1680 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. ITI—PADA VITI.—ADHI. (9).

their Performer, at the time that the same Actions are spoken of as
‘ Dvandvas’ (in the Yajamana section) ; and as such they could not be
regarded as to be performed by the Master (on the strength of the
name of this latter section).

Thus then we find that the simple performance of the Actions not
being connected with the Master, it is only the Dvandvata (Coupling)
of these that could be done by him. (But this too is not possible) ;
as the Coupling too could not possibly be done by a person other
than the actual performer of the Actions; because the Coupling is to
be done immediately after the Actions have been performed; and
when all Actions are performed by one Person, their Coupling could
not be done immediately after their performance, if it were done by
another Person. Nor would it do to make the Actions also performed
by the Master, for the sake of the immediate Coupling. Hence, in
accordance with the Law relating to Contradiction of the Accessories of
Subsidiaries (७2८१८, XIT—1ii,—25), the Coupling too must be regarded
as to be done by the Adhvaryu (and not by the Master).

Then, as for the name ‘Yajamana’ (of the section in which the
Couplings are laid down), its indications would be duly observed, by
the fact of the Master calling the attention of the Adhvaryu to the
Couplings of the Actions performed by the latter.

ADHTKARANA (10).
[ The Adhvaryava-Karana should be performed by the 017. ]

Stétra (21): When there is mutual ineompatibility, the
Karan Mantra should be recited (by the Hotri);
because of the inherent relationship (between the two).
The other Vantra should be vecited: by another
Priest, who may have special veasous for doing it.

In connection with the Sacrificial Post at the Syotishtoma, we
have two Mantras—one to be recited by the Adhvaryu, ‘Parivirasi
ele.’ which is descriptive of the [nstruamentality of the tving of the
Rope, and another to be recited bv the //ofri ‘ Yuva 51८10520 ९/८. , which
is descriptive of the actual Z'yeng,-—hboth of which are recited simulta-
neously, by the two Priests, at the Primary Sacrifice (Juotishtoma) ;
and these same Mantras come to be used at its Modification—the
Kundapayinadmayana (in accordance with the Law that the Modifica-
tion is to be done in the same way as the Original) ; and inasmuch as at
this particular Sacrifice (of the Kundapayinamayana), the duties of the
Hotyi and the Adhvaryu are pertormed by the same person (in accor.
dance with the Injunction ‘Yo hola so ’adhvaryuh’); and as such
the recitation of both Mantras being impracticable, it becomes neces-
sary to recite only one of them, and reject the other. And there arises
the question, which one of the two Mantras should be admitted
and which rejected.

And on this question, we have the following —

PURVAPAKSHA,

“In the first place there can be no hatd aud fast rule as to
“which one of the two should be recited. Or, it may be that in-
“agmuch as the Hotri has a well-established character, the Injunc-
“tion ‘Yo hota 50 ‘adhvaryuh’ must be taken as laying down
“the duties of the Adhvaryu as to be one by the Hotrt; and as
“such at the Sacrifice in question, the Hotri cannot give up any of the
‘accessories belonging specifically to him; and as such it his Mantra
*(* Yuea guvasa, etc.’) that should be rejected (and not that which
५ belongs to the Adhvaryu, Parivirasi ele.’).

211 ति

1682 . TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. HL-—PADA VIIL—ADHL (10),

SIDDHANTA.

When both cannot be used, and one has to be rejected, it is the
Karana-Manira (‘ Parimrasi etc.’) that should be admitted, because of
the particular inherent ‘relationship.

In connection with this some people offer the following explana-
^“ tion: “The ‘inherent relationship’ spoken of could be nothing else
‘ but the close proximity to the Principal. And hence, inasmuch as
“that which is descriptive of the Tying would be an extraneous
‘‘ factor in the Tying it would be a remoter auxiliary than the other
‘* which is descriptive of the Instrumentality; as this latter forms an
‘integral part of the Tying, and as such is more nearly related to
it (and it is for this reason that the former Mantra ‘ Parivirast ete.’
‘* should be rejected).”’

But this explanation 18 not tenable; as the said ‘proximity’
could not serve as the ground for the admission of one of the Mantras.
Because if the Performer would come to the Action, (the Reciting)
through the Principal Action (the Tying), then in that case, a proxi-
mity or non-proximity to this latter could serve as a determining
factor. But as a matter of fact we find that the said Performer is
got at, both as regards the Primary and the Subsidiaries, by means of
the Name and the Implicating Injunction. Nor is the present case
subject to the Law of the Contradiction of the Accessories and Subsi-
diaries (५2८70 XII—ii—25) ; as both the Mantras are equally Accessories.
Nor does the mere remoteness of the aid imparted make the accessory
imparting such aid the less authoritative, when this accessory appears
in another action ; as this also falls in with the action. In fact, the
Manira sought to be rejected is not a remote Auxiliary either; as it
serves the purpose of bringing about a visible purificatory effect, by the
contrivance of the remembrance of the Tying being performed. Hence
we conclude that the ‘inherent relationship,’ of the Manira belong-
ing to the Adhvaryu, spoken of in the Séira, is that consisting in the
fact of the connection of this Mantra (with the Tying) being distinctly
perceptible; while that of the Mantra—that belonging to the Hotri—
can at best, be only inferred. Thatis to say, in the Implicatory Injunc-
tion laying down the * Hotri’ and other priests, these words being used
in their direct original signification—with reference to the Actions that
are spoken of in connection with the word ‘ Adhvaryu’ and the like,—
we cannot but conclude that the relationship of the Hotri with these
Actions is only one to be inferred, while that of the Adhvaryu is
distinctly perceptible

Adhvaryava Karana P¥R¥YORMED RY HOTRI. 1683

It has been argued above that, “the Hotri, without renouncing
his characteristic details, becomes connected with the J/anitra belong-
ing to the Adhvaryu.”

But he could have been thus conuected, only—(1) if the Holrt-
character depended wholly upon the recitation of that Mantra, or (2) if
the Adhvaryu had been laid down with reference to the MWanira related
to the Holrz, or (3) if the duties of the Adhvaryu had been laid down
with reference to the (10/11. Asa matter of fact however none of these
contingencies is possible. (1) Because, the character of the Holy: is as-
certainable from the presence of 4 certain capability, and even if that
character were determined by any action, there would be thousands
of such actions (done by him) that would serve to mark out the Holri
priest. (2) Nor is the Adhvaryu laid down with reference to the actions
belonging to the Hotrt; because the two words (1047 and ‘ Adhvaryu’
denote two wholly distinct persons; and as such (in the sentence * yo
hota so’ dhvaryuh’) there could be no co-extensiveness between the
words (in their direct significations) ; and as such it becomes necessary
to take one of them in their indirect secondary signification ; and then
it is a well-known fact that all such secondary significations are assumed
on the ground of certain incongruities or inconsistencies (of the Direct
signification) ; and as a matter of fact, we do not find any grounds
for assuming such an indirect signification for the word ‘Holy,’ as this
is the first to appear in the sentence (and the inconsistency appears
only after the sentence has been concluded with the word ‘ Adhvaryuh’);
and hence, according to the Siéra X11—ii—23, we must take the word
‘Holri’ in its direct signification ; and as a necessary outcome of this,
the word ‘ Adhvaryuh’ should be taken as indicating the ‘duties of the
Adhvaryu’ ; and with reference to these the (4047 would be laid down ;
and these would serve certain useful purposes in connection with the
Sacrifice, which cannot be said of the Performer (Hotr:) ; and as in all
such cases it is the principal factor with reference to which sume-
thing is laid down, the Hotri, if enjoined, would be the subordinate
factor; and as such he would have to be connected with only such
of his own accessories as would be compatible with the Principal
factor (‘duties of the Adhvaryu, with reference to which he has been
enjoined). (3) And if the sentence be taken as laying down the * duties
of the Adhvaryu’ with reference to the Holri (and not the Hotra for
these duties), then, inasmuch as only those of these duties would
come in to be performed by the Holyi as are compatible with his own
duties, there would be no abandoning by tha Hotri of any of his own
specific duties. And under the circumstances, the ‘dultes of the

1684 TANTRA-VARTIKA, ADH. HI--PADA VIII. ADHE. (10).

Adhvaryu’ would come to be merely purificatory of one not related to
the Original Sacrifice; and as this would be far from desirable, it is the
contrary view (that the Hotri is laid down as reciting the Adhvaryu’s
Mantra) that has been accepted. And hence it must be admitted that
it is the relationship (to the Holi) of the ‘ Mantra belonging to the
Adhvaryu’ that is directly perceptible; and hence being the principal
factor, this would be the Alanira recited (by the Hotri who 18 not to
recite his own Manira).

Against this, some people bring forward the following objections :—
‘* In the case in question neither of the two Mantras should be dissociat-
‘ed from the Hotri. Because, there could be an incompatibility in
०५ the two Mantras (being recited by the same person) only if they were
‘ meant to be recited at one and the same time; in the case in question,
‘“ however, we find that the Karana-Mantra is to be recited before the
“action, while the other is recited afler the Action has been performed.
८: That is to say, in accordance with the Law ` Mantrantena Karma-
५ disannipatah’, the Karana-Mantra is always recited before the Tying,
‘while the other Manlra (descriptive of the Ariyamana action) is
“ recited after the Z'ying has been done. And as such there would be

no incongruity in the Holr: reciting both these Mantras

Reply: It is nob so; because the Kriyamana-character (i.e. the
character of being performed) persists from the Sankalpa, a mental
operation of the Agent, to the end of the Action; and hence if the
action of T'ying were called up by the completion of the Action
immediately preceding it,—then all the said time (from the Sankalpa
to the end of the Action of T'ying) would be the time for the reciting of
the Mantra descriptive of the Kriyamana (and as such the recitation of
the Karana-Mantra at this time would be wholly incongruous, there
being every likelihood of the time of the one overlapping that of the
other)

Objection : ‘* But even then inasmuch as the Karana Mantra would
‘be recited before the aforesaid operation of the Z'ying (beginning
< from the Sankalpa), there could be no incongruity (no chance of the
‹* said overlapping)...”

Reply: Not su; because the Karana-Manira, ‘ Parivirasi ete. can
not indicate all the following: the Sankalpa, the getting hold of the
Rope, the Sacrificial Post which has not yet been brought in, and the
Tying which is but partially coming to appear; and as such this
Manira could not but be recited by the Priest standing near the Post:
when the Prineipal Action has been begun (and not before that)

Objection: ` But even then, inasmuch as the Action (of Tying)

Adhvaryava Kuranu PERFORMED BY HOTRI. 1685

‘ would continue for a certain length of time, the two Mantras could
‘ 06 recited at different periods of it, and thus too there would be no
^ meongruity in the reciting of 00४0."

Reply: Why should there be no incongruity, when both the
Mantras actually come to be recited at one and the same time, the
time for the Karana-Mantra being indicated by the Order of Sequence
mentioned in the Brahmana—passage—‘ yipaya pariviyamanayanu-
brihs,’ while the same time 1s also indicated for the other Mantra also,
by the force of the same Direction (‘ yipaya etc.’)? Nor is there any
authority for regarding the Mantra descriptive of the Kryamana as to
be recited at any one period of time during the performance of the
Action. Because we find that the Recitation of that Mantra is called-
up by the Direction addressed (to the Hotri) immediately after the
Holding of the Rope; and being a long Mautra it takes up all the time
from then till the end of the Action (of 7'ying); and if the Advaryu’s
Mantra—i,e. the Karana-Mantra—were to come in during this time:
it could not be admitted without interfering with the recitation of the
former Mantra.

Objection: ‘‘ Under the circumstances, it being found necessary to
० reject cither the simultaneity of the two Maniras, or the fact of their
“ being recited by the same person,—it would be more reasonable to
¢“ reject the time (i.e. the simultaneity), as its cognition appears long
“ after that of the subject under consideration; and there would be

, «५ 0 ground for rejecting their intimate relationship to the same
‘ person (Reciter).”’

Reply: Such could have becn the case if, in stepping over the
time of the Original, the Mantras did not fall off from their purpose.
As a matter of fact however, if any of the two Mantras were to be
recited at a time other than the Original, if would certainly fall off
from the purpose pointed out by its own Indicative force ; and thus in
this case we would have a contradiction ot. Linga (Indicative Force).

Objection: ‘‘This Indicative Force would be set aside by the
‘superior authority of the Direct Declaration—* Y6 hota so’ adhva-
“ryuh’.”

Reply: 1४ would have been set aside if this sentence had in-
volved a Direct Declaration (of one and the same Person reciting both
the Mantras); as a matter of fact, however, the sentence indicates
this fact only by means of Syntactical Connection; and this too
has been found to be based upon Indirect Secondary Signitication.
Because we do not find any word of the senfence directly expressing
that ‘the Mantras belonging to the Holyt and the Adhvaryu are to

be recited by one and the same Person’; in fact this is indicated
by the fact of the two words ‘ Hota’ and ‘ Adhvaryuh’ appearing in
the sentence as Co-extensive; and we have already shown above that
such an indication is always due to Syntactical Connection; and this
too has been found to be possible only by taking the word ‘ Adhvar-
yuh’ as indirectly indicating the action (Mantra) related to the
Adhvaryu. (And certainly such an Indication based upon a far-fetched
Syntactical Connection could not set aside that based upon the
aforesaid Indicative Force.)

Objection: “The Indicative Force also, depending upon the
‘Implicatory Injunction, would be very much removed from its ob-
‘fective. The Syntactical Connection would beset aside by the Indi-
“cative Force, only on account of the former being removed from its
“objective; and in the case in question, the case would be quite the
reverse (inasmuch as the Indicative Force would be further removed
‘from its objective than the Syntactical Connection would be from its
own). Becauseasa matter of fact, until the presence of the Mantras
‘‘has been pointed out by the Implicatory Injunction, they are not
‘recognised as to be recited at the same time. Consequently it must
‘be admitted that the fact of the Mantras being recited by the
‘same person is more authoritative than that of their being recited
‘at the same time.’

Reply: It is true that we have to accept the Implicatory In-
junction; but that is for the sake of the form of the Mantra, and
not for that of the Indicative Power. And as for the admission of
the Injunction for the sake of the form of the Mantra, that is
common to both, Indicative Power as well as Syntactical Connection.
And when the two Mantras have been duly laid down as to be recited,
their Indicative Force becomes equal to any Direct Injunction.

Objection: `" {018 could have been the case, if the Implicatory
“Injunction laid down the Mantras as to be recited. As a matter
‘of fact, however, this [njunction cannot lay down the two Mazniras,
“in contradiction of the unity of the Reciter as laid down by the
‘Direct Injunction (‘yo hata so’ dhvaryuh). Though Syntactical
‘Connection could not lord it over Indicative Power,—yet if the
‘form of the Mantra were laid down by the Implicatory Injunction,
“even the subsequent recognition of incompatibility would enable
“us to reject the said Injunction; and thus the very basis of the
“Indicative Force having been cut off, the Indicative Force itself be-

comes very much weakened.”

Reply: It is only when two means of knowledge contradict each

Adhvaryava Karana PERFORMED BY HOTRI, 1687

other that one is set aside by the other; nor can an unrecognised con-
tradiction be the cause of such rejection. And in the case in question,
at the time that the Implicatory Injunction is laying down the Man-
tras, no such contradiction (or incompatibility) is recognised. And as
for the incompatibility perceptible after the Mantras have been laid
down, we have already shown that in all such cases of subsequent
recognition of incompatibility the Indicative Force is endowed with
the superior authority. |

Tf, in the case in question the fact of both the Mantras being
recited by the same person were indicated by Syntactical Connection
itself, then, there might have been some ground for accepting this
Connection as possessed of superior authority. Asa matter of fact,
however, what is laid down is the connection with the Holrt, of the
Mantra helonging to the Adhvaryu, and not that of the Manira
helonging to the Holri himself; as the reciting of this latter ts indica-
ted by the Implicatory Injunction (1.6. this Mantra is recited by
the Hotri at the modification simply because of its being so recited
at the Original Sacrifice; while as for the other Mantra being recited
by the Hotri, that is aspecial provision meant for the Modification
only, laid down bv the sentence ` Yo hota elc.’). Consequently if the
sentence ‘yo hota efc.’ were to reject the other, on the ground of
its indications being directly perceptible, then, the Name itself
would come to set aside the Connection, with the Hofrt, of the Mantra
descriptive of the Kriyamana (i.e. the Mantra ‘yuvd suvasah etc.’).
And in that case, there being no incompatibility between the
indications of Indicative Force and Syntactical Connection, there 18
nothing that could be set aside; and we would obtain the recitation
of the Mantra belonging to the Adhvaryu. While if we were to accept
the fact of Indicative Force being possessed of superior authority,
in the manner shown above, then, we would fall upon something most
undesirable (i.e. we would have the recitation of the Manira belonging
to the Hotri only, the other being wholly rejected); and that would
lead to the very object of the sentence “Yo hold etc.’ being wholly
set aside (by the said Indicative Power); as the object of this sen-
tence is the connecting of the Hotrt with the Mantra belonging to the
Adhvaryu, and not that of the Hotri with the Mantra belonging to
himself. And hence in that case we would have the recitations at the
Modification (the Kundapayinamayana) exactly in the same way as we
have at the Original Primary Sacrifice (of the Jyottshtoma).

For these reasons it must be admitted that, on account of the
peculiar inherent relationship (expressed by the sentence ‘yo hota

1688 VANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. 111-- 1414 VIU.—ADAI, (10).

so’ dhvaryuh’ the Karana- Mantra (belonging to the Adhvaryu) should
be recited by the Hotr1,—thereby setting aside the indications of
the name ‘ Adhvaryava’, as to the Mantra bearing this name being
recited by the Adhvaryu, which could he possible (at the Modification)
only through the Implicatory Injunction (that ‘the Modification is to
be done in the same wav as the Original Primary ’).

ADHIKARANA (11).

(The Directing, and the Action commissioned are to be done by
different persons. |

Svitra (22); Ja the case of Directions also, (the Action
commissioned should be done by a person other than the
Director); because Directions always refer to another
person.

[In connection with the Darca-Pirnamasa, we find certain Diree-
ons laid down—such as ` prokshanirasadaya’ ete. ete ; and with
regard to these there arises the question whether the Person addressing
the Direction is the same that is carrying out the Direction, or they
are dillerent. And on this question, we have the following— |

PURVAPAKSHA.

“Inasmuch as both the Direction and the Action commissioned
‘thereby are equally subject to the Name *Adhvuryava, both should
“be regarded as to be done hy one and the same person-- viz: the
` ` Adhavryu.

(061९८07 ; ‘How could there be a Direction of one’s own self ?

“Reply: The words under consideration are no /imperalive Direc-
“tions; the Imperative ending is only meant to indicate that the
“lime for the particular action has arrived.

“The upholder of the ‘Direction-theory’ retorts: ‘If the Im-
‘‘ perative in the sense referred to by you were addressed to one’s own
‘self, then, certainly, we should have the affixes of the First Person.
‘Phe Second Person, in the sense of you, could not be possible unless it
“were meant for another person. If however the word be taken as
४ Directions (to somebody else) it is only right that there should
“† 06 the endings of the Second Person.’

“ Renly; The fact of the words being imperative directions 18 set
‘aside by the very fact of the utterance of these words, and the per-
‘*formance of the action commissioned by those words, being done
‘by one and the same person,—as 18 distinctly indicated by the name
“+ Adhvaryava’; and then, in that case, the words could not but be

“taken as’laying down the udvent of a particular time: and then there
| 212 ४

1690 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. tI—--PADA VIII.—ADHI. (11).

“arises the question whether this time is that of the Actions or of
“the Performers; and it 18 at once concluded that it is that of the
‘actions; hecause it is these that, being enjoined, have heen pre-
‘‘ viously recognised as having an origination; and hence the recalling
“of the time for their performance is found to serve a perceptibly
“useful purpose. Jf the tome were taken as pertaining to the Per-
“formers, then the case would be wholly the reverse of it (the purpose
“served being, at best, only an imperceptible one). Then as for the
‘Second Person endings, it has been used simply because the affix
‘of some particular Person was necessary in a Verb; and there is
‘no special significance attaching to the affixes of the particular
५: Pergon used. In fact it is the action itself which is addressed thus,
“*vour time has arrived.’ If the word were taken as signifying
“the advent of the time of the Performer, then, he would stand in
“need of being told that for the doing of which the time had arrived.
‘* And if he were meant to be told that ‘ his time for the doing of the
“ Asidana of the Prokshani ९८८. had arrived,’—then, the Direction
‘being a qualified one, there would bea syntactical split. And for
“this reason we must take the word as pointing out the advent
‘© of the time of the Action to be performed.

‘Tf, however, the sentence be taken as real Directions, then, too,
८ they could not but be taken as addressed to one’s self, the speaker
‘“ himselt being taken as the director and the dtrected, in view either of
“the difference between the Body and the Bodied soul, or of the
‹‹ different conditions of his own life.

‘¢And thus there can be no doubt as to the addressing of the
‘¢ Directions and the performance of the Actions commissioned therein,
“ being performed by one and the same person.”

In reply to the above, we have the following—

SIDDHANTA.

The Directions are to be addressed by another person; because
by their very nature, they refer to another person; just like Purchase.

It has been argued above that the sentence in question is not a
real Direction ; but that is not admissible; as the form of the Mantra
itself clearly shows that the words involve areal imperative Direction.
11 we were tu set aside this by the indication of the name ‘ Adhvaryava,’
‘as to the two being done by one and the same person.—then that
would mean the setting aside of Indicative Power hy the Name, which
is an absurdity. Nor could this contradiction of Indicative Power be
explained away by taking the words as signifying the advent of time ;

DIRECTING AND AOTION COMMISSIONED DONE BY DIFF. PERSONS. 1691]

because in that case, the presence of the affix of the Second Person
could not be explained. Specially as unless the action were spoken of
by means of another word, the word in question could not be taken as
addressed to the Action, in the sense of-- your time has arrived.’
Even if this were possible, it could not serve wiv perceptible purpose»
because as a rule such words are addressed to living persons only.
The admission of the difference in the various states of one’s own self too
could not serve any perceptibly useful purpose : and apart from this,
such interpretations would involve the necessity of having recourse to
secondary significations, while it has been already shown that Alantras
are to be used in connection with aetions signified by them directly.
Hence, even though the [mperative were tnken as signifving the
advent of tame, yet even then it could be addressed to some one else;
and as such the fact of its being done by काकी person remains
untouched.

Nor would this involve a syntactical split; as the Diresvion would
be with regard to a qualified object. Inany case it would be necessary
to admit this object being a quelified one; because of the words
‘Prokshani’ ete Nor does the signification of many things by a
single word constitute a syntactical split, as we can never avoid the
fact of all Verbs signifying at one and the same time, such distine!
objects as—the Action, the Performer, its number, the ‘Transitive or
Intransitive character of the Verb, the particular Person, aud the
Bhavana: and hence we cannot but admit of such a qualified Injune-
tion as we have in the sentence in guestion. In fact, if we were to
take the words as signifying the Advent of lime, masmuch as the
Second Person and the Aclion would be wholly distinct, we would have
to assume two distinct expressive potencies in the word (and so it would
be in your case that there would be a syntactical split). In the case
of the words being taken as Directions, inasmuch as these are always
addressed to Second Persons, the use of the Second Person affix might
be taken as used by way of mere descriptive reference ; in fact it is only
thus that we could justify the name of ` Madhyaima (Second)—Purusha
(Person).’ |

Thus then, the Indicative force of the words setting aside the
Indications of the Name ‘Adhvaryuva,’ the Directions should be ad-
dressed by one person, and the uction commissioned therein should be
performed by another.

ADHIKARANA (12).

[The Direction and the Action are to be done by the Adhvaryu and
the Agnidh respectively. }

Sutra (23) : The Adhvaryu (should perform what is com-
“missioned); as is distinctly shown (by the Veda).”

[Now then, there arises the question as to whether the Direction
is to be addressed by the Adhvaryu to the Agnét, or vice versa, And
on this we have the following—]

PURVAPAKSHA.

‘We have the declaration—‘ Yadanvancan dharayét vajrénadk-
“varyum kshinvita’—or as otherwise read. ‘ Vajrodhvaryum kshin-
१ १८. 10 is a well-known fact that the Sphya is held by the
‘“‘Agnit; and hence the declaration ‘ Adhvaryum kshinvita’ distinctly
“shows that it is the Agnit wielding the Sphya who is to address
“the Direction.

“Question: ‘Wherefrom do you get the injunction of this 4 01041
(° 88 the Director ?’.

^ Answer: In accordance with the Satra XU—ii—-25, inasmuch as
“the Direction is a subsidiary action, it is only right that there should
‘be an elimination of the Nominative of this subsidiary, and not
“of the Principal Action. Then again, there are many actions com-
‘‘ missioned, while the actual Direction is one only ; and for this reason
‘also, im accordance with the Sitra--‘Bhiyasam syat sadharmaivat,'—
“(the Performer as indicated by the name ‘Adhvaryava’ should be
‘‘ taken as pertaining intact to the action commissioned by the Direc-
“tions,—of which actions there are many, and as such as it is only
“right that that whereof the number is large should be given the pre-
‘ference in the matter of relationship with the Performer indicated
“by the name]; and hence the Adhvaryu being regarded as the Per-
‘former of the actions, we cannot but take the other, the Agnit, to
‘be the person who addtesses the Directions.” ‘

“ADHVARYU’ REFERS TO THE AGNIT. 1693

SIDDHANTA

Sttra (24): The word ‘Adhvaryu! would indirectly
apply to the Agnit; because of the siimilurity of the
dutics (of the two Priests).

In accordance with the Sutra X1J—ii—23, it is only proper that,
through priority, it is the Direction that should have for its Performer
the person indicated by the name; nor, at that time. is there any
incongruity perceptible in the acceptance of this person as the ad-
dressor of the Direction ; in fact it is after the Direction has been ad-
dressed by that person (the Adhvuryu), that the performance, by the
same person, of the Actions cominissioned therem bemg found to
be incongruous, the p rformance of these is relegated to another
person. And as the Direc/or has got some sort of a nominative agency
towards the actions performed under his Directions, the said ad-
justment of the functions of the two Priests would be quite in keeping
with the name ‘ Adhvaryava’ (as the directing Adhvaryu would have
an agency with regard to the actions perfortined by the Agnal under his
directions). Otherwise (if the Agni! were to do the Directing) in
regard to the Direction, there would be total rejection of the tndica-
tions of the Name: as it would be neither done nor got done, by the
Adhvaryu. Hence it must be admitted that the Agaei performs the
actions, when directed by the Adhnaryu.

Then as for the declaration ‘ Fajrénadhraryum etc” we can take
the word ‘Adhvaryu’ as referring to the Agnil, as performing the duties
of the Adhvaryu.

ADHIKARANA (18).

[In the Karana-Mantras what js asked for is the Result aceruing to
the Master. |

१1.८८ (25): “it ts the Result accruing to the Priests
‘Cthatis asked forin the Karana- Mantras: as the
“declaration directly potuts to that.’

@

| [1 connection with the Darca-Pirnamasa we find the declara-
tion—‘ Mamayré varco vihavéshwasti ili piirvamaynim grhnati. And
with regard to this there arises the question as to whether the ‘Glory `
(Varcas) asked for in the Mantra is for the Priest, or for the Master.
And on this question, we have the following—]

PURVAPAKSHA.

"^ Just as in the case of the cesults spoken of in Mantras other
“than the Karana-Maniras, the Result is taken to be one that Is
“mentioned in the Context, and we do not assume any other,—so, in
‘the same manner. in the Mantra in question, the result spoken of
‘““must be regarded as the same that is mentioned in the Context.
‘And as the Mantras other than the Karana-Mantras are recited
“by the Master, it is only proper that the Results therein asked for
‘should refer to the Master. The Karana-Mantras however are al-
‘“ways recited by the Priests, as it is necessary that their recitation
“should be done by the same Person that does the Action. If the
‘* Mantras recited by the -dhvaryu Priest would speak of Results
“ pertaining to the Master, then the mention of ‘fama’ (Mine) would
‘be wholly incongruous.

‘*As for the question as to what sort of ‘Glory’ could accrue to
“the Priest (when the final result of the Action accrues to the
^ Master),—we reply that a proper fulfilment of the Sacrifice would
‘show that Sacrifices at which a particular priest officiates is sure
“to terminate successfully; and this fame would greatly encourage the
‘Priest. This is what is meant by the Bhashya declaration— ‘ éva
“mutsaht bhavishyati ’).”

RESULT ASKED FOR IN KARANA-MANTRAS ACCRUE-TO SACRIFICER. 1695

STDDHANTA.

Setra (26) : It would be the Result aceruing to the
Masters asthe whole thing is done Jor his sake.

The Mantra in question eannot be taken merely as yerving the
purposes of encouragement as is done by the Mantras other than the
Karana- Mantras. What the Mantra does is to mention a result that
always follows from the subsidiary action (done with the Mantra),
Because the Mantra has been laid down as serving a wholly distinet.
purpose (that of pointing to the Deity): and as such it is only when it
indicates either the action, or something else connected with it, that
it comes to be regarded as an accessory of the Principal Action.

Thus then, in the case in question, if the Mantre only spoke of the
glory attaching to the Adhraryu Priest, --then. in that case, the whole
of this Mantra could not be used in accomplishment of the Anradhana
of Fire (in connection with which it is laid down): because an indica-
tion of the Adhvaryu’s glory is not required hy this Anvadhana. In
fact, even if it indicated the Result of the Principal Action, then too. it
could not have any connection with the Aneadhana; and this connec.
tion becomes all the more impossible, when it indicates merely the
Adhvaryu’s glory, which is something wholly extraneous to the इष्टा
fice, and serves no useful purpose in connection with the sacrificial
operations. Hence in accordance with the Law of the Saklavaka (LII---
u—15 et seq.), the Result spoken of must be taken as that which
follows from the action of Anradhana, as otherwise we could not justify
the injunction of the Mantra as instrumental in that Action (and it has
been proved already that the Result of actions belongs to the Master,
and not to the Priests).

As for the Benediclions, they are directly subsidiary to the Principal
Action; and hence they could become subsidiaries, by the indication
of the Results of that Action; and hence if they were to bring about
distinct results of their own, then. being ‘ connected ’ (with the distinct
result), thev could not be taken up by the Context as subsidiaries of
the sacrifice (Vide, Sitra T1—iii-—11). And hence the case of the
Mantra in question cannot be regarded as similar to these Benedic-
tions.

Objection: «Even if the Mantra were to lead to a distinct result,
(५ inasmuch as the word ‘d/ama’ refers to the Adhraryu (who recites
‘the Manira), the Result should be regarded. in accordance with the
Law of Tadvyapadéca, as pertaining to the Adhvaryu.”

Repl: It is Indicative Power that. indicates the fact of the Result

1696 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. WI—PADA VIIT.—AaADHI. (13).

pertaining to the Adhvaryu; while the Atmanépada affix (in ‘ @dadhita’)
involves the Direct Declaration of its pertaining to the Master (and
there can be no doubt that this latter is more authoritative than the
former)

Objection : “ Well, in that case, in order to be in keeping with both
‘(Direct Declaration and Indicative Power), why should not this
‘ action also be taken as to be performed by the Master himself; as in
५ that case we would have no incongruity in the use of tho word
‘“* Mama,’ and the said Atmanépada ending i

keply: It is not so; because if the Action (of Anvadhana) were
preceded by a recitation of the Mantra, then we could have such
i restriction as you speak of. As a matter of fact, however, we find
that the Action appearing before (the Mantra) comes to be recognised
as wholly subservient to the Sacrifice only; and as such it becomes
quite compatibly connected with the Adhvaryu, in accordance with
the indications of the Name ‘Adhvaryava’ (of the Section in which the
Action happens to be mentioned).

Nor could it be urged that—‘in that case, the mere recitation
of the Mantra would be done by the “ Master.’ Because that which
is taken up by the Action itself has necessarily the same Performer
as that Action.

Objection: “` 17 that case, inasmuch as the Result in question
` ‹ would also be taken up by the Action (it could not but pertain to
“the Master).’’

Reply: The Result could be taken up, if such taking up were not
obstructed by the said Atmanépadu ending. But inasmuch as there is
no possibility of the indication of the Atmanénada being set aside,—
and as there is no possibility of its being taken in an indirect secondary
signification,—it is far more reasonable to take the word ‘ Mama’ in
the Manira either as explained by means of certain words supplied
from without, or as being used in an indirect secondary signification, —
the sentence in question being taken as ‘May my Master obtain
glory, or ‘ May the Master similar to me obtain glory.’

For these reasons, it must be admitted that the Result spoken of
pertains to the Waster. |

Those theorists who hold the Anvadhina of Fire as to be done by
the Master himself fall into this mistake, simply by reason of this
word ‘ Mama’ occurring in the Mantra. If they could bring forward
any text in support of their contention, then too, then it would be
necessary to consider the question as to whether the Result should

RESULTS ASKED FOR IN KARANA-MANTRAS ACCRUE TO SACRIVICER. 1697

be taken as pertaining to the Adhvaryu and the Master, as optional
alternatives,—as in the case of options with regard to Actions,---or as
pertaining always to the Muster only.

Stitva (27): Also because of [Indications to that cffeet,
The Benedictions that ave pronounced by the Priests are dis-
tinctly declared,—in the sentence ‘ ¥@m vat kincenea [161] acvhanteasalt
Yajamanasyatwa sa,’-—as pertaining tothe Master: and this declaration
would be compatible with the Siddhanta, and not with the Piarra-
paksha view.

213

ADHIKARANA (14).

| |1\ the Aarana Mantras, those Results that affect the Action belong
to the Priests. |

Sttra (23): The Results affecting the Action belong to
the Priests; as the Master also would want such
results to acerue to the Priests ९ 1411/.

This is an exception to the previous Adhikaranu. In a case
where the Kurana Mantra speaks of a result that affects the Action,—
eg. the Mantra, ‘Agnavishnti mavakramisham viphatham ma ma
santaptam’ (‘May Agni and Vishnu....not make me very hot’); and
in this case, inasmuch as the Result-—absence of much heat-——would be
of use in the Action (as the Priests when not overheated would be in
7 position to perform their duties better),—and as such the Master too
would require such a result to accrue to the Priests (as thus would
his Sacrifice be performed in a suitable manner),—this conclusion
would not be incompatible with the Atmanépada ending.

Satra (29): Because of the distinct mention (of the Priest
as connected with the Result).

Under the Sittra ILl—viili—1l4, we have cited an instance of the
mention in Brahmanas: while what we cite, in course of the present
discussion, is an instance of the mention in Mantras. As this mention
in the Mantra would ba hard to be got at, there might be a doubt as
to the Results in question not pertaining to both (the Adhvaryu and
the „1 31६1}. But asa matter of fact the ground for the assumption of
the Result being mentioned in the Mantra, operating simultaneously,
is found to be applicable to both, and as such there would be no neces
sitv of having recourse to a complicated method of interpretation.

Objection: ^` Well, in that case, whv should not both recite the
‘* Mantra in question ?”’

Reply: When being recited by one only, the Mantra can indicate
the Result accruing to both,—and all that is desired having been
accomplished by that single reeitation,—there could be no use for its

RESULTS AFFECTING ACTION BELONG 10 PRIESTS. 1099४

being recited over again by the other. And as it isthe Adhvaryu alone
who recites the Mantra (the Result herein spoken of is one that
belongs to the Adhvaryu).

ADHIKARANA (15).

(The Purification of Materials pertains to the Primary as well as to the
Subsidiary Sacrifices. |

Sittra (30): The Purification of Materials pertains to
all Actions; as atl equatly belong to the same Con-
text.

We have done with the question of the contradiction and non-.
contradiction of Name (by Direct Declaration, etc.). And all these
discussions relating to the contradiction or non-contradiction of
Direct Declaration, etc., apply cqually to the Original Primary Sacri-
fice as well as its modifications.

it has been shown that the Accessory Details belong to the Primary
as well as its subsidiaries (Sara L11—vii—l1 et seq.) ; and then there
arising the question as to how it would be with the Modifications, the
present Sutra has been introduced simply by way of showing that the
same conclusion holds regarding these also.

ADHLIKARANA (16),

(The Accessory Details peculiar to the Original Primary do not belong
to the Modifications. |

The last Sava (30) can be taken as embodying the Parvapaksha
of the Siddhanta put forward in the following Sada; and thus for the
present Adhikarana, we have the following :—-

PURVAPAKSHA.
५५ Tyasmuch as the accessory details, in the shape of the Crass, ete.,
‘have been shown to belone to ali Aciions. we inust vegard them as

‘belonging to the Modifications also.”

SEDDITANTA.,

Sittra (31): Inasmuch as they are mentioned tr con-
nection with the Primary Oviginal, the Peewtiar
Accessary Detail could not belong to the Modifica-
tion.

If the Accessory Detail in question had been mentioned as com
mon to all actions by way of Anushanga like the Injunction with
regard to the Subsidiaries, --and if these were scriptural texts pointing
to its presence at. the Modifications,---then. 01 those vases, inasmuch as
there would be no grounds for restricting — the Injunction of that
Acessory to the Primary Sacrifice only, we could not but rogard it as
belonging to all Actions. As a matter of fact however. wil attribution
of Accessory Details is preceded by an Injunction of the Actions thein-
selves. And when an Accessory has been taken up bv a Sacrificial
operation, it does not take upon itsclf, for its own accom plishment, the
purposes, perceptible and imperceptible, emanating from restrictions.
And these purposes again enter into the (Primary) Sacrifiec, only as
having their extent fully recognised. And these. for the sake of their
own fulfilment, betaking themselves to several Actions, come into
these as wholly restricted within themselves. »

Nor have we found, at the Primary Sacrifice, the Yupavalasturana

1702 = TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. UI—PADA VIIJ.—ADHI. (16).

being done by the Grass + and hence the Modifications could not take
in either the Grass or its accessories. Those actions —e.g. the Vedis.
tarana and the like—that do take in those accessories of the Grass, are
109 found to be wanting in any essential factor, without the Yapa-
vatastarana ; and as such the said Details could not enter into the
Modification for the sake of those—i.e. the Vedistarana, etc. Hence
it must be concluded that the Accessory that is peculiar to the Pri-
mary does not find place in the Modification.

The Bhashya says—‘ Pradhanam hi coduko’pekshaté’; and the
sense of this is that the Accessory cannot be regarded as enjoined in
common for the Primary and the Modification ; nor does any scriptural
text imply the presence of that Accessory at the Modification.
Because if the Modification could call up all the texts bearing upon its
Primary Origina], then everything in connection with it would have
to be done afresh, Just as in the Original sacrifice; and that would
involve the necessity of connecting factors very remote from one
another.

Then again, as a matter of fact, we have found that the mere [mpli-
cation of scriptural texts and the fact of the Accessory being enjoined
equally for both (the Primary and the Modification), do not connect,
with other duties, the Pagupurodacu, which, among the purificatory
rites relating to the Sacrificial animals, has been found to pertain to
the Animal dedicated to the Deity Agni-Somu. And this fact, as
well as the presence of Uhas (at the Modification), would not be com-
patible with the theory that the Accessory in question belongs to the
Primary Original, as well as to its Modification. Hence it must be
admitted that it is only the beneficial effect of the rite performed in
connection with the Original Primary that is transferred to the Modifi-
cation (and not so the actual performance of the Rite).

\DHIKARANA (17).

[The (407८? and the Paetira should be made of the Paribho.
jantya Grass. |

Sittra (382): There beiuy an tneompatibility, the others
could have no distinct coumection (with the Accessory
Detail in question); specially because of a particular
Declaratioir.

We proceed to show that the Gruss laid down for the Primary
does not subserve all purposes.

(In connection with sacrifices we have the making of the Paméra
and the Vidhrli, out of the Auca Gruss, laid down. And with regard
to these there arises the question as to whether these are to he made out
of the Grass brought in for the purpose of being spread over the Altar,
or out of other Grasses. And the Pirvapaksha taking up the former
alternative. we have the following— |

SIDDHANTA.

The Gruss that has been chopped in a particular way being laid
down as to he used for spreading over the Altar,—in the sentence
Trdhanupancadha, ete.’,--it could not be uscd for the making of the
Pavitra, etc. Consequently we must seek for another sentence laying
down the Grass in general, for the purpose of making the Pavitra and
the Vidhyli. And we find that the sentence ‘ Dhatuh, cte., serves
to lay down collectively a number of spreadings (and among these
we find the mention of the Paribhojaniya Grass ; and the Pavitra and

the Vidhriis should be made out of this Grass).

ADHIKARANA (18).

[it is the Cake, etc. of the Original Sacrifice that should be
kept In. |

Sutra (33): Ltis (८ portion (of the former) that should be

set aside; because of the connection (with the Injunction}

Of what already exists,

[In connection with the Jyotishtoma, we find the declaration—
‹ Purodacacakalam aindravayarasya grahé nidadhais, ete ,etc.’: and with
regard to this there arises the question as to whether the Cake-piece
that is kept in these vessels is taken out of the Cake used at the Original
Primary Sacrifice, or it is obtained from clsewhere. And on this ques-
tion we have the following ~ |

PURVAPAKSHA.
“Tnagsmuch asthe Cake, the Dhana, ete., are meant for the
(° Savanitya Sacrifice, we must, in accordance with the previous
८ Adhikarana, take the Cake-pieces, required for Grahana, Crapana,
‘ ate., as to be obtained from elsewhere.”’
In reply to this we have the following—

SIDDHANTA.

In aveordance with Siira LV-—i—28, the Purvapaksha view would
necessitate a recourse to Secondary signification, without much use,
and we must regard the Cake-pieces as te be obtained from the
Cake that has been used at the Original Sacrifice ; specially (1) because
we do not find any other piece of Cake in existence; (2) because
at the Original Sacrifice only two Slices having been offered, the
Disposal of the remainder by the Keeping under question would serve
a distinctly useful purpose; (3) and because this procedure would
be in keeping with the Accusative ending (in ‘ Puredagacakalam ’).
Yonsequently it must be admitted that the Cake-pieces kept in the
Aindravayava and other vessels, should be those obtained from the
Cake that has been used at the Original Primary Sacrifice.

ADHIKARANA (1)

[At the Ramya Ishtis, the specification of (ined pertains
to the Principal Action. |

Sutru (384): ° The Aceessory laid down in connection
‘with the Modification relates to all Aetions,--just
“like the Original Primary.”

[We have the declaration— Yajnatharvana vasi kimya ishtayah,
ia upameu kartavyah’; with regard to this there arises the question as
to whether the specification of Upimcu (Quietness) pertains to the
Primary as well as the Subsidiary Sacrifices, or to the Primary only.
And on this question we have the following—]

PURVAPAKSHA.
‘The Upamgu should be observed in all those cases, where
existing, it could afford some aid to the Kamya Ishlis.”’

SIDDHANTA.

Sttra (35): It must be regarded as meant for the Prin-
cipal Action only; as it has not been enjoined for
the Subsidiary.

Some people explain the expression ‘ aenditatvat’ as follows:
< Inasmuch as the character of the Upamcu has already been found
‘to be distinctly perceptible, the Subsidiaries that are amenable to
८८ the Implicatory Injunction do not get at it,”

But this explanation is not admissible; because in all cases the
operation of the Implicatory Injunction is the very first to come in.
Hence the expression should be explained in the following manner:
In the case of the Original Sacrifice, the Context having shown that tie
characteristic in question pertains to the Principal Action only,-—it.
is the more authoritative Syntactical Connection that connects it with
all the Actions; in the case of the Modification, on the other hand,
it 18 Syptactical Connection itself that specifies the Characteristic
as belonging to the Principal Action only; because the sentence
214 °

1706 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. IlI—PADA VIII.—ADBT. (19).

distinctly mentions the word ‘ Kamyah’; and certainly the Subsidiaries
are never related to any desires; and hence the characteristic in
question cannot be regarded as enjoined for these Subsidiaries.

ADHIKARANA (20).

At the Subsidiaries of the Cyéna simple Bulter should be used in place
of Clarified Butter. |

92८८४. (36): Because of the inupossibility of its being
used at the Primary Sacrifice, it nust be used at the
Subsidiaries; specially om account of the peculiar
proximity,

[11 connection with the Cyéna, we tind the declaration Dyti-
navanitamajyam’ : and with regard to this there arises the question as
to whether the Butter is to be used at the Principal Sacrifice of the
CGyéna, or at its Subsidiaries. And on this question, we have the
following— |

PURVAPAKSBHA.

^“ Inasmuch as the sentence in question is found to be a qualified
‘Injunction in the Context of the Principal Action, the Butter must
‘“be taken as replacing the Soma at the Principal Sacrifice.’

SIDDHANTA.

Inasmuch as it is not possible to have Injunctions of many sub-
stances, the sentence must be taken as laying down a particular sub-
stance with reference to the Clarified Butter (Ajya). And as a matter
of fact we find that there is no Clarified Butter used at the Principal
Sacrifice: and hence, in accordance with the Sara [1J—i—18, the
material laid down in the sentence in question must be regarded as
pertaining to the Subsidiary Sacrifices.

Stra (87): Objection: ^^ The same would be the case
“with the Luying of Fire also,.’’

“The ‘Clarified Butter’ spoken of in the sentence must be taken

as that which imparts some aid to the Cyénu sacrificc, and in that case
“inasmych as the Clarified Butter used gt the Pavamana Ishirvs of

C

^ the Laying of Fire would also be imparting some aid to the Gyéna,

1708 $$ ANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. HI—PADA VIII.—ADHI- (20).

“we would have the Stmple Butter at these [shits also in place of the
“Clarified Butter.’’

Sutra (38): Reply: It cannot be so; because these
(Ishtis) do not appeur in the Context (of the Cyéna):
specially as (the mere fact of the Ishtis imparting an aid
to the Cyena) cannot be a ground for regarding them
as Subsidiaries to it

That is to say, an Action becomes subsidiary to a Sacrifice, not by
merely imparting an aid to this latter, but by imparting such aid while
being laid down in its Context. And as a matter of fact, the Clarified
Butter that is found in the Context of the Cyéna is that which is
mentioned in its Injunction, and not that used at the Pavamana Ishtis ;
and as such we have the restriction that it is only at the actual
Subsidiaries of the Cyéna (and not at these Ishtis) that the Clarified
Butter is to be replaced by simple Butter.

ADHIKARANA (21).

_ [At all the Subsidiaries of the (लक we have Simple Butter in
the place of Clarified Butter. |

Stitra (39) : * The Replacing would be ut the particular

” Seubsidiaries (performed at the time of the 9।१६1/ ^) ;

` “because of Indications to that effect.”

Now there arises the question as to whether the Clarified Butter is
to be replaced by Simple Butter, only at those Subsidiaries that are
performed at the time of the Suty@, or at all the Subsidiaries of the
४214. And on this, we have the following —

PURVA PAKSHA.

“The Replacing is to be only at the Subsidiaries performed at the
time of the Sutya: (1) because of the proximity (of Context); (2)
‘‘ also because of Inference from Analogy, based upon Indications, the
‘argument being this:—The presence of the 4 nimal as an accessory
“of the Cyéna has been found to appear at those Subsidiaries that
‘ are performed at the time of the Sulya ; as the Subsidiaries connected
“ with the Agnistomiya and the Anubandhy@ (animals of the Cyénu)
“ are spoken of as aided by other Accessories (and not by the Clarified
८८ Butter). Consequently, the simple Butter also musb be regarded as
“an accessory of those Subsidiaries only that are performed at the
¢ time of the Sutya.” :

SIDDHANTA.

Sitra (40): It must be at all the Subsidinuries ‰ because

of its being reluted equally to all;—

as has been fully established under the Sitra {Il—vi—2.

Sitra (41): As for the Indications (spoken of), they could
be regarded as authoritative only when veferring to
something bused upon Keason.

That4s to say, it is a well-known fact th&t such Indications can be
‘regarded as authoritative only with wegard to such subjects as are

1710 §$TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH. JII—PADA VIII.—ADHI. (21).

amenable to Reason only. The case in question however is found to
be amenable to Verbal Authority only. Because the ‘ Sahalambha’
(Killing together of the Animals) 18 to be done at the time of the Sutya,
not because it is an accessory laid down with special reference to this
time, but because of a reasoning,—which however does not apply to
the:case in question, of the Buiter | |
This ‘ reasoning’ we proceed to show as follows: There is a certain
order, of sequence pointed out in certain sentences, whose authority in
the shape of ‘Direct Declaration is to be inferred from proxumity ; and
the connecting of the other Details with the time of the Sutya would be
in keeping with this order of sequence. Specially as in connection with
the time of the Savaniya, we do not find any section dealing with the
Animals: and as such we could not but pass over the time of this
Savaniya. Nor could there be two ways of taking the things; as in
that case we would have both (which would not be desirable). Thus
then, the Indications in question are quite compatible with the
Siddhanta view.

ADHIKARANA (22)
[The Savaniya Offerings only consist of Flesh,

Sutra (42): The Plesh betongs to the Savanitya Offerings:
becanse of the particular Injunction.

[In connection with the ‘Capyanamayana extending over thirty-
six years’, we find the declaration— Samthité samsthilé’ hani mrqa-
patirmrgayam ४८८१, sa taira yan mrgan hanti teshamantarasah purddacah
savaniya bhavaniz’; and with regard to this there arises the question
as to whether the Flesh of the animals killed in the hunting is to
form the Cakes at the Savantya as well as the other offerings, or at the
Savanya only. And on this question we have the following—]

PURVAPAKSHA.

८ Inasmuch as the word ‘ Purodaca’ (in the sentence in question)
‹ could not be taken as referring to the Dhana and the other offerings
‘“ of the Savantya, we must regard all the Cakes as to be made of the
* Flesh mm question. And even though the sentence speaks of the
‹ “Savaniya Offerings,’ yet this could not be taken as specifying the
‘© Cake (as this specification would involve a syntactical split).”’

In reply to this we have the following—

SIDDHANTA.

The mention of the word ‘Savantya’ cannot be regarded as
mistaken reading; and hence, iu accordance with the Sara l—iv-—28,
we must take the word ‘ Purodacah’ in its secondary signification, and
as such, including the Dhana and the other Savansya Offerings.

Sitra (43) : Objection: “In the absence of Proximity,
the recourse to Secondary signification cannot be
admissible.’’

‘Inasmuch as the Dhana, etc. are wholly different from the
Purodaca, we cannot rightly take the word ‘ /urodacu’ as indirectly
indicating those other substances. For, even if this were possible, it
could be so only by the word ‘ Purodacah’ being partly taken, by way
of a reference to the word ‘Savaniya’ (and this too would not be
admissible).”’ |

1712 TANTRA-VARTIKA. ADH, UI—PADA VIII.—ADHI. (22).

Sutra (44) : Reply: The word could be (taken as indirectly
indicating the Snvaniya. offerings) ; because of its being
found to be so indicative, in connection with the
Original Primary Sacrifice; just as in the case o7
the Vairaja.

In connection with the Primary Sacrifice, we find the declaration—
‘ Purodacanalankuru,’—where the word ‘ Purodacadn’ indicates the
Dhana and the other offerings ; as for the word ‘ Savantya’ however, we
do not find it ever applying to any other offerings save the Savaniya.
Then again, the word ‘ Purodacah’ could very well indicate the Dhana,
etc., on account of the proximity of these; while the word ‘ Savanityah ’
cannot indicate anything else. And then, inasmuch as that Purodacna
which does not constitute a Savantya Offering can have no connec-
tion with the Dhana, etc.,—it must be admitted that the Flesh in ques-
tion is to be employed at the Dhana and other offerings in connection
with the Savantya. |

।

Thus have we explained the relation of subserviency among
Actions,-— as based upon the (six) Means of Knowledge,—whose certitude
is based finally upon Direct Vedic Declaration, and with regard to
which the question of their comparative authoritativeness has been
fully dealt with, as leading to definite conclusions in cases of-con-
flict among the various Means of Knowledge.

Thus ends the Highih Pada of Adhyaya ITT.

Thus ends the Third Adhyaya.

Here ends the V'antravartika of Bhatta Kumarila.

ALPHABETICAL]

Abhikramana, 1031], 1032.
Abbikraman juhoti, 1031,
Abhiaava, 1475, 1477, 1562
Abhisécaniya, 1210, L211, 1545
-Abbyuditesti, 802

Abhyarijana, 1381

Abhyadiina, 82

‘Abhyadéna mantra, 82.

' Abstract, 979, 1332, 1333, 1331.
Absurdity, 914

Accessories, 65, 94, 170, 398, 400. 43:
- 441, 660, 705, 736, 774, 816, 840, S45

1195.

845, 847, 848, 858, 860, 866. 875, 957
994, 1046, 1018, 1073, 1141, 11.1६,
1143, 1144, 1146, 1148, 1150. 1°52.
1156, 1167, 1164, 1165, 1182, 1190
1191, 11५१, 1193, 1194, 1227, 1206,
1508, 1511, 1514, U20, 152:2, 153°,
1640, 1549, 1065, 1567. 1588, 1541,
1672, 1579. 1683 1587. 1588. 155%.
1695, 1596, 1597, 1598, 1600, 1495
Achiirya, 242.

Accueativo ending G71, 10921.

Acquisition, 883

Aditibhya. 863, 864, 1559

Adhana, 832, 855, 857, 1141,

Adharima, 2.

Adlhaatit samidhan dharayan anudra-
vet upari hi doevebhyo dhiirayati,
1283.

Adhvarakalpa, 1516.

Adhvaryu, 153, 1162, 1389,

— 1628, 1951, 1653, 1692.

Adhvaryava, 110, 1271,
` 1651.

Aditi, 98.

Adityasthali, 1113.

Affix, 475, 478.

Affix verbal, 1290,
1304, 1475, 1481.
Affix Feroinine, 1327
Affix Conjugational, 478
1317, 1322, 1329, 1330
Affix abstract, 979, 1333, 1334,

Agama, 280.

Agastya, 101. —

Aghira, 398, 40
681, 69

Aghframachirayati, 679, 6६2,

Agna iiyahi, 1090, 1091.

“Agng patnivan § sajiirdevena tvastra
Bomena piba, 1116

Agnayé, 1058

‘AgnAavigniigetc, 1698.

215

1232, 1526.

1479, 1623,

1384, 1389,

1301, 1202, 1303.

1313, 1315,

633, 625, 679, 680,

G59.

ee 7 ee eee eee ह ।

» ॐ ow oF कः =

INDEX.

Agnéstrnani, 102%,
Apnavaun avakdlatvat, 1445
Agnayve Justa nirvana, 117)

Agueyamatanuaunistarae dabheda dim
drugnamukthys dvitiyam, 1472,

\enevyiipnumanteana, 1154

Agneyi, O02, 1800, 1093, 1694, 1096,

_ Ttod.

Agneya, 411, 6338, 636, 647, 658, SSO,
S81, 887, 1049, 1050, 1051, 152, 1057,
1195, 14140. 1424, 1425, 1428, 1431,
1452.

Agneyan eatardhéa karoti, (049, 11१74,

\gneyamastiikapaélam nirvapet rukla-
mah, ¢S8l

Aguesvostikapalah, 662, 427, 1432,

` TAB.

Agniostikapilo bhavati, 1122, 1426.

Agncostikaptilo bhavati etayié annad-

yakiimam yajayvet, 883,
Agneostikapalo hianyam daks mi,
S16 {887

Apgnicgtikapalo mavasyfiyim bbavati,
# {71174181 : [पण mavasyaydain pourna-
mosyancicyuto bhavati. S87, 1414}

Agneyva, 1022, 041. 11102

Agneyyi agnidhramnupatic( bats,
15.14.

Agni, 102, 547,
869, &70. 1049
10४46, 1191.
। 127, 1419.
1451, 1432,
1553.

Apnicayana, G6.

Agnidagninvihara, 1068.

Agnid Agnid, 85,97.

Agnidhra, 1097, J 191.

Agnidhropasthdna 1090

Agnihotra, 398, 680, 631, 602, 604, 665
698, 752, 44. 862, 841, 872. 873, B75,
S76. 877, 890, 891. 58५२. 896, {011 , 1280

Agnihotram juhoti, 670, 682, 689, 695.

Agnihotrin, 270

\enim, 868

Agnificinutée, Alhbat ‘gnimapgnmig tomeni-
11} ६११8 , 866

\gnirminavakah, 10005,

Agwirmtirdha re. *3.

Agni-soma. 1#62, 1553

Agnisomiya, 547, 1049, 1234, 1685, 1537
1551, 1599, 1657

Agnistoma,, 1289, 1246, 1250, 1264, 1635
1569. ©

100,
0.1, €95, 113, 04, 868,
1(700, Tht, 116, (48,
1907, 112}, Piva, 112,
1424. 1426, 1127. 1428,
1433, 1134. 8408, 1२६,

bie],

1714

Agnistomé, 1250, 1254, 1589.

Agnistut, 783.

Agnitrahimanah, 444.

Agniréruni, 1088.

Agniviharana, 1068.

Agravanti Prigagrini udgagrani, 1282.

Agrayanasthali, L114

Ahvaniya, 1531, 1432, 1635

Ahichatra, 194

Ahina, 1223, 1224, 1225, 1226, 1239, 1376.

Ahitagnirva ésa yo’agnihotram juhoti,
900.

Ahvayati, 1067.

Aibhiragné .. patnivatastrim gatas-trim-
ca..madaysva, 1118.

Aindra, 1195.

Aindragna, 1049, 1086, 1192, 1193.

Atndrvadyava, 1457, 1458, 1459.

Aindravayavam grhnatt, 701, 709.

Aindri, 1061, 1169, 1172. 1178.

Aindrya, 1172.

Atndrya qarahapatyamuptishthat2, 1167
1169, 1170, 1173, 1176, 1190, 1201.

Atticayana, 1129.

Aja, 1327.

Ajya, 397, 416.

‘Pancadacajyant, 396

Ajyabhdga, 646, 1043, 1044, 1144, 1145

AkanksG, 1208

Akrtt, 331

Alabhat, 702, 853, 854.

Alambhana, 845, 848, 850, 861.

Allegorical-interpretation, 44.

Alphabet, 296.

Altar, 1595, 1610, 1611, 1613, 1628.

Amavasya, 650, 664, 1044.

Ameu, 864, 1559.

Amcum grhnatt, 863.

Amyaks&tah, 100.

Anabhthite, 1338, 1357, 1360. 1361,

Analogy, 4, 107, 310, 498, 802, 951.

Anavanam yajatt, 1487

Andra, 820

4 १00, 930

Animal, 388, 854, 970, 988, 99], 1234,
1237, 1238, 1257, 1259, 1335,
1561, 1553, 1557, 1558.

Auked, 737

Anna, 1381

Anointment, 822.

Anrtam, 1365.

Antarved:, 1811.

Anu, 867

Anubandhya, 1144, 1145, 1635, 1639.

Anujanali, 867

Anusanga, 599, 606, 606, 609.

Anuvacana, 1661,

` Anuvada, 1017. +

AnuvasatkGra, 1122. =

1539,

Se

es oS == कान धि = a A oe Se आ ee ee ee 1,

NE ES OES SF oR ee Ee Gee

| Avadayavadaya

|

‘TANTRA-VARTIKA.

Anvaharyapacana, 1273, 13665.

Apacabda, 270

Apacavo ४ anyZ, 446

Appointment, 1488, 1489, 1622 1632
1634, 1635, 1636, 1641

Apirva, 265, 336, 471, 472, 473, 474
495, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503
504, 506, 510, 511, 612, 513, 514, 516
523, 632, 610, 613, 621, 623, 625, 724
793, 861. 937, 948, 949, 950, 953, 954
957, 958, 1027, 1097, 1208, 1266, 1267,
1811, 1374, 1514, 1662, 1664

Arambhaniya, 1533

Architecture, 121,

Ardhamantarvediminots, 1610.

Arjuna, 193.

Area, 228.

Arthavada, 1, 3, 11, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25
26-32, 37. 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 53, 68
66, 68, 81, 93, 119, 122, 375, 429, 430
439, 565, 672, 854, 925, 1135, 1137
1218, 1242, 1269, 1273, 1276, 1280
1286, 1288, 1309, 1398, 1408, 1406
1406, 1407, 1145, 1451, 1497, 1501,
1553.

Artvija, 1403.

Artvijye, 1410

Aruna, 980

Arunaya, 959, 970, 974, 975, 980, ‘981
984, 985, 94

Arunaya pingakeyG étkahiyanya somam
krinait, 959, 1186

Arya, 208, 209, 219

Aryavarta, 217, 828

Acvabhidhani, 91

Acvtn, 1546 1549

Acvina, 1453.

Aslakd, 112.

Astékapala, 1409.

Asamyuktam, 1157, 1158.

Asandeha, 283.

455, 1008.

A ati, 483.

Asura, 287.

Asyah, 966.

Atah, 923.

Atha, 923, 926

Athatsa Jyotih, atha vicvajyotsh, 731.

Atharva, 156, 167

Atha va, 772

Attrdtra, 1250, 1569

Atithya, 1144, 1146

Aimanepada, 1617, 1618, 1619

Aupavasathya, 1635

A ९८८02८72, 1465

Avabhrtha, 1144, 1145

9

svistakrtévgdyats
pratyabhigharayatt, 1446

| Avadyats, 701, 702.

| Avaghata, 1026. ९.०

ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

Avédana, 1045, 1046, 1047, 1048.
(Addressing.

4४९१४, 810, 816, 817, 820, 821, 828, 829,

Avivakea, 996, 997, 999.

Ayurvat ghrtam, 460.

Babare 7४200112, 14.

Badari, 939, 941.

Bahirvedi, 1611.

Bahu, 1332, 13335.

Bahusu, 1332.

Bahutva, 1332, 1335.

Bahuvrihi, 808, 959, 961, 966. 967. 170.

‘Bathing, 1370.

- Bauddha 166, 167, 226, 232, 233, 234.

Barhaspatya, 816.

Beaconing, 485.

Fedding, 441.

Being, 333.

Bhaga, 1262, 1266, 1267, 1268, 1419.

Bhakgsa, 1102,

Bhaksanuvaka, 1103, 1107, L108, 1128,
1189.

Bhakso hi ma vica. .bhaksayfmi, 1162,
Bhaksitapyayitanccamasan dakyi-
nasydnasdvalambs sadayanti, 1460.

Bharana, 1636.

Bharyam, 1384.

Bhasya, 5, 6, 15, 26, 32, 39, 66, 69, 70.
71, 78, 116, 118, 147, 169, 158, 204,
207, 239, 249, 250, 253, 266, 340, 341,
345, 355, 356, 357, 358, 361, 362, 3H,
373, 383, 419, 426, 465, 469, 492, 494,
515, 517, 631, 547, 564, 555, 565, 666,
669, 587, 603, 610, 611, 612, 614, 689,
690, 708, 709, 723, 751, 752, 758, 797,
198, 834, 835, 852, 853, 870, 873, 878,
913, 924, 926, 928, 936, 937, 940, 941,
942, 971, 972, 1010, 1050, 1051, 1074,
1079, 1082, 1083, 1085, 1171, 1203,

1216, 1211, 1224, 1228, 1269, 1275, |
1351, 1407, 1443, 1457, 1462 1500,

1503, 1520, 1540, 1543, 1548, 1550,
1697, 1622, 1642, 1643, 1646, 1650.
Bhavana, 20, 21, 23, 250, 473, 474, 475,
478, 480, 481, 482, 483, 485, 486, 488,
489, 491, 492, 494, 610, 611, 612, 613,
616, 659, 689, 732, 787, 877, 878, 908,
997, 1000, 1001 1003, 1004, 1012, 1208,
1289, 1291, 1301, 1308, 1313, 1314,
1317, 1318, 1319, 1320, 1336, 1340,
1943, 1347, 1348, 1353, 1360, 136),
1619.
Bhavartha, 474, 493.
Bhavarthacbada, 492.
Bhiyagabda, 473,
Bhavati, 477.
Bhavayati, 478.
Bhiivay6ét—-batham, 492.

Se © oe eee eee neni tener aay: Ditnaeeiearitinats निकः ee ee a qe
शी ममि arg =

1 मी ets i ee 14 ४० ् _— ee ee नयन
॥ म क व ४" 9 गगणं 7 ee re ee ee [षि =A a SS

111;

Bhavayét—kim, 488.
¢ 9 kena, 489,

Bhisma, 190.

Bhitimea. 100,

Bhi 477, 473

Bhiiyastva, Li.

Bilva 157s.

Body, 517, 519
1259, 1870.

Boy, 1056.

Brahma, 1623, 163s.

Grahmacharya, 162, 163,

Brilimana. 7, 10, 103, 193. 194, 19),
196, 198, 227, 241, 444. 508, 570, 816,
S21, 828. 890, 908, 1051, 1131, 12919,
1222, 1247, 1377, 1379, 1462, 1497,
1499, 1502, 1503. |

Brahmanéna na miechhitavyam, 2

Braneh, lod. |

121178६, 919.

Bricks, 1561.

Brightnoss 1383.

Buddha, 165, 179.

Bull, 291,

Butter, 916, 1465, 1116, 1447, 1448, 1449,
1511. 1707.

521, ५1, 908, 1257,

Cake, 9.4, 1049, 1051, 1052, 1257, 1259,
14221, 1442, 1443, 1444, 1454, 1456,
1456.

Calf, 852, 853.

Jalling, 1065, 1066.

Camasa, 1470, 1623, 1625,

Camasidhvaryu, 1623, 1624, 1625, 1640.

Cart, 1454, 1615.

Cart wheel-shaped, (454,

Carn, 1259, 1260, 1262, 1265, 1266,
1411, 1419, 1422, 1423, 1424, 1426,
1427, 1428, 1421, 1432, 1433, 1434,
1435, 444.

Caste, 10, 11, 816, 818, $19, 821, 823.

Cattle, 1518, 1525.

Caturhotra ptirnamaasi, 1604,

Caiturmiasya, 902,

Cayana, 80, 868, 869.

Chalicnge, 876.

Chanda, 12).

Chandoga, 1466.

Chanting, 184.

Child, 9, 10, 49.

Cinute, 868.

Chopping, 1053, 15965.

Citpatistvaé etc., 609.

Citra, 368, 388, 390.

Citrini, 1561.

Cleaning, 1556.

Cloth, 145, 146, 153.

Clothes, 1382, 1383, 1386.

Coalition, 1165, 1166,

Commenc® J87,

1716

Competition, 1624

Compilution, 165, 167, 168

Completion, 899, 906, 917

Composite, (48, 650, 665.

Compound, 545, 547, 548 559,
808, 959, 960. 96८1, 965, 966
970, 1471

556, S07,
064 068,

Compound —Bahuviili, 808, 959, 981. |
966, 957, 970

(0110011, 106.

Conflict, 114. (165, 1172, 174. 1176,
1182, List, if86, 11547, 3188, Liss,
1196, DiGi, tive, F193, 119.;, 1195,
1:00, 12503, 1404, 1205, 1207, 1210
1212, Tabi, 1221, 17. 1:49, 46,
1269, 1211, 1570.

Conver-nation, L380, L384.

Conversing. (380, 1581.

Cooking, 1288, 1352

Cora, 521. 951, 954.

Coupleta, 1087.

Courses, 1380,1381.

Coveriiay. 1234, 1550, 1555,

Covering, protective, 1284.

Cows, $17, 854.

Cupit, lOz8, 1029.

Cups 815, 863, 1108.
1112, 11:24, 1125,
1408, [400, 1470, 1474,
494, 1496, 1497, 1499,
love, 1525, 1546, 1549

Cupholder, 1468

Cubdabrahma, 998, 999.

Cabdatva, 293.

Cikha, 903, 904, 908, 910, 913, O14.

Cikta, 1215.

Cala, 1648.

Cainitr, 1626.

Camvu, 1377, 1379.

Gintimayah Sruchat.

Castré, 542, 563

Cistra, 316

Catam brahman®h somain blinksayanti,
1497, 1499, 1501, 1502

Catapatha. 1054, 1052

७५६६, 921, 922, 923, 930, 1420, 1425

Cesalaksana, 921, 922, 923

Ciksa, 119

Cona, 1322, 1324, 1323.

Cono dhavati, 1328.

Cri, 1327.

Crotriya, 1255.

Crota, 153

L109,
14-49,

1110,
1461

1111,
1463,
1477, 147%),
1508, 1524.
1623, 15.

Dos

07५0४, 124, 936, 1164, 1167, 1168, 1169,
1170, 1172, 1173, 1175, 1176, 1177
1173, 1179, 1188, 1184, 1186, 1187

1100 - 1191, 1194, 1195, 1196, 1197
1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202, 1219

1215, 1216, 1218, 1220, 1221, 1223,

1294, 1297, 4290, 1233, 1368:

|

|

[1 me ge nee EE: a ES es a 7 1 1 7 ।

rs ir PT TS EE EE ० on याका = NS TC TE व ऋ 1 ति शि |

TANTRA-VARTIKA.

Cunahshapa, 1210
Qundhadhvam, 1212
७५९1७, 889

Cvéna, 403, 1707

Dahbdhiramusit, 1159 | |
Dadhi, 691, 752, 771. -946, 1400
Dadbna Juhoti, 679, ६५1

| Dadhnéndriyakamasya Juhuyat, 752

Diakeityana, 840, 841, 842,843

Daksina&h somasya, 1608

Daksyityanayajnefia yajota, 840

Darea, 152, 1078, 1080, 1084, 1085

Darcapirnamasa, 633, 666, 840, 841
842, 845, S47, 81, 873, 945, 948, 950

111, 1034, 1039, 1078, 1144, 1156
1212, 1235, 1288, 1276, 1277, 1280.
1289, 1310, 1364, 1365, 1374, 1380,
1289, 1515, 1582, 1595, 1597. 1598s,
1600, 1604, 1616 शि

Darvi-homa, 1148 |
Dacgadacaikimecamasanupasanpéyuh |
Dacgapavitrena, 1016

Dacaipavitrena graham sammarati, 994
Dacapeyn, 1497, 1625

Dacatya 1093.
Dative, ending, €7).

, 1220, 1227, 1339,

| Day, 46, 1223, 1225
$242, 1:38, 1540.
Death 896.
Deitv, 414, 424, 427, 642, 543, 547, 549,

556, O61, 562, 646, 669,
Tua, 717, 719, 736, 856,

८, 853, 554
671, 672, 698,
$57, 864, 908,

'076, 1078, 1082, 1083, 1084, 1085,
loss, 1108. 1109, 1110. Tibi, 1112,
1119, 1114, 1115. 111}, GETZ. LETS,
1119, 1122, 1123. 11:24, 1125, 1126,
$153, 1160५, 1219, 1260, 1262, 1265,
1264, 1266, 1207, 1424, 1482, 1443,
1454, di,

Delinguencios, 1300.

Doliverance, 119.

Donominations, 96),

a | verhal, 960

nominal, 960
Denotability, 1339
Deprecation, 24, 26, 42.
Deaaire, 810, 881, 1296, 1300.
Deovadatta, 1327, 1351.

| ‘Devasya tva,. .nirvapdmi, 1181.

Devaivai Camyum..abruvan.

.yo brah-
manayfvaguret, 1377. |

Dharma, 2, 5, 1,

133, 166, 180

181

263, 267, 269, 282,
Dhavya, 1088.
Dhrtaraéstra, 191.
Dhrtyai, 1242 - 1245.

104, 1139.

20, 024.

Gr

119. 128.
184, 197,

¦ 88, 203.

ALPHABETICAL INDEX,

Dhruva, 1445, 1447, 1448,

Digesting, 1102.

Digestion, 1412.

Digging, 1595.

1911051) somasya, 1608.

Diksantyé, 1144, 1145, 1269, 158i.

` Directing, 1641, 1652, 1689.

Direction, 121, 486, 593, 1066, 1195, 1203.

` 1186, 1880, 1653.

Direction, 1617, 1618, 1689.

Dirgha, 1930, 1241, 1242.

Dirghasoma, 1239, 1240, 1241.

Dirghasoma santrdyad, dhrivai, i234.

Disfigurement, 1386.

Disposal, 1412, 1439, 1450, 1 1.8, 1571.

Disposal-offering, 10176, 1453, 1456, 1.4...

Disruption, 1142.

‘Draupadi, 192.

Driivida, 219,

Drinker, 1117.

Drinking, 1116, 1411.

*‘Drtinavanitam’ 1705.

Dropsy, 1393, 1398.

Duality, 1229, 1230, 1232.

Duplication, 905, 915.

Durability, 1242, 1245.

Dvadaciha, 1223.

Dvaipayana, 190.

Dviraindravayavyasya bhaksavati
1457, 1458.

Dvirétra, 1229.

Dvichvisévadyati, 1421, 14).

Dvyavadina, 1419. |

Dvyavadanam juhoti, 1425, 1421, 1454,

Eastern, 255.

Eating, 1109, 1109, 11 5. toe,

1113, 1116, 1118, 1119, Hl20, Lise,
1124, 11; 9 1126, 1429, 11:50, 1442.
1443, 1444, 1457, (459, 1460, 14:51.
1462, 1463, 1464, 1466, 1458, 14५.
1471, 1472, 1473, 1471, 1478, 1470.
1479, 1480, 1482, 1485, 148४, L487,
1483, 1489, 149), 1493, 1494, 1497,
1499, 1502, 1503.

Effort, 1107.

hi, 1105.

Kkahayant, 961, 907, 963, G80, 981. £82,
988, 984, S85, 99.

Ekahayanyd, 95, 935, 998.

Ekam hayanam asyah, 997.

Kkeasya hayanasya tyam, 007.

Ekaha Cabdah....Kemadhug bhavati.
Ekaikam, 1501.

Likarthavartiviat vacah, 1166.

४५०४2 etc, 101.

Eke ६४६, 1187.

Elements, 518, 810.

Employment, 1643. [ 1618.

Endings, 637, 1349, 1450; 1362, 1617

1 113;), |

मी यी ee meee ee क ' 1 CS YE ि ss ग्ण भभ TE ALIS OE oS कवः क काक कक कु" SE ES = र वय = = न , जके,

a = = क = = कः न्वा श

| Hiro, 13, 46, 72, 421, 8382, 983. 868, REO

171;

Endings, Case 537, 1360, 1382.

9 क 2 क

indings, Conjugational, 1349, 1350.

Enomy, 1386.

Entirely, 154,

(८.2 var dareaptirnamisayadaksind, 1443.
Lit, `

7 ५ 9 4 a pos tp a

bea १4४ hevied....yodabhyam gqrihiten,
Sou,

Ktasya, 784,

Ktasyatea revatisu varavantiyam, 774.

| Ktayit anvadhya Kadmam, 828, 820.

न । 1 ।

(८१९ १८१८71८४ hotuett 77" havirédyam
acats, 1479, ।
Etymology, 217, 11५. 552, 821, 1104.

16:42. छ
Kulozistw-character, 44.
Eulogtsation, (O74.
Kulogy, 512, S92, 1 111.
vening, 1554, 1558,
fexpiation, 897, 905, O17.

Faco, 11, +),

— brightening of, Lf,

False, 1365,

VFalaity, 1367.

Farming 1817.

Fasts, 184.

Frat, 42, 1540.

Father, 9,1५.1.

Wee, 1442, 143, 1607, 1632. 1634, 1685,
1630, 1638, 1640,

Femininity, (327.

Feativals, [+

Fetching, 155.
S70, 102, 1056, 1061, 1062, 1062. 1505"
1433, 1434, 1527, 120. 19:31, 1442.
1333, 1534, 1571, 1693, 1645.

Fire-kindling. 1040, 114. (1.

ल. daving, 114. 1142, 1143, 1148. 1426,
15:27, 143. 1520, 1530, 1531, 12024.

Fist. 1450,

Fist cloaine, L040. 1046, LOS,

Fondling, Seo-t.

Foren, 400, 609, T09

Footing, (521, L562.

Feuit, 8070,

Fuel, 1281, 1384.

: Buel atick, 1284,

. Carhapatya,

OGL, 1063, 1169, 1172,
1173 1476.

CGarhapatyam, 1062, 1033.

Girhpatye, 1062, 1065.

Gantama, 244, 245

; Gavatracchandasah, 11 28.
i Gavatri, 1128.

, Generation, 10.

Gender, 979. 1002, 1327, 1528, 1350.

Genitivefnding, 980, 988.

1718

Ghritam, 460, 461,

Ghritam devanim mastu pitrindm, 1286.

Gifts, 1224, 1390, 1393 to 1401.

Gira, 1193

Glorification, 4, 122, 887, 888, 1288

Gloss, 852

Go, 346, 963, 964.

Gotva, 346.

God, 45, 1120, 1274, 1379.

(06808, 925.

Gold, 1382, 1386.

Goldon, 1196.

Goman, 960, 963, 964, 965.

(०४९1 7६, 925.

(18118, 1026, 1027. es

wrahdgrata, 805.

Graham, 994, 1003,
1017.

Gaham Saminarsti, 997, 999, 1010

Grahana, 710, 716, 719

Grahayét, 1406, 1408

feain, 521, 1196, 1257, 1258, L2o0.

Grammarians, 969, 979, L3lo
1329, 13:30, 13387, 1343, J544,
1348, 1351, 1352, 1363.

Grass, 1281, 1560, 1557, 1595, 1598.

Grass bundle, 1070, 1072, 1074,
1079, 1082, 1084.

(८888 spreading, 1045, 1046.

Gravastut, 1468.

Greatnoss, 556.

Greed, 156, 165, 174, 182, 184, 187.

Grhnati, 702.

Grhniyat, 810, 1408.

Grhya, 271.

Grhyasiitra, 244, 202

Grinding, 1256, 1257, 1258 1260, 1262,
1263, 1264, 1266, 1267, 1268

Guests, 1288, 1640.

Guna, 930, 1054.

Hautra, 1616, 1646,
1651.

Hiariyojana, 1468, 1469

Hastam avanenakti, ulaparajinstpnati,
1045

Hasti, 1327.

Havirdhana, 1614, 1615.

Havirdhane Gravabhisutya, ahavaniyé
rig Sadasi bhaksin bhaksayanti
47

Haviskrt, 1066, 1067.

Haviskrt ehi triravaghnan fhvayati,
1065.

` Head 1602.

Heart, 677, 1257.

Heaven, 86, 98, 1399,

Hell, 1312.

Herbs, 86.

Hiim avime, 1102. d

1004, LOLS, 1016.

1:16},
1347,

1016,

1647, 104, 1650,

eee ममम [अ क ण [ ¶१० 71 1 षा ह, ) 1

(ge ea Cr यायिनि 5 Me ge eet me Sy eis A my SPE Wap “OPS SG A PA ण्म मभ ge [7 ह ee eee ee क eee eee

TANTRA-VARTIKA.

Holding, 1102, 1104, 1105, 1107, 1984
1285, 1320, 1646, 1549, 1580

Hole, 1553

Holaka, 248

Homa, 153, 184, 680, 681, 695, 752, 771

925, 1031, 1032, 1073, 1388, 1419
1432, 1435, 1435, 1437, 1450, 1476, 1477
Honey, 12

Horns, 86 98.

Horse, 91, 1008, 1324, 1390, 1391, 1303

1396, 1397, 1400, 1401, 1403. 1404
‘ 1406, 1407, 1409, 1410
Otr, 1203, 1479, 1480, 1486, 1816

1623, 1646, 1647, 1649, 1651, 1653

Hotngcamasah, 1459, 14641. =

Hrdayasyiagre’vadyati, 709.

Hunger, 1101

Hymns, 542, 556, 557, 561, 562, 800
1090, 1102, 1104, 1128, 1153, 1193
1464, 1545 |

Hyiun-singer, 1464, 1467

Hymning, 564, 778, 1463

Ida, 1454.
Idaémupahvay ati, 1446,
Idambruhmanah, 1442
Idam dyévaprthivi agniridam, 1083
Idamdyavaprthivi soma idam, 1083
Imamagrbhnan, 82, 91
Imamagrbhvam | rashanamrtasyétyac-
vabhidhanimadatté, 1007
Implements, 956, 958, 973, 1957
Implication, 726, 1571, 1584, 1597
Import, 1295
Impurity, 157, 159, 1485, 1503.
Incapability, 905, 915.
Indieation, 974, 977,
10174, 1086, 1104,
116%, 1173, 1201, 1202, 1206, 1209
1233, 1214, 1241, 1273, 1372, 1404
1517, 1526, 1650, 165
Tundra, 189, 543, 544, 649, 553, 554, 556,
705, 1050, 1061, 1062, 1086, 1108,
1109, 1110, L113, 1114, 1128, 1124,
1125, 1126, 1127, 1129, 1169, 1173,
1176, 1267.
Indrapita, 1127, 1129, 1130
Indrapitasya, 1108, 1123, 1125, 1129
Indravayii, 1457, °*
Indravayupatnivatpitasya, 1113
Indraya rathantaraya... .indraya cakva-
raya, 1464
— 121, 131, 308, 498 . 1200, 1218,
361.
Infringement, 1311, 1365, 14.49.
Initiation, 1607, 1638, 1640. -
Instrument, 376, 1354
Instrumental Ending, 981
1172
Intelligence, 26, 998

981, 1001, 1067,
1106, 11168, 1155,

984, 986,

&

ALPHABETICAL INDEX,

Intercourse, 1381. .
Interdependence, 149, 186, 928, 1274.
Invitation, 1432, 1483, 1484, 1485.

Tra, 1193.

Isti, 654, 880, 1040, 1144. 1145, 1390,
1391, 1393, 1394, 1395, 1397, 1398,
1399, 1409, 1401. 1405, 1404, 1490,
1410, 1626, 1527, 1532, 1583, 1534.

Itihasa, 26, 272. (793.

[हिध vratikamasya nidhanam = kuryat

Jaghani, 1234, 1235, 1236, 1237, 1238.

Jaghany& patnih samyiijayanti, 1234.

Jaimimi, 138.

Jaina, 234. |

Jimi, 669, 674.

Jami, flaw of, 674.

Janjabhyamana, 1374.

Japa, 184.

Jaramaryam vii état satraim, १०५.

Jaya, 1387, 138s, 1389.

Jayaté, 485.

Joining together, 1239, 1240, 1242, 1243,
1244, 1245, 1246, 1256.

Juhoti, 1032

Juhi, 1448, 1449, 1506.

Juhuyat, 771.

Jyotiga, 120,

Jyotistoma, 731, 733, 805, 806, 807, ४। l,
$12, 813, 816, 868, 1097, 1100, 1123,
1144, 1145, 1147, 1148, 1152, 1153,

1192, 1193, 1203, 1223, 1224, 1295,
1296, 1227, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1233,
1239, 1241, 1243, 1244, 1246, 1247,
1248, 1249, 1250, 1252, 1253, 1254,
1955, 1490, 1491, 1535, 1556, 1559,
1562, 1563, 1569. 1570, 1571, 1580,
1582, 1583, 1584, 1586, 1587, 1588,
1589, 1590, 1602, 1603, 1607, 1611,
1623, 1625.

Kada ca nastarirasi, 1061, 1169, 1173.

Kalabha, 1.325. |

Kalpa, 224, 227, 229, 240, 241, 242,
271.

Kalpasutra, 120, 224, 225, 226, 227,
298, 229, 238, 239, 242, 243.

Kamya, 1037, 1086, 1087, 1518, 15/9,
1520, 1521, 1528, 1624, 1525, 1684,
1587.

Kamyam yajyakandam, 1087.

Karaka, 997, 1297, 1314, 1317, 1819,
1320, 1322, 1336, 1341, 1342, 1352,
1359, 1360.

Karabha, 1325.

Karanamantra, 1694.

Karma, 493.

Kafmacabda, 487, 492.

Kamya Istayah, 1705.

Kartavya, P 208.

ee ee 1 EE oy म्र eee ee ee ee. oe oe

। 1) ष्णी मि
गणयामि 1 ets ० (इ श 1 कष भ्य

| सथो eye => आन ee ee eee

1471५

Karoti, 47, 478.
Karturékatvé, 1336.

‘Karya, 610.

Kiistham pacanti, 1354,

Kathaka, 910, 911.

(८८४४४, 267, 272, 273, 282.

Kaundinya 1222,

Kaucitaki, 1247.

Khadira, 1505.

Kikata, 8%.

Killing, 854, 1546.

King, 817, 818, 819, 822.

Kingly funetions, 818, 3819, $20, 821,
823, $25, 827.

Kippti, 597.

Kr (to do), 477.

Kriyé, 487,

Kriyacabda, 487.

Krisna, 192, 104.

Krsnala, । १५6,

1९९८, 481, 1350, 1358.

Krtya, 486.

Ksanikavada, 123.

Kaatriya. 167, 193, 816, 818, 819, 820,
$21, 822, 828, 825, S28, 831, 1490,
1497, 1499, 1503, 1563,

Ksaumé vasinam, 1232.

Kgaya, 1562

{९९8 , 1222.

Kundapayindmayana, 1549.

Kulsya, 1229.

Kumiira, 1320.

Ladle, 1026, 1027.

Laghu (siinplication), 1283.
Lah, 1361, 1362.

Lah karmani ca. 1332, 19301.
Laksama, 921.

| Language, 219, 298.
| Lata, 1381.

Law, 82, 167, 172, 684, ५58, 1007,
1047, 1061, 1256, 1452.

Leaves, 1500.

Lovel platform, 664.

Liar, 5

Libation, 1365

Lio, 270, 1291, 1297, 1304, 1312.

Lying, 1289, 1307, 1809, 1310, 1311,

1312, 1364, 1368.

Lifo, 890, 891, 892, 893, 804, 896, 897,
899, 900, 901, L390, 1४91, 1304, 1397,
1309, 1411, 1416.

Limb, 677, 1257.

Limita, 1173, 1238.

Linga, 143, 936, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1172, .
1173, 1175, 1176, 1147, 1178, (179,
1188, 1189, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1196,
1196, 1198, 1199, 1200, 1201, 1202,
1203, 1204, 1205, 1207, 1218, 1220,
1269, (ॐ;

1720)

Locative, 1606,

Logicians, 969.

Loas, 1418

Loudness, 1131, 1132, 1137, 1139. 1140
114], 1143, 1148

Mahabhasya, 274, 276, 1334, 1338.
Mahéndra, 543, 544, 545, 547, 549,
552, 553, 554, 556,

Mahendra, 1545.

Maitravarina, 1203,
1653.

Maitrayani, 1409.

Mala, 1648.

Malavadvasas, 1380.

Malavarivisas& na
annamadyit, 1380.

Mamiers varco, 1694.

Mina, 1562.

Mandrabhibhiitib. .

Manotii, 1188.

Mantra. 15, 78, 79, 80, 81. 89, 88, 85.
40, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91. 93, 94, 97, 98,
99, 100, 102, 103, 122, 144. 229, 287,
375, 454, 457, 566, 557, 558, 5५५1, 562,
565, 566, 567, 668, 570, 573, 574, 593,
594, 5917, 600, 098. 925, 10-435,
1044, 1053, 1058, 1001, 1062, 1063,
1064, 1065, 1066, 1067, 1069,
1070, 1072, 1074, 1076, 1079,
1083, 1086, 1090, 1091, 1097,
1100, 1102, 1198, | 1107,
1108, 1109, 1113, 1116, 1118,
1120, 1122, 1123, 1124, , 1126,
1128, 1129, 1130, 1141, 1139,
1155, 1157, L160, 1162, Lied,
1169, 1173, 1176, 1180, 1188,
1194, 1195, 1202, 1203, 5, 7206,
1212, 1219, 1870, 1374, 1483,

1486, 1565, 1568.

Manu, 180, 153, 214, 825, 10838.

Masamagnitatram juhoti, $71.

Masculinity, 1328.

Master, 1616, 1619, 1640, 1641, 1697.

Mathara Brahmana, 1222.

Mathura, 194, 256.

Matup, 977, 979. -

May: dakaakratii, 1370

Meaning, 1053, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1057,
1058, 1059, 1061, 1063, 1067

Meaning—Primary, 1053, 1054, 1055,
1056, 1057, 1058, 1059, 1081, 1063

Meaning-—Secondary, 1053, 1054, 1055,
1057, 1058, 1059

Measure, 1028, 1030, 1412

Measurements, 1603

| Medicine, 1411

Method, 685, 770, 1079

Method of direct Injunction, 685

B50,

1500, (O51, 1652,

gamvadet nisyi

, bhaksaytémi, L107.

.
"रीणाम 1 ध वा क ES 1 ए पि 1 एतत 7 118 1 111 ए > ति ee oe en ee द 21 1 श 1 7 ।

च शि

110. 11 १.३ णण)

TANTRA-VARTIKA..

Metre, 1128

Metrical feet, 576

Milk 804 1453

Milking, 1518, 1523, 1624, 1554
Midday, 1556

. Mimamaa, 121, 482.
¦ Mimimsaka, 129, 997, 998..
` Mind, 5. 4%, 138, 296.

: Mleccha, 208,

Mitrabinda, 1516..

209, 218, 219, 220

Mo.iification, 573, 657, 841, 1129, 1219.
1255, 1256, 1452, 1490," 1513, 1515,
1516, 1517, 1618, 1520. 1621 1568,
980, 1591, 1625, 1643, 1701 |

. Moksani, 418 |
- Mouth, 871, 872, 875, 876, 877. -

[ 7 हि ह| 7)

. ee ee ee ey ee ee |

7 ०" we ee eee SS 2 । -—_— he see ee Fe ।

Morning, 1545, 1554, 1556

Mother, 102, 203. ` a

Motion, 516, 418, 522, -

Motive, 15, 128, 129, 152, 165, 168, 182
184, 187

Mraksanna, 1381.

Mrtignihotra, 1276, 1280, 1281, 1283.

Muakhya, 1225

Mustikarana, [045.

Muatim karoti vacam yacchati, 1045

Na, 1365

Na, 1327.

Nadhvaryurupajapet, 1628,

Nahusga, 18).

Naimittika, L518, 1519, 1520, 152).

Naiviira caru, 855,

Naivaraccarurbhavati ..
mupadadhat:, 855

Nanrtam vadet, 1289, 1304, 1365.

Na prathamé yajiie pravrfijyat, 1247.

Narasimha, 1437.

Na somam, 1494, 1495.

Navanita, 1705, 1707.

Negation, 107, 509.

Neha bhujyaté, 1360

Nidhana, 793, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800
801, 803

Nigada, 579. 580, 1073.

1१1०7५8 . 273, 323.

Nirmanthya, 421.

Nirukta, 120, 222, 271.

Nirvapa, 1192.

Nirvapana, 946.

Nivids, 1037.

Nispnadyaté, 485.

vadénaticaru-

Nitya, 1519, 1620, 1521, 1528, 1524,
1525, 1684 |

Nivara, 1565, 1566

Nivécanah .... iti girhapatyamapatis

thate, 106]
Nivita, 1269, 1271, 1272, 1273, 1274°
Nivitam manusgyanaim, 1269.
Niyama, 91, -. ।

ALPHABETICAL INDEX,

Nominative, J290, 18296. 1301, 1513.
1314,-1818, 1320, 122. 14:29. 145,
1336, 1840, 13438, 1852, 14. 1

1364, 124
Nominative agent, 1200,
Non-employment, 1523.
North, 1291, .
North wardlinoss,

Pu,

1:41}.

1५५}, 1.2.

Names, 328, 347, 472, 17, 191. dad,
40: 1352

Nreakean, 1102

Number, 978, 994, 999, foot, Too2,
“1003, 1014, 1015, 1016, 10:21, 1023,
1313, - 1315, 1317, 1319, 1322, 1326,
1332, 1334, 1386, 1343, 1845, 1.52,
` 18658.

172)

Pago 700, Tu:

tala, 1811.

7९9 1030, 1235, 1236,

; [> पता, 1114, 114.

——

Number—singular, 994, 999, 1a03, 1015, |

Numbor—plural, 904, 102°.

jective, 1322, 1829, 1336, 1340, 134,
1343, 1346, 1441, 1859, । 2८40, tsar, |
1384

Jblations, 184

Jbservances, 1310

Imnipresent, 519, 521, 522

Iption, 133, 134. 137, 1as. 112. 1.1).

151
Jrigin, 122, 167, 1149.
2117 of the word, 122.
Yriginal, 1452.
Jrigination, 1150,
Iwnership, 1432.

Picakah, 1951, 1352.

Pacati, 1385, 1345, 1350, 135).

Pacati devadattah, 1345, 1353.

Pain, 26, 321,

Pairs, 1178.

Pakt&, 1345, 1350.

Pakt& devadattah, 1345.

Palmistry, 121.

Paurodiicika, 1212, 1214.

Pans, 1419

PiincadagasAmidheniranubriiyat, 11५४;

Paindava, 191

Pinini, 266, 272, 273
1330, 1335, 1360, 1361

Parents, 10

Paribhojaniya, 170%.

Paridhi, 539

Parisankhya, 91, 92.

Parivirast, L188. |

Parlance, 60, 61, 323, 600, 1138
1483

Participle, 1032.

Parties, 150], 1571.

Paruji-dita, 1286 |

Paryagnikarana, 858, 860

Paryagnikytam, 869, 86

Paryud&sa, 2251, 1254

216.

74, 282,

1329,

213,

oe

ee ee eee ee -

ee ee

re Se es
cE AE I IS =

Poaciukama, | 191.

Vacumalabheta 7ot

Patanjall, hy 01.10, 1.
PSR ONT, 204, 1222), 1421, TANT. । 424

Vite CAA tiv jakah, 1

11141) 4४11511, 194

Patnivata, 659, &(८0. SGT, 1112
1115. 11160, 1114, 1120, 72)

Patnivatamfcrayanat grhndti, 1119

Patah cuidah, 1383

Patasya ouklah, 1333

Patasya cuklatvam, 1333

Pauroomiisa, 640. 652, 1078, 1080, 1084.
FOSS

1१11111}, द्वति, (70), Ci

{6 पापात, 11 ५४

Paurnamasyansy, [(६.

[गार द्िपो क्र ङ्ा) paurnamisylim yajeta,
& 5.

Pavanidna, {040, 101,
153, (534.

Pavitra, 1703.

Prvasa juhobl, 679.

Payment, 1619,

Penalties, 1378.

Perception, 9,
। 221

Pormissibility

Phalacamasa
104, 1.19;

1110116 { 1
1111]1२५, 97

Pindapitryajiia, । 99

Pingaksl, G61, 669, 968

Pingaksya, 950

Pitharapaka, 970

Plants, 86

Vieasure, 26, 110, (87, 42!

Plurality. 1229, 1230, [624

Poetry, 278.

Porsessar, 1206,

a ire 4 शष
८६१५६ 4 :

[285 | My st)

, {04 1. TENS, COG,

1526, 1527. 163

121.

;1, 1255,
1452, 1490, 1491. 1492,
L196, 15603, 1802, L563,

ar
fen) tte 2

Post, 63. 141, 145, 1028, 1030, 118%,
1519. 1567, 1610, 1611
Pot Es be

Potcney, 59, 511, 565, 566, 568, 884,
१07. 959, 1165, 1315, 13816, 1347.

Pounding, 1 249, 1495

Pouring. 046, 11 !1, 1365

Pracindové abhajanta daksiném pita-
ralt, 1286

Praharati, 1070

Praica, 486, 1651

Praixe, 24, 26, 32, 40, 42, 49, 60, 61, 63
72, 73, 94, 98, 441, 444, 445, 446, 1227

Praitu hatuccamasah pra brahmanah
prodgit: nim 1477 3

Prajapati,“42. 44, 189

1722

Priijapatya, 925.

Prakarana, 143, 936, 1173, 1175, 1182
1183, 1185, 1188, 1190, 1191, 1192,
1193, 1195, 1207, 1208, 1209, 1210
1212, 1213, 1231, 126¥, 1561

Prakrti 1231

Pramana, 1145.

Priinabhrtah, 457,

Pracitra, 1051,

Prastara, 1070.

Prastotr, 1464.

Prittahsavanee, 1129, 1130, 1550.

Prataranuvaka, 1653.

Prathamabhakgah, 1471.

Prathana, 95, 961.

Prathayati, 95.

Pratihartr 1464.

Pratigrhniyat, 1406.

Pratigrhyaté, 1409.

Pratipat, 1229, 1230, 1233.

Pratipat kalpa, 1192.

Praticakhyas 282.

Pratisthakimasya ekavimoatiranubru
yat, 1136, 1191.

Praudhi-vida, 855.

Pravaras, 45.

Pravagya, 1247, 1250, 1264, 1265,

Priya, 677.

Prayadargana, 113 ४,

Pray6é, 11365.

Prayajas, 289, 635, 657, 658, 1031, 1047,
1146, 1190, 1199, 1222, L533.

Prayajaiséna havimsyagharayati, 1600.

Prayaniya, 1144, 1145.

Precincts, 86).

Preclusion, 1006, 1007, 1008.

Predicate, 1003, 1006.

Prefixes, 323

Premises, 115.

Preparatory, 710, 712, 717, 865, 866
10365.

Price, 959, 985.

L072

Priest, 85, 153, 156, 289, 1058,
1410,
1442, 1444,
1468,
1483,
1626,
1639,

1203, 1403,
1414,
1463,

1477

1365, 1368,

1415, 1416,

1464, 1465, 1466,

1479, 1480, 1482,
1602, 1607, 1620. 1623,
1629, 1635, 1636, 1638,
1643, 1646, 1649, L651, 1652.

Priesthood, 1641.

Primary (sacrifice ), 1513,

1617
Proksanirasidaya, 1689
Prompter, 1403, 1404

Prompting, 1391, 1397, 1414, 1596

Pronouns, 1416

1617,
1552,- 1603, 1604, 1607, 1608,

1411
1461
1474
1494
1628
1640

1532,
1616,

Property, 897, 901, 939, 946, 959, 975,

979, 1064, 1131, 1137, £39

1140

|

TANTRA-VARTIK A’

1141, 1142, 1143,

114, 1149, 1150,
1219, 1271, 1272,

1279, 1286, 1322,
1324, 1328, 1332, 1333, 1334, 1387 `
1418, 1503, 1568. |

Prose, 1073, 1132, 1138,

Protection, 818, 1379.

Prstakota, 570.

Prthupajavati, 1088.

Punarabhyunnita, 1110.

Punita, 605,

Purakrta, 25

Purana, 25, 26, 129, 272 |

Purchase, 970. 971, 981, 982, 984, 9865
987, 988, 993, 1619

Purification, 97, 293, 294, 295, 296, 1019,
1367, 1374

Purity, 10

Purity original, 10.

Parnahuti, 50.

Purodaga, 1212, 1552, 1553.

‘Purodicacakalani, 1704.

Purodaga vessel, 1212,

Purodagaficaturdha karoti, 1194

Puronuvakya, 557, 1652, 1653

Purusa, 1297

Purvakalpa, 25

+ ०९४५१, 1059, 1256, 1257, 1260, 1262,
1263, 1264, 1266, 1267

Piisanumantrana, 1188

Piirvedyuramavasy&yim védim karoti
1192

Putikaé, 1495, 1567, 1563.

Qualification, 1294, 1297,
1363, 1547, 1557, 1558.

Quarters, 49.

Quartering, 1049, 1051, 1062, 1442, 1456.

Raja, 1465.

Rajanya, 824, 824.

Raji, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821,
823, 824, 827, 828 1297, 1648.

Rajainamabhisificet, 822.

Raj& rajastiyena yajéta, 816.

Réjapurusah, 1297.

Rajasiiya, 816, 817, 821,
1210, 1497

Rajya, 818, 819, 824, 827, 1648

Raksa, 276.

Rama, 190

Rathantara, 805, 807, 812, 813
919

Rathantara-sima, 807, 808.

Ratrisatra, 52.

Reyadhytidham sama, 1139.

Reading, 40, 147, 617, 772,
1507.

Recensions, 127, 803, 1409.

Receptacle, 1114

Redness, 959, 970, 979, 981, 987, 989

Regress, 1533 छ

1446, 1359,

822,
828, $30,

814,

1784, 1506,

ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

tains, 1008

bujection, 1161, 1164, 11722, 1174, 1218,

1219, 1220, 1221, 1372, 1444, 1523.

lelationship, 9, 23, 41, 91, 413, 472,

779, 782, 785, 810, 950, 959, १60, 961,

` 962, 963, 9665, 96४, 980, 981, 082, 983,

984, 988, 991, 1162, 1173, 1184, 1213,
4, 1611

emembrance, 39, 105, 108, 237.

ronants, L108, 1110, 1111 1113, 1114.
: 1116, JETS, 1119, 1120, 11, 11:24.
1125, 1126, . 1127, 1130, 1५419, 142),
, 1421, 1422, 1425, 1427, 1438, 1439,
| 144], 1445, 1447, 1448, 1449, 1450,
1452, 1453, 1454, 1455, 1456, 1457,
; 1458, 1459, 1460, 1461, 1463. 1470,
11486

srnoteness, 1178, 1182, 1213.

“jesigning, 143

jetirement, 1224

: (6५911) 785, 787

66, 855, 856, 857, 1257, 1461.
-dansing, 178.

finsing of the mouth, 178.

| 1068, 1069

“fu, 863, 865, 866, 906, 917
1034, 1040, 1365, 1366, 1495, 1534
“igveda, 890, 1131, 1148

ojik, 576, 787, 1131, 1132, 1147, 1138,
‘14139, 114s.

oot, 477, 481, 482, 485, 496, Glo,
` 012. 616, 621, 689 770, S77, + 78, 908,
1102, 1290, 1292, 124, 1361, 1302,
1313, 1320, 13435, 1344. 1556, 1587.
ope, 1187, 1546, 1857, 1878

gis, 99, 100, 127
tugrahésti, 1486
_tvik, 1410, 1630
1636, 1647, 1639.
tviktva 1634.
प्रता, 962.
—ukmin, 104.

bOzL,

011.

16041, 1032,

10234,

scrifice, 63, 80, 85, 89, 90, 93, 98, 99,
144, 166. 157, 179, 321, 373, 376, 381,
2१6, 392, 397, : 98, 420, 403, 404, 406,
411, 423, 499, 501, 503, 505, 506, 543,
621, 63), 633, 636, 647, 650, 652, 654,
658, 660, 664,: 605, 666, 668, 670,

674, 675, 701, 702, 704, 705, 709, 717,

` 96, 737, 738, 782, 783, 805, 807, 813,

813, 815, 816, 817, 832, 833, 840, 841,
845, 850, 852, 853, 855, 856, 857, 858

$60, 861, 863, 864, 866, 867, 868. 869

870, 871, 872, 881, 883, 941, 942, 943

3883, 1028, 1030, 1034, 1040, 1043
44, 1059, 1072, 1074, 1076, 1078,
1079, 1080, 1081, 1083, 1085, 1086,
41087 1088, 1094, 1007, 1122, 1123,
1111, 1162, 1159, 1154, 1191, 1219,

a ES OS A a A a Ee ee a 2 ee eS en
SS ey

672, |

ee ee ee ee Ge = = =>

1223,
1232,
141,
1242,
1216,
1307,
1368,
1378,
1384,
1403,
1412,
1438,
L468,
1403,
151;

1623,
1530,
| 0658,
6) |,

1607,
1641,
1641,

Saeriteer,

422.
1 494.

Sacrifietal,

214,

1412,
1533,

$224,
1235
1 २५१,
125 3
1277
131]
1370,
137%),
L385,
140-4,
1414.
| {-4९,
1486,
L494,
1516
1524
31
159४2,
{10 2,
1011,
1634,

1225

1236,
L246,
1255,
1279,
1312,
L371,
1380,
1390,
(44)7,
1418,
L493,
JAS7,
1303,

LALS,

1525,
1533,

1595,
1603,

1616,
1096,

1643, 1645.

। { 13.

1400,
1557,

1G0,

4,
20.0, 388.

441,

1484,
0.4,

1491,
15601,

LLY,
390, 398, 400, 441,
O04, 998, 1028, 1020. 1187,

| 9945
1297
124
1256,
L239,
1४111,
134,
138],
12891,
1409,
1454,
1455,
143s,
1505,
1520),
120
1591
1°96,
(0.4,
1620,
LOSS,

LOGS.
(487,

1498,

77,

1227,
1238,
12438,
$266,
129],
1365,
1374,
1382,
L399,
1410,
1435,
1468,
L490,
1506,
1591
12५
563
1598
1105,
1095.
1839,

1;

1188

2.1

1218,

1496,

1505, 1607,

16384, 1648, 1640, 1643, 1645.
Sacrificing, 778, 83, 854.
Stidana, 1856.1859
Sadasya, 1640, 1641.
Sa eso'eval pratigrhyate, 1409.
Saghydsatn, 1102
Siihna, 1223
Sfikawnprasth&yva, 1452.

‘Samsthaté samsthilé ete ,
Samé@khya, 1173,

1189,

1190),

1191,

1642.

1709.
L175, 1183, 1184, 1187,
110४,

1193,

1195, 1212, 1213, 1214, 1215."

Sama, 677, 780, 787, 803, 804, 805,

812,
114.

Samaviiya, 1165.

Samaveda.

2 16,

1159, 1463, 1465.
Samavedic, 1465.
Saimavoding, 1465, 1466, 1467.
Samavatta, 1446, [45],
Saubhara, 793, 746, 798. 801, 803, 804.
Samidhenia, 1034, 1036, 1037. 1088, 1513,

1515, 1516, 1618, 1614, 1615.

Samidho vajati, 1290.

Samit, 621, 631.
Sanmarjana, 994

91011475, 1003, 1004, 1011
Sinn&yy@, 1212, 1454,

809,

141,

1148,

1729

1220),
122.9,
1249,
1267,
1304,
1566,
1377,
1383,
1400,
1411,
1457,
1461,
1401,
1514

1522,
1529

1564,
1600,
1108.
16530,
1640,

। 1६0.

140,

व eall

677,
1304,
1614,
1632,

1194,

807,

1690, 1132, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141,
1148.
88."70108{1‰8.}7:61) , 1448.

1152,

1724.

Sampradanatva, 671

Samsthas, 1289, 1243, 1244, 1245, 1246,
1247, 1680, 1582

Sanctifications, 939, 946, 1202, 1225,
1491, 1527, 1551, 1601, 1602, [632

Sandamoa,: 1047

‘Samskrta, 260

Sautrimani, 1453

Sapdaga prajapatyan pagiindlabuota,

3

Saptadacairatni, 958

a ~क yiipah, 778,
028

Saptadaga rtvija':. 1630

‘Saptadaga Simidhéniranubrily at, 194.

Sarasvata, 919

Sarit, 1327

Sarvaprsthesti, 1454, 1458

Sarvam purusgakiryam, 1८.५4

Sarvartha, 1644

Sarvatahpariharam
yatj, 1459, 1460

Satisfaction, 1107 ।

Sattra, 868, 892, 1239, 1635

Sattrmeatprakramaé priichi, 1603

Sanmika Vadi, 1603

Saurya, 1597

Savana, 1129, 1130, 1146

Savaniya, 1146, 1188, 1535, 1537, 1/39
1540, 1541, 1545, 1649, 1550, 1593, 1597
1709

Sa yadi rajanyain va vaicyan vii yajayot
nyagrodhastibhih, 1491, 15४:

Seionce, 119, 121, 123, 173, 179, 185, 225,

2397, 240, 241

Science of reasoning, 121

Scionce, striptuval, 1112, 1506

Scriptures, 110, 111, 128. 179, 181, Zot
204. 206, 226, 232, 233, 2:;4, 236, 237
238, 242, 250, 263, 264, 280 28%, 204.
303, 308, 309, 316. 302.

Seeing, 1102

Self, 321

Series of Ideas, ol),

Services 1442, 1607, 1619.

Shave, 1256, 1257, 12°50, 1442

Sickness, 1393

devinam bhaksa-

, 1423.

Signification, 6, 88, 94, 97, 279, 441
443, 552, 807, 816, 821, ॥)7४, 110:
1163, 1266, 13865, 164१

Silence, 1045, 1046, 1049.

Silver, 4! |

Sin, 1309, 1312

Singularity, 1319

Size, 521, 1028

Sky, 13, 848, 2!

Slabs, 1239 ` |

Slices, 1419, 1421, 1422, 1424. 1426,

1427, 1428, 1451, 1433, 1434. Ls.
Slicing, 1428. - ` »

ee "1 [णण es Sy A A SS OK A A Ty et Se eR Ou SEES yee A Oe Se Se ee Te ame oe 31)

Subsidiary-action, 525, 528

TANTRA-VARTIEA.

Slowness, 1141.
Smrta, 150, = । . ~ `“
9007658, 104, 106, 108, 107, 108, 109; `
130, 112, 114, 115, 118, 119, 123, 124,
126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 182, 1953, -
i34, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143.3
144, 147, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 166;°
161, 163, 164, 166, 169, 170, 173,.178;:

179, 209, 210, 224, 225; 229, 237, 244,-
245, 247, 2661, 317, 533, 825, 925,
1106, 1218, 1221, 1248. . 1279, 1282;
1303, 1206, 1904. 1209, 1310, 1311
1312 1229, ` 1330, . 1365, ` 1381, 1411
1412, 1414, 1418, 1440; 1457, 1459
11६५, 1401, 1462. 4453, 1468, 1440,
14471, $475, 1477, 1479, 1482, ` 1483,
1454, 1485, 14860, 1490, 1401, 1494,
1495, 1496, 1503, 156, . 1563, 1569;
1567, 1568, 1589, 1583, 1614, 1618;
L629 a.

Soma, 156, 160, 647, 701,702, 705, 709,.
117, 872, 902, 959, 970, O71, 983, 985,
1050, 1051, $108, 1109, 1110, PML:
1110, 1117, 1124, 1128, 1129, 1130,
1239, 1241, 1246, 1249

Soma juice, 1110

Soména yaytia, {01 , 17५5

Somu-vondor, 1629

Somaindra, 1411, 1414 ह

Somaindram carunnirvapet yau somam:
varati, 1111

Somapausnam carunnirvapot nemapis:—
tam, 1264, 1268 |

Somarudri, 1188

Somfruadriya, 1192 ;

Somasviigué vihitanuvasat karoti, 1122, .

Soul, 500. 593, 597, 511, 516 618, 519,.

21, 522, 999.
Space, 1011. 11.19.
Speech, 5, 292, 10४३, 1069.
Sphota 206
Sphya, 90:
Sphyceen kapalani ca, 956
Spring, 332
Sruva, 531
Srati, ५54 |
3111६, 1070, 1284
Sruva, 1505, 1508, 1510, 1611 ee:
Sihina, 1173, 1175, 1183, 1184, 1186,;
1188, 11४9, 1191. 1142, 1193, 11954, -
1195, 1907, L210, 1212, 1213, 1551. =
Stone, 1239.
Storv. 26, 100, 119
Stotraé, 1146 Y oe
Striking, 1377 |
Students, 916, 1310 ` = 4
Subrahmanya, 1463 वि :
Subserviency, 1611, 16] + =

ALPHABETIOAL INDEX. 1725:

644, 854, 1152, 1387, 1595, 1596, 1597,

` 1698, 1599, 1602, 1603, 1604, 1606

1607; 1608, 161], 1616, 1617, 1619

1620

Substances, 939, 946, 962, 963, 966, 968
969, 970, 972, 974, 975, 976, 978, 979
980, 985, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 983

19006, 1012,. 1014, 1023, 1028, 1219

, 4287, - 1333. 1934, 1349, 1352, 1438
1439, 1447, 1453,-146¥, 1505, 1557

Substantive, 974

Substitute, 1491, 1603,.1562, 1565, 1566

:' 1667, 1568.

Substitution, 1662, 1563

Substratrum, 502, 511, 979, 1568

Siktia vake,; 1070, 1071,.1072, 1073, 1074
1015, 1076,. 1078, 1679, 1080, 1082
1083, 1084,°1085, 12090, :1210

Sitktavaka eva 2/2, 1073

Suktaviikéna prastaram praharati, 1070

Sun, 894

Supplementary, 726

Supplementary Sentence, 726.

Sugiro ४8 étarhi paguh.,..chidrapidha-

' narthopi, 1563

१४8, 1146, 1148, 1145, 1549, 1707

suvasasa bhavitavyam, 1382

Svalaksana, 342

२५६०६] #&, 1058

` ३४९१ 8.1071380 ४९ yajati, 1457

Svistakrt 1078 1420, 143%, 1439, 1441

| 1445, 1446, 1451, 1462, 1454, 1456

synonym, 1209 , 1330, 1361, 1432

syntactical connection, 16, 920, 46

` 972, 985, 1000, 1046, 1048, 1093, 1105

¦ 1181, 1130, 1156, 1167, 1167, 1239
. 1248, 1249, 1258, 1267, 1273, 1370
972, 1404, 1516, 1526, 1610

byntuctical split, 67, 784, 797, 839, 848

1 859, 873, 930, 1027, 1099, 1273, 1425

~ syntactical unity, 583

-. fyonanté6 sadanam krnomi—sida, 1179

! 1180, 1195, 1204, 1205

_ fadvidhah karmabhedah, 469

lodacin, 919, 1669

‘ell, 1234,
jalttiriya, 1250
amagmai bhaksam prayacchét, 1492,
14.93
‘dm caturbhiradatts, 90, 91
lantinapat 631, 1290
‘ap, 1327
Jasmanmaitrévarunah preayati ciinuca-
: ए ca, 1193, 1203, 1651
97296. {9796 prapistabhaigah adatko hi
.{ 1), 1266.
99०26 somo nanupahiténa 5४०1), 1482
mat suvarnam hiranyam, bharyam,

" {1582 -.

Teachers, 946, 1255.
Technicality, 1339.
Teeth, 1264, 1268,
Temporal, 1412. _
Temporal actions, 1387.
Tense, 1278, 1279.

Tense- Present, 1278, 1279, a
Terminus, 1569, 1570, 1571 1680,
1582, 1584, 1587, 1589, 1590, 159. `
Theories, 122, 123, 223. 390, 513, 515,
709, 810, OL4, ५915, 930, 93।, 932, 923
941, 963, 968, 975, 1089, 1920, 137

Thief, 5,46

Thread, 178 | |

Thread-Wearing of the sacred, 178.

Threatening, 1377

Threefoldness, 1557. .

Throshing, 946, 951, 952, 951, 10865,
1066, 1067, 1196.

Throwing, 1432

rime, 859, 878, 880, 891, 893, 894. 897
901, 10.44, 1065, 1066, 1068, 1070, 1075,
1311, 1313, 1314, 1370, 1479, 1496,

+ 1619, 1550, 1554, 1604, 1630,

1632, 1634, 1639

Tirthasnéna, 1370

Tisra ahutirjuhoti, 722

Touching 845, 850, 862, 854, 1604, 1605
1606

Toya, 1327

Traidhataviys dikganiya, 881

Trayl, 1138

Prayividya, 1128

Tree, 1554

Trio, 654

Trniany, 1023

Trvrt, 214

Trpyatu, 1107

Truth, 1309, 1310

Tvam hi agné, 103

Tvastra, 861

Tvastr, 1116, 117

rvastrampatnivatam, 853

Twice-born, 816, 817

Tying, 1646, 1657

Uccairrea kriyate..vadi rxkta ulvanam
kurute, 1131 |

Ucchista, 1485

Udayamga, 1144, 1145

Udbhid, 373, 374, 376, 383

Uddegya, 881, 884, 1002, 1017

Udgaitr, 1463, 1465, 1467

Udgatrnam camasah, 1465, 1465

Udumbara, 63 क

Udyat Sunvanti Samidhénistanvabhfih,
1614 |

Oha, 102, 276, 278, 279, 280, 1564, 1568...

Uktha, 1239

Ukthyag 1244 , 1569, 1670, 1280, 1583

1726: TANTRA: VABTIEA,.
“Ukthyam grhniyat, 1880. .".. | , Vakya-gésa, 458, 925
. Unit, 1141. # arn | Vapapracira, 1549

. Upadadhati, 865, 856

| Vapaya pratahsavané pracaranti, 1643
Upadeya, 875, 1017

| Vapaya. pracaranti purodacena miadh- `

Upaga, 16:28.

-Upahiita upahvayagva, 1453, 1484
Upiikarana, 1535

Upanayana, 1304, 1307... - - - *
Upanigadic 591 ति

‘Upamcu, 662, 666, 677, 1705
Upaimeu Paurnamasyam, 677

Upimenu. Yaga, 666, 674, 677

Upaimeu Yastavyah, 666

Upaimcou Y&gamantaraé yajati, 672, 677

Upamou ‘Yaga, 1159, 1445, 1447, 1448

Upari hi dévébhyo dhirayati, 128

Upasads, 872, 1144, 1145, 1186, 422:

1224, 1225, 1226, 1227, 1253.

Upasarjana, 1298

Upasthana, 1090, 1091,.1099, 1109, 110]

Upatisthati, 1063

Upavaharana, 156

Upavamea, 852. `

Upavita, 1034, 1036, 1029, 1274
1277, 1278, 1279, 1280

Upavyayaté, 1273, 1278

Upavyayaté dévalaksemameva
kuruté6, 1278 -

Urdhvamagharnyati, 679

Uruprathé, 81, 93

Usriinam, 103

Utsrjati, 859

Uttarardhat svistakrte’vadyati, 1445

Utterance, 1084

Uttering of speech, 1068, 1069.

Uttigthan, 1068

Uttigsthan anvéha = agnidagnin
vihara, 1068

tat

Vadét, 1304, 1319, 1365.

Vaisarjana, 153.

- Vaikankata, 1040.

Vaicvadeva, 423.

Vaicvadevi amiksaé, 736, 740.

Vaicvanara, 668

Vaicya, 1490, 1518, 1563

Vaiyaékaranas, (seo'Grammarian ’)

Vajapeya, 406, 1028, 1029, 1090, 1191.

V&ja&peyasya, 1030

` $ 81101090 vajinam, 736, 741

Vajina, 737

Vajrini, 1661

Vakya, 1168, 1172
1182, 1186, 1189

1173, 1175,

1193, 1196, 1203, 1204, 1205, 1206,
1207, 1209, 1210, 1212 |
`. Vakyapadiya, 333

` Valkyatva, 1134
` Vakya-bheda, 972, 1548
Viakyam ‘bhidyeta, 1650). |

1179,
1190, 1191, 1192,

| Vasanto brahmano’gninadudhita,

| Vagatkara, 1470, 1471

yandine savané, 1552
Varana, 1636 |
Varana, 1040
Viiravantiya, 774, 782, 785, 787, 1141 ?
Varavantiyamagnistomasahia kiiryam, =:
174 | | |

Varhih, 416

Vari, 1327. : ; ^

Varkara, 132: अ -

(2/1, 154, 178, 208, 209, . 239, २५, -`
254, 319, 339, 340, 341, 366, 374, 465. .
147, 652, 554, 566, 501, -649; 604, 811...
613, 709, 750, 874, 1076, 1083, 1138, `
1227, 1275, #458, ८478. 1500, 3502,
1529, 1605, 1650 =

Vartraghni, 1043

Varuna, 292.

Varuna, 1390, 1393, 1397,
1410.

Jt

[1526.

1400, 1401,

| Varuno grhnati 1398

Varnimo vii etam pratizgrhnati yo gvam —

pratigphnatt, 1390 3
22, `
Vasante vasante jyotisa, 902
1473, 1474 1477,..

1480 1486, 1487, 1488, 1489
Vasatkartr, 1471, 1472, 1474, 1477, 1480. :

| Vagatkartuh prathamo bhaksah, 1410) .

1472, 1480

| Vasatkartuh camasah, 1470
। Vashistha, 190
Vaso, 1102

Vasumat, 1107. ‘
Vata berries, 1490). :

| Vatsa, 1325,
| Vatsamalabbeta, 852
। Vayu, 705, 1113, 1114

Véyavyain evotamalabhéta bhutilka-.:
mah, 846 és
Veda, 5, 16, 17, 20, 26, 38, 39, 52, 61,.
89, 91, 101, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109,::
113; 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 127, 129,~
130, 134, 135, 147, 160, 156, 157, 167, .
171, 172, 175, 176,177, 178, 179, 180,~
188, 209, 213, 217, 220, 224, 226, 227,::
228, 229, 232, 234, 235, 237, 238, 240,"
241, 242, 243, 246, 266, 269, 272, 278,
279, 280, 281, 284, 294, 305; 30६, 319;
$23, 325, 350, 352, 374, 501, 506, 562, ..
564, 595, 600, 601 819, 908, 909, O44, =
924, 994, 998, 997, 998,: 999, 113K,"
1182, 1134, 1187, 1138, 1139 .
«A141, 1148, 1144, 1147, 1148 194१
1180, 1152, 1154, 1177, 1197,
1218, 1265, 1865, 1866, 1379, 1387,:
1445, 1446, 1483, 1484, < - oer

॥

ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

Vedangas, 119, 281

Veda-praya, 1135

Vedi, 918

Vedic, 13, 17, 25, 88, 99, 106, 107, 110
111, 112, 114, -116., 116, 118, 124, 126
124, 123, 129, 131, 132, 134, 135, 137,
138, 139, 140,141, 142, 144, 147, 153,

m= = = न क्क == न = =

‘A 18, 212, 213, 214, 221, 224, 227, 228,
“| 299, 244, 245,247, 262, 262, 268, 269
“` 274, 275, 277, 285, 287, 506, 515, 562,
x 563, 601, 780, 903, 919, 952, 998
¦ 1024, 1086, 1177, 1196, 1387, 1388
1389, 1390, 1391, 1394, 1396, 1411
^ ¥412,° 1484, 1671, 1608, 1630, 1634
Vepotablea, 946
Verbs, 323, 347, 472, 473, 474, 481
482, 483, -485,. 4947 405, 565, 566
| 567, 568, GLO, 611, 912, G13, 618

७० ५ ५ i ia
. % 4. A'S 4.
[1 oe

=
171 इ, ।

is

` 621, 623, 624, 628, 635, 636, 722,
863, 877, 1032, 1291, 1492, 1294
` 1295, 1297, 1300, 1301, 1318, 1314
' 1317, 1819, 1329, 1341, 1342, 1344
: 1345, 1846, 1347, 12848, 1360, 1384
1586, 1587, 1617, 1648
Verb—Impersonal, 130
Verb—Intranstive, 491, 1341
Verb—'l'ransitivo, 491
Vernacular, 260, 307, 308. .
Verses, 1084, 1088, 1090, 1093, 1095,
1096, 1101, 1131, 1132, 1138, 113%,

` * 1614, 1652.

Vessels, 808, 994, 995, 999, 1008, 1004,

`: 1005, 1011, 1013, 1036, 1017,
, : 1026, 1027, 1029, 1040, 1041,
. 1446, 1461, 1453, 1457, 1458,
¦ 1479, 1485, 1618, 1528, 1524,
* 1659. |
“Videvana, 1537.
idheya, 881.
` # 10701, 91, 486, 565, 1017.
-Vidhrti, 1703
Vidhy adi, 1209
Vijfianavada, 123
WVikrti, 1256
Violation, 1213
Vicvamitra, 190
Vienu, 675
Vienurup&mou yaatavyah, 672
Vitiation, 1312
Vivaksd, 996, 997, 998, 999
Vu.sitter, 1415, 1416
Vomitting, 1411, 1412, 1414, 1415, 1416
1418 .
Vratam krouta iti vicam visrjati, 1068
Vrdhanvati, 1043
ल hi, 1562, 1565, 1666
rsti, 794, `
retikamasya, 797, 799,
Vrtti, 243, 752, 862, 943

1021,
1212,
1459,
1556,

= ee
9 ७
=

, 164, 169, 170, 171, 173, 179, 181, 185

षि र म ० य ४

[1
ऋः = भ ज ७ ou «= ee Gee ee भे oe ra गीष

amet ee Se

भ = ० ० ee प

Vyckarnaa, -120, 259; 200, 262; 263, 266;
267, 268, 869, 276, 277, 278, 280; ` 283 ,*
287, 291 93, 294, 298, 204; 805 ध
306, 307, 316, 319, 322, 1330, 1339... ~ ~.

Vyékaranatva, 268. =

Vyakti, 332. .

Vyavadharanakalpana, 1495

Washing—846, 994, 999, 1004, 1005, -

1012, 1019, 1020, 1026, 1027 ॥
Washing—hand 1045, 1046 |
(५९८७, 418, 1518, 1523, - `
Weaknoss, 1178, 1207 |
Wearing, 1382, 1383, 1384. 1385, 1386
Western, 255

‘Wife, 1065, 1232, 1380

Windows, 49 ५ त
Wine. 193, 1453, ~ <. a
Wish, 998. | ४२
Woman, 1380, 1381.
Wood, 1505, 1518
Worship, 1063, 1173
Wounding, 1377

Yadanyancean masajuhvati, 1496
Yadi, 810

. Yadibrihmano Yajeta—Yadi rajanyah-

6८0, 816
Yadi 01090807 gukragrdh, 805.

| Yadi rathartarasima, 805

Yadi Somam na vindséta putikaim, 1567

Yadyagniatome juhoti, 1571

Ya evam 647, 659, 665

Yaga 925, 1432, 1435, 1436, 1437.

Yaégéena bhivayét, 479. |

Yaja, 1652

Yajati, 621, 623, 628, 096, 636, 868

Yajeta, 479, 787

Yaji, 670.

Yajfiapatimavati, 94.

‘Yajnatharvana, etc.’ 1705

Yajiiayajiiya pragatha, 1190

Yajfiopaviti hi devebhyo dohayati,,
1280.

Yajamana, 1229, 1230,.1231, 1232, 1367,
1368, 1403, 1404, 1410, 1411, 1414,
1415, 1416, 1417, 1418, 1601, 1602,.
1135, 1640. न

Yajamino * प्रह), 4465, |

Yajurveda, 890, 1139, 1141, 1142, 1144,
1148, 1163, 1271, 1409

' Yajus, 678, 579, 1132, 1138, 1139, 1152

Yajya, 587, 1071, 1072, 1073, 1074, 1087,
1088, 1486, 1487, 1488. |
Yajyénuvikya, 1086.

| Y8jydpuronuvakya, 1088

0. ee eee ewe a =

| Yasyagné vadyati, 701

Ya té agné rajashayAé, 602
Yathacamasamanyan, 1465
Yat papusi ditam, 1286.

Yat pravargyam 1247, 1253 3 =
Yat purnantanmanusyananr, 1256... `
Yat. catani Somam, 1502. - ss
YatSado juhvti, 1608: © -
Yatigika, 962, 963, 966...

Yava, 1562 =
Yiavajjivam, 303, 896, 991, 902.
Yaivat, 893; 896. = °
Yaivajjivamagnihotram, 890.
Yawnins,-13870, 1374

ear; 970 fy

. Yona karinank irtayét, 1957
YS puroddeah 128) त |
Yo gvam pratigrhnati, 1401
‘Yo‘sya vratye hani, 1386. —
Young-ones, 854. ie

Yo vidagdhah sa nairrtah, [285
Yo vrstikamo, 793.
Yudhisthira, 192

Yirpah, 1029, 1030

Yiivam hi sthali, 1229,

= "
8०४
7 . ४ .
1 र
1
SE ES 1 ए 1 ee i a SE aa शं

Haptic, Mission Press, Caleutta,