BIBLIOTHECA INDICA
Work No. 259

VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA
OF
NIMBĀRKA
AND
VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA
OF
ŚRĪNIVĀSA
(COMMENTARIES ON THE BRAHMA-SŪTRAS)
(ENGLISH TRANSLATION)
THIRD CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FIRST QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikarana 1: The section entitled “Obtaining what is different from that”. (Sūtras 1-7)

Sūtra 1

“In obtaining (a body) different from that (the soul) hastens closely embraced, from question and determination.”

The interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras, entitled the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

The object to be established (viz. Brahman) being definitely ascertained by means of concordance and non-contradiction, now the means (sādhanas) are being determined. Here with a view to generating dispassion, the author is, first, exhibiting the soul’s going to and returning from the heaven and the rest. The individual soul, having the stated marks and possessed of the vital-breath, discarding the present body, goes to another body, as “closely embraced” indeed by the subtle elements. This is known “from question to determination”, viz.: ‘Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man?’ (Chānd. 5.3.3) and so on.

The commentary entitled Vedānta-kaustubha, composed by the reverend Śrīnivāsa.

The object to be resorted to, an ocean of all auspicious attributes, free by nature from all faults and the object which one should desire to enquire after—being determined in the two preceding chapters,

1 The concordance of all the scriptural texts with regard to Brahman has been demonstrated in the first chapter; and the non-contradiction in the doctrine of the causality of Brahman, in the second.
2 Vide Br. Śū. 2.3.16 ff.
3 Ś, R, Bh, Šk, B.
now, on an enquiry into the means of attaining Him, the means are being designated. The first quarter of this first chapter, which explains the meaning of several Vedānta texts and removes a variety of doubts, tries to generate a strong feeling of disgust towards mundane existence by demonstrating the imperfections of the world. The second quarter tries to generate a yearning for Brahman by demonstrating His attributes. In the third quarter, discussions about the difference or non-difference among the meditations on Brahman, as well as the determination of the combination or non-combination of details therein, are undertaken. In the fourth quarter, on the other hand, the doubt being, viz. whether the highest end of men is derived from knowledge or from action, it is established that the highest end of man arises from knowledge, while work, which is without any desire for fruits, is a subsidiary part of knowledge.

To begin: In accordance with the texts: ‘Then these vital-breaths gather round him’ (Brh. 4.4.1), ‘It makes another newer . . .’ form’ (Brh. 4.4.4) the individual soul, accompanied by the vital-breath, the sense-organs and so on, having discarded the prior body, obtains another body with a view to enjoying the fruits of the works done by itself. Here a doubt arises, viz. whether it goes closely embraced by the subtle elements which are the seeds of the future body, or not so embraced? If the prima facie view be: In accordance with the view of the Sāṁkhyas, viz.: ‘Wherever, in heaven or in hell, the fruits of work are undergone, there alone the particles of elements, originating the body which is the abode for undergoing the fruits of works, are obtained’, the soul is accompanied by these—the author states the correct conclusion.

The individual soul “hastens”, i.e. goes, “closely embraced”, i.e. surrounded indeed by the subtle elements, the substratum of the vital-breath and the rest and the seeds of the future body, “in obtaining (a body) different from that”, i.e. when entering another body. Why? “On account of question and determination.” The question, to begin with, is contained under the knowledge of five fires, thus: “Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man?” (Chānd. 5.3.3). “Determination” means answer, and it, beginning thus: “In this fire the gods offer reverence. From

1 “A more auspicious.”
2 Pañcāgni-vidyā. Vide Chānd. 5.3–5.10.
that offering Soma, the king, arises’’ (Chānd. 5.4.2) and so on, establishes that water alone, offered to the heaven-world and so on, becomes denotable by that term thus: ‘‘In the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man’’ (Chānd. 5.9.1). The sense is this: ‘The gods’, i.e. the vital-breaths which are the associates of the individual soul, ‘offer’, i.e. throw, ‘reverence’ to the heaven-world, imagined as fire; and that is transformed into an immortal body, called ‘Soma, the king’. Those very gods offer that body to the fire of cloud; and that body, offered thereto, becomes rain. The very same gods offer that rain to the fire of earth; and that, offered thereto, assumes the form of food. The very same gods offer that food to the fire of person; and offered thereto, that food assumes the form of semen. The very same gods offer that semen to the fire of woman, and that semen, offered thereto, becomes an embryo and obtains the name of a person. In this way, water comes to attain the name of a person. Although acquainted with all this, the king Pravāhaṇa, having put to Śvetaketu the questions about the goal of workers, asked this too thus: ‘Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man?’ (Chānd. 5.3.3). Thus asked, Śvetaketu, approaching his father Gautama, said: ‘I have been asked thus by the king, I do not know its answer’. Gautama, himself not knowing it, approached the king and said: ‘Impart that knowledge to us’. Thereupon the king answered Gautama. From such question and answer, it is definitely ascertained that the individual soul goes to another body as closely embraced indeed by the invisible subtle elements.

SŪTRA 2

‘‘But on account of (water) consisting of the three (elements), on account of preponderance.”’

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since water consists of the three elements in accordance with the scriptural text about tripartition, the other two are also to be understood here. The mention of water only, on the other hand, fits in on account of its preponderance.

1 Vide Chānd. 6.3.3. See Br. Śū. 2.4.19–21.
Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz., since in the question: ‘“Do you know how in the fifth oblation”’ (Chāṇḍ. 5.3.3), and likewise in the determination (i.e. answer), there is the mention of the term ‘water’, it is known that the soul goes surrounded by water. This being so, it cannot be said that it goes surrounded by all the subtle elements,—the author says:

The term “but” is meant for disposing of the objection. Since water consists of the three elements in accordance with the scriptural text: ‘“Let me make each of them tripartite’’ (Chāṇḍ. 6.3.3), the other two also are understood, viz. food and fire, the rise of the body from mere water being impossible. Why, then, there is the mention of water only in the question as well as in the answer?—to this the author replies: “On account of preponderance” of water, it alone has been mentioned. Although it appears that in the body there is the preponderance of the earth, since it is observed to be hard, yet on account of there being the preponderance of water in semen and blood, the statement: “On account of preponderance” is perfectly justifiable.

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. “Ātmakāt tu . . .”.

SŪTRA 3

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE GOING OF THE SENSE-ORGANS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because of the scriptural declaration of the going of the sense-organs thus “He going out . . . all the sense-organs go out after him” (Bṛh. 4.4.2), the soul goes, closely embraced indeed by the subtle elements.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In accordance with the scriptural text: ‘He going out the vital-breath goes out after him. The vital-breath going out, all the sense-

1 Bh. B. 3.1.2, p. 152. 2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
organisms go out after it’ (Brh. 4.4.2); in accordance with the Smr̥ti
passages: ‘It draws the sense-organs of which the mind is the sixth’’
(Gitā 15.7), ‘‘When the lord obtains a body and when he departs
from it, he goes taking them, as the wind take fragrances from their
abodes’’ (Gitā 15.8); as well as on account of this going of the sense-
organs like speech and the rest together with the chief (vital-breath),
the soul goes closely embraced indeed by the subtle elements, as
going is not possible on the part of the sense-organs which are
without a substratum,—this is the sense.

SŪTRA 4

“IF IT BE OBJECTED: ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION
OF THE GOING (OF SPEECH AND THE REST) TO FIRE AND THE REST,
—(WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF METAPHORICAL NATURE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: Because of the scriptural mention of the
“going”, i.e. disappearance, of speech and the rest into fire and so
on thus: ‘When the speech of this dead man goes into fire, his breath
into the air, his eye into the sun’ (Brh. 3.2.13 1) and so on, they
do not go with the soul,—(we reply:) “No”, “on account of the
metaphorical nature” of the text about fire and the rest, it being
cited together with the text: ‘His body-hairs to the medicinal herbs,
his hairs on the head to the trees’ (Brh. 3.12.13 2).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The going of the sense-organs with the individual
soul is not justifiable, since the text: ‘When the speech of this dead
man goes into fire, his breath into the air, his eye into the sun’
(Brh. 3.2.13) mentions the “going”, i.e. the disappearance at the
time of the death of the body, of the sense-organs like speech and
the rest, into the deities like fire and so on,—(we reply:) “No”.
Why? “On account of metaphorical nature”. That is, the scriptural

text about the dissolution of speech and the rest into fire and so on is only figurative, concerned with the passing out of the presiding deities, while the text: ‘The vital-breath going out’ (Brh. 4.4.2) may be interpreted literally. The metaphorical nature of the text: ‘When the speech of this dead man’ (Brh.3.12.13) is known from the fact of its being cited together with the text: ‘His body-hairs to the medicinal herbs, his hairs on the head to the trees’ (Brh. 3.12.13). It is never found that the body-hairs and the rest of a dead man dissolve into the medicinal herbs, etc.

SŪTRA 5

“If it be objected on account of non-mention in the first, (We reply:) it alone,¹ on account of fitting in.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: “On account of the non-mention of water “in the first” fire, how can it become a person in the fifth oblation? —(We reply:) “No”, since by the term ‘reverence’ “it alone” is denoted, “on account of the fitting in” of the introduction and the rest (on this view alone).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: In the text: ‘In this fire the gods offer reverence’ (Chānd. 5.4.2) reverence is mentioned as the object to be offered “in the first” fire, but there is no mention of water, and hence how can water become a person in the fifth oblation; and how, in the absence of its mention at first, can the going of the soul as closely embraced by the subtle elements (i.e. waters) be admitted on the ground of its consisting of the three (elements)?—

(We reply:) “No”. The term “for” implies the reason, i.e. because “the very same” water, mentioned in the question; “Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man?” (Chānd. 5.3.3), is denoted by the word ‘reverence’. Why? “On account of fitting in”, i.e. on account of the fitting in of the introduction and the conclusion; otherwise the question and the

¹ The word ‘Ap’ (=water) is always plural. Hence the plural form “tāḥ” has been used in the sūtra.
answer cannot refer to the same topic. Thus, if in the beginning of the answer, viz. ""In this fire the gods offer reverence"" (Chând. 5.4.2), given to the question, viz. ""Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of a man?"" (Chând. 5.3.3), by the term 'reverence' (६५५६) reverence which is of the form of a special kind of mental mode be understood, then evidently such a reverence, a mere mental mode, cannot be referred to in the subsequent passage: ""Thus, verily, in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of a man"" (Chând. 5.9.1).

Thus, there must be (on this view) one kind of question, another kind of beginning of answer, and another kind of answer. Moreover, it is impossible for reverence, which is of the form of a mental mode, to be an object that may be offered; and it is also impossible for the moon, rain and the rest to have a mental mode as their material cause. In the text: 'Water indeed produces faith in him for holy works', water is declared to be the cause of reverence and reverence is declared to be its effect. Accordingly, the word 'reverence' should be known to imply water metaphorically. The application of the word 'reverence' to water is found in Scripture itself. Compare the passage: 'Reverence, verily, is water. Beginning with reverence alone he performs a sacrifice' (Tait. Sam. 1.6.8.1). The moon too is declared by Scripture to have reverence for its material cause in the passage: ""(The gods) offer reverence. From that offering Soma, the king, arises"" (Chând. 5.4.2).

SŪTRA 6

""If it be objected that on account of not being mentioned, (we reply:) No, on account of those who perform sacrifices and the rest being known.""

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that it cannot be said that the individual soul goes, closely embraced by the subtle elements, because there is no

1 That is, the cause and the effect being non-different, the effect (reverence) may stand for the cause (water).
mention of the individual soul as there is of water and the rest,—
(we reply:) "no". Having established that those who perform
sacrifices attain the world of the moon through the path of smoke,
thus: ‘Those who worship through sacrifice, charitable deeds and
alms-giving,—they pass into the smoke’ (Chând. 5.10.3), the text
goes on to establish them alone by the word ‘Soma’, thus: ‘This is
Soma, the king’ (Chând. 5.10.4). As pious workers are referred to
in the passage: ‘Soma, the king, arises’ (Chând. 5.1.2), the above
objection has no force.

Vedânta-kaustubha

If it be objected: water may be denoted by the term ‘person’ in
the fifth oblation through the successive order of reverence, uñcon,
rain and so on. Other two elements, too, may be understood on
account of water consisting of the three elements. But it cannot be
said that the individual soul goes, closely embraced by the elements
like water and so on. Why? Because in this text there is no mention
of the individual soul as there is of water and the rest,—

We reply: “No”. Why? “On account of those who perform
sacrifices and the rest being known.” Having established that those
who perform sacrifices and so on attain the world of the moon through
the path of smoke thus: ‘Those who worship through sacrifices,
charitable deeds and alms-giving—they pass into the flame’ (Chând.
5.10.3), the text goes on to denote them alone (viz. those who
perform sacrifices, etc.) by the word ‘Soma, the king’, thus ‘This is
Soma, the king’ (Chând. 5.10.4). This being so, in the text under
discussion too, viz. ‘In this fire the gods offer reverence. From that
offering Soma, the king, arises’ (Chând. 5.4.2), those who perform
sacrifices and the rest are referred to by the words ‘Soma, the king’.
So there is indeed the mention of the individual soul. The sense is
that it goes, closely embraced by the subtle elements like water and
the rest. There is no fault whatsoever here.

1 Ś, R, Bh, B.
2 Correct quotation: “Eṣa Soma rājā”. Vide Chând. 5.10.4, p. 261; Ś, R,
Bh, Ṣk, B.
SŪTRA 7

“Or (that designation is) metaphorical, on account of being not acquainted with the soul, for this (Scripture) shows.

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The mere workers “being not acquainted with the soul”, stand in a subordinate relation to the gods, and hence the designation of those who perform sacrifices and the rest as edible, viz. ‘That is the food of the gods. The gods eat that’ (Chānd. 5.10.4) is “metaphorical”, in accordance with the scriptural text: ‘He is like a beast of the gods’ (Bṛh. 1.4.10).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. The going of the souls, which perform sacrifices and the rest, to the world of the moon for undergoing the fruits of works appears to be inconsistent, because in the text: ‘That is the food of the gods. The gods eat that’ (Chānd. 5.10.4), Soma is mentioned as the food of the gods. Hence it cannot be said that the text: ‘Soma, the king, arises’ (Chānd. 5.4.2) refers to the souls which perform sacrifices and the rest, it being impossible for the souls to be food,—the author replies:

The term “Or” is meant for disposing of the objection. Since those who perform sacrifices and the rest are only implements of enjoyment,—like sons, servants and so on,—to the gods, the statement that they are food is “metaphorical”, i.e. figurative, but not literal, in conformity with the denial of chewing (i.e. actual eating) on the part of the gods in the passage: ‘The gods, verily, do not eat, do not drink, (but) are satisfied by seeing that very nectar’ (Bṛh. 1.4.10).

If it be objected: It is unreasonable to hold that one who has become a god (viz. Soma) too is the implement of another’s enjoyment, like sons, servants and the rest,—(We reply:) no, “on account of being not acquainted with the soul”. Even then, it is indeed reasonable to hold that the mere workers “on account of not being acquainted with the soul”, are the implements of the enjoyment of those who are possessed of knowledge.

1 Š, R, Bh, Śk, B.
With a view to dispelling the notion that the view established by him is based only on what is seen,¹ the author says: "For this (Scripture) shows". The scriptural text: ‘He is like a beast of the gods’ (Brh. 1.4.10) "shows" that the individual soul, because of being not acquainted with the Ātman, is an implement of the enjoyment of gods.

Here ends the section entitled “Obtaining what is different from that” (1).

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

Reading slightly different, viz. he substitutes “Ca” for “Vā”.²

Adhikarana 2: The section entitled “The passing away of works”. (Sūtras 8–11)

SŪTRA 8

“On the passing away of works, (the soul re-descends as) possessed of the remnants of results, on account of what is seen (i.e. Scripture) and Smṛti, as (it) had come and not thus.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the decay of the works, productive of fruits in the next world, the soul, possessed of the works, productive of fruits in this world, re-descends “as (it had) come and not thus”, in accordance with the scriptural text: ‘Hence those who are of a pleasant conduct here, the prospect is indeed that they will attain a pleasant birth’ (Chānd. 5.10.7 ³), and in accordance with the Smṛti passage: ‘Men of (different) castes and stages of life, who are devoted to their own works, having departed and having undergone the fruits of works, attain, through the remnant of that, births in distinguished castes and families,

¹ Vide the objection above that the soul is never seen to be food.
² Bh. B. 3.1.7, p. 154.
³ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
endowed with beauty, longevity, scriptural knowledge, wealth, happiness and intelligence’ (G.D.S. 11.2.9 1).

Vedānṭa-kaustubha

Thus it has been established that the workers, while ascending, are closely embraced by water and the rest. Now, if all Karmas be exhausted by enjoyment there, the souls cannot evidently attain again various kinds of bodies,—it is being established now that while descending, they are possessed of the remnants of the consequences of their acts.

In the text: ‘Having dwelt there as long as there is a remnant (of their good works) (Sampāta), then they return again by the way they came’ (Chānd. 5.10.5) and so on, the descent of those who are in heaven is recorded. Here a doubt arises, viz. whether the soul, which is in heaven, re-descends without any remnants of the results of its acts, or as possessed of the remnants of results. The prima facie view is as follows: The word ‘Sampāta’ means whereby one falls down, i.e. work. Hence in accordance with the text: ‘Having dwelt as long as there is sampāta’ (Chānd. 5.10.5), the soul enjoys all the fruits of its works. This being so, after enjoying all works, the soul re-descends without any remnants of the results of its acts.

With regard to it, we reply: “On the passing away”, i.e. on the decay, through enjoyment, “of works”, i.e. only of works like sacrifices and the rest, performed with the attainment of heaven in view, the individual soul, “possessed of the remnants of consequences”, re-descends “as (it had) come”, i.e. as it had gone, or in the way of its ascent, “and not thus”, i.e. in a different way. By the scripture text: ‘As long as there is sampāta’ (Chānd. 5.10.5) and so on, the group of works, the cause of the attainment of heaven, is denoted. By the term “remnants of results” (“anusāya”) the works, other than the above and the causes of the attainment of the body and the rest, are understood. The sense is that one, who is possessed of these remnants of results, re-descends by the way of its ascent, the order of which is: smoke, night, the other (viz. the dark) fortnight,

1 P. 15, lines 18–20. Slight variations are found.
S, R, Bh.
2 Sampatati anena sampātaḥ.
the six months of the northern progress of the sun, the world of fathers, the ether and the moon, i.e. through the order: the moon, the ether, the air, smoke, mist, cloud and rain. Why? "On account of what is seen and Smṛti." 'What is seen' means Scripture, and it declares the descent of the soul as possessed of the remnants of its works thus: 'Then those who are of a pleasant conduct here,—the prospect is indeed that they will attain a pleasant birth, the birth of a Brāhmaṇa, or the birth of Kṣatriya, or the birth of a Vaiśya. Now, who are of a stinking conduct here,—the prospect is indeed that they will attain a stinking birth, the birth of a dog, or the birth of a pig, or the birth of a Čaṇḍāla.' Smṛti too declares the descent of the soul as possessed of the remnants of its works thus: 'Men of (different) castes and stages of life, who are devoted to their own works, having departed and having undergone the fruits of works, attain, through the remnant of these, births in distinguished castes and families, endowed with beauty, longevity, scriptural knowledge, wealth, happiness and intelligence' (G.D.S. 11.29).

**COMPARISON**

**Bhāskara**

Reading slightly different, viz. he leaves out the "Ca".

**Baladeva**

He divides this sūtra into two separate sūtras,—thus: "Kṛtā'ntyaye . . . . . . " and "Yathetam . . . ca".

1 Vide Chān. 5.10.3-4. This is, the order of ascent.
2 Vide Chān. 5.10.5-6. That is, the order of descent is partly similar ("Yathetam") to that of ascent, and partly dissimilar ("anevam") to it. The two journeys are alike, as in both cases the soul passes through the moon, the ether and smoke; but different, as the descending soul passes through the air and does not pass through the world of fathers and the rest of the stages of ascent. Vide also Brh. 6.2.16—exactly similar account given.
3 An outcaste, born of a Brāhmaṇa mother and a Śūdra father.
4 Bh. B. 3.1.8, p. 154.
5 G.B. 3.1.8.
SŪTRA 9

"If it be objected: On account of conduct, (We reply:) No, (the text is) meant to connote that (viz. work) metaphorically, so Kāṛṣṇājini thinks."

Vedānta-pārījāta-saurabha

If it be objected that in the phrase: "of a pleasant conduct" (ramāṇīya-carana) (Chānd. 5.10.7), the word ‘carana’ means conduct. Our purpose being served therefrom alone, the descent of the soul as possessed of the remnants of its works is not possible,—(We reply:) "No", since the text about ‘Carana’ is meant to connote work, so Kāṛṣṇājini thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: If in the text: ‘Those who are of a pleasant conduct attain a pleasant birth. Those who are of a stinking conduct attain a stinking birth’ (Chānd. 5.10.7), the word ‘Carana’ means good and bad deeds, then alone we can assert that the soul descends as possessed of the remnants of its work for attaining good and bad births; but that is not the case. Why? "On account of conduct," i.e. on account of behaviour. As the attainment of good and bad births, is mentioned here the word ‘Carana’ does not mean work, but only conduct; and this latter has been designated in the Veda by the word ‘good conduct’ as different indeed from work thus: ‘Those works which are irreproachable are to be practised and not others. Those that are our good should be revered by you and not others’ (Tait. 1.11). Hence to say that the soul re-descends as possessed of the remnants of its works is inconsistent,—

(We reply:) "No", since the teacher “Kāṛṣṇājini” thinks that the scriptural text about ‘carana’, is “meant to connote” work “metaphorically”, as in the absence of good and bad deeds, the attainment of good and bad births from mere conduct is impossible.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. omit “tad”.

1 Ś.B. 3.1.9, p. 691; Bh. B. 3.1.9, p. 155.
SŪTRA 10

"If it be objected that (there is) futility, (we reply:) no, because of the dependence on that."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that in that case there may be "futility of conduct,—(we reply:) "no", "because of the dependence" of works on conduct.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected that there may be "futility" of conduct called 'caraṇa', if it be admitted that the scriptural text about 'caraṇa' is meant for connoting work,—(we reply:) "no", "because of the dependence" of good and bad works on good and bad conduct, the former being accomplishable by the latter, in accordance with the Śṛṇti passage: 'The Vedas do not purify one who is devoid of good conduct' (V. Sm. 6.3 1).

SŪTRA 11

"But (the word 'caraṇa' means) nothing but good and bad works, so Bādari (thinks)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Good and bad works" are denoted by the word 'caraṇa', "so Bādari" (holds).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the phrase: 'of a pleasant conduct' (ramāṇīya-caraṇa) the word 'caraṇa' means good deed; and in the phrase 'of a stinking conduct' (kapūya-caraṇā), the word 'caraṇa' means bad deed. Thus by the term 'caraṇa' good and bad deeds are denoted. The separate designation has a meaning in accordance with the maxim of a Brāhmaṇa-mendicant,—"but this", the teacher "Bādari" holds.

1 P. 197, line 7.
Ś, R, Bh.
2 I.e. the Brāhmaṇa-parivrājaka-nyāya, which is the same as the Brāhmaṇa-Vaśiṣṭha-nyāya and the Go-baltvarda-nyāya. When it is said: 'The Brāhmaṇas should be fed, the mendicants as well', the separate mention of the latter, who are really included in the former, merely emphasizes their position as a special
Hence it is established that the soul re-descends as possessed of the remnants of its works.

Here ends the section entitled "The passing away of works" (2).

**COMPARISON**

*Bhāskara*

Reading slightly different, viz. he omits the word "iti".  

**Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "Those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest".  (Sūtras 12–21)**

**PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 12–16)**

**SŪTRA 12**

"AND (THE ASCENT) OF EVEN THOSE WHO DO NOT PERFORM SACRIFICES AND THE REST IS DECLARED BY SCRIPTURE."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

The going of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest is being considered. Here, first, the *prima facie* view is as follows: The going of even the wicked, who are attached to what is prohibited and averse to what is enjoined, "is declared in Scripture" thus: 'Whoever, verily, depart from this world,—they all go to the moon' (Kauś. 1.2 2).

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

Thus, the ascent of those, who perform sacrifices, works of public utility and so on, to the moon and their descent therefrom have been considered. Now the question is being considered, viz. whether those also who do not perform sacrifices and the rest go to the region of the moon or not.

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1 Bh. B. 3.1.11, p. 155.
2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
On the doubt, viz. whether those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, too, go to the region of the moon or not,—the prima facie view is as follows: The word "anistha" (in the sūtra) means forbidden deeds, and the word "ādi" means the giving up of what is enjoined. The going of even those who perform what is forbidden and give up what is enjoined "is declared" by a Kausitaki-text, viz. 'Whoever, verily, depart from this world,—they all go to the region of the moon' (Kauś. 1.2).

**PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)**

**SŪTRA 13**

"But (there are) ascent and descent of others, having experienced (the consequences of their evil deeds) in the abode of Yama, such a going being declared."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

"There are ascent to and descent from" the orb of the moon on the part of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, after they have experienced sufferings in the abode of Yama, "such a going being declared" in texts like: 'He comes under my sway again and again' (Katha. 2.61), 'The son of Vivasvat, the meeting of place of men' (Rg. 10.14.13) and so on.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

To the objection, viz. If both the pious and the impious go to the moon, then Scripture, concerned with injunctions and prohibitions, must be futile,—(the prima facie objector) replies:

The term "but" is meant for disposing of the above objection. That is, the pious as well as the impious do not go to the moon, and hence the two kinds of scriptural texts are not futile by any means. Then what is the difference between these two cases?—We reply: "On account of such a going being declared", i.e. because the going

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1 Š, R, Bh, B.
2 Correct reading translated, viz. "saṅgama" and not "saṃyamana".
3 P. 270, line 9.
Š, R, Bh, Sk.
of the latter to the abode of Yama is declared by texts like: ‘The passage from this world into another is not manifest to him who is childish, careless, deluded with the delusion of wealth. Thinking: ‘This is the world, there is no other’, he comes under my sway again and again’ (Kaṭha. 2.6), ‘The son of Vivasvat, the meeting-place of men,¹ Yama the king’ (Ṛg. V. 10.14.1) and so on. “There are ascent to and descent from” the region of the moon on the part of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, after they have experienced sufferings “in the abode of Yama” in accordance with their own respective works. The sense is that the impious, having undergone various sufferings, and having then ascended to the world of moon, re-descend.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara, Śrikanṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 13 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 14 in the commentary of the last. According to them, it does not continue the prima facie view, but lays down the correct conclusion against the preceding prima facie sūtra, thus: “But there are ascent (to the world) and descent (to hell) of others, after having experienced in the abode of Yama, such a course being declared”. That is, it is not a fact that those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest too go to the moon. They do not do so. But they descend to the hell, experience the consequences of their evil deeds there, and then ascend to the earth once more.²

The literal interpretation of the following three sūtras is the same, but while Nimbārka takes them to be stating the prima facie view, they take them to be giving the correct conclusion. Thus, while according to Nimbārka, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara four sūtras state the prima facie view, according to Śaṅkara, Śrikanṭha and Baladeva, only one.

¹ See footnote 2, p. 492.
² Ś.B. 3.1.13, p. 694; Śk. B. 3.1.13, p. 208, Part 9; G.B. 3.1.14, pp. 22-23, Chap. 3.
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 14

"And Śr̥uti texts declare."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Parāśara and the rest declare that they (viz. the impious) are under the sway of Yama.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Parāśara and others declare that all are under the sway of Yama thus: ‘And all these, verily, come under the sway of Yama, reverend sir!’ (V.P. 3.7.5 1).

SŪTRA 15

"Moreover seven."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Śr̥uti texts declare also that there are seven hells, beginning with the Raurava.

Vedānta-kaustubha

And “moreover” Śr̥uti texts declare that there are seven hells,—beginning with Raurava and the rest,—as the places to be approached by the sinners.

COMPARISON

Śaṁkara and Śrīkaṇṭha

They add a “ca” thus: “Api ca sapta”.

1 P. 372.
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SūTRA 16

"On account of his activity even there, (there is) no contradiction."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the activity" of Yama alone even in the Raurava and the rest, due to the fact that Citrāgupta and the like, the presiding lords, are under the control of Yama,—to hold that there are other lords too involves "no contradiction".

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Smṛti texts declare that in Raurava and the rest there are other presiding lords like Citrāgupta and the rest. Hence to say that all come under the sway of Yama seems to be inconsistent,—(the prima facie objector) replies:

"On account of his activity," i.e. on account of Yama’s activity", "even there too", i.e. in Raurava and the rest too, Citrāgupta and the rest are under the control of Yama; and hence there is "no contradiction".

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 17–20)

SūTRA 17

"But (the paths) of knowledge and work thus, on account of being the subjects of discussion.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Now the correct conclusion:

Scripture shows the non-descent of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, under the knowledge of the five fires thus: ‘Now through neither of these two paths these small many-times returning creatures are born. ‘Be born and die’,—thus is this third place. Thereby this world is not filled up’ (Chānd. 5.10.8).

By the phrase: ‘of the two paths’, knowledge and work are designated, these two "being the subjects under discussion". In the

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1 See pp. 809-10 of the book.  
2 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
text: ‘So those who know this’ (Chānd. 5.10.1), the path of gods, and in the text: ‘Sacrifices, works of public utility, alms-giving’ (Chānd. 5.10.3), the paths of fathers are mentioned. Those who do not go through either of these two, are these beings who enjoy a third place. The sinners never go to the moon—this is the sense of the text.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author states the right conclusion. The term “but” is meant for disposing of the prima facie view. The going to the region of the moon does not fit in on the part of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, since under the knowledge of five fires, viz. in the passage: ‘Now through neither of these two paths these small, many-times returning creatures are born. “Be born and die”,—thus is this third place. Thereby this world is not filled up’ (Chānd. 5.10.8), Scripture declares the non-descent of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest. By the phrase: ‘of these two paths’, knowledge and work are designated. This very thing the author of the aphorisms states: “Of knowledge and work thus”. The word ‘meaning’ is implied. Why? On account of these two “being the subjects under discussion”, i.e. the words ‘these two’ in the text: ‘of these two’ denote what has been referred to before as the topic. The sinners do not become entitled to either of these two ‘paths’, i.e. the path of knowledge and the path of work, or the path of gods and the path of fathers. The resultant meaning is as follows: Having stated: ‘So those who know this, and those who in the forest worship through faith and austerity’ (Chānd. 5.10.1), the text goes on to show the true path of gods, the path concerned with knowledge, in the text: ‘They pass into light, from light to day’ (Chānd. 5.10.1) and so on. And having stated: ‘Now, those who in the village worship through sacrifices, works of public utility and alms-giving’ (Chānd. 5.10.3), the text goes on to show the path of gods, concerned with meritorious works. Those who do not go through either of these two, are those beings who enjoy a third place. The scriptural text: ‘Whoever, verily, depart from this world,—they will go to the moon’ (Kauṣ. 1.2) too refers to the journey of those who perform sacrifices and the rest.
COMPARISON

Śaṅkara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

They reach the same conclusion as Nimbārka does, viz. that the sinners do not go to the world of moon. Only while they definitely say that the sinners go to hell, Nimbārka says that they go to a ‘third place’ and leaves the question there.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 18

“(THERE IS) NO (NEED FOR THE FIFTH OBLATION) IN THE THIRD (PLACE), BECAUSE OF OBSERVATION THUS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“In the third” place, there is no need for the fifth oblation even for the origination of the bodies of those who do not perform sacrifices and so on, “because it is observed” in the passage: “‘Be born’” (Chānd. 5.10.8) that their bodies originate even without the fifth oblation which comes in the order of reverence and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It may be objected: The text: “In the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of a man” (Chānd. 5.9.1) declares that the soul depends on the fifth oblation for obtaining a body. And before this oblation, the soul attains the moon. Hence it must be admitted that even those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest ascend to and descend from the moon, in order that they may obtain bodies. To this the author replies here.

The path beginning with light belongs to those who are desirous of salvation; the path called the path of father belongs to those who perform sacrifices and the rest. A third place as distinguished from these two is denoted by the term ‘place’. In accordance with Scripture, in the third path of those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest, there is no need for the fifth oblation in order that the soul may obtain

1 Š, R, Bh, ŠK, B.
a body. Why? "Because this is observed, i.e. because it is found in the text: "'Be born and die',—thus is this third place" (Chāṇḍ. 5.10.8) that bodies are attained—even independently of the fifth oblation—by those who have entered into the third place. The sense is that those who perform sacrifices and the rest attain bodies in this world through the successive order, beginning with reverence, moon and so on; and in the case of their attaining bodies, there is a restriction with regard to number, viz. "In the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man" (Chāṇḍ. 5.9.1). But in the case of those who do not perform sacrifices and so on, bodies are generated from water, intermixed with other elements, even without any restriction with regard to the number of oblations,—and not from water which comes in the order of reverence and the rest. By the text: "In the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of a man" (Chāṇḍ. 5.9.1), it is proved simply that in the fifth oblation water comes to be denotable by the word 'man', but it is not denied that it cannot come to have the speech of a man in any other way. There is also the absence of any limitation of the kind: 'In the fifth oblation alone water comes to have the speech of a man'.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 19

"And moreover (this is) declared by Smṛti in ordinary life."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā

It is "declared by Smṛti" in the passage: "He was born from fire for the destruction of Drona, so it has been heard by us", and so on, that the bodies of even those who performed sacrifices and the rest, like Dhṛṣṭadyumna and so on, originated even without the fifth oblation.

Vedānta-kaustubhā

In the Mahā-bhārata and the rest it is mentioned that the bodies of even pious workers, like Dhṛṣṭadyumna and so on, originated independently of the fifth oblation. It is declared by Smṛti too: "There arose, from that fire, a god-like prince" (Mahā. 1.63936).

1 P. 232, line 24, vol. 1.
“From the centre of the altar there arose too a princess of the Pāñcālas, well-beloved by her husband, beautiful to look at, with wide, deep black eyes” (Mahā. 1.6398 1) and so on.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 20

“And on account of observation.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is found that among the four kinds of beings the moisture-born and the plant-born originate even without the union of the male and the female, so there is no need of the fifth oblation in all cases.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It is directly observed that among the four kinds: womb-born, egg-born, moisture-born and plant-born, the moisture-born and the plant-born originate even without the union between the male and the female, so there is no need of the fifth oblation for the origination of the body in the case of sinners.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 21

“(There is) inclusion of the moisture-born by the third term.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: “The egg-born, the soul-born, the plant-born” (Chānd. 6.3.1 2) third term includes the moisture-born as well. Hence there is no setting aside of four classes.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection: The scriptural text: “Of these beings, verily, there are only three origins, the egg-born, the soul-born, the plant-

2 Ś, R, Bh, ŠK, B.
born” (Chānd. 6.3.1) does not mention the moisture-born. Hence there cannot be four kinds of beings—the author replies:

The term ‘plant-born’, mentioned in the above text and “third” in order of reading: “The egg-born, the soul-born, the plant-born” “includes the moisture-born”, i.e. the heat-born. Literally, the plant-born (udbhijja) are those which are born by bursting through the earth and water, i.e. trees and the rest; as well as lice and the like. Hence there are four kinds of beings. Thus it is established that those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest never ascend to the moon.

Here ends the section entitled “Those who do not perform sacrifices and the rest” (3).

Adhikarana 4: The section entitled “Attaining the nature of that”. (Sūtra 22)

SŪTRA 22

“(There is) Attaining the nature of that, ¹ on account of fitting in.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The process of descent is being considered.

The question is as to whether in the text: “Then, by the very path they came they return again, just as they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. After having become the air he becomes smoke; after having become smoke he becomes mist; after having become mist he becomes cloud; after having become cloud, he rains down” (Chānd. 5.10.5-6 ²), it is said that the soul actually becomes the ether and the rest, just as it becomes a god and so on, or merely becomes similar to the ether and so on. If it be suggested that it actually becomes the ether and the rest,—we reply: It becomes similar to them. Why? Because that alone fits in.

¹ The C.S.S. ed. (p. 49) reads “sābhāvyya . . .” instead of “svābhāvyya . . .”.
² Ś, R, Bh, ŠK, B.
Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that those who perform sacrifices and the rest attain the world of the moon, being closely embraced by the subtle elements, and after having undergone the fruits of their works there re-descend with the remnants of the results of their works, just as they had come and not thus. Now, the process of that descent is being considered.

On the doubt whether the scriptural text about descent, viz.: "Then, by the very path they came they return again, just as they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. After having become the air he becomes smoke, after having become smoke he becomes mist, after having become mist he becomes cloud, after having become cloud he rains down" (Chānd. 5.10.5-6), implies that the descending souls, possessed of the remnants of the results of their works, become the ether and the rest, just as they become gods, men and so on; or that they only become similar to the ether and the rest,—the prima facie view is: It is implied that they become the ether and the rest, just as they become the moon, there being no distinction between the two cases.

With regard to it, we reply: There is "attaining the nature of that", i.e. the above text means that the descending souls, possessed of the remnants of their works, become similar to the ether and the rest. Why? "On account of fitting in," i.e. because the only reasonable conclusion is that they become similar to the ether and the rest, due to their contact with them. Thus, in ordinary life, milk can become curd, since when there is milk, there is no curd. But the descending soul, possessed of the remnants of its works, cannot properly become the ether and the rest which are already existent, it being impossible for one thing to become another. The fact that it becomes a body, viz. the moon, for enjoying the fruits of its own meritorious works, stands to reason; but its becoming the ether and so on does not fit in, there being no question of enjoyment at that time. Hence the above scriptural text refers to its similarity with the ether and so on. Thus it is established that the soul becomes similar to them.

Here ends the section entitled "Attaining the nature of that" (4).
COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

He reads “sābhāvya . . .” instead of “svābhāvya . . .”¹.

Adhikarana 5: The section entitled “In a not very long time”. (Sūtra 23)

SŪTRA 23

“In a not very long time, on account of specification.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The soul remains similar to the objects beginning with the ether and ending with rain only for a short time, and then having entered the earth, it attains the state of rice and the rest, in accordance with the specific statement, viz. “Thence, truly, it is difficult to escape” (Chand. 5.10.6²). This text implying that it is more difficult for the soul to emerge out of its states of rice and the rest makes it clear that it remains in the previous state only for a short time.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the duration of the soul’s state of similarity to the ether and the rest is being considered.

The doubt is as to whether on attaining the ether, the air, smoke, cloud and rain, the soul, possessed of the remnants of its works, remains similar to them for a long time, or for a short time. On the suggestion: There is no evidence that it remains similar to them for a short time only; so we may reasonably conclude that the soul remains similar to them for a long time,—

We reply: “In a not very long time”. That is, the soul, possessed of the remnants of its works, remains similar to the ether and the rest only for a short time, and then after becoming similar to rain, it enters the earth. Why? “On account of specification,” i.e. because after entering the earth, the soul becomes rice and so on, and the text

¹ Ś, B, 3.1.22, p. 698. ² Ś, R, Bh, ŠK, B.
makes a specific statement with regard to its emergence therefrom thus: "Hence, truly, it is difficult to escape" (Chand. 5.10.6), the sense being that 'thence' or from the state of rice and the rest, the emergence is more difficult, i.e. cannot be effected in a short time. This implies that the soul emerges from the states of the ether and the rest in a short time. The elision of the second 'ta' in the word 'durnisprapataram' (=more difficult to escape) is Vedic. Our view is correct also because there is no purpose in the soul's remaining in a state of similarity to the ether and the rest for a long time. Hence it is established that the soul remains similar to the ether and the rest for a short while.

Here ends the section entitled "In a not very long time" (5).

Adhikarana 6: The section entitled "Occupied by others". (Sūtras 24–27)

SūTRA 24

"In (rice and so on), occupied by others, on account of statement, as in the previous cases."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is a text: "They are born here as rice and barley, as herbs and trees, as sesamum and beans (Chānd. 5.10.61). Here the statement that they are born as rice and the rest, already occupied by other souls, really means that they only come to be connected with rice and the like. Why? Because only their connection with rice and the like—as with the ether and the rest—is stated.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If on attaining rice and the rest, the soul remains in them for a long time, then do rice and the rest become bodies of the soul, possessed of the remnants of its work?—The author is solving this problem.

After the souls, possessed of the remnants of their works, have attained the earth, it is said: "They are born here as rice and barley,
as herbs and trees, as sesamum and beans” (Chānd. 5.10.6). Here the doubt is, whether rice and the rest become the bodies of the souls possessed of the remnants of their works, or whether the latter come to have only a connection with rice and the rest, just as they have with the ether and so on. Here, on the suggestion, viz. that on the ground of the statement ‘are born’, they are born as having rice and the rest as their bodies,—

We reply: They attain only a connection with rice and the rest, already occupied by other souls, entitled to immobile bodies. Why? “On account of statement, as in the previous cases.” That is, it has been stated that the descending souls come to be connected only with the objects beginning with the ether and ending with rain and not that they are the souls of those objects, possessing them as their bodies, there being no reference to karmas—where there is participating in pleasure and pain, preceded by the assumption of a body, there is a reference to works, such as: “Those who are of a pleasant conduct attain a pleasant birth” (Chānd. 5.10.7). In the same manner the states of rice and the rest are designated in the text without indeed any reference to works. Hence the text simply means that the souls enter into those rice and so on. Further, the absence of any works, leading to immobile births, on the part of those who perform sacrifices and the rest, also proves that the words ‘are born’ imply a connection merely,—this is the sense.

SŪTRA 25

“If it be objected that (sacrifices and the rest are) impure, (we reply :) no, on account of scriptural text.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that their works like Jyotistoma and the rest are “impure”, involving, as they do, the killing of living creatures, and therefore these lead them to immobile births,—we reply: No impurity is involved in Jyotistoma and the rest, on account of scriptural injunction.
Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The works of those who perform sacrifices and the rest, viz. Jyotiṣṭoma and the rest, are “impure”, involving, as they do, the sacrificing of animals to Agni and Soma and so on. Thus, after having experienced the fruit of the meritorious portion of those sacrifices and so on in heaven, they attain immobile births as rice and so on for experiencing the fruit of that part of their action which is of a harmful nature,—

We reply: No. Why? “On account of scriptural text,” i.e. because Jyotistoma and the rest being acts of righteousness pure and simple “on account of scriptural text”, are causes of happiness only. The sense is that the texts forbidding acts of unrighteousness like killing etc., viz. “Let no one harm any creature” (Mahā. 12.9971^n), are not set aside by the texts enjoining acts of righteousness and indicating happiness as the reward. Such killing of sacrificial animals is indeed beneficial to those animals themselves, in accordance with the sacred text: “Thou dost not die, thou art not hurt, thou goest to the gods through easy paths. Where men of good deeds go and not evil-doers, there may the sun-god lead thee” (Tait. Br. 3.7.7.14^n). Hence such acts are not impure.

SŪTRA 26

“After that (there is) conjunction with one who performs the act of generation.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The soul becomes rice and the rest just as it becomes one who performs the act of generation, mentioned in the text: “For whoever eats food, who performs the act of generation, that he (viz. the ascending soul) becomes again” (Chānd. 5.10.6^n).

Vedānta-kaustubha

“After that”, i.e. after the text designating that the soul becomes rice and the rest, there is a text about its connection with one who

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1 P. 716, line 26, vol. 3.
2 P. 147, lines 6–8, vol. 3. Bibliotheca Indica ed.
3 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
performs the act of generation: “For whosoever eats food, who performs the act of generation, that he (viz. the descending soul) becomes again” (Chānd. 5.10.6). The compound “retaḥ-sig-yoga” is to be explained thus: One who performs the act of generation is ‘retaḥ-sic’; the connection of the soul, possessed of the remnants of its works is ‘retaḥ-sig-yoga’. Here the word ‘that’ means the eater, and the phrase: ‘that he becomes again’ establishes a connection merely. Like that the text about its becoming rice and the like too refers to its connection merely with them. The meaning of the statement: ‘That he becomes again’ is that the descending soul, entering into a connection with a man or an animal and so on who perform the act of generation, becomes similar to them.

SŪTRA 27

“FROM THE WOMB THE BODY.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The body arises from the womb.

Here ends the first quarter of the third chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The soul, possessed of the remnants of its work, and separated from one who performs the act of generation, enters into connection with a womb in the fifth oblation and thereby attains a body. Hence it is established that the texts preceding it, i.e. those designating that the soul becomes the ether and the rest, prove only that it comes to be connected with them respectively.

Here ends the section entitled “Occupied by others” (6).

Here ends the first quarter of the third chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā by the reverend teacher Śrīnīvāsa.
Résumé

The first section of the third chapter contains 27 sūtras and 6 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrikanṭha; and 28 sūtras and 6 adhikaraṇas according to Baladeva, who divides sūtra 8 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras.
THIRD CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

SECOND QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikarana 1: The section entitled "The intermediate place". (Sūtras 1–6)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 1-2)

SŪTRA 1

"In the intermediate place, the creation (is due to the individual soul), because (Scripture) depicts (so)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Thus, the course of transmigratory existence has been enunciated for the purpose of generating a dispassion for worldly objects on the part of the individual soul in the waking state. Now, the states of dream and the rest are being determined.

Referring to the dream-state, Scripture declares: "Now there are no chariots, no teams, no roads there. Then he creates chariots, teams and roads" (Brh. 4.3.10) and so on. The doubt being, whether the creation of the chariots and the rest is due to the individual soul or to Brahman, the prima facie view is that in the sphere of dreams, the "creation" of chariots and the rest is due to the individual soul, "because" Scripture "depicts": "He creates. For he is the creator" (Brh. 4.3.9).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, in the first quarter, the relation of the soul in the waking state with the elements and the elemental has been elucidated for the purpose of generating a right discrimination between the soul and the non-soul; as well as its relation with heaven and hell for the purpose of generating a feeling of dispassion. Now with a view to making these discrimination and dispassion still stronger, the states of dream and the rest are being discussed; and with a view to promoting

1 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
2 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

( 506 )
the rise of devotion for Brahman, the Highest Person, His attributes are being determined.

In the Brhadāranyaka, it is declared, referring to the state of dream: “There are no chariots there, no teams, no roads; then he creates chariots, teams and roads. There are no blisses there, no pleasures, no joys; then he creates blisses, pleasures and joys. There are no ponds there, no lakes, no rivers; then he creates ponds, lakes and rivers. For he is the creator” (Brh. 5.3.10). Here the doubt is as to whether this creation of chariots and the rest is due to the individual soul or to Brahman. The prima facie view is as follows: The scriptural text: “He creates. For he is the creator” (Brh. 5.3.10) “depicts” the individual soul alone as the creator of chariots and the rest, “in the intermediate place”. “The intermediate place” is the sphere of dream, as declared by the scriptural text: “There is a third, the place of dream” (Brh. 4.3.9). Hence the “creation” of chariots and the rest is due to the individual soul.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different. According to them too this sutra lays down the prima facie view, but according to them the problem is not whether the dream-creation is due to the individual soul or to Brahman, but whether it is real or unreal. Thus the prima facie view: “In the intermediate place, the creation (is real), because (Scripture) says (so)”.

Baladeva

He does not take this sutra as laying down a prima facie view, but the correct conclusion, thus “In the intermediate place, the creation (is due to the Lord and not to the individual soul), for (Scripture) says (so).”

1 Ś.B. 3.2.1; Bh. B. 3.2.1.
2 G.B. 3.2.1.
PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 2

"AND SOME (DESIGNATE) THE MAKER, AND SONS OF THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the passage: “He who is awake in those that are asleep, the person making desire after desire” (Kaṭha. 5.8.1) “some” speak of a creator of the desires of the soul, viz. sons and so on, in the state of dream.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Moreover, in the text: “He who is awake in those that are asleep, the person making desire after desire” (Kaṭha. 5.8), the followers of “some” branch say speak of the individual soul as a creator, making objects of desire in the state of dream. The author states the objects of desire, referred to in the text, thus “sons and the rest”. By the word ‘desire’, objects that are desired, viz. sons of the rest, are denoted, and not a mere wish, in accordance with the introductory texts: “Ask for all objects of desire (kāma) just as you wish” (Kaṭha. 1.25), “Choose sons and grandsons living a hundred years” (Kaṭha. 1.23). The statement of Prajāpati clearly establishes that the individual soul has true resolves and so on. Hence it is possible for the soul, endowed as it is with (the attributes) of true resolves and so on, to be the creator of chariots, etc.—this is the prima facie view.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different. They too take this sūtra as laying down the prima facie view, but as pointed out above, the problem is a different one for them. Thus: “Some (depict the Lord as) the maker (of dream-objects); and sons and the rest”. That is, just as, the prima facie objector continues, the objects in the waking state are

1 Ś, R, Bh, SK, B.
2 Other editions, viz. the C.S.S. ed. (p. 51) and the Brindaban ed. (1905) (p. 826) read: “jivam kāmānām”, in which case the meaning would be: “some speak of the soul as the creator of desires”. This reading seems preferable. V.K. also follows it.
3 Vide Chānd. 8.7.1.
created by the Lord, so are the dream-objects. Hence just as the former are real, so must be the latter.¹

**Baladeva**

He does not regard this sūtra too as laying down a *prima facie* view, but the correct conclusion. Hence it means: “Some (depict the Lord alone) as the maker (of dream-objects), sons and the rest”².

**CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 3–6)**

**SŪTRA 3**

“But (the dream-creation is) mere māyā, (the individual soul is not the creator of dream objects) on account of not having (its own attributes) fully manifest in nature.”

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

With regard to it, we reply: In the state of dream, the group of effects like chariots and the rest is made by the supreme Lord alone, possessed of true resolves and omniscient,—since such wonderful objects are not indeed made by the individual soul, its attributes of having true resolves and the rest being not “fully manifest” during its state of bondage.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

With regard to this, the author states the correct conclusion. The word “but” is meant for disposing of the above view. The dream-chariots and the like are “mere māyā”, i.e. simply wonderful. Here the word “māyā” means wonderful things. Lord Vāsudeva, an adept in the art of creating and destroying all wonderful objects, creates—through His own powers which are inconceivable—groups of wonderful objects like chariots and the rest, in accordance with the respective deeds of souls in order that they may enjoy these objects. But it is not possible for the dreaming soul itself to be their creator in the absence of appropriate implements and the like,—because its

¹ Š.B. 3.2.2, pp. 706-7; Bh. B. 3.2.2, p. 161.
² G.B. 3.2.2, pp. 41-42, Chap. 3.
³ The C.S.S. ed. (p. 51) reads “sākalyena” instead of “kārṣṭaṇyena”.
attributes of having true resolves and the rest “are not fully manifest in nature”, i.e. are hidden during its state of bondage.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation absolutely different. They too take this sūtra as beginning the correct conclusion. Thus the sūtra means: “But (the dream-creation is) mere māyā (i.e. unreal), on account of not having its own nature fully manifest.” That is, a dream-object is not like an object in the waking state, since it does not possess all the characteristics of the latter. An object in the waking state has a particular place where and a particular time when it exists, it is perceived through a particular sense-organ, and is non-contradicted. Now a dream-object has no place where it can exist. A dream-chariot, e.g. cannot exist in the limited span of the body. It has, further, no fixed time when it exists. To the dreamer a single minute may appear as a century. Also it cannot be grasped by any sense-organ. How can the dreamer see a chariot, e.g. when his eyes are shut? Finally, it is contradicted as soon as the dreamer wakes up. Hence a dream-object cannot be on a par with an object in the waking state and be real like it.¹

Bhāskara criticizes the view of Śaṅkara in this connection by pointing out that those who hold that objects in the waking state too are māyā misinterpret the author of the sūtra and delude people.²

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. “But (the dream-objects are) māyā (i.e. not composed of ordinary materials, but are created by the mysterious will of the Lord), on account of not having (their) real nature fully manifest, (i.e. because they are not objects of perception as gross material objects are)”. This also proves that the dream objects are created by the Lord alone and not by the individual soul.³

¹ Ś, B. 3.2.3, pp. 707 ff.; Bh. B. 3.2.3, p. 161.
² Bh. B. 3.2.3, p. 161.
³ G.B. 3.2.3, pp. 42-43, Chap. 3.
"AND BECAUSE (A DREAM IS) INDICATIVE (OF FUTURE GOOD OR EVIL), IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCRIPTURAL TEXT AND THOSE WHO ARE VERSED IN THAT DECLARE (IT)."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

From the scriptural texts, viz.: "When during works undertaken for a wish, a man sees a woman in his dreams, let him there conceive of success in that dream-vision" (Chānd. 5.2.9). "Now, when a man sees a black person with black teeth in his dreams, he (i.e. the black person) kills him (i.e. the dreamer)" (Ait. Ār. 3.2.4²), it is known that a dream is "indicative" of future good or evil. "Those who are versed" in the results of dreams also "declare" the same thing. Now, we do not always dream dreams that indicate the approach of what is desired; again, we often dream dreams that predict undesirable results. Hence none but the Supreme Soul is the maker of the dream-chariots and the rest.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

That the dream-chariots and the rest are created by the Lord is proved further by the following facts: dreams are "indicative" of good and ill, "in accordance with scriptural texts" like: "When during works undertaken for a wish, a man sees a woman in his dreams, let him there conceive of success in that dream-vision" (Chānd. 5.2.9), "Now, when a man sees a black person with black teeth in his dreams, he (i.e. the black person) kills him (i.e. the dreamer)" (Ait. Ār. 3.2.4). Hence, they must be due to another. "Those who are versed" with the science of dreams too "declare" that a dream is indicative of good or evil thus: "Mounting on cows, buffalos and elephants, mounting on palaces, hill-tops and trees, besmearing one's self with feces, weeping, death and coming to an unapproachable place in a dream are lucky. There is death, undoubtedly, for him whom in his dream a woman, dressed in black and smeared with black garlands, embraces" and so on. If the

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŠK, B. ² Pp. 136-7. Ś, R, ŠK, B.
individual soul were the creator of dream-objects, then it would have enjoyed happiness alone by creating women and the rest which are indicative of good alone, but it would never have created a black person and the rest for its own destruction.

And the followers of that branch too 1 speak of the Supreme Soul as the maker of objects of desires, thus: "He is awake in those that are asleep, the Person, making desire after desire. That alone is the bright, that is Brahman, that alone is said to be the Immortal. In Him all the worlds rest, no one surpasses Him" (Kaṭha. 5.8), it being impossible for the marks, stated in the scriptural text about dream-creation and referring to the Supreme Lord, to refer to the individual soul.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Interpretation different, viz. "Because a (dream though unreal) (is yet) indicative (of the future), those who are versed in it also declare (this)". That is, although the dream itself is unreal, yet the thing indicated by it may be real. Further, the dream-objects are created by the individual soul itself, and not by the Supreme Soul, though it is not denied altogether that the Supreme Self is active in dreams, since the Lord of all, the Supreme Soul, is the controller of the soul at all times and in all its states 2. This view is diametrically opposed to Nimbārka's view, as evident.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They change the order of the sūtras 4–6 which will be noticed at the end of sūtra 6. Interpretation same.

Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. "And (the individual soul and not the Lord is the creator of dream-objects,) (for) (a dream is) indicative (of future good and evil), those who are versed in it (also) declare (so)". That is, it is unreasonable to suppose that what is created by

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1 Viz. Kaṭha., mentioned by the prima facie objector.
2 Ś, B. 3.2.4, pp. 309-10.
the Intelligent Being can be subject to pleasure and pain. Hence the dream-objects which are such cannot be due to the Lord, although, of course, He being the controller of all, is the cause here too in that sense.

Baladeva

Baladeva begins a new topic here, ending with the next sūtra, and concerned with establishing that the dream-objects are real. Hence the sūtra: "And (a dream-object is real) for (it is) indicative (of the future), those who are versed in it (also) declare (so)."

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 5

"But through the wish of the Highest, (the real attributes of the soul remain) hidden, for from that its bondage and (its reverse) (viz. release) (result)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If the soul be the maker of the dream-objects, then the attributes of having true resolves and the rest must surely be admitted on its part. But through the wish of the Supreme Lord in accordance with the deeds of the soul, they remain "hidden" during its state of bondage. From Him alone the soul’s bondage and release arise, as declared by the scriptural text: "The cause of transmigration, bondage, subsistence, salvation" (Śvet. 6.16).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Why should the soul’s attributes of having true resolves and the rest remain hidden during its state of bondage?—the author replies:

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1 "Na hi prajā-jaṣya sukha-duḥkha-yogyatayāvakalpate." It is difficult to see the point of this argument; and it is difficult to see how Bhāskara would have answered Nimbārka’s objection to this view.

2 Bh. B. 3.2.4, p. 161.

3 G.B. 3.2.4, p. 43, Chap. 3.

The word "but" is meant for disposing of the above objection. Though the attributes of having true resolves and the rest are natural to the individual soul,—which is a part of Brahman, which is deluded by nescience consisting in beginningless karmas, and which, for that very reason, has its face turned away from the Lord,—yet they become "hidden" during its state of bondage. Why? "Through the wish of the Highest," i.e. 'through the wish' or the resolution in accordance with the deeds of the soul, "of the Highest" or of the Supreme Person. The word "for" implies emphasis. "From that" resolution alone "its" "bondage and (its) reverse" arise, as declared by the scriptural texts: "The cause of transmigration, bondage, subsistence and salvation" (Śvet. 6.16). "For, truly, when he finds fearlessness as a foundation in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined and unsupported, then he is gone to fearlessness. When, however, he makes the smallest distinction therein, then he comes to have fear" (Tait. 2.7) and so on; and in accordance with the Smṛti passages: "The binder with the noose of the world and the liberator from the noose of the world" and so on.

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṅkara and Bhāskara**

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "But through the meditation on the Highest, the hidden (attributes of the soul become manifest), for from that its bondage and (its) reverse (arise)". That is, if it be said that the soul being a part of Īśvara is possessed of the power of realizing all its wishes; and hence it creates real dream-objects,—the answer is that the real attributes of the soul, viz. its power of realizing all wishes and so on, remain hidden through nescience and become manifest only through the meditation on the Lord. Thus their interpretation of the first portion of the sūtra is diametrically opposed to Nimbārka's.

**Nimbārka**

Through the wish of the Highest (the real attributes of the soul become) hidden.

**Śaṅkara and Bhāskara**

Through the meditation on the Highest the hidden (attributes of the soul become manifest).

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1 Ś.B. 3.2.5, p. 711; Bh. B. 3.2.5, p. 162.
Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. "But through the wish of the Highest, (the dream consciousness is) sublated, for from that its bondage and (its) reverse (arise)". That is, if it be objected that dreams must be unreal, since the dream-consciousness is sublated by the waking-consciousness, the reply is that the dream-objects are withdrawn by the wish of the Lord alone. Since the Lord can cause the bondage and release of the soul, there is nothing strange in His creating and withdrawing the dream-objects. Hence the dream-objects are not unreal, simply because they are sublated.¹

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 6

"Or that (results) also from the connection with the body."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And "that" obscuration takes place by way of its connection with nescience.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"That also," i.e. the obscuration of the soul's attributes of having true resolves and the rest, arises through its "connection with the body" at the time of creation, and through its connection with prakṛti at the time of dissolution. The sense is that the Lord, who takes into consideration the deeds of the soul, purposely conceals the form of the soul which, as a part of Himself, is endowed with the attributes of having true resolves and the rest,—and this He does by connecting the soul with prakṛti in its effected and causal states. Hence it is established that the dream-objects, conforming to the deeds of particular souls and to be enjoyed by them respectively, are created by the Lord, and not by the individual soul.

Here ends the section entitled "The intermediate place" (1).

¹ G.B. 3.2.5, p. 45, Chap. 3.
COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrikaṇṭha

They change the order of sūtras 4–6 thus:

Nimbārka, etc. Rāmānuja, etc.


Baladeva

He takes it as an adhikarana by itself, concerned with showing that the waking-consciousness too is due to the Lord. Hence the sūtra: “Or that too (viz. the waking-consciousness which arises) from (the soul’s connection with the body), (is caused by the Lord)”.

Adhikarana 2: The section entitled “The absence of that”. (Sūtras 7-8)

SŪTRA 7

“The absence of that (takes place) in the veins and in the soul, because of the scriptural text to that effect.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Highest Self is the maker of the dream-objects. During deep sleep too, the soul enters into the vein and the pericardium, and then rests in the Highest Self alone, in accordance with the scriptural text: “Then he comes to fall asleep in those veins” (Chānd. 8.6.3). “Having crept out through them, he lies in the pericardium” (Bṛh. 2.1.19).

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1 G.B. 3.2.6, pp. 46-47, Chap. 3.
2 Ś, R, ŚK, B. Correct quotation: “Srpto bhavati” and not “Suspto bhavati”. In that case, the passage would mean: ‘The he has crept into those vein’. Vide Chānd. 8.6.3, p. 436.
3 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
Thus, it has been demonstrated that the dream-objects are not created by the dreamers themselves, and that they are transitory. This has considerably promoted the growth of right discrimination and dispassion. After that, now for further promoting the growth of those very same things, the place of deep sleep is being considered.

It is declared by scripture that deep sleep takes place in the veins: “Then when he is sound asleep, composed, placid, he knows no dream; then he comes to fall asleep in these veins” (Chānd. 8.6.3). Another scriptural text declares that deep sleep takes place in the pericardium: “Now when he comes to fall into a profound sleep, then he does not know anything whatsoever, then—there are seventy-two thousand veins called ‘Hitā’ which lead from the heart to the pericardium—having crept out through them, he lies in the pericardium” (Brh. 3.19.1). Again, a third text declares that deep sleep takes place in Brahman also: “That which is the ether within the heart, in that he lies” (Brh. 4.4.22), “When this person sleeps, as we say, then, my dear, he comes to be united with the Existent” (Chānd. 6.8.1), “Embraced by the intelligent soul, he knows nothing that is outside, nothing that is inside” (Brh. 4.3.21) and so on. Here the doubt is as to whether the soul sleeps in any of these three places, or whether all of them together constitute its place of sleep. The prima facie view is: The soul can sleep in any one of these three places, but can never sleep simultaneously in all three of them. So, the soul sleeps in any of these three.

We reply: “The absence of that”, i.e. the absence of dream, viz. deep sleep, takes place “in the veins”, “in the soul,” i.e. in Brahman, denoted by the term ‘ether’, and in the pericardium as implied by the term “and” (in the sūtra)—i.e. in a particular place intermediate between the vein and Brahman. The sense is that the vein, the pericardium and Brahman conjointly constitute the place of deep sleep and not separately. Why? “On account of the scriptural text to that effect,” i.e. on account of the scriptural declaration that the vein, the pericardium and Brahman are the place of deep sleep conjointly. Of these three, again, the vein and the pericardium are but of a secondary importance,—they are like a palace and a bedstead respectively. But the Highest Self alone is of primary
importance—He is like a bed, and as such He alone is the immediate place of deep sleep,—this is the resultant meaning.¹

**SŪTRA 8**

“HENCE THE AWAKENING FROM HIM.”

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

For that very reason, the soul rises from the Supreme Lord, as declared by the scriptural passage: “Having come back from the Existent” (Chānd. 6.10.2 ²).

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

None but the Supreme Soul is the place where souls rest during deep sleep. “Hence,” i.e. for this reason, “the awakening”, i.e. their re-attaining the place (or the condition) of waking, “from him”, i.e. from the Supreme Soul alone, fits in, in accordance with the statement: “Having come back from the Existent, they do not know: ‘We have come back from the Existent’” (Chānd. 6.10.2). If anyone else be the place of the soul’s deep sleep, then the text: “Having come from the Existent” (Chānd. 6.10.2) will be contradicted. The sense is that it is not possible for the soul to lie down in one place and arise from another. Hence it is established that Brahman is the place of deep sleep.

Here ends the section entitled “The absence of that” (2).

¹ I.e. a man sleeping on a bed is at the same time sleeping on the bedstead and within the house. As such the bed, the bedstead and the house are his places of sleep conjointly, yet his immediate place of sleep is the bed. In the very same manner the vein, the pericardium and Brahman are the places of the soul’s deep sleep, yet Brahman is the immediate place.

² Ś, R, ŚK, B.
Adhikarana 3: The section entitled “The remembrance of work, text and injunction”. (Sūtra 9)

SUTRA 9

“But he alone (rises) on account of work, remembrance, text and injunction.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“He alone,” i.e. that individual soul which was asleep, arises,—because having half finished a piece of work the previous day, he remembers it and finishes the other half the next day; because there is a scriptural text to that effect: “Whatever they are in his world, whether tiger, or lion, or wolf, or boar, . . .,1 or gnat, or mosquito, that they become” (Chānd. 6.9.2) and so on; and because of the injunctions: “Let one perform the Agni-hotra” (Maitri 6.36), “Let one meditate on the soul” (Brh. 1.4.7) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now apprehending the objection, viz. Naturally, the soul, which has entered Brahman, the place of deep sleep, and has thereby become freed from the two states, the abode of miseries, will never rise from Him again—the author replies:

The doubt is as to whether he alone who was asleep arises at the time of awakening, or some one else? On the suggestion, viz. One who has attained Brahman will not rise from Him again, and hence not the sleeper himself, but another rises—

We reply: The word “but” is meant for disposing of the view. “He alone” who was asleep arises, and not another. Why? On account of the following reasons, viz. work, remembrance, text and injunction.5 Having begun a piece of work, accomplishable in two days, a man goes to sleep at night, and on arising again, that very man finishes it the next day. From such work it is known that that very one who was asleep is now awoke. This is so, also on account of remembrance,

1 The portion “kiṭo va pataṅga va” left out. Vide Chānd. 6.9.2, p. 341. 2 Ś, R, ŚK, B. 3 Bh. 4 Bh, B. 5 Note that while Nimbārka interprets the compound “karmāṇusmṛtiśabda-vidhīh” as (1) remembrance of work, (2) text, (3) injunction; Śrīnivāsa interprets it as (1) work, (2) remembrance, (3) text, and (4) injunction, like Śaṅkara and others.
i.e. on account of the recognition, viz. 'I, who was asleep at night, am awake in the morning'; on account of texts like: "All these creatures go day after day to the world of Brahman, (but) do not know it" (Chānd. 8.3.2), "Whatever they are in this world, whether tiger, or lion, or wolf, or boar, . . . , or gnat, or mosquito, that they become" (Chānd. 6.9.2) and so on; and on account of the injunctive texts, referring to enjoyment and emancipation, such as: "Let one desirous of heaven perform the Agni-hotra" (Maitrī 6.36), "Let one desirous of heaven perform sacrifices" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5 3), "Tranquil, let one meditate" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "Let one meditate on the soul" (Brh. 1.4.7) and so on. If some one other than the person who went to sleep arose, then these reasons would have been set aside. Hence it is established that the very same person who went to sleep arises.

Here ends the section entitled "The remembrance of work, text and injunction" (3).

**COMPARISON**

All others interpret the compound "karmānasmitī-sabda-vidhi-bhyah" like Śrīnivāsa, i.e. giving four reasons and not three like Nimbārka. 4

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**Adhikarana 4: The section entitled "The swooning person". (Sūtra 10)**

**SŪTRA 10**

"IN THE SWOONING PERSON, (THERE IS) HALF-ATTAINMENT, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING LEFT OVER."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

In one who is in a swoon, there is "half-attainment" of death. 5

The state of swoon is not included among the states of deep sleep and

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1 Correct quotation: "vindanti" (=find).
2 See footnote 1, p. 519.
3 P. 208, line 27, vol. 2.
4 Ś. B. 2.3.9, pp. 719 ff.; Śrī. B. 2.3.9, p. 226, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.3.9, p. 163; ŚK. B. 2.3.9, pp. 240-241, Part 9; G.B. 2.3.9, p. 51, Chap. 3.
5 I.e. a swooning person attains half the characteristics of death, or is half-dead.
the rest. Hence "on account of being left over", it is something different.

**Vedanta-kaustubha**

Now the state of swoon is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether the well-known state of swoon is included under the states of deep sleep and the rest, or is something different from them, the suggestion being: There are four well-known states of the soul, viz. waking, dream, deep sleep and death. So the state of swoon must be included under them, there being no proof that swoon is something different from them,—

We reply: “In the swooning person” there is “half-attainment”. One who has fainted owing to excessive grief is said to be a 'swooning person'. He attains 'half' the place of death.¹ That is, the state of swoon is something different from the other four states. Why? "On account of being left over." Thus, the state of swoon is not the same as the state of waking or the state of dream, on account of the absence of knowledge.² It is also not identical with death, on account of the presence of life and heat.³ Nor can it be said that deep sleep itself is swoon, because the soul being embraced by the Existent then, deep sleep is a state of bliss.⁴ Hence it is established that "on account of being left over", the state of swoon is not one among the states of deep sleep and the rest, but is a different state.

Here ends the section entitled “swooning person” (4).

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¹ I.e. makes a half-way approach to death.
² I.e. a swooning person is unconscious, while a person who is awake or a dreaming person is conscious.
³ I.e. a swooning person is still alive and warm unlike a dead person.
⁴ I.e. a swooning person does not enjoy any bliss as a person in a deep sleep does.
Adhikarana 5: The section entitled "Possessed of two-fold characteristics". (Sūtras 11-21)

SŪTRA 11

"Not on account of place even (Is there any imperfection) on the part of the Highest, because everywhere (He is described as) possessed of two-fold characteristics."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It has been already proved ¹ that the respective imperfections of the souls do not pertain to the Highest Self, though abiding within all, since He is not subject to karmas. There is no imperfection "on the part of the Highest, on account of place even", since "everywhere" Brahman is stated to be free from all defects and endowed with all auspicious qualities.

Vedānta-kaustubha

With a view to generating an aversion to transmigratory existence, the particular states of this individual soul have been briefly demonstrated above. The attributes of Brahman, the Highest Person, such as, being the creator of dream-creation, having true resolves, being the cause of pleasure during deep sleep and so on too have been demonstrated for the sake of generating an yearning for Him. Now, for generating an yearning for the Highest, the reverend author wants to establish that He is free by nature from all faults and is one mass of all auspicious qualities. Hence he says this:

On the doubt, viz. whether those imperfections,—which arising from the different places pertain to the individual soul abiding in those places, viz. waking, dream and deep sleep,—pertain to the Highest Self, or not,—the prima facie view is as follows: Although it has been stated in the first chapter under the aphorism: "If it be objected that enjoyment results, (we reply:) no, on account of difference" (Br. Sū. 1.2.8), that those imperfections cling only to the individual soul, a self-conscious agent, but never to the Highest Self who is not subject to karmas,—yet just as, like Yajñadatta, the owner of a house, his friend Devadatta too, who has entered there, comes to be affected by the heat of fire, owing to his connection

¹ Vide V.P.S. 1.2.8.
with that blazing house,—so the imperfections arising from places pertain to the Highest Self too.¹

With regard to it we reply: No. There are no imperfections, arising from those particular places, "on the part of the Highest", i.e. on the part of Brahman full of His own bliss, although He has entered into those places out of compassion as the inner controller of the individual souls, His own parts, for their guidance,—"because" "everywhere", i.e. in scriptural and Smṛti passages, the Supreme Brahman is established to be "possessed of two-fold characteristics", i.e. as possessed of the marks of being free by nature from all faults and being an abode of a mass of auspicious qualities. The scriptural texts are to the effect: "The soul that is free from sins, ageless, deathless, griefless, without hunger, without thirst, possessed of true desires, possessed of true resolves" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3), "Who is omniscient, all knowing" (Munḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), "Whose penance consists in knowledge (Munḍ. 1.1.9), "He who knows the bliss of Brahman" (Tait. 2.4.1; 2.9.1), "Natural is the operation of (His) knowledge and strength" (Śvet. 6.8) and so on. The Smṛti passages are to the effect: "He possesses all auspicious qualities; and has drawn out, by a particle of His own power, the creation of beings" (V.P. 6.5.84 8), "He is possessed of might, power, lordship and supreme knowledge, and is one mass of qualities like His own strength, power and the rest. He is the highest of the high, in whom, the Lord of the high and the low,⁴ there are no miseries and the like" (V.P. 6.5.85 ⁵).

**COMPARISON**

Samkara

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "Not even on account of place (i.e. limiting adjunct), two-fold characteristics (viz. saviśeṣa

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¹ Here the house stands for the body, Yajñadatta for the soul, Devadatta for the Lord. Just as when the house is on fire, the heat affects not only Yajñadatta, the owner, but also Devadatta, a visitor who has entered into it, so the imperfections inhering in the body affect not only the individual soul, the owner, but also the Lord who has entered into it as its ruler.

² Reading: "Sva-sakti-licṣāvṛta-bhūta-vargaḥ", meaning: 'Who has covered the group of beings by a particle of His own power'.

³ P. 837, lines 9-10.

⁴ Reading: "Parāparesē", meaning the same.

⁵ P. 837, lines 13–16.
and nirviṣēśa) (are possible) on the part of the Highest, for everywhere (Scripture declares it to be nirviṣēśa)". That is, in Scripture two classes of texts are found, one designating Brahman as possessed of difference, the other designating Brahman as devoid of difference. This gives rise to a doubt, viz. whether Brahman is both saviṣēśa and nirviṣēśa. The answer is that one and the same thing cannot have two different natures. Hence Brahman cannot be saviṣēśa even through the limiting adjuncts which do not change its real nature, but only conceals it for the time being.¹

Bhāskara

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "Not even on account of place (viz. the world and the rest), two-fold characteristics (viz. sākāra and nirākāra) (are possible) on the part of the Highest, because everywhere (Scripture declares Him to be nirākāra)". That is, although Brahman has two forms—causal or nirākāra and effected or sākāra,—yet He is to be meditated on in His Nirākāra aspect only, which is His real form and which He never loses even when He comes to have a connection with the world and the rest.²

Baladeva

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "Not even on account of place (i.e. by the mere fact of His being in two places), two-fold characteristics (i.e. changes of nature) (are possible) on the part of the Highest, because everywhere (He is present simultaneously)". That is, though the Lord manifests himself in various places, yet by reason of His mysterious power, He Himself undergoes no change.³

SŪTRA 12

"If it be objected: On account of difference, (we reply:) no, on account of the statement of what is not that in each case."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: Because of its connection with the body, the imperfections arising from the difference of states, do indeed pertain

¹ Ś.B. 3.2.11, p. 724, lines 8-17. ² Bh. B. 3.2.11, pp. 164-165. ³ G.B. pp. 54-55, Chap. 3.
to the individual soul, though endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest. Likewise they may belong to the Highest as well—we reply: “no”, because nowhere there is any text designating imperfections on the part of the Inner Controller; on the contrary, there are texts about His immortality, viz. “He is your soul, the inner controller, immortal” (Bṛh. 3.7.3, etc.1).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The individual soul passes through many different states and assumes many different bodies (such as human, divine and so on), and hence the stated imperfections do indeed pertain to the individual soul, though it is naturally endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest, established by the statement of Prajāpati, recorded in the Chāndogya.2 Likewise, the Lord too, the Inner Controller of all, has to pass through many different states and come into contact with many different bodies. Hence, those imperfections may pertain to the Highest as well, naturally endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest,—

We reply: “No”. Why? “On account of the statement of what is not that in each case,” i.e. because there is no text designating the imperfections of the Highest Person “in each case”, i.e. in any state. The stated imperfections pertain to the individual soul,—which though endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest, has yet its real nature concealed through the wish of the Highest, in accordance with its karmas,—but never to the Highest who has His real nature ever-manifest. Thus, in reference to the state of waking, there are texts establishing the imperfections of the individual soul, such as: “Those who are of a stinking conduct attain a stinking birth” (Chānd. 5.10.7) and so on, but none referring to the imperfections of the Highest. Then, in reference to the state of dream, there are texts like: “When one sees a black person with black teeth in his dream, he (i.e. the black person) kills him (i.e. the dreamer)” (Ait. Ār. 3.2.44) and so on; and in reference to deep

1 Repeated altogether 20 times (once at the end of each verse) up to the end of the section beginning with verse 3.7.3.
2 Vide Chānd. 8.7.1, 3.
3 Vide V.K. 3.2.5.
4 P. 136-137.
sleep, there are texts like: “All creatures go to this world of Brahman
day by day, (yet) do not find it, for they are carried away by untruth”
(Chānd. 8.3.2) and so on,—all referring to the individual soul, but not
to the Highest. Similarly, it should be understood that in reference
to death and the rest as well there is ‘statement of what is not that’.
Our view is further confirmed by the texts designating the immor-
tality of the Inner Controller and proving His faultlessness, viz.:
“He is your soul, the inner controller, the immortal” (Brh. 3.7.3,
etc.). The same text is repeated in connection with each of the
objects to be controlled,—beginning with the earth, water, fire and
sky, and ending with the skin, understanding and semen 1,—men-
tioned in the Brhadāranyaka in the text which begins “He who
dwelling in the earth is other than the earth, whom the earth does
not know, of whom the earth is the body, who rules the earth from
within” (Brh. 3.7.3).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Reading different, viz. adds “na” in the beginning thus: “Na
bhedat . . .” Interpretation also different, viz.: “If it be objected
that (Brahman is) not (nirviśeṣa), on account of difference (of forms),
(we reply:) No, on account of the statement of what is not that in
each case”. That is, it may be objected that since Brahman is desig-
nated by Scripture as having various forms, e.g. as having four feet,
sixteen parts and so on, it must be held to be savīśeṣa, i.e. possessed
of attributes and forms; and there is no contradiction involved here
in taking Brahman to be so, the difference of Brahman’s forms being
due to limiting adjuncts. That is, Brahman is both savīśeṣa and
nirviśeṣa according to Scripture. To this the reply is that Scripture
depicts Brahman as nirviśeṣa only, even though it mentions its dif-
ferent forms, due to limiting adjuncts,—for in every passage describing
such adjuncts of Brahman, it is itself described as free from all diver-
sity. Such designations are for the purpose of meditation only, but
their real meaning is non-difference only. 2

1 Vide Brh. 3.7.3–3.7.23.
2 “Bhedasya upāsanārthatvād abhede tātparyāt.” Ś.B. 3.2.1–, p. 725.
Bhāskara

Interpretation absolutely different. He continues the topic of the Nirākāra-upāsanā of Brahman. Hence the sūtra: “If it be objected that on account of difference, (i.e. on account of the corporeal and incorporeal forms of Brahman as designated in Scripture,) (Brahman is not to be worshipped in his casual or formless aspect) (we reply:) no, on account of the statement of what is not that in each case, (i.e. because there is no text which designates difference on the part of Brahman due to limiting adjuncts)”.  

Hence everywhere the one Brahman is to be worshipped.

Baladeva

Reading different, viz. like Śaṅkara, he adds a “na” in the beginning. Interpretation too different. He continues the theme of the previous sūtra, viz. the oneness of the Lord in spite of His various manifestations in different places. Hence the sūtra: “If it be objected that on account of difference (i.e. because the manifestations of the Lord are different), (the oneness of the Lord, alleged above, is not possible), (we reply:) no, because there is the statement of the absence of that (viz. difference) with regard to each (of these manifestations)”. That is, with regard to each of the manifestations of the Lord, Scripture is careful to point out that He is one.

SūTRA 13

“Moreover thus some (teach).”

“Moreover” the followers of “some” branch teach: “One of these two eats the sweet berry, the other, without eating, looks on” (Ṛg. V. 1.164.20; 3 Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6 4).

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Moreover”, the followers of “some” branch teach that though the individual soul and the Supreme Lord abide in the same place, it is the individual soul alone that is subject to karmas and

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1 Bh. B. 3.2.12, p. 165.  
2 G.B. 3.2.12, pp. 55-56, Chap. 2.  
3 P. 146, lines 1–3.  
4 R, ŠK.
participates in imperfections, but not the Highest who is not subject to karmas, thus: "Two birds, close friends, cling to the same tree. Of these two, one eats the sweet berry; the other, without eating, looks on" (Ṛg. V. 1.164.20; Munḍ. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6).

**COMPARISON**

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

They quote from the Katha and Śvetāsvatara Upaniṣads to show that Scripture teaches the essential non-difference of Brahman.

Baladeva

He quotes from the Mundukya-upaniṣad to show that the Lord is one, though appearing as many.

**SŪTRA 14**

"FOR (BRAHMAN) IS WITHOUT FORM (I.E. NOT AN ENJOYER) INDEED, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING THE PRINCIPAL (AGENT) WITH REGARD TO THAT (VIZ. CREATION OF NAMES AND FORMS)."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

The Highest is the principal agent, the creator of names and forms, as declared by the text: "‘‘Let me evolve name and form’’" (Chānd. 6.3.2). Hence He is not the enjoyer of the names and forms to be created by Himself, and as such Brahman is "without form". Hence Brahman is not touched even by an odour of imperfections.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

To the objection, viz. There may not be any imperfections on the part of Brahman even on account of place; still as the creator of names and forms, Brahman must be their enjoyer too, for generally a creator creates objects for enjoying them. Names and forms

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1 Katha, 4.11; Śvet. 1.12.  
2 Ś.B. 3.2.13, p. 725; Bh. B.  
3 Munḍ. 7.  
4 G.B. 3.2.13, p. 58, Chap. 3.  
5 Not quoted by others.
are known to have Brahman as their creator from the use of the first person in the text: ‘“Let me evolve name and form”’ (Chānd. 6.3.2). Hence it is established that the Supreme Brahman is subject to karmas, and every imperfection is possible on the part of one who is subject to karmas,—the author replies:

One to whom the forms together with the names,—such as the divine bodies and the rest, created by Brahman in accordance with the works of the individual soul,—are not objects of enjoyment is “without form”. Hence Brahman, who is “without form indeed” does not proceed to evolve names and forms for His own enjoyment, since all His desires are eternally fulfilled. The word “for” indicates the absence of all imperfections, arising from the material names and forms, on the part of Brahman. Why? “On account of being the principal (agent) with regard to that,” i.e. because “with regard to that”, or with regard to that act, Brahman is the principal agent, the creator of names and forms, in accordance with the scriptural text: “The ether, verily, is the creator of names and forms” (Chānd. 8.14.1.). That the Highest creates names and forms for the sake of the individual soul, is indicated by the words ‘by the individual soul’ (jivena). The individual soul, possessed of the stated marks, is a part of Brahman; and Brahman, the Whole, dwells in it, in accordance with the scriptural text: “He who dwelling in the soul” (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30 2). Here, any activity in connection with the creation of names and forms being impossible on the part of a mere part (viz. the individual soul), the term ‘individual soul’ refers to Brahman, the Whole, acting for the good of the part. Hence the two words ‘jīvena’ and ‘ātmanā’ refer to the same object (viz. Brahman). The individual soul being subject to karmas is connected with these forms, and hence imperfections are possible on its part. But Brahman, though the creator of names and forms in accordance with the works of the individual souls, is not the enjoyer of their fruits, and as such the stated imperfections can never pertain to Him. Hence Brahman is possessed of a two-fold characteristic.

1 Vide Chānd. 6.3.2—“Anena jīven-ātmanā anupraviśya nāma-rūpe vyā-karavāni”.
2 P. 1074, line 18.
3 Viz. in the above passage—Chānd. 6.3.2.
COMPARISON

Saṁkara

Interpretation different, viz. "For (Brahman is) without form (i.e. nirākāra) only (and not both sākāra and nirākāra), because of the primariness of that (viz. of the texts teaching that Brahman is formless)". That is, the texts which attribute forms to Brahman are not the main purport of Scripture, since they simply enjoin meditation, and do not set forth the real nature of Brahman. ¹

Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. "For (Brahman is) without form indeed, because He is the principal (being)." ²

After this sūtra, Bhāskara reads an additional sūtra, not found in the commentaries of others, which is as follows: "Asthūlam anany-ahrasvam-adīrgham-asābdham asparśam-arūpam-avyayam", meaning: "(Brahman is) non-gross, non-fine, non-short, non-long, without sound, without touch, without form, immutable". Hence such a nirākāra or formless Brahman is to be worshipped, and not the sākāra Brahman. ³

Baladeva

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here concerned with the question of the form of Brahman (four sūtras). Hence the sūtra: "For (Brahman is) without a form, because that (viz. the form) is the chief (viz. Brahman)". That is, Brahman is formless in the sense that He has not the form, but is the form itself, since the body of Brahman is identical with Brahman Himself. ⁴

SŪTRA 15

"AND (BRAHMAN IS) POSSESSED OF LIGHT, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING NOT DEVOID OF MEANING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Untouched by darkness, "possessed of light"—Brahman, possessed of such a two-fold characteristic, is designated by one text:

¹ Ś.B. 3.2.14, p. 726. ² Bh. B. 3.2.14, p. 166. ³ Bh. B. 3.2.15, p. 166. ⁴ G.B. 3.2.14, p. 59, Chap. 3.
of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness” (Vj. S. 31.18; Tait. Ār. 3.13.1; Śvet. 3.8; Gita 8.9), on account of the text being not devoid of meaning.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The view that Brahman is possessed of a two-fold characteristic is being confirmed once more.

Brahman “possessed of light,”—that which has light for its attribute is ‘possessed of light’,—and untouched by the imperfections of the objects to be lighted, as implied by the term “and” (in the sūtra), is possessed of a two-fold characteristic. Why? On account of the texts being not devoid of meaning, viz. “He alone shining everything shines after him. Through his light all this shines” (Kaṭha. 5.15; Munḍ. 2.2.10; Śvet. 6.14), “Of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness” (Vj.S. 31.18; Tait. Ār. 3.13.1; Śvet. 3.8; Gita 8.9) and so on. This aphorism is for showing that one text after another denotes Brahman as possessed of a two-fold characteristic.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. “And (Brahman is) like light, on account of non-futility of texts (which designate Brahman as possessed of a form)”. That is, just as the light of the sun or the moon, though pervading the entire expanse of the heaven and having no particular shape as such, appears straight, crooked and so on when passing through a finger which is straight, crooked and so on, so Brahman appears as the Universe through its connection with the limiting adjunct. Hence it is that the texts which designate Brahman as having the form of the Universe and so on are not absolutely devoid of meaning, but serve the purpose of meditation.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkanṭha

Interpretation different, viz. “And on account of the non-futility (of texts designating Brahman as possessed of all auspicious qualities and devoid of all imperfections)”. That is, just as (the texts designating Brahman as) light such as: “Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite”

1 P. 857, lines 10-11.
2 P. 201.
3 Not quoted by others.
4 Ś.B. 3.2.15, pp. 726-27.
(Tait. 2.1) establish Brahman to be self-manifesting, so certain texts prove Him to be possessed of two-fold characteristics, viz. having all auspicious qualities on the one hand and being free from all defects on the other, both kinds of texts having a definite meaning.¹

Bhāskara

Reading slightly different, viz. substitutes "vā" in place of "ca".²

Baladeva

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. continues the same topic about the body of the Lord thus: "And because of the non-futility (of this conception of the form or body of the Lord) as in the case of light". That is, just as, though the sun is pure light yet is conceived as having a definite form for the purpose of meditation, so the Lord, though a pure light of knowledge and bliss, is yet conceived to have a form for the purpose of meditation.³

SŪTRA 16

"AND (A SENTENCE IS NOT MEANINGLESS WHEN IT) STATES THAT ONLY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

When a text "states that only" or its real meaning only, then indeed it is not meaningless.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, what makes a text have a meaning or be devoid of meaning?

When a scriptural text "states that only", i.e. its real meaning only, then it is not meaningless. The term "and" implies that if it be taken, by foolish persons, to be referring to what is not its subject-matter, then it becomes meaningless. This being so, the texts designating the two-fold characteristics of Brahman being

¹ Śrī B. 3.2.15, p. 232, Part 2; ŚK. B. 3.2.16, p. 247, Part 9.
² Bh. B. 3.2.15, p. 166.
³ G.B. 3.2.15, p. 60, Chap. 3.
mutually non-contradictory, are literally true and authoritative,—
this is the implied meaning.

. COMPARISON

Śaṁkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different as before, viz. "And (Scripture declares that only, (viz. that Brahman is pure, non-differentiated consciousness)".¹

Rāmānuja and Śrikanṭha

Interpretation different, viz. "And (texts like: 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite') declare that only', viz. only that Brahman is self-manifesting, but does not deny that Brahman has other qualities, such as, being capable of realizing all His wishes at once and so on, known from other texts. This sūtra and the next answer, according to them, the prima facie view, viz. that texts like "Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite" (Tait. 2.1) only designate Brahman as devoid of all differences and self-manifesting by nature; while, on the other hand, texts like: "Not so, not so" (Brh. 2.3.6) prove the qualities of Brahman, such as Omniscience and so on, to be false. Hence Brahman cannot be said to be possessed of two-fold characteristics, viz. having all auspicious qualities and being free from all defects whatsoever.²

Baladeva

He continues the same topic about the body of the Lord, viz. "And (Scripture) declares that only, (viz. that the body of the Lord is the Lord himself)". That is, it must not be thought, on the ground of the previous aphorism, that Brahman has no actual form, but is conceived to have a form for the sake of meditation only, for Scripture declares that the Lord does possess a form and that this form is not different from Him, but the very essence of His self.³

¹ Ś.B. 3.2.16, p. 727; Bh. B. 3.2.17. p. 166.
³ G.B. 3.2.16, p. 429, Chap. 3. "Atra dehād bhīnno dehit-y- evam bhīdeśvara-vaśtuni nāsti; kimtu deha eva dehī labdham."
SŪTRA 17

"AND (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS (THIS), THEN (IT IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI TOO."

Numerous texts like: "The Soul that is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3), "Without parts, without action, tranquil, irreproachable, stainless" (Śvet. 16.19), "Having true desires, having true resolves" (Chānd. 8.1.5; 8.7.13) and so on, prove that Brahman is possessed of a double characteristic. "Then" it is "declared by Smṛti too", thus:

\[ \text{कान्यअं निर्जीवित्रां तेजस्वेनुमिन} \]

Hence in the world and in the Veda I am proclaimed to be the Highest Person" (Gītā. 15.18), "I am the origin of all, everything proceeds from me" (Gītā. 10.8), "Or, what is the use of so much knowledge to you, O Arjuna? Having pervaded this entire Universe with one part of mine, I abide" (Gītā 10.42) and so on.

"And" the mass of scriptural texts "shows" that Brahman is indeed possessed of a two-fold characteristic, viz. "The soul that is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3), "Without parts, without action, tranquil, irreproachable, stainless" (Śvet. 6.19), "Having true desires, having true resolves" (Chānd. 8.1.5; 8.7.1, 3), "He who is omniscient, all-knowing" (Mund. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), "Supreme is his power, declared to be of various kinds indeed; natural is the operation of his knowledge and power" (Śvet. 6.8), "Him who is the supreme and Great Lord of lords; him, who is the supreme God of gods" (Śvet. 6.7), "He is the cause, the cause of the lord of causes" (Śvet. 6.9a), "Of him there is no progenitor whatsoever, nor a lord" (Śvet. 6.9b), "This is one bliss of Brahman" (Tait. 2.8), "He who knows the bliss of Brahman does not fear anything" (Tait. 2.4) and so on. This is "declared by Smṛti too" thus: "I am beyond the perishable and am superior to even the imperishable. Hence in the world and in the Veda I am proclaimed to be the Highest Person" (Gītā 15.18),

1 Not quoted by others.
2 R, ŚK.
3 Not quoted by others.
4 Not quoted by others.
5 Op cit.
6 R.
7 Correct quotation: "Karanādhipādhipa", meaning: the lord of the lord of sense-organs, viz. the individual soul. Vide Śvet. 6.9, p. 70.
"I am the origin of the entire world, likewise the dissolution" (Gita 7.6), "He who knows me unborn, without beginning and the Great Lord of the world" (Gita 10.3), "The multitudes of gods do not know my origin, nor the great sages" (Gita 10.2), "Having pervaded this entire world with a part of mine, I abide" (Gita 10.42), "There is nothing higher than me, O Dhanañjaya" (Gita 7.7), "For I am the enjoyer of all sacrifices, and the lord indeed" (Gita 9.24) and so on.

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṅkara**

He quotes from Scripture (Bṛh. 2.3.6, etc.) and Smṛti to show that Brahman is nirviśeṣa or absolutely free from differences.\(^1\)

**Bhāskara**

He quotes from Scripture (Śvet. 6.13) and Smṛti (Gita 8.9) to show that Brahman is self-manifest by nature.\(^2\)

**Baladeva**

He quotes from Scripture (Gopāla-pūrva-tāpani) and Smṛti (Brahma-saṁhitā) to show that the body of the Lord is identical with the Lord Himself.\(^3\)

**SŪTRA 18**

"AND FOR THAT VERY REASON, (THERE IS) THE SIMILE, LIKE THE SUN AND WATER AND SO ON."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

Brahman, though all-pervading, is indeed faultless, possessing as He does two-fold characteristics. "For that very reason," texts like: "Likewise,\(^4\) verily, the one soul abides within many, like the sun within water-receptacles" (Yāj. Sm. 3.144\(^5\)) and so on,
take the help of "the simile of the sun and water and so on" for establishing Brahman's faultlessness.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

Brahman, though abiding in many places, is not subject to even an odour of imperfections arising out of those places. "For that very reason", in Scripture the following "simile" is employed: Just as the sun and the rest, though reflected on water and the like, are not touched by their imperfections, so the Supreme Brahman too, though abiding in the sentient and the non-sentient, is not touched by their respective imperfections. The texts to that effect are as follows: "But just as the one ether becomes divided in the pots and the rest, so verily, the one soul abides within many, like the sun within water-receptacles" (Yāj. Sm. 3.144), "For the soul of beings, which is one only, is installed in each separate being, and is seen as one-fold and many-fold, like the moon reflected on water" (Brahmab. 6.12 1).

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṅkara and Bhāskara**

The same simile of the sun and water is interpreted differently by them, viz. Just as the same sun appears to be many when reflected on many sheets of water, so the one Brahman appears to be many through being connected with Upādhis or limiting adjuncts.² However, Śaṅkara and Bhāskara understand the term 'Upādhi' in two different senses, as already noted.

**Baladeva**

He begins a new adhikarana here (one sūtra), concerned with showing that the worshipper (i.e. the individual soul) is different from the object worshipped (viz. the Lord). Hence the sūtra: "And for that very reason, (i.e. because the individual soul is different from Brahman), the simile, like the sun and water and so on, (is appropriate)". That is, in Scripture we meet with the similes of the sun reflected on water and so on, and such similes simply show that just

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1 P. 338.
2 Ś.B. 3.2.18, pp. 328-329; Bh. B. 3.2.19, p. 167.
as the sun (or the bimba) is different from its image (or the prati-bimba), so the Lord is different from the individual soul.¹

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 19)

SŪTRA 19

"But on account of the non-apprehension like water, there is no being so."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is doubted: Water is apprehended to be remote from the sun, but not so the place (viz. the individual soul) from the whole (viz. the Lord).² Hence the example cited is not to the point.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It is doubted that the example cited does not illustrate the point. The word "but" is indicative of the doubt. It may be objected: "There is no being so", i.e. Brahman is not like the reflected sun. Why? "On account of the non-apprehension like water," i.e. water is apprehended to be remote from the sun, and the sun and the rest, though reflected on it, are yet not touched by its imperfections as they are remote from it; but all the sentient and the non-sentient are not apprehended, as in the case of water, to be remote from Brahman. Compare the scriptural texts: "He who abiding within the earth" (Brh. 3.7.3), "He who abiding within water" (Brh. 3.7.4), "He who abiding in the soul" (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30 ³), "In whom all the worlds are situated" (Kaṭha. 5.8; 6.1) and so on; and also the Smṛti passages: "The Lord dwells, O Arjuna, in the heart-region of all" (Gītā 18.61), "In me all this is woven" (Gītā 7.7) and so on. Hence there is no parallelism between the Supreme Person, the topic of discussion, and the reflected sun and the rest.

¹ G.B. 3.2.18, pp. 65-66, Chap. 3.
² The C.S.S. ed. (p. 54) reads "sthaninah".
³ P. 1074, line 8.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 20-21)

SŪTRA 20

“(Brahman’s) participation in the increase and decrease on account of being included within (is denied), on account of the agreement between the two (i.e. the example and the exemplified) (it is) so.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it, we reply: “The participation” of the Lord of places (i.e. Brahman) “in the increase and decrease” of the places (i.e. the individual souls and matter),—He being their Inner Controller,—is what is denied by the example. “On account of the agreement between the two,” it is “so”, i.e. only the intended portion is to be understood.

Vedānta-kaustubhā

With regard to it, the author replies: The word ‘no’ is to be supplied from the preceding aphorism. In spite of His “being included within” the places, there is no “participation in the increase and decrease”,—due to those places,—on the part of Brahman, the Highest, who is the lord of places, in accordance with the scriptural texts: “He who abiding within the earth” (Brh. 3.7.3), “He who abiding within the soul” (Śat. Br. 6.7.30). This is what is denied by the example of the sun and the rest. “On account of the agreement between the two (this is) so”, i.e. on account of the agreement between the illustration and the illustrated, only the relevant portion is to be understood. Thus, just as the ether, though actually entered within pots, jars and so on, does not participate in the faults of increase and decrease,—although the ether is in every pot and is distinguished conventionally as: ‘There is no water in this pot’, ‘There is sugar in another’, yet it remains one only,—and just as the sun, reflected on different receptacles of water, does not participate in the faults of their increase and decrease, on the contrary manifests a multitude of objects under water,—so the Supreme Brahman, who is one only, abides as manifold in the sentient and non-sentient objects as their Inner Controller, but is not touched by their respective faults, is not divided by their respective differences and does not participate in their increase and
decrease. Thus, "on account of the agreement between the two, (this is) so", i.e. only the relevant points of similarity are to be accepted, otherwise there can be no appropriateness of these two. The resultant meaning is that there can be no relation of example and the exemplified between two objects when the example proves the exemplified to possess contrary qualities.

Or (the word "ubhaya-sāmānyāt" may be explained as): On account of the appropriateness of the two examples of the sun and so on, (i.e. the sun and water, and the ether and pot).

**COMPARISON**

**Saṃkara and Bhāskara**

As before, they interpret the example in a different way. Hence the śūtra: "(There is a common point between the example and the exemplified, viz. their) participation in increase and decrease, owing to being included within, on account of (such an) agreement between the two, (it is) thus: (i.e. the comparison holds good)". That is, just as the reflected image of the sun, being inside the sheet of water, participates in all the qualities of water, viz. increases and decreases when water does so and so on, but the real sun does not do so, so Brahman, when within, i.e. connected with the limiting adjuncts, such as the body and so on, participates in their growth and the like, but real Brahman never does so.1

**Rāmānuja and Śrīkāṇṭha**

They take this śūtra and the next one as constituting one śūtra.2 Interpretation same.

**Baladeva**

Interpretation different, viz. "(The above simile of the sun and water holds good, though not in its primary sense, yet in its secondary sense of) participating in increase (i.e. greatness) and decrease (i.e. smallness), (i.e. just as the sun participates in increase, i.e. is a large substance untouched by the limitations of water and so on, while the images of the sun participate in decrease, i.e. are limited by the conditions and variations of water, so the Lord participates in greatness, i.e. is great and independent, while the individual soul participates

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1 Š.B. 3.2.20, pp. 729-730; Bh. B. 3.2.31, pp. 167-168.
2 Śrī. B. 3.2.20, p. 234, Part 2; ŚK. B. 3.2.20, p. 250, Part 9.
in smallness, i.e. is small and dependent,—this is what is meant to be illustrated by the simile), on account of being included within, (i.e. because the purport of Scripture is fulfilled by this mode of explanation,—everything is contained in it), on account of the agreement between the two (this is) so, (i.e. the comparison holds good)".1

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 21

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF OBSERVATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because in ordinary experience, (comparisons like): ‘A lion-like boy’2 are found.

Vedānta-kaustubha

And because in ordinary life, expressions like ‘A lion-like boy’ and so on are found, this is “so”, i.e. the attribute which is common to the example and the exemplified is to be understood as the relevant portion here. Hence it is established that Brahman is possessed of a two-fold characteristic.

Here ends the section entitled “Possessed of two-fold characteristics” (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. “And because it is seen (i.e. declared by Scripture that Brahman enters within the body)”.3

1 G.B. 3.2.20, pp. 69-70, Chap. 3.
2 The whole point is that when one thing is compared to another, that does not imply that the two must be similar in all respects, but only that they are so in some intended points. E.g. when a boy is compared to a lion that evidently does not mean that he has four feet, thirst for blood, etc. like the lion, but simply that he is as brave as the lion. Hence only this point, viz. braveness, is to be taken into account here. Similar is the case with Brahman and the sun.
3 Ś.B. 3.2.21, p. 730; Bh. B. 3.2.22, p. 168.
Adhikarana 6: The section entitled "The so-muchness resulting from what has been previously declared". (Sūtras 22–30)

SŪTRA 22

"For (the text) denies the so-muchness resulting from what has been previously declared, and after that speaks (of Brahman as limitless) once more."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the doubt, viz. whether the text: "Not so, not so" (Brh. 2.3.61) denies the corporeal and the incorporeal forms, mentioned previously in the passage: "There are, verily, two forms of Brahman, the corporeal and incorporeal" (Brh. 2.3.12), or denies simply Brahman's so-muchness resulting from His connection with the previously mentioned forms—the suggestion being that it denies the forms of Brahman—we reply:

It "denies" only "the so-muchness resulting from what has been previously mentioned". "After that," "once more" 3 the concluding portion of the text says: "For there is nothing higher than this—hence (it is called) 'not so'" (Brh. 2.3.64).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated above that Brahman is possessed of a two-fold characteristic. Now the world is real, the world which consists of the sentient and the non-sentient, which is not known through any other means of knowledge, which is knowable from Scripture alone as a form of Brahman on account of having Brahman for its soul, and which is not deniable by such texts like: 'This is not a form of Brahman.' Now, it may be thought that Brahman, who possesses the world as His form and is endowed with infinite, inconceivable, auspicious

1 Ś, R, Bh, Šk, B.
2 Op. cit. This text occurs in Maitri 6.3 as well.
3 The word "bhūyah" may mean both 'once more' and 'something more'. It is not clear in which sense precisely Nimbārka understands it. Śrīnivāsa gives both the meanings, see V.K. below.
4 Ś, R, Bh, Šk, B.
qualities and powers, becomes limited owing to His connection with the limited world. The author here denies this.

In the Brhadāranyaka, having begun thus: “There are, verily, two forms of Brahman, the corporeal and the incorporeal” (Brh. 2.3.1), and having exhibited the particular forms of saffron-colour and the rest thus: “The form of this person, verily, is like the saffron-colour” (Brh. 2.3.6), the text goes on to record: “Hence, now, there is the teaching: ‘Not so, not so’” (Brh. 2.3.6). Among these, the corporeal, i.e. the three elements: fire, water and food; the incorporeal, i.e. the two elements: air and ether; as well as the particular forms of the saffron-colour and the rest have been mentioned before. Here the doubt is whether the text: “Not so, not so” (Brh. 2.3.6) denies the above-mentioned group of the corporeal and the incorporeal forms of Brahman, or denies Brahman’s so-muchness, resulting from His possession of the above-mentioned group of the corporeal and the incorporeal forms. Here on the suggestion: It denies the group of the corporeal and the incorporeal forms,—we reply: The text: “Not so, not so” denies Brahman’s so-muchness, resulting from His connection with those corporeal and incorporeal forms which have been mentioned previously. The word “for” shows that no things, sentient and non-sentient, are capable of being denied—things which, on account of having Brahman for their soul, are His forms, as established by hundreds of scriptural passages, such as: “There are, verily, two forms of Brahman, the corporeal and the incorporeal” (Brh. 2.3.1), “Everything has that for its soul” (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.4, etc.), “All this, verily, is Brahman” (Chānd. 3.14.1), “By proving the enjoyer, the object enjoyed and the Mover, all has been said. This is the threefold Brahman” (Śvet. 1.12) and so on. The phrase: “And after that speaks once more” shows that Brahman is not limited by so-muchness. That is, “after that” or after denying the so-muchness of Brahman, “once more”, i.e. again, the concluding portion of the text “speaks” of Brahman as not limited by so-muchness.

Or else (an alternative explanation): the concluding portion of the text speaks of something more than the previously mentioned corporeal and incorporeal forms thus: “For there is nothing higher than it, hence (it is called) ‘not so’. ‘Now (its) name is ‘the real of the real’.

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1 Vide Brh. 2.3.2-3. 2 Vide Brh. 2.3.6.
The vital-breaths, verily, are real. It is their real” (Brh. 2.3.6). Its meaning is as follows: It is not to be said that the real nature of Brahmān is not other ‘than it’, i.e. than what has been mentioned above. Brahmān is higher than it, unlimited by so-muchness, without an equal or a superior. There is also a ‘name’ for Brahmān, the highest of all. The same text states it thus: ‘the real of the real’. Anticipating the enquiry: The real of which reals? the text says: ‘The vital-breaths, verily, are real; it is their real’. ‘The vital breaths’ are the individual souls having the vital-breaths, and they do not, like the ether and the rest, undergo any change of nature at the time of creation, hence they are ‘real’. Just as the Vedas, though eternal, arise from Brahmān, in accordance with the maxim of a person who was asleep but has arisen now,¹ He being the cause of all,—so the individual souls, too, being under the influence of karmas, come to have births, etc., i.e. undergo changes in the form of contraction or expansion of their knowledge. But the Supreme Brahmān is not subject to any such changes. For this reason, and also because He is the whole, He is the real of them too,—this is the sense. For this very reason, Scripture says: “The eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious” (Kaṭha. 5.13; Śvet. 6.13).

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṅkara**

Interpretation diametrically opposed: The question is, what exactly is denied by the text “Not so, not so”. Does it deny the two forms of Brahmān merely, or also Brahmān Himself possessing those forms? It may be suggested: As none among these is specially mentioned as the object of negation here, so both these are negated. The term ‘not so’ is repeated twice, which also seems to imply that there are two objects of negation, the universe and Brahmān. Or, Brahmān alone is negatived here, since it being beyond the eyes and the mind, may very well be non-existent.

The answer to this view is as follows: The two-fold negation of the forms of Brahmān and Brahmān Himself is not possible. Negation implies something positive and existent on the basis of which the thing is set at naught, e.g. the snake is denied to be in the rope and so

¹ Vide V.K. 1.3.28.
on. Hence absolute and universal negation is impossible and meaningless. Therefore, Brahman cannot be negativ ed. As such the text “Not so, not so” denies only the two previously mentioned corporeal and incorporeal forms of Brahman and thereby depicts the real nature of Brahman, viz. His absolute freedom from all differences. If it be said: Why should Scripture first designate these forms and then deny them?—the answer is that Scripture never actually proves that Brahman possesses these forms, but simply mentions them as the views of the ignorant for the purpose of showing their hollowness later on. Moreover, the repetition of the words ‘not so’ simply refers to the two forms separately. Thus according to Śaṅkara, there are two alternative explanations of the sūtra:

(1) Having first designated Brahman as “Not so, not so”, the text goes on to say once more: “There is nothing higher than it, hence (it is called) ‘Not so’.”

(2) (Or) there is no better designation of Brahman’s real nature than the text: “Not so”; and the text declares something more, viz. the name of Brahman.¹

Rāmānuja

Interpretation same, but he does not begin a new adhikarana here, but continues the same adhikarana up to sūtra 25.

Bhāskara

He also does not begin a new adhikarana here, but continues the same topic of the meditation on Brahman in His aspect of non-difference, as pure existence and consciousness. According to Him in the text: “Not so, not so”, the first ‘not so’ denies the corporeal and the incorporeal forms of Brahman, i.e. His form as the elements; while the second ‘not so’ denies His Vāsanā-maya form, i.e. His form as the individual soul. Thus this text designates the pure, non-differenced form of Brahman, but by no means proves the non-existence of the world. Hence the sūtra: (“The text) denies the so-muchness of the topic of discussion (viz. Brahman) after that speaks (of Brahman) once more (as the Highest Being)”²

¹ Ś.B. 3.2.22, pp. 737 ff.
² Bh. B. 3.2 23, p. 169.
SŪTRA 23

"THAT (viz. BRAHMAN IS) UNMANIFEST, FOR SCRIPTURE STATES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The scriptural text: "He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by speech" (Mund. 3.1.8) and so on, states that Brahman is "Unmanifest".

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author points out that Brahman, immanent in the corporeal and the rest, yet transcendent, is not apprehended by the ordinary sense-organs.

"That," i.e. Brahman, is "Unmanifest", "for" Scripture "states": "His form is not present to vision, no one whosoever sees Him with the eye" (Kaṭha. 6.9; Śvet. 4.20), "He is not apprehended by the eye, nor by speech" (Mund. 3.1.8) and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Like Nimbārka, he also holds that Brahman is not perceivable by the ordinary sense-organs; although unlike Nimbārka he holds here, as before, that Brahman has no corporeal and incorporeal forms.2

Baladeva

He takes it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself.

SŪTRA 24

"AND (BRAHMAN IS REVEALED) IN PERFECT MEDITATION, ON ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION (I.E. SCRIPTURE) AND INFERENCE (I.E. (ŚMṚTI))."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But Brahman is revealed in loving devotion, i.e. in meditation, in accordance with the following scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. "He, with his nature purified through the clarification of the

1 Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
2 Ś.B. 3.2.23, p. 741.
knowledge of Brahman, perceives, meditating, him who is without parts” (Mund. 3.1.8\(^1\)), ““But through exclusive devotion, I may be known thus, O Arjuna, and perceived in truth, and entered, O conqueror of enemies!”’ (Gitā 11.54\(^2\)).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz. This view, surely, is inconsistent with texts like: “‘O, the self is to be seen’” (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6) and so on, the author points out that if an earnest effort be made by virtuous men who follow Scripture and are desirous of a direct vision of Him, then He becomes manifest to them.

The word “and” implies possibility. Brahman becomes manifest “in perfect meditation”, i.e. in loving devotion or meditation. And this is known “from perception and inference”, i.e. from Scripture and Smṛti. Compare scriptural texts like: “He is attainable only by him whom he chooses. To him he reveals his own person” (Kaṭha. 2.23; Mund. 3.2.3), “He, with his nature purified through the clarification of the knowledge of Brahman, perceives, meditating, him who is without parts” (Mund. 3.1.8); and Smṛti texts like: ““But through exclusive devotion, I may be known thus, O Arjuna, and perceived in truth, and entered, O conqueror of enemies!”’ (Gitā 11.54). “He whom the Yogins\(^3\),—sleepless, with subdued breath, with contented minds, with restrained sense-organs,—see as light, obeisance to Him, whose self is Yoga” (Mahā. 12.1642\(^4\)), “The Yogins see him, the lord, the eternal” and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṁkara

Reading slightly different, viz. he adds a “ca” after “api”\(^5\).

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\(^1\) Ś, R, Bh, Ṣk, B.
\(^2\) R, B.
\(^3\) A Yuddhāna is a Brahmin, one who by religious exercise called Yoga endeavours to obtain union with the Lord.
\(^4\) P. 423, lines 18-19, vol. 3, Asiatic Society ed. This edition and the Vaṅgavāsi ed. (p. 1420, col. 2, line 5) read “saṁtivasṭhāḥ” and “sattivasṭhāḥ” respectively in place of “samtuṣṭāḥ”.
\(^5\) Š.B. 3.2.24, p. 741.
Baladeva

He takes this sūtra too as forming an adhikarana by itself. Interpretation same.

SŪTRA 25

"And as in the case of light and the rest, (there is) non-difference (i.e. the case of Brahman is similar to the case of light and the rest), and (Brahman's) manifestation (takes place) through repetition with regard to act (i.e. the means)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as there is manifestation of the sun, fire and the like through the repetition of the means resorted to by those who long for them, so there is "non-difference" in the case of Brahman too, i.e. there is "manifestation" of Brahman. The sense is that the direct vision of Brahman results from the incessant repetition of the sādhanas or the means consisting in perfect meditation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. To say that Brahman becomes manifest in perfect meditation only does not stand to reason; for why should not everyone equally see Brahman who is the soul of all and all-pervading?—the author replies:

The light of the sun is within the reach of all, yet the sun manifests itself "through the repetition with regard to act", i.e. through the repeated mutterings of sacred formulæ and so on by Kunti, Yudīśthīra and the like; the fire is within the reach of all, yet it manifests itself "through the repetition with regard to act", i.e. through the repeated churning and the like by the twice-born; and gold is available only "through the repetition with regard to act", i.e. through repeated searching and so on. The case of Brahman too is "non-different" or similar. That is, Brahman, though available by all, manifests Himself to those alone who are desirous of salvation and meditate on Him incessantly.

1 The last portion of the sentence: "Brahma-prakāśo bhavati” is omitted by C.S.S. ed., p. 55.
Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "And as in the case of light and the rest, there is non-difference (between Brahman and the individual soul), and the light (viz. Brahman) (appears manifold) in work (i.e. through its connection with the limiting adjuncts), on account of repetition (i.e. the repeated declaration of Scripture)". That is, in the preceding sūtra it has been pointed out that Brahman manifests itself in profound meditation. This seems to suggest that there is a difference between Brahman, the object worshipped, and the individual soul, the worshipper. This sūtra controverts the suggestion by pointing out that just as the rays of the sun appear crooked, straight and so on in accordance with the shape and position of the fingers and the like through which they are passing, but the real sun remains what it is, so Brahman appears dual through the limiting adjunct of meditation and so on, but is really one and without a second. That is, for the purpose of meditation, a distinction is made between Brahman and the individual soul, but there is no real difference between them.¹

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 24 in his commentary.

Interpretation different. Here he continues the problem, viz. What is exactly denied by the text: "Not so, not so" (Brh. 2.3.6). The sūtra means, according to him: "Like light (i.e. knowledge) and so on, there is non-difference, (i.e. just as knowledge, bliss and the like constitute the very nature of Brahman, so do His corporeal and incorporeal forms), and (just as) light (i.e. knowledge) (and bliss and the like are known to be constituting the very nature of Brahman) from the repetition with regard to act, (i.e. from the repeated practice of devout meditation), (so are His corporeal and incorporeal forms)". That is, Vāmadeva and others, who obtained a direct vision of the Lord, perceived Him as knowledge and bliss and so on, just as they perceived Him also as possessed of the corporeal and incorporeal forms. And, just as Vāmadeva and others perceived Him as knowledge and bliss and so on through the repeated practice of meditation, so they perceived Him.

¹ Ś.B. 3.2.25, p. 742.
as possessed of the corporeal and the incorporeal forms through the repeated practice of meditation. Hence the above text: "Not so, not so" denies only the so-muchness of Brahman, but not His corporeal and incorporeal forms.¹

**Bhāskara**

This is sūtra 26 in his commentary. He interprets the first portion of the sūtra like Śaṅkara, the last portion like Nimbārka; although he gives two alternative interpretations of the word "karmani": "(If it be said that the Highest Self being unmanifest, beyond the senses and obtainable through meditation only, must be different from the individual soul,—we reply:) Like light and the rest, there is non-difference also (between Brahman and the individual soul), and the manifestation (of Brahman, which brings about this non-difference, arises) from the repetition (i.e. the repetition of meditation) with regard to act (i.e. with regard to the object to be worshipped, viz. Brahman). (Or an alternative explanation:) from the repetition with regard to act (i.e. with regard to meditation)".²

**Śrīkaṇṭha**

This is sūtra 24 in his commentary. Interpretation different.

"And as in the case of light (viz. knowledge) and so on (there is) non-difference, and the manifestation (of Brahman takes place) through the repetition with regard to act, (i.e. those who attain a direct vision of the Lord, come to have lordship and the rest like Him, just as they come to have knowledge, bliss and the rest like Him,—there is no difference between their attaining knowledge, bliss and the rest like the Lord and attaining lordship and so on like Him)."³

**Baladeva**

He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras thus: "Prakāśādi-vac ca vaiśāśyāt" (sūtra 25), "Prakāśaś ca karmany abhyāsāt" (sūtra 26). Interpretation of the first portion entirely different.

**Sūtra 25.**—Here the word "na" is to be supplied, according to Him, from sūtra 19. Hence the sutra: "And (the Lord is) not like light (i.e. fire) and the rest, for (there are) no (such) distinctions (in

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¹ Śr. B. 3.2.24, p. 238, Part 2.
² Bh. B. 3.2.26 (written as 3.2.25), pp. 169-170.
Him). That is, fire has two states, subtle and gross, and it is unmanifest in its subtle state, but becomes manifest in its gross state. Such is not the case with the Lord, i.e. it is not that the Lord is unmanifest in His subtle state, but becomes manifest in His gross state,—for, in Him there is no such distinction of subtle and gross. Hence the manifestation of the Lord does not depend on any such states, but on the love and devotion of the devotee.¹

Sūtra 26.—“And (if it be objected that it is by no means a universal rule that whoever loves God sees Him, we reply:) the manifestation (of the Lord to the devotee is brought about) through the repetition with regard to act (i.e. through the repeated practice of meditation).” That is, mere love is of no avail, but the constant repetition of the acts of meditation, etc. is necessary.²

SŪTRA 26

“HENCE (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL ATTAINS SIMILARITY) WITH THE INFINITE, FOR THUS (IS) THE INDICATION.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

When the individual soul directly intuits Brahman, it becomes similar to Him, in accordance with the text “When the seer sees the golden-coloured creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahmā, then the wise men, having discarded merit and demerit attains the highest equality” (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3 ³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Incidentally, the author is indicating the fruit of the direct vision of Brahman.

“Hence,” i.e. through the manifestation or the direct vision of Brahman, the individual soul becomes similar to the Infinite, i.e. to Brahman, the Highest Person, “for thus (is) the indication”, i.e. because there is a text intimating this, viz. “When the seer sees the golden-coloured creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of

¹ G.B. 3.2.25, p. 80, Chap. 3.
³ Not quoted by others.
Brahmā, then the wise man, having discarded merit and demerit, attains the highest equality” (Mund. 3.1.1.3).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 27 in Bhāskara’s commentary. Interpretation different, viz. “Hence (i.e. because the distinction between Brahman and the individual soul is due to nescience, while the absolute oneness of Brahman is the ultimate truth), (the individual soul can get rid of nescience and become one) with the Infinite (i.e. Brahman), for this (is) the indication ”.¹

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. “Hence (i.e. on account of the above reasons), (it is proved that Brahman is qualified) by infinite (auspicious qualities), for thus (i.e. this being so), the mark (i.e. the two-fold characteristics of Brahman) (is established)”² According to Rāmānuja, the section about the two-fold characteristics of Brahman ends here, while according to Nimbārka, as we have seen, it ends with sūtra 21.

Śṛiṅkaṭha

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Interpretation different,—very similar to that of Rāmānuja: “Hence (i.e. because the devotees of Brahman, who have attained similarity with Him, are endowed with knowledge, bliss, supreme lordship and the like), (it is proved that Brahman has connection) with infinite (auspicious qualities) for thus (i.e. this being so), the mark (i.e. two-fold characteristics of Brahman) (is established) ”.³

Baladeva

This is sūtra 27 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. “Hence (the direct vision of the Lord is possible) through (the grace of) the Infinite (viz. Brahman) for thus (is) the indication”.

¹ Ś.B. 3.2.26, p. 743; Bh. B. 3.2.27 (written as 3.2.26), p. 170.
² Śrī. B. 3.2.25, p. 238, Part 2.
³ Śk. B. 3.2.25, p. 258, Part 9.
That is, the Lord, though invisible, yet makes Himself visible to His devotees through His mysterious power or grace.¹

SŪTRA 27

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF BOTH, LIKE THE CASE OF THE SERPENT AND THE COIL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The view that the corporeal and the incorporeal are never negated by Scripture is being confirmed here. The universe, consisting of the corporeal and the incorporeal, abides in its own cause, viz. Brahman, in a relation of difference-non-difference, on account of the designation of both difference and non-difference, "like the case of the serpent and the coil".

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out that the entire expanse of the universe, consisting of the corporeal and the incorporeal, mentioned in Scripture as the effect and form of Brahman, cannot be the object of the denial: “Not so, not so” (Brh. 2.3.6); and also that Brahman, being transcendent, is faultless. With a view to confirming this, the reverend author of the aphorisms states his own conclusion, expounding the meaning of all Scriptures, viz. that the universe, the effect, stands in a relation of difference-non-difference to Brahman, the cause.

In spite of their difference from Brahman, the whole groups of effects, like the corporeal and the incorporeal and so on, are non-different from Him. Why? “On account of the designation of both,” i.e. on account of the designation of difference and non-difference. Compare the following texts designating difference: “From whom, verily, these beings arise” (Tait. 3.1), “He who abiding within the earth” (Brh. 3.7.3) and so on; and the text designating non-difference: “All this, verily, is Brahman” (Chānd. 3.14.1) and so on.

Here the author states a parallel instance: “Like the serpent and the coil”. In all cases, the parallel instances are to be understood

¹ G.B. 3.2.27, p. 82, Chap. 3.
as referring to the relevant portion only. The serpent, having the form of a rope and the material constituting the coil, is the cause; and analogous to it is Brahman, endowed with all powers, and the one non-different efficient and material cause of the world. The coil, having the form of a bracelet, is the effect; and analogous to it is the Universe, consisting of the corporeal and the incorporeal, the effect. Among these, the coil is dependent on another, something to be pervaded and an effect; while in contrast to it, the serpent is self-dependent, the pervader and the cause. Hence there is a difference between the two. And, since the coil has no existence and activity apart from the serpent, it is non-different as well from the serpent. In the same way, the Universe, the effect of Brahman who is possessed of the powers of the sentient and the non-sentient, is both different and non-different from Brahman, the cause. There is a multitude of scriptural texts in conformity with the aphorisms, viz. “Two birds, close friends” (Rg. V. 1.164.20; Mund. 31.1; Svet. 4.6), “Thinking the Mover and the soul to be separate” (Svet. 1.6), “And all this, verily, is Brahman” (Chānd. 3.14.1), “All this has that for its soul” (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.), “Brahman alone is all this” (Nṛ. Ut. 7), “The soul alone is all this” (Chānd. 7.26.1) and so on. The sense is that there can be no negation of the corporeal and the incorporeal, because they have Brahman for their soul.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 28 in Bhāskara’s commentary.

They take this sūtra as stating a prima facie view regarding the relation between Brahman and the individual soul, i.e. how to reconcile the texts designating difference and those designating non-difference. Hence the sūtra: “But on account of the designation of both (i.e. because in Scripture we meet with two kinds of texts, one designating difference, the other non-difference), (the individual soul is both different and non-different from Brahman), like the serpent and the coil”. That is, the snake is one as a whole, yet is different, as having

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1 As shown under V.K. 3.2.20-21.
2 P. 146, line 1.
different postures, viz. coil, the erect hood and so on. Similarly Brahman is one, but is different as soul, matter and so on.¹

Rāmānuja and Śrikaṇṭha

This is sūtra 26 in their commentaries. Rāmānuja begins a new adhikarana here. Interpretation different. They too take this sūtra as stating a prima facie view regarding the relation between the non-sentient (i.e. the acit) and Brahman, and interpret it to mean that the non-sentient is but a particular state (saṃsthāna-viśeṣa) of Brahman, just as the coil is of the serpent.²

Baladeva

This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikarana here, concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the identity between the Lord and His attributes (four sūtras). Hence the sūtra: “But on account of the designation of both, (the Lord is both bliss and blissful and so on), like the serpent and the coil”. That is, the Lord is essentially intelligence and bliss, yet possesses these as His attributes, just as the serpent is nothing but the coil, yet possesses it as its attribute.³

SŪTRA 28

“Or like light and (its) substratum, on account of being light.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is such a relation (of difference-non-difference) between the individual soul and the Highest Person as well,—on account of the designation of both,—as between light and its substratum. Hence, it is not to be supposed that there is an absolute non-difference (between the two) on the ground of the aphorism: “Hence with the infinite” (Br. Sū. 3.2.26),—this is the sense.

¹ Ś.B. 3.2.27, p. 743; Bh. B. 3.2.28 (written as 3.2.27), p. 170.
³ G.B. 3.2.28, p. 85, Chap. 3.
Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. There may be a relation of difference and non-difference between the non-sentient and Brahman, but there is no such relation between Him and the individual soul, since in accordance with the aphorism: “Hence with the infinite, for thus (is) the indication” (Br. Sū. 3.2.26), the individual soul attains equality with the Infinite, and as such it appears that there is an absolute non-difference between the two,—the author replies:

The phrase: ‘on account of the designation of both’ is to be supplied. The word “or” is meant for disposing of the objection. There is no absolute non-difference between the two, on account of the designation of a natural difference between the two. On account of the designation of a natural difference in the passages: “When the seer sees the golden-coloured creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahmana” (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3; Maitrī 6.18), “But then he meditating perceives him who is without parts” (Muṇḍ. 3.1.8), “The knower of Brahman attains the Highest” (Taitt. 2.1), “He obtains the Person, higher than the high, celestial” (Muṇḍ. 3.2.8), “Non-knowing, a beast (as it were), and not the Lord”, “He who is omniscient, all-knowing” (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), “Those who abiding the midst of ignorance” (Kaṭha 2.5; Muṇḍ. 1.2.8), “This soul is free from sins, having true desires, having true resolves” (Chānd. 8.1.5; 8.7.1, 3; Maitrī 7.7), “He who abiding in the soul” (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30) and so on; and on account of the scriptural statement of a natural non-difference in the passages: “That thou art” (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.), “I am Brahman” (Br. 1.4.10), “This soul is Brahman” (Br. 2.5.19) and so on, there is a relation of natural difference-non-difference between the soul and Brahman.

The author states a parallel instance: “Like light and (its) substratum”. “Light” is the ray of the sun and the like. There is a natural relation of difference and non-difference between light and its substratum, since the former has no separate existence apart from the latter. In answer to the objection: Why is there such an insistence on the non-difference between those two absolutely different objects? the author states here another reason: “On account of being light”. There is non-difference between light and its substratum also because both are equally light; and like that, there is a natural relation of

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1 P. 1074, line 18.
difference and non-difference between the individual soul, the part and the whole (viz. Brahman)—this is the sense. Under the aphorism: “A part, on account of the designation of variety, and otherwise also” (Br. Sū. 2.3.42) the relation between the individual soul and the Highest soul has been discussed for the sake of removing the conflict between the two classes of texts; but here it is stated once more for refuting the view of the logicians and the rest who hold that there is an absolute non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman—this is the distinction.

COMPARISON.

Śaṁkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 29 in Bhāskara’s commentary. They take this sūtra too as stating another prima facie view regarding the relation between Brahman and the individual soul. Hence the sūtra means: just as the sun and its rays are identical, both being light, yet they are taken to be different, so also Brahman and the individual soul.¹

Rāmānuja and Śrikaṁṭha

This is sūtra 27 in their commentaries. They too take this sūtra as laying down another prima facie view regarding the relation between the non-sentient and Brahman. This prima facie view, Rāmānuja points out, criticizes the preceding prima facie view by pointing out that if the non-sentient world be a state of Brahman, as the coil is of the snake, then it will become identical with Him, seeing that the coil is after all nothing but the snake itself. Hence the correct view is that the world is related to Brahman just as the ray is to the sun, i.e. is His form (rūpa) and is different from Him.²

Baladeva

This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. He continues the topic of the identity between Brahman and His attributes, illustrating it by a second example. Hence the sūtra means: “Just as the sun is essentially light, yet a substratum of light, so Brahman is essentially knowledge, yet the substratum of knowledge (i.e. a knower)”³.

¹ Ś.B. 3 2.28, pp. 743-744; Bh. B. 3.2.29 (written as 3.2.28), p. 170.
² Śrī. B. 3.2.27, p. 246, Part 2; Śk. B. 3.2.27, p. 259, Part 9.
³ G.B. 3.2.29, p. 86, Chap. 3.
SŪTRA 29

‘Or as before.’

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Objections, like the consequence of entire (transformation) and the rest, have been refuted ‘before’.¹

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. If the universe be a particular state of Brahman, as the coil is of the serpent, then there results a mass of objections like the consequence of entire (transformation of Brahman), the contradiction of scriptural texts and so on,—(the author) replies:

The word ‘or’ is meant for refuting the objection. There can be no objection whatsoever ‘as before’; i.e. the above objections have already been refuted under the aphorism: ‘But on account of Scripture, on account of being based on word’ (Br. Śū. 2.1.25).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 30 in the commentary of Śaṃkara. They take it as stating the correct conclusion as against the above two prima facie views regarding the relation between Brahman and the individual soul. Hence the sūtra means: The relation between the two is to be understood as before, i.e. as stated under the sūtra 3.2.25 (sūtra 3.2.26 in Bhāskara’s commentary), viz. the relation between light and its limiting adjuncts, like fingers, etc.²

Rāmānuja and Śrikanṭha

This is sūtra 28 in their commentaries. They too take it as stating the correct conclusion as against the above two prima facie views regarding the relation between the non-sentient and Brahman. They point out that both the above alternatives lead Brahman Himself to partake of the faults of the non-sentient world. Hence the correct view of the relation between the two is the same as that mentioned before under sūtras 2.3.42 and 2.3.45, in connection with the

¹ Vide Br. Śū. 2.1.25.
² Ś.B. 3.2.29, p. 744; Bh. B. 3.2.30 (written as 3.2.29), p. 170.
discussion of the relation between the sentient and Brahman, i.e. an attribute-substance relation. That is, just as it has been shown that the individual soul is a part and an attribute of Brahman and as such different from Him, so exactly is matter too.¹

Baladeva

This is śūtra 30 in his commentary. He continues the topic of the identity between the Lord and His attributes, illustrating it by a third example, viz. Brahman is both bliss and blissful, knowledge and knower and so on, just as the one, indivisible time is said to be prior and posterior. Baladeva points out that of these three illustrations, viz. the serpent and its coil, the sun and its rays, and time, each of succeeding one is meant for finer and subtler intellect.²

SŪTRA 30

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF NEGATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the negation," viz. "He is not smeared with the misery of the world" (Kaṭha 5.1), Brahman, the topic of discussion, does not possess any imperfections.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Moreover, although Brahman, as abiding within all, and being the cause of all, has everything as His form, yet He has no connection with imperfections, "also on account of the negation" of imperfections, celebrated in Scripture thus: "Just as the sun, the eye of the whole world, is not smeared with the external faults of the eyes, so the one inner soul of all beings is not smeared with the misery of the world, being external (to it)" (Kaṭha 5.11). "Just as the one air, entered in the world, corresponds in form to every form, so the one inner soul of all beings corresponds in form to every form, and is (yet) external (to it)" (Kaṭha 5.10) and so on. Hence it is established that Brahman, having everything as His form, is

¹ Śrī. B. 3.2.28, pp. 246-247, Part 2; Śk. B. 3.2.28, p. 259, Part 9.
² Not quoted by others.
untouched by every fault, is an abode of a mass of auspicious attributes and is the highest of all.

Here ends the section entitled “The so-muchness resulting from what has been previously declared” (6).

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṁkara and Bhāskara**

This is sūtra 31 in Bhāskara’s commentary. Interpretation different, viz. “And on account of the denial (of a reality besides Brahman, non-difference is the ultimate truth)”.

**Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṅtha**

This is sūtra 29 in their commentaries. Interpretation different, viz. “On account of the denial (of the attributes of the non-sentient on the part of Brahman, they stand in the relation of attribute and substance)”.

**Baladeva**

This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. He concludes the topic of the identity between Brahman and His attributes thus: “On account of the prohibition (by Scripture of any difference between Brahman and His attributes, they are never to be taken as different)”.  

To sum up: Sūtras 27-50 are interpreted in four different ways thus:—

1. According to Nimbārka, sūtra 27 states the relation between Brahman and the non-sentient; sūtra 28 states the relation between Brahman and the sentient; and sūtras 29-30 state that Brahman’s having the corporeal and incorporeal forms gives rise to no objections.

2. According to Śaṁkara and Bhāskara, sūtras 27-28 state two *prima facie* views regarding the relation between Brahman and the sentient; and sūtras 29-30 state the right conclusion.

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1 Š.B. 3.2.30, p. 744; Bh. B. 3.2.31 (written as 3.2.30), p. 171.
2 Śrīkaṅtha adds the sentient too.
4 G.B. 3.2.31, p. 88, Chap. 3.
(3) According to Rāmānuja and Śrikaṇṭha, sūtras 27-28 state two prima facie views regarding the relation between Brahman and the non-sentient; and sūtras 29-30 state the right conclusion.

(4) According to Baladeva, all these four sūtras show the identity between Brahman and His attributes.

Adhikarana 7: The section entitled "The Highest". (Sūtras 31–37)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 31)

SŪTRA 31

"(There is some one) higher than this (viz. Brahman), on account of the designations of bridge, measure, connection and difference."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The prima facie objector says: "Than this", i.e. than Brahman, the topic of discussion, there is a reality still "higher", on account of the designation of connection, viz. "Now the soul that is a bridge" (Chānd. 8.4.1) and on account of the designation of difference, viz. "By him . . . . . . . all this is filled" (Śvet. 3.9), "That which is beyond that is without form, without disease" (Śvet. 3.10).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that Brahman is the cause of all, omnipotent, untouched by faults at times, an abode of a mass

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1 Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
2 The word "puruṣeṇa" omitted.
3 R.
4 R. The C.S.S. ed., p. 56 has a more detailed reading which is translated below:

On account of the designation of a bridge, viz. "Now the soul that is a bridge" (Chānd. 7.4.1); on account of the designation of measure, viz. "Brahman has four feet" (Chānd. 3.18.2), "Having sixteen parts" (Praśna 6.1); on account of the designation of connection, viz. "This is the bridge of immortality" (Mund. 2.2.5); and on account of the designation of difference, viz. "By him, by the Person, all this is filled (Śvet. 3.9), "That which is beyond that is without form, without disease" (Śvet. 3.10).
of eternal, infinite, auspicious qualities, unlimited by so-muchness and
different and non-different from all. Now, it is being shown that He
is not excelled by anything, and this will go to confirm the view that
He is not limited by so-muchness. With regard to it, the doubt
being whether Brahman is surpassable or unsurpassable, the author
states the prima facie view:

"Than this," i.e. than Brahman, omnipotent, the cause of all,
there is a still "higher" reality. Hence Brahman is surpassable.
Why? "On account of the designations of bridge, measure, connection
and difference." Thus the Supreme Brahman is designated as a bridge:
"Now that which is the soul is a bridge" (Chând. 8.4.1). From this
designation it is known that there is a reality,—analogous to a rare
object in another island,—which is to be reached and which is higher
than Brahman, analogous to a bridge. Moreover, from the text:
"Having crossed that bridge, one who is blind becomes non-blind"
(Chând. 8.4.2) too, it is ascertained that like a bridge, Brahman is only
something to be crossed; while the object to be attained is something
other and higher than Brahman. Further, there are designations of
measure, viz. "Brahman has four feet" (Chând. 3.18.2), "Having
sixteen parts" (Praśna 6.1), i.e. the Supreme Brahman is designated as
something limited. These designations clearly indicate the existence
of an immeasurable object to be attained by the bridge. And
from the designation of connection too, viz. "This is the bridge of
immortality" (Mund. 2.2.25), it is known that there is someone higher
than Brahman. Finally, there are designations of difference, viz.
"By him, by this Person, all this is filled" (Svet. 3.9), "That which
is beyond that is without part and without disease" (Svet. 3.10), i.e.
there is another reality which is beyond Brahman, denoted by the term
'person'. Thus, it is established that there is a reality higher than
even the Highest Brahman,—this is the prima facie view.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

According to them the word "param" does not mean something
higher, but something different (anya-tattvam).1 They too take
this to be stating the prima facie view.

1 Ś.B. 3.2.31, p. 745; Bh. B. 3.2.32 (written as 3.2.31), p. 171.
Baladeva

This is śūtra 32 in his commentary. He, too, begins a new adhikarana here, but concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. that the bliss of the Lord is the highest (three śūtras). Accordingly, he does not take this śūtra as stating a prima facie view, but simply as stating the correct conclusion. Hence the śūtra: “(The bliss of Brahman is) higher than this (viz. worldly bliss), on account of the designation of bridge, immeasurableness, relation and difference.” That is, the bliss of Brahman is infinitely higher than the bliss of the individual soul, for the text about the bridge (Chānd. 8.4.1) shows that Brahman, the bliss, is the support of the entire world. Further, the bliss of the Lord is said to be immeasurable (Tait. 2.4). Also, the relation between the bliss of the Lord and human bliss is declared to be that between infinity and one (Brh. 4.3.22). Finally, the difference between the bliss of the Lord and human bliss is declared. All these go to prove that the bliss of the Lord is the highest.¹

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Śūtras 32–37)

SŪTRA 32

“But on account of resemblance.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The author states the correct conclusion.

The term “but” is meant for disposing of the above view. There is nothing whatsoever higher than the Universal Lord, the cause of the world. The Lord is designated as a bridge only because He is similar to the bridge in a certain respect, i.e. He keeps the worlds apart.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author states the correct conclusion.

The word “but” is meant for disposing of the prima facie view. It cannot be said that there is something ‘higher than this’. Why? On account of the following reasons: First, the Lord is designated

¹ G.B. 3.2.32, pp. 90-91, Chap. 3.
as a bridge "on account of resemblance", i.e. simply because He is similar to the bridge, well-known in ordinary life. Just as in ordinary life a bridge adjusts water\(^1\), so the Soul too is a bridge as adjusting the boundary of the world\(^2\), in accordance with complementary passage: "For keeping these worlds apart" (Chānd. 8.4.1). In the text: "Having crossed the bridge" (Chānd. 8.4.2), the word ‘crosses’ means ‘attains’, as in the statement: ‘He crosses the Vedānta’.\(^3\)

**Baladeva**

This is sūtra 33 in his commentary. He continues the topic of the bliss of Brahman. Hence the sūtra: “(If it be objected that human bliss cannot be different from the bliss of Brahman, because the same word ‘bliss’ is applied to both, just as an object designated by the word ‘jar’ cannot be different from another object designated by the same term ‘jar’—we reply: the word ‘bliss’ is applied to human bliss) on account of generic resemblance”. That is, just as the common term ‘jar’ is applied to all jars irrespective of their individual differences, so the common term ‘bliss’ is applied to human and divine bliss, irrespective of the difference between the two.\(^4\)

**CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)**

**SŪTRA 33**

"(THE DESIGNATION OF MEASURE IS) FOR THE PURPOSE OF UNDERSTANDING, AS IN THE CASE OF FEET."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

The designations of measure are for promoting meditation. It is for this reason that Brahman is designated as having feet thus: “Let one meditate on the mind as Brahman,—thus with reference to the self” (Chānd. 3.18.1 \(^5\)), “That Brahman has four feet. Speech is one foot” (Chānd. 3.18.2 \(^6\)) and so on.

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\(^1\) I.e. separates one sheet of water from another, and marks the boundaries of contiguous fields.

\(^2\) I.e. separates one world from another.

\(^3\) Which means that he has attained or mastered the Vedānta.

\(^4\) G.B. 3.2.33, p. 91, Chap. 3.

\(^5\) Not quoted by others.

\(^6\) R, ŠK.
Vedānta-kaustubha

The designations of measure too are "for the purpose of understanding" or meditation. "As in the case of feet," i.e. as in the case of the designation of the feet of the mind and the rest. Thus, in the text: "Let one meditate on the mind as Brahman,—thus with reference to the self. That Brahman has four feet. Speech is one foot, the vital-breath is one foot, the eye is one foot, the ear is one foot" (Chānd. 3.18.1-2), the mind, a symbol of Brahman, is declared to have feet. In the same manner the fire and the rest are described as the feet of the ether (Chānd. 3.18.2) for promoting meditation, but not for indicating a particular measure or size. Similarly, here too Brahman,—who is the cause of the world and who is ascertained to be unlimited from the text: "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite" (Tait. 2.1)—is designated as having four feet (Chānd. 3.18.2) "for the purpose of understanding" only, but this never implies that He is something measured or limited—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 34 in his commentary. He concludes here the section concerned with showing that the bliss of Brahman is the highest. Hence the sūtra: "(If it be objected: If the bliss of Brahman be different from human bliss, i.e. if Brahman be different from the Universe of the sentient and the non-sentient, then how can the teaching in Chānd. 3.14.1, viz. that 'All this, verily, is Brahman', be reasonable?—we reply: that teaching is) for the purpose of Understanding, as in the case of feet". That is, the whole world is said to be Brahman in order to bring about an easy realization of Him, just as everything is said to be His foot (Rg. V. 10.90.3) for the same reason.¹

¹ G.B. 3.2.34, pp. 92-93, Chap. 3.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 34

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE SPECIALITY OF PLACE, AS IN THE CASE OF LIGHT AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The thinking of what is unlimited as limited fits in "on account of the speciality of place, as in the case of light and so on".

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. The unlimited can never become limited even for promoting meditation?—the author replies:

It is possible for Brahman, though Himself unlimited, to become limited "on account of the speciality of place", "as in the case of light and so on", i.e. just as light, the ether and the like, though unlimited, yet appear to be limited through their connection with windows, pots and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Interpretation different, viz. "(There is nothing besides Brahman) on account of the difference of place (i.e. limiting adjunct), as in the case of light and so on". That is, Brahman is one, though it appears to be many through its connection with limiting adjuncts, just as the light of the sun appears to have many shapes through its connection with fingers, etc. Hence plurality is not ultimately real.1

Bhāskara

This sūtra is not found in his commentary.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 35 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikarana here, concerned with showing that the Lord has a variety of manifestations (two sūtras). Hence the sūtra: "(The manifestations of the Lord are different), on account of the difference of place (i.e. the

1 Ś.B. 3.2.34, p. 748.
difference of the devotees to whom He manifests Himself), as in the case of light and so on'. That is, the Lord, though one, manifests Himself in different forms to His devotees, in accordance with the difference of their devotions,—those who worship Him; as the Master see Him as the Majestic, and those who worship Him as the Beloved, see Him as the Sweet,—just as the same light appears different when it falls on different parts of a temple and so on.¹

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 35

"ON ACCOUNT OF APPROPRIATENESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And "on account of the appropriateness" of the designation of a relation, since He Himself leads to His own attainment, there is no other reality, higher than Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been alleged that on account of the designation of a relation between the object to be attained and that which causes to attain, there is something 'higher than this'. To this the author replies:

The Supreme Person causes the attainment of His own self, the object to be attained, in accordance with the scriptural text: "This soul is not attainable by instruction, nor by intellect, nor by much learning. He is attainable only by one whom he chooses. To him the soul reveals his own person" (Kaṭha 2.23; Munḍ. 3.2.3); and in accordance with the statement of the Highest Person: "'Fix your mind in me, be my devotee, sacrifice to me, bow down to me. You shall come to me alone. I promise you truth; you are dear to me'" (Gītā 18.65). "On account of the appropriateness," thus, of the designation of the object to be attained and that which causes to attain,—to say that there is something 'higher than this' does not stand to reason.

¹ G.B. 3.2.35, p. 94, Chap. 3.
COMPARISON

All others add a “ca” at the end, thus “Upapattes ca”.

Śāṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. In answer to the objection (stated under śūtra 31), viz. that there is something other than Brahman, since during deep sleep the individual soul is said to enter into Brahman—which implies a difference between the two,—it is pointed out here that such a relation between the individual soul and Brahman is appropriate, since it does not imply that the individual soul is related to Brahman as a man to a city, (according to Bhāskara, as a rope to a pot), i.e. externally, but that the two are really identical. Hence it is that the individual soul is said to enter into itself during deep sleep.¹

Baladeva

This is śūtra 36 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic of the different manifestations of the Lord in accordance with the different kinds of devotion thus: “And on account of the appropriateness (of the Chānd. text 3.14.1)”. That is, the text: “As you meditate, so you become” is explicable only on this view, viz. that the devotees realize the Lord differently in accordance with their different modes of worshipping Him.²

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 36

“Likewise, on account of the denial of another.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Likewise,” it is not to be said that on account of the designation of difference, viz. “That which is beyond that” (Śvet. 3.10³), there is a reality other than Brahman,—“on account of the denial”, viz. “Than whom there is nothing else whatsoever higher” (Śvet. 3.9; Mahānār. 10.4⁴).

¹ Ś.B. 3.2.35, p. 748; Bh. B. 3.2.35, p. 171.
² G.B. 3.2.36, p. 95, Chap. 3.
³ R, B.
⁴ Š, R, Bh, B.
 Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said that on account of the designation of difference, viz. "By him, by the Person, all this is filled. That which is beyond that is without form, without disease" (Śvet. 3.9-3.10), there is something 'higher than this'. To this the author replies:

On account of the stated reasons Brahman is without an equal and a superior; "likewise on account of the denial of another", i.e. of an equal or a superior, as well, it is established that He has no equal or a superior; In accordance with the scriptural text: "Than whom there is nothing else whatsoever higher" (Śvet. 3.9; Mahānār. 10.4) and so on,—the word 'higher' meaning something better, the word 'something else' meaning something equal,—as well as in accordance with the Śrāṃti passage: "'There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya!'" (Gītā 7.7) and so on, the section is concerned with the supremacy of the Person, the topic of discussion; and hence by the text: "That which is beyond that" (Śvet. 3.10) another reality is not established. On the contrary, in accordance with the text: "Than whom there is nothing else whatsoever higher, than whom there is nothing else smaller, nothing else greater,—the One stands motionless like a tree in heaven, by him, the Person, all this is filled" (Śvet. 3.9; Mahānār. 10.4), Brahman, the Highest Person, is without an equal and a superior, and all-pervading; and for this reason, Brahman, called 'Person', is said to be beyond that.

COMPARISON
Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They understand this sūtra to mean that in Scripture there is the denial of anything else besides Brahman, and hence Brahman is the sole reality.

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 35 in his commentary.

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with the question whether there is anything equal to the Lord, the doubt that there may be something superior to Him being disposed of in the previous adhikaraṇa. Hence the sūtra: "Likewise (i.e. just as

1 The text is: "Yasmāt param nāparam asti kiñcit".
2 Ś.B. 3.2.36, pp. 748-749; Bh. B. 3.2.36, p. 172.
there is nothing superior to the Lord, so there is nothing equal to Him), on account of the denial of another (creator), (i.e. because Scripture denies that there is any other creator besides Him).\footnote{Sk. B. 3.2.35, p. 266, Part 9.}

Baladeva

This is śūtra 37 in his commentary. He takes it as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with proving that the Lord is the highest, for unless the Lord be the Highest, there can be no love and devotion for Him.

**CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)**

**ŚŪTRA 37**

"HEREBY THE ALL-PERVASIVENESS (OF THE LORD IS CONFIRMED), ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL TEXTS ABOUT EXPANSION AND SO ON."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā**

"Hereby” the “all-pervasiveness” of the Supreme Brahman is confirmed, “on account of the scriptural texts” like: “By Him, the Person, all this is filled” (Śvet. 3.9\footnote{R.}) and so on.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

"Hereby,” i.e. by the section designating the Lord as having no equal or a superior, the “all-pervasiveness” of Brahman is confirmed. If there were an equal or a superior to the Lord, He would not have been all-pervasive. The author states the authority for this: “On account of the scriptural texts about expansion and so on” —the word ‘expansion’ here means all-pervasiveness—such as: “By Him, the Person, all this is filled” (Śvet. 3.9; Mahānār. 10.4), “And whatever is seen or heard in this world,—Nārāyaṇa abides by pervading all that, inside and outside” (Mahānār. 11.6\footnote{A slightly different version is found in Tait. Ār. 10.11.1.}), “Eternal, omnipresent, all-pervasive, excessively subtle” (Mund. 1.1.6) and so on. The words “and so on” imply the scriptural texts that denote Brahman as the cause of all, as the soul of all, thereby confirming
His all-pervasiveness, viz. "He is the cause, the cause of the lord of causes"\(^1\) (Śvet. 6.9), "All this has that for its soul" (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.). "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "Brahman alone is all this" (Nr. Ut. 7), "The soul alone is all this" (Chānd. 7.26.1) and so on. Hence it is established that Brahman, the cause of the world, is without an equal and a superior.

Here ends the section entitled "The Highest" (7).

**COMPARISON**

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

While Nimbārka takes the section to be establishing that there is nothing higher than Brahman, they take it as establishing that there is nothing besides Brahman. Hence the sutra: "Hereby (i.e. by proving that there is nothing besides Brahman) (His) all-pervasiveness (is established) . . . . . . . ".\(^2\)

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sutra 36 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic, viz. that there is nothing equal to Brahman. Interpretation different, viz. "Hereby (i.e. through Nārāyaṇa) (Śiva's) all-pervasiveness (is known), on account of scriptural texts about expansion (i.e. supreme all-pervasiveness) and so on". That is, Scripture declares that the Lord Śiva pervades the entire universe through Nārāyaṇa, the material cause who is but a part of Himself. Hence it is known that the Lord Himself is all-pervasive.\(^3\)

Baladeva

This is sutra 38 in his commentary. He takes this sutra as forming an adhikarana by itself, concerned with establishing the all-pervasiveness of the Lord, though he interprets it differently thus: "(If it be objected that the Lord is not all-pervasive, but of a middle size, i.e. of the size of the body or form in which He appears before His devotees,

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\(^1\) Correct quotation: "Karaṇādhipādhipa" = lord of the lord of sense-organs (or the individual soul).  
\(^2\) Ś.B. 3.2.37, p. 749; Bh. B. 3.2.37, p. 172.  
\(^3\) Śk. B. 3.2.36, pp. 269-270. Vide also the commentary on Śk. B. on the same pages.
—then we reply:) “By Him (i.e. by the Lord) all-pervasiveness (is possible), on account of the scriptural texts about expansion and so on”. That is, even the middle form of the Lord, i.e. the form in which He appears before His devotees, is all-pervasive, for Scripture declares so.\(^1\)

Adhikarana 8: The section entitled “The Fruit”. (Sūtras 38-41)

SŪTRA 38

“THE FRUIT (ARISES) FROM THIS, ON ACCOUNT OF APPROPRIATENESS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“From this,” i.e. from Brahman alone, arises "the fruit" accruing to different individuals, in accordance with the particular duties to which they are entitled,—as He alone can be such a giver of fruits.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus the attributes of Brahman, viz. being free from sins, being an abode of eternal and infinite, auspicious attributes, having no equal or superior and the like, have been stated. Now the author states a particular quality of Brahman, the Highest, viz. being the giver of fruits.

“The fruit,” consisting in enjoyment and salvation, accruing to particular individuals in accordance with the particular duties to which they are entitled, arise “from this”, i.e. from the Highest alone. Why? “On account of appropriateness,” i.e. because the Highest Person alone, omniscient, omnipotent, the controller of all can be such a giver of fruits.

SŪTRA 39

“AND BECAUSE OF BEING DECLARED IN SCRIPTURE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because the fact that He is the giver of fruits is declared by texts like: “He, verily, is the great, unborn self, the eater of food, the

\(^1\) G.B. 3.2.38, p. 98, Chap. 3.
giver of wealth' (Brh. 4.4.24), "For he alone causes bliss" (Tait. 2.7).

Vedānta-kaustubha

And as the fact that the Highest Self is the giver of fruits is declared by texts like: "He, verily, is the great, unborn self, the eater of food, the giver of wealth" (Brh. 4.4.24), "For He alone causes bliss" (Tait. 2.7),—from Him alone can the fruit arise.

OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtra 40)

SŪTRA 40

"Religious merit (is the giver of fruits), Jaimini (thinks so) for those very reasons."

Vedānta-pārljāta-saurabha

"Jaimini" thinks that "religious merit" is the cause of the fruit,—because, as in the case of tilling, it alone can appropriately be its cause; and because the text: "One desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5) declares it to be such a cause.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated above that 'On account of appropriateness' (sūtra 38), 'And on account of being declared' (sūtra 39), the fruit arises from the Highest. Now, as in the case of tilling, Karmas alone can appropriately be the cause of fruits. Further, Karmas like sacrifices and the rest, are declared to be productive of fruits by texts like: "One desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5) and so on. Hence, "for those very reasons," i.e. on account of the same two reasons, the teacher "Jaimini" thinks that "religious merit" alone, or Karma, is the cause of fruit through the

1 Ś, R, Bh, B.
2 R.
3 P. 208, line 27, vol. 2. Ś, R, Bh.
intermediary of the operation called ‘apûrva’. The operation called ‘apûrva’ is said to be a particular subsequent state of the sacrifice.\footnote{According to Pûrva-mimâ̄nsâ, the results of sacrifices and so on are due neither to a Supreme Deity—which it does not recognize—, nor to the particular deities to whom the oblations are offered, but to an unseen potency generated by the very performance of the sacrifices and so on. This unseen potency is called ‘apûrva’. Vide Pû.Mi.Sû. 2.1.5.}

**CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sûtra 41)**

**SÛTRA 41**

“**But** (the giver of fruits is) the former (viz. the Lord), Bâdarâyana (thinks so), on account of the designation of (him as) the cause.”

**Vedânta-pârijâta-saurabha**

The word “but” is meant for disposing of the above view. The teacher of the Veda thinks that the giver of fruits is the Highest Self, mentioned before, “on account of the designation” of the Highest as the cause of it thus: “In consequence of good work, it leads to a holy world” (Praśna 3.7\footnote{B.}), “He is attainable by one alone whom he chooses” (Kaṭha 2.23; Muṇḍ. 3.2.3\footnote{Not quoted by others}).

Here ends the second quarter of the third chapter in the Vedânta-pârijâta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śârîraka-mîmâṃsâ texts, by the reverend Nimbârka.

**Vedânta-kaustubha**

The term “but” indicates the hollowness of Jaimini’s view. Never in the past, present or future do Karmas like tilling and the rest bestow the fruit to the tiller independently, but the Supreme Lord alone does so. Similarly, the Vedic works too (viz. sacrifices and the like), unacquainted with the nature of themselves and of others, and done by persons who are tormented by the wheel of the world and are dependent on another, are not able to bring about the fruit independently. Even texts like: “One desirous of heaven
should perform sacrifices" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5) and so on, never assert that Karma is the giver of fruits independently. On the contrary, these texts instigate men to Karmas such as, worship of the deity, that lead to heaven. But Bādarāyaṇa thinks that the giver of fruits like enjoyment and salvation is "the former", i.e. the Highest Self, the soul of all, omniscient, mentioned above. Why? "On account of the designation of (Him as) the cause,” i.e. because the Highest Self alone is designated as the cause, as the instigator of actions and as the giver of fruits by a mass of scriptural texts like: "For he alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do good deed" (Kaus. 3.8), "In consequence of good work, it leads to a holy world" (Praśna 3.7), "He is attainable by one alone whom he chooses" (Katha 2.23; Muṇḍ. 3.2.3) and so on; as well as by a group of Śmrṭī passages like: "And he attains his desires from him, the benefits are decreed by me alone"’ (Gītā 7.22) "I give that connection with intellect whereby they come to me’’ (Gītā 10.10) and so on. Hence it is established that the fruit arises from this.

Here ends the section entitled "The fruit” (8).

Here ends the second quarter of third chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīrakamīmāṁsā, by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

Résumé

The second quarter of the third chapter contains:—
(1) 41 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
(2) 41 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara;
(3) 40 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
(4) 41 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
(5) 40 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrikanṭha;
(6) 42 sūtras and 19 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Rāmānuja and Śrikanṭha take sūtras 20 and 21 in Nimbārka’s commentary as one sūtra. Bhāskara omits sūtra 34 in Nimbārka’s commentary, while sūtra 15 in Bhāskara’s commentary is not found in Nimbārka’s. Baladeva breaks sūtra 25 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras.
THIRD CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

THIRD QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa I: The section entitled "The understanding from all the Vedāntas". (Sūtras 1–5)

SŪTRA 1

"The understanding (i.e. what is understood) from all the Vedāntas (is one), on account of the non-difference of injunction and the rest."

Vedānta-pārljāta-saurabha

Although mentioned in many places, meditation is one only, "On account of the non-difference of injunction and the rest."

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, with a view to instigating one who desires salvation to the meditation on the Highest Self which is a means to attaining His nature, the attributes of the Highest Self have been stated. Now, although knowledge is a means to attaining the nature of the Highest Self, yet just as sacred texts, spiritual teachers and the like, though well-known, come to be productive of fruits only when meditated on, so the Highest Self, though well-known, comes to be productive of fruits only when meditated on. Now, we shall discuss the nature of vidyās or meditations on such a Supreme Brahman, as well as the problem whether these different vidyās are really identical or not, for ascertaining the combination or options of the details in them.

The Udgītha-vidyā, the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, the Puruṣa-vidyā, the Dahara-vidyā, the Vaiśvānara-vidyā and the rest are mentioned

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1 The vidyās are the various meditations mentioned in the various Upaniṣads and so on.
2 Brh. 1.3 and Chānd. 1.2. Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.6.
3 Brh. 5.6; Sat. Br. 10.6.3; and Chānd. 3.14. Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.19.
4 Chānd. 3.16–3.17 and Ait. Ār. 10.64. Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.24.
5 Brh. 2.1.17 and Chānd. 8.1–8.6. Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.38.
6 Brh. 5.9 and Chānd. 5.11–5.18. Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.55.
by many schools. It will be shown later on that the peculiar features or details, mentioned in connection with each particular vidyā, are to be combined together. However, the arrangement of the syllables in the aphorism is as follows: The same vidyā is mentioned in many Vedāntas. On the doubt, viz. whether it is different, or whether the same vidyā is mentioned in many places,—if the prima facie view be: As it is mentioned in texts again and again without any specification, and because of the force of context, it is different. For this very reason, surely, the restriction with regard to the imparting of knowledge to the followers of the Atharva-veda who practise the head-rite¹ mentioned in the passage: “Let one declare this knowledge of Brahman to them alone by whom, however, the head-rite has been practised according to rules” (Mund. 3.2.10), is reasonable; otherwise the head-rite, a part of vidyā, being open to the followers of all schools, the above restriction will be meaningless,—

We reply: “The understanding from all the Vedāntas”, i.e. the meditation which is known from all, i.e. many, Vedāntas should be known to be one only. Why? “On account of the non-difference of injunction and the rest.” Among these, ‘injunction’ means an injunction like ‘one should know’, ‘one should meditate’. The words ‘and the rest’ imply connection, form and name, mentioned as the reasons for the non-difference of Karmas, in the aphorism laying down the correct conclusion under the section treating of different schools in the Pūrva-tantra, viz. “Or, one, on account of non-difference of connection, form, injunction and name” (Pū. Mi. Sū. 2.4.9 ²). That is, the meditations are identical, on account of the non-difference of their injunctions, connections, forms and names,—just as the obligatory Agni-hotra ³, mentioned in many branches, such as “He performs the Agni-hotra” (Chānd. 5.24.1, 2), is one, on account of the non-difference of injunction; just as the Vaiśvānara-vidyā is recorded in both the Chāndogya (Chānd. 5.11–5.18) and Vājasaṇeyaka (Brh. 5.9), and here on account of the non-difference of injunctions, viz. “He meditates on Vaiśvānara” (Chānd. 5.12.2–

¹ For explanation see V.K. 3.3.3 below.
² P. 200, vol. 1.
³ Agni-hotra is an oblation to fire, chiefly of milk, oil and sour gruel, and there are two kinds of it, nitya or of constant obligation and kāmya or optional.
5.13.2, etc.), as well as of forms, name and of connection, viz. the attainment of Brahman, the vidyās are identical. In this case, the root ‘as’ indicates that the injunction is same; the form, viz. Vaiśvānara, is the same; and the name also is the same, viz. Vaiśvānara-vidyā.

COMPARISON.

Śaṅkara

Literal interpretation same. But the fundamental difference is that according to Śaṅkara, all these vidyās are concerned with Saguna or lower Brahman only, and are not as such means to the attainment of the Nirguna or the higher Brahman. Some of them lead to the attainment of results here, while others lead to salvation on gradually by way of generating knowledge.¹

Baladeva

He does not refer to the various vidyās, mentioned in the various Upaniṣads. In fact, as we shall see, he does not regard this pāda as dealing with the vidyās at all. He interprets the word: “Sarva-vedānta-pratyam” as “Sarva-veda-antapratyam”. The word “anta” means settled conclusion. Hence the sūtra: “The settled conclusion of all the Vedas is the knowledge (of Brahman), on account of the non-difference of injunction and the rest”. That is all the Vedas seek to teach Brahman, since all of them enjoin meditation on Brahman.²

SŪTRA 2

“If it be objected that on account of the differences (of the object of meditation, there is) no (identity of vidyā), (we reply:) (there may be repetition) even with regard to one (vidyā).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: the object of meditation is not the same, otherwise the same vidyā would not have been repeated in different Scriptures. Hence the vidyās are different—(we reply:) No, because

¹ Ś.B. 3.3.1, p. 754.
² G.B. 3.3.1.
the repetition of one and the same vidyā is appropriate sometimes, because the readers are different, and sometimes for making the topic clear.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

If it be objected: the same vidyās are often found repeated in the very same form in different sections. Hence the object to be meditated on must be different, and so the vidyās cannot be identical,—

We reply: Such repetitions of the same vidyās in different sections are quite reasonable, as they serve a useful purpose. The same vidyā, set forth in one branch, is set forth again in the same form in other branches for the benefit of the different readers of those branches. If there be differences in some parts, then the device of the combination of points is to be resorted to. In the case of one and the same branch, on the other hand, the readers being the same, every section deals with a different vidyā, since the texts are mutually sufficient by themselves.

1 Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.5.

2 The sense is as follows: If one and the same vidyā be repeated in different Upaniṣads and so on, then there must evidently be some reasonable explanation for such a repetition. The prima facie objector points out that such a repetition serves no purpose and hence we must hold that really there is no repetition of the same vidyā, but that each is a new and separate vidyā, concerned with a different object. The answer to this is that such a repetition of one of the same vidyā in different branches of the Vedas is not meaningless, but serves two purposes:—

(a) First, such a repetition is for the benefit of the different readers of the different branches of the Vedas. Each and every person does not evidently study each and every branch of the Vedas, but may read only one or some. A man, e.g. who studies the Brhadāranyaka, may not study the Chāndogya as well, and vice versa. Hence one and the same vidyā is set forth in both these Upaniṣads in order that both these persons may equally have an access to the vidyā in question.

(b) Secondly, such a repetition serves to rectify possible mistakes, and make the topic clearer and confirm what has been already said.

Thus, the fact that we meet with the same vidyā in different branches gives rise to no inconsistency. In the case of one and the same branch, however, the above two purposes being absent, there is no such repetition. Hence here every section deals with a different vidyā.
COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. "If it be objected that on account of the differences (of details) (there is) no (oneness of vidyā), (we reply:) (there may be difference of details) even in (one vidyā)". That is, the prima facie objector holds that the same vidyā is mentioned with different particulars in different places, e.g. in connection with the Pañcāgni-vidyā, five fires are spoken of in the Chāndogya, but six in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka. This proves that the two Pañcāgni-vidyās are not identical. The answer is that such differences of details are permissible even in the case of one and the same vidyā. If two vidyās agree in all essential points, the difference in some details by no means makes them two separate vidyās.¹

Baladeva

As before, he does not raise the problem of the identity of vidyās at all, but only the problem whether Brahman is known from all the Vedas or not. Hence the sūtra: "If it be objected that on account of difference (i.e. the different accounts of Brahman), (Brahman is) not (designated in all branches), (we reply:) even in the same (branch) (other attributes of Brahman are mentioned)". That is, if it be objected that Brahman is designated differently in different Upaniṣads, —e.g. in one place He is depicted as knowledge and bliss (Bṛh. 3.9.28), in another as omniscient and all-knowing (Mund. 1.1.9),—and as such the same Brahman is not set forth by all the Upaniṣads—the reply is that in the same Upaniṣad where Brahman is designated as knowledge and bliss, He is designated as omniscient as well. Hence all branches speak of the same Brahman.²

¹ Ś.B. 3.3.2, pp. 757-758; Bh. B. 3.3.2, pp. 175-176.
² G.B. 3.3.2.
SŪTRA 3

"Because (the head-rite is a subsidiary part) of the study of the Veda (and not of vidyā), (it) being so (there is) that restriction, (because it is mentioned to be so) in the Saṃcāra, and because of the topic, and as in the case of libations."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And that head-rite too, which is mentioned in the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda thus: "Let one declare this knowledge of Brahman to them alone by whom, however, the head-rite has been performed according to rules" (Mund. 3.2.10 1), does not prove that the vidyās are different, since the head-rite is enjoined as a subsidiary part of the study of the Veda. It being a subsidiary part of the Vedic study, is not performed by any one other than a follower of the Atharva-veda, and hence there is "that restriction".2 Since in the book called "Saṃcāra" too they record the head-rite as a Vedic rite, and since there is a text: "One who had practised the vow does not read this" (Mund. 3.2.11 3), that restriction is indeed appropriate, as it is in the case of oblations, beginning with the Sauryya.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If the rite of carrying a pot of burning charcoals on the head, taught as a sacred duty in the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda thus: "Let one declare the knowledge of Brahman to them alone by whom, however, the head-rite has been performed according to rules" (Mund. 3.2.10), were a subsidiary part of the vidyā, then only we could have said that the vidyās are different. But as it is not a subordinate part of vidyā, we cannot do so.4 The word "because" states the reason, i.e. because the sacred duty called 'head-rite' is a subsidiary part of the study of the Veda, and not of the vidyā stated in it. "(It) being so," i.e. the head-rite being a subsidiary part of the study of the Veda, there is "that restriction", i.e. the restriction with regard to the teaching of

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1 Š, R, Šk.
2 Viz. that only those who have performed the head-rite are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.
3 Š, R, Bh, Šk.
4 This answers the prima facie view mentioned above under V.K. 3.3.1.
the rite, viz. that the sacred duty called ‘head-rite’ is to be performed by the followers of the Atharva-veda, and not by others. How is this known? “In the Samācāra,” i.e. in a book concerned with teaching Vedic rites, the followers of the Atharva-veda record the head-rite as a Vedic rite,—from that this is known: also “from the topic”, i.e. because in the subsequent and concluding text: “One who has not practised the vow does not read this” (Mund. 3.2.11), the word ‘this’ refers to the collection of the Mundaka-treatises forming the topic previously treated; further, the word ‘reads’ means ‘studies’.

Here (the author) quotes a parallel instance: “And as in the case of libations”. The ‘libations’, i.e. the seven oblations, beginning with the Sauryya and ending with the Sataudana, have no connection with the three fires mentioned in a different branch, but are connected with the one fire mentioned by the texts belonging to the Atharva-veda, and hence they are to be offered to one fire by the followers of the Atharva-veda alone. In the very same manner, the followers of the Atharva-veda alone are entitled to perform the sacred duty called ‘head-rite’, which is a subsidiary part of the study of the Veda, and not others. In the text: “Let one declare the knowledge of Brahman” (Mund. 3.2.10), on the other hand, the word ‘Brahman’ denotes the sound Brahman (i.e. the Vedas).^1

**COMPARISON**

**Bhāskara**

He reads “salila-vac ca” in place of “sava-vac ca”.^2 Interpretation same.

**Baladeva**

He breaks the sūtra into two separate sūtras thus: “Svādhya-yasya ... adhicārac ca” (sūtra 3), and “Sava-vac ca tan niyama” (sūtra 4). Interpretations entirely different, viz.:—

*Sūtra 3:* “For the injunction of the study of the Veda being such (i.e. of a general import), and because of the eligibility (of all) to the sacred duties (mentioned in the Veda), (the entire Veda must

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^1 That is, the head-rite being a Vedic rite, a part of the Vedic study,—those who practise it become entitled to the knowledge of the Atharva-veda in general.

^2 Bh. B. 3.3.3, p. 176.
be studied)’. That is, injunctions like “Let one study his own sacred text” (Tait. Ār. 2.15) do not specify that only one particular portion of the Veda is to be studied, but that it is to be studied entirely. Moreover, the followers of one branch are not necessarily confined to the sacred duties of that branch only, but to all the duties enjoined in all the branches. Hence Brahman may be realized by all the religious practices taught in all the Vedas.¹

Sūtra 4: “And the restriction is not like libations”. That is, the seven libations, beginning with the Sauryya and ending with the Śataudana, are open to the followers of the Atharva-veda only, and cannot be offered by the followers of other Vedas. But such is not the case with the worship of Brahman, which is universal and may be performed by any and every one.²

SŪTRA 4

“AND (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“And” the scriptural text: “The word which all the Vedas record” (Katha 2.15³) “shows” that the vidyās are identical.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Scripture “shows” that the vidyās are the same thus: “The word which all the Vedas declare” (Kāṭha 2.15); Smṛti too: “Through all the Vedas I alone am to be known” (Gītā 15.15).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He quotes the same passage, but as before does not refer to the identity of vidyās, but concludes the topic that Brahman is the object taught by all the Vedas.⁴

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¹ G.B. 3.3.3, pp. 114-115, Chap. 3.
² G.B. 3.3.3, pp. 114-115, Chap. 3.
³ Ś, R, Bh, B.
⁴ G.B. 3.3.5.
SŪTRA 5

"AND (THE VIDYĀS) BEING THE SAME, (THERE IS) COMBINATION (OF THE SPECIAL FEATURES), ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DIFFERENCE OF MEANING AS IN THE CASE OF WHAT IS COMPLEMENTARY TO INJUNCTION."

Vedānta-पārijāta-saurabha

The vidyās being identical, and their meaning being the same, their special features are to be combined together, "as in the case of what is complementary to the injunction" with regard to the Agni-hotra and the like.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The identity of the vidyās being thus established, the author explains its purpose.

"And" meditations "being the same", their special features are to be combined together. The sense is that the special features or details found in one vidyā are to be applied to others as well, "on account of the non-difference of meaning", i.e. on account of the unity of purpose. "As in case of what is complementary to injunction," i.e. just as there is the combination everywhere of what is complementary to the injunctions regarding the Agni-hotra and the rest,—like that.1 Hence it is established that on account of the non-difference of injunctions and the rest, vidyās or meditations are the same, and that their special features are to be combined together.

Here ends the section entitled "The understanding in all the Vedāntas" (1).

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Śrikanṭha

They take this sūtra as forming an adhikarana by itself. Interpretation same.

1 I.e. in the Karma-Kāṇḍa, the special features or aṅgas of a sacrifice are mentioned in various places and not in the same place; yet when the sacrifice is performed, all these scattered features and details are combined. Similarly, the special details of a particular vidyā or meditation may be mentioned in various places; yet when it is practised, all these details are to be brought together.
Baladeva

This is sūtra 6 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras) concerned with the problem of the coalescence of the attributes of the Lord. Brahman is described variously in various texts. In one place, He is described as Kṛṣṇa, in another as Rāma, in another as Nṛsiṁha and so on. Hence the problem is whether all of these different attributes of the Lord,—His sweetness, heroism, terribleness, and so on—are to be combined when meditating on Him, or not. The prima facie view is that they being contradictory attributes are not to be combined. Hence the reply: “And if (the meditation) be the same, the combination (of attributes) (is permissible), on account of the non-difference of the object (viz. Brahman), as in the case of what is complementary to injunction”. That is, in the case of the common meditation on pure Brahman, the object of meditation being the same, all the attributes are to be combined, just as Agni-hotra being the same, all its details are to be combined.¹

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled “Difference”. (Sūtras 6–9)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 6)

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THERE IS) DIFFERENCE (BETWEEN THE TWO UDGĪTHA-VIDYĀS) ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL TEXT, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF NON-DIFFERENCE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is stated in the Vājasaneyaka: “Then, verily, they said to this breath in the mouth: ‘Sing the udgītha for us’. ‘So be it’—that breath sang the udgītha for them” (Brh. 1.3.7²). And it is stated in the Chandogya too: “Then, verily, he who is this chief vital-breath him they worshipped as the udgītha” (Chānd. 1.2.7³). On the doubt, viz. whether the vidyās are the same here, or different, the prima facie view is that the vidyās are the same. If it be objected that

¹ G.B. 3.3.6, pp. 119-120, Chap. 3.
² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.
in the Vājasaneyaka text: "Sing the udgitha for us" (Brh. 1.3.7),
breath is said to be a subject; while in the Chāndogya text: "Him
as the udgitha" (Chānd. 1.2.7), it is said to be an object. Hence
the vidyās are different,—(the prima facie objector replies:) "no",
"on account of non-difference" in the introductory part, i.e. because
in the texts: "Let us overcome (the demons) by the udgitha" (Brh.
1.3.1), "They took the udgitha, (thinking:) with this we shall kill
them" the udgitha alone appears to be the object to be meditated
on (Chānd. 1.2.1). Hence it is established that the meditations are
the same.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said above that the vidyās, though recorded in many
places, are really identical as the injunctions and the rest are so; and
it has been shown that their special features are to be mutually
combined. Now, wishing to point out the difference of several vidyās,
the author is first stating the prima facie view.

Having begun thus: "The gods and the demons were the offspring
of Prajāpati" (Brh. 1.3.1), having mentioned the vow of the gods,
viz.: "Those gods said: 'Let us overcome the demons at the sacrifice
with the udgitha' " (Brh. 1.3.1), and having shown how they failed to
realise their purpose, i.e. to destroy the demons through speech and
the rest, the Vājasaneyins record how they finally overcame the
demons through the knowledge of the udgitha thus: "Then, verily,
they said to the breath in the mouth: 'Sing the udgitha for us'.
'So be it,' that breath sang the udgitha for them" (Brh. 1.3.7). They
further state the fruit of the knowledge of the udgitha thus: "He
becomes superior by himself, his hateful enemy (becomes inferior) who
knows thus" (Brh. 1.3.7).

Having begun thus: "Then, verily, the gods took the udgitha,
(thinking) 'With this we shall kill them'" (Chānd. 1.2.1), and
having shown, as before, how they failed to realise their purpose though
striving hard, the Chandogas too record how they finally overcame
the demons through the knowledge of the udgitha thus: "Then, verily,

1 R, ŚK.
2 Correct quotation: "abhibhāviṣyāmaḥ", meaning "we shall overcome".
Vide Chānd. 1.2.1, p. 20.
3 R, ŚK.
4 For correct quotation see footnote 2, above.
he who is the chief vital-breath,—him they worshipped as the udgītha” (Chānd. 1.2.7). They, further, state the fruit of the knowledge thus: “So exactly he falls to pieces who wishes evil to one who knows thus” (Chānd. 1.2.8).

On the doubt, viz. whether here the vidyās are identical or different,—we (i.e. \textit{prima facie} objectors) say: The vidyās are the same. Why? “On account of the non-difference” of injunctions and the rest. Thus, the injunction, expressed by the root ‘to know’, is the same; the fruit too, viz. the overcoming of the demons, is the same; the form, as well, is the same as the object to be meditated on, viz. the udgītha viewed as the vital-breath, is so; and the name, too, viz. ‘udgītha-meditation’ is the same.

If it be objected: There is “difference”, i.e. there is difference from the admitted sameness of the vidyās, i.e. the vidyās are not identical. Why? In the text: “Sing the udgītha for us.” That breath sang the udgītha” (Brh. 1.3.7), the vital-breath is indicated as a subject by the Vājins by a word in the nominative case. But in the text: “Him, the udgītha” (Chānd. 1.2.7), it is described as an object, having the form of the udgītha, by the Chandogas by a word in the accusative case,—on account of such scriptural texts,—

1 Vide the udgītha-vidyā or the doctrine of the udgītha in Brhadāranyaka and Chandogya:—

(a) \textit{Brh.} 1.3.—The story begins: The gods and the demons, the offspring of Prajāpati fought with one another for the worlds. The gods, then resolved to overcome the demons at the sacrifice by the udgītha. So they asked speech to sing the udgītha for them. But the demons, coming to know of this, rushed upon it and pierced it with evil. Thereupon the gods successively approached the in-breath, the eye, the ear and the mind, each of which was however corrupted by the demons. Finally, they approached the chief vital-breath which sang the udgītha for them, and when the demons rushed upon it, trying to pierce it with evil, they themselves were scattered and perished (Brh. 1.3.1–1.3.7).

(b) \textit{Chānd.} 1.2.—A very similar account given. The story begins: The gods and the demons, the offspring of Prajāpati fought with one another, and the gods took the udgītha, thinking that they would overcome the demons with it. Then they worshipped the breath in the nose as the udgītha, but the demons pierced it with evil. Thereupon, they successively worshipped as the udgītha speech, the eye, the ear and the mind, each of which were, however, corrupted by the demons. Finally, they worshipped the chief vital-breath as the udgītha, and when the demons tried to corrupt it, they themselves fell to pieces (Chānd. 1.2.1–1.2.7).
(We, i.e. the prima facie objectors, reply:) "no", because in the texts: ‘“Let us overcome (the demons) by the udgīthā”’ (Bṛh. 1.3.1), ‘“They took the udgīthā, (thinking) ‘With this we shall kill them’”’ (Chānd. 1.2.1), the udgīthā alone appears to be the object to be meditated on. Nor can it be said that this difference of case-endings would make them differ in major points.1 In the text: ‘“Sing the udgīthā for us”’ (Bṛh. 1.3.7), the udgīthā which is really an object is said to be a subject figuratively.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 7 in his commentary. He does not take it to be setting forth a prima facie view, and does not begin a new adhikarana here, but continues the topic of the coalescence of the different attributes of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "If it be objected that the contrary is the case (i.e. all the attributes of the Lord are not to be combined while meditating on Him), (we reply:) no, on account of non-specification, (i.e. because there is no specific text to the effect)".2

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 7–9)

SŪTRA 7

"OR (THERE IS) NO (SAMENESS OF THE VIDYĀS), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCES OF THE SUBJECT-MATTERS, AS IN THE CASE OF BEING HIGHER THAN THE HIGH."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it we reply:
The vidyās are not identical. Having begun by designating the praṇava, which is a part of the udgīthā, as the object to be worshipped, in the text: “Let one meditate on the syllable ‘Om’ as the

1 E.g. the war between the gods and the demons; the approach of the gods to speech, eye, ear and mind; the successful attempt of the demons to corrupt them; their unsuccessful attempt to corrupt the chief vital-breath; the final overcoming of the demons by the chief vital-breath as the udgīthā, etc.

2 G.B. 3.3.7, pp. 120-121, Chap. 3.
udgīthā” (Chānd. 1.1.1 1), the text goes on to say: “They took the udgīthā” (Chānd. 1.2.1 2); and hence in the Chāndogya, the pranāva, a part of the udgīthā, is enjoined as the object to be viewed as the vital-breath. In the Vājasaneyaka, on the other hand, in accordance with the introductory passage, containing no specification, viz. “Let us overcome (the demons) by the udgīthā” (Brh. 1.3.1 3), the entire udgīthā is the object to be viewed as the vital-breath. Hence, the introductory parts being thus different, the vidyās themselves must be so; just as in spite of the sameness of injunctions, viz. that the pranava, which is a part of the udgīthā, is to be viewed as the Highest Self,—the injunction that the udgīthā is to be viewed as the golden Person is different from the injunction that it is to be viewed as qualified by the attributes of being higher than the high and so on. 4

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author refutes the above view.

The words “or not” imply that the above view is to be rejected. The udgīthā-meditations are not identical. Why? “On account of the difference of subject-matters”. The word ‘subject-matter’ means ‘introduction’, i.e. on account of the difference of the introductory parts. Thus, having begun with the pranava,—which is a part of the udgīthā, the object of the action of the singer of the udgīthā,—as the object to be worshipped in the text: “Let one meditate on the syllable ‘Om’ as the udgīthā (Chānd. 1.1.1), the text goes on to say: “They took the udgīthā” (Chānd. 1.2.1); and hence in the Chāndogya, the pranava, a part of the udgīthā, is stated as the object to be viewed as the vital-breath. In the Vājasaneyaka, on the other hand, in accordance with the introductory passage, containing no speci-

1 S, R, ŚK. 2 Not quoted by others. 3 R. 4 i.e. in Chānd. 1.6.9 it is said that sāman, i.e. the udgīthā, is to be viewed, i.e. meditated on, as the golden Person within the sun; while in Chānd. 1.9.2 it is said that the udgīthā is to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes of being higher than the high and so on. Now, although in both cases the udgīthā is the object enjoined to be meditated on, yet as it is to be meditated on under two different aspects, in the one case as a golden Person and in the other as higher than the high and so on,—the two udgīthā-meditations are taken to be different. In the very same manner, here although the same udgīthā is enjoined to be meditated on, yet since in the one case it is to be meditated on as a part, in the other as the whole, the two udgīthā-meditations are not identical.
fication, viz. ‘“Let us overcome (the demons) by the udgītha”’ (Bṛh. 1.3.1), the entire udgītha is the object to be viewed as the vital-breath. Hence as the introductory parts are different, the objects enjoined too must be so; the things enjoined being different, the forms too must be so, and on account of that, the vidyās themselves must be different; just as, even in the same branch, in spite of the sameness of injunctions, viz. that the prāṇava, which is a part of the udgītha, is to be viewed as the Highest Self,—the injunction that it is to be viewed as the golden Person is different from the injunction that it is to be viewed as qualified by the attributes of being higher than the high and so on.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 8 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikāraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with an altogether different topic. It has been pointed out in the previous adhikāraṇa that while meditating on the Lord, all His attributes are to be combined. Now it is pointed out in this adhikāraṇa that that is the case with the svanīṣṭha devotees only, but in the case of the ekāntin devotees, there is no such combination. He interprets the word “prakāraṇa” in the sūtra as “prakṛṣṭa karaṇam”, i.e. excellent act, viz. devotion. Hence the sūtra: “Or (there is) no (combination of attributes in the case of the ekāntins) on account of the difference of devotion (i.e. because the devotion of the ekāntins is one-pointed, while that of the svanīṣṭha is universal), as in the case of being higher than the high, (i.e. just as the ekāntin worshipper of the golden Person in the sun does not combine the qualities of being higher than the high and so on).”

1 The rule is that meditations are different when the objects meditated on are different, whether in the same branch or in different branches. If the objects meditated on are not different, then the meditations are identical, in spite of repetition, and serve other purposes. See footnote 2, p. 578.

2 G.B. 3.2.8, pp. 122-123, Chap. 3.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 8

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT (OF THE SIMILAR) NAME (THERE IS SAMENESS OF THE VIDYĀS), (WE REPLY:) THAT HAS BEEN SAID, ON THE OTHER HAND, (THERE IS) THAT TOO (I.E. THE IDENTITY OF NAMES) (EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF IDENTITY OF THE OBJECTS NAMED).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“If it be objected that on account of name” the vidyās must be identical,—(we reply:) Under the aphorism: “Or not, on account of the difference of subject-matter” (Br. Sū. 3.3.7) it has been shown the more identity of names is of no great force. “On the other hand,” names may be identical even when the subject-matters enjoined are different; just as the name ‘Agni-hotra’ applies to the regular Agni-hotra, and to the Agni-hotra which is a part of the ceremony called ‘Kuṇḍapāyinām ayanam’.¹

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected that “on account of name”, i.e. on account of the name ‘udgītha-meditation’, the udgītha-vidyās are identical—(we reply:) The reply to this has been given under the aphorism: “Or not, on account of the difference of subject-matter” (Br. Sū. 3.3.7). That is, the difference of vidyās being established on the ground of the difference of introductory parts, mere identity of names cannot make the vidyās identical. Moreover, even two different subject-matters may have identical names, just as the name ‘Agni-hotra’ applies to the regular Agni-hotra and to the Agni-hotra which is a part of the ceremony called ‘Kuṇḍa-pāyinām ayanam’, and just as the First-Day sacrifice is to be observed both in the Twelve-Days’ sacrifice and in the Gavāmayana sacrifice.

¹ A particular religious ceremony in which ewers or pitchers are used for drinking.
COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is śūtra 9 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic that in the case of the ekāntin devotees, there is no combination of all the attributes of the Lord. Hence the śūtra: “If it be objected that on account of (the similarity of) name (i.e. because both the svanīṣṭha and ekāntin are called ‘worshipper of Brahman’) (the ekāntin, too, must be called ‘worshipper of Brahman’) (the ekāntin, too, must meditate on all the attributes of the Lord), (we reply:) that has been said (under the previous śūtra), on the contrary, there is that¹”. That is, there is an instance to the effect, viz. the meditation on the golden Person² and that on the ether³ have both the name ‘udgīthā-meditation’, yet the attributes of the one are not combined in the other.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

ŚŪTRA 9

“And on account of universality, (it is) appropriate.”

Vedānta-pārljāta-saurabhā

As the prāṇava, mentioned in the beginning, is the object to be meditated on, in all the udgīthā-meditations in the Chāṇḍogya, it is “appropriate” that the word ‘udgīthā’, mentioned in the middle in the text: “They took the udgīthā” (Chand. 1.2.1), too should really imply the prāṇava. In the Chāṇḍogya the prāṇava, a part of the udgīthā, is to be meditated on under the aspect of the vital-breath; in the Vājasaneyaka, the entire udgīthā,—as such, the vidyās are different.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the first chapter of the Chāṇḍogya, various udgīthā-meditations

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¹ G.B. 3.3.9, pp. 123-124, Chap. 3.
² Chand. 1.6.9.
³ Chand. 1.9.2.
are mentioned. Now, the praṇava,—introduced in the text: “Let one meditate on the syllable ‘Om’ as the udgītha” (Chānd. 1.1.1),—is the common object to be meditated on as a part of the udgītha. So it is “appropriate” that the word ‘udgītha’, mentioned in the middle in the text: “Then, forsooth, the gods took the udgītha” (Chānd. 1.2.1), too should really imply the praṇava. It is often found that a word denoting the whole denotes its parts, as e.g. when one part of a piece of cloth is burnt, it is said that the cloth is burnt. This being so, in the Chāndogya, the praṇava alone, denoted by the term ‘udgītha’ and a part of the udgītha, is the object to be meditated on under the aspect of the vital-breath. In Vājasaneyaka, by the term ‘udgītha’ the entire udgītha, that which the singer of the udgītha sings, is to be understood, i.e. that alone is to be meditated on under the aspect of the vital-breath. Hence, it is established that the udgītha-meditation mentioned in the Chāndogya is different from the udgītha-meditation mentioned in the Vājasaneyaka.

Here ends the section entitled “Difference” (2).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

They take it as an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation different, viz. It is said in the Chāndogya (1.1.1) that the ‘Om’ is to be meditated on as the udgītha. Here the Om and the udgītha are designated as standing in a relation of co-ordination (sāmanādhi-karaṇa). Now the problem is what exactly this co-ordination between the two implies,—whether adhyāsa or conscious voluntary super-imposition of one object upon another and thereby thinking the two as identical; apavāda or bādha, i.e. the negation of the former false knowledge of a thing by the latter correct knowledge; or finally viśeṣaṇa, i.e. qualification, distinguishing the thing qualified from other things. The last is the correct view. The udgītha here specializes and thereby restricts the Om which extends over the entire Veda,—i.e. only that Om which is a part of the udgītha is to be meditated on here and not the Om which extends over the entire Veda. Hence the sūtra: “On account of the extension (of the Om to the entire Veda), (the view
that the term udgītha expresses a specialization of the Om is) appropriate”.

Śrīkaṇṭha

He too takes this sūtra as forming an adhikarana by itself. Interpretation different, viz. In the text: “Let one meditate on the syllable Om, the udgītha” (Chānd. 1.1.1), the Om and the udgītha are mentioned separately. The problem is whether they are to be meditated on separately or co-ordinately. The *prima facie* view is that they are to be meditated on separately, since they are mentioned separately. But the correct conclusion is that the udgītha qualifies the praṇava and as such the praṇava is the object to be meditated on here. Hence the sūtra: “And on account of the universality (of the praṇava as the object to be meditated on), (the view that the praṇava is qualified by the udgītha is) appropriate”. That is, just as the praṇava is designated as the object to be meditated on in the introductory passage, so in the subsequent passages too. Hence here the object to be meditated is the praṇava as qualified by the udgītha, and not the praṇava and the udgītha.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 10 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikarana by itself, concerned with the question whether the attributes of infancy and the like too are to be included in the meditations on Him. Hence the sūtra: “And on account of all-pervasiveness, (this is) consistent”. That is, the Lord is all-pervading in spite of His states of infancy and the like, since He is not limited by those attributes of infancy and so on. Hence the meditation on the Lord as possessed of these attributes is perfectly consistent.

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1 Ś.B. 3.3.9, pp. 766 ff.; Bh. B. 3.3.9, pp. 177-178.
2 Śk. B. 3.3.9, pp. 296-298, Part 9.
3 G.B. 3.3.10, pp. 127-128, Chap. 3.
Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "Non-difference of everything". (Sūtra 10)

SūTRA 10

"On account of the non-difference of everything (i.e. everywhere, viz. Chāndogya and Brhadāraṇyaka), those (qualities are to be inserted) elsewhere (viz. in the Kauṣītaki)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the Chāndogya as well as in the Vājasaneyaka, under the dialogue of the sense-organs, the vital-breath, endowed with the attributes of being the oldest and the best, is designated as the object to be worshipped, and also speech and the rest are designated as possessed of the attributes of being the richest and so on; and those attributes are ascribed to the vital-breath. In the dialogue of the sense-organs in the Kauṣītaki, on the other hand, the attributes of speech and the rest are stated, but are not ascribed to the vital-breath. With regard to it, we reply: "Elsewhere", i.e. in the dialogue of the sense-organs in the Kauṣītaki as well, they are to be ascribed to the vital-breath, as in all the three dialogues speech and the rest are said to be under the control of the vital-breath,—which is the cause of the seniority and excellence of the latter.

Vedānta-kaustubha

While in one place (viz. in the Brhadāraṇyaka) the word 'udgītha' refers to the whole, in another place (viz. in the Chāndogya) it refers to a part only and as such does not relate to the whole,—hence the two udgītha-meditations are different. Likewise since in some cases the vital-breath is designated as endowed with the attributes of being the richest and the like, in some cases, again, not so endowed, the meditations on the vital-breath too are different,—the author is refuting this view now by the maxim of the combination of special features.¹

In the dialogue of the sense-organs, the Chandogas as well as the Vājasaneyins demonstrate the vital-breath, endowed with the attributes of being the oldest and the best, as the object to be worshipped thus: "He who, verily, knows the oldest and the best, becomes, for-

¹ Designated under Br. Sū. 3.3.5.
sooth, the oldest and the best of his own people. The vital-breath, verily, is the oldest and the best’ (Bṛh. 6.1.1) and so on; and they demonstrate the attributes of speech and the rest, such as: being the richest and so on, thus: “These divinities, verily, disputed for self-superiority” ² and so on, “Disputing for self-superiority” (Bṛh. 6.1.7) and so on; as well as establish the excellence of the vital-breath on the ground that speech and the rest and the body have their existence as well as activities under the control of the vital-breath; and finally ascribe the attributes of speech and the rest, such as, being the richest and so on, to the vital-breath, the oldest and the best, thus: “Then, verily, speech said to him: ‘If I am the richest, you are the richest’” (Chānd. 5.1.13) and so on. Thus, according to them, the object to be worshipped is the vital-breath, endowed with the attributes of being the oldest, the best, the richest and so on, as subserving speech and the rest.

In the dialogues of the sense-organs in the branches of the Kauśitaki and the rest, on the other hand, the excellence of the vital-breath is demonstrated, but the attributes of speech and the rest are not ascribed to it (Kauś. 2.14).

The attributes in question are those belonging to speech, the eye, the ear and the mind,—namely, being the richest being the support, being prosperity and being the abode (respectively), to be known from the following texts: “He who, verily, knows the richest . . . . Speech, forsooth, is the richest” (Bṛh. 6.1.2; Chānd. 5.1.2), “He who, verily, knows the support . . . . The eye, forsooth, is the support” (Bṛh. 6.1.3; Chānd. 5.1.3), “He who, verily, knows prosperity . . . . The ear, verily, is prosperity” (Bṛh. 6.1.4; Chānd. 4.1.4), “He who, verily, knows the abode . . . . The mind, verily, is the abode” (Bṛh. 6.15; Chānd. 5.1.5) and so on.

On the doubt, viz. whether these attributes are to be included in the meditations on the vital-breath of the Kauśitakins, or not, the

1 An exactly similar passage—omitting only the word ‘svānām’, is Chānd. 5.1.1.

2 This is evidently a mis-quotation, since it is traceable neither in the Chānd. nor in the Bṛh.

3 Cf. Chānd. 5.1.6.—“Now the sense-organs disputed among themselves about self-superiority.”

4 Cf. Bṛh. 6.1.4.—“She (i.e. speech) said: ‘Verily, wherein I am the richest, therein you are the richest’.”

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prima facie view is that since they have not been mentioned in those scriptural texts as belonging to the vital-breath, they are not to be so included.

With regard to it, we reply: "These," i.e. the attributes of being richest and the best belonging to speech and so on, are to be accepted as belonging to the vital-breath, "elsewhere" than in the Chāndogya and the rest, i.e. in the meditations on the vital-breath of the Kausitakins as well. Why? "On account of the non-difference of everything," i.e. because in all the three dialogues the cause of the seniority and excellence of the vital-breath, the object to be meditated on, is the very same. Just as in the meditations on the vital-breath in the Chāndogya and the rest, the dependence of speech and the rest and of the body on the vital-breath, as well as the connection of the vital-breath with the attributes of being the richest and the rest have been stated with a view to establishing the seniority and excellence of the vital-breath,—so in the meditations on the vital-breath in the Kausitaki too, the attributes of speech and the rest, such as being the richest and so on, have been stated with the same view to establishing the seniority and excellence of the vital-breath. The text: "Then these divinities said to Father Prajāpati: 'Who among us is the best?' He, Prajāpati, said: 'That one among you, on whose departure the body appears to be most miserable, is the best'. Then speech went out,1 and so on, shows that speech and the rest, their attributes, as well as the body depend on the vital-breath. Here, their own attributes of being the richest and the rest are not attributed to the vital-breath by speech and the rest. Hence they are to be ascribed to the vital-breath,—this is established.

Here ends the section entitled "Non-difference of everything" (3).

COMPARISON

Śāṅkara, Bhāskara and Śrikanṭha

The interpretation of the phrase: "Sarvābhedāt" different, viz. "on account of the non-difference of the prāṇa-vidyā in the three Upaniṣads". That is, the meditation on the vital-breath is every-

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1 Cf. the very similar passages in Chānd. 5.1.7–5.1.8.
where the same, and hence the special features mentioned in one place are to be ascribed to others.¹

Baladeva

This is sūtra 11 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikarana by itself, concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the acts of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "(The acts of the Lord, viz. the deeds performed by him in His infancy and so on are eternal) on account of the non-difference of all (viz. of the Lord and His companions) they (manifest themselves) elsewhere (i.e. in another place and time)". That is, the Lord and His companions, viz. the freed souls, exist subsequently in other places and times and enact the same parts. In this sense, those acts of the Lord which He performs through His cit-śakti are eternal, while those acts which He performs through matter and so on are non-eternal.²

Adhikarana 4: The section entitled "Bliss". (Sūtras 11–17)

SŪTRA 11

"Bliss and the rest (are to be understood everywhere), (on account of the non-difference) of the Chief."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The substratum of attributes (viz. Brahman) being the same, the attributes like "bliss and the rest" are to be inserted in all the meditations on the Highest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the question of the combination of the essential attributes of Brahman is being considered.

The phrase: 'On account of non-difference' is to be supplied (from the preceding aphorism). On the doubt, viz. whether the attributes of Brahman, such as, bliss and the rest, are to be included in all meditations on Brahman or not—the suggestion is: these attributes are not to be so included, because the texts of every Vedānta are

¹ Š.B. 3.3.10, p. 770; Bh. B. 3.3.10, p. 171; ŠK. B. 3.3.10, pp. 298 ff.
² G.B. 3.3.11, pp. 130–133, Chap. 3.
complete by themselves and do not require other texts to complete their meaning; because there is no restriction with regard to the inclusion of qualities not mentioned in a particular section; and because the meditating devotees can attain their goals from that very knowledge which they derive from a particular section where certain attributes are recorded,—

We reply: On account of the sameness "of the chief' ', i.e. as Brahman, the substratum of attributes, is the common object to be meditated on in all these Brahma-vidyās, His attributes, viz. "bliss and the rest", are to be comprised everywhere. It being impossible for texts to have a complete sense in isolation, the attributes, not mentioned in a particular section, should, nevertheless, be inserted there from another section for the benefit of meditating devotees.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 12 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikarana by itself. Interpretation same.

SŪTRA 12

"(THERE IS) NO RELEVANCY OF (THE ATTRIBUTES OF) HAVING JOY FOR THE HEAD AND THE REST, FOR (THERE WILL BE) INCREASE AND DECREASE (ON THE PART OF BRAHMAN) IF (THERE BE) DIFFERENCE (OF LIMBS ON HIS PART)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā

The attributes of having joy for the head and the rest do not constitute the essential nature and attributes of the Highest,—since "if there be difference" of limbs like the head and the rest, then there will result increase and decrease on the part of Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubhā

To the objection, viz. then, on account of the non-difference of Brahman, the attributes, mentioned in the Taittiriya-text: "Of him joy alone is the head, delight the right wing, excessive delight the left wing, bliss the soul, Brahman the tail, the foundation" (Tait. 2.5), too should be comprised everywhere like His essential attributes of bliss and the rest,—the author replies:
The attributes of having joy for the head and the rest are not necessary for a clear understanding of the nature and attributes of Brahman,—since they are not His essential attributes. Otherwise, "if there be difference" of limbs like the head and the rest, then there must be "increase and decrease" on the part of Brahman. If that be so, texts like "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite" (Tait. 2.1) will come to be contradicted.

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṅkara and Bhāskara**

The interpretation of the last portion, viz. "upacayāpacayau hi bhede" different, viz. "because increase and decrease are possible only if there be difference". That is, lower and higher degrees like joy, delight, excessive delight, bliss and so on, which are all different, are possible only if there be a plurality of beings, i.e. only on the part of ordinary enjoyers, (and hence they are not possible on the part of Brahman who is one only).

**Śrikaṇṭha**

He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikāraṇa by itself.

**SŪTRA 13**

"**BUT THE OTHER (ATTRIBUTES ARE TO BE COMBINED), ON ACCOUNT OF THE SAMENESS OF THE PURPORT.**"

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā**

"But" as the substratum of attributes (viz. Brahman) is the same everywhere, the attributes like bliss and the rest are to be combined.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

"But" bliss and the rest, "other" than (the attributes of) having the joy as the head and so on, are to be supplied everywhere, "on account of the sameness of the purport", i.e. "on account of the sameness", i.e. identity everywhere, "of the purport", i.e. of the object to be demonstrated, viz. Brahman, the substratum of attributes. As He is not described as a person everywhere, so those (attributes of having the joy for the head and so on), if applied (everywhere),
would be purposeless. In order that there may be a clear knowledge of the real nature of Brahman, bliss and the rest are to be comprised everywhere, as they are connected with the real nature of Brahman. This aphorism is meant for indicating the reason why bliss and the rest should be included everywhere, and also for suggesting that it is simply meaningless to include others everywhere.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation of the phrase: "artha-sāmānyāt different, viz. "on account of (their) equality with the object itself". That is, the attributes of bliss and the rest, determining the very nature of the thing (viz. Brahman) are similar to the thing itself and are accordingly included in all meditations just like the thing itself.\(^1\)

Baladeva

This is sūtra 14 in his commentary. Literal interpretation different, though the conclusion is the same. Thus: "But others (i.e. the other attributes mentioned in the Taittirīya) (are to be combined everywhere), on account of the sameness of the result". That is, the meditation on Brahman, as possessed of the attributes of all-pervasiveness and the rest, mentioned in the Taittirīya, leads to the attainment of Brahman, just as the meditation on Him as possessed of other attributes, mentioned in other Vedāntas, does.\(^2\)

SŪTRA 14

"(The designation of Brahman as having joy for His head and so on is) for the purpose of meditation, on account of the absence of (another) purpose."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The designation: "Of him, joy alone is the head" (Tait. 2.5 \(^3\)) and so on, on the other hand, serve the purpose of meditation, "on account of the absence of " any other "purpose".

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2 G.B. 3.3.14, p. 137, Chap. 3.
3 R.
In that case, the teaching of the attributes of having joy for the head and the rest will have no meaning,—to this the author replies:

The teaching, concerned with determining Brahman as a person, viz. “Of him, joy alone is the head” (Tait. 2.5) and so on, on the other hand, is “for the purpose of meditation”, i.e. for the sake of helping easy comprehension. That is, in the absence of any other purpose, this alone is the purpose of such a designation.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

They begin a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. a discussion about a text in the Kaṭha-paniṣad. Thus, in Kaṭha 3.10–3.11 it is said that sense-objects are higher than the sense-organs, the mind is higher than the sense-objects and so on and finally the Person is said to be the highest of all. The question is as to whether each of these, viz. sense-objects and so on, is high or only the Person. The answer is given in this sūtra thus: “(The Person alone is designated as the High) for the purpose of meditation, (and not others) on account of the absence of purpose”.

That is, there is no necessity for designating the sense-objects, the sense-organs and the rest as high, while there is such a necessity for designating the Person as high, viz.—meditation.¹

Śrikanṭha

He also begins a new adhikaraṇa here (four sūtras), concerned with the question, viz. whether the self consisting of food and the rest (Tait. 2.2 ff.) too are to be meditated on constantly as the self consisting of bliss is. The answer is: “(They are not to be meditated on constantly) on account of the absence of purpose (for such meditations)”. That is, the meditations on the self consisting of food and the rest have a purpose only so long as the self consisting of bliss is not reached. But when it is reached, they become meaningless. Hence, such meditations are not to be practised perpetually.²

¹ Ś.B. 3.3.14, pp. 773-774; Bh. B. 3.3.14, p. 180.
² ŚK. B. 3.3.14.
SŪTRA 15

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE TERM ‘SELF’ ALSO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As head, wings and the rest cannot possibly belong to the soul, designated thus: “Another internal self” (Tait. 2.5), that designation serves the purpose of meditation on Him.

Vedānta-kaustubha

That the designation: “Joy alone is the head” (Tait. 2.5) in the beginning of the text about that which consists of bliss serves the purpose of meditation and is concerned only with demonstrating (Brahman) as a person, is ascertained “from the term ‘self’ also”. Thus, as head of the form of joy, wings and the rest cannot possibly belong to an object, which is denoted by the term ‘self’ in the text: “Another internal self is that which consists of bliss” (Tait. 2.5), and the real nature of which is different from joy, delight, excessive delight and the rest,—it is merely for helping one to meditate on the self that in the text: “Of him, joy alone is the head” (Tait. 2.5) (the self) is designated as a person,—this is known from the term ‘self’ as well.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They conclude here the discussion about the above Kaṭha-text. The immediately following passage designates the Person as the self. This also proves that the Person alone is intended to be designated as high. The designation of the rest as high is simply for the purpose of showing the supremacy of the Person.¹

Śrikanṭha

He continues the topic whether the selves consisting of food, consisting of the vital-breath and the rest are to be meditated on perpetually or not, and gives the second reason why they are not to be so meditated here. The term ‘self’ is applied to each of the selves, consisting of food and so on. This shows that these denote the presiding deities of food and the rest. Now, Brahman alone is to be

¹ Ś.B. 3.3.15, p. 774; Bh. B. 3.3.15, p. 180.
meditated on and not any other deity. For this reason too the selves consisting of food and so on are not to be meditated on.\[1\]

**SŪTRA 16**

"(There is the) Understanding of the self (in the Taittirīya) as in other (places), on account of what follows."

**Vedānta-pārijata-saurabha**

In the text: "Another internal self" (Tait. 2.5\[2\]), by the term 'self' there is the "understanding of" the Supreme Soul alone, just as in the passage: "The soul, verily, was this, one alone, in the beginning" (Ait. Ār. 2.4.1\[3\]), by the term 'self' the Supreme Self alone is meant. Further, another text too, subsequent to the text about that which consists of bliss, viz. "He desired: 'May I be many'" (Tait. 2.5\[4\]), supports this meaning.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

To the objection, viz. Since we know that in the preceding cases the term 'self' refers to what is not the self, it cannot be said that in the text: "Another internal self is that which consists of bliss" (Tait. 2.5) the term 'self' refers to the Self,—the author replies:

In the text: "Another internal self" (Tait. 2.5), by the term 'self' there is the "understanding of the self", i.e. the apprehension of the self, or the Supreme Soul alone. "As in other (places)," i.e. just as in a text other than the text: "Another internal self is that which consists of bliss" (Tait. 2.5),—viz. in the Aitareya-text: "The self, verily, was this, one alone, in the beginning, there was nothing else blinking. He thought: 'Shall I create worlds?' He created these worlds" (Ait. Ār. 2.4.1), by the term 'self' the Soul is understood, so is the case here. This is definitely ascertained also from a text which is subsequent to the text concerned with the soul consisting of bliss, viz. from the text: "He desired: 'May I be many'" (Tait. 2.6).

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1 ŠK. B. 3.3.15, p. 309, Part 9.  
2 R, ŠK.  
3 P. 118.  
4 R, B.
COMPARISON

Saṃkara and Bhāskara

They begin a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with a different problem, viz. a discussion about a passage in the Aitareya-āranyaka (2.4.1). The question is as to whether the term ‘self’ in this passage stands for Brahman or for Hiranyagarbha. The answer is: ‘‘(There is) the understanding of the self (i.e. Brahman) (by the term ‘self’ in the passage), as in other (places) (i.e. in Tait. 2.1, etc.), on account of what follows (i.e. the word ‘perceives’).’’

Śrikanṭha

He continues the above topic, viz. whether the selves consisting of food and so on are to be meditated on or not. The answer is that as the self consisting of bliss is nothing but the Supreme Brahman, that alone is to be meditated on and not the other selves. Hence the sūtra: ‘‘(In Tait. 2.5 by the term ‘self’ there is) the understanding of the self (i.e. Brahman), as in other places (i.e. in Tait. 2.1, etc.), (this is known also) from what follows’’. Thus, literal interpretation is the same, though import different.

SŪTRA 17

‘‘If it be objected: On account of the connection (of the term ‘self’ with what is not-self, there is no understanding of self here, we reply:) there may be (such an understanding), on account of ascertainment.’’

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that since the term ‘self’ is found to refer to the vital-breath and the rest in the previous cases, in the text: ‘‘The self, consisting of bliss’’ (Tait. 2.53), the Supreme Self is not meant by the term ‘self’—(we reply:) ‘‘There may be’’ indeed such an understanding by that term,—as we know that in the previous cases

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1 Ś.B. 3.3.16, pp. 775 ff.; Bh. B. 3.3.16, p. 180.
3 Not quoted by others.

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too, the term ‘self’ refers to the not-self simply because those not-selves are viewed as the Supreme Self.

\textbf{-Vedānta-kaustubha}

If it be objected that as in the previous cases, e.g. in the text: “Another internal self is that which consists of the vital-breath” (Tait. 2.2) and so on, the term ‘self’ refers to the not-self, so in the text: ‘Another internal self is that which consists of bliss’ (Tait. 2.5) the Highest Self is not referred to by the term ‘self’,—

(We reply:) “There may be” indeed the apprehension of the Highest Self by the term ‘self’. Why? “On account of ascertainment.” That is, we have, first, in mind the idea of the Highest Self, mentioned previously in the passage: “From him, verily, the ether arose” (Tait. 2.1); then, with a view to determining His nature and attributes, the term ‘self’ is made to refer to the selves consisting of food and so on, simply because they are viewed as the Highest Self.\(^1\)

Hence it is established that attributes like bliss and the rest alone are to be combined for the sake of determining the real nature of the substratum of attributes (viz. Brahman), and not those of having joy for the head and the like which are not His (essential) attributes.

Here ends the section entitled “Bliss” (4).

\textbf{COMPARISON}

\textbf{Śaṃkara and Bhāskara}

Here they conclude the discussion about the above Aitareya-āranyaka text. “If it be objected that on account of the connected meaning (of the passage as a whole, i.e. because of the reference to the creation of the world and so on, Hiranyagarbha is here denoted by the term ‘self’), (we reply:) there may be (the understanding of Brahman here) on account of ascertainment (viz. that the self is said to be the one).”\(^2\)

\(^1\) I.e. right from the beginning of the section we get the idea that the Highest Self is the topic of discussion, and hence the subsequent references to the not-self in the chapter are made with the Highest Self in mind.

\(^2\) Ś.B. 3.3.17, pp. 777-778; Bh. B. 3.3.17, pp. 180-181. For Śaṃkara’s alternative explanation of these two sūtras, vide Ś.B. 3.3.17, pp. 338 ff.
Srikantha

Here he concludes the discussion as to whether the selves consisting of food and the rest are to be meditated on or not. Hence the sūtra: “If it be objected that on account of the connection (of the term) ‘self’ with the selves consisting of food and so on, these latter too are to be meditated on like the self consisting of bliss, (we reply:) there must be the meditation on the self consisting of bliss alone), on account of ascertainment, (i.e. because the self consisting of bliss is known to be different from the other selves)”.

Adhikarāṇa 5: The section entitled “The telling of a thing to be done”. (Sūtra 18)

Sūtra 18

“On account of the telling of a thing to be done, (already established by Smṛti and custom,) (that is not enjoined by the text here, but) something new, (i.e. the meditation on water as the dress of the vital-breath.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: “He should rinse the mouth with water when about to eat, and should rinse the mouth with water when he has eaten. Thus indeed he makes the breath non-naked” (Śat. Br. 14.9.2, 15), the meditation on water as forming the dress of the vital-breath, not mentioned before, is enjoined, there being only a re-mention here, on the other hand, of the rinsing of the mouth with water, already established by Smṛti and custom.

1 ŚK. B. 3.3.17, p. 310, Part 9.
2 P. 1103, line 7. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.
3 I.e. the ordinary practice of rinsing the mouth with water before and after meals is not enjoined by Scripture here, since it is already enjoined by Smṛti and custom and Scripture does not enjoin what has already been enjoined. Hence the text simply re-mentions this ordinary custom, but does not enjoin it. What it enjoins here is something new, viz. the meditation on water as the dress of the vital-breath.
Vedānta-kaustubha

Now a particular subsidiary part of the above-mentioned meditation on the vital-breath is being considered. In the Vājasaneyaka it is said that the vital-breath asked speech and the rest: ‘What is my food, what is my dress?’ (Brh. 6.1.14; Sat. Br. 14.9.2, 14). They replied: ‘Whatever there is here, as far as dogs, worms, crawling and flying insects,—that is your food; water is your dress’ (Brh. 6.1.14; Sat. Br. 14.9.2, 14). After that we read: ‘Those versed in the Veda who know this rinse the mouth with water when they are about to eat, and rinse the mouth with water when they have eaten. So indeed they think that they are making the breath non-naked’ (Brh. 6.1.14), ‘Hence he who knows this should rinse the mouth with water when about to eat and should rinse the mouth with water when he has eaten. Thus indeed he makes the breath non-naked’ (Sat. Br. 14.9.2, 15).

In the very same manner, we read the following in the Chandogya as well: ‘He said: ‘What will be my dress!’ ‘Water,’ they said. Hence, verily, those who are about to eat clothe it before and after with water. It is accustomed to receive a dress; it becomes non-naked” (Chand. 5.2.2).

Here the doubt is as to whether here the rinsing of the mouth is enjoined or the meditation on water as forming the dress of the vital-breath, while there is simply a re-mention of the rinsing of the mouth. If it be suggested: As in the text: ‘So indeed he makes the breath non-naked’ (Sat. Br. 14.9.2, 15), there is no mention of an injunctive form referring to the meditation on water as forming the dress of the vital-breath, and as in this text: ‘He should rinse the mouth with water when about to eat’ (Sat. Br. 14.9.2, 15), there is the mention of an injunctive form, it is the rinsing of the mouth that is enjoined here, and water is designated as forming the dress of the vital-breath for glorifying the rinsing of the mouth.

We reply: It is the meditation on water as forming the dress of the vital-breath—which is “something new”, i.e. is something not mentioned before,—that is alone enjoined here. For this very reason there is the mention of clothing only in the Chandogya: ‘They

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1 P. 1103, line 3.
2 And no mention of the rinsing of the mouth with water.
clothe it with water” (Chānd. 5.2.2). From the circumstance also of its being found together with the meditation on food as far as dogs and so on, (enjoined) in the text: “As far as dogs” (Bṛh. 6.1.14; Śat. Br. 14.9.2, 14), it is known that the meditation on (water) as forming the dress (of the vital-breath) alone is what is enjoined here, but the rinsing of the mouth with water is not what is enjoined. Why? “On account of the telling of a thing to be done,” i.e. because of the telling, i.e. mention, of a thing to be done, i.e. of a duty to be performed daily, already established by Smṛti and custom, and simply re-mentioned in the meditation on the vital-breath, as well for the sake of laying down a clothing of the vital-breath. Hence it is established that the meditation on the rinsing-water as forming the dress of the vital-breath is enjoined here as a subsidiary part of the meditation on the vital-breath, while there is simply a re-mention of the act of rinsing the mouth with water.

Here ends the section entitled “The telling of a thing to be done” (5).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is śūtra 19 in his commentary. He also takes this śūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, though concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the designation of the Lord as Father. He interprets the word “apūrva” in the śūtra as: similar (“a”) to what precedes (“pūrva”). Hence the śūtra: ‘(The attributes of fatherhood and the like), similar to the preceding ones (viz. bliss, and so on) (are to be comprised in all meditations on Brahman), on account of the

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1 I.e. the preceding passage: “Whatever there is here, as far as dogs . . ., that is your food”, does not enjoin the use of the food of all kinds,—since that would be contrary to Scripture and impossible,—but merely enjoins the meditation on all food as the food of the vital-breath. Therefore, we must conclude that the text: “Water is your dress” also, which forms the immediate continuation of the above passage, does not enjoin the act of rinsing the mouth with water, but only the meditation on water as forming the dress of the vital-breath.
statement of the effect, (i.e. the fruit, i.e. because such meditations also lead to salvation).\(^1\)

\textbf{Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled “In the same”. (Sūtra 19)}

\textbf{Sūtra 19}

“In the same (branch) too, (it is) thus, (i.e. there is identity of vidyās), on account of non-difference.”

\begin{quote}
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha
\end{quote}

In a branch of the Vājasaneyins,\(^2\) i.e. in the ‘Mystery of fire’,\(^3\) viz. in the section which beginning: “Let one meditate on truth as Brahman” (Sat. Br. 10.6.3, 1\(^4\)), continues: “Let one meditate on the self, consisting of mind” (Sat. Br. 10.6.3, 2\(^5\)) and so on; as well as in the Brhadāraṇyaka text: “This person consists of mind” (Brh. 5.6.1\(^6\)), the meditation taught by Śāṇḍilya is recorded. And just as the vidyās, mentioned in different branches, are identical owing to the identity of the objects meditated on, so the Śāṇḍilya-vidyās, though mentioned in the same branch, are identical.\(^7\) The vidyās being the same, their special features are to be combined together.

\begin{quote}
Vedānta-kaustubha
\end{quote}

Now (the author) points out the identity of the meditations intuited by Śāṇḍilya.

The meditation taught by Śāṇḍilya is recorded in the ‘Mystery of Fire’ in a branch of the Vājasaneyins thus: “Let one meditate on truth as Brahman. Now, verily, this person consists of thought.

\(^1\) G.B. 3.3.19, pp. 143-144, Chap. 3.
\(^2\) The followers of the white Yajur-veda.
\(^3\) The name of the tenth book of the Satapatha-brāhmaṇa.
\(^4\) P. 806, line 14. R, Bh.
\(^5\) Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
\(^6\) \textit{Op. cit.}
\(^7\) Vide V.P.S. 3.3.2.
With whatever thought he departs from this world, that he becomes on departing to the other world. Let him meditate on the self, consisting of mind, having the breath for its body, of the form of light, having true resolves, having the ether for its soul” ¹ (Śat. Br. 10.6.3, 1-2 ²). In that very branch, i.e. in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, that meditation is recorded once again thus: “This person within this heart consists of mind, is of the nature of light, is like a grain of rice or a barley-corn. He, verily, is the ruler of all, the Lord of all, governs all this, whatsoever there is” (Bṛh. 5.6.1).

Here the doubt is as to whether the two vidyās mentioned in the ‘Mystery of Fire’ and Bṛhadāraṇyaka are identical or not. The suggestion being that on account of repetition the vidyās are different, just as on account of the five-fold repetition, the preliminary offerings are so,—

We reply: Just as the vidyās mentioned in different branches are the same, and consequently their special features are combined, so “in the same”, i.e. in the same branch, the vidyās are identical, and consequently their special features are combined. Why? “On account of non-difference,” i.e. because of the identity, in both the places, of the objects to be meditated on, viz. (the selves) endowed with the attributes of consisting of mind and the rest.

If it be objected: There may be identity of vidyās in both the cases, and the combination of the attributes like ‘being the ruler of all’ and so on. But the laying down, over again, of (the attributes like) ‘consisting of mind’ and the rest does not stand to reason,—for if there be the laying down of the unknown attributes in one place, then the realization of our purpose results simply through a combination of them elsewhere.³—

¹ The phrase ‘having the ether for its soul’ is put immediately after ‘of the form of light’. The text really is: “. . . having the form of light, having the ether for its soul, changing its shape at will, swift as thought, having true resolves, having true purposes . . . .”


³ I.e. the attributes like ‘being the ruler of all’, etc., mentioned in the Bṛh., but not in the Śat. Br.—are to be inserted in the latter, and as such they serve a useful purpose. But the attributes like ‘consisting of mind’, etc.—mentioned in both the Bṛh. and Śat. Br.—are mere useless repetitions, serving no purpose.
We reply: No, because the mention of several already-mentioned attributes serves the purpose of recognition. Hence it is established that in both cases the vidyās are identical.

Here ends the section entitled “In the same” (6).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 20 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikarana by itself, concerned with the problem whether the Lord is to be meditated on as a pure soul or as possessed of a body. The prima facie view is that He is to be meditated on as a pure soul only, for if one is to meditate on the form of the Lord, then he will have to meditate on His eye sometimes, on His ears sometimes and so on and as such no uniform and uninterrupted flow of the devotional sentiment, which alone is the means to salvation, will be possible. The answer is given in this sūtra. He reads “samāna” instead of “samāne”. Hence the sūtra: “Even (in the meditation on the form of the Lord, the sentiment is) the same thus, on account of the non-difference (of the Lord’s different limbs, such as eyes, and so on, with His very self)”. That is, just as a golden image is gold throughout and by looking at the different parts of the image, viz. the eyes and so on, one does not get different ideas, but only one idea, viz. that of gold, so the different parts of the Lord are identical with the Lord Himself and hence they do not give rise to different ideas, but to one idea of the Lord. Hence the meditation on the Lord as having a form does indeed lead to release.

1 I.e. in order that we may recognize the two vidyās to be identical, there must be mentioned some features common to both. Hence the repetition of certain attributes in two identical vidyās is not useless.

2 G.B. 3.3.20, p. 145, Chap. 3.—“Evam api caksurādinām vaiṇekṣanyena bhāne’pi samāna eka-rasaḥ sa eva hiranya-pratimādi vat bhagvan vodhyah.”
Adhikarana 7: The section entitled "The connection". (Sūtras 20–22)

Prima Facie View (Sūtra 20)

Sūtra 20

"On account of connection, so elsewhere also."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as the Śāṇḍilya-vidyās are identical, and through connection with them, there is the combination of special features, "so" on account of their connection with the same vidyā through the introductory passage: "Truth is Brahman" (Brh. 5.4.1 1), the two names, mentioned in the scriptural texts: "His secret name is 'Day'—this in reference to the presiding deities" (Brh. 5.5.3 2), "His secret name is 'I'—this in reference to the self" (Brh. 5.5.4 3), are to be combined,—this is the prima facie view.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, having suggested a prima facie view, viz. Just as owing to the identity of the objects to be meditated on, there is combination of attributes in the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, so there is combination of the names in the meditation on the true Brahman also, having the mystic words for His body,—(the author) disposes of it in two aphorisms.

In the Brhadāraṇyaka, we read, beginning: "Truth is Brahman" (Brh. 5.4.1), and continuing: "Now the real is the yonder sun. The Person who is there in that orb and the Person who is here in the right eye" (Brh. 5.5.2) and so on. Here, having declared that the true Brahman is the object to be meditated on—in the orb of the sun as well as in the right eye—as having the mystic words as His body in the passage: "Bhūr is his head, Bhuvar is his arms, Svar is his feet" (Brh. 5.5.3), the text teaches two secret names as complementary to the meditation. Here, the true Brahman, the support of the sun and the support of the eye, is successively stated to have the name 'Day' and the name 'I', thus: "His secret name is 'Day'—this in reference to the presiding deities" (Brh. 5.5.3), "His secret name is 'I'—this in reference to the self" (Brh. 5.5.4).

1 Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
4 Viz. Bhūr, Bhuvar and Svar.
Here the doubt is as to whether the stated names are each to be meditated on singly in its own place (i.e. where mentioned), or whether each is to be meditated on in both the places as combined with the other. Just as in the Śāndilya-vidyā there is a mutual combination of attributes on account of their connection with an identical vidyā, “so elsewhere too”, i.e. in the case of the orb of the sun and the eye, the two names are to be mutually combined in both the places “on account of their connection” with an identical vidyā,—this is the meaning of the *prima facie* aphorism.

**COMPARISON**

**Baladeva**

This is sūtra 21 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (five sūtras), concerned with the worship of the aṣṭāvatāras or God-possessed souls like Nārada and so on. The question is whether they too are to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes of the Lord Himself. This is the *prima facie* view: “On account of (their intimate) connection (with the Lord Himself), in others also (i.e. the God-possessed souls), (are to be meditated on) thus, (i.e. as possessed of the attributes of the Lord ).”\(^1\)

**CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 21-22)**

**SŪTRA 21**

“OR NOT, ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE.”

*Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha*

But the correct conclusion is that “on account of the difference” of place, (such) a combination is “not” appropriate.

*Vedānta-kaustubha*

(The author) refutes (the above view). The names are “not” to be combined. Why? “On account of difference,” i.e. on account of the difference of place. Just as the attribute, stated of a teacher when seated, does not belong to him

\(^1\) G.B. 3.3.21, p. 147, Chap. 3.
when walking, so exactly on account of the difference of the forms of Brahman,—who is one indeed,—in consequence of His connection with those respective places, (viz. the orb of the sun and the eye), there is difference of vidyās, and as such no combination. Thus, in one case, truth is to be meditated on as connected with the locality of the sun, and here the name: "His secret name is 'Day'—this is in reference to the presiding deities" (Bṛh. 5.5.3) is appropriate. The insertion of such a name to the locality of the eye is not possible. In the other case, on the other hand, it is to be meditated on as connected with the locality of the eye, and here the name: 'His secret name is 'I'—this is in reference to the self" (Bṛh. 5.5.4) is appropriate. There can be no insertion of it to the locality of the sun. In the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, on the contrary, there is no difference of place, since the object to be meditated on is, in both the cases, situated within the heart.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 22 in his commentary. It answers the prima facie view. He reads "aviseṣāt" instead of "viseṣāt". Hence the sūtra: "Or not, (i.e. the God-possessed souls are not to be worshipped as possessed of all God-like attributes,) on account of (their) non-difference (from other souls)". That is, the God-possessed souls too are after all jivas and hence they are to be highly venerated, but not worshipped like the Lord Himself.¹

SŪTRA 22

"And (Scripture) shows."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The scriptural text, viz. "The form of this one is the very same as the form of that one" (Chānd. 1.7.5 ²), "shows" the absence of a combination of the attributes of that which is situated within the sun and that which is situated within the eye.

¹ G.B. 3.3.22, p. 147, Chap. 3.
² Ś, R, Bh.
Vedānta-kaustubha

In another place, a scriptural text concerned with transference “shows” the absence of a combination of the attributes of that which is situated in the sun and that which is situated in the eye. Thus, the scriptural text concerned with transference, viz. “The form of this one is the very same as the form of that one” (Chāṇḍ. 1.7.5) transfers the form of the Person abiding in the sun to the Person abiding in the eye. And this (text) clearly indicates the absence of a combination of attributes in such a case. If there were any combination of attributes, then the transference would have been meaningless. Hence it is established that there is no combination of the names.

Here ends the section entitled “The connection” (7).

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

He takes this sūtra as constituting a new adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the Maṇḍala-vidyā, or the meditation on the Person within the orb of the sun, in the Chāṇḍogya (Chāṇḍ. 1.6.6) and the Mahā-nārāyaṇa (Mahā. 12.2) Upaniṣads, and concludes that the two vidyās are identical, since Scripture “shows” their identity.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 23 in his commentary. He gives here a second reason why the God-possessed souls are not to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes of the Lord Himself: “And (Scripture, viz. Chāṇḍ. 7.1.1) shows”. That is, the above text shows that

1 I.e. a special transference, identifying two things, is necessary only when the two things are naturally different. E.g. a king is not, as a rule, expressly mentioned to be rich, for it is understood that all kings are naturally rich. Hence we simply say: ‘He is a king’. But we say: ‘He is a servant and rich’, for the quality of being rich does not, as a rule, belong to servants and any exception has to be expressly mentioned. Similarly, since here the form of the person within the sun and the form of the person within the eye are expressly mentioned to be identical, it is clear that there is no natural identity between them, so that no combinations of their attributes, names and so on are possible.

Nārada, a God-possessed soul, approached Sanatkumāra with a view to learning about the Supreme Soul from him. This proves that the God-possessed souls are not perfect like the Lord. Hence they cannot be worshipped as possessed of His attributes.¹

**Adhikarana 8: The section entitled “Holding together”.** (Sūtra 23)

**Sūtra 23**

“(The attributes like) holding together and pervading the heaven too (are not to be inserted in all Vidyās) and for this reason.”

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

Owing to the very same difference of places,² there is no insertion, in other vidyās, of the attributes like “holding together, pervading the heaven” and so on, laid down in the manual of the Taittirīyas³ thus: “The powers of which Brahman is the oldest, were held together. Brahman stretched out the heaven, the oldest, in the beginning” (Taitt. Br. 2.4.7, 10).⁴

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

Now (the author) is extending the above-mentioned maxim to other cases.

In the manual of the Taittirīyas, i.e. in the supplementary writings of the Rāṇāyaniyas, a mass of attributes belonging to Brahman, such as, holding the powers together, pervading the heaven and so on, is recorded in the passage: “The powers of which Brahman is the oldest, were held together. Brahman stretched out the heaven, the oldest, in the beginning. Brahman was born first among all beings.” Who then is fit to rival that Brahman?” (Taitt. Br. 2.4.7, 10). The sense is: ‘energies’—here the word ‘vīryyāḥ’ (in the masculine gender) means ‘vīryyāṇī’ (in the neuter gender)—have Brahman as their

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¹ G.B. 3.3.23, p. 148, Chap. 3.
² Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.21.
³ A school of the Yajur-veda.
⁴ Pp. 252-253. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK. Cf. Athar. V. 19.22.21, 30—same, only “Brahma-jyeṣṭhā sambhṛtā vīryyāṇī”—slightly different.
⁵ The text reads: “Rtasya Brahma prathamota jañe”. 
‘oldest’, i.e. as their chief,—that means: they are the attributes of Brahman. (They are) ‘held together’, i.e. supported, by the substratum of the attributes, (viz. Brahman),—hereby (Brahman’s attribute of) holding the powers together is designated. That chiefest Brahman stretched out the heaven,—hereby (Brahman’s attribute of) pervading the heaven is designated.

Here the doubt is as to whether these attributes of Brahman are to be inserted in the Śaṅḍilya-vidyā and the rest,—that are meditations on Brahman—enjoined in their (i.e. Rāṇāyaniyas’s) Upaniṣads, or not to be inserted, a different kind of meditation (on Brahman) as possessed of these attributes being enjoined here. On the suggestion that they are to be inserted,

We reply: Just as the two names are not combined, so the group of attributes like “holding together and pervading the heaven” and so on too is not to be combined. Why? “For this reason,” i.e. on account of the very same difference, i.e. on account of the difference of abodes. In the Śaṅḍilya-vidyās and the rest, Brahman is declared to have a small abode in the texts: “This soul of mine within the heart” (Chānd. 3.14.3, 4). Here, there (is no mention of the) attribute of occupying a place that is not small, resulting from (His) ‘pervading the heaven’, as well as of other attributes of occupying a place that is not small, such as, ‘holding together’ and the rest, resulting from (their) association with that. Hence it is established that there is a separate meditation (on Brahman) as qualified by the attributes of holding the powers together, pervading the heaven and so on.

Here ends the section entitled “Holding together” (8).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 24 in his commentary. He continues the topic that the God-possessed souls are not to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: “And (the attributes like) holding together and pervading the heaven too (are not to be combined in the meditations on the God-possessed souls) also for this reason (i.e. because they are not equal to the Lord)”.

1 G.B. 3.3.24, pp. 148-149, Chap. 3.
Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "The meditation on the Person". (Sūtra 24)

SŪTRA 24

"And even in the meditation on the person (there is no transference of attributes), on account of others being not recorded."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As "even in the meditation on the person",—recorded in the Chāndogya thus: "The person, verily, is a sacrifice" (Chānd. 3.16.1) and in the manual of the Taittirīyas thus: "For him who knows thus" (Tait. Ār. 10.64; 2 Mahānār. 25.1),—the details mentioned in one place, viz. "His twenty-four years are the morning libation" (Chānd. 3.16.1), are not recorded in another, so the vidyās are different.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Previously, in accordance with the reason (stated in Br. Su. 3. 3. 21): 'On account of difference', the meditation on (Brahman) as endowed with the attributes like holding together and so on was demonstrated to be different from the meditations on Brahman as taught by Śāndilya and others. Now, by showing the difference of the meditations on the person, (the author) is removing the doubt that in the case of meditations on the person, the meditations are identical on account of the non-difference of names and the rest.

The meditation on the person is recorded in the Chāndogya in the Rahasya-brāhmaṇa of the Tāṇḍins and the Paiṅgins thus: "The person, verily, is a sacrifice. His twenty-four years are the morning libation" (Chānd. 3.16.1), "Now the forty-four years are the mid-day libation" (Chānd. 3.16.3), "Now the forty-eight years are the third libation" (Chānd. 3.16.5) and so on. In the manuals of the Taittirīyas too, there is a meditation on the person in the first section: "For him who knows thus, the soul of the sacrifice is the sacrificer, faith his wife, his body the fuel, his breast the sacrificial altar, his body-hairs the sacrificial grass" (Tait. Ār. 10.64; Mahānār. 25.1).

Here the doubt is as to whether the meditations recorded in the two places are different or identical. If it be suggested that on account

1 R, ŚK. 2 P. 779. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.
of the non-difference of names and the rest, the meditations are the same,—(the author) states the correct conclusion: "Even in the meditation on the person". The meditations on the person are different. Why? Because "even in the meditation on the person" of the Chāndogya and the Taittirīya-manual, recorded without distinction, the attributes which are mutually different are "not recorded", i.e. not mentioned, in the other place. Thus, in the Chāndogya, the life of a person, up to his hundred and sixteen years, divided thrice, is imagined to be a libation. In the Taittirīya-manual, on the other hand, in the text: "The evening, the morning and the mid-day are the libations" (Tait. Ār. 10.64; Mahānār. 25.1), three libations are imagined, but in the Chāndogya three libations are not imagined.\(^1\) Moreover, in the Chāndogya, the desire to eat and the rest are imagined to be the purificatory ceremony and so on,\(^2\) but not in the Taittirīya-manuals. In the Chāndogya, a person is imagined to be a sacrifice thus: "The person, verily, is a sacrifice" (Chānd. 3.16.1), but his soul and the rest are not imagined to be the sacrificer and so on. In the Taittirīya-manual, on the other hand, the soul of the person is imagined to be a sacrifice and so on thus: "For him who knows thus, the soul of the sacrifice is the sacrificer" (Ait. Ār. 10.64; Mahānār. 25.1\(^3\)). Hence there is a difference of form in the two cases, since everywhere the difference of special points is the cause of the difference of meditation. There is a difference of connection with fruit as well. In the Chāndogya, to begin with, the fruit of the meditation on the person is the attainment of longevity.\(^4\) In the Taittirīya-manuals, on the other hand, the attainment of Brahman is the fruit of the meditation on the person. Thus, having set forth the meditation on Brahman in the previous section thus: "Let him unite himself with you, the great Brahman,

\(^1\) In the Chāndogya, the parts of the one and the same thing are fancifully represented as three libations; while in the Taittirīya-manuals three different things are so represented.

\(^2\) Vide Chānd. 3.16.1–5. "When he desires to eat and drink and does not enjoy himself—that is his purificatory ceremony," etc.

\(^3\) The Chāndogya stops at identifying a person with a sacrifice, but does not enter into any details. The Taittirīya-manuals differ from the Chāndogya not only in not identifying a person with a sacrifice, but also in entering into greater details.

\(^4\) Vide Chānd. 3.16.7. "He who knows this lives for hundred and sixteen years."
Om" (Tait. Ār. 10.63; 1 Mahānār. 24.2), and having stated the fruit belonging to a knower of Brahman, viz. the attainment of Brahman thus: "He attains the greatness of Brahman" (Tait. Ār. 10.63; 2 Mahānār. 24.2), the text goes on to say: "For him who knows thus, the soul of the sacrifice" (Tait. Ār. 10.64; Mahānār. 25.2) and so on. As there is a reference to the knower of Brahman by the term 'him' here, and as it (viz. the meditation on the person) is mentioned in the immediate vicinity (of the meditation on Brahman), so it is gathered that the meditation on the person here is a subsidiary part of the meditation on Brahman, and that (as such) the former has no reference to a different fruit. This being so, it is deduced that the attainment of Brahman alone is the fruit of the meditation on the person which is a subsidiary part of the meditation on Brahman. Hence it is established that as the identity of mere names, viz. 'meditation on the person' (puruga-vidyā), in the two cases, is of no great importance, the vidyās are different; that being so, there is no combination of their special features.

Here ends the section entitled "The meditation on the person" (9).

COMPARISON

Śaṁkara

He reads "Puruṣa-vidyāyāṁ iva", instead of "Puruṣa-vidyāyāṁ api", and explains the sūtra thus: "As (the record of the Tāndūrs and Paiṅgins is) in the puruṣa-vidyā, (not such is the record) of others". Conclusion reached, the same.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Like Śaṁkara he reads: "iva" in place of "api". He concludes here the topic of the worship of the God-possessed souls, viz. that they, being not equal to the Lord, are not to be meditated on as possessed of His attributes. Hence the sūtra: ("As attributes like creatorship, rulership, and so on, are declared to be belonging to the Lord) in the meditation on the person (i.e. in the Puruṣa-sūktas of the Veda) and (in the Gopāla-

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1 Pp. 774-775. 2 P. 775. 3 Ś.B. 3.3.24, p. 790.
pûrva-tâpani), (so they are) not declared (to be belonging) to others (viz. the God-possessed souls) "1

Adhikarana 10: The section entitled "Piercing and so on". (Sûtra 25)

SûTRA 25

"On account of the difference of the matter of piercing and so on."

Vedânta-pārijâta-saurabha

In meditation there is no insertion of the sacred formulæ like: "Pierce all, pierce the heart" 2, as well as of the sacrificial acts like Pravargya 3 and the rest, mentioned in the passage: "The gods, forsooth, held a sacrificial session" (Śat. Br. 14.1.1, 14) and so on. Why? "On account of the difference of the matter of piercing and so on" from meditation.

Vedânta-kaustubhâ

Now, the following question is being considered: Just as the meditation on the person is a subsidiary part of the meditation on Brahman, it being mentioned in close proximity,—so are the sacred formulæ and the sacrificial acts, to be stated below, to be inserted in the meditation on Brahman as its subsidiary parts, they, too, being mentioned in close proximity, or not?

In the beginning of their Upaniṣads, the followers of the Atharvaveda record sacred formulæ like: "Pierce all, pierce the heart, cleave the veins, cleave the head, divide into three parts" and so on. That is, O Deity! 'pierce', i.e. tear off, 'all' the limbs of my enemy. Thus, (1) 'pierce his heart', (2) 'cleave his veins', (3) 'cleave his head'. In this way, may my enemy be 'divided', i.e. disjoined, 'into three parts'.

1 G.B. 3.3.25, pp. 149-150, Chap. 3.
2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
3 Pravargya is a ceremony introductory to the Soma-sacrifice.
4 Ś, R, p. 1021, line 1.
In the beginning of the Rahasya-brähmana, the Tândins also, the singers of the Sāma, read the sacred formulæ: "O God Savitṛ! produce the sacrifice, produce" (C.M.B. 1.1.1 1).

The Śāṭyāyanin’s record: "Thou art a white horse, tawny and black".

The Kaṭhas and the Taittiriyakas record: "May Mitra give us weal, may Varuṇa" (Tait. 1.1) and so on.

The Aitareyins too record a Mahā-vrata-brähmana: "Verily, Indra became great by killing Vṛtra".

The Kausitakins too record a Mahā-vrata-brähmana thus: "Verily, Prajāpati is the whole year, his self is the Mahāvrata".

The Vājasaneyins, on the other hand, record a Pravargyya-brähmana in the beginning of their Upaniṣad thus: "Verily, the gods held a sacrificial session" (Śat. Br. 14.1.1, 1).

Here the doubt is, viz. whether the sacred formulæ and the sacrificial acts like Pravargya and the rest, mentioned in certain Vidyās, are to be comprised under those vidyās as their subsidiary parts, or not. The suggestion being: The inclusion of the sacred formulæ as well as of the sacrificial works as the subsidiary parts of meditation is proper, they being mentioned in close proximity.

We reply: There is no inclusion. Why? "On account of the difference of the matter of piercing and so on." That is, as the matter of piercing and so on, subserving certain magical practices that are different from meditation, is different from meditation, so the matter of piercing and so on, mentioned by those particular texts, are not fit to be applied to meditation. Thus, from the indication, viz. the power of the sacred formulæ to exhibit their own sense,—which is stronger than (mere) proximity 2—it is deduced that the sacred formulæ are subsidiary parts of works like magical practices, study and so on. From direct scriptural statement, which is stronger than (mere) proximity, 3—sacrificial works like Pravargya and the rest too are deduced to have an application to Jyotiṣṭoma and the like. Hence

1 Vide V.C., p. 491. This passage occurs in many other places. This text is found in many other treatises, vide e.g. Vj. Sam. 9.1 ; 11.7; 30.1; Tait. Sam. 1.7.7, 1; 4.1.1, 2, etc.

2 Vide Pū. Mi. Sū. 3.3.14.

it is established that there is no inclusion of these in those (vidyās) as the subsidiary parts of meditation.

Here ends the section entitled “Piercing and so on” (10).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 26 in his commentary. He too takes it as forming an adhikarana by itself, though concerned with an entirely different problem, viz. whether like the sweet and majestic attributes of the Lord such as bliss, omnipotence, mentioned above, His destructive and fearful attributes too such as piercing and so on, are to be meditated on, or not. The answer is given here. He supplies the word “na” here from sūtra 3.3.22 (21 in Nimbārka’s commentary). Hence the sūtra: “(One who is desirous of release should not meditate on the Lord as possessed of the attributes of piercing and so on, on account of the difference of result (of such a meditation, i.e. because such a meditation does not lead to release as the meditation on the Lord as Sweet and Majestic does)”.

Adhikaraṇa 11: The section entitled “Abandonment”. (Sūtra 26)

SūTRA 26

“But in the abandonment (of merit and demerit, the taking of them by others is to be supplied) on account of the word ‘taking’ being supplementary (to the word ‘abandoning’), as in the case of kuśa, metre, praise, and accompanying song, it has been said (in Pūrva-mīmāṃsā).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“In the abandonment,” consisting in getting rid of merits and demerits, stated in the scriptural passage: “Then the knower, having discarded merits and demerits” (Mund. 3.1.3), the taking,

1 G.B. 3.3.26, p. 151, Chap. 3.
2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
consisting in taking the merits and demerits, discarded by the knower, stated in the passage: “His sons obtain the inheritance, his friends the good deeds, his enemies the bad deeds”,¹ is included. Why? Because the word ‘taking’, mentioned in another branch, is supplementary to the word ‘abandoning’, just as the text: “The progeny of the udumbara tree”² is supplementary to the text: “The kuśas are progeny of tree”; just as the text: “The metres of the gods are the prior” is supplementary to the text: “Let one praise by the metres”; just as the text: “The sun is half-risen” (Śat. Ś.S. 9.7.19 ³) is supplementary to the text: “He assists the chanting of the gódásin ⁴ with gold ⁵”, and just as the text: “The Adhvaryyu ⁶ does not ⁷ join the singing” (Tait. Śam. 6.3.1 ⁸) is supplementary to the text: “The sacrificial priests join the singing”.⁹ Moreover, it is said by Jaimini as well: “Let it be supplementary to the text, on account of the impropriety of an option” (Pū. Mi. Sū. 10.8.15 ¹⁰).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author points out that the inclusion of a particular matter in a particular place, with which it is connected, stands to reason.

In the Upaniṣad of the Tāṇḍins, it is declared: “Shaking off evil, as a horse his hairs, shaking off the body as the moon frees itself from the mouth of Rāhu, I, with the self obtained, pass into the uncreated world of Brahman” (Chānd. 8.13.1). Similarly, it is declared by the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda: “His sons obtain the inheritance, his friends the good deeds, his enemies the bad deeds”. The Śātyāyanins read: “Then he discards good and evil deeds. His dear relatives obtain the good deeds, those not dear the evil deeds” (Kauś. 1.4).

⁴ A hymn or a formula consisting of sixteen parts.
⁵ Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
⁶ One of the four classes of priests. His special duty was to measure the ground, build the altar, prepare sacrificial vessels, etc., and he had to recite the hymns of the Yajur-veda while doing these duties.
⁷ Correct reading: Na upagāyet=should not sing.
⁸ P. 175, line 9, vol. 2. R, Bh, Śk. ⁹ R, Bh, Śk.
¹⁰ P. 631, vol. 2. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
Now, in the Upanisad of the Tândins, as well as in the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda, the abandonment of merit and demerit is declared. In the text of the Śâtyāyanins, the obtainment of merit and demerit by the dear and the not dear is declared. In the text of the Kauṣītakins, on the other hand, both are declared. This being the case, there is no room for any doubt in the case where both abandoning and taking are mentioned. Where there is the direct mention of taking only, there abandoning too is implied, since taking is impossible without (prior) abandoning. But where only abandoning is mentioned, there the following (question) is to be considered: The doubt is as to whether the taking of the abandoned merit and demerit, which taking is mentioned elsewhere, is to be inserted in the Upanisad of the Tândins and in the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda, or not. On the suggestion, viz. It is not to be inserted owing to the force of separate mention. Otherwise, the double implication (viz. abandoning and taking)—which is the result of such an insertion—being already established in the cases of the two texts of the Tândins and the followers of the Atharva-veda through such an insertion from the text of the Kauṣītakins, the mention of abandoning in those two texts must become useless.

We reply: “But in the abandonment, on account of the word ‘taking’ being supplementary”. The word “but” disposes of the (above) prima facie view. “In the abandonment,” i.e. in the text which designates abandoning only, taking is to be inserted. Why? “On account of the word ‘taking’ being supplementary,” i.e. on account of the word ‘taking’ being supplementary to the word ‘abandoning’. The sense is that in the Upanisad of the Kauṣītakins, the text designating the taking of the good and evil deeds is recorded as being supplementary to the text designating the abandoning of the good and evil deeds. Similarly here too, it is essential that the merits and demerits, abandoned by a knower, should be obtained by others.

(The author) states a number of parallel instances, illustrating

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1 Hence these two cases present no difficulty.
2 I.e. in the text of the Kauṣītakins both abandoning and taking are mentioned, while in the texts of the Tândins and the followers of the Atharva-veda only abandoning is mentioned. Now if it be said that taking is inserted from the first to the last two, then abandoning too may very well be so inserted. In that case, the mention of abandoning in the last two texts becomes meaningless.
the fact that a text, mentioned in one branch, may form the supplement of a text, mentioned in another branch, thus: “As in the case of the kuśa, metre, praise and accompanying song”. Thus, just as it being known in a general manner that the kuśas are the progeny of tree from the text of the Kauśitakins, viz. “You kuśas are the progeny of the tree, do protect me”, it is known from the specific text of the Śāṭyāyanins: “The progeny of the udumbara tree”, that the kuśas are the progeny of the udumbara tree,—this being so, the text of the Śāṭyāyanins becomes the supplement of the text of the Kauśitakins,—the construction of this (latter) text is as follows: O Kuśas! You are the progeny of the tree, protect, i.e. save me, the sacrificer;—just as no specific order of priority and posteriority of gods and demons being mentioned in the text: “Let one praise by metres”, a specific order is known from the text of the Paṅgins, viz. “The metres of the gods are prior”; just as on an enquiry into the time of chanting, which is a subsidiary part of the taking of a particular kind of pot, viz. ṣoḍaśin, the time not being known specifically from the text: “He assists the chanting of the ṣoḍaśin with gold”, the text of the Taittiriyas, designating the time specifically thus: “When the sun is half risen, he assists the chanting of the ṣoḍaśin” (Śat. Ś.S. 9.7.19) becomes the supplement of that text; and just as the prohibitive text of one branch, viz. “The Adhvaryyyu does not join the singing” (Tait. Saṃ. 6.3.1) becomes the supplement of the non-specific text of a different branch, viz. “The sacrificial priests join the singing”—so in the matter under discussion too, viz. abandoning, there is the insertion of taking.

(The author) shows that this view that general texts imply specific texts is supported by another teacher as well, thus: “It has been said”, i.e. said by Jaimini, viz. “Let it be, on the contrary, supplementary to the text, on account of the impropriety of an option. Let the injunction refer to the same place” (Pū. Mi. Sū. 10.8.15). The establishing of the double implication (viz. of abandoning and taking) in places concerned, on the other hand, should be known to be meant for the benefit of the respective readers of those (treatises). Hence it is established that “in the abandonment”, taking is inserted.

Here ends the section entitled “Abandonment” (11).
COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sutra 27 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikarana here (two sutras), concerned with an entirely different question, viz. whether the meditation on the Lord is obligatory or optional to the freed souls. He reads “Achanda” instead of “chanda”, interpreting it as ‘option’. Hence the sutra: “But on the destruction (of bondage, the released souls are under no obligation to practise meditation, because they have obtained) nearness (i.e. upāyana) (to the Lord), (and) because scriptural texts are supplementary (to this, i.e. are meant for leading the soul to this stage, viz. release), just as the singing of hymns with the kuśa (in hand) is optional (i.e. āchanda) (for a student who has finished his daily duties), it is declared (by Scripture)”.

That is, the aim of all scriptural texts is to teach men meditation so that they may attain salvation. When that end is reached, i.e. men are freed and approach the Lord, it is no longer necessary for them to go on with further meditation.¹

Adhikarana 12: The section entitled “The passing away”. (Sūtras 27-30)

SŪTRA 27

“In passing away (there is a complete abandonment of merit and demerit), on account of there being nothing to be crossed, for thus others (declare).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

At the time (of the soul’s) departure from the body, it completely abandons (its) merits and demerits. Why? Because after (its) separation from the body, there is no more experience “to be crossed” (i.e. undergone) through these two. This very thing others declare thus: “Verily, when one is bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him” (Chānd. 8.12.1 ²), “This serene being, having arisen from this body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in

¹ G.B. 3.3.27, pp. 153-154, Chap. 3.
² R.
its own form” (Chānd. 8.3.4; 8.12.3) and so on. This being so, the decay of works which has actually taken place at the time of the soul’s separation from the body, is recorded to take place after it crosses the river in the text: “He crosses that river Virājā. Then he discards good and evil deeds” (Kauś. 1.4).

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

An investigation into the abandoning of sins by a knower and taking (by others) was undertaken above. Now we shall consider the time when such an abandoning of merit and demerit takes place.

The doubt is as to whether some portions of the merits and demerits of a knower decay at the time of his separation from the final body, while some portions of these decay on the way, when, having left the body, he is moving towards the world of Brahman; or whether such an abandonment takes place only at the time of his separation from the body. Here the *prima facie* view is: Having begun thus: “Having reached the path of gods, he comes to the world of fire” (Kauś. 1.3), the Kauśītakins record: “He comes to the river Virājā, crosses it with the mind; then he discards good and evil deeds” (Kauś. 1.4). As here such an abandonment appears to take place immediately after he crosses the river, and as in the Upaniṣads of the Tāṇḍins too, viz. in the text: “Having shaken off the evils, as a horse his hair” (Chānd. 8.13.1), such an abandonment appears to take place at the time of his separation from the final body, it follows that he abandons some of his good and evil deeds at the time of his separation from the final body, and of some on the way, both these texts being (equally) authoritative:

With regard to it, we say: “In passing away”. “In passing away,” i.e. when the soul is going to the next world, viz. at the time of its departure from the body alone, a knower discards his merits and demerits. Why? “On account of there being nothing to be crossed; or no good fruit to be attained through merits, and no evil fruit to be attained through demerits subsequently to the soul’s leaving the body, there existing, subsequently to that, the fruit of vidyā alone, consisting in the attainment of Brahman’s nature.

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1 R. 2 Ś, Bh, Śk.
Thus others,” i.e. the followers of the other schools too record that subsequently to the fall of the body, there is no fruit of work to be undergone by a knower, except the attainment of the nature of Brahmân, thus: “Verily, when one is bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him” (Chând. 8.12.1), “This serene being, having arisen from this body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in his own form” (Chând. 8.3.4; 8.12.3). The decay of karmas, which has actually taken place at the time of the soul’s departure from the body, is recorded in the text of the Kausîtakins to take place immediately after it crosses the river Virajâ, thus: “He crosses the river Virajâ with the mind; then he discards good and evil deeds” (Kaus. 1.4),—this is to be understood here. Hence it is that the Tândins and the rest record that the abandonment takes place actually at the time of the soul’s separation from the body, thus: “Shaking off the evils like a horse”, etc.

COMPARISON

Śrīkanṭha

Literal interpretation same, but he takes this (and the following two sūtras) as representing the prima facie view.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. He concludes the topic, viz. whether the worship of the Lord is obligatory on the part of the freed or not. He interprets the word, “sāmparāya” as love of the Lord. ‘Samparāya’ means ‘samparayanti tattvāni yasmin’, i.e. one in whom all the truths meet, viz. the Lord, and love of the Samparāya is ‘sāmparāya’. Hence the sūtra: “When the love of the Lord (has arisen), (i.e. when the soul has become free), (it is no longer obligatory for it to practise meditation), on account of there being nothing to be crossed (i.e. there is no bondage any more), for thus others declare”.¹

¹ G.B. 3.3.28, pp. 155–158, Chap. 3.
"According to intention, on account of the non-contradiction of both."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

The friend and the enemy of a knower get respectively his merits and demerits "according to intention",—thus both become free from contradiction.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

The good and bad deeds, performed by a knower, go to others "according to intention", i.e. according to resolution, "on account of the non-contradiction of both". A causeless discarding, by parts, of his own deeds to others is inconsistent on the part of a knower who is impartial; and a causeless appropriating of the good and bad deeds, performed by others, too, is inconsistent on the part of any one. One who acting in a friendly manner, wishes the knower good, obtains the merits of the knower for that very reason. But one, who acting in an unfriendly manner, wishes the knower ill, obtains the demerits of the knower for that very reason. Thus, if the good and evil deeds go (to the friend and the enemy) in accordance with their intentions, the discarding and the appropriating come to be free from contradiction. So Smṛti declares: "The sin of one who is being cursed goes to one who is cursing". It has been said by the reverend Manu as well: "Having left his good deeds to his dear relatives, and his bad deeds to those not dear, he Brahman, the eternal, through the path of meditation" (Nhis separatis)

**COMPARISON**

Śaṅkara

Interpretation different: "(The soul may attain knowledge) according to (its) liking (only so long as it has a body); (our view is preferable) on account of the non-contradiction of both". That is, a disembodied soul cannot evidently undergo the requisites and so on for attaining knowledge, but an embodied being alone can do so according to its own liking. Hence, if the works of a knower still persist after the fall of his body, it will not be possible for him

1 P. 225.
to get rid of them ever, seeing that it will not be possible for him, a disembodied soul, to acquire any further knowledge. Further, if knowledge be the cause of the destruction of works, as soon as the knower attains knowledge, all his works must decay at once. Scripture also declares so. Hence our view is preferable, since it avoids a two-fold contradiction—viz. makes knowledge the direct cause of the destruction of works and does not contradict Scripture.¹

Rāmānuja

Interpretation different. He here explains the Kauśitaki-text (Kauś. 1.4) which seems to go against the view that the soul leaves all its works at the time of leaving the body. Hence the śūtra: "(The different parts of the text are to be arranged) at will, on account of the non-contradiction of both (viz. reason and Scripture)". That is, as it has been established on the ground of reason as well as Scripture that the soul leaves all its works at the time of its departure from the body, in order that these two—reason and Scripture—be not contradicted, the parts of the Kauśitaki-text are to be re-arranged to suit the above conclusion, i.e. the part: 'He then discards good and evil deeds' is to be put before the part: 'Having attained the path of gods, he comes to the world of fire'.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

Literal interpretation same, but the fundamental difference is that he takes it to be laying down the *prima facie* view.

Baladeva

This is śūtra 29 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two śūtras), concerned with showing the two ways of meditating on the Lord. Hence the śūtra: "(Either of the two modes of meditation, viz. on God, the sweet or on God, the Majestic, leads to salvation) through the will (of the Lord), since there is no conflict between the two, (i.e. there are texts to both effects and the devotee may choose either of them)".³ The word "no" is to be supplied from śūtra 3.3.22.

¹ Ś.B. 3.3.28, p. 806. ² Śr. B. 3.3.28, p. 298, Part 2. ³ G.B. 3.3.29, pp. 158-159, Chap. 3.
SŪTRA 29

"There is meaning of the going (of the soul) in a two-fold way (i.e. only if it discards both demerit and merit), for otherwise there is contradiction."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"There is meaning of the going" through the cessation, without distinction, of good and evil deeds. If the good deeds follow (the soul), then immediately after the enjoyment of their fruits, there must follow recurrence of births.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection: It is not appropriate to hold that at the time of the soul's separation from the body, it discards its good deeds (as well), as that may lead to undesirable results,—(the author) says:

"In a two-fold way," i.e. through the cessation of both good and evil deeds at the time of the soul's separation from the body, "there is meaning of the going", i.e. the soul comes to attain its end immediately after the fall of the body. Otherwise, if it be admitted that bad deeds alone are discarded, and that good deeds—which are non-distinct (from the bad deeds in this respect)—are exhausted through the enjoyment of their fruits, the scriptural text: "His friends attain his good deeds" will be contradicted, as well as the going,—this is the sense. Further, there being recurrence of births at the completion of enjoyment, the scriptural text laying down (the soul's) non-return will also come to be contradicted, viz. the text: "Those proceeding by this path return not to human existence" (Chānd. 4.15.6). It cannot be said that he (i.e. the knower) does not go by it, since there is no mention in Scripture of the soul's going through a different path. If it be said that the fruit of vidyā would be permanent,—(we reply:) there will be uncertainty of the fruit.1

1 I.e. if it be urged that although the fruits of the good deeds of the knower, accompanying him, may entitle him to return, yet the fruit of his vidyā, which also accompanies him and which is permanent, entitles him to non-return—we point out that in that case, what exactly is going to be the fate of the knower, return or non-return, remains uncertain and ambiguous.
COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Interpretation entirely different. He begins a new adhikaraṇa. In some texts, the soul is said to go through the path of gods after having discarded merits and demerits; but in some texts, it is simply said to discard its merits and demerits. Hence the problem is whether the soul has to travel always through the path of gods for attaining Brahman. The answer is that there is no such necessity. The journey through the path of gods is not necessary for one who has attained identity with Brahman here and now. Hence the sūtra: "There is meaning of the going in two ways, (i.e. it is necessary in certain cases, not necessary in others), otherwise there is contradiction (of texts))."¹

Rāmānuja

He takes this sūtra as laying down the prima facie view, thus: "There is meaning of the (soul's) going in two ways, (i.e. only on the hypothesis that it discards a part of its merit and so on at the time of leaving the body and the rest on its way), for otherwise there is contradiction". That is, if he is to discard all its merits and demerits at the time of its departure from the body, its subtle body too must be destroyed simultaneously. In that case, no going through the path of the gods will be possible on its part, a mere disembodied soul.²

Nimbarka raises the problem and solves it in the next sūtra, as we shall see.

Śrīkaṇṭha

He inverts the order of this and the next sūtra. Thus:—

Nimbārka and others

"Gaterarthava-vattvam . . . . " (sūtra 29).

"Upapannas tal-lakṣaṇārtho . . . . " (sūtra 29).

"Upapannas tallakṣaṇārtho . . . . . " (sūtra 30).

Śrīkaṇṭha

"Gaterarthava-vattvam . . . . "

"Upapannas tal-lakṣaṇārtho . . . . " (sūtra 29).

"Gaterarthava-vattvam . . . . " (sūtra 30).

Interpretation too different, viz.:

Sūtra 29.—"Upapannas tal-lakṣaṇārtho . . . . ": Here he concludes the prima facie view, viz. that the soul discards all its

¹ Ś.B. 3.3.29, pp. 803-804.
² Śrī. B. 3.3.29, p. 299, Part 2, Madras ed.
merits and demerits at the time of leaving the body. He interprets it exactly after Nimbārka\(^1\) (sūtra 30 in Nimbārka’s commentary), the fundamental difference being that while Nimbārka takes it to be stating the correct conclusion, Śrikanṭha takes it to be stating the *prima facie* view only.

*Sūtra 30.*—“Gater artha-vattvam . . . . “: He takes it to be stating the correct conclusion against the *prima facie* view stated above in three sūtras, thus: “There is meaning of the going in two ways, (i.e. only on the hypothesis that the soul discards a part of its merits and so on, i.e. karmas, at the time of its departure from the body, and the rest after crossing the river Viraja), for otherwise there is contradiction”. That is, if all the karmas of the soul are destroyed completely at the time of its departure from the body, it will become freed immediately and it would not be necessary for it to travel through the path of gods, attain Brahman, and then be freed. Hence the texts which designate the soul’s travelling through the path of gods to attain Brahman and release will come to be contradicted. Further, if the soul becomes freed as soon as it leaves the body, the texts which designate that the soul attains its real form only on approaching Brahman too will come to be contradicted. In order to avoid the contradiction of these two kinds of texts, it must be held that all the karmas of the soul do not decay completely as soon as it leaves the body. The fact is that though the vidyā of the soul leads it to travel through the path of gods, yet as actual release is not obtained until one directly approaches Brahman, some remainders of karmas still cling to the soul until it crosses the sphere of matter and actually attains the Lord.\(^2\)

**Baladeva**

This is sūtra 30 in his commentary. Here he concludes the section about the two paths of meditation. Hence the sūtra: “There is meaning of the path in two ways, (i.e. both the paths, viz. meditation on God, the sweet, and meditation on God, the majestic, have the power to lead to the Lord), for otherwise there is contradiction (i.e.

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1. ŠK. B. 3.3.29, pp. 332-333, Parts 10 and 11.
2. ŠK. B. 3.3.30, pp. 333-334, Parts 10 and 11.
the texts which designate both of them to be leading to the Lord will be contradicted). 1

SŪTRA 30

"(The going of the soul is) appropriate, on account of finding things which are marks of that, (viz. connection with the body), as in ordinary life."

Vedānta-pārljāta-saurabha

In spite of the decay of all the karmas of a worshipper of Brahman at the time of his separation from the body, the path (i.e. his going through the path of gods) is "appropriate". Why? "On account of finding things which are marks" of connection with the body and the rest, in the passages: "Having attained the form of supreme light, he is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.3.4 2), "He roams about there, laughing, playing and enjoying" (Chānd. 7.25.1 3) and so on,—just as a royal servant attains mundane ends. The sense is that in spite of the decay of all works and of the gross body, he continues to retain the subtle body, through the power of vidyā, in order that he may go to a distinguished place. Immediately after his separation from that, the knower, having attained the form mentioned in Scripture, comes to attain the nature of Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. if it be admitted that there is the decay of all works at the time of the soul’s leaving the body, there must be the destruction of the subtle body too at the same time. This being so, the path defined as the path of gods is "inappropriate",—(the author) says:

In spite of the decay of all the works of a knower at the time of his leaving the body, the path of gods is "appropriate". Why? "On account of finding things which are marks of that," i.e. on account of finding things that indicate that even a knower whose good and evil deeds have decayed and whose real form has become manifest has connection with body and the rest. The things

1 G.B. 3.3.30, p. 160, Chap. 3.
2 R, ĪK.
3 R.
which are marks of his connection with the body and so on, not brought about by karmas, is found in the following scriptural texts: “Stainless, he attained the highest equality” (Mund. 3.1.3), “Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form” (Chând. 8.3.4; 8.12.3), “He roams about there, laughing, playing, enjoying” (Chând. 8.12.3), “He becomes a self-ruler, he comes to wander at will in all the worlds” (Chând. 7.25.1), “He becomes one-fold, he becomes three-fold” (Chând. 7.26.2) and so on. That is, just as in ordinary life, a royal servant attains his ends through the grace of the king, though he himself is unable to accomplish them through his own efforts, so through the grace of the Highest Person, the knower obtains a supremely wonderful body and so on, not brought about by karmas. The intention is this: when through the influences of vidyā, the knower, whose karmas have decayed, comes to attain a wonderful body and the rest,—not brought about by karmas,—why should not vidyā, for the sake of bestowing its own fruit, viz. the attainment of Brahman, cause the subtle body to persist through its own power in order to enable him to go through the path of gods, even on the complete decay of all karmas and of the gross body which is the means of enjoying pleasures and pain? The sense is this: The subtle body continues up to the soul’s reaching the river Viraja, and immediately after that merges in the cause (viz. Brahman). This (the author) will state under the aphorism: “Those in the Highest, for so (Scripture) says” (Br. Sû. 4.2.14). Hence it is established that there is the decay of all karmas at the time of the soul’s separation from the final body.

Here ends the section entitled “The passing away” (12).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Interpretation absolutely different,—viz. “(The view that the going through the path of gods holds good in some cases only and not universally is) appropriate, on account of finding a purpose characterized thereby (i.e. a purpose for going)”’. That is, only those who meditate on the qualified Brahman go through the path of gods to attain Brahman, for in their case only, such a going has any meaning
and purpose, viz. the attainment of certain results, to be reached only through going to different places, as declared by Scripture (e.g. Kaus. 1.5-1.6). But in the case of the knowers, there is no necessity for such a going, since they attain identity with Brahman here and now immediately after the removal of the veil of nescience.

Rāmānuja

Here he answers the prima facie view stated under the previous aphorism. Similar to Nimbārka's interpretation, though the interpretation of the words "upapanna" and "lokavat" different, thus: "(The view that there is the complete decay of all works at the time of the soul's separation from the body is) appropriate, on account of finding things which are marks of that, (i.e. soul's connection with the body), as in ordinary life". That is, just as a pond, dug at first for the purpose of irrigation of fields, continues to exist and be used by people for other purposes, such as, supplying drinking water and the like, even when its original purpose has been served, i.e. just as the effect, viz. the pond, continues to exist when its cause, viz. the purpose of irrigation, is no more, so the subtle body, the effect, continues to exist for serving a purpose, viz. the attainment of Brahman, other than its original purpose, viz. the undergoing of karmas, even when the karmas, its causes, are no more.

Bhāskara

He interprets the sūtra thus: "(The teaching about the going of the soul is) appropriate, on account of finding a purpose characterized by that (viz. a purpose for the going), as in ordinary life". That is, in Scripture (Kaus. 1.5-1.6) we find that the soul enters into conversation with the Kāryya-Brahman and this is not possible unless it travels through the path of light and so on. This also shows that it is accompanied by the subtle body, since in ordinary experience we find that only those who are endowed with sense-organs can enter into conversations. This subtle body disappears only when the soul attains the Supreme Brahman through the Kāryya-Brahman.

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1 Ś.B. 3.3.30, p. 804.
2 Śrī B. 3.3.30, p. 299, Part 2.
3 Bh. B. 3.3.30.
Srikantha

For Śrikantha interpretation, see under the previous sūtra. This is sūtra 29 in his commentary.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. He takes it as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with indicating which of the two paths of meditation—viz. meditation on God, the sweet and meditation on God, the majestic—is the higher. Hence the sūtra: “(The devotee who meditates on God, the sweet) has attained superiority (‘upapanna’) on account of obtaining an object having that characteristic (viz. the Lord who is devoted to such a devotee), as in ordinary life”. That is, just as a person through his love and loyalty for the king brings him under his control, i.e. pleases him, so the devotee who meditates on the Lord as the sweet brings the Lord under his control, i.e. wins over his favour.¹

Thus, according to Nimbārka, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara, there is a complete decay of the karmas of a knower at the time of his departure from the body, while according to Śrīkaṇṭha, there is the decay of some works then, the rest coming to decay when the soul has crossed over the river Virajā. Baladeva does not raise the problem at all.

Again, while Nimbārka, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha hold that the going through the path of gods is obligatory for all knowers, Śaṅkara holds that it is obligatory only for those who meditate on the qualified Brahman, but never for those who know the non-qualified Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa 13: The section entitled "Non-restriction". (Sūtra 31)

SŪTRA 31

"(There is) no restriction (with regard to the going through the path of gods, but it belongs) to all (the worshippers of Brahman), (there is) non-contradiction on account of word (i.e. Scripture) and inference (i.e. Smṛti)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is "no restriction" that the going which is mentioned in the Upakosala-vidyā, Pañcāgni-vidyā and so on belongs only to those who are possessed of those vidyās; but it belongs "to all" the worshippers of Brahman. Thus, if the going be common to all, then (alone) there is "non-contradiction" of Scripture and Smṛti, viz. "Those who know this and those who worship faith and truth in the forest, pass over to light" (Bṛh. 6.2.15), "Fire, light, day, bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun,—departing through these, the knowers of Brahman go to Brahman" (Gita 8.24) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Previously, it has been stated that the going has a meaning only if there be the cessation of both good and bad deeds at the time of the decay of the gross body. Now, the question is being considered whether all those who possess Brahma-vidyā are entitled to such a supremely excellent journey, or only those who possess the vidyās in which it is mentioned.

1 Vide footnote 1, p. 640.
2 Vide footnote 2, p. 640.
3 Ś, R, Bh, Šk.
4 R, Šk.
The path beginning with light is mentioned in certain vidyās, such as, Upakosala-vidyā, Pañcāgni-vidyā, Dahara-vidyā, and so on, but is not mentioned in the Madhu-vidyā, Śāndilya-

1 Upakosala-vidyā or the knowledge obtained by Upakosala, the disciple of Satyakāma Jābala. Vide Chānd. 4.10–4.15. The story begins thus: Upakosala Kāmalāyana dwelt with Satyakāma Jābala as a student of sacred knowledge, and for twelve years he tended the fires. But his teacher did not allow him to return home, nor did he teach him the knowledge of Brahman, but went off on a journey. Thereupon, Upakosala, filled with grief, began to fast. At this the three fires, Gārhapatya, Anvāhāryya and Āhavaniya took pity on him and each taught him the Agni-vidyā and the Atma-vidyā, and told him that the teacher would teach him the path. When the teacher returned, he proceeded to instruct Upakosala further thus: “That Person who is seen within the eye is the soul, that is the immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman” (Chānd. 4.15.1).—“Now, whether they perform cremation obsequies in the case of such a person, (i.e. who knows this vidyā), or not, they (i.e. the dead) pass over to light, from light to the day, from day to the fortnight of the waxing moon, from the fortnight of the waxing moon to the six months of the northern progress of the sun, from those months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, from the moon to lightning”. Chānd. 4.15.5. Vide V.K. 1.2.13.

2 Pañcāgni-vidyā or the doctrine of the five fires, taught to Gautama by King Pravāhana. Vide Brh. 6.2; Chānd. 5.4–5.10. For detailed account see V.K. 3.1.1.

3 Dahara-vidyā or the doctrine of the Small, i.e. the doctrine that the Universal Soul is within the heart of man. Vide Chānd. 8.1–8.6; Mahānār. 10.7. The doctrine begins thus: “Now, what is here in this city of Brahman is a small lotus-chamber, small is the ether within that. What is within that should be searched for, that certainly is what one should desire to understand” (Chānd. 8.1.1), and ends: “Now, as a great extending highway goes to two villages, this one and the yonder, even so these rays of the sun go to two worlds, this one and the yonder. They extend from the yonder sun and enter into these veins. They extend from the veins and enter into the yonder sun” (Chānd. 8.6.2). “But when he thus departs from the body, then he ascends upwards through those very rays of the sun. With the thought ‘Om’, forsooth, he passes up. As quickly as one could direct one’s mind to it, he goes to the sun. That, certainly, is the door to the world (of Brahman), an entrance for knowers, a stopping for non-knowers” (Chānd. 8.6.5). Vide V.K. 1.3.14–23; 3.3.38.

4 Madhu-vidyā or the doctrine of the honey, i.e. the doctrine of the co-relativeity of all things, cosmic and personal, and the immanence of the soul, taught to the two Aśvinis by Dādhyātīc Āṭhavarṇa. Vide Brh. 2.5.6–19. It begins: “This earth is the honey for all creatures and all creatures are honey for this earth. This shining immortal Person who is in this earth, and with reference to the self, this shining immortal Person who is in the embodied soul,—he, indeed, is this Soul, this Immortal, this ALL” (Brh. 2.5.1) and goes on with
vidyā, Vaiśāṇara-vidyā and the rest. Hence the doubt is as to whether the path belongs only to those who are possessed of the Upakosala-vidyā and the rest, or to all those who possess the Brahma-vidyā. With regard to it, the prima facie view is as follows: It is proper that the path should belong only to those who are possessed of the vidyās in which it is mentioned, on account of the force of the general subject-matter, and not to others,—so is the restriction.

With regard to it, we reply: "No restriction", i.e. there is no restriction that the path belongs only to those who possess the vidyās in which it is mentioned, but this path is open to all those who possess Brahma-vidyā.

If it be objected that in that case, there will result contradiction with the general subject-matter, we say: "non-contradiction", since the general subject-matter is set aside by text. Whence is this known? "From word and inference," i.e. from Scripture and Smṛti, viz. from the scriptural texts: "Those who know this thus and those who worship faith and truth in the forest, they pass over to light" (Brh. 6.2.15) and so on; and from the Smṛti passage: "Fire, light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun,—departing through these those who know Brahman go to Brahman" (Gitā 8.24) and so on. Here having stated that those who are devoted to the five fires and who know this heaven-world and the similar designs of water, fire, air, the sun, the quarters, the moon, lightning thunder, space, law, truth, mankind, and soul.

There is a different Madhu-vidyā, or the representation of the sun as the honey extracted from all the Vedas in the Chāndogya (Chānd. 3.1-3.11). For detailed account, vide V.K. 1.3.33, footnote 1, p. 335.

1 Śūndilya-vidyā or the doctrine taught by Śūndilya. Vide Brh. 5.6; Śat. Br. 10.6.3; Chānd. 3.14. For detailed account vide V.K. 3.3.19.

2 Vaiśāṇara-vidyā or the doctrine of the Universal Soul taught to six Brāhmaṇas, Prācināśāla and the rest, by King Aśvapati, vide Chānd. 5.11-5.18. The story begins: Six great house-holders, Prācināśāla and the rest assembled and pondered: "Who is our Soul? Who is Brahman?" Unable to decide, they approached Uddālaka Ārūṇi with a view to learning about the Vaiśāṇara Ātman or the Universal Soul from him. The latter directed them to King Aśvapati. Aśvapati asked each of the six: "Whom do you reverence as the Universal Soul?" They successively answered: the heaven, the sun, the wind, the ether, water and the earth. Thereupon Aśvapati taught them that the Universal Soul is not thus separate, i.e. either the heaven, or the sun, etc., but is the Universal Being, comprehending everything. Vide V.K. 1.2.25; 3.3.55.

3 Vide Pū. Mt. Sū. 3.3.14.
rest as fire pass over to light, Scripture goes on to say in the text: "And those who in forest" (Brh. 7.2.15) that those too who meditate with faith on the true Brahman, celebrated in another scriptural text: "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite" (Tait. 2.1), pass over to light. In this manner, truly, the path is attained by all those who possess Brahma-vidyā, as by those who possess the Pañcāgni-vidyā. Hence it is ascertained that the general subject-matter is set aside by the texts, designating such a journey through the path of light, which are of a greater force. Similarly, by Smṛti as well the journey of all worshippers of Brahman through this path alone is established. Hence it is established that the path beginning with light, which is indeed met with in all the vidyās, is (only) re-mentioned (in the Upakosala-vidyā) and so on.

Here ends the section entitled "Non-restriction" (13).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He reads "sarvasām" (feminine gender) instead of "sarvesam" (masculine gender), and interprets the sūtra thus: "(There is) no restriction (with regard to the going through path of light, but it is valid) for all (the saguna-vidyās or meditations on the qualified Brahman), (there is) non-contradiction on account of work and inference". Thus, literally he interprets the sūtra like Nimbārka, but while he speaks here of saguna-vidyās only, which, according to him, do not directly lead to release, Nimbārka does not do so.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They revert the order of this sūtra and the next thus:—

Nimbārka and others

"Aniyamaḥ . . . ." (sūtra 31).
"Yāvadhiṅkāram . . . ." (sūtra 32).

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

"Yāvadhiṅkāram . . . ." (sūtra 31).
"Aniyamaḥ . . . ." (sūtra 32)

1 Ś.B. 3.3.31, p. 805.
Interpretation same, only Rāmānuja does not take śūtra 31 (śūtra 32 according to Nimbārka) as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, but includes it under the section entitled “The Passing Away” (section 12 according to Nimbārka). He, however, takes 32 (śūtra 31 according to Nimbārka) as forming a section by itself, like Nimbārka. Śrīkanṭha takes each of these two śūtras as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, like Nimbārka.

Baladeva

This is śūtra 32 in his commentary. He too begins a new adhikaraṇa here, but concerned with an entirely different topic. He reads “avirodhāt” instead of “avirodhaḥ”. Thus: “(There is) no rule (that meditation, muttering prayers, singing the name of the Lord and the rest are to be performed conjointly always as a means to salvation, since any one of them may singly lead to salvation), since there is no contradiction of all (texts), on account of word and inference”.

Adhikaraṇa 14: The section entitled “So long as the office lasts”. (Śūtra 32)

Sūtra 32

“Of those who are entrusted with (certain) office, there is abiding so long as the office lasts.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurābha

Of Vaśiṣṭha and the rest, on the other hand, “there is abiding so long as the office lasts”, owing to the influence of the works of which their office is the result.

Vedānta-kaustubha

(The author) is now refuting the following objection:

The argument stated above, viz. that through the power of knowledge there result the decay of all the karmas of a knower at the time of his separation from the body, and the (consequent) attainment (by him)

1 G.B. 3.3.32, pp. 164-165, Chap. 3.
of a distinguished place through the path beginning with light, is not justifiable, since it is found that even great sages like Vaśiṣṭha and the rest, (though) possessed of knowledge, were re-born and experienced pleasures and pains. The re-birth of Vaśiṣṭha from a pitcher is well-known.¹ How he experienced grief is declared by Smṛti thus: "He devoured Vaśiṣṭha's hundred sons, Śakti and his younger brothers, as an infuriated lion devours a small deer. On hearing that his sons had been killed by Viśvāmitra, Vaśiṣṭha bore that grief as the great mountain bears the world. He, the best of the sages, planned to destroy himself, but never did the greatest among the wise think of destroying Kauśika (i.e. Viśvāmitra). The holy sage threw himself down from the peak of the Meru. From the mountain he fell down on its stones as on a heap of cotton. When he did not die from that fall, O Pāṇḍava, His Holiness entered a blazing-fire in a great forest. Then, though well-lit, the fire did not burn him. Seeing the sea, the great sage, afflicted with grief, fastened a heavy stone around his neck and dropped into the water. (But) the great sage was placed on the land by the current of the sea-waves. Then, depressed, he, went once more towards his own hermitage" (Mahā. 1. 6737–6744 ²). How he experienced happiness, too, is declared by Smṛti thus: "And he was followed to his hermitage by his daughter-in-law, named Adṛśyanti. Then by chance he heard from behind the sound of the study of the Veda, complete in meaning and ornamented with the six subsidiary parts. 'Who is following me?' he asked then. 'I, Adṛśyanti,' replied his daughter-in-law, Śakti's wife, highly virtuous, endowed with austerities and leading a religious life. 'Daughter, from whom is coming the sound of the study of the Veda with its subsidiary parts? Formerly, the Veda with its subsidiary parts was heard by me from Śakti alone.' 'In my womb has been born, O sage, the offspring of your son Śakti, who repeated the Vedas here for twelve years.' Told thus by her, the sage Vaśiṣṭha, the highest, highly pleased, saying: 'I have an offspring', refrained, O Pārtha, from dying" (Mahā. 1.67556–6760 ³).

(Reply:) "Of those who are entrusted with (certain) office", i.e. of Vaśiṣṭha and the rest, who owing to certain karmas, have been

¹ Vide Rg.V. 7.33.13, p. 26.
² Pp. 244-245, vol. 1.
³ P. 245, lines 14–19, vol. 1.
entrusted with offices like composing the Veda and so on, “there is abiding so long as the office lasts”, owing to the non-cessation of the works which have already begun to bear fruits and which brought about the office. Hence, in their case too, when through retributive enjoyment, the works which have begun to bear fruits and which brought about the office become exhausted; and when the office (thereby) comes to an end, there result the decay of all works at the time of their separation from the final body and the (subsequent) attainment (by them) of the path beginning with light.

Here ends the section entitled “So long as the office lasts” (14).

Adhikarana 15: The section entitled “The conception of the Imperishable”. (Sūtras 33-34)

SŪTRA 33

“But there is the comprehension (in all Brahma-vidyās) of the conceptions of the Imperishable, on account of generality and on account of being that, as in the case of what belongs to the Upasad, that has been said.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There should be the inclusion, under all meditations on Brahman, of the conceptions of non-grossness and the rest, connected with the Imperishable, stated in the text: “That, verily, O Gārgī, the Brāhmaṇas call the Imperishable, non-gross, non-atomic, non-short” (Brh. 3.8.8 1). Why? Because everywhere the Imperishable, viz. Brahman, the chief, is the same; and because those attributes of non-grossness and the rest form essential parts of an investigation into His real nature; just as in the Jāmadagnya-ahīna 2 sacrifice, in which the Upasad 3 offerings are to consist of puraḍāś 4, the sacred formula read

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1 Ś, R, Bh, Šk, B.
2 A sacrifice lasting four days, called ‘Jāmadagnya’ because offered by Jāmadagni. Vide Tait. Saṁ. 7.1.9. See V.K. 3.3.33.
3 Name of a ceremony lasting several days and forming part of the Jyotisṭoma sacrifice.
4 A puraḍāś is a sacrificial cake of ground rice, usually divided into pieces and offered in one or more cups (or kapāha).
in the Sāma-veda, viz.: "May the fire promote the sacrifice" (Tāṇḍ. Br. 21.10.11) and so on, is recited in the low accent of the Yajur-veda.

"That has been said," viz.: "If there be opposition between the subsidiary and the primary, there is connection of the Veda with the primary, because of the subserviency of that, (i.e. of the subsidiary to the primary)". (Pū. Mi. Sū. 3.3.9.2)

Vedānta-kaustubha

By the statement (made above) that the knowers abide (in this world) until the completion of their offices, it is indicated that the departure of such men also from the universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is under the control of the Highest Person alone, different from the universe. Now (the author) points out that the attributes of non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest of that very Highest Person,—the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, the controller of the sentient and the non-sentient, different in nature from the whole group of non-sentient objects which are seen to be possessed of grossness and from the group of sentient beings which are declared by Scripture to be atomic, and an ocean of natural, eternal and infinite mass of attributes,—are to be meditated on by the knower in all the meditations on Him.

In the Brhadāraṇyaka, the answer given to Gārgī by Yājñavalkya is recorded thus: ‘"That, verily, O Gārgī, the Brāhmaṇas call the Imperishable, non-gross, non-atomic, non-short, non-long, not red, not fluid, without shadow, without darkness, without air, without space, unassociated, tasteless, odourless, without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without breadth, without

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1 P. 625, vol. 2. Ś, R, Bh, ŠK, B.
2 P. 280. Ś, R, Bh, ŠK.

The sense is that when the primary and the subsidiary belong to two different Vedas, the Vedic characteristic of the subsidiary is to be determined by the primary, because the subsidiary is subservient to the primary, i.e. because the performer takes up the performance of the subsidiary solely for the purpose of making the primary complete in all details. Vide Śab. B. on Pū. Mi. Sū. 3.3.9, pp. 280-281. Hence here the Sāma-veda mantras, instead of being recited in the loud accent of the Sāma-veda, are to be recited in the low accent of the Yajur-veda, since they form subordinate parts of a Yajur-vedic sacrifice, viz. Jāmadagnya-ahīna.
happiness, without measure, without inside and without outside. It consumes nothing whatsoever.  

Verily, O Gārgī, at the command of this Imperishable the sun and the moon stand held apart”’ (Brh. 3.8.8-9). In the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda too beginning: “Now, the higher is that whereby the Imperishable is apprehended” (Mund. 1.1.5), it is said: “That which is invisible, intangible, without family, without caste, without eye, without ear, without hands and feet” (Mund. 1.1.6).

Here the doubt is, whether the attributes, viz. non-grossness, non-atomicity, invisibility, intangibility and the rest, which belong to Brahman, denoted by the word ‘Imperishable’, which are mentioned in the Brhadāranyaka and the text of the followers of the Atharva-veda, and which establish the difference of Brahman from the sentient and the non-sentient,—are to be inserted in all the meditations on Brahman or not. On the suggestion, viz. that they are not to be inserted, there being no purpose for that,—

(We reply:) There is a purpose. In those meditations on Brahman too, it is Brahman, different from the sentient and the non-sentient, that is the object to be attained by the attainers,—so says (the author): “But there is the comprehension of the conceptions of the Imperishable”. “The Imperishable” is Brahman. There should be the “comprehension”, i.e. inclusion, of the “conceptions” of non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest also, connected with Him, in all the meditations on Brahman, in order that we may understand

1 Correct quotation: “amukham” (=without mouth) and not “asukham”. Vide Brh. 3.3.8, p. 169.

2 Vide the dialogue between Gārgī and Yājñavalkya, Brh. 3.8. Gārgī put two questions to Yājñavalkya: First: “That which is above the sky, that which is beneath the earth, that which is between these two, sky and earth, that which people call the past, the present and the future,—across what is that woven, warp and woof?” (Brh. 3.8.4). Answer: “That, O Gārgī, the Brāhmaṇas call the Imperishable”, etc.

3 Vide Mund. 1.1. Brahmā taught this knowledge of Brahman to his eldest son Atharva, who taught it to Aṅgir, who taught it to Bhāradvaja Satyavrāha, who taught it to Aṅgiras. Then, Śaunaka, a great householder approached Aṅgiras with the question: “Sir! Through knowing which everything else becomes known?” (Mund. 1.1.3). Thereupon Aṅgiras proceeded to teach him two kinds of knowledge, higher (or parā) and lower (or aparā). The lower so is the knowledge of the four Vedas with their subsidiary parts, the higher is the knowledge whereby the Imperishable is apprehended.
His real nature as different from the sentient and the non-sentient. That His essential attributes, like bliss and the rest, are to be so included has been stated under the aphorism: "Bliss and the rest belonging to the chief" (Br. Sū. 3.3.11). Similarly, in order that the illusory notion that His bliss is similar to other kinds of blisses may be set at naught, it is proper that the attributes of non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest should be included everywhere. Why? "On account of generality and on account of being that"; that is, because in all meditations on Brahman, the real nature of the object to be meditated on, which is different from the sentient and the non-sentient and is the object to be attained, remains the same; also because those attributes of non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest form essential parts of an investigation into the nature of the Chief, as they follow Him.

An instance illustrating that the attributes (or the secondary matters) follow the chief (or the primary matter) is given in the phrase: "As in the case of what belongs to the Upasad". That is, just as in the Jāmadagnya-ahīna sacrifice, in which the upasad offerings are to consist of purāḍās, enjoined in the text: "Jāmadagni, desiring prosperity, sacrificed with the four-nightly rite. . . . 2 The sacrificial cakes become the upasad offerings" (Tait. Saṃ. 7.1.9 3), the sacred formulae read in the Sāma-veda, like "May the fire promote the sacrifice" (Tānd. Br. 7.1.9) and so on, are recited by the Adhvaryu in the low accent of the Yajur-veda, as they follow the principal matter. "That has been said", i.e. said by Jaimini, viz. "If there be opposition between the subsidiary and the primary, because of the subserviency of that (viz. of the subsidiary to the primary)". (Pū. Mi. Sū. 3.3.9.)

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1 That is, to know a thing is to know its peculiar attributes which distinguish it from other objects. Now, bliss and the rest do not constitute the exclusive attributes of Brahman, since they are the attributes of the individual souls as well. Hence in order that the bliss and so on of Brahman may not be confused with the bliss and the rest of the individual soul, it is necessary to include in all meditations on Brahman the further attributes of non-grossness, non-atomicity and the rest, which belong to Brahman exclusively, over and above the attributes of bliss and so on.

2 Omitted portion: "He prospered therein and the two descendants of Jāmadagni are not found to be grey-haired. He who knowing thus offers the four-nightly rite comes to have that prosperity".

3 P. 251, line 17, vol. 2.
COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation of “sāṁanya-tad-bhāvābhyām” different, viz. “On account of the equality (i.e. because all texts equally establish Brahman as such, i.e. as different from the Universe) and on account of that object (viz. Brahman, being the object of all texts)”.

SŪTRA 34

“So much (i.e. only these attributes) (are to be included everywhere), on account of reflection.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since Brahman, the best of all, is meditated on through (i.e. as possessed of) bliss and the rest, characterized by non-grossness and so on, bliss and the rest are to be included everywhere. Other attributes like having all works and the like, though following the Chief (viz. Brahman) are to be comprised (only) where mentioned.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. In accordance with the stated maxim, it follows that there is the inclusion everywhere of those attributes as well, which are stated in the scriptural text: “Having all works, having all odours, having all tastes” (Chānd. 3.14.2, 4), as they too follow the Chief—(the author) says: “So much”, i.e. bliss and the rest, characterized by non-grossness and so on, are included in all the meditations on Brahman. Why? “On account of reflection”; that is, “the reflection” on Brahman, different from the

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1 Š.B. 3.3.33, p. 811; Bh. B. 3.3.33, p. 188.
2 Viz. that attributes or secondary matters follow their substratum or the primary matter.
3 Which differentiate such bliss, etc. from ordinary bliss, etc. of the individual souls.
sentient and the non-sentient, is preceded by the differentiation of Him from others by means of the group of attributes like bliss and the rest, characterized by non-grossness and so on,—on account of such a reflection on Him, i.e. meditation on Him with thought directed toward Him. (The attributes like) having all works and so on, though following the chief, are suitable in those place alone where they are mentioned, there being no special purpose for their inclusion everywhere. Hence it is established that ‘there is the comprehension of the conceptions of the Imperishable’ (Br. Su. 3.3.33).

Here ends the section entitled “The conception of the Imperishable”.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Bhāskara reads “iṣat”. They take this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the two passages in the Śvetāsvatara-upaniṣad (Śvet. 4.6) and in the Katha-upaniṣad (Katha. 3.1) refer to the same vidyā. The answer is that they are the same “on account of so much (viz. the number two) being recorded”. That is, in both the passages the Lord and the individual soul are designated as the objects to be known. As such, both constitute the same vidyā.¹

Baladeva

Interpretation same, only the interpretation of the word “āmananāt” different, viz. “On account of scriptural declaration ².

¹ Ś.B. 3.3.34, pp. 814; Bh. B. 3.3.34, p. 188.
² G.B. 3.3.35.
Adhikarana 16: The section entitled “Being within”. (Sūtras 35-37)

SŪTRA 35

“If it be objected that (the former reply which describes the self as) within (speaks) of one’s own self as possessed of the group of elements, otherwise (there is) unaccountableness of difference, (we reply:) no, as in the case of another teaching.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: In the Brhadāranyaka, to the question of Usasta, viz. “He who is Brahman manifest and not visible, he who is the soul within all, explain him to me” (Brh. 3.4.1), the answer given was: “He who breathes in with the in-breath is your soul which is within all” (Brh. 3.4.1.2). Here, the phrase: “He is your soul, which is within all”, teaches something “within”, i.e. teaches the individual soul as within the body and the rest, it alone being the cause of breathing in and breathing out. In the very same manner, to the question of Kahola, viz. “He who alone is Brahman, manifest and not invisible, he who is the soul within all, explain him to me” (Brh. 2.5.1.8), the answer given was: “He who passes beyond hunger and thirst, beyond grief, delusion, old age, death” (Brh. 3.5.1.4). Here, on the other hand, the text teaches the Highest Self,—as such the vidyās are different, otherwise the difference of the answers is unaccountable,—

(We reply:) “No”, since in both the cases, the questions and the answers refer to the Primary Being alone (viz. Brahman). Just as in the Sad-vidyā,5 it is found that with a view to demonstrating

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1 Ś, R, Śk.
2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
3 R, Śk.
4 Ś, Bh, Śk.
5 Sad-vidyā or the doctrine of the Existent or the True, taught to Śvetaketu by Ārūṇi, vide Chând. 6 (whole).

The story begins: Śvetaketu became a student of sacred knowledge at the request of his father Ārūṇi, and after having studied the Vedas for twelve years, returned home, conceited, thinking himself very learned. Thereupon his father asked him whether he had asked for the instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known. As Śvetaketu
the particular attributes of Brahman, there is repetition of the question:
‘"Sir, you yourself tell me that"' (Chānd. 6.1.7), ‘"Sir, inform me once more"' (Chand. 6.5.4; 6.6.5, etc.), as well as of the answer: ‘"That which is the finest essence,—all this has that for its soul"' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), so here too the repetition of question and answer—with a view to demonstrating that the object to be known passes beyond hunger and so on—is appropriate.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

In the previous section, concerned with the inclusion of the attributes of non-grossness and the rest, it has been shown that the object to be known is different from other objects. With a view to confirming this, (the author), by showing now the identity of vidyās in the two texts to be mentioned hereafter, refutes the illusory notion that there are two realities as the thing to be known.

In the Brhadāranyaka, Usasta asked Yājñavalkya: ‘"He who is Brahman, manifest and not invisible, he who is the soul within all, explain him to me"' (Brh. 3.4.1). The reply to it was: ‘"He who breathes in with the in-breath is your soul which is within all. He who breathes out with the out-breath is your soul which is within all"' (Brh. 3.4.1) and so on. Likewise, in the immediately following section, to the question of Kahola, viz. ‘"He alone who is Brahman, manifest and not invisible, he who is the self within all, explain him to me"' (Brh. 3.5.1), the answer was the following, beginning: ‘"He who passes beyond hunger and thirst, beyond grief, delusion, old age, death,—forsooth having known such a self, the Brāhmaṇas give up the desire for sons, desire for wealth"', ending: ‘"Aught else is wretched"' (Brh. 3.5.1).

Here, the doubt is as to whether the questions and answers in the two cases refer to two vidyās or to one. Here (the author) having propounded the *prima facie* view, rejects it thus: ‘If it be objected was not acquainted with that doctrine Āruni taught him how from the knowledge of the cause, all its effects can be known. Next he proceeded to teach him process of creation from the Sat. (Chānd. 6.2–6.7). Finally, he taught him the great doctrine of "Thou art that" in various ways (Chānd. 6.8–6.16). Each time Śvetaketu asked to be taught once more (altogether nine times) and in answer Āruni taught him each time by means of a new illustration.

1 R. 2 Ś, R. 3 Ś, R.
that (the former reply which describes the self as) within (speaks) of one's own self possessed of the group of elements, otherwise there is unaccountableness of difference, (we reply:) no''. If it be objected: The reply, viz. '“He who breaths in with the in-breath”' (Brh. 3.4.1), given to the question of Usasta, viz. '“He who is the self within all”' (Brh. 3.4.1), and referring to something “within”, should be known to be referring to “one's own self possessed of the group of elements”, i.e. to the individual soul, since the individual soul being the inner soul of all, viz. of the body, the sense-organs, the mind, the intellect and so on, can appropriately be the inner soul of all. Consequently, the question of Kahola and the answer to it refer to the Highest Self, the primary inner soul, since the Highest Self alone is devoid of hunger and the rest. Thus owing to the difference of form, the questions and answers refer to two vidyās. "Otherwise," i.e. if the vidyās be taken to be identical on the ground that the questions and answers refer to the Highest Self in both cases, the difference of the answers is unaccountable,—

(We reply:) "no", i.e. there is no difference of vidyās, as the two sets of questions and answers refer to the same form, viz. to the Highest Self (equally). Thus, to begin with, the question of Usasta, viz. ‘“He who is manifest and not invisible Brahman, he who is the soul within all, explain him to me”’ (Brh. 3.4.1) does indeed refer to the Highest Self alone. It means: Reverend Yājñavalkya, he who is Brahman, explain him to me. I am not asking about Brahman, consisting in His own power (viz. pradhāna, which may also be called Brahman) simply because of its connection with great attributes like existence and the rest.2 With this idea he said: ‘Explain Brahman who is not invisible and who is the soul’.3 The individual soul too is Brahman because of its connection with the attribute of knowledge.4 I am not

1 I.e. possessed of the body, etc., which are products of the elements.
2 I.e. the word ‘Brahman’, meaning ‘one possessed of greatness’, may figuratively denote pradhāna too owing to its connection with great attributes. That a thing, though not great by nature, may yet be designated as great because of having great attributes, is shown under V.K. 2.3.28.
3 Pradhāna is not ‘not invisible’, i.e. its evolutes are visible to all, while the Lord is so to the freed only. Again, pradhāna is not ‘soul’, which the Lord is. Hence these two epithets show that the word ‘Brahman’ does not mean here pradhāna, but the Lord alone.
4 The individual soul, though atomic by nature, is said to be great because of having great attributes. Vide V.K. 2.3.28.
asking about Brahman having such a mark. With this idea, he said, 'Explain Brahman who is manifest, who is the soul within all'.

But such a Brahman is none but the cause of the world, having the stated marks, called the Highest Person. Thus it is known that the question is concerned with the Supreme Brahman, in accordance with the following scriptural and Smṛti texts: "The controller of matter and soul, the Lord of the properties of matter" (Svet. 6.16), "He is your soul, the inner controller" (Bṛh. 3.7.3–23), "Entered within, the ruler of men" (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2), "He who abiding within the earth is other than the earth" (Bṛh. 3.7.3), "He who abiding within the soul is other than the soul" (Ṣat. Br. 14, 6.7.30), "I transcend the perishable and am higher than even the imperishable. Hence I am celebrated in the world and in the Veda as the Highest Person" (Gītā 15.18), "He who sees me everywhere" (Gītā 6.30), "And I am situated in the heart of all" (Gītā 15.15) and so on.

The answer, viz. "He who breathes in with the in-breath" (Bṛh. 3.4.1) too refers to the Highest Person alone, since the Highest alone is the primary agent of in-breathing, in accordance with the scriptural text: "For who would live, who would breathe, if there were not this bliss in the ether" (Tait. 2.7).

That the last set of question and answer refers to the Highest Self is admitted by the prima facie view as well.

There is repetition of question and answer for the sake of demonstrating that the Highest Person, the cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures, is beyond hunger and so on. (The author) states a parallel instance: "As in the case of another teaching". That is, just as under the same Śad-vidyā, which begins: '"You are proud. Did you ask for that teaching"' (Chāṇḍ. 6.1.2), there is repetition of the question thus: '"But you yourself, Sir, tell me that"' (Chāṇḍ. 6.1.7), '"Sir, inform me once more"' (Chāṇḍ. 6.5.4, etc.); and repetition of the answer as well, thus: '"That which is the finest essence—all this has that for its soul"' (Chāṇḍ. 6.8.7, etc.)—with a

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1 The individual is not 'manifest' Brahman, i.e. it is not directly and actually Brahman, but only figuratively, while the Lord is Brahman or great directly. Again, the individual soul is not the 'soul within all', which the Lord is. Hence these two epithets show that the word 'Brahman' here does not mean the individual soul, but the Lord alone.

2 P. 181.

3 P. 1074.
view to demonstrating particular attributes in particular cases of one and the same object to be known,—so is the case here.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

He breaks the sūtra into two separate sūtras thus:

“Antarā bhūta-grāma-vat svātmanah” (sūtra 35).

“Anyathā bhedānupapattir iti cen nopadesāntara-vat” (sūtra 36).

Import and the conclusion reached are the same, only the literal interpretation different. Thus, while according to Nimbārka the whole portion “Antarā—bhedānupapatti” constitutes the prima facie view, according to Śaṅkara, the portion “Antarā—svātmanah” does not state the prima facie view, but the view of the author, while the portion “Anyathā bhedānupapattir” alone states the prima facie view. Thus he interprets the portion: “Antarā—svātmanah” (sūtra 35 in his commentary) as follows.—“(Both the texts speak) of one’s own self (viz. the Lord) (to be) within all, (hence these two selves must be identical, otherwise the inner soul must become relative) as in the case (of the body composed of the) group of elements”. That is, both the Brhadāraṇyaka passages speak of a self which is within all. Now if these two selves be different, we have to say that there are two selves within all. But in that case neither can be said to be the inner being absolutely, but only relatively, just as none of the five elements which constitute the body can be said to be within another—i.e. water within the earth and so on—absolutely or solely, but only relatively so. Hence to avoid this conclusion we must hold that the two selves are identical, i.e. the two passages refer to the same vidyā.

Śaṅkara gives an alternative explanation of the phrase: “bhūta-grāma-vat”, viz. “as (another scriptural passage, viz. Śvet. 6.11 declares the one self to be within all) the group of (beings)”. Hence here also, there must be only one self within all. This proves the identity of the two selves and the consequent identity of vidyās.¹

Sūtra 36.—Like Nimbārka’s interpretation.

¹ Ś.B. 3.3.35, pp. 814-815.
Bhāskara

Interpretation diametrically opposed. He interprets the first part of the sūtra like Śaṅkara, but arrives at a directly opposite conclusion. Thus, like Nimbārka, according to him also the portion “ Antarā—bhedānupapatti” constitutes the prima facie view, the rest the reply. Hence the prima facie view: “(The two passages in the Brhadāraṇyaka refer to the same self, for on this view alone the self which is designated as) within (can be the absolute inner self and not relatively only), otherwise (the self would be) like the group of elements none of which can be said to be within another absolutely). (Hence there is) inappropriateness of difference, (i.e. the two passages refer to the same self)”.

Correct conclusion: “No, as in the case of the difference (‘antarā’) of teaching”. That is, just as there are two different teachings here, so the objects taught by them too must be different. Or, an alternative explanation: “No, as in the case of another (‘antarā’) teaching”. That is, just as in the Chāndogya the nine repetitions of the dictum: ‘Thou art that’ show that in every version the object established is different, so here.1

Baladeva

He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras exactly after Śaṅkara. Interpretation absolutely different. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (three sūtras) concerned with the topic of the identity between the Lord and His city. Thus:

Sūtra 36.—“Within (the city of the Lord, viz. Saṃvyoma or the great Ether), (things appear) like (things in) an elemental city (“bhūtagrāma-vat”) (i.e. in an ordinary city) (to the vision) of His own (i.e. to the devotees chosen by the Lord).” That is, in the city of the Lord, everything being a manifestation of the Lord is but the Lord Himself, but they look like material objects to His devotees.2

Sūtra 37.—“If it be objected that otherwise (i.e. on the view that there is no difference between the Lord and His city), there is inappropriateness of difference (between the dweller and the residence), (we reply:), no, as in the case of another teaching.” That is,

1 Bh. B. 3.3.35, p. 189.
2 G.B. 3.3.36, p. 174, Chap. 3. “Yatratyam vastu-jātam sarvam brahmātmakam api prthivyādi-nirmita-vat sphurati.”
just as another text (Tait. 2.1) declares the Lord to be both bliss and blissful, the attribute and the substratum of attributes, so the Lord is both the dweller and the residence, i.e. is identical with His city, yet dwells in the city. Everything is possible in His case.¹

SŪTRA 36

“(There must be) exchange (of ideas), for (the two texts) specify (the same Brahman), as in another case.”

Vedānta-parijāta-saurabha

An investigation into the Highest, distinguished from the individual soul as the cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures, is to be made by Kahola as by Usasta. Similarly, an investigation into Him, distinguished from the individual soul as beyond hunger and so on, is to be made by Usasta as by Kahola. Thus, there is a mutual exchange of investigations. This being so, Brahman becomes distinguished from the individual soul. Hence the answers given by Yājñavalkya “specify”, in both cases, the same soul of all as the object to be worshipped, just as in the Sad-vidyā all the answers specify the same Brahman, the Existent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Let it be that in both the cases the questions and the answers refer to the Primary Inner Soul of all. Still, the vidyās do not become identical, a difference between them being possible by reason of the fact that in the prior section the Primary Inner Soul, characterized by the attribute of being the cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures, is of one form as an object to be known by Usasta; while in the subsequent section, the Primary Inner Soul, characterized by the attribute of being beyond hunger and so on, is of another form as an object to be known by Kahola,—(the author) says:

¹ G.B. 3.3.37, p. 175, Chap. 3.
There is "exchange", i.e. inter-change, of the attributes of being the cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures and being beyond hunger and so on. The object to be known by Usasta too is the one Supreme Brahman, differentiated from the sentient by the two distinguishing attributes. Similarly, the object to be known by Kahola too is the same Brahman, "for", with a view to making it known that the Highest Person, the soul of all and the object to be worshipped, is different from the individual soul, endowed with the attributes of occupying a small place and so on,—the answers given by Yājñavalkya "specify", i.e. demonstrate, Brahman as different from the individual soul by defining His attributes of being the cause of the breathing of all breathing creatures and being beyond hunger and so on. "As in another case." That is, just as in another case, viz. in the case in the Sad-vidyā, by the repeated answers, establishing diverse attributes, the same Brahman is specified as the object to be known, but by reason of this difference of attributes, He Himself does not become different, in those cases, as an object to be worshipped,—so is the case here.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is śūtra 37 in Śaṅkara’s commentary.

They take this śūtra to be constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the Aitareya and Jābāla texts: "I am he, he is I" (Ait. Ār. 2.2.4, 6), "You are I, I am you" mean only that the individual soul is the Lord; or both that the individual soul is the Lord and the Lord is the individual soul. The Prima facie view is that here the transposition is to be understood in one way only, viz. that the individual soul is the Lord,—since the lower can become the higher,—but never that the Lord too is the individual soul, since the Lord can never become the individual soul. The answer is: "(The texts designate) exchange (i.e. mutual transposition of the ideas of the individual soul and the Lord), for (they) specify (this exchange expressly), as in other cases". That is, in the texts, we must not only understand the individual soul to be the Lord, but vice versa as well, seeing that the texts expressly say not only "I am he", but also "He is I". If the transposition were meant to be understood in one way alone, they would have stopped by
saying “I am he”. What the above passages aim at enjoining is the meditation on the unity of the soul. Hence just as other texts record the attributes of being the soul of all and so on for the purpose of meditation, so the above texts record a mutual transposition of the ideas of ‘I’ and ‘He’ for the same purpose.1

Baladeva

This is śūtra 38 in his commentary.

Here he concludes the topic of the identity between the Lord and His city. Hence the śūtra: “For (texts like Brh. 1.4.15) specify (that an) interchange (is possible between the Lord and His city), like other (texts, e.g. Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī, etc.)”. That is, the City of Brahman is identical with Brahman Himself, hence an exchange is possible between them, and the former is equally adorable like the latter.2

SŪTRA 37

“For he alone (is the object of meditations in all the versions), the true and the rest (are inserted in all the versions).”

Vedānta-pārljāta-saurabhā

“He alone” who is denoted by the term ‘true’, and is mentioned in the texts: “That divinity thought” (Chānd. 6.3.2 3), “Light (merges) in the highest divinity” (Chānd. 6.8.6 4), is repeated in the versions, such as: “Just as, my dear, the bees prepare the honey” (Chānd. 6.9.1 5) and so on. The very same (attributes of being) “the true and the rest”, mentioned in the first version thus: “Everything has that for its self, that is true” (Chānd. 6.8.7 6), are inserted in all other versions.

Vedānta-kaustubhā

To the objection, viz. In the Sad-vidyā too, there being a repetition of question and answer, how is it ascertained that the object to be meditated on is the same?—(the author) says:

1 Ś.B. 3.3.37, pp. 816-817; Bh. B. 3.3.36 (written as 3.3.37), p. 189.
2 G.B. 3.3.38, p. 176, Chap. ५, “Paramātmāiva loko lokaḥ paramātmeti.”
3 R, ŠK.
4 R.
5 R.
6 R, ŠK.
“For he alone,” i.e. the Highest Divinity alone, denoted by the term ‘existent’ and referred to in the passages: “That divinity thought” (Chänd. 6.3.2), “Light (merges) in the Highest Divinity” (Chänd. 6.8.6), is repeated in the versions: “Just as, my dear, the bees prepare the honey” (Chänd. 6.9.1) and so on. The very same attributes of being “the true” and so on, mentioned in the first version: “All this has that for its soul, that is true” (Chänd. 6.8.7), are inserted in all the other versions. Hence in the Sad-vidyā, the object to be worshipped is the same indeed. Thus it is established that in both the cases the questions and the answers are concerned with the same vidyā.

Here ends the section entitled “Being within” (16).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 38 in Śaṃkara’s commentary. They take this sūtra too as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the two Sad-vidyās (in Brh. 5.4 and Brh. 5.5) constitute the same vidyā or two different vidyās. The answer is that they are the same vidyā. They read “sā” (meaning vidyā) instead of “sa” (meaning the Lord). Hence the sūtra: “For that (viz. the same Sad-vidyā) alone (is recorded by the two texts), (hence the attributes of) truth and so on (are to be comprehended in one act of meditation)”.1

Śrīkaṇṭha

He takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation same.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 39 in his commentary. He takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with proving that the attributes of the Lord are not unreal. Like Śaṃkara and Bhāskara, he reads “sā” (meaning the parā-sakti of the Lord). Hence the sūtra: “She (viz. the parā-sakti of the Lord) alone is truth and the rest”. That is, the attributes of the Lord like truth, omniscience

1 Š.B. 3.3.38, pp. 817-819; Bh. B. 3.3.37 (written as 3.3.38), p. 190.
and so on, are the modifications of the parāsakti or the svarūpa-sakti of the Lord. Hence they are real, constituting the essential nature of the Lord, and not illusory.¹

Adhikaraṇa 17: The section entitled “Desire”. (Sūtras 38-40)

Sūtra 38

“(The attributes of having true) desire and so on (are to be inserted) elsewhere (i.e. in the Brhadāraṇyaka) and there (i.e. in the Chāndogya), on account of abode and so on.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the Chāndogya, in the text beginning: “Now, that which is within this city of Brahman is a small lotus-chamber. Small is the ether within that. What is within that should be searched out” (Chānd. 8.1.1 ²) and continuing: “This soul is free from sins” (Chānd. 8.1.5 ³), it is declared that the Highest Self, possessed of the attributes of having true “desire and so on” is the object to be worshipped. And in the Vājasaneyaka, in the text: “He, verily, is the great, unborn self, who is this one consisting of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who lies in the ether within the heart, the controller of all, the Lord of all” (Brh. 4.4.22 ⁴), it is declared that the Highest Self, possessed of the attributes of being the controller and so on, is the object to be worshipped. Here the vidyās are identical. Hence the attributes of having true desires and the rest are to be included in the Vājasaneyaka, and those of being the controller and so on in the Chāndogya. Why? On account of the non-difference of abode and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, (the author) points out that when owing to the non-difference of forms, the vidyās, mentioned in even different treatises, are not different, how much more it is the case that the vidyās, demonstrated by two sections of the same treatise, are not different owing to the non-difference of forms.

¹ G.B. 3.3.39, pp. 177-178, Chap. 3.
² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.
³ Ś.
⁴ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.
Having designated the Highest Self by the term 'ether' in the passage: "Now, that which is within this city of Brahman is a small lotus-chamber, small is the ether within that. What is within that should be searched for" (Chānd. 8.1.1), the Chandogas go on to mention His special characteristics by means of eight attributes, thus: "This soul is free from sins, without old age, without death, without grief, without hunger, without thirst, having true desires, having true resolves" (Chānd. 8.1.5).

Having stated: "He, verily, is the great, unborn self, who is this one consisting of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who lies in the ether within the heart" (Brh. 4.4.22), the Vājasaneyins too go on to mention His special characteristics by means of the attributes of being a controller and so on, thus: "The controller of all, the ruler of all" (Brh. 4.4.22).

Here the doubt is, viz. whether the vidyās of the Chandogas and the Vājasaneyins are different, or whether they are identical. On the suggestion, viz. In the one case, the object to be meditated on is the Highest Self, denoted by the term 'ether' and possessed of the attributes of freedom from sins and so on; while in the other case, the object to be meditated on is one who abides within a special kind of ether and is possessed of the attributes of being a controller and so on. This being so, owing to the difference of forms, there results difference of the objects to be known, and hence the vidyās differ,—

We reply: The vidyās are identical, owing to the non-difference of forms. So says (the author): "Desire and the rest". "Desire and the rest," i.e. the group of attributes like having true desires and so on, mentioned in the Chāndogya text: "Free from sins" (Chānd. 8.1.5) and so on, is to be inserted "elsewhere", i.e. in the Vājasaneya. "And here," i.e. and in the Chāndogya, the group of attributes like being the controller and so on, mentioned in the Vājasaneya text, is to be inserted. This being so, the form is not different; that being so, there is identity of the objects to be meditated on and hence the vidyās are identical.

(The author) states the reasons for this mutual insertion of attributes: "On account of abode and so on", i.e. on account of the non-difference, in both the cases, of the abode, viz. the heart; ¹ of the

¹ Vide Chānd. 8.1.1; Brh. 4.4.22. See the quotations above.
designation of Brahman, the object to be meditated on, as a bridge;¹ and of the connection with the fruit, viz. the attainment of Brahman, mentioned in the passages: “Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form” (Chānd. 8.4.4), “He becomes the fearless Brahman” (Chānd. 4.4.25).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

This is sūtra 39 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. He begins by explaining the sūtra exactly like Nimbārka, viz. that there is identity of the vidyās here and hence the attributes are to be mutually combined. But in conclusion he adds that there is, however, a difference between the two passages, viz. that the Chāndogya text refers to the qualified Brahman, the Brhadāraṇyaka text to the highest Brahman.²

Śrīkanṭha

He reads: “Kāmādayas tatra tatra”. Interpretation same, only while Nimbārka speaks of only two Upaniṣads, he speaks of three, viz. Chāndogya, Brhadāraṇyaka and Māhā-nārāyaṇa (Mahānār. 10.7), and points out that all these three passages refer to the same vidyā.³ He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 40 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras) concerned with Śrī, the eternal consort of the Lord. According to him, the words ‘sā eva’ are to be supplied here from the preceding sūtra. Hence the sūtra: “She (viz. the para-sakti of the Lord) alone (is Śrī), (who creates all) objects of desire and so on elsewhere (i.e. in the material world) and here (i.e. in the city of the Lord or Saṃvyoma), (for the Lord) since (she is) all-pervading (“āya”),

¹ Vide Chānd. 8.4.1; Brh. 4.4.22.
² Ś.B. 3.3.38, p. 820, “Ayam tu atra vidyate viśeṣaḥ, saṅgūḥ hi Brahma-vidyā Chāndogye Upadiśyate, . . . Vājasaneyake tu nirgūṇam eva param Brah- mopadiśyamānaṁ dṛśyate”.
³ ŚK. 3.3.38, p. 350, Parts 10 and 11.
spreading out ("tana") (bliss and release for the devotees) and so on.¹

SŪTRA 39

"ON ACCOUNT OF CARE, THERE IS NON-OMISSION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no negation of the attributes of having true desires and so on, recorded "carefully", since the negation: "There is no plurality here" (Brh. 4.4.19; Kāṭha 4.11 ²) refers to the things not having Brahman for their essence.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It may be objected: The statement, made above, that the group of attributes like ‘being the controller’ and so on, mentioned in the Vājasaneyaka, is to be inserted in the Chāndogya, is not justifiable. In accordance with the text under discussion, viz. “It is to be perceived by the mind alone. There is no plurality here, He gets death after death who perceives here apparent plurality. It is to be looked upon as a unity alone,—this unknowable being” (Brh. 4.4.19-20), as well as in accordance with the subsequent text: “This soul is not this, not this” (Brh. 4.4.22), we arrive at the conclusion that the Highest is free from distinctions. Hence it is known that like grossness, atomicity and so on, the group of attributes like ‘being the controller’ and so on, is something to be negated. Hence, it should be known that in the Chāndogya too, the group of attributes like having true desires and so on, is something to be negated. This being so, such an absence of attributes is to be included in all the meditations subserving final release.—To this (the author) says:

There is “non-omission”, i.e. non-denial, of the attributes of the Highest Brahman, like ‘having true desires’ and so on and ‘being the controller’ and so on, which are incapable of being denied and are taught “carefully” as something new in the texts: “What is within that should be searched for” (Chānd. 8.1.1), “This soul is free from sins, without old age, without death, without grief, without hunger, without thirst, having true desires, having true resolves”

¹ G.B. 3.3.40, pp. 182–184, Chap. 3.
² R.
(Chând. 8.1.5), "Those who go, having found here the soul and the true desires, come to have free movement in all the worlds" (Chând. 8.1.6), "The controller of all, the ruler of all" (Brh. 4.4.22; 5.6.1), "He is the Lord of all, he is the ruler of all beings, he is the protector of all beings" (Brh. 4.4.22), "He is the separating dam for keeping these worlds apart" (Brh. 4.4.22) and so on. On the contrary, they are to be inserted, there being no authority for their denial.

The scriptural text: "There is no plurality here" (Brh. 4.4.19; Katâ 4.11) states, on the other hand, that in Brahman, who is the cause of the world, who is different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient and who has the stated marks, there is no 'plurality', i.e. there are no objects which, not having their existence and activity dependent on Him are dependent on one another only. Since everything has Brahman for its essence, 'he who perceives here apparent plurality', not having Brahman for his essence, 'gets death after death'. He is to be 'looked upon as a unity alone', since all things have Brahman for their essence, and since there is nothing which does not have Brahman for its essence. This is what the text designates, but it does not prove that the real attributes of Brahman are to be denied.

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṁkara and Bhâskara**

This is sutra 40 in Śaṁkara’s commentary. They begin a new adhikarana here (two sutras), concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. whether the Prâñâgni-hotra or the offering of the first food to the vital-breaths, enjoined in the Chândogya (Chând. 5.19.1), is to be omitted when eating itself is omitted or not. This sutra states the *prima facie* view, viz. that there is no omission of the offering to the vital-breath even when there is the omission of eating, but it has to be performed by means of water in place of food, since the Jâbâla version of the same vidyâ (viz. Vaiśvânara-vidyâ) shows great respect for this ceremony of Prâñâgni-hotra.

**Śrîkaṇṭha**

He takes it to be an adhikarana by itself, and interprets it in a sectarian way. The question is whether the form of the Lord as having a blue neck (Nila-kaṇṭha), having Umâ by His side and having attributes like true desires and so on is something to be negated
or not. The *prima facie* view is that having parts like a blue neck and so on involves increase and decrease and hence it is not possible on the part of Brahman, the immutable. Therefore, the attributes of having a blue neck, having Umā by the side and so on, are not His real attributes, but are simply imagined for the sake of meditation and are, as such, subject to negation sometime or other. The answer is: "There is no negation (of the attributes having a blue neck, three eyes, Umā by the side and so on), since (they are designated in Scripture) with (great) care". That is, the Lord (viz. Śiva) is to be meditated on always as having a blue neck and so on and as accompanied by Umā,—which are His real attributes—for such a meditation alone leads to release.¹

Baladeva

This is sūtra 41 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic of Śrī, viz. her identity with the parā-śakti of the Lord. The problem is that if Śrī be identical with the parā-śakti of the Lord, then she must be identical with the Lord Himself, since the parā-śakti of the Lord is identical with Him. In that case, however, she cannot be devoted to the Lord, since none can be devoted to one's own self. The answer is: "On account of (her great) regard (for the Lord), there is non-cessation (of her devotion for Him)". That is, Śrī, though one with the Lord, cannot but love and be devoted to Him who is her very existence, just as the branch cannot but love the tree, or the ray the moon.²

**SŪTRA 40**

"When one has approached (the Lord, he comes to have freedom of movement), for this reason, on account of statement to that effect."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

When one has attained Brahman by means of meditating on Him who has the stated marks, one comes to have freedom of movement in

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¹ ŚK. B. 3.3.39, pp. 354-355, Parts 10 and 11.
² G.B. 3.3.41, p. 185, Chap. 3. "Satyapya bhede vicitra-gunaratnākaratvena sva-mūlatvena ca śriyāḥ paraśmin ādarāt tad bhaktār lopāḥ. Na khalu-vyākṣam anādriyamānā śākhāstī, na candram tatprabhā."
all the worlds. If it be objected: How can one have freedom of movement everywhere unless one first aspires to attain those particular worlds and then practises the means leading to them?—We reply: “For this reason”, i.e. on account of this very reason of attaining (the Lord), in accordance with the statement: “Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form” (Chând. 8.3.4), “He becomes a self-ruler” (Chând. 7.2.2), “He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds” (Chând. 7.25.2).

Vedânta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. In the texts: “Now, those who depart having the self here and these true desires come to have freedom of movement in all the worlds. If he comes to desire the world of fathers” (Chând. 8.2.1) and so on, it is declared that even by those who desire salvation, the worlds common to those who desire enjoyment are attained. This being so, what difference is there between devotion to works and devotion to knowledge?—(the author) says:

“When one has approached,” i.e. when the knower, freed from all connection with matter in its causal and effected states, has come to attain the nature of Brahman, he attains freedom of movement in all the worlds. Why? “For this reason” alone, i.e. on account of the very reason of attaining the nature of Brahman. The sense is this: Just as a man, desirous of universal sovereignty, having given up the objects of enjoyment, common to all men, as well as the means thereto, attains universal sovereignty through the means thereto, and afterwards for just that reason, comes to have freedom of movement among the objects of enjoyment that are common to all men, as well among those that are difficult to be attained by them,—though not desired by him,—so the knower, having given up all enjoyments, here or hereafter, as well as the means thereto, attains the nature of the Lord through the hearing, thinking, meditation, worship and so on of Him; and for that very reason of attaining His nature, comes to have freedom of movement everywhere. Whence is this known? To this (the author) replies: “From statement to that effect”, i.e. from the statement, everywhere, of a knower’s having freedom of movement, such as

“Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form” (Chānd. 8.3.4; 8.12.3), “He is the excellent person. He roams about there laughing, playing, enjoying with women, or with carriages, or with relatives, not remembering the appendage of this body” (Chānd. 8.12.3), “He becomes a self-ruler. He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds” (Chānd. 7.25.2), “As to the perfection of means to the four ends of men,—without it a man, whose refuge is Nārāyaṇa, attains them”, and so on. Thus, there is a great difference between devotion to works and devotion to knowledge. Hence it is established that through the mutual insertion of the attributes of having true desires and so on and of being the controller and the rest, the Brahma-vidyās of the Chandogas and of the Vājasaneyins are the very same.

Here ends the section entitled “Desire” (17).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is śūtra 41 in Śaṅkara’s commentary. Here they answer the prima facie view stated in the previous śūtra, thus: “When (eating is actually) taking place, (then alone an offering to the vital-breaths is to be made) from that (1.९. from the first food), on account of statement to the effect”. ¹

Śrīkanṭha

He takes it to be forming an adhikarāṇa by itself. Interpretation different. The question is whether the freed attain the very nature of Brahman, as possessed of infinite auspicious attributes, and so on, or something else. The prima facie view is that Brahman is declared to be free from distinctions or nirviśeṣa. Hence the freed souls attain this distinctionless form of Brahman. The answer is: “When one has approached (Brahman, one attains the nature of Brahman as possessed of all auspicious attributes), for that reason (i.e. because the freed soul attains its own form), (and) because of texts to that effect (i.e. that the freed become similar to the Lord)”. ²

¹ Ś.B. 3.3.41, pp. 822-824; Bh. B. 3.3.40 (written as 3.3.41), pp. 191-192.
² ŚK. B. 3.3.40, pp. 356-357, Parts 10 and 11.
This is śūtra 42 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic of the identity of Śrī with the para-sakti of the Lord and hence with the Lord Himself. The contention is that if Śrī be identical with the Lord, then no erotic sentiment is possible between them, since any such sentiment is possible only if there be a difference between the lover and the beloved. The answer is: “(Śrī being the highest of the females and the Lord being the best of the males, an erotic sentiment naturally arises between them) when (they) have approached (each other), hence (such a sentiment is possible on the part of the Lord), on account of statement to that effect”. 1

Adhikaraṇa 18: The section entitled “Non-restriction with regard to the specifying of that”. (Śūtra 412)

ŚŪTRA 41

“(There is) non-restriction with regard to the specifying of that, on account of that being seen, for the fruit (viz.) non-obstruction is ‘different’.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is “non-restriction” (i.e. no fixed rule) that the meditations that are founded on the subordinate parts of sacrificial acts and are mentioned in texts like: “Let one meditate on the syllable ‘Om’ as the udgītha” (Chānd. 1.1.13) and so on (are to be included) in those acts. Why? Because in the scriptural text: “Both perform with it, he who knows this thus and he who does not know thus” (Chānd. 1.1.10 4), such a non-restriction is found. As we learn from Scripture that even a non-worshipper is a performer of sacrificial works through the praṇava, a subsidiary part of sacrificial works, so it is ascertained that there is no restriction with regard to the act of meditation. And hence that the fruit of meditation is “different” from the fruit of work is known from the passage: “What only one does with

1 G.B. 3.3.42, p. 186, Chap. 3.
2 This topic is resumed in Br. Śū. 3.3.59-64.
3 Ś, R, Bh.
4 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.
knowledge, with faith, with the mystic doctrine,—that only becomes more potent” (Chând. 1.1.10).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been shown at the end of the previous section that there is a great difference between meditation and work, since the former is the cause of a knower’s (attaining) freedom of movement and a supreme place. Now (the author) is showing the superiority of meditation to work, on the ground of the superiority of the fruit of the meditations, founded on the subsidiary parts of work, over that of mere works (like sacrifices, etc.) though performed together with all their subsidiary parts.

Now, there are certain meditations which are founded on the udgītha and the rest, the subsidiary parts of sacrificial works, such as: “Let one meditate on the syllable ‘Om’ as the udgītha” (Chând. 1.1.1) and so on. Here the doubt is as to whether they are to be inserted regularly in the sacrificial acts, like the quality of being made of paraṇa-wood; or not regularly, like the milking-vessel. With regard to this, the prima facie view is as follows: As the designation about the meditation on the udgītha, viz.: “Whatever one does with knowledge, with faith, with the mystic doctrine, that becomes more potent” (Chând. 1.1.10), does not mention any separate result,—just as the hearing of non-sinful verses connected with the quality of being made of the paraṇa-wood, mentioned in the passage: “He whose sacrificial ladle is made of the paraṇa-wood does not hear sinful verses” (Tait. Saṁ. 3.5.7) (is not a separate or special fruit),—so the meditations on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts are to be inserted regularly (in those acts) as their subsidiary parts, just as the quality of being made of the paraṇa-wood (is always connected with sacrificial acts) through the sacrificial ladle.

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1 Ś, Bh, ŚK. Vide Br. Sū. 4.1.18.
2 A beautiful sacred tree of the wood of which particular sacrificial vessels are made.
4 The problem here is as to whether the meditations, enjoined in the Upaniṣads, on certain subsidiary parts of sacrifices, such as, on the udgītha and so on, are necessarily connected with these sacrifices, i.e. are to be undertaken whenever those sacrifices are undertaken; or whether they may be undertaken optionally in accordance with the will of the sacrificer. In the former case, such meditations
With regard to it, we reply: "Non-restriction with regard to the specifying of that", and so on. The word "specifying" ("nirdhāraṇa) means complete retention by the mind, i.e. meditation. There is "non-restriction" with regard to the meditation "of that", i.e. of the meditations founded on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, such as the udgītha-meditation and the like. That is, the meditations on the udgītha and the rest are not to be inserted regularly in sacrifices as their subsidiary parts. Why? "On account of that being seen," i.e. because such a non-restriction is found in Scripture. Thus, in the scriptural text: "Both perform with this, he who knows this and he who does not know thus" (Chānd. 1.1.10), even a non-knower being stated to be an agent, it is ascertained that there is no fixed rule that the meditations founded on the udgītha and the rest would stand to the sacrifices in the same relation as the quality of being made of the pārṇa-wood (pārṇamayitva) does. The quality of being made of the pārṇa-wood is permanently connected with sacrifices through the sacrificial ladle made of the pārṇa-wood. Similarly, these meditations on the udgītha and the rest would, on this view, be permanently connected with the sacrifices through the udgītha and the rest. That is, in accordance with the dictum laid down in Pū. Mi. Sū. 3.6.1-2 (vide Śab. B. on the same, pp. 366-368), a sacrificial ladle made of the pārṇa-wood is an essential ingredient of a sacrifice and is to be included in it whenever it is performed. Similarly, on the first view, the meditations on the udgītha and so on are to be performed whenever the main sacrifices are performed.

In the latter case, however, such meditations would stand to the sacrifices in the same relation as the quality of being made of the pārṇa-wood. That is, in accordance with the dictum laid down in Pū. Mi. Sū. 4.1.2 (vide Śab. B. on the same, p. 436), the milking-vessel (go-dohana) is used in certain sacrifices, viz. in the Daśā-pārṇa-māsa, not universally, but only occasionally, i.e. only if the sacrificer desires for a special end, viz. cattle. Similarly, on the second view, the meditations on the udgītha and the rest are not obligatory to the main sacrifices, but only optional.

The prima facie view is that the meditations on the udgītha and the rest serve no special purpose, as the using of the milking-vessel, e.g. does. They simply secure the greater potency of the sacrifices which is the general fruit of all other connected acts, just as having one's sacrificial ladle made of the pārṇa-wood secures no special result. Hence it cannot be said those meditations on the udgītha and the like are to be undertaken at will for the sake of securing a special result. Therefore, they are to be undertaken always with the sacrifices.

1 Niravāsaʿatayā dhāraṇam-nirdhāraṇam.
2 Here the word "veda" (=knows) may be translated in conformity with the context, as "meditates", the text meaning that one may perform a sacrifice either with meditating on the Om, or not meditating on it.
are to be inserted regularly in sacrificial acts as their subordinate parts. Further, as the fruit of the injunction of meditation is different from that of sacrificial acts, there is no fixed rule with regard to the meditations on that,—so says (the author): "For different", i.e. because "the fruit" of the injunction of meditation, consisting in "non-obstruction", is declared by Scripture to be "different" from the fruit of sacrificial works. The sense is that the fruit of one work is obstructed by the fruit of another stronger work; the fruit of the injunction of meditation is the opposite of that. In accordance with the text: "Both perform with it, he who knows this thus and he who does not know thus. Diverse, however, are knowledge and non-knowledge. What only one does with knowledge, with faith, with the mystic doctrine, that only becomes more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10), 'with it', i.e. with the Om-kara, forsooth, both perform sacrificial acts. Though 'he who knows 'this', i.e. the syllable, Om, 'thus', i.e. as possessed of the attributes of being the finest essence and so on, and 'he who does not know', are both equal in point of being agents, yet there is a difference in the result on account of knowledge and non-knowledge,—this is what the text designates. Here 'knowledge' is 'diverse', i.e. different from 'non-knowledge'. That work which one does 'with knowledge', 'with faith', 'with the mystic doctrine', i.e. with the meditation on the Mystic Deity, 'becomes more potent',—this is the sense. Hence, it is established that just as the text: "For one desiring cattle he should fetch water in a milking-vessel" establishes a (special) fruit of the (use of) the milking-vessel, having the fetching of water as its abode,—here as the text can very well be so interpreted, the milking-vessel is not a subordinate part of sacrificial acts,—so the meditations, founded on the subsidiary elements of sacrificial acts are to be included in those acts optionally.

Here ends the section entitled "Non-restriction with regard to the specifying of that" (18).

1 That is, the quality of being made of the parna-wood cannot have a special result of its own, since it is only a quality and not an act and must, as such, abide in a substratum to be connected with any result. But the milking-vessel may have a special fruit, since it has an act, viz. the fetching of water, as its abode. Vide Ś.B. 3.3.42, p. 826.
COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is śūtra 43 in his commentary. He too takes it to be an adhikarana by itself, concerned, however, with an entirely different topic. The question is as to whether the Lord is to be meditated on as Kṛṣṇa alone. The answer is: "(There is) no restriction with regard to the specifying of that (viz. the Lord), (i.e. there is no fixed rule that the Lord is to be worshipped as Kṛṣṇa alone), on account of that being found (in Scripture), for there is a separate fruit, (viz.) non-obstruction (of the worship of Kṛṣṇa)". That is, the worship of Kṛṣṇa is the unobstructed or direct means to salvation, while the worship of other deities is the indirect means.¹

Adhikaṇaṇa 19: The section entitled "Offering". (Śūtra 42)

ŚūTRA 42

"Simply as in the case of offering, that has been said."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

During the meditations on the attributes also, the meditation on the dahara (or the small), the substratum of the attributes, is to be repeated as qualified by those attributes respectively, "as in the case of the offering" of the sacrificial cake ², designated in the text: "Let one offer the sacrificial cake on eleven potsherds to Indra, the king, to Indra, the over-lord, to Indra, the self-ruler" (Tait. Saṃ. 2.3.6 ³). "That has been said," viz. "Diverse, forsooth, are the divinities, owing to different conceptions".⁴

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said above that the meditations founded on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts are not to be inserted in those acts

¹ G.B. 3.3.43, pp. 189-190, Chap. 3.
² Purodāś.
⁴ Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
regularly. Now, apprehending the objection, viz. that just as the meditations on the subsidiary parts are independent of the whole, so the meditations on the attributes are independent of the meditation on the substratum of attributes—it is said:

Under the Dahara-vidyā, after having first stated the small ether, i.e. the soul, the substratum of the attributes, as the object to be meditated on thus: "Now, those who depart having known the self here" (Chānd. 8.1.6), the text goes on to set forth separately once more the meditations on the attributes of being free from sins and the rest too thus: "And these true desires" (Chānd. 8.1.6). Here the doubt is as to whether while meditating on an attribute, the small ether, the substratum of the attributes, too is to be meditated on as possessed of that particular attribute, or not. On the suggestion: As the small ether can very well be meditated on at all times as qualified by the attributes of being free from sins and so on, during the meditation on the attributes, the meditation on Him as qualified by those particular attributes is not to be repeated.

We reply: "As in the case of offering", the meditation on the small ether, the substratum of attributes, as qualified by those particular attributes, is to be repeated with the meditations on those attributes themselves. The sense is this: Although those attributes like freedom from sins and so on have only one substratum, viz. the small ether, yet in accordance with the text: "Free from sins, without old age" (Chānd. 8.1.5) and so on, which intends to designate its (different) forms as qualified by those particular attributes, it is to be meditated on as diverse. Just as in the case of the sacrifice comprising three sacrificial cakes, laid down in the text: "Let one offer the sacrificial cake on eleven potsherds to Indra, the king, to Indra, the over-lord, to Indra, the self-ruler" (Tait. Sam. 2.3.6), although the same Indra is qualified by the attributes of kingship and the rest, yet as the attributes of kingship, over-lordship and self-rulership are different from one another, the god himself is taken to have different forms as qualified by each particular attribute, and as such the "offerings" of the sacrificial cakes are repeated,—so is the case.

1 Vide Chānd. 8.1 ff. See V.K. 3.3.1, for further explanation.
2 The text continues to designate these three epithets thus: "Indra, the king is this (earth); Indra, the over-lord, is this (atmosphere); Indra, the self-ruler is the yonder (heaven)—. There are three cakes, these worlds are three".
here. "That has been said" in the section treating of the divinities: "Diverse, forsooth, are the divinities owing to different conceptions". Hence it is established that during the meditation on an attribute, the meditation on the small ether in that particular form, qualified by that particular attribute, is to be repeated.

Here ends the section entitled "Offering" (19).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is sutra 42 in Śaṅkara's commentary. Śaṅkara and Bhāskara too take it to be forming an adhikarana by itself, though concerned with an entirely different topic. In the Brhadāranyaka (Brh. 1.5.21), the vital-breath is said to be the best among the organs of the body, and the air to be the best among the gods. Similarly, in the Chandogya (Chānd. 4.3.1), the air is said to be the general absorber of the gods, and (Chānd. 4.3.3) the vital-breath is said to be the general absorber of the organs of the body. Here the question is as to whether the air and the vital-breath are to be conceived as separate or not. The prima facie view is that they are not to be conceived as separate, since they do not differ in their true nature. But the real view is that although they are fundamentally one, yet they are to be meditated on separately, since the texts teach them separately. Hence the vidyās here are not the same, but there are two separate vidyās. The parallel instance cited from the Taittirīya-samhitā and the maxim are the same as those cited by Nimbārka. Thus the sutra: "As in the case of offering (the air and the vital-breath are to be conceived separately), that has been said".1

Baladeva

This is sutra 44 in his commentary. He too takes it as an adhikarana by itself, but concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the grace of the spiritual preceptor. Hence the sutra: "Like the giving (of knowledge by the preceptor) alone that has been said". That is, salvation depends upon the extent the preceptor is pleased

Ś.B. 3.3.43, pp. 827–830; Bh. B. 3.3.42 (written as 3.3.43), p. 192.
to impart knowledge to the devotee. Mere study of the Veda is not enough to ensure the attainment of Brahman, but the grace of the preceptor is necessary too.¹

**Adhikarana 20:** The section entitled “The majority of indicatory marks”. (Sūtras 43–50)

**Sūtra 43**

“ON ACCOUNT OF THE MAJORITY OF INDICATORY MARKS, FOR THAT (VIZ. INDICATORY MARK) IS STRONGER, THIS ALSO (HAS BEEN EXPLAINED).”

**Vedānta-pārījāta-saurabha**

The fires, piled up by the mind, piled up by speech, piled up by the vital-breath, piled up by the eye, piled up by the ear, piled up by action, piled up by the fire, and so on,² are simply the subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation³, “on account of the majority of the indicatory marks”, such as: “Whatever these conceive with their mind that alone is their composition” (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3⁴), “All beings at all times pile up those (fires) for him who knows thus, even while he sleeps” (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12⁵) and so on; “for” an indicatory mark is “stronger” than the context. “This also” has been said in the section treating of what is supplementary to sacrifices: “If there be combination of direct association, indicatory mark, syntactical connection, context, place and name, then each succeeding one is weaker (than each preceding one), on account of its remoteness from the meaning” (Pū. Mi. Sū. 3.3.14⁶).

¹ G.B. 3.3.44, p. 192, Chap. 3.
² Vide Śat. Br. 10.5.3 (whole), pp. 796–798.
³ I.e. these fires do not constitute parts of real sacrifices, and are not actually lighted during the performance of sacrifices, but are simply parts of meditation, i.e. mentally imagined fires.
⁴ P. 796, lines 7-8. This shows that the fires are composed by mind only, i.e. not actual fires.
⁵ P. 798, lines 14-15. Ś, Bh.
⁶ P. 284, vol. 1. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
Vedānta-kaustubha

Now (the author) points out that the fires too, that are going to be designated now, are not to be taken as subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, just as the meditations founded on the subsidiary elements of sacrificial acts are not to be taken as such.

Having begun: "Verily, in the beginning, this was not existent, not even non-existent" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 1), having described the appearance of the mind, and having referred to the mind, by pointing out that that mind saw the fires belonging to itself, thus: "It saw the thirty-six thousand fires, the suns, belonging to itself, made of the mind, piled up by the mind. By the mind alone they were placed, by the mind they were piled up, by the mind the cups were taken in them, by the mind they praised, by the mind they recited. Whatever work is done in a sacrifice" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3) and so on, the Vāja-saneyins, thus, record imaginary fires, piled up by the mind and so on, viz. piled up by speech, piled up by the eye, piled up by action, piled up by fire, and so on, in the "Mystery of Fire". The life of a person lasts a hundred years. It consists of thirty-six thousand days and nights. In the course of a single day and night, many mental modes arise, and they are taken to be one because they have arisen in the course of the same day and night. Thus, there are thirty-six thousand mental modes in the course of thirty-six thousand days and nights; and they are demonstrated as the bricks which are subsidiary parts of sacrifices, and as elemental fires, by the text: "Thirty-six thousands" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 1) and so on. Among these, those which are 'piled up', i.e. built, by the mind are the 'mind-piled'. Similarly, the meaning of the texts 'breath-piled' and so on are to be understood as the case may be.

Here the doubt is as to whether these fires, piled up by the mind and so on are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in actual action, they being mentioned in a section concerned with sacrificial acts; or whether they are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting only in meditation.

1 P. 796, line 1.
2 Quotation mark wrong (in the text).
3 P. 796, lines 4–6.
4 Quotation mark wrong (in the text).
5 The name of the tenth book of the Śat. Br.
First, (the author) begins with the correct conclusion, thus: "On account of the majority of indicatory marks". They are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation only. Why? "On account of the majority of indicatory marks," i.e. on account of the majority or numerosity of the indicatory marks, such as "Whatever these conceive with the mind alone that alone is their composition" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3), "All beings at all times pile up those (fires) for him who knows thus, even while he sleeps" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12) and so on. "For that," i.e. for an indicatory mark, is "stronger" than the context. "That also," i.e. the fact of its being of a greater force, is stated in the Karma-Kāṇḍa thus: "If there be combination of direct assertion, indicatory mark, syntactical connection, context, place and name, then each succeeding one is weaker (than each preceding one), on account of its remoteness from the meaning" (Pū. Mi. Śū. 3.3.14).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

He takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikarana by itself, concerned with an entirely different topic. The question is as to whether the eleventh section of the Mahānārāyaṇa-upanisad,—constituting the same vidyā as the vidyā, viz. the Dahara-vidyā, mentioned in the tenth section—establishes only the object to be meditated on in that vidyā, or an object to be meditated on in all Brahma-vidyās. The prima facie view is that this section, in accordance with the context, establishes the object which is to be meditated on in the Dahara-vidyā only. The answer is: "(It establishes an object to be meditated in all Brahma-vidyās), on account of the majority of indicatory marks, (i.e. because there are many specific indications that Nārāyaṇa, designated in this section, is none but the object to be meditated on in all Brahma-vidyās), for that (viz. mark) is stronger (than the context), that too (has been stated in the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā)".

Śrīkāṇṭha

He too takes this sūtra as forming an adhikarana by itself, concerned with a topic similar to that of Rāmānuja, only referring to a different passage, designating Rudra instead of Nārāyaṇa. Thus,

1 Śrī. B. 3.3.43, pp. 325-326, Part 2.
the question is as to whether the Supreme Brahman or Rudra, accompanied by Umā, mentioned in the thirteenth section of the Mahānārāyanā-upanisad, is the object to be meditated on in all the parāvidyās, or only in that particular vidyā of that section. The prima facie view is that in accordance with the context, such a Supreme Brahman is to be meditated on in that particular vidyā alone. The answer is the same as that given by Rāmānuja, viz.: "(Such a Brahman is to be meditated on in all the parā-vidyās on account of the majority of indicatory marks—".1

Baladeva

This is sūtra 45 in his commentary. He too takes this sūtra to be forming an adhikarana by itself, concerned with an altogether different topic, viz. the grace of the spiritual teacher. Hence the sūtra: "On account of the majority of indicatory marks, (viz. scriptural texts), that (i.e. the grace of the teacher), is stronger (than any other element in bringing about final emancipation), (but) that also (viz. exertion on one’s own part, viz. study, meditation and so on,) (must be continued)".2

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 44-45)

SŪTRA 44

"(The fires built up by the mind and the rest) may be an alternative form of the preceding fire built up by bricks) on account of the context, (they are) action, as in the case of the mental (vessel)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā

Now the prima facie view: This "may be an alternative form" of that same "preceding" (fire) consisting in action enjoined in the text: "With bricks he piles up the fire".3 Since the indicatory mark here is contained in the descriptive portion, the stated fires are indeed of the form of action, as in the case of: "He takes the mental vessel".4

1 Šk. B. 3.3.43, pp. 362 ff., Parts 10 and 11.
2 G.B. 3.3.45, p. 193, Chap. 3.
3 Bh.
Vedānta-kaustubha

Now (the author) states the *prima facie* view.

This "may be" "an alternative form", i.e. a mode, of the same "preceding fire", enjoined in the passage: "With bricks he piles up the fire". Why? "On account of the context," i.e. because previously in the passage: "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Sat. Br. 6.1.1, 1), the fire, piled up by bricks, is mentioned.

If it be argued that it has been said that context is weaker than indicatory mark,—(we reply:) no, since the stated indicatory marks, being contained in the descriptive portion and as such concerned with the glorification of the mentioned imaginary fires, form a coherent whole with the injunction, and are hence not true in their own literal sense. Hence the fact that they are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation is set aside by the context. Therefore these fires too, which have the form of meditation, are really of the form of action, "as in the case of the mental (vessel)". That is, just as the offering of the mental vessel on the tenth day of the twelve-days' sacrifice, mentioned in the passage: "With this (earth) as the jug, with the sea as the juice, he takes the mental cup, offered to Prajāpati, for you" 2, though of the form of meditation, is yet of the form of action because of being the subsidiary part of a sacrifice consisting in action, so is the case here.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikarana here (two sūtras), concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. meditation on the self as identical with the Lord (So'ham). Hence the sūtra: "(The meditation on the self as identical with the Lord) may be an optional form of the former (viz. devotion) on account of

1 P. 499, line 1.
2 A similar passage is found in Āp. Š.S. 21.10.2.

The sense is that on the tenth day of the Soma sacrifice, lasting twelve days, a cup is offered mentally to Prajāpati, the earth being imagined to be the cup and the sea the soma-juice. Now, all operations connected with this cup are mental, yet the offering of the cup is taken to be a real, and not an imaginary action, since it is connected with a real sacrifice. In the same way, the fires built up by the mind and so on, though mental, are to be taken as parts of real sacrifices, so says the *prima facie* objector. Vide Š.B. 3.3.46, pp. 832-833.
the context (i.e. the Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī), like (the physical) acts (of offerings and so on), (and) the mental (acts of meditation and so on)’). That is, expressions like ‘I am he’, and so on, uttered by God-intoxicated devotees in a state of extreme ecstasy, are not to be understood literally as implying an identity between the Lord and His devotee, because they are only particular moods of meditation, just as offerings and the like are.¹

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 45

“And on account of transference.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: “Of these, each is as great as the former” (Śat. Br. 10.3.3, 11 ²), the power of the former fire is transferred to them. Hence they are indeed of the form of action.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the text: “There are thirty-six thousand fires, the suns. Of these, each is as great as the former” (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3.11), the power of the previous fire, piled up by bricks, is transferred to them. On account of such a transference as well, the fires piled up by the mind and the rest are indeed of the form of action.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 47 in his commentary. Here he concludes the section about the ‘I am he’—meditation. Hence the sūtra: “Also on account of analogy”. That is, in the Gopāla-uttara-tāpanī-upaniṣad, the Lord is compared to a loving father, and the devotee to His son. This shows that the individual soul is not identical with the Lord. Hence sentiments like ‘I am he’ and so on are but modes of devotion, and do not indicate any identity between the two.³

¹ G.B. 3.3.46, p. 195, Chap. 3.3. “Prakāra-viśeṣa, nārthāntaram.”
² P. 798, lines 13-14. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
³ G.B. 3.3.47, pp. 199-200, Chap. 3.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 46–50)

SŪTRA 46

"But (they are) meditation alone, on account of specification and on account of observation (i.e. scriptural text)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The correct conclusion is that they are of the nature of meditation alone. Why? "On account of the specification," viz.: "For they are piled up by knowledge alone" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12¹); and also because in that very treatise, viz. in the text: "By the mind they were placed, by the mind they were piled up, by the mind the cups were taken in them, by the mind they praised, by the mind they chanted. Whatever work is done in a sacrifice" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3²) and so on, a sacrifice consisting of meditation is designated—the whole, of which they (viz. the fires) are subsidiary parts.

Vedānta-kaustubha

(The author) states the correct conclusion.

The word "but" is meant for disposing of the prima facie view. The word "only" implies emphasis. The fires piled up by the mind and so on cannot be of the form of action, but are "meditation alone," i.e. are of the nature of meditation alone, or are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation. Why? "On account of specification and on account of observation," i.e. because of the specification, viz.: "For they are piled up by knowledge alone" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12); and because in the text: "By mind alone they are placed, by mind they are piled up, by mind the cups are taken in them, by mind they praised, by mind they chanted. Whatever work is done in a sacrifice, whatever sacrificial work there is, that, consisting of mind alone, was performed by mind alone, in these, consisting of mind, piled up by mind" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3), a sacrifice consisting in meditation alone is designated—the whole, of which they are subsidiary parts.

¹ P. 798, lines 14-15. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
² P. 796, lines 5-6. R, Śk.
COMPARISON
Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

They break the sūtra into two separate sūtras thus: “Vidyāiva . . . . nirdhāraṇāt” and “Dārśanāc ca”. Interpretation same.

Baladeva

Like Śaṅkara, he too breaks the sūtra into two separate sūtras. He begins a new adhikarana here (three sūtras) concerned with showing that vidyā or devotion based on knowledge alone is the means to salvation. Thus: Sūtra 48.—“But vidyā alone (is the means to salvation), on account of specification, (i.e. because Scripture mentions it exclusively, neither karma nor a combination of vidyā and karma).” 1 Sūtra 49.—“And because (salvation results) from the direct vision (of the Lord).” That is, the direct vision of the Lord is attainable through vidyā alone. Hence vidyā alone is the cause of salvation.2

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 47

“And on account of the greater force of direct scriptural statement and the rest, (there is) no setting aside.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the greater force” of the direct scriptural statement”, viz.: “For they are piled up by the mind alone” (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12 3); of the indicatory mark; “All beings at all times pile up (those fires) for him who knows thus, even while he sleeps” (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12 4); and of the syntactical connection: “For through knowledge alone these are piled up for one who knows thus” (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12 5), there is “no setting aside” of the fact that these fires are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation.

1 G.B. 3.3.48, p. 202, Chap. 3.
3 P. 798, line 14. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
4 P. 798, lines 14-15. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
5 P. 798, line 15. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
To the objection, viz. to say that those fires piled up by the mind and so on are here subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation, does not stand to reason. As in the text: "With mind they were placed" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3) there is no mention of an injunctive word, and as we do not perceive their connection with a fruit, so the fact of their being subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation is set aside by the context, concerned with a sacrifice consisting in action, and suggested to the mind by fires piled up by bricks—(the author) replies:

There is "no setting aside", by the context, of the fact of their being subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation. Why? "On account of the greater force of direct scriptural statement and the rest" than the context. By the words "and the rest", indicatory mark and syntactical connection are to be understood. The direct scriptural text is: "For these are piled up by knowledge alone" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12). The indicatory mark is: "All beings at all times pile up these for him who knows thus, even while he sleeps" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12). The syntactical connection is: "For by knowledge alone these are piled up for one who knows thus" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 12).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 50 in his commentary. Here he concludes the section about vidyā being the only means to salvation. It may be objected that some texts speak of karma as the means to salvation, while some texts again speak of the combination of karma and vidyā as such a means. The answer is: "And on account of the greater force of Scripture and so on (there is) no setting aside (of our view)." That is, the scriptural texts quoted by us in support of our view that vidyā alone is the cause of release is of a far greater authority than the Smṛti texts quoted by the prima facie objector to prove his case.¹

¹ G.B. 3.3.50.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 48

"ON ACCOUNT OF INSEPARABLE ADJUNCTS AND THE REST, LIKE THE SEPARATENESS OF OTHER COGNITIONS, AND (BECAUSE IT) IS SEEN, THAT HAS BEEN SAID."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the inseparable adjuncts" like hymns, recitations and so on 1, mentioned in the text: "By mind the cups were taken in them" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3 2), and on account of direct scriptural statement and the rest, 3 the sacrifice consisting in meditation is indeed different, "like the separateness of other vidyās", such as, the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā and so on. This being so, an injunction is to be supposed. "And" it is "found" that in the case of what is similar to a mere statement, e.g. in the passage: "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10 4), an injunction is supposed. It has been "stated" as well: "But the texts, on account of being new" (Pū. Mi. Sū. 10.4.22 5) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection stated above, viz. that because of the non-mention of an injunctive word in the text: "By mind alone they were placed" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3), and because we do not perceive their connection with a fruit,—to say that they are subordinate members of a sacrifice consisting in meditation does not stand to reason,—(the author) replies:

The sacrifice consisting in meditation is indeed different from the sacrifice consisting in action, and (hence) the fact that they (i.e. fires) are the subordinate members of the former does stand to reason. Why? "On account of the inseparable adjuncts and the rest," i.e. on account of the inseparable adjuncts, transference, Scripture and so on. Among these, the inseparable adjuncts, (i.e. the attendant performances) are stated in the text: "By mind the cups were taken in them" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 3). As a sacrifice consisting in action and

1 This last portion "like . . . so on" is omitted in the C.S.S. ed.
2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
3 See V.P.S. 3.3.47.
4 Śk.
its subordinate members are directly perceivable, these would be meaningless if there be not a separate sacrifice consisting in meditation. The inseparable adjuncts of a sacrifice are the cups, hymns, recitation and so on. The transference, viz. "Of these, each is as great as the former" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 11) has been mentioned above. Such a transference does not fit in if there be no difference (between these two)\(^1\). The scriptural text and the rest have been indicated above.\(^2\)

With regard to this, a parallel instance is cited thus: "Like the separateness of other cognitions". Just as other cognitions like the Śāndilya-vidyā and the rest are different from a sacrifice consisting in action, as well as from other vidyās, owing to their respective peculiar adjuncts, so is the case here too. This being so, an injunction is to be supposed. "And" it is "found" that in the case of what is similar to a mere statement, e.g. in the text: "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10) and so on, an injunction is supposed. "That has been said," thus: "But the texts, on account of being new" (Pū. Mi. Sū. 10.4.22). Their connection with a fruit too may be known from the transference: "Of these, each one is as great as the former" (Śat. Br. 10.5.3, 11).

**COMPARISON**

**Baladeva**

He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras:—"Anubandhā-dibhya" and "Prajñāntara . . . taduktam," and interprets them absolutely differently. Thus:

*Sūtra 51.—* He takes it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the worship of holy men. Hence the sūtra: "On account of injunction and so on". That is, Scripture expressly enjoins the worship of great and good men, and hence such worship must be undertaken as an auxiliary and indirect means to salvation.\(^3\)

*Sūtra 52.—* He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (two sūtras), concerned with showing that the devotees realize and intuit the Lord differently. He reads "dṛṣṭiḥ ca" in place of "dṛṣṭaś ca". Hence the sūtra: "And like the difference between prajñā and the other (sort of knowledge) the perception (of the Lord too differs in the case

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\(^1\) Vide under V.K. 3.3.22.

\(^2\) Vide V.K. 3.3.47.

\(^3\) G.B. 3.3.51, pp. 206-208, Chap. 3.
of different devotees), that has been said". That is, in the Brhadāranyaka (Brh. 4.4.21 1), two sorts of knowledge, viz. vijñāna and prajñā, are spoken of. The first is intellectual knowledge or mere conception, the latter is intuitional knowledge or direct realization. Now, just as there is a difference between intellect and intuition, so there is a difference among the intuitions themselves. That is, different devotees, following different paths, come to have different intuitions or visions of the Lord. This has been declared in the Chāndogya (Chānd. 3.14.1 2).

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 49

"NOT EVEN ON ACCOUNT OF RESEMBLANCE, ON ACCOUNT OF OBSERVATION, AS IN THE CASE OF DEATH, NOR, VERILY, (THERE IS ANY) BECOMING THE WORLD."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Not even on account of their resemblance to the mental cup, they are subordinate members of a sacrifice consisting in action, since they are found to be of the form of meditation. In spite of the resemblance of both fire and the person in the sun to death,—as stated in the texts: "He, verily, is death who is the person within this orb" (Śat. Br. 10.5.2, 3 3), "Fire, verily, is death" (Brh. 3.2.10 4),—the difference (between them) remains; "nor verily" does fire (actually) become the world in accordance with the passage: "The world, O Gautama, is a fire" (Chānd. 5.4.1 5).

Vedānta-kaustubha

(The author) condemns the statement made above, viz. that like the mental (cup), the fires piled up by the mind and so on too are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in action.

1 Vijñāya prajñāṁ kurvita.
2 G.B. 3.3.52, p. 209, Chap. 3. "Yathā kratu asmin loke puruṣo bhavati tathetah pretya bhavati."
3 P. 793, line 5. Also repeated in various places of the same chapter. Vide p. 794, lines 14-15; p. 795, lines 19-20, etc. Ś, R, Bh, Šk.
4 Ś.
5 Ś, Bh.
“Even on account of the resemblance,” in point of being mental, of the fires piled up by the mind and the rest to the mental cup,—mentioned in the text: “With this (earth) as the jug, with the sea as the juice, I take the cup, offered to Prajāpati, for you”,—they are not to be taken as the subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in action. Why? Because we find from Scripture and the rest that they are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation. The sense is that a minor resemblance does not invalidate a major difference.

With regard to this, (the author) states a parallel instance: "As in the case of death". Just as, though fire and the person within the sun resemble each other in point of being denoted by the same word ‘death’ in the texts: “He, verily, is death who is the person within this orb” (Sat. Br. 10.5.2, 3), “The fire, verily, is death” (Brh. 3.2.10), they are still different from each other; or just as, in accordance with the text: “This world, O Gautama, is the fire” (Chānd. 5.4.1), the world does not (actually) become the fire,—so though the fires piled up by the mind and so on and the mental cup resemble each other in point of being mental, they still remain mutually different.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrikaṇṭha

Interpretation different. The prima facie objectors say that since the power of the actual fire is transferred to the mental fires (Sat. Br. 10.5.3, 11), the latter must be actual brick-built fires like the former. The answer is: “Not even on account of resemblance (i.e. transference) (an identity) between them results), for (it is) found (that there is transference even when there is no identity), as in the case of death, for (there is) no attaining the world (of death by the person in the sun)”. That is, the mere transference of the property of one thing to another is by no means an indication of an actual identity between them, for it is found that sometimes such a transference is based on a single point of similarity. E.g. the person within the orb of the same is said to be death (Sat. Br. 10.5.2, 3), but there is only one point of resemblance between them, viz. destructive

1 See above V.K. 3.3.47.
power, and no resemblance in other points. The person within the sun, e.g., does not occupy the world of death.¹

Baladeva

This is sūtra 53 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. The prima facie objector points out that if the vision of the Lord be the cause of salvation ², then when the Lord descends on earth as an incarnation, viz. Rāma and so on, everyone who sees Him must become freed immediately. The answer is: “Even on account of the common perception (of the Lord as an incarnation, there is no universal release), like death (which is) not (the cause) of salvation, but) the attainment of (other particular) worlds”. That is, death does not necessarily lead to release, but more often to other worlds like heaven and so on. Similarly, all visions of the Lord are not the cause of release, but the vision of the Lord on earth as an incarnation leads to heavenly regions alone.³

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 50

“And on account of what is subsequent, the being of this kind of the word (is established), there is connection with (action), on the other hand, on account of majority.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account also of the immediately following (section), viz.: “This world, verily, is piled up by the fire” (Śat. Br. 10.5.4, 1⁴), this text, referring to the fires piled up by the mind and so on, is of such a kind. “On account of the majority,” i.e. numerosity, of the details of (actual) fire which are to be accepted in the fires piled up by the mind and so on, there is the “connection” (of these mental fires) in the very vicinity of a fire built up by action.

¹ Śrī. B. 3.3.49, p. 331, Part 2; Śk. B. 3.3.49, p. 369, Parts 10 and 11.
² Vide G.B. 3.3.49 above.
³ P. 798, line 17. Ś, R, Bh, Śk. Correct quotation: “Agniś cita”, in which case the quotation would mean. “This world, verily, is the piled up fire.”
⁴ Correct quotation “Agniś Cita”, meaning “piled up fire”, and not “Agni-Cita”.
Vedānta-kaustubha

"On account of what is subsequent" to the section concerned with the fires piled up by the mind and so on, viz. the section concerned with world which is filled, beginning: "This world, verily, is piled up by the fire (Śat. Br. 10.5.4, 1), and on account of the preceding section,—implied by the term "and" (in the sūtra)—, beginning: "This orb that shines" (Śat. Br. 10.5.2, 1), the "text", i.e. the section coming between them, is "of that kind", i.e. concerned with an injunction about meditation. That is, on account of its association with a preceding and a subsequent sections which have meditation for their primary topic, here too there is the primacy of meditation,—that is what it comes to.

To this objection, viz. If in this section, there be the primacy of meditation, then what is the sense in beginning with action?—(the author) replies: "On account of majority". That is, "on account of the majority" or numerosity of the details of the fire built up by action to be accomplished (mentally) in the case of the fires which are the subsidiary parts of meditation, there is the "connection", i.e. setting forth, of the fires, the subsidiary parts of meditation, after the fires which are subsidiary parts of action. Hence it is established that the fires piled up by the mind and the rest are subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation.

Here ends the section entitled "The majority of indicatory marks" (20).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 54 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikarana by itself concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the grace of the Lord. The prima facie view is that it cannot be said that the direct vision of the Lord alone, attainable through devotion ¹, in the cause of salvation, for a text in the Muṇḍaka (Muṇḍ. 3.2.3 ²) shows that the vision of the Lord depends on the grace of the Lord.

¹ Vide G.B. 3.3.49 above.
² "Nāyamātmā pravacanena labhyah", etc.
The answer is: "On account of what follows (i.e. the immediately following text 1), the being of that kind of the word (is established), (there is) the mention (of grace in the passage), on the other hand, on account of preponderance (i.e. because the grace of the Lord is the most predominating factor in attaining salvation)". That is, the Mundaka-text does imply that devotion is the cause of a direct vision of the Lord, and the latter a cause of emancipation, for the grace or choice by the Lord is not arbitrary, but is determined by the devotion of men.2

Adhikarana 21: The section entitled "Existence in the body". (Sūtras 51-52)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 51)

SŪTRA 51

"Some (hold that the individual soul is to be meditated on in its state of bondage), on account of the existence (of such a soul) in the body.'"

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā

At the time of meditation, the individual soul is to be meditated on in its state of bondage, on account of the existence of such a soul alone "in the body"—so "some" (think).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Immediately above, an investigation has been undertaken into the fires piled up by the mind and so on as forming subsidiary parts of a sacrifice consisting in meditation. Now, the question is being considered, viz. in what form is the individual soul too, entitled to its fruit, to be sought for at the time of meditation?

The doubt is as to whether at the time of meditation, the individual soul is to be conceived of simply in its state of bondage,—i.e. in the form of a knower, a doer, an enjoyer and the rest,—or in its state of

1 "Nāyamātmā vala-hīnena labhyah", etc.
2 G.B. 3.3.54, pp. 214 ff., Chap. 3.
salvation, i.e. in its real nature, characterized by the manifested attributes of freedom from sins and the rest. With regard to it "some" think that it is to be conceived of in its state of bondage alone, i.e. in the form of a knower and the rest. Why? On account of the non-existence "in the body", at that time, "of the soul" in its state of salvation, i.e. in its real nature as characterized by freedom from sins and so on. Or else, (an alternative explanation:) on account of the existence of such a soul alone, i.e. of the soul in its state of bondage. 1

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṅkara and Bhāskara**

This is sūtra 53 in the commentary of Śaṅkara and 52 in that of Bhāskara. They take this adhikarana to be concerned with a different problem, viz. the relation between the soul and the body. This sūtra sets forth the opponent's view, viz. the view of the Cārvākas, that the soul is nothing but the body, since consciousness is found only when the body is present, and not found when it is absent. Hence, the sūtra: "Some (maintain the non-difference) of the soul (from the body), on account of the existence (of consciousness) if there be the body". 2

**Baladeva**

This is sūtra 55 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikarana by itself, concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the worship of the Lord in the different parts of the body. Hence the sūtra: "Some (recommend the worship) of the soul (viz. the Lord) in the body, on account of the existence (of the Lord there)". That is, the Lord is to be worshipped in the different parts of the body, such as, the stomach, the heart, the top of the head and so on, since He exists in these places also and gives salvation to the devotee. 3

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1 Note that while Nimbārka reads only "bhāvāt", Śrīnivāsa reads both "abhāvāt" and "bhābāt".

2 Ś.B. 3.3.53, pp. 838-840; Bh. B. 3.3.52 (written as 3.3.53), pp. 195-196.

3 G.B. 3.3.55, pp. 218-219, Chap. 3.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 52)

SŪTRA 52

"But (the individual soul is to be meditated on in its state of release) different (from its state of bondage, and) not (in its state of bondage), because of becoming of that nature, as in the case of realization."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

1At the time of meditation, the individual soul is to be conceived of in its freed state, different from its state of bondage,—since during release, it is to become of that very form, just as one attains the Highest Self in accordance with meditation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

With regard to it, we reply:

The word “but” implies emphasis. The individual soul is not to be conceived of simply in its state of bondage, i.e. simply in its form of a knower, a doer and so on. On the contrary, it is the real nature of the soul, in its state of release, possessed of the manifested attributes of freedom from sins and so on, and possessed of the attributes of being a knower and so on, which is “different” from its nature in its state of bondage, that is to be conceived of at the time of meditation. Why? “Because of becoming of that nature,” i.e. because during the state of release, the soul becomes “of that nature”, i.e. of the nature of its real form, conceived, in accordance with Scripture, at the time of meditation,2 “As in the case of realization”. That is, just as there is the realization of Brahman in accordance with meditation, so is the case here, as declared by the scriptural texts: “As the purpose of man is in this world, so will he be on departing” (Chānd. 3.14.1). “Howsoever he meditates on him, such alone he becomes” (Sat. Br. 10.5.2, 20). Hence it is established that during

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1 The C.S.S. ed. adds “Tan na”—“that is not so”, p. 68.
2 I.e. the form which is meditated on during bondage is the form which is attained later on during salvation.
3 P. 725, line 13. Cf. a very similar passage in Mudg. 3, p. 384, lines 8-9.
the state of realization, the individual soul is to be conceived of in its state of release.

Here ends the section entitled “Existence in the body” (21).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 54 in the commentary of Śaṅkara, sūtra 53 in that of Bhāskara. Here they answer the Carvāka view that the soul is identical with the body. They interpret the sūtra in the same way, only Śaṅkara reads: “tad-bhāvabhāvītvāt”, instead of “tad-bhāva-bhāvītvāt”. Thus, according to him, the sūtra means: “(The soul is) different (from the body), not (identical) because the existence (of consciousness) does not depend on the existence of that (viz. the body), as in the case of perception”. That is, consciousness is not a quality of the body, since even where the body is present, there may be no consciousness, e.g. in the case of a dead body. Hence just as perception is other than the object perceived, so consciousness is other than the conscious body.¹

According to Bhāskara, the sūtra means: “(The soul is) different (from the body) not (identical) because the existence of (the qualities of the body) depend on the existence of that (viz. the body), as in the case of perception”. That is, consciousness cannot be an attribute of the body, since an attribute of the body exists when the body exists. But consciousness does not exist always when the body does, e.g. in a dead body.² Hence the two explanations are identical in spite of the difference of reading. Bhāskara’s reading is preferable.

Rāmānuja

Interpretation same, only the phrase “upalabdhitvat” interpreted differently, viz. just as the realization of Brahman, enjoined in Scripture, means the realization of His real form, so exactly, self-realization too means the realization of the real form of the self.³

¹ Ś.B. 3.3.54, p. 840.
² Bh. B. 3.3.53 (written as 3.3.54), p. 196.
³ Śrī. B. 3.3.52, p. 337, vol. 2.
Baladeva

This is sūtra 56 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikarana here (three sūtras), concerned with an absolutely different topic, viz. different kinds of realizations in accordance with the different kinds of devotion. Hence the sūtra: "(During release, there is) no (perception of the Lord as possessed of the attributes) other (than those with which He was meditated upon in this life), on account of the existence (of the Lord) as having that nature (i.e. attributes) (during release), as in the case of knowledge". That is, when a man, conceiving a thing in a particular form, meditates on it as such, he obtains that thing in that particular form. Similarly, the devotees who meditates on the Lord as the Sweet, realizes Him as such during release; and who meditates on Him as the Majestic, realizes Him as such.1

Adhikarana 22: The section entitled "Connected with the subsidiary parts". (Sūtras 53-54)

SŪTRA 53

"But (the meditations) connected with the subsidiary parts, (are) not (restricted) to (particular) branches, for (they belong) to each Veda."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The meditations connected with the subsidiary parts of (sacrifices) like the udgītha, enjoined in the passage: "Let one meditate on this syllable 'Om' as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.1.1 2) and so on, do not rest upon (their own) branches 3, but are connected with "each Veda", i.e. with all the branches 4, on account of the non-specification of the scriptural text about the udgītha.

1 G.B. 3.3.56, p. 221, Chap. 3.
2 Ś, R, Bh.
3 C.S.S. ed. reads "Sva-śakhāsu", p. 68.
It has been pointed out above that at the time of meditation, the particular form (which the individual soul has) at that time should be disregarded, and (its) special form, as characterized by the manifested (attributes) of freedom from sins and so on, is to be conceived of. Similarly, here too, since a particular form can accomplish the end, the meditations may rest upon the particular forms of the udgītha and the rest, i.e. be based on them, in whatever special forms these udgītha and the rest are mentioned in whatever particular branches with whatever special accents,—this doubt (the author) dispels now by stating his own view.

The doubt is as to whether the meditations, founded on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts like the udgītha and the rest, such as: “Let one meditate on this syllable ‘Om’ as the udgītha” (Chānd, 1.1.1), “Let one meditate on the five-fold sāman in the worlds’. (Chānd. 2.1.1), ‘Hymn, hymn’, people say. The hymn is, forsooth, the earth” (Ait. Ār. 2.1.2 1), “This world, verily, is the piled up fire” (Śat. Br. 10.5.4, 1 2) and so on, enjoined in all the branches of all the Vedas, are based on those particular forms of the udgītha and the rest in which they are read in those particular branches in those special accents, or are connected with the udgītha and the rest contained in all the branches. Here the prima facie view is that on account of proximity, they are based on those particular forms of the udgītha and the rest in which these udgītha and the rest are read in those particular branches in those special accents, but are not connected with the udgītha and the rest presented in a different branch.

With regard to this, (the author) states the correct conclusion: “Connected with the subsidiary parts”. The word “but” is meant for rejecting the prima facie view. Those meditations, “connected with the subsidiary parts”, i.e. founded on the subordinate members of sacrifices, do not rest on the udgītha and the rest belonging to their own branches, but are connected with “each Veda”, i.e. with the udgīthas and the rest represented in all the branches. The word “for” implies the reason, i.e. because in spite of the difference of the forms of the udgītha and the rest resulting from the difference of accents and so on, the scriptural text about the udgītha, viz. “Let one meditate

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1 P. 101. 2 P. 798, line 17.
on the udgitha’” (Chānd. 1.1.1) and so on, lays down no specification, and thereby proximity is set aside.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 57 in his commentary. Here he illustrates the doctrine that the Lord is realized differently by different devotees in accordance with the kind of devotion with which they worship Him. Hence the sūtra: “But (the priests) are restricted to (particular) parts (of the sacrifice), (but are not appointed) to (all the) branches (of it), because (the parts are regulated) according to each Veda.” That is, when a man is about to perform a sacrifice, he chooses several priests, all of whom are able to perform all the parts of it, and appoints them to certain offices. And, the priests, so appointed by their master, must perform only the portions allotted to them, and not the others, and receive the fee accordingly. Similarly, it is the will of the Lord which determines which particular path of devotion a soul should follow, i.e. whether they should meditate on Him as the Sweet, or as the Majestic,—and realize Him accordingly.1

SŪTRA 54

“Or, as in the case of the sacred formulæ and the like, (there is) no contradiction.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“As in the case of the sacred formulæ” like: “Thou art a cock” (M. Sam. 1.1.62), or as in the case of preliminary offerings, there is “no contradiction” in applying meditations mentioned in one place to other places.

Vedānta-kaustubha

There is “no contradiction” in connecting meditations, set forth in one place, with the udgitha and the rest, set forth elsewhere, “as in the case of the sacred formulæ and the like.” The

G.B. 3.3.57, pp. 221-222, Chap. 3.

2 P. 6, line 14. Ś, Bh.
word "or" means 'and,' i.e. and just as the sacred formula which accompanies the taking of the stone for grinding the rice, viz. "Thou art a cock" (M. Sam. 1.1.6), mentioned in one place, is applicable in other places as well, so is the case here. By the words "and the like", it is meant that just as the preliminary offerings, mentioned in one place, are applicable in other places also (so is the case here). Hence, it is established that the meditations founded on the subordinate members (of sacrifices) like the udgītha and the rest, mentioned in one place, are connected with the udgītha and the rest, mentioned elsewhere.

Here ends the section entitled "Connected with the subsidiary parts" (22).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is śūtra 58 in his commentary. Here he concludes the topic, viz. the different modes of worshipping the Lord, by giving a second illustration, thus: "Or, as in the case of the sacred formulæ and the rest, (there is) no contradiction", that is, just as some formulæ are employed in many ceremonies,—some in two, some in one only,—so some men worship the Lord in several ways, i.e. with mixed sentiments or devotion, some only in one.

Adhikarana 23: The section entitled "The superiority of the plentitude". (Śūtra 55)

ŚŪTRA 55

"(There is) superiority of the plentitude, as in the case of a sacrifice, for thus (Scripture) shows."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, the meditation on the aggregate is commended, just as there is a single performance of the

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1 G.B. 3.3.58, pp. 222-223, Chap. 3.
2 See under Br. Śū. 3.3.31.
Paurṇa-māsa sacrifice and the rest together with the subsidiary parts.
Thus, the scriptural text: ‘‘Your head would have fallen off if you
had not come to me’’ (Chānd. 5.12.2 1), designating the fault involved
in the meditation on each limb, shows the excellence of the meditation
on the aggregate.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that in accordance with scriptural
statements, meditations mentioned in one place are applicable to
other places. Why should we not, then, meditate on the parts in the
Vaiśvānara-vidyā, in accordance with scriptural statement?—To this
objection (the author) replies:

In the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, from the questions and answers of
the six sages, viz. Prācināśa and the rest and king Kekaya, we
learn of a meditation on the Vaiśvānara (or the Universal Soul) in its
separate aspect, viz. the heavenly world, the sun, the wind, the ether,
the earth,—as well as in its aggregative aspect. Here the doubt is,
viz. whether one should meditate on the separate parts or on the
aggregate. On the suggestion that in accordance with the scriptural
texts laying down an injunction regarding the meditation on the
separate parts, one should meditate on the separate parts,—

We reply: There is ‘‘superiority’’, i.e. excellence, ‘‘of the plenti-
tude,’’ i.e. of the meditation on the aggregate alone, and not of the
meditations on the separate parts,—since the object to be meditated
on being Vaiśvānara alone, having (different) limbs like the heaven
as its head and so on, the beginning and the end form a connected
whole. ‘‘As in the case of a sacrifice.’’ That is, just as the single
performance of sacrifices like Paurṇa-māsa and the rest in their
entirety is intended to be designated, but not of the separate parts
like the preliminary offerings and the rest, so is the case here also.
‘‘For,’’ the scriptural text, designating the fault involved in the medita-
tion on the separate parts, viz.: ‘‘Your head would have fallen off had
you not come to me’’ (Chānd. 5.12.2), ‘‘You would have become
blind had you not come to me’’ (Chānd. 5.13.2) and so on, ‘‘shows’’
‘‘thus’’, i.e. that the meditation on the aggregate alone is to be
undertaken and not meditation on the separate parts.

It is not to be said also that (on the above view) the texts
enjoining meditating on the separate parts will become meaningless,
viz. those beginning with the question of the king: "'Auhamanyava, whom do you worship as the soul?' 'The heaven alone, O reverend king.' He said: 'The brightly shining one whom you worship as the soul is verily the universal soul'" (Chānd. 5.12.1) and so on,—since as it is, the meditation on the aggregate which is to be enjoined through the explanatory reiterations of the meditations on the separate parts, those texts are concerned with explanatory reiterations only. Moreover, having rejected the meditation on the separate parts, Scripture mentions the result of the meditation on the aggregate only thus: "He eats food in all the worlds, in all beings, in all selves" (Chānd. 5.18.1). Hence, it is established that the meditation on the aggregate alone is to be undertaken.

Here ends the section entitled "The superiority of the plentitude" (23).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is śūtra 59 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with an altogether different topic, viz. the meditation on the Lord as possessed of the attribute of plurality or manifoldness. Hence the śūtra: "On account of the pre-eminence of (the attribute of) muchness, (the Lord is to be meditated on as possessed of this attribute), as in the case of a sacrifice, for thus (Scripture, i.e. Chānd. 7.2.3, 1) shows". That is, just as a sacrifice is a sacrifice even when the sacrificer first begins it, and remains a sacrifice even when he has finished it, and just as this conception of the sacrifice is the most essential element involved in all sacrifices, so the manifoldness of the Lord, i.e. His appearing in many forms, is the most essential of all His attributes, and therefore must be included in all meditations on Him.2

1 Quotation given in the text is all wrong.
2 G.B. 3.3.59, pp. 224-225, Chap. 3.
Adhikaraṇa 24: The section entitled "Difference of words". (Śūtra 56)

ŚŪTRA 56

"(The vidyās are) diverse, on account of the difference of words and so on."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is diversity among the Śāndilya-vidyā and the rest. Why? "On account of the difference of words and so on" regarding them.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, by showing that in spite of Brahman, the object to be meditated on, being one and the same, there are diverse meditations as there are different texts about them and so on, (the author) is after that removing the following doubt: It has been pointed out immediately above that in spite of there being injunctive texts regarding the meditations on the separate parts, the meditation on the Whole is the best of all, as the object meditated on is everywhere the same. Similarly, in spite of there being injunctive texts regarding different kinds of meditations on Brahman, such as the Śāndilya-vidyā and the rest, all these meditations must be one and the same, as the object meditated on is everywhere the same (viz. Brahman).

The doubt is as to whether all the meditations on Brahman which result in final emancipation, consisting in the attainment of Brahman, viz. the Śāndilya-vidyā, the Bhūma-vidyā, the Sadvidyā, the Dahara-vidyā, the Upakosala-vidyā, the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, the Ānandamaya-vidyā, the Aksara-vidyā, and so on,

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1 Here the śat-suffix implies reason.
2 Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.31.
3 Bhūma-vidyā or the doctrine of the Plenty taught by Sanatkumāra to Nārada. Vide Chāṇḍ. 7.13. Vide also V.K. 1.3.8.
4 Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.35. Vide also V.K. 3.3.33.
5 Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.31.
8 Ānandamaya-vidyā or the doctrine of the Self consisting of bliss. Vide Tait. 2.
9 Aksara-vidyā or the doctrine of the Imperishable taught to Gārgī by Yājñavalkya. Vide Brḥ. 3.8. Vide also V.K. 3.3.33.
as well as the Prāṇa-vidyā¹ and the rest which have a special object and a special result, are to be undertaken collectively or separately. The prima facie view is that though there are injunctions with regard to each of the meditations, yet as the object to be meditated on is everywhere the same, they are to be undertaken collectively.

With regard to it, we reply: “Diverse”. The meditations are diverse. Why? “On account of the difference of words and so on,” i.e. as there are different texts about them like: ‘Knows’, ‘Let one meditate’, ‘Let one form a resolution’ (Chānd. 3.14.1), “But let one desire to enquire into the Plenty” (Chānd. 7.2.3, 1), “Let one meditate on Truth” (Bṛh. 4.1.4) and so on. The sense is this: Though the object to be meditated on is the same, yet these meditations are not exactly identical, since the object to be meditated on has different forms, as (variously) qualified by the special attributes mentioned in the texts designating those special meditations. By the words “and so on” other grounds, besides texts, for taking sacrificial acts as different, as demonstrated in the section concerned with that topic², viz. repetition, number, name, attribute and context, are to be understood. These establish that the meditations are different here too.

Here ends the section entitled “Difference of words” (24).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 60 in his commentary. He too takes it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, but interprets it in a sectarian manner thus: “(The meditations on the different forms of the Lord are) different, on account of the difference of words and so on. That is, the meditation on Kṛṣṇa, e.g., is different from the meditation on Nṛsiṁha, because the two words ‘Kṛṣṇa’ and ‘Nṛsiṁha’ are different, their forms are different and their mantras too are different.”³

¹ Prāṇa-vidyā or the doctrine of the primacy of the vital-breath. Vide Bṛh. 6.1; Praśna 2; Kaus. 3. Vide also V.K. 3.3.10.
² Vide Pū. Mi. Sū. 2.2.1 ff.
³ G.B. 3.3.60, p. 225, Chap. 3.
Adhikarana 25: The section entitled "Option". (Sūtras 57-58)

Sūтра 57

"(There is) option, on account of the non-distinction of the result."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It has been shown that the various meditations (on Brahman) are not identical but different from one another. There is ‘option’ of performance with regard to them, ‘on account of the non-distinction of result’.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated above that the meditations are ‘diverse’. Now, the mode of performing them, having the attainment of Brahman as their result, is being considered.

The doubt is as to whether these Śāṇḍilya-vidyā, Bhūma-vidyā, Sad-vidyā and the rest, which result in the attainment of Brahman, are to be undertaken collectively or optionally. On the suggestion that like the Agni-hotra, Daśa-pūrṇa-māsa and the rest, they are to be undertaken collectively.—

(The author) says: “Option”, i.e. any one alone is to be undertaken. Why? “On account of the non-distinction of the result,” i.e. because all the meditations on Brahman lead, without distinction, to the attainment of His nature. That is to say, as our purpose is served through one alone, it is not necessary for us to perform all the rest. Compare the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: “The knower of Brahman attains the highest” (Tait. 2.1), “My devotees go to me even” (Gitā 7.23) and so on.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 61 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikarana by itself, concerned with showing that the meditations on the different forms of the Lord, such as Kṛṣṇa, Rāma and so on,
are optional, since any one of them leads to release. Hence, the devotee should choose one form and stick to it.\(^1\)

**SūTRA 58**

"But (the meditations bringing about) objects of desire may be combined together or not at will, on account of the absence of the former reason."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

There is no restriction with regard to the performance of (meditations) having results other than the attainment of Brahman, "on account of the absence of the former reason", which involves such a restriction.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

This aphorism supplies a counter-instance with a view to confirming the stated view.

"But the (meditations leading to) objects of desire," i.e. the symbolic meditations having results other than the attainment of Brahman, set forth in the texts: "Verily, he who meditates on Name as Brahman comes to have freedom of movement as far as Name goes" (Chānd. 7.1.5), "He who knows this wind thus as the child of the quarters, mourns not for a son" (Chānd. 3.15.2) and so on, "may be combined together or not at will", like the sacrificial acts which bring about heaven and the rest as results. Why? "On account of the absence of the former reason," i.e. on account of their not having the same result. Hence it is established that just as (the meditations) which have results other than the attainment of Brahman are to be undertaken at one's will, without any restriction, by those who aim at those results, so, contrarily to them, (the meditations) which have the attainment of Brahman as their result are to be undertaken optionally by one who desires for salvation, as all these meditations produce the very same result.

Here ends the section entitled "Option" (25).

\(^1\) G.B. 3.3.61, p. 226, Chap. 3.
This is śūtra 61 in his commentary. He takes it as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation like Nimbārka’s.

Adhikaraṇa 26: The section entitled “Of the same nature as the bases”.1 (Sūtras 59–64)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 59–62)

SŪTRA 59

“(The meditations based) on the subsidiary parts (of sacrifices) are of the same nature as their bases.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

(The author) raises an objection, viz. On account of numerous indicatory marks, there is a regular inclusion in sacrifices of the meditations based on their subsidiary parts like the udgītha and the rest.

The meditations based on the udgītha and the rest are of the nature of subsidiary parts like the udgītha.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out that the meditations aiming at objects of desire are to be practised at will. Now, although it has been pointed out under the aphorism: “Non-restriction with regard to the specification of that” (Br. Sū. 3.3.41) that those meditations also which are based on the subsidiary parts of sacrifices may be included in those sacrifices at will,—yet with a view to confirming it strongly, (the author) raises an objection, viz. that as these (meditations on the subsidiary parts of sacrifices) subserve those sacrifices, as the subsidiary parts themselves do, they are to be included in sacrifices regularly.

On the doubt, viz. whether the meditations which are based on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, such as the udgītha and the

1 Vide Br. Sū. 3.3.41, where the topic has already been treated.
rest, as set forth in the passages: “Let one meditate on the syllable ‘Om’ as the udgitha” (Chānd. 1.1.1) and so on, are to be included regularly in the sacrificial acts like the subsidiary parts themselves, or at will—(the prima facie objector says:) Regularly like the subsidiary parts themselves. So he says: “In the subsidiary parts” and so on. That is, with regard to the sacrificial acts, the meditations based on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts are “of the same nature as their bases”. The means, just as the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, like the udgitha and the rest, are subsidiary parts, so are the meditations based on them.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 63 in his commentary. He too begins an adhikarana here (continuing up to the end of the chapter), but concerned with an altogether different topic, viz. the meditation on the various limbs of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: “In the limbs (of the Lord), (the qualities or gestures), appropriate to them (are to be meditated on)”. That is, one should meditate on the eyes of the Lord benevolent, the face as smiling and so on”.1

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 60

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF TEACHING.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the teaching, viz. “Let one meditate on the udgitha” (Chānd. 1.1.12), there is a regular inclusion.

Vedānta-kaustubha

And as the passage teaches that these meditations are based on the udgitha: “Let one meditate on the udgitha” (Chand. 1.1.1), there is a regular inclusion of the meditation in sacrificial works.

1 G.B. 3.3.63, p. 230, Chap. 3. 2 R, Śk.
COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 64 in his commentary. He reads "Śiṣṭaiś Ca" instead of "Śiṣṭeś Ca". He continues here the topic of the meditation on the limbs of the Lord. Hence the sūtra: "And (such a meditation is performed) by those who are taught".1

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 61

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF COMBINATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the performance together of the praṇava and the udgitha, in accordance with the text: "From the seat of the Hotṛ2 simply, he sets right the wrong utterances of the udgitha" (Chānd. 1.5.5 3).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And on account of the combination," i.e. performance together, of the praṇava, mentioned in the Rg-veda, and udgitha, mentioned in the Śāma-veda, in accordance with the text: "From the seat of the Hotṛ simply, he sets right the wrong utterances of the udgitha" (Chānd. 1.5.5), it is known that there is a regular inclusion of meditation in sacrificial acts. Owing to the potency of the combination of the praṇava and the udgitha, the priest who chants the udgitha sets right the ‘bad udgitha’, i.e. that udgitha which, though chanted by himself, has been chanted wrongly owing to the lack of his proper knowledge of accents and so on, ‘from the seat of the Hotṛ’, i.e. by means of the work of the Hotṛ, viz. the act of reciting,—this is the meaning of the scriptural text.

1 G.B. 3.3.64, p. 230, Chap. 3.
2 One of the four kinds of officiating priests who recites the Rgveda.
3 Ś, R, Bh, Šk.
This is sūtra 65 in his commentary. It may be objected that a Chandogya text (Chand. 1.6.7) mentions only the lotus-like eyes of the Lord, but not His other limbs. Hence this text must be defective. The answer is: "(There is) no (discrepancy in this text) on account of comprehensiveness". The word "na" (=no) is to be supplied from sūtra 3.3.67. The sense is that the description of the eyes only must be supposed to involve the description of other members of the body of the Lord, and hence the description is not defective.¹

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 62

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL TEXT ABOUT THE COMMONNESS OF ATTRIBUTES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the scriptural text about the commonness of attribute," viz. "Thereby this triad . . . . ² exists" (Chand. 1.1.9).³

Vedānta-kaustubha

And on account of the scriptural mention of the commonness of "attribute", i.e. of the Om-kāra, the basis of meditation, in all sacrificial works, thus: "Thereby this triad . . . . exists" (Chand. 1.1.9). The meaning is that 'thereby', i.e. by the Om-kāra, the basis of meditation, 'the triad exists', i.e. the works mentioned in the three Vedas proceed.⁴ The sense is that those meditations too which are based on

¹ G.B. 3.3.65, p. 231, Chap. 3.
² Correct quotation: "Tenāyaṃ trayi vidyā vartate".
³ Ś, R, Śk.
⁴ The text continues: "With 'Om' the Adhvaryyu gives orders, with 'Om' the Hotṛ recites, with 'Om' the Udgāṭṛ sings".
the subsidiary parts are to be regularly included in those sacrifices, just like the subsidiary parts themselves.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sutra 66 in his commentary. He continues here the topic of the meditation on the limbs of the Lord. He takes this to be setting forth a prima facie view. Hence the sutra: "(Every limb of the Lord must be meditated on as possessed of the powers or attributes of all the rest), on account of a scriptural text about the commonness of attributes." That is, a text in the Bhagavad-gītā, viz. "Everywhere that has hands and feet" (Gītā 13.14), shows that every limb of the Lord can discharge the function of every other limb. Hence every member must be so meditated on.¹

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 63-64)

SŪTRA 63

"OR NOT, ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURE NOT DECLARING (THEIR) ACCOMPANYING (SACRIFICES)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no fixed rule that the meditations on the subsidiary parts of sacrifices are to be included always in those sacrifices, just like the subsidiary parts themselves, since Scripture does not declare them to be subsidiary parts of sacrifices.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now (the author) refutes it.

The statement that there is a regular inclusion, in sacrificial acts, of the meditations based on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts,

¹ G.B. 3.3.66, p. 231, Chap. 3.
such as the udgītha, like those subsidiary parts themselves, is not tenable. Why? "On account of Scripture not declaring (their) accompanying." That is, Scripture declares that the subsidiary parts of sacrifices should always accompany the sacrifices themselves. Compare the text: "Having taken the graha, having raised the camasa, he should begin the stotra (Tait. Sam. 3.1.2, 4). But there is no such declaration about the meditations (on the subsidiary parts).

**COMPARISON**

**Baladeva**

This is sūtra 67 in his commentary. Here he refutes the *prima facie* view, mentioned in the previous sūtra, thus: "Or not, (i.e. every limb of the Lord is to be meditated on as possessed of its peculiar attributes only), because there is no scriptural text (to the effect that it is to be meditated on) as accompanied by (the attributes of other limbs)".5

**CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)**

**SŪTRA 64**

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

This is so also because the scriptural text: "Verily, the Brāhmaṇa priest who knows (or meditates) thus protects the sacrifice, the sacrificer, and all officiating priests" (Chānd. 4.7.10) shows that

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1 A graha is a vessel used for taking out a portion of fluid from a larger vessel, especially a vessel used for taking up the soma-juice.
2 A camasa is a vessel used at sacrifices for drinking the soma-juice.
3 A hymn of praise.
4 P. 247, lines 14-15.
5 G.B. 3.3.67, p. 232, Chap. 3.
6 Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
there is no fixed rule that these meditations are to be regularly included (in the sacrifices).

Here ends the third section of the third quarter of the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts, by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Further, as declared by Scripture itself, there is indeed no fixed rule that the meditations based on the subsidiary parts of sacrifices are to be regularly included in those sacrifices. The scriptural text: “Verily, the Brāhmaṇa priest who knows (or meditates) thus protects the sacrifice, the sacrificer and all officiating priests” (Chānd. 4.7.10), designating the protecting of all sacrifices, sacrificers and the rest of the knowers by the Brāhmaṇa priest, shows that there is no fixed rule about the regular inclusion of meditations. Hence it is established that there is no regular inclusion, in sacrificial acts, of the meditations based on their subsidiary parts, like the udgitha and the rest, but only optional inclusion, like the milking-vessel.

Here ends the section entitled “Of the same nature as the bases” (26).

Here ends the third section of the third quarter of the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the sect of the holy Sanatkumāra.

1 For if meditation were included regularly in all sacrificial acts, then all priests would have such a knowledge and so the text would not have specially announced that a Brāhmaṇa priest who possesses such a knowledge protects others.

2 See under V.P. 3.3.41.
COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 68 in his commentary. "And because it is seen." That is, it is more natural to suppose the eyes to see, the ears to hear and so on than to suppose every other member. Hence the conclusion is that every member of the body of the Lord is to be meditated on as (endowed with its own attributes).¹

Résumé

The third quarter of the third chapter contains:

(1) 64 sūtras and 26 adhikaranas, according to Nimbārka;
(2) 66 sūtras and 36 adhikaranas, according to Śaṃkara;
(3) 64 sūtras and 26 adhikaranas, according to Rāmacanuja;
(4) 65 sūtras and 34 adhikaranas, according to Bhāskara;
(5) 64 sūtras and 36 adhikaranas, according to Śrīkanṭha;
(6) 68 sūtras and 34 adhikaranas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṃkara breaks each of the sūtras 35 and 46 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras.
Rāmacanuja inverts the order of sūtras 31 and 32 in Nimbārka’s commentary.
Bhāskara breaks sūtra 46 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras.
Śrīkanṭha inverts the order of sūtras 29-30, and 31-32 in Nimbārka’s commentary.
Baladeva breaks each of sūtras 3, 35, 46 and 48 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras.

¹ G.B. 3.3.68, p. 232, Chap. 3.
THIRD CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FOURTH QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikarana 1: The section entitled "The end of men". (Sūtras 1-20)

SŪTRA 1

"THE END OF MEN (ARISES) FROM THIS, ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIP-
TURAL STATEMENT, SO BĀDARĀYAṆA THINKS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Brahman can be attained through knowledge 1, "on account of the
scriptural statement", viz.: "The knower of Brahman attains the
highest" (Tait. 2.1 2) "so" the reverend "Bādārāyaṇa" thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the previous quarter, discussions about the non-difference of
meditations, the consequent combination or non-combination of
details and so on were undertaken. Now, in this quarter, the problem
as to whether the end of men arises from knowledge or from action,
its subsidiary part, and so on is being discussed.

On the doubt, viz. whether the end of men results from knowledge
or from action, a subsidiary part of meditation, first (the author)
begins with the correct conclusion. The end, i.e. the purpose, of men,
viz. the attainment of Brahman, arises "from this", i.e. from know-
ledge. Why? "On account of scriptural statement," i.e. on account
of scriptural statements like: "The knower of the self crosses
over grief" (Chāṇḍ. 7.1.3), "Verily, he who knows the Supreme
Brahman becomes Brahman indeed" (Munḍ. 3.2.9), "The knower
of Brahman attains the highest" (Tait. 2.1), "He attains all the worlds"

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1 That is, knowledge leading to meditation, not knowledge in the Śāṇkarite
sense.
2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

( 713 )
(Chānd. 8.7.1, 2.3; 8.12.6) 1, "I know this great person of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness" (Vj.S. 31.18; Śvet. 3.8), "Knowing him thus one becomes immortal on earth; there is no other way to salvation" (Tait. Ār. 3.12 2), "Just as the flowing rivers merge in the sea, discarding names and forms, so a knower, freed from name and form, attains the celestial Person, higher than the high" (Mund. 3.2.8), "When the seer sees the Golden-coloured creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahma, then the knower, having discarded merit and demerit, stainless attains the highest equality" (Mund. 3.1.3) and so on,—"so" the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

The word "puruṣārtha" does not mean only 'salvation' according to him, but all the four ends of men, viz. religious merit, wealth, enjoyment and salvation. The prima facie view is that meditation brings about salvation only and not heaven and the rest. The answer is that not only salvation, but all the four end of men arise from meditation.8

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 2–7)

SŪTRA 2

"ON ACCOUNT OF BEING COMPLEMENTARY, (THE STATEMENTS ABOUT THE FRUITS) ARE GLORIFICATION OF THE MAN, JUST AS IN OTHER CASES, SO JAIMINI (THinks)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As knowledge effects the purification of the agent who is a subsidiary part of action, it is but a subsidiary part of action, on account of the agent "being complementary" to action. The scriptural statement about the fruit is "glorification", just like the script-

1 Correct quotation: "Sarvāṁś ca", vide Chānd., p. 440.
2 P. 199.
3 G.B. 3.4.1.
Having thus begun with the correct conclusion of the Upaniṣads, now (the author) is stating the *prima facie* view.

Knowledge is a subsidiary part of action. Why? “On account of being complementary,” i.e. because the self, which to be known, stands in a complementary relation to action, in consequence of being the agent, i.e. because any effort towards acts having heaven and the rest as their ends is possible if there be the knowledge of the self as different from the body and the rest on the part of the agent. Hence as knowledge effects the purification of the agent, it too is a subsidiary element of action. The scriptural statements about the fruit, on the other hand, such as: “The knower of the self crosses over grief” (Chānd. 7.1.3), “The knower of Brahman attains the highest” (Tait. 2.1) and so on, may be taken as a “glorification of the man”, i.e. mere glorification, “just as in other cases”, i.e. just as in the case of objects, purification and acts, the scriptural statements about the fruit are mere glorifications.

Thus, with regard to objects, there is the passage: “He whose sacrificial ladle is made of the pāṇa-wood does not hear sinful verse” (Tait. Saṃ. 3.5.7); with regard to purification, the passage: “He who anoints his eyes wards off the eye of his enemy”; and with regard to acts, the passage: “He who performs the prayāja and the anuyāja sacrifices makes, forsooth, an armour for this sacrifice” and

1 The object, viz. the ladle, made of the pāṇa-wood, is a subsidiary part of the sacrifice and hence the fruit ascribed to it, viz. the hearing of non-sinful verses, subserves the purpose of the sacrifice, i.e. glorifies it. Similarly, the agent, i.e. the sacrificer, is a subsidiary part of sacrifice, and hence the fruit ascribed to the knowledge of the self of the sacrificer subserves the sacrifice, i.e. glorifies it, but such a knowledge has no independent fruit of its own.

2 That is, the agent, the sacrificer, cannot undertake the performance of sacrifices, leading to heaven and so on, unless he first knows that his soul is different from and survives the body, for evidently the body does not go to heaven, but the soul only. This knowledge of the real nature of the self as distinct from the body, therefore, qualifies the agent for undertaking the performance of sacrifices and as such is a complementary factor of sacrifices.

so on. It has been said: "The statement about the end attained with regard to substance, quality and purification must be glorification, because they subserve the purpose of another" (Pu. Mi. Sū. 4.3.1). So is the case here too,—"so" the teacher "Jaimini" thinks.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 3

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE OBSERVATION OF CONDUCT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of the conduct of Janaka and others as declared by the scriptural text: "Verily, Janaka, the king of Videha, performed a sacrifice in which many presents were given" (Brh. 3.1.1) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected that in accordance with the aphorisms, viz.: "Not the other, on account of inappropriateness" (Br. Sū. 1.1.17), "And on account of the designation of difference" (Br. Sū. 1.1.22), "And on account of inappropriateness, not the embodied one" (Br. Sū. 1.2.3) and so on; in accordance with the scriptural texts, viz.: "The eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious, the one among the many, who grants desires" (Kaṭha 5.13; Śvet. 6.13), "There are two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord" (Śvet. 1.9), "The Lord of matter and soul, the controller of qualities, the cause of transmigratory existence, salvation, continuance and bondage" (Śvet. 6.16), "He is the cause, the lord of the lord of the sense-organs" (Śvet. 6.9), "He who is omniscient and all-knowing" (Mund. 1.1.9; 2.2.7) and so on; and in accordance with the Smṛti-texts, viz.: "Because I surpass the perishable and am superior to the imperishable also, I am celebrated in world and in the Veda as the highest Person" (Gitā 15.18) and so on, the Highest Self, different in nature from the individual soul,

1 P. 487, vol. 1. 2 Ś, R, Bh, B.
has been established as the object to be known. He is not complementary to action. Hence the knowledge relating to Him is not a subsidiary part of action,—

(We reply:) On the ground of the indicatory marks mentioned by the Vedānta-texts themselves, the Vedānta-texts are concerned with the real nature of the agent, different from his body. Those indicatory marks are being stated.

As Janaka and others, possessed of the knowledge of Brahman, are said to perform Sacrifices, etc., with knowledge, by scriptural and Smṛti texts like: "Verily, Janaka, the king of Videha, performed a sacrifice in which many presents were given" (Bṛh. 3.1.1), "For by work alone Janaka and others attained to perfection" (Gītā 3.20) and so on, knowledge is a subsidiary part of action.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 4

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL STATEMENT ABOUT THAT." ¹

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the scriptural statement" about the subserviency of knowledge to action, viz.: "What alone one does with knowledge, with faith, with the mystic doctrine, that alone becomes more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10 ²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

"That," i.e. the fact that knowledge is a subsidiary part of action, is indeed reasonable. Why? "On account of the scriptural statement", viz.: "What alone one does with knowledge, with faith and the mystic doctrine, that alone becomes more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10).

¹ Note that while Nimbārka understands the word "tac chruteh" as a compound word and explains it as "tasya śruteḥ", Śrīnivāsa understands it as "Tat śruteḥ"—two separate words.

² Ś, R, Bh, Šk, B.
Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because the association of knowledge and work is declared by the text: "Knowledge and work lay hold of him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2).  

Vedānta-kaustubha

On account of the scriptural statement about the association of knowledge and work too, viz. "Knowledge and work lay hold of him" (Chand. 1.1.10), it is known that knowledge is a subsidiary part of work.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 6

"ON ACCOUNT OF ENJOINMENT (OF WORK) ON THE PART OF ONE HAVING THAT (VIZ. KNOWLEDGE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And "on account of the enjoinment" of work in the passage: "Having studied the Veda in the house of a teacher in accordance with rules in (the leisure) time left over from doing work for the teacher, having returned to his own home, studying his sacred text in some clean spot" (Chānd. 8.15.1).  

Vedānta-kaustubha

"On account of the enjoinment" of work "on the part of one having that", i.e. on the part of one possessed of the knowledge of

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2 The C.S.S. ed., p. 71, adds "on the part of one possessed of knowledge".
3 Ś, R, Bh, Šk.
all the Vedas, by the scriptural text, viz.: "Having studied the Veda in the house of a teacher, according to rules in time left over from doing work for the teacher, having returned to his own home, studying his sacred text in a clean spot" (Chānd. 8.15.1), knowledge is a subsidiary part of work.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 7

"And on account of restriction."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the restriction," viz.: "Only doing work here, let one desire to live a hundred years", and so on (Īśā 2) ¹.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And on account of the restriction," viz.: "Only doing work here, let one desire to live a hundred years. Thus work adheres to you, to a man. There is no other way than that" (Īśā 2), knowledge is subservient to work alone.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 8–20)

SŪTRA 8

"But on account of the teaching of what is superior, such (is the view) of Bādarāyaṇa, on account of that being seen."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it, we reply:

"On account of the teaching" of the Lord of all, the controller of all, who is "superior to" the individual soul, the agent, as the object

¹ Ś, R, Bh, Šk, B.
to be known,—the view of the reverend "Bādarāyana" is that "the end of men arises from this" (Br. Sū. 3.4.1), "On account of that being seen" from the texts: "He is the Lord of all" (Brh. 4.4.22 1), "Entered within, the ruler of men" (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2 2), "The ruler of all, the controller of all" (Brh. 4.4.22 3), "I ask about that Person taught in the Upaniṣads" (Brh. 3.9.26 4), "The word which all the Vedas record" (Kaṭha 2.15 5) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

On this suggestion, (the author) replies:

The word "but" is for disposing of the prima facie view. The view of Jaimini,—that by way of effecting the purification of what is complementary to work, viz. the agent, knowledge, obtainable from the Upaniṣads, is a subsidiary part of work,—is not correct. On the contrary, "on account of the teaching of what is superior" to the individual soul, the agent, possessed of the stated marks, i.e. as the Highest Person,—the soul of all, free by nature from all faults, an abode of a mass of auspicious qualities, possessed of natural, infinite and inauspicious powers, the cause of the world, the Lord of matter and soul and the Lord of all,—is taught as the object of knowledge, as He alone is established as the object to be known by the Vedāntas, the end of men arises from knowledge,—"such" is the view of the reverend "Bādarāyana". Why? "On account of that being seen," i.e. because texts are found which establish "that", viz. the Highest Self alone, the object to be known, i.e. a multitude of texts are found establishing Him, such as: "All this has that for its self" (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), "Higher than the imperishable, the high" (Mund. 2.1.2), "Free from sins, ageless, deathless, griefless, without hunger, without thirst, having true desires, having true resolves" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3), "He who is omniscient, all-knowing" (Mund. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), "He consists of infinite auspicious qualities.—He is possessed of might, power, lordship and supreme knowledge" (V.P. 6.5.84 6), "Supreme is his power, declared to be of various kinds, and natural is the operation of his knowledge and might" (Śvet. 6.8), "He is the cause, the lord of the lord of the sense-organs" (Śvet. 6.9),

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"The lord of matter and souls" (Śvet. 6.16), "The word which all the Vedas record" (Kaṭha 2.15), "I ask that Person taught in the Upaniṣads" (Brh. 3.9.26), "I am the source of all, everything originates from me" (Gītā 10.8), "There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanaṇḍajaya" (Gītā 7.7), "And by all the Vedas I alone am to be known" (Gītā 15.15) and so on.

**COMPARISON**

**Baladeva**

He interprets the sūtra thus:

"But on account of the teaching (of vidyā as) more than (or superior to) (karma)—." ¹

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**CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)**

**SŪTRA 9**

"But the scriptural declaration is equal."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

"The scriptural declaration,"—viz.: "For what purpose shall we study, for what purpose shall we perform sacrifices" ² and so on,—establishing that knowledge is not a subsidiary part of work, is of equal weight.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

To the objection, viz.: "On account of conduct being seen" (Br. Sū. 3.4.3), knowledge is a subsidiary part of work,—we reply:

"The scriptural declaration" of the non-performance of works by knowers, establishing that knowledge is not a subsidiary part of action, is of equal weight, such as: "Knowing this, forsooth, the sages descended from Kavaṣa said: 'For what purpose shall we study, for what purpose shall we perform sacrifices?'", "Knowing this,

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¹ G.B. 3.4.8, pp. 240-241, Chap. 1.
² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
indeed, those ancient ones did not perform the Agni-hotra sacrifice” (Kaus. 2.51), “Verily, having known that self, the Brāhmaṇas, rising above the desires for sons, the desires for wealth,—live the life of mendicants” (Brh. 3.5.1). Our view is that the performance of works without any desire for results, but only with a desire for knowledge, is justified. This (the author) will state under the aphorism “And reference to all, on account of the scriptural text about sacrifice and so on, as in the case of a horse” (Br. Sū. 3.4.26). It has been stated by the Lord too thus: “By work also, Janaka and others attained perfection” (Gītā 3.20), and “The knowers should similarly act without attachment, desiring the welfare of the world” (Gītā 3.25). The sense is that if we hold that knowledge is a subsidiary part of work, then the scriptural text about the non-performance of work will come to be contradicted.  

**CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)**

**SŪTRA 10**

“(The text quoted by the prima facie objector is) non-universal.”

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

The scriptural text, viz.: “What alone one does with knowledge” (Chānd. 1.1.10 4) is not concerned with all sorts of knowledge.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

To the objection, viz.: “On account of the scriptural statement of that” (Br. Sū. 3.4.4), we reply:

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1 For correct quotation see Kauṣ., p. 114.

2 ‘Desires for worlds.’

3 I.e. if we hold that knowledge is not a subsidiary part of work, then those texts which do enjoin the performance of works on the part of knowers may very well be explained as enjoining the performance of works in a purely disinterested spirit with a view to the attainment of knowledge. But if we hold that knowledge is a subsidiary part of work, then those scriptural texts which enjoin the non-performance of action cannot be explained in any way.

4 Ś, R, Śk, Bh, B.
The scriptural text: "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10), referring to the udgitha alone, is "non-universal", i.e. is not concerned with all sorts of knowledge.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 11

"The division (is) as in the case of a hundred."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "Knowledge and work lay hold of him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2), "the division" is to be known just like the division of a hundred (coins) for the sake of a two-fold fruit.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: "On account of laying hold of" (Br. Sū. 3.4.5), we reply:

In the text: "Knowledge and work lay hold of him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2), a "division" is to be known, viz. knowledge lays hold of him for bringing about its own special result and work for its own special result, "as in the case of a hundred". That is, just as when for the accomplishment of two purposes it is said: 'give him a hundred (coins)', these are divided and fifty are given for one purpose, fifty for the other,—so is the case here.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 12

"On the part of one who has only read the Veda."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "Having studied the Veda in the house of a preceptor" (Chānd. 8.15.1), work is enjoined "on the part of one who has only read the Veda".

2 Ś, R, Śk.
To the objection, viz. "On account of the enjoinment on the part of one having that" (Br. Śū. 3.4.6), we reply:

In the text: "Having studied the Veda in the house of a preceptor" (Chānd. 8.15.1), work is enjoined "on the part of one who has only read" the Veda, but not on the part of one who possesses knowledge, so knowledge cannot be taken to be a subsidiary part of work. Though one who has not studied the Purva-tantra may, in accordance with the injunction about the Vedic study, viz. "Let one study the Veda", labour with great care to master the Veda, and though he may attain a little knowledge, yet since he lacks the knowledge of the real nature of religious duties and the method of performing them, demonstrated in the Purva-tantra, he, as dependent on that tantra, comes to have a reading knowledge only of the Veda, but does not know the meaning thereof. The meaning of the Veda, on the other hand, according to the author of the Purva-tantra, is attainable through an investigation into that tantra. But, in our view, even one who after studying the Veda, has come to know the mystery of religious duties and even one who knows everything in a general way, is said to have only read the Veda, since he has not investigated into the Vedānta, designating Brahman, the primary meaning of all the Vedas. Work is enjoined in that text on the part of such a one, but not on the part of a knower,—such is the view of the reverend author of the aphorisms.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 13

"Not (so), on account of non-specification."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā

And also because the text about restriction does not necessarily refer to the knower.

1 I.e. the Purva-mīmāṃsa.
To the objection: “On account of restriction” (Br. Sū. 3.4.7), we reply:

It cannot be said on the ground of the text: “Only doing work here” (Īśā 2) that knowledge is a subsidiary part of work. Why? “On account of non-specification,” i.e. because the text contains no specification, viz.: ‘knowers doing work’ and so on.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 14

“OR THE PERMISSION (OF WORK) IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF EULOGY.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The allowing of work to one who knows, viz. “only doing work here” (Īśā 2), is “for the purpose of eulogizing” knowledge.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Since the text begins with knowledge thus:

“By the Lord all this is to be enveloped. Whatever is moving in this moving world, having that renounced, enjoy. Do not covet the wealth of any one” (Īśā 1), it is ascertained that it is specially concerned with the knower,—(the author) says:

“The permission,” i.e. allowing of, work to a knower is “for the purpose of eulogizing” knowledge. Though doing work so long as he lives, a knower is not touched by karmas,—thus there is an eulogy of knowledge here, in accordance with the concluding text: “Thus, work adheres not to you, to a man, there is no other way than that” (Īśā 2), as well as in accordance with the statement by the Lord: “Though ever doing all works, one who has resorted to me, attains the eternal and immutable place through my grace” (Gitā 18.56), “He who thus knows me is not bound by works” (Gitā 4.14) and so on.
"And some (branches designate that knowers give up work) according to voluntary procedure."

Vedanta-parijata-saurabha

For this very reason, "some" designate the voluntary giving up of the life of a house-holder by the knowers thus: ‘‘What shall we do with progeny, we whose is this soul, this world?’’ (Brh. 4.4.22).

Vedanta-kaustubha

"Some," i.e. the members of one branch, record the giving up by the knowers of progeny and the rest, involving the performance of action, "according to voluntary procedure", i.e. voluntarily indeed, thus: "Knowing this, forsooth, those ancient ones did not wish for progeny", ‘‘What shall we do with progeny, we whose is this soul, this world?’’ (Brh. 4.4.22). The sense is that such a giving up of the life of a house-holder fits in if knowledge be not complementary to work, but not if it be so.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He begins a new adhikarana here (eleven sutras), concerned with the power of vidya. He substitutes "Va" in place of "Ca". Hence the sutra means: "Or some (hold that a knower of Brahman may act) according to (his) liking". That is, such great is the glory of vidya that one who has attained vidya may act just as he likes, or omit to act yet be not subject to consequences, good or bad.

1 Ś, R, Bh, Šk.
2 G.B. 3.4.15, p. 250, Chap. 3.
"And (there is) the destruction (of work by knowledge)."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

For this very reason texts declare "the destruction" of work by knowledge, thus "And his works perish, when he who is high and low is seen" (Mund. 2.2.8).

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

"And" texts record "the destruction" of work,—the cause of the three kinds of miseries, and consisting in good and bad deeds,—by knowledge, thus: "The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are cut off and all his works perish, when he who is high and low is seen" (Mund. 2.2.8) and so on. There are statements by the Lord too, viz. "Him whose works are burnt off by knowledge the wise call a knower" (Gītā 4.19), "The fire of knowledge reduces all works to ashes, O Arjuna!" (Gītā 4.3.7).

**COMPARISON**

**Baladeva**

Interpretation same, but he is of the opinion that even prārabdha-karmas may be destroyed by vidyā.⁰¹

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⁰¹ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

⁰² G.B. 3.4.17, pp. 251-252, Chap. 3. "Yadyapi sarvāṇi karmāṇi nirdagdhum vidyā samarthā tathāpi tat-sampradāya-pracārārthaēsvarec chaiva dehārambhakam karma na nirdahati."
SŪTRA 17

“AND (KNOWLEDGE ARISES) IN ONE WHO IS CHASTE FOR (SUCH A STAGE OF LIFE IS DECLARED) IN SCRIPTURAL TEXT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“And” because knowledge is found to arise in those stages of life which are given to chastity, its independence is definitely ascertained. These (stages) are found in the scriptural text: “There are three branches of religious duty” (Chānd. 2.23.1).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Scripture declares that knowledge of Brahman arises even in those stages of life which are given to chastity, i.e. in which the duties of a house-holder are absent; and Scripture does not mention works, like Agni-hotra and the rest in them. This also proves that knowledge is something independent.

To the objection, viz. The text: “As long as he lives” contains a reference to works like Agni-hotra and the rest. Like those, those stages of life are not mentioned in the Veda,—we reply: “Because in scriptural text”. Those stages of life are mentioned “in scriptural text”, i.e. in the Veda, in passages like: “There are three branches of religious duty” (Chānd. 2.23.1), “And those who meditate on faith and austerity in the forest” (Chānd. 5.10.1), “Wishing for the world alone the mendicants wander forth” (Brh. 4.4.22). Hence there are indeed such stages of life. The scriptural text: “He performs the Agni-hotra sacrifice as long as he lives”, on the other hand, refers to those who are attached to worldly life.

1 Ś, R, Bh, Šk.
SūTRA 18

“(THERE IS ONLY) A REFERENCE (TO THOSE STAGES OF LIFE), JAIMINI (THINKS SO), ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING NO INJUNCTION, FOR (SCRIPTURE) CONDEMONS (SUCH STAGES OF LIFE).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: “There are three branches of religious duty” (Chand. 2.23.11), there is only a re-mention of those stages of life, in view of the fact that there is no injunctive word there. Also as the text: “He who extinguishes the gods” (Tait. Saṃ. 1.5.2) contains a condemnation of other stages of life, such stages are not to be adopted,—such is the view of “Jaimini”.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The statement that such stages of life are mentioned in scriptural texts and hence they exist,—is not justifiable, since when the section concerned with the injunction about the worship of the Sāman has been fully expounded, Scripture, changing the subject, makes “a reference”, i.e. a re-mention simply, in the text: “There are three branches of religious duty” (Chānd. 2.23.1), of those stages of life which are celebrated in Smṛti, with a view to eulogizing a separate meditation on Brahman as the praṇava, that being the subject of discussion; but does not enjoin them. Why? “On account of the absence of any injunctive text.” And, scriptural texts like: “He who extinguishes the fire is the slayer of the hero among the gods” (Tait. Saṃ. 1.5.2), “After having brought an acceptable gift to the teacher do not cut off the line of progeny” (Tait. 1.11), “He who is childless does not possess the world” (Ait. Br. 33.1) and so on, “condemn” other stages of life. Hence the stage of a house-holder is to be adopted and not other stages,—so the teacher “Jaimini” thinks.

1 Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
2 P. 57, lines 5-6, vol. 1. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
3 Vide Chand. 2.22.
4 P. 838, Ānandāśrama sans. series ed.
COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

They read “acodanā” in place of “acodanāt”,¹ and begin a new adhikaraṇa. Interpretation same.

Śrikanṭha

He too begins a new adhikaraṇa here. Interpretation same.

Baladeva

He too reads “acodanā” and interprets this śūtra differently thus: “(There is a favourable) reference (to works in Scripture), Jaimini (thinks so), (there is) no injunction (with regard to the giving up of works), because (Scripture) condemns (such a giving up of works)”. That is, here the opponent objects to the view that a knower may or may not act at will ² by pointing out that even a knower cannot give up all works. All that he is at liberty to do is to perform the obligatory duties at any time he likes unlike ordinary men who must do them at the fixed time only,—but cannot altogether omit them.³

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

ŚŪTRA 19

“(THEY ARE) TO BE ADOPTED, BĀDARĀYĀNA (THINKS SO), ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION OF EQUALITY.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since in the text concerned with explanatory re-mention, ⁴ the other stage of life is mentioned as equal to the stage of a house-

¹ S.B. 3.4.18, p. 863; Bh. B. 3.4.18, p. 204.
² Vide G.B. 3.4.15.
³ G.B. 3.4.18, pp. 254-255, Chap. 3.
⁴ Viz. Chānd. 2.23.1.
holder, the former "is to be adopted,"—so the reverend "Bādarāyāṇa" thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The other stage of life "is to be adopted,"—so the reverend "Bādarāyāṇa" thinks. Why? "On account of the scriptural mention of equality," i.e. because the other stage of life is mentioned in Scripture as equal to the stage of a house-holder. Thus, in the text: "There are three branches of knowledge, sacrifice, study and charity are the first; austerity alone is the second; a student of sacred knowledge dwelling in the house of a preceptor is the third" (Chānd. 2.23.1) there is an equal inclusion of all the stages of life. Among these, the stage of a house-holder is indicated by the words 'sacrifice, study' and so on. The stage of a religious student is referred to by that very word. The stages of a hermit in the forest 1 and of an ascetic 2 are referred to by the word 'austerity'.

If those who belong to these stages of life devote themselves to the duties incumbent thereon desiring for enjoyment, then they come to attain a world leading to return, in accordance with the scriptural text: "All these become possessors of meritorious worlds" (Chānd. 2.23.1). But one who knows the truth about the Lord, who is desirous of salvation, who is favoured by the Lord and who is devoted to Him, attains His nature. The concluding text: "One who stands on Brahman attains immortality" (Chānd. 2.23.1) intimates this, in conformity with the statement by the Lord: "Among thousands of men, scarce one strives for perfection; even among the perfected ones who strive, scarce one knows me in truth" ' (Gītā 7.3), "The worlds up to the world of Brahmā come and go, O Arjuna! But on attaining me, O son of Kuntī, there is no more rebirth" ' (Gītā 8.16).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Here he replies to the opponent thus: "(The obligatory duties) are to be performed, Bādarāyāṇa (thinks so) on account of the scriptural mention of equality". That is, a knower of Brahman may perform the obligatory duties partially just as he likes, but is not

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1 Vāna-prastha.
2 Sannyāsa.
required to perform them exhaustively, like ordinary men. Scripture states that such a partial performance by a knower is equal to a full performance by ordinary men.1

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 20

"Or, (there is) an injunction, as in the case of holding."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is indeed “an injunction”. Just as with regard to the enjoined Agni-hotra, it is said in Scripture: “Let him follow holding the sacrificial faggot below (the ladle). He holds it above for the gods” (Āp. Ś.S. 9.11.8-9),—in this text the holding above (of the faggot) by separating (it) is enjoined, since it is something new (not enjoined anywhere)—so is the case here.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having thus pointed out that even if we hold that there is (only) a re-mention (of those stages of life and not injunction), still then the other stage of life may be proved to exist, (the author now) points out that in this text there is indeed an injunction with regard to them and not a re-mention.

The word “or” implies emphasis. In the stated text there is indeed “an injunction” with regard to those stages of life. Apprehending the objection that the text will cease to be a coherent and unbroken whole if it be admitted that in one and the same text there is an injunction with regard to many stages of life,—(the author) says: “As in the case of holding”. Just as with regard to the enjoined Agni-hotra it is declared by Scripture: “Let him follow holding the

1 G.B. 3.4.19, p. 255-256, Chap. 3.
3 Other editions read “vākyam” instead of “vākya”.
17B
sacrificial faggot below (the ladle). He holds it above for the gods” (Āp. Ś.S. 9.11.8-9)—here though occurring in the same sentence with the holding of the faggot below the ladle, the holding of the faggot, by separating it, over the clarified butter placed in a ladle is enjoined because of being something new (not enjoined before), so here too. It has been said in the section treating of what is complementary (action): “But (there is) an injunction with regard to the holding, on account of being something new” (Pū. Mī. Śū. 3.4.3 2).

Although with regard to this stage of life, there is an injunction celebrated in a text of the Jābāla, viz. “Having completed the life of a religious student, let one become a house-holder. Having become a house-holder, let one become a dweller in the forest. Having become a dweller in the forest, let one wander forth. Or else, let one wander forth from the very life of a religious student, or from the house, or from the forest. The day one gets indifferent to the world, let him wander forth on that very day” (Jābāla 4),—yet it is shown by his Holiness that the other stage of life occurs in other texts as well irrespective of that,—this is to be understood here. The texts, viz. “He who extinguishes the fire is the slayer of the hero of the gods” (Tait. Saṃ. 1.5.2). “After having brought an acceptable gift for the teacher, let him not cut off the line of progeny” (Tait. I. II), “One who is childless does not possess the world” (Ait. Br. 33.1) and so on, are concerned with people hankering after enjoyment. Hence it is established that the end of men arises from knowledge.

Here ends the section entitled “The end of Men” (1).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He continues here the same topic, viz. whether a knower of Brahman must work or not. Hence the sūtra: “Or (the text designating

1 I.e. the above passage may be conceived as a coherent and unbroken whole if we take it to be referring to one thing only, viz. the holding of the faggot below. Nevertheless, we conceive it as enjoining the holding of the faggot above too, since this latter is not enjoined anywhere else.

2 The sūtra really reads: “Vidhistu apūrvatvāt syāt”.
that a knower of Brahman may perform his duties in any way is) an injunction, like the holding (i.e. studying)". That is, the above text is an injunction with reference to the parinīṣṭha devotees, allowing them to act according to their will, just like the injunction, viz. that a Brāhmaṇa is to be initiated in order that he may study the Veda.¹

Adhikarana 2: The section entitled "A Mere Eulogy". (Sūtras 21-22)

SŪTRA 21

"If it be objected that (the texts about the best essence and the like are mere eulogy, on account of taking (them as connected with parts of sacrifices,) (then we reply:) No, on account of being new."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that texts like: "This is the best essence among the essences" (Chānd. 1.1.3 ²) and so on, are "mere eulogy" of udgīthā and the rest, the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, since the best essence and the rest are taken as related to them,—(we reply:) "No". This being not established before, here there is an injunction with regard to the udgīthā and the rest to be looked upon as the best essence.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been established above that since in the text: "There are three branches" (Chānd. 2.2.3, 1) and so on, the other stage of life is mentioned as equal to the stage of a house-holder, the former is to be adopted. Similarly, as the groups of texts about the best essence are similar to the texts about the sacrificial ladle the sun and so on which relate to the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, the former too are subsidiary parts of such acts,—apprehending this objection, (the author) is now disposing of it.

¹ G.B. 3.4.20, p. 257, Chap. 3.
² Ś, R, Bh, Šk.
Under the udgītha-meditation and the like, the following are mentioned by Scripture: “This is the best essence among the essences, the supreme and the highest place, the eighth,—the udgītha” (Chand. 1.1.3), “The Ric is this earth indeed, the Sāman the fire” (Chand. 1.6.1), “Verily, this world is the piled up fire” (Śat. Br. 10.5.4, 11), “This earth forsooth, is the hymn” (Āit. Ār. 2.1.2) and so on. Here the doubt is, viz. whether the texts about the best essence and so on are concerned simply with an eulogy of the udgītha and the rest which are subsidiary parts of sacrifices, or whether they enjoin the udgītha and the rest to be looked upon as the best essence and so on. With regard to this, (the author) states the *prima facie* view: “If it be objected: mere eulogy, on account of taking”. That is, they are concerned simply with eulogy. Why? “On account of taking,” i.e. as the groups of texts about the best essence and so on are similar to the texts eulogizing the subsidiary parts of sacrificial parts, such as: “This earth indeed in the sacrificial ladle, the sun the tortoise, the heavenly world the āhavanīya-fire”, and so on, they must be taken as concerned with the glorification of udgītha and the rest which are subordinate members of sacrificial acts.

To this we say: “No.” This cannot be said. Why? “On account of being something new,” i.e. because the udgītha and the rest are not established as the best of essence by any other means or proof. The injunction refers to the udgītha and the rest to be looked upon as the best essence and so on, it being unreasonable to take a text to be concerned with the glorification of the udgītha and the rest, enjoined in a different place, when it is possible to interpret it in relation to its own context.

**COMPARISON**

**Baladeva**

He does not begin a new adhikarana here, but continues the topic of the previous section, viz. that a knower of Brahman is at liberty to act at will. Hence the sūtra: “If it be said that (the texts allowing a knower to act at will are) mere glorification, on account of (their) reference (to works), (we reply:) No, on account of being

1 P. 798, line 17.
2 P. 101.
something new”. That is, that a knower is at liberty to act at will is not enjoined before, and it is enjoined in the above texts.¹

SŪTRA 22

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF TEXTS (INDICATIVE OF) THE EXISTENCE (OF INJUNCTION).”

Vedānta-pārljāta-saurabha

“And” on account of the injunctive “text”, viz. “Let one meditate on the udgīthā” (Chānd. 1.1.1²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

“And” on account of injunctive “texts” like: “Let one meditate on the udgīthā” (Chānd. 1.1.1), “Let one meditate on the sāman” (Chānd. 2.2.1) and so on, it is established that the quoted texts enjoin the udgīthā and the rest to be viewed (i.e. meditated on) as the best essence and so on.

Here ends the section entitled “Mere Eulogy” (2).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Here he concludes the topic that a knower may perform actions at will. Thus the sūtra: “And on account of texts (indicative of) intense love”. That is, the parinīṣṭha devotee is so absorbed in love and devotion for the Lord that he has no time for performing ordinary works.³

¹ G.B. 3.4.21, pp. 257-258, Chap. 3.
² Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
³ G.B. 3.4.22, pp. 258-259, Chap. 3.
Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled “The legends recited at the Aśva-medha”. (Sūtras 23-24)

Sūtra 23

“If it be said that (the scriptural stories) are meant to be recited at the Aśva-medha, (we reply:) No, on account of being specified.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā

It is not to be thought that the scriptural stories in the Vedāntas are meant to be recited at the Aśva-medha sacrifice,—since only some are specified (to be so) by texts, beginning: “He is to tell the legends recited at the Aśva-medha” and continuing: “Manu, Vivasvat’s son, the King” (Śat. Br. 13.4.3, 32) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection that the texts about the best essence are concerned with something else, it has been shown that they relate to meditation (and not to action). Similarly, apprehending the objection that the texts dealing with particular stories are concerned with something else, (the author) shows that they (too) relate to meditation.

In the different Vedāntas, there are many texts relating stories, such as: “Forsooth, Pratārdana, the son of Divodāsa, went to the favourite place of Indra” (Kaus. 3.1), “Now, there was Jānaśruti, the great-grandson (of Janaśruti) a pious giver, a liberal donor, a preparer of much food” (Chānd. 4.1.1), “Now, there was Śvetaketu, the son of Aruṇa” (Chānd. 6.1.1), “Yājñavalkya had two wives, Maitreyī and Kātyāyani” (Brh. 4.5.1) and so on. Here the doubt is, viz. whether they are meant to be recited at the Aśva-medha sacrifice, or whether they subserve the injunction of meditation. What is reasonable to begin with? “If it be said that they are meant to be recited at the Aśva-medha, (we reply) no.” Why? “On

1 A pārīplava is a legend to be recited at the Aśva-medha sacrifice and repeated at certain intervals throughout the year.
2 Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
account of being specified," i.e. in the text beginning: "He is to tell the legends recited at the Aśva-medha" and continuing: "Manu, Vivasvat's son, the King" (Śat. Br. 13.4.3, 3) and so on, certain texts alone are specified as those to be recited at the Aśva-medha.

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

He takes this sūtra and the next as constituting a single sūtra, and reads "pāriplavārtha" instead of "pāriplavārthā" 1.

SŪTRA 24

"And this being so, on account of the connection (of these stories with meditation) as forming part of a coherent whole."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

This being so, on account of the connection" of other (stories) with injunction,—such as: "Should be seen" (Brh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6) and so on—"as forming part of a coherent whole", they subserve the purpose of meditation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"And this being so," i.e. all the scriptural stories being not legends to be recited at the Aśva-medha, only some being so, these former scriptural stories subserve the end of the injunction of meditation, "on account of their connection" with injunctions like "O, the self should be seen" (Brh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6) and so on, "as forming part of a coherent whole". Hence it is established that the scriptural stories subserve the purpose of the injunction of meditation.

Here ends the section entitled "The legends recited at the Aśva-medha" (3).

1 Bh. B. 3.4.23, p. 207.  
2 Ś, R, Bh, B.
Sūtra 25

"And for this very reason, (in the case of those who observe chastity, knowledge is) independent of the kindling of fire and so on."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

In accordance with the scriptural text: "One who is devoted to Brahman goes to immortality" (Chānd. 2.23.11), in the case of those who are bound by chastity, knowledge is "independent of the kindling of fire and so on".

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

It has been stated above that the stages belonging to one bound by chastity are mentioned in Scripture. Immediately after that, two more points were considered by reason of their association with what has been shown. Now, on the doubt, viz. whether by reason of the absence of acts like sacrifices and so on which are subsidiary parts of knowledge, knowledge too, the whole, is possible in those stages or not: and on the suggestion that it is not possible, but is possible in the stage of a house-holder, involving the knowledge of sacrifices and so on,—(the author) states the correct conclusion.

From the scriptural texts, such as: "Desiring which people live the life of religious studentship that word I declare to you in brief" (Kaṭha 2.15), "Desiring this world alone mendicants wander forth" (Brh. 4.4.22), "One who stands firm on Brahman attains immortality" (Chānd. 2.23.2), "And those who meditate on faith and austerity in the forest" (Chānd. 5.10.1) and so on, they (viz. those who are bound by chastity) are known to have knowledge. "And for this very reason," it is definitely ascertained that in their case knowledge is "independent of the kindling of fire and so on", i.e. independent

2 Viz. that the (a) udgitha texts and (b) the scriptural stories subserve the purpose of meditation.
of the sacrificial acts to be accomplished by placing the fire on the sacrificial fire-place, i.e. is brought about by the proper duties, incumbent on their own stage of life, such as hearing, thinking, meditating and so on. During the stage of a house-holder there being a variety of unavoidable worldly and scriptural duties, the full development of knowledge, the means to the highest end of men, is not possible; and hence the intentional giving up of the life of a house-holder for the sake of that (viz. knowledge) is known from Scripture itself. Therefore, it is established that in the case of those who are bound by chastity, knowledge is all the more possible.

Here ends the section entitled “The kindling of fire” (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

While Nimbārka holds that knowledge is independent of works only in the case of those who are bound by chastity, Śaṅkara is of the opinion that this is so in all cases, and does not speak here especially of those only who observe chastity. Accordingly he, interprets the phrase “ata eva” as “because the highest end of men arises from knowledge” (established Br. Śū. 3.4.1 1).

Baladeva

He also does not speak here of those alone who are bound by chastity. Hence the sūtra: “For this very reason, (i.e. because vidyā is independent of karma, it) does not depend on the kindling of fire and the like, (for manifesting its fruit)”. That is, there is no necessity for a combination of vidyā and karma for leading to salvation, but vidyā alone is sufficient.2

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1 Ś.B. 3.4.25, p. 874.
2 G.B. 3.4.25.
ADH. 5.

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Adhikarana 5: The section entitled “Dependence on all”. (Sūtra 26)

SŪTRA 26

“And dependence on all, in accordance with the scriptural text about sacrifice and so on, as in the case of a horse.”

Vedanta-pārijāta-saurabha

In accordance with the scriptural text: “Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by the recitation of the Veda, by sacrifice” (Bṛh. 4.4.21), knowledge depends for its own origination on all the works which are the means, as one depends on a horse for going.

Vedanta-kaustubha

Knowledge being established to be the means to the highest end of men, it might be thought that all works are to be given up. Apprehending this objection, (the author) is now exhibiting their use for producing the desire to know.

On the doubt, viz. If the highest end of men arises through knowledge alone, then is it independent of all duties incumbent on the stages of life or dependent?—if it be suggested that the desired end being accomplished through it (viz. knowledge) alone, what is the use of works? Hence it is independent of all,—

We reply: “Dependence on all”.

The compound “dependence on all” ("sarvāpekṣā") is to be explained as follows: That which depends, for its origin, on all the duties, incumbent on the stages of life, i.e. the subsidiary parts (of knowledge), which are performed by those who are desirous of salvation and aim at knowledge. But when it has originated, it does not depend on anything for bringing about the highest end of men. Why?

“In accordance with the scriptural text about sacrifice and the rest,” viz. “Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by the recitation of the Veda, by sacrifice, by charity, by austerity, by fasting” (Bṛh. 4.4.22). The word ‘Vividīṣanti’ is to be explained as: They ‘desire to know’ by sacrifices and the rest. Here, if the primacy of the meaning of the suffix be admitted, then sacrifices and the rest are to be regarded as subsidiary parts of knowledge by way of (producing) a desire (for

1 Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
knowledge), (i.e. indirectly). If the primacy of the meaning of the root be admitted, then sacrifices and the rest are to be regarded as the subsidiary parts of so desired knowledge directly.¹

A parallel instance is cited: “As in case of a horse”. A horse is needed for accomplishing a journey to a desired place; but when the journey is accomplished, it is no longer needed—so is the case here.² It has been said by the Lord as well: ‘“The acts of sacrifice, charity and austerity are not to be given up, but are to be performed. Sacrifice, charity and austerity are the purifiers of the wise”’ (Gītā 18.8), ‘“From whom proceeds the activity of all beings, by whom all this is pervaded, by worshipping Him with his own work, a man attains perfection”’ (Gītā 18.46). Thus it is established that knowledge,—having the form of worship, meditation, highest devotion, steady remembrance and so on; the destroyer of all evil; the special cause of the attainment of the nature of the Highest Person, denoted by the terms ‘Highest Brahman’ and so on; and attainable through His grace,—arises, through the grace of Scripture and the spiritual teacher, from the proper performance of the daily and occasional duties, incumbent on one’s own stage of life, and constituting the means to the worship of Lord Vāsudeva.

Here ends the section entitled “Dependence on all” (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

The example “aśva-vat” interpreted differently. He points out that knowledge is dependent on work in the sense that work gives rise to it; and independent of work in the sense that once generated, it does not depend on work for bringing about its result, viz. salvation. Hence there is no contradiction in saying that knowledge is independent of work (as done in the previous sūtra) and dependent on it (as done in this sūtra). In this world everything has its own particular use. A horse, e.g. is of no use for drawing the plough, but is of use for drawing the chariot only. Similarly, works are of

¹ See Br. Sū. 1.1.4, pp. 37-38.
² I.e. Karma is needed for the rise of vidyā; but when vidyā has once originated, it is no longer needed.
no use in bringing about the result of knowledge, but are of use only for giving rise to it.\footnote{Ś. B. 3.4.26, pp. 875-876.}

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They too interpret the example “aśva-vat” differently thus: Just as a horse, though the real means of going, depends on some other assisting factors, viz. saddle, attendants, grooming and the like, so knowledge, though the real means to salvation, depends on the cooperation of works.\footnote{Ś. B. 3.4.26, p. 376, Part 2; ŚK. B. 3.4.26, p. 398, Parts 10 and 11.}

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Interpretation different. In direct contrast to Nimbārka, he points out that Karma is not the cause of the origin of knowledge\footnote{“Na ca jñāna-svarūpotpattau karma vyapriyate; āravaṇamanānādi tad-uptatti-kāraṇam.}, but its essential part bringing about salvation. Thus, here he stresses his doctrine of the combination of knowledge and work. He interprets the example “aśva-vat” thus: “Just as a horse is fit for carrying a man, but not for drawing a plough, so knowledge, combined with work, is fit for leading to salvation, and not mere knowledge”.\footnote{Bh. B. 3.2.25 (written as 3.2.26), p. 210.}

\begin{quote}
**Adhikarana 6: The section entitled “Calmness, self-control and so on”. (Sūtra 27)**
\end{quote}

SŪTRA 27

"But still (the seeker after the knowledge of Brahman) must be endowed with calmness, self-control and so on; since, on account of the injunction of these as the subsidiary parts of that (viz. knowledge), they are to be practised necessarily."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Although in the case of one who desires to know Brahman, knowledge may be brought about through the proper performance
of the duties incumbent on his own stage of life, yet he “must be endowed with calmness, self-control and so on”; since, “on account of the injunction” of calmness and the rest in the passage: “Hence, he who knows thus, having become calm, self-restrained, indifferent, patient and collected, should see the self in the self alone” (Bṛh. 4.4.23), “they are to be practised necessarily”.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having thus determined the external means to the origination of knowledge, the author is now determining the internal means.

On the doubt, viz. whether a seeker after the knowledge of Brahman must be endowed with calmness, self-control and so on in order that there may be the rise of knowledge, or not,—if it be suggested: Since calmness and the rest, being posterior to the rise of knowledge, are not its subsidiary parts; and since the rise of knowledge is possible by means of those works alone which are mentioned in the text: “Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by the recitation of the Veda” (Bṛh. 4.4.22), it is not reasonable to suppose that the seekers after the knowledge of Brahman should be endowed with calmness and so on,—

We reply: the word “but” is meant for disposing of the objection. Although knowledge is possible on the part of a seeker after the knowledge of Brahman through the purification of the mind by works, “still” he “must be endowed with calmness, self-control and so on”. Why? They “are to be performed necessarily”, on account of the injunction of them as subsidiary parts of that, i.e. because calmness, self-control and the rest have been enjoined as the subsidiary parts of knowledge, and because “they” are enjoined in the text: “Hence, he who knows thus, having become calm, self-restrained, indifferent, patient and collected, should see the self in the self alone” (Bṛh. 4.4.23). Through calmness, self-control, and so on, one-pointed attention arises (directly), in accordance with the scriptural text: “By religious duty he drives away evil (Mahānār. 22.1). And through works, one-pointed attention arises (indirectly) by way of the removal of sins; thence there is the rise of knowledge;

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1 Ś, R, Bh, ŠK, B.
thence, again, there is a still greater rise of calmness and so on. Hence it is established that one who seeks knowledge must be endowed with calmness and so on.

Here ends the section entitled “Calmness, self-control and so on” (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

The word “tathāpi” interpreted differently, viz. even if it be granted that the text about sacrifices and so on (Bṛh. 4.4.22) contain no injunction and the rest. It is shown later on that the above text is really injunctive. He does not take it as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself, but as included under the previous one.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled “The permission of all food”. (Sūtras 28–31)

Sūtra 28

“And the permission of all food (is valid) in the event of danger to life, on account of that being seen.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The permission of all food in the text: “Verily, to one who knows thus, there is nothing whatever that is not food” (Chānd. 5.2.1 3), is valid only “in the event of danger to life”, for Cākrāyaṇa ate the leavings of a rich man when his life was in danger, this being found in Scripture.

1 I.e. calmness and the rest produce (1) attention, which produces (2) knowledge; while works first produce (1) mental purity, which produces (2) attention, which finally produces (3) knowledge. Hence, the former are more direct means to knowledge than the latter. Further, calmness, and the rest are both causes and effects, i.e. they give rise to knowledge, but when knowledge has originated, it in its turn produces a greater degree of calmness and so on.

2 Š.B. 3.4.27, pp. 876-877.

3 Š. R, Bh, ŠK, B.
It has been stated that calmness and the rest are subsidiary parts of knowledge. Now, wishing to dispose of the objection, viz. like that, the eating of all food, too, is a subsidiary part of knowledge,—the author points out that such eating relates only to cases of life being in danger.

In the Brhadāranyaka, it is said: “Verily, what is not food is not taken by him” (Bṛh. 6.1.14); as well as in the Chāndogya: “Verily, to one who knows thus, there is nothing whatever that is not food” (Chānd. 5.2.1). Here the doubt is, viz., whether this eating of all food by one who knows the vital-breath is valid, as a subsidiary part of the doctrine of the vital-breath, like calmness and so on, even when one is in a healthy state; or only in the event of danger to life. What is reasonable? If it be suggested: when one is in a healthy state,—we reply: only “in the event of danger to life”, there is “permission of all food”. Why? “On account of that being seen,” i.e. because in the text: “When the Kurus were destroyed by hail-storm ¹ (Chānd. 1.10.1), the eating of improper food is found to be allowable only in the event of life being in danger. When all food being eaten up by a kind of animals called ‘maṭaci’ there came to be a famine among the Kurus, then the sage Cākrāyaṇa, seized with hunger, ate the leavings of an elephant-keeper ². From this it is known that the eating of all food is permitted even to one who knows the vital-breath only in the event of danger to life.

**COMPARISON**

**Baladeva**

Interpretation same, but he takes this adhikaraṇa as concerned specially with the pariniṣṭha devotee.

¹ Śrīnvāsa, however, understands the word as a kind of crop-destroying animals. See below.

² Vide Chānd. 1.10.1–5 for the story. The sage ate the leavings because he would have died without food, but refused to drink leavings because he could survive without drink.
SŪTRA 29

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF NON-CONTRADICTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“And on account of the non-contradiction” of the text: “If there be purity of food, there is purity of life” (Chānd. 7.26.2).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the text: “If there be purity of food, there is purity of existence. If there be purity of existence, there is steady remembrance”, (Chānd. 7.26.2), the purity of food is enjoined as a means to the rise of knowledge. “On account of the non-contradiction also” of that, it is definitely ascertained, that there is permission of all food only in the event of danger to life.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. “On account of non-obstruction”. Although in ordinary cases the taking of improper food obstructs the full manifestation of knowledge, yet when a knower of Brahman is obliged to do so, it does not obstruct his knowledge.

SŪTRA 30

“MOREOVER (IT IS) DECLARED BY SMṚṬI.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And it is declared by Smṛti too in the passage: “He who being in danger of life eats food from anyone whatsoever is not touched by sin, as a lotus-leaf is not touched by water”.

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1 Ś, R, Bh, ŠK.
2 G.B. 3.4.29, p. 268, Chap. 3.
3 The first line of the passage is similar to Manu 10.104, last line to Gitā 5.10. Ś, R, Bh, ŠK.
“Moreover,” the eating of all food from anyone whatsoever both
by a knower and a non-knower in the event of danger of life “is
declared by Smṛti” thus: “He who being in danger of life eats food
from anyone whatsoever is not touched by sin, as a lotus-leaf is not
touched by water”.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Baladeva

They omit the “Ca”.

SŪTRA 31

“And so there is a scriptural text as to non-proceeding
according to liking.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For this very reason, there is “a scriptural text” for prevent-
ing wanton acting, viz.: “Hence let not a Brāhmaṇa drink wine”
(Kāṭh. Saṃ. 12.12 1).

Vedānta-kaustubha

As the permission of all food to both who knows and who does
not is valid only in the event of life being in danger, “so” the “scrip-
tural text” of the Kaṭhas “as to non-proceeding according to liking”,
i.e. the text regarding the reverse of acting as one likes, viz. “Hence
let not a Brāhmaṇa drink wine” (Kāṭh. Saṃ. 12.12) fits in. The
permission of all food to a worshipper of the vital-breath refers to his
being in danger of life. The texts not referring to such a danger, on
the other hand, are for the purpose of glorifying those particular
vidyās, but are not enjoined as subsidiary parts of the doctrine of the
vital-breath, like calmness and so on,—this is the resulting meaning.
Hence it is established that the eating of all food is allowable only
in cases of danger to life.

Here ends the section entitled “The permission of all food” (7).

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1 P. 174, last line but four. Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "Being enjoined". (Sūtras 32–35)

Sūtra 32

"And on account of being enjoined, the work incumbent on the stages of life too."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Sacrifices and the rest, which are subsidiary parts of knowledge, are to be performed also by one, who does not desire for salvation, as the duties incumbent on one's stages of life, "on account of being enjoined" in the passage: "He performs the Agni-hotra sacrifice as long as he lives." ¹

Vedānta-kaustubha

Under the aphorism: "And dependence on all, in accordance with the scriptural text about sacrifice" (Br. Sū. 3.4.26) it has been said that works like sacrifices and the rest are subsidiary parts of the knowledge of Brahman. After that, two relevant problems have been considered. Now the question is being considered as to whether, for the sake of gaining prosperity, works like sacrifices and the rest are to be performed even by one, who is not desirous of salvation, as the duties incumbent on one's stages of life.

On the doubt, viz. the works, mentioned in the text: "Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by the recitation of the Veda, by sacrifice" (Brh. 4.4.22) and so on, have been accepted previously as auxiliaries to the means to salvation. Do they incur on the part of one who does not desire for salvation, but wishes to fulfill the duties of his stage of life merely, or not? The prima facie view is that sacrifices and the rest, relating to a definite object, cannot be supposed to be mere duties incumbent on the stages of life, and so they do not incur on his part,—

We reply: "The work incumbent on the stages of life too". The works like sacrifice, charity and so on, which are mentioned in Scripture as auxiliaries to knowledge, are "works incumbent on the stages

¹ Ś, R, Śk.
of life too”, i.e. are to be performed even by one, not desirous of salvation, as the duties incumbent on his stage of life too. Why? “On account of being enjoined,” i.e. because in texts like “He performs the Agni-hotra sacrifice as long as he lives” and so on, they are enjoined as merely the works incumbent on the stages of life and to be performed always. The sense is that such works are obligatory on the part of one who carries out only the duties incumbent on his own stage of life, but does not desire for salvation.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He begins a new adhikarana here (two sūtras) concerned with the svāniṣṭha devotees. Hence the sūtra: “On account of being enjoined, the worked incumbent on the stages of life too (are to be performed by the svāniṣṭha devotee)”. That is, even when the devotee has come to acquire knowledge, he must go on performing his duties in order to increase his knowledge.1

SŪTRA 33

“ALSO BECAUSE OF BEING AUXILIARY.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since sacrifice and the rest are enjoined “also as auxiliary” to knowledge in the text: “The Brāhmaṇas desire to know by sacrifice” (Brh. 4.4.22), they are to be performed also by one who is desirous of salvation, a double purpose being possible in accordance with the maxim of conjunction and separateness.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: If this be so, then sacrifices and the rest cannot be auxiliaries to knowledge,—the author replies:

Since sacrifice and the rest are enjoined “also as auxiliary” to knowledge, by way of bringing about its origination, in the passage:

1 G.B. 3.4.32, p. 271, Chap. 3.
2 s, R. Bh.
“Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by sacrifice” (Brh. 4.4.22) and so on, works like sacrifice and the rest are to be performed also by one who is desirous of salvation. If it be objected that the same works cannot serve the purpose of a stage of life and that of knowledge,—we reply: that is not so, because even the same works may serve different purposes, in accordance with the maxim: “But with regard to one and the same thing being both, there is conjunction and separateness” (Pū. Mi. Sū. 4.3.5). Just as the same quality of being made of the Khādira-wood is laid down as serving the purpose of sacrifices in the passage: “The sacrificial post is made of the Khādira-wood”; and is, again, laid down as serving the purpose of men in the passage: “For one desiring power, let one make a post of the Khādira-wood”, so is the case here.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Here he continues the topic, viz. that the svanistha devotee should continue to act even after attaining knowledge. Hence the sūtra: “And (the works must be done by the svanistha devotee) as being auxiliary (to knowledge)”, i.e. with a view to its further increment.2

SŪTRA 34

“In every way even, those very (sacrifices and the rest are the same) on account of a double indicatory mark.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Those very” sacrifices and the rest are to be taken as serving a double purpose, since in both the cases, the works of the same form are recognized.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is proving the non-difference of works.

“In every way,” i.e. whether taught as duties incumbent on a stage of life or as serving the purpose of knowledge, “those very”

1 P. 493. 2 G.B. 3.2.33, p. 271, Chap. 3.
sacrifices and the rest are to be understood. Why? “On account of a double indicatory mark,” i.e. because in both the cases works of the same form are recognized. The sense is that sacrifices and the rest, each of the same form indeed, are taught, in both the cases, as duties incumbent on a stage of life, and as auxiliaries to knowledge, by respective texts.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He begins a new adhikarana here (two sūtras), concerned with the parinistha devotees. The sūtra means according to him, “Under all circumstances even (the parinistha devotee is to perform his duties of worship and so on), on account of a double mark (viz. Scripture and Smṛti)”. That is, the parinistha devotee should first perform his duties of worship and so on, and do other ordinary duties afterwards.¹

SŪTRA 35

“AND (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS THE NON-OVERPOWERING (OF KNOWLEDGE).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The scriptural text: “By means of religious observance one removes one’s sins” (Mahanār. 22.1 ²) “shows the non-overpowering” of knowledge through the removal of sins—which are the cause of the overpowering of knowledge—by the very same sacrifices and so on, celebrated in Scripture.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The scriptural text: “For the self which one finds out through the life of a religious student does not perish” (Chānd. 8.5.3 ³) “shows the non-overpowering” of the knowledge of the self by the duties

¹ G.B. 3.4.34, pp. 274-275, Chap. 3. “Pariniṣṭhitena tena bhagavad-dharmāḥ evānuṣṭheyaḥ. Svadharmās tu kathafi cit gauṇa—Kāle.”
² P. 23, last line, reading: “anudanti”.
³ Note that Śrīnivāsa understands a different passage here by the term “darṣayati”.
incumbent on the stages of life, such as, the life of a religious student and so on. The phrase: 'The self does not perish' means that the self is not forgotten. Sacrifices and the rest, performed as the mere duties incumbent on the stages of life, lead to the attainment of heaven and so on; those very sacrifices and the rest, performed as auxiliaries to knowledge, give rise to knowledge. Hence there is difference of application, but not difference of works. Hence it is established that the same things are to be performed by both one who is desirous for salvation and one who is not.

Here ends the section entitled "Being enjoined" (8).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He concludes here the topic of the parinistha devotees. "And (Scripture) shows the non-overpowering (of a parinistha devotees)." That is, a parinistha devotee is not overpowered by the fault of not performing the duties incumbent on his own stage of life. He incurs no sins by such an omission.¹

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "Widower". (Sūtras 36-39)

Sūtra 36

"But (those) also (who stand) between, on account of that being seen."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Those "also" who stand "between" the stages of life, are entitled to knowledge, since Raikva and the like are found to be well-grounded in knowledge.

¹ G.B. 3.4.35, pp. 275-276, Chap. 3.
It has been stated above that those who belong to one or other of the stages of life are entitled to knowledge, and that the works performed by them are auxiliaries to knowledge. Now a discussion is being undertaken with a view to establishing that even those who stand midway are entitled to knowledge and the works done by them also are auxiliaries to knowledge.

The doubt is as to whether those who stand ‘between’ the stages of life, such as widowers and so on, are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman or not. The prima facie view is that the knowledge of Brahman depends for its origin on the duties incumbent on the stages of life and since those who stand “between” have no duties incumbent on the special stages of life, they are not so entitled.

With regard to it, we reply: “Between”. That is, even those who stand between, i.e. outside, the stages of life are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. Why? “On account of that being seen,” i.e. because “that”, viz. the right to the knowledge of Brahman, is found in Scripture and Smṛti to be belonging to Raikva, Samvarta and so on. The scriptural text indicating that Raikva is entitled to the knowledge of Brahman has been quoted in the first chapter. The details of the story of Samvarta, the son of Angiras, may be seen in the Mahā-bhārata in the chapter treating of the horse-sacrifice thus: “O King, Samvarta, Angiras’s son, a pious man, roamed about in all directions, sky-clothed (i.e. naked), perplexing all beings” (Mahā. 14. 137) and so on.

The purport is this: Religious duties like sacrifices and the rest, auxiliaries to knowledge and mentioned in the scriptural text: “Him” (Brh. 4.4.22) and so on, are to be understood, in the case of house-holders, as Agni-hotra and the rest, productive of knowledge and fit for a house-holder who desires for salvation. In the case of those who belong to those stages of life in which chastity is compulsory, the religious duties, incumbent on those stages of life and other than Agnihotra and so on, are to be understood (as productive of knowledge). Similarly, in the case of those also who do not belong to any stage of life, muttering of prayers, fasting, worship of the deity and so

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1 Vide V.K. 1.3.34.
2 P. 278, line 1, vol. 4.
on, not obligatory to the special stages of life, are to be understood (as productive of knowledge).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Here he too begins a new adhikaraṇa (three sūtras), but concerned specially with the nirapekṣa devotees only. Literal interpretation same.

SŪTRA 37

"Moreover, (it is) declared in Śmṛti."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the Śmṛti passage, viz. "But through the muttering of prayers alone a Brāhmaṇa may attain success,—there is no doubt about it. Whether he does something else or not, a friendly man is called a Brāhmaṇa" (Manu 2.87), it is declared that they too may easily attain knowledge through the muttering of prayers and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the Śmṛti passage: "But through the muttering of prayers alone, a Brāhmaṇa may attain success,—there is no doubt about it. Whether he does something else or not, a friendly man is called a Brāhmaṇa" (Manu 2.87), it is declared that through the muttering of prayers alone even those who do not belong to any stage of life may have success. The sense is that when the mind is purified through the muttering of prayers and so on, knowledge arises. Hence they, too, come to have their ends fulfilled.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They omit the "Ca". Baladeva is here speaking of the nirapekṣa devotees.

1 P. 46. Ś, R, Śk.
SŪTRA 38

"AND (THERE IS) A SPECIAL FACILITATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is "facilitation" of knowledge also through the particular acts of duties performed in a previous life. This is declared by Śmrṭi too: ""Perfected through many births, he then goes to a supreme goal"" (Gītā 6.45 1).

Vedānta-kaustubha

There is "facilitation" of knowledge through the particular works done in the course of many lives. It is declared by Śmrṭi too thus: ""Perfected through many lives, he then goes to a supreme goal"" (Gītā 6.45). The sense is that in those cases where there is the presence of knowledge, but the absence of any duties incumbent on the special stages of life,—mentioned above and auxiliaries to knowledge,—other duties incumbent on the stages of life, performed in previous births, are to be inferred.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He relates this sūtra specially with the nirapekṣa devotees only, thus: "And (the nirapekṣa devotees attain knowledge easily through) the special grace (of the Lord)".

SŪTRA 39

"BUT THAN THIS THE OTHER IS BETTER, ON ACCOUNT OF INDICA-
TION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Being within a stage of life is "better" than standing midway, also "on account of the indication", viz. "Let one not remain without a stage of life" (D.Sm. 1.10 2).

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1 Š, Bh.  
2 P. 71, line 13. Š, R, Bh, Śk.
Vedānta-kaustubha

"Than this," i.e. than standing midway, "the other", i.e. being within a stage of life, is "better", since it secures the perfection of the means to knowledge, i.e. is productive of knowledge within a short time. Why? "On account of indication." The scriptural text: "By it goes the knower of Brahman, the doer of meritorious deeds, the shining one" (Brh. 4.4.9) shows the going of those belonging to particular stages of life through the path of gods. The meaning of the text is that 'the knower of Brahman', 'the doer of the meritorious deeds', i.e. the doer of the works incumbent on his own stage of life, "by it", i.e. by means of knowledge increased by works, go to Brahman through the path of gods—on account of such a scriptural reference to 'the doer of meritorious deeds'. And, there are four stages of life in conformity with the text: "And those who in the forest" (Chānd. 5.10.1). On account of Śruti passages as well, such as: "Let not a twice-born remain outside the stages of life even for a single day" (D.Sm. 1.10), "If one stays outside the stages of life for a year, one should undergo penance. The Highest Person, forsooth, the soul of the Universe, is pleased by a person who practises the duties incumbent on his caste and stage of life; nothing else pleases Him", and so on.

If, accidentally, it be impossible for one to enter any stage of life, then one may attain salvation through the muttering of prayers, fasting, charity, worship of the deity, non-violence, contentment, straightforwardness, company of the great and so on. Thus says Yājñavalkya: "Being within a stage of life is not the sole impetus to performing religious duties; let a Brāhmaṇa practise them (whether he be within a special stage of life or not). Hence, let no one do to others what is unpalatable to one's own self".

It is said in historical legends too: "For what is the use of an āśrama to one who abiding in knowledge is modest, who has the senses under control and who abides in honesty?" For that very reason, it has been said in the Mahā-bhārata that even in the absence of the mark of an āśrama, one should perform religious duties thus: "Even one who is corrupted should perform religious duties. The mark (of an āśrama) is not the cause of religious duties". Hence it is

1 The text reads "kṣaṇam".
established that in spite of the greater excellence of the state of belonging to a stage of life, knowledge may be gained even by those who do not belong to any special stage of life,—such as bachelors, widowers and so on,—through the muttering of prayers and the like.

Here ends the section entitled "Widowers" (9).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

All others add a "ca" at the end.

Baladeva

He too begins a new adhikarana here (five sūtras), concerned with the question, viz. whether one who belongs to a stage of life is higher or one who does not, and arrives at a conclusion opposite to that of Nimbārka, viz. that one who does not belong to any stage of life is higher. Hence the sūtra: "But than this (i.e. the state of belonging to a particular āśrama) the other (i.e. the state of not belonging to any āśrama, viz. that of a nirapekṣa devotee) is better, on account of indicatory mark".1

Adhikarana 10: The section entitled "One who has become that". (Sūtras 40–43)

Sūtra 40

"But of one who has become that there is no becoming not that, (this is the view) of Jaimini too on account of restriction, on account of the absence of the forms of that."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"But" the giving up of the state of chastity which one has reached is not allowed,—this the view of "Jaimini too", on account of the

absence of texts, on account of the absence of a cause, on account of
the absence of good custom.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the problem is being considered, viz. whether those also
who have fallen from the stage of a perpetual religious student bound
by chastity and so on are entitled to knowledge or not.

It has been established above that there are such stages of life
where chastity is obligatory. The doubt is as to whether those who
have fallen from these are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, or not.
If it be suggested that like widowers and so on, they are so entitled,
through the muttering of prayers and so on,—

We reply: The word “but” is meant for disposing of the objec-
tion. “Of one who has become that,” i.e. of one who has reached,
as a supreme fruit, the stage where chastity is obligatory, there is
“no becoming not that”, i.e. no falling off,—this is the view “of
Jaimini too”. The word “too” indicates that the author’s own
view is confirmed through being held by Jaimini as well. The sense
is that it being impossible for a perpetual religious student bound
by chastity ¹, a hermit belonging to the third religious order ² and
a mendicant belonging to the fourth religious order ³ to stay outside
a stage of life like widowers and the rest, they cannot be entitled to the
knowledge of Brahman.

The author states the reasons why such a falling off is not allow-
able thus: “On account of restriction, on account of the absence of
the forms of that”, that is, on account of the restriction with regard
to the non-deviation from a stage of life, in the passages: A “student
of sacred knowledge, dwelling in the house of a teacher, exhausting
himself completely in the house of a teacher, is the third” (Chānd.
2.23.1), “One should go to the forest, thence one should not return
any more”. “Having once given up the fire, one should not return any
more” (Kaṭha 5.4). The compound “on account of the absence of
the forms of that” is to be explained as follows: The word “that”
means ‘not becoming that’. The words “the forms” mean scriptural
texts. Hence, the clause means: because of the absence of texts
indicative of the falling from a stage of life. That means, there are

¹ Naśṭhika. ² Vaikhānasa. ³ Parivrājaka.
no texts negating the steady adherence to a stage of life. By the plural (in “abhāvebhyaḥ”) other kinds of absence are to be understood, viz. on account of the absence of texts indicative of descent (from a higher stage), unlike the texts indicative of ascent (to a higher stage), such as: “Having completed the life of a religious student, let one become a house-holder; having become a house-holder let one become a dweller in the forest; having become a dweller in the forest, let one wander forth” (Jābāla 4); on account of the absence of any cause for such a falling off; and on account of the absence of good custom.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Reading slightly different, viz. “niyamātad rūpābhāvebhyaḥ”.

Bhāskara

Reading slightly different, viz. “Jaimini” instead of “Jaimineh”.

Baladeva

Reading like Śaṅkara’s. Interpretation different, viz. “But one who has become that (viz. a nirapekṣā), there is no becoming not that, (this is the view) of Jaimini too, on account of the restriction (viz. that the senses of the nirapekṣa devotee are devoted to the Lord alone and never to worldly objects), on account of the want of desire (for anything other than Brahman), and on account of the absence (of the life of a house-holder)”. That is, a nirapekṣa devotee never deviates from his vow and enters worldly life.

1 Ś.B. 3.4.40, p. 885.
2 Bh. B. 3.4.39, (written as 3.4.40), p. 213.
3 G.B. 3.4.40, pp. 283-284, Chap. 3.
SŪTRA 41

"AND NOT EVEN (THE EXPIATION) TREATED (IN THE SECTION) ABOUT RIGHTS (IS POSSIBLE ON THE PART OF A TRANSGRESSING HERMIT AND THE LIKE), ON ACCOUNT OF ITS INEFFECTIVENESS BY REASON OF THE INFERRENCE (I.E. SMṛTI PASSAGE) ABOUT THE FALL."

Vedānta-pārījāta-saurabha

The expiation, formulated in the section treating of rights,¹ is not possible on the part of a perpetual religious student bound by chastity, "On account of its ineffectiveness" in his case, in conformity with the Smṛti passage: "But the twice-born who having ascended the state of a perpetual religious student bound by chastity deviates therefrom,—I do not see any expiation whereby he, the slayer of himself, may be purified" (Agni 165.23a–24b,² A. Sm. 816 ³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Inadvertence (and not wilful negligence) may be the cause of one’s deviation from the stage of life one has reached; and expiation may entitle such a fallen one to knowledge once more,—the author replies ‘no’.

An expiation is mentioned in the text: “A religious student who has deviated from the vow of chastity should sacrifice an ass to Nirṛti”. It is formulated in the sixth chapter, treating of rights, under the aphorism: “The Avakīrṇi-paśu (sacrifice) also (is to be performed like that (viz. the Sthāpati-isti), since the time for the installation of fire has not arrived” (Pū. Mi. Sū. 6.8.22). This is said to be “treated (in the section) about rights”. This is not available for one who has deviated from the vow of a perpetual religious student bound by chastity. Why? “On account of its ineffectiveness by reason of the inference about the fall”, i.e. because in conformity with a Smṛti passage indicating the fall as very difficult to be atoned for, the expiation is not effective for him. The Smṛti passage is as follows: “But the twice-born who having ascended the state of a

¹ Pū. Mi. Sū. 6.8.22.
² Pp. 158-159. Š, R, Bh, Śk.
³ P. 33, line 19. Reading slightly different, viz. “Yena śuddhāyati karmanā”.
perpetual religious student, bound by chastity, deviates therefrom,—
I do not see any expiation whereby he, the slayer of himself, may
be purified” (Agni 165.23a-34b, A.Sm. 8.16). The word “even”
(in the sūtra) suggests that the stated expiation is valid for a religious
student who becomes a house-holder after the completion of his study.¹

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation totally different, viz. “and (the nirapekṣa devotee
does) not (desire for) even the office (of world-rulership and the like),
on account of the inference (i.e. possibility) of fall (from such office),
(and) because (he has) no connection with those (offices)”, i.e. no wish
for them.²

OPPONENT’S VIEW (Sūtra 42)

SŪTRA 42

“But preceded by ‘upa’, (i.e. a minor sin) even, some (think
so), (they claim) the existence (of an expiation for it),
as in the case of eating, that has been said.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“But some” think that the deviation of a perpetual religious
student bound by chastity ³ from his vow of chastity is a minor sin,
and hence there is an expiation for it, since he too is equally a religious
student like one who is a religious student for a time only and not for
life ⁴, “as in the case of the taking” of intoxicating liquor. “That has
been said:” “Of the subsequent ones, what is non-contradictory.” ⁵

¹ I.e. an upakurvāṇa. A naiṣṭhika remains a religious student all his life,
but an upakurvāṇa only for a time.
² G.B. 3.4.41, p. 285, Chap. 3.
³ A naiṣṭhika.
⁴ An upakurvāṇa.
⁵ R, Šk.
Vedanta-kaustubha

"Preceded by 'upa'," i.e. the deviation of a perpetual religious student and so on, bound by chastity and the rest, from their vow of chastity by going to women and so on, is "preceded by the word 'upa',", i.e. is but a minor (upa) sin (pataka); not a major sin that cannot be atoned for. The word "even" implies reason. "Some" teachers think that they too being equally religious students, there is "the existence" of an expiation for them as for those who are religious students for a time, but not always. "As in the case of eating." Just as the prohibition with regard to the taking of spirituous liquor and so on and the expiation thereof apply equally to those who are religious students for life and those who are so for a time only,—so is the case here. "That has been said" by the Smṛti-writer: "Of the subsequent ones, what is non-contradictory to that". The sense is that what has been said with regard to one who is a religious student for a time is possible in the case of one who belongs to a subsequent stage of life, viz. one who is religious student for life and so on, in so far as it is not contradictory to the stage of life of the latter. In this way, an expiation for the deviation of perpetual religious students from their vow of chastity being possible, they come to be entitled to knowledge once again. Similar is the case with the hermits belonging to the third order of life and the wandering mendicants belonging to the fourth order.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

He takes it to be forming an adhikarana by itself. Interpretation same.

Bhāskara

This sūtra is not found in his commentary.

Baladeva

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "But what is preceded by 'upa' (i.e. upāsanā or meditation) (is the only object desired by a nirapekṣa devotee) some (branches declare so), (and) the sentiment (of devotion) is like food (to him), that has been said (in Scripture)".

1 G.B. 3.4.42, pp. 286-287, Chap. 3.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 43)

SŪTRA 43

"But (such a transgressor is) outside (the sphere of knowledge), in either case even, on account of Smṛti and on account of conduct."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Whether the deviation of perpetual religious students from their own stage of life be a major or a minor sin, "in either case even", they are "outside" the right to the knowledge of Brahman, "on account of the Smṛti passage: "I do not see any expiation whereby he, the killer of himself, may be purified" (Agni 165.246) "and on account of the conduct" of the good.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Whether the deviation of those who are bound by chastity from their own stage of life be a major or a minor sin, "in either case even", they are to be kept "outside" indeed by the good. Why? "On account of Smṛti and on account of conduct," i.e. on account of the Smṛti passage censuring such a deviation, viz.: "I do not see any expiation whereby he, the killer of himself, may be purified" (Agni 165.246), "If one sees a Brāhmaṇa who ascended (to a high stage) has fallen (therefrom), one should undergo the Cāndrāyana penance"; and on account of the conduct of the good who always shun one who has deviated from the vow of chastity. Hence it is established that those who have deviated from their stages of life are not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled "One who has become that" (10).

1 Š, R, Šk.
2 Note that the interpretation of the term "bahih" is different from Nim-bārka's.
3 An expiatory penance regulated by the moon's age. The method is to begin with taking fifteen mouthfuls of food at the full moon, and decrease it daily by one mouthful during the dark-half, and increase by one mouthful again during the bright-half. Vide Manu 6.20 and Kullukabhaṭṭa's commentary.
COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

He takes it as forming an adhikarana by itself, and interprets the work “bhāhiḥ” like Śrīnivāsa.¹

Bhāskara

He omits the word “api” and interprets the word “bhāhiḥ” like Śrīnivāsa². This is sūtra 41 in his commentary.

Baladeva

He too omits the word “api”. Interpretation absolutely different, viz. “(The nirapekṣa devotee is) outside (all worldly entanglements) in both ways, (viz.) on account of Smṛti and on account of conduct”.³

Adhikarana 11: The section entitled “The Lord”. (Sūtras 44-45)

OPPONENT’S VIEW (Sūtra 44)

Sūtra 44

“Of the Lord, on account of the scriptural statement about fruit, so Ātreya (thinks).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The meditation based on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts is performed by the sacrificer, “so Ātreya” thinks, on account of the scriptural statement about the result attained, viz. “What alone one does with knowledge” (Chāṇḍ. 1.1.10 ⁴).

¹ Ś.B. 3.4.43, p. 888.
² Bh. B. 3.4.41, (written as 3.4.42), p. 214.
³ G.B. 3.4.43, pp. 287-288, Chap. 3.
⁴ Not quoted by others.
Vedānta-kaustubha

The view of one who knows is acceptable, but not that of one who does not know. Hence in the previous section the view of Jaimini has been accepted, while that of others has been rejected. Now by showing that the meditation on the subsidiary parts is the work of the officiating priest, and having thereby rejected the view of one who does not know, the author is again demonstrating that the view of only one who knows is acceptable.

On the doubt, viz. whether the meditation on the udgītha and the rest, the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, is the work of the sacrificer, the Lord, or of the sacrificing priest,—"of the Lord, so" the teacher "Ātreya" thinks. Why? "On account of the scriptural text about fruit," i.e. because in the text: "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10) the result produced, viz. greater potency, is declared to be pertaining to the sacrificer.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He too begins a new adhikarana here (three sūtras), but concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. the special favour shown by the Lord to His nirapekṣa devotees. Hence the sūtra: "From the Lord (arises the fulfilment of all the wants of the nirapekṣa devotee), on account of the scriptural text about fruit, so Ātreya thinks". Hence he does not take this sūtra as representing the opponent's view.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 45)

SŪTRA 45

"THE WORK OF THE PRIEST, SO AUḍULOMI (THINKS), BECAUSE FOR THAT (HE) IS BOUGHT."

Vedānta-pārljāta-saurabha

The meditation based on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts is performed by the officiating priest, because the priest has been

1 G.B. 3.4.44, pp. 289-290, Chap. 3.
bought "for that"¹, i.e. for the sacrificial act; and the result produced pertains to the sacrificer ².

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

The meditation on the udgītha and the rest, which are subsidiary parts of sacrificial acts, is to be performed by the officiating priest—"so" the teacher "Audulomi" thinks. Why? The word "because" states the reason. That is, as the officiating priest, who performs the sacrificial act, has been "bought" with fees by the sacrificer "for that", i.e. for the sacrificial act together with its subsidiary parts, so it is to be performed by him alone.

If it be objected that the result produced, viz. greater potency, mentioned in the scriptural text: "What alone one does with knowledge, that alone becomes more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10), can belong only to one who meditates,—we reply: not so. In accordance with the maxim: "The fruit mentioned in Scripture (accrues) to the instigator" (Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.7.18 ³), and in accordance with the scriptural text: "Whatever blessing, forsooth, the priests pray for, all those accrue to the sacrificer" (Sat. Br. 1.1.1, 26 ⁴), the fruit belongs to the sacrificer alone. Hence it is established that the meditation based on the subordinate members of sacrificial acts is the work of the officiating priest.

Here ends the section entitled "The Lord" (11).

**COMPARISON**

Śaṃkara

After this sūtra, he reads a sūtra "Sruteś ca", not found in Nimbārka's commentary. Here he quotes some passages to the effect that the fruit belongs to the sacrificer himself ⁵.

¹ C.S.S. ed. reads "tasya", p. 77.
² This last portion: "and . . . sacrificer" not found in the C.S.S. ed.
³ Brindāban ed. reads "phalasya", p. 1164.
⁴ P. 25, lines 7-8.
⁵ Ś.B. 3.4.46, p. 890.
Baladeva

Interpretation absolutely different, viz. "the work of the priest, so Audulomi (thinks), for (the Lord) is bought for him". That is, just as an officiating priest sells himself, as it were, to the sacrificer, so the Lord sells Himself to the nirapekṣa devotees.¹

He too like Śaṅkara reads a sūtra "Śruteṣ ca" after this sūtra.

Adhikaraṇa 12: The section entitled "The injunction of another auxiliary". (Sūtras 46-48)

Sūtra 46

"(There is) injunction of another auxiliary for one who possesses that, as in the case of injunction and so on, (the term 'mauna' denoting), in accordance with the other alternative, a third something."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "Hence let a Brāhmaṇa, being disgusted with learning, desire to live in the childlike state; being disgusted with the states of childhood and learning, then he becomes an ascetic" (Bṛh. 3.5.1 ²), the term 'ascetic' may, of course, mean 'one possessed of knowledge', yet "according to the other alternative", it may also mean 'one given to profound reflection'. Hence, "another auxiliary", "a third" something as distinguished from learning and childlike state, viz. asceticism, has been enjoined here, like sacrifice and the rest and like calmness and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Previously, sacrifices and the rest and calmness and the rest have been determined as auxiliaries to one who is possessed of knowledge. Similarly, asceticism is another auxiliary to one possessed of knowledge. Now, a discussion relating to this is being undertaken.

¹ G.B. 3.4.45, p. 291, Chap. 3.
² Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
In the Brhadāraṇyaka, to the question of Kahola, it is said: “Hence let a Brāhmaṇa, being disgusted with learning, desire to live in the childlike state; being disgusted with the states of childhood and learning, then he becomes an ascetic; being disgusted with the non-ascetic and ascetic states, then he becomes a Brāhmaṇa” (Brh. 3.5.1). Here the doubt is as to whether here like the states of childhood and learning, asceticism too is enjoined, or is only referred back (as something already enjoined). If it be suggested that ‘asceticism’ means knowledge, and that has indeed been already established by the phrase: ‘Being disgusted with learning’, and (hence) the word ‘ascetic’ simply refers back to this,—

We reply: “For one who is possessed of that”, i.e. for one possessed of knowledge, “a third”, i.e. a means, viz. asceticism, a third something as distinguished from learning and childlike state, is enjoined. This very thing the author states in the phrase: “An injunction of another auxiliary”. The states of learning and childhood are auxiliaries to a direct vision of Brahma, the object to be attained; asceticism is another auxiliary as distinguished from them; and the word ‘ascetic’ is nothing but an injunction with regard to it. “As in the case of injunction and so on.” An injunction is what is enjoined as helpful, such as, all the duties incumbent on the stages of life, sacrifice, charity and so on, and calmness and the rest. By the words “and so on” the states of learning and childhood are understood.

To the argument, viz. that ‘asceticism’ means knowledge, and that has indeed already been established by the phrase: ‘Being disgusted with learning’, and hence the word ‘ascetic refers back to this,—we reply: “In accordance with the other alternative”. That is, since the word ‘ascetic’ is well known to mean, alternately, ‘one given to profound reflection’, as in the statement “Among ascetics also, I am Vyāsa” (Gītā 10.37) ‘asceticism’ is a different thing, a third something, distinguished from the state of learning. Here although in the phrase: ‘Then an ascetic’, there is no employment of the imperative, yet this special kind of reflection, not enjoined before, must be taken as something to be enjoined. As in this way the previous Brāhmaṇas have attained their ends ‘so’ let another Brāhmaṇa too, ‘being disgusted with’, i.e. having succeeded with certainty, in ‘the state of learning’, i.e. the duties of a learned man, viz. hearing of the Veda, ‘desire to stay in the childlike state’, i.e. wish to stay reflecting. Having succeeded in both, he may be an ‘ascetic’, i.e. given to profound
meditation. After that, having succeeded in non-asceticism, i.e. in the group of means other than asceticism, as well as ‘asceticism’, he becomes a ‘Brāhmaṇa’, i.e. comes to attain knowledge,—this is the meaning of the text.1

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He too begins a new adhikāraṇa here (one sūtra), but continues the topic of the nirāpekṣa devotees. This is sūtra 47 in his commentary. Hence the sūtra: “(There is) the injunction of another third auxiliary (viz. meditation), an alternative (to hearing and thinking) for one who has that, (viz. for the nirāpekṣa devotees), as in the case of injunction and so on”. That is, in the case of the svanisṭha and parinisṭha devotees, sacrifice and calmness, self-control and so on are enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge. But the nirāpekṣa devotees already possess these, and so in their case these two sets of auxiliaries cannot be enjoined. Hence in their case meditation is enjoined instead, and this they must practise necessarily, just as house-holders and the rest must necessarily perform the saṁdhyā-ceremony and so on.2

SŪTRA 47

“BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE OF ALL (DUTIES INCUMBENT ON THE DIFFERENT STAGES OF LIFE), (THERE IS) CONCLUDING WITH THE HOUSE-HOLDER.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“The concluding with the house-holder” in the passage: “Forsooth, having stayed thus as long as he lives, he reaches the world of Brahman and does not return any more” (Chānd. 8.15.13), is meant for exhibiting all religious duties, as in the stage of a house-holder the religious duties, incumbent on all the stages of life, are obligatory.

1 I.e. here pāṇḍītya means: śrāvana, bālya manana and mauna nididhyāsana.
2 G.B. 3.4.47, p. 293-294, Chap. 3.
3 Ś, R, Bh, Šk, B.
It may be objected: If the religious duties like sacrifice, charity, austerity, calmness, self-control and the like, as well as those called hearing, thinking and meditating,—duties that are to be performed by men of all stages of life who desire for salvation,—be auxiliaries to knowledge; and if knowledge, attainable through them and common to men of all stages of life, be the means to salvation, then there cannot be any justification for “concluding with the house-holder” in the Chāndogya-text, which beginning: “Having studied the Veda in the house of a teacher in accordance with rules, in time left over from doing work for the teacher; having returned to his own house, studying his sacred texts in a clean spot” (Chānd. 8.15.1), concludes: “Forsooth, having stayed thus as long as he lives, he reaches the world of Brahmān and does not return any more” (Chānd. 8.15.1). Hence, such a conclusion clearly indicates that there are no other stages of life. To this the author replies here.

The word “but” is meant for disposing of the objection. That is, simply because the stage of a house-holder has been mentioned at the end, it is not to be thought that there are no stages of life other than that. “On account of the existence of all” religious duties therein, “the concluding with the house-holder” is meant for exhibiting all religious duties.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkañṭha

The phrase compound “kṛtsna-bhāvāt” interpreted differently, viz. “on account of the existence (of knowledge) in all (the stages of life).” Śrīkañṭha takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself.

Baladeva

He too takes it as an adhikaraṇa by itself. Interpretation same.

1 Vide the same objection raised on another ground in Br. Sū. 3.4.18.
2 Śr. B. 3.4.47, p. 394, part 2; Śk. B. 3.4.47, pp. 411-412, Parts 10 and 11.
"As in the case of asceticism, on account of the teaching of others as well."

Vedanta-parijata-saurabha

In the very same manner, the teaching of asceticism in that text is meant for exhibiting all religious duties, since like the teaching of asceticism, there is the teaching of the duties incumbent on all stages of life in the text: "There are three branches of religious duty" (Chand. 2.23.1).

Vedanta-kaustubha

The author points out that similarly here too the teaching of asceticism in the passage: "Then an ascetic" (Brh. 3.5.1), preceded by that of the life of a mendicant: "Then they live the life of mendicants" (Brh. 3.5.1), is meant for exhibiting the religious duties incumbent on all stages of life.

Thus, here too, the teaching of asceticism, preceded by that of the life of a mendicant, in the passage: "The Brähmanas, having risen above the desires for sons, desires for wealth, desires for worlds, live the life of mendicants" (Brh. 3.5.1), is meant for exhibiting the religious duties incumbent on all the stages of life. Why? "As in the case of asceticism," i.e. because like the teaching of asceticism, there is the "teaching of other" stages of life too in the passage: "There are three branches of religious duty. Sacrifice, study and charity are the first; austerity alone is the second; a student of sacred knowledge living in the house of a preceptor and exhausting himself completely in the house of a teacher is the third. All these become possessors of meritorious worlds. One who stands on Brahmāna goes to immortality" (Chand. 2.23.1) and so on. Hence it is established that the states of learning, childhood and asceticism are enjoined here.

Here ends the section entitled "The injunction of another auxiliary" (12).

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1 §, R, B.
He begins a new adhikarana here (two sutras), concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. whether those who practise the vow of Pāśupata and do not belong to any particular stage of life are entitled to salvation. The answer is that they are entitled. Hence the sutra: "On account of the teaching of others too (viz. calmness and the like, etc.) like, asceticism". That is, asceticism, as well as calmness, self-control and the rest, which have been designated as auxiliaries to knowledge, the means to salvation, are enjoined in connection with the vow called Pāśupata as well. Hence it follows that those who practise this vow, automatically practise asceticism and the rest, gain knowledge thereby, and attain salvation through it.1

Adhikaraṇa 13: The section entitled "Non-manifestation". (Sūtra 49)

Sūtra 49

"Non-manifesting, on account of connection."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Without manifesting one's own greatness and so on, due to learning, let one remain in the childlike state, i.e. without pride, since it is possible for this alone to have a "connection" with the topic.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been established that in the text: "Hence let a Brāhmaṇa, being disgusted with learning desire to stay in the childlike state; being disgusted with the childlike state and learning, then he becomes an ascetic" (Brh. 3.5.1), asceticism too is something to be enjoined. Now the meaning of the phrase 'childlike state' is being considered.

1 Śk. B. 3.4.48, pp. 413-414, Parts 10 and 11.
The doubt is whether the action of a child, i.e. nothing but wilful behaviour, is meant by the phrase ‘childlike state’, and that is to be practised by one desirous of salvation; or whether freedom from arrogance, pride, self-consciousness and so on are denoted by the phrase ‘childlike state’ here, and these are to be practised by one desirous of salvation. If it be suggested that ‘childlike state’ means the state of a child, i.e. nothing but wilful behaviour; that is to be practised by one desirous of salvation, there being no reason for the restriction that only freedom from arrogance and the rest are to be practised and not simply wilful behaviour,—

We reply: “Without manifesting one’s wisdom, generated through hearing and so on, one should desire to stay in the childlike state, i.e. be free from arrogance and the rest. Why? “On account of connection,” i.e. because the state of freedom from arrogance and so on alone can have any “connection” with the topic of discussion, while wilful behaviour can have no connection whatsoever with it, in accordance with the scriptural text: “Not one who has not refrained from bad conduct, not one who is not tranquil, not one who is not composed, not one who is not of peaceful mind, can obtain Him even through intelligence” (Kaṭha 2.24). Hence it is established that one desirous of salvation should have ‘childlike state’, i.e. freedom from arrogance and the like.

Here ends the section entitled “Non-manifestation” (13).

COMPARISON

Śrikanṭha

Here he concludes the topic, viz. whether those who practise the vow called Pāśupata are entitled to salvation or not. The prima facie view is that since such people do not belong to any stage of life, they are not so entitled. The answer is: “(Although the Pāśupata-āśrama) does not manifest itself, (i.e. is not, a particular āśrama, yet) owing to (its) connection (with all the requisites of the stage of asceticism, such as, chastity and so on, it is called an ‘atyāśrama’ or super-āśrama, and is the cause of salvation)”.

1 Śk. B. 3.4.49, pp. 415-416, Parts 10 and 11.
Baladeva

He, like Nimbārka, takes this sūtra (sūtra 50 in his commentary) as forming an adhikarana by itself, but dealing with an entirely different topic, viz. the keeping of knowledge as secret. Hence the sūtra: "(Let one remain) without manifesting (i.e. revealing the knowledge attained), on account of connection (i.e. tradition)". That is, when a preceptor teaches his disciple, he should ask the disciple to keep what he has learnt a strict secret, for such is the tradition.

Adhikarana 14: The section entitled "In this life". (Sūtra 50).

Sūtra 50

"(There is the rise of knowledge) in this life if obstruction be not present, on account of that being seen."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"If obstruction" be non-existent, then there is rise of knowledge "in this life"; if it be present, in the next, "on account of that being declared" by the text: "Then Naciketas, having obtained the knowledge declared by Death" (Kaṭha 6.18 2) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having stated the multitude of means that lead to the rise of knowledge, the author is now considering its time.

On the doubt, viz. whether through the means, demonstrated in the group of aphorisms ending with "Non-manifesting, on account of connection" (Br. Sū. 3.4.49), knowledge arises in this life or in the next,—the prima facie view is that in accordance with the scriptural text: "Let one desirous of salvation perform sacrifices" (Tait. Sam. 2.5.5 3) and so on, people strive for only prosperity.

1 G.B. 3.4.50, pp. 299-300, Chap. 3.
2 B.
3 P. 208, line 27, vol. 2.
in the next life, but not for the rise of knowledge, knowledge being possible in this very life.

With regard to it, we reply: “If obstruction”, i.e. if the obstruction to knowledge, viz. works which are dependent on particular place and time and are about to produce results other than knowledge, “be not present”. That is, if the group of means which lead to knowledge be performed well, there is the rise of knowledge “in this life”; if any obstruction to such works be present, then in the next. Why? “On account of that being seen,” i.e. because the rise of knowledge is found to take place in both ways. That in the absence of any obstruction, there is the rise of knowledge in this life is declared by the text: “Then Nāciketas, having attained the knowledge declared by Death and this rule 1 of the Yoga entirely, attained Brahman and became stainless, deathless” (Kaṭha 6.18). That through the means, practised in one life, there is the rise of knowledge in another life is declared by the text: “Even when in the womb, Vāmadeva perceived”. If there be a large number of obstructions, the attainment of knowledge is indeed very difficult, in accordance with the scriptural text: “He whom many, though hearing, know not” (Kaṭha 2.7). Hence it is established that the rise of knowledge takes place on the removal of obstructions. There is no fixed rule that knowledge arises in that very life in which the means were performed.

Here ends the section entitled “In this life” (14).

COMPARISON

Śaṁkara

He reads: “Aihikam api aprastuta-pratibandhe....” 2. Interpretation same. This is sūtra 51 in his commentary.

Rāmānuja

He reads: “Aihikama aprastuta-pratibandhe....”. Interpretation of the word “aihikam” different, viz. “What belongs to this

1 Our text reads “yoga-siddhi”—a mis-quotation. Correct one “Yoga-vidhi”. Vide Kaṭha, p. 120.
2 Ś.B. 3.4.51, p. 894.
world (i.e. meditation aiming at worldly prosperity)”. That is, there are two kinds of meditation, viz. that which aims at worldly prosperity only (“aikham”) and that which aims at final release. The former may or may not arise in this life according to the absence or presence of obstruction; and similarly there is no fixed rule with regard to the latter also as will be shown in the next sutra.

**Bhāskara**

He reads: “Aikham aprasutam pratibandhena darśānat”. Accordingly the sutra means: “(There is the rise of knowledge) in this life, (if the works which obstruct it have) not sprung up, through (the presence of such an) obstruction (however, there is the rise of knowledge in the next world), because (that) is seen”. Thus, the import is the same as Nimbārka’s. This is sutra 48 in his commentary.

**Śrīkaṇṭha**

His reading of the sutra is like Rāmanuja’s reading. Interpretation different, i.e. he is here speaking of the time of the rise of salvation and not of knowledge. Nimbārka speaks of this in the next sutra. Śrīkaṇṭha interprets the sutra thus: “(The result of meditation, viz. salvation, arises) in this life (i.e. as soon as the present body ceases), if obstruction be not present, on account of that being seen”. That is, if there be no contrary karmas, then a knower attains release as soon as he dies. But if there be such karmas, he has to be re-born and exhaust them before he can attain release. Hence it is that even knowers like Vāmadeva are seen to have re-births.

**Baladeva**

His reading too is like Rāmanuja’s reading. Interpretation same.

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1 Śrī. B. 3.4.50, p. 398, Part 2.
2 Bh. B. 3.4.48, (written as 3.4.49), p. 216.
3 Śk. B. 3.4.50, pp. 416-418, Parts 10 and 11.
Adhikarana 15: The section entitled “The fruit, viz. salvation”. (Sūtra 51)

Sūtra 51

“Similarly, (there is) non-restriction with regard to the fruit, viz. salvation, on account of one having that state being ascertained, on account of one having that state being ascertained.”

Vedānta-pārijātā-saurabha

Likewise, there is “non-restriction with regard to the fruit, viz. salvation”, in accordance with the statement: “For him there is delay so long” (Chānd. 6.14.2 1).

Here ends the fourth quarter of the third chapter in the Vedānta-pārijātā-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The question as to when a seeker attains knowledge, whether here or hereafter, has been considered above. Now, the question as to when one who has attained knowledge and is a seeker of salvation attains salvation is being considered.

The doubt is as to whether or not there is any universal rule that the fruit of knowledge, viz. salvation, arises only after the knower is freed from the body in which he has attained knowledge. The prima facie view is as follows:—

As soon as the means are accomplished, the fruit may be attained at that very moment; hence the fruit arises immediately after he is freed from the body.

With regard to it, we reply: “There is non-restriction with regard to the fruit, viz. salvation”. That is, just as there is non-restriction or no universal rule with regard to the rise of knowledge,—viz. in the absence of obstructions, there is the rise of knowledge here; in their presence elsewhere,—“so” there is “non-restriction” with regard to the fruit of knowledge, viz. “salvation”, belonging to one who

1 B.
has attained knowledge. If the works which have begun to bear fruits be absent, then the fruit of knowledge, viz. salvation, belonging to the knower, arises after he is freed from the present body; but if they be present, then after he is freed from still another body,—thus there is no fixed rule here. Why? "On account of one having that state being ascertained," i.e. because the Chāndogya text: "For him there is delay only so long as I am (i.e. he is) not free, then I shall (i.e. he will)\(^1\) attain (Brahman)" (Chānd. 6.14.2) speaks of "one having that state", i.e. one having the state of a knower, or, one by whom knowledge has been obtained. Hence it is established that there is no fixed rule with regard to the fruit, viz. salvation. The repetition of the last words indicates the completion of the chapter.

Here ends the section entitled "The fruit, viz. salvation" (15).

Here ends the fourth quarter of the third chapter in the Vedaññata-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṁsā by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Nimbārka, the founder and the teacher of the sect of the holy Sanatkumāra.

And this third chapter, entitled "The means", concerned with the discussion about the knowledge of Brahman, is completed.

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṁkara**

Interpretation different, viz. "Similarly, (there is) no fixed rule with regard to the fruit, viz. salvation, on account of such a state being ascertained (to be Brahman)". That is, the result of knowledge is *not* subject to the same rule as the origin of knowledge. The latter may vary, i.e. take place here or hereafter; but the former is not subject to any variations, but is the same always, since Scripture declares salvation to be Brahman, the *UNCHANGEABLE*.\(^2\)

**Rāmānuja**

Interpretation same. He points out that just as there is no fixed rule with regard to the rise of the fruit of that kind of meditation

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1 See V.K. 1.1.7.

2 Ś.B. 3.4.51, pp. 896 ff.
which aims at worldly prosperity (considered in the previous sūtra), so there is no fixed rule with regard to the rise of the fruit of that of meditation which aims at salvation.¹

**Bhāskara**

He interprets the first part, viz. "muktiphalāniyamaḥ" like Nimbārka, the second part, viz. "tadavasthāvṛteḥ" like Śaṅkara. Thus, according to him the sūtra means: although there is no fixed rule as to whether salvation is to arise here or hereafter, yet there is no non-fixity in the very nature of salvation, for salvation is nothing but the state of the Highest Lord.²

**Śrikanṭha**

Interpretation different, viz. "(There is) no fixed rule that the fruit, viz. salvation (has grades like the fruit of karma) since (salvation) is ascertained to be that condition (viz. the state of Brahman)". That is, salvation means attaining similarity with the Lord; hence the Lord being the same, salvation does not vary, though there may be gradations in the meditations.³

**Résumé**

The fourth quarter of the third chapter contains:

1. 51 sūtras and 15 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 52 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṅkara;
3. 51 sūtras and 15 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 49 sūtras and 16 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 51 sūtras and 17 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrikanṭha;
6. 52 sūtras and 16 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Sūtra 46 in the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Baladeva is not found in Nimbārka’s commentary.

Bhāskara takes sūtras 23 and 24 in Nimbārka’s commentary as forming a single sūtra, and omits sūtra 42.

¹ Śrī. B. 3.4.51, p. 399, Part 2.
² Bh. B. 3.4.49, (written as 3.4.50), p. 217.
³ Śk. B. 3.4.51, pp. 418-419, Parts 10 and 11.
FOURTH CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FIRST QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikarana 1: The section entitled “Repetition”. (Sūtras 1-2)

SŪTRA 1

“Repetition more than once, on account of teaching.”

The interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras, entitled Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

There must be “repetition” of the means “more than once”, “on account of the teaching” of the means that lead to a direct vision of Brahman, viz. “Should be heard, should be thought, should be meditated on” (Brh. 2.4.5, 4.5.61).

The Commentary, the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

In the third chapter, the nature of the means were determined. Now, in this fourth chapter, that of the fruit or the result is being determined. Thus, in the first quarter, it will be established that the attainment of the fruit results straight on through the steady practice of the means. With a view to this, the means are to be repeated till death. Further, it will be clearly shown that a knower, having Brahman for his soul, attains salvation through the might of his knowledge, the cause of the cessation of the prior and subsequent works. It will also be proved that the end, viz. Brahman, is attained when there is a complete exhaustion of works, which have begun to bear fruits, by retributive experiences. In the second quarter, problems like the departure of a knower from the body and so on will be considered. In the third quarter, those of his going through the path beginning with light will be discussed. In the fourth quarter, the real nature and attributes of one, who has attained Brahman and has his real nature manifest, will be determined. Now, first of all, the author points out that the means are to be practised more than once.

1 Ś, R, Bh. (781)
The doubt is as to whether the means leading to a direct vision of Brahman, mentioned in scriptural texts like: "O! the self is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated on. It is to be sought for, it is to be enquired into" (Brh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6), "Knowing him alone, one passes beyond death, there is no other way to salvation" (Śvet. 3.8, 6.15), "The knower of Brahman attains the highest" (Tait. 2.1) and so on, are to be practised once, or are to be repeated more than once. With regard to it, the prima facie view is that they are to be performed once, there being no evidence for a repetition more than once.

With regard to this, we reply: "Repetition", i.e. there must be a repetition, more than once, of the means leading to a direct vision of Brahman. Why? "On account of teaching," i.e. on account of the teaching of meditation, the means to a direct vision of Brahman, which teaching is preceded by that of hearing of and reflecting on the scriptural texts. The purport is this: The real knowledge of the meaning of texts cannot be attained, through a mere hearing of the scriptural texts only once, even on the part of men like Śvetaketu, the meaning of the Vedānta-texts being very difficult to be understood; otherwise, the repetition of the text: "Thou art that" (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc. 1) would have been meaningless. For this very reason, texts like: "Whom they do not know, though hearing" (Kaṭha 2.7 2) and so on are not without meaning. For this very reason, considering that no understanding of the meaning of the Vedānta-texts is possible through a mere hearing of those texts in accordance with the injunction about Vedic study, His Holiness composed this treatise. Thus, in the text: "O! the self is to be seen" (Brh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6) the teaching: 'to be heard', aiming at a direct vision of Brahman, indicates that there is hearing more than once. If the direct vision of Brahman be attainable through a mere hearing of the scriptural texts about Brahman, celebrated in the passages: "From whom, verily, all these beings arise" (Tait. 3.1), "Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite" (Tait. 2.1) and so on, then the teaching "should be heard" (Brh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6) becomes futile. Exactly similar is the teaching: "Should be thought" (Brh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6), i.e. the teaching about thinking which means

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1 Repeated nine times. Vide Chānd. 6.8.7 ff.

2 Correct quotation: "Śṛṇvanto' pi vahavo yam na vidyoh". Vide Kaṭha, pp. 35-36.
constantly reflecting on Reality. After that there is the teaching about meditation, viz. "Should be meditated on" (Brh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6), i.e. the teaching of meditation, which means an unbroken perception of Brahman, the object of hearing and thinking, and is the special cause of a direct vision of Him. On account of such a teaching, when the meditation on Brahman is practised more than once, then alone there is, through Brahman's grace, a direct vision of Him, in accordance with the scriptural text: "But then he, meditating, sees him who is without part" (Mund. 3.1.8).

**COMPARISON**

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They all connect the word "asakṛt" (more than one) with the word "updeśā" and not with the word "āvṛtti". That is, according to them, the means are to be repeated because Scripture teaches them more than once, i.e. repeatedly.¹

**SŪTRA 2**

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF INFERENTIAL MARK."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

And on account of the Śruti passage: "'By force of practice, desire to attain me, O Dhanañjaya'" (Gītā 12.9 ²).

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

An inferential mark means Śruti. There are Śruti passages to this effect, such as "'But through repetition O son of Kunti!"' (Gītā 6.35), "'Desire to attain me, O Dhanañjaya'" (Gītā 12.9), "Viṣṇu is to be remembered always, and should never be forgotten. Let all injunctions and prohibitions be subordinate to these two"

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¹ Ś.B. 4.1.1, p. 900; Bh. B. 4.1.1, p. 218; G.B. 4.1.1.

² Correct quotation: "abhyāsa-yogena". Not quoted by others.
and so on. Hence it is established that the means to a direct vision of Brahman are to be repeated more than once.

Here ends the section entitled "Repetition" (1).

COMPARISON
Baladeva

He omits the "ca".

Adhikarana 2: The section entitled "Meditation under the aspect of Self". (Sutra 3)

Sutra 3

"But 'the self'—so (they admit and make others) understand."

Vedanta-parijata-saurabha

"This is my self" (Chand. 3.14.3, 4)—so the previous teachers "admit". "This is your self" (Brh. 3.4.1, etc.)2, so they teach the disciples. Hence the Highest Person is to be meditated on by one desirous of salvation as one's own self.

Vedanta-kaustubha

In the immediately adjoining section, it has been shown that the means are to be practised more than once. This suggests an absolute difference between the knower and the object known. Now we hasten to remove this misconception.

The doubt is as to whether the object to be known, viz. Brahman, is to be meditated on as different from the knower or as the self of the knower? With regard to it, the prima facie view is: As different. Why? For the following reasons: First, the self, being within the range of the perception of the 'I', is easily knowable. Secondly, the means are, on the contrary, enjoined to be repeated more than once.

1 Š.

2 Š. R. Bh.
for knowing the self in question. Thirdly, there are a great many scriptural and Smṛti texts as well as aphorisms teaching a fundamental difference between Brahman and the individual soul like: “And on account of the designation of difference” (Br. Sū. 1.1.18), “But something more, on account of the indication of difference” (Br. Sū. 2.1.21) and so on. In this way, such a difference between Brahman and the individual soul being established by the direct evidence of one’s own realization, as well as by Scripture, no other supposition is to be made, in accordance with the condemnatory statement: “He who supposes the self to be otherwise than what it really is,—what sin is not committed by him, the thief, the stealer of his own self?”

With regard to it, we reply: “But ‘the self’—so (they) admit”, since the Highest self is the whole of which the individual self is a part and since the former is the very soul of the latter, which can have no existence and activity independently of Him, just as the thousand-rayed sun, having independent existence and activity in contrast to its own rays, is their soul, and the rays are non-different from it. Similarly, the Lord should be known to be non-different from the individual souls.

The word “but” indicates clearly the difference in nature between the individual soul and the Highest self, the non-knowing and the all-knowing. The relation of identity is possible between two things when they are non-different in some way or other. No identity is possible between a cow and a horse. Again, identity is not possible in the case of a single horse also. But there is a relation of identity between the effect and its cause, the attribute and its substratum, the power and its possessor,—i.e. only between two things which are both different and non-different. Otherwise, in accordance with the text: “All this, verily, is Brahman” (Chānd. 3.14.1), the universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, must be non-different from Brahman in nature, which is impossible.

Hence, the Lord is the soul of the meditating devotee,—a part of Brahman and different, indeed, from Him in nature,—as the tree is of the leaf, the substratum of light of light, the chief vital-breath of the sense-organs. Hence, both difference and non-difference are equally fundamental and natural. Thus, alone, texts like: “Thou art me, O lord Deity! I am ‘Thou’” and so on can have a meaning. For this very reason, again, the non-difference of the individual soul from Brahman being established,—as of the leaf from the tree, light
from its substratum,—texts like: "He who worships another deity, (thinking:) 'The Deity is one, I another', does not know, like a beast" (Brh. 1.4.10) and so on, too, fit in. Since between Brahman and the individual soul there is a non-difference of this kind which is not in conflict with difference, there is no contradiction of scriptural and Smṛti passages and aphorisms like: "The conscious among the conscious" (Kaṭha 5.13; Śvet. 6.13), "And I am superior to the imperishable as well" (Gītā 15.18), "But on account of the teaching of something more" (Br. Sū. 3.4.8), "Not the other, on account of inappropriateness" (Br. Sū. 1.1.17) and so on, the relation of difference-non-difference between the two being approved by all Scriptures. Hence "This is my self" (Chānda. 3.14.3, 4), "This is the inter soul of all beings" (Mund. 2.1.14),—so the previous teachers admit. "This is your soul, within all" (Brh. 3.4.1, 2; 3.5.1), "This is your self, the inner controller, immortal" (Brh. 3.7.3, etc.), "All this has that for its soul . . . Thou art that" (Chānda. 6.8.7) and so on,—so they teach their disciples the very same thing. In accordance with the Smṛti passage as well, viz. "I am the soul, O thick-haired one! dwelling within the heart of all beings" (Gītā 10.20), "Know me also as the knower of the field" ¹ (Gītā. 13.2), it is established that the Highest Person is to be meditated or as one's own self.

Here ends the section entitled "Meditation under the aspect of self" (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The Symbol". (Sūtras 4-5)

Sūtra 4

"Not in a symbol, for that (is) not (the self)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But the self is not to be sought for "in a symbol"; "that" is "not" the self of the meditating devotee.

¹ I.e. the individual soul, the knower of the body.
Now the author points out that similarly, the self is not to be sought for in a symbol.

With regard to the meditations on symbols, such as, "Let one meditate on the mind as Brahman" (Chānd. 3.18.1), "He who meditates on name as Brahman" (Chānd. 7.1.5) and so on, the doubt is as to whether the self is to be sought for in symbols or not. What is reasonable, to begin with? If it be suggested: It is to be done so indeed, symbolic meditations too being equally meditations on Brahman.

We reply: The self is not to be sought for "in a symbol", since "that", i.e. the symbol, is not the soul of the meditating devotee, seeing that symbols like the mind and the rest are to be meditated on under the aspect of Brahman.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

The interpretation of the clause: ‘na hi sah’ different, viz. "for he (i.e. the meditating devotee) does not (look upon the symbol as his self)".  

Baladeva

He omits the word "sah".

Bhāskara

He omits the first "na".

SŪTRA 5

"THE VIEW OF BRAHMAN, ON ACCOUNT OF SUPERIORITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The viewing of the mind and the rest as Brahman is indeed proper, but not the viewing of Brahman as the mind and the rest, "on account of the superiority" of Brahman.

1 Ś.B. 4.1.4, p. 908. 2 Bh. B. 4.1.4, p. 221. 3 G.B. 4.1.4, p. 4, Chap. 4.
To the objection, viz. In the above cases, let Brahman alone be the object to be meditated on, viewed as the mind and so on,—the author replies:

The mind, name and so on are to be viewed as Brahman. Why?

"On account of superiority," i.e. on account of Brahman's superiority to the mind, name and the rest. But Brahman is not to be viewed as the mind, name and the rest. Just as to view a minister as the king is proper, but not the king as a minister, so is the case here. Hence it is established that the self is not to be sought for in a symbol.

Here ends the section entitled "The Symbol" (3).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He takes this sutra as constituting an adhikarana by itself, concerned with an entirely different topic, viz. "The view of Brahman (is to be super-imposed upon the Lord), on account of superiority (of such a meditation)"). That is, just as the Lord is to be meditated on as the self of the devotee, so He is to be meditated on as Brahman as well, i.e. as possessed of great attributes and powers, since such a meditation is the highest of all.\(^1\)

\textbf{Adhikarana 4: The section entitled "The ideas of the sun and the rest". (Sūtra 6)}

\textbf{Sūtra 6}

"And the ideas of the sun and the rest (are to be super-imposed) on the subsidiary part, on account of appropriateness."

\textbf{Vedānta-pārljāta-saurabha}

With regard to the meditations, viz. "Verily, he who shines, let one meditate on him as the udgītha" (Chānd. 1.3.1 \(^2\)) and so on, "the

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\(^1\) G.B. 4.1.5, p. 7, Chap. 4. 
\(^2\) Ś. R. Bh. ŚK.
ideas of the sun and the rest" are to be super-imposed on the udgīthā and so on, on account of the superiority of the sun, etc.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

Certain meditations, based on the subsidiary parts, are mentioned in Scripture thus: "Verily, he who is the sun, let one meditate on him as the udgīthā" (Chānd. 1.3.1) and so on. Here, on the suggestion that on account of the superiority of the udgīthā and the rest,—as the subordinate parts of sacrificial acts which are means to an end,—to the sun, etc., which lead to no end, the ideas of the udgīthā, etc., are to be super-imposed on the sun and so on—the author now states the correct conclusion.

"The ideas of the sun and the rest," i.e. the views of the sun and the rest alone, are to be super-imposed "on the subsidiary parts", i.e. on the subordinate members of sacrificial acts. Why? "On account of appropriateness," i.e. because the superiority of the sun and the rest is appropriate. When the udgīthā and the rest are ceremoniously purified by being viewed as the sun, etc., then alone can the sacrificial acts come to produce results. Hence the superiority of the sun and the rest stands to reason. So it is established that the view of the sun, etc., is to be super-imposed on the udgīthā and the rest.

Here ends the section entitled "The ideas of the sun and the rest" (4).

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṁkara**

He reads "aṅgeṣu" instead of "aṅge".1

**Baladeva**

He too takes this sūtra as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, but, as usual, concerned with an entirely different topic, thus: "The ideas of the sun and the rest (as generating from the eyes of the Lord and
so on, should be super-imposed) on the limb (of the Lord), on account of appropriateness”. That is, the Lord is to be contemplated on as producing the sun from His eyes and so on.¹

Adhikārana 5: The section entitled “Sitting”. (Sūtras 7-11)

Sūtra 7

“Sitting, on account of possibility.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

One should practise meditation, “sitting” only, since meditation is possible only on the part of one who is sitting.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been proved above that meditation, the special cause of a direct vision of Brahman, is to be repeated more than once. Now, the problem is being considered as to whether it is to be practised somehow without following any restrictive rule, or only in a sitting posture.

On the doubt, viz. whether there is no restrictive rule how meditation is to be practised,—whether in a sitting posture, as lying down, walking or standing still; or whether there is a restrictive rule that it is to be practised in a sitting posture alone,—if the prima facie view be that there being no cause for such a restriction, there is no restriction,—

We reply: “sitting”. Why? “On account of possibility,” i.e. because meditation is possible on the part of a devotee who is sitting. One who is lying down may fall asleep, while one who is walking or standing still may have his attention diverted owing to his effort for holding the body up and so on, and as such no meditation is possible on their part.

¹ G.B. 4.1.6, p. 9, Chap. 4.
SŪTRA 8

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTEMPLATION."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

Meditation being of the form of contemplation, it is to be carried on in a sitting posture alone.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

"And" meditation being of the form of contemplation, as evident from the text: "Should be meditated on" (Brh. 2.4.5, 4.5.6); and contemplation, consisting of a continuous stream of ideas having the form of the object contemplated, being possible only on the part of a contemplating devotee who is sitting, there can be no question as to the propriety of the above restrictive rule,—this is the sense.

SŪTRA 9

"AND WITH REFERENCE TO IMMOBILITY."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

In the text: "The earth contemplates, as it were" (Chānd. 7.6.1), the word ‘contemplates’ has been used “with reference to (its) immobility”. Hence one should practise meditation in a sitting posture only.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

In the scriptural text: “The earth contemplates, as it were. The heaven contemplates, as it were. Water contemplates, as it were. The mountains contemplate, as it were” (Chānd. 7.6.1), the term ‘contemplates’ has been used “with reference to the immobility” of the earth and the rest. On account of this indicatory mark too, meditation, having the form of contemplation, knowing and so on, is to be practised in a sitting posture alone.

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1 Ś. R. Bh. ŚK. B.
SŪTRA 10

"And Smṛtis declare."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And the Smṛti texts declare": “Having placed in a clean spot” (Gītā 6.11) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“And Smṛti texts declare” that contemplation is possible only on the part of one who is sitting, thus: “Having placed, on a clean spot, one’s steady seat that is neither very high nor very low and consists of a cloth, deer-skin, and kuśa-grass, one over the other; having sat there on the seat, concentrating one’s mind and with the functions of the mind and sense-organs controlled, let one practise deep meditation for the purification of his self” (Gītā 6.11) and so on.

SŪTRA 11

“Where concentration (is possible) there, on account of non-specification."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Where” concentration of the mind is possible “there” one should practise meditation, there being no mention in Scripture of a special place and the rest over and above this.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“Where,” i.e. in whatever place, time and so on, “concentration” of the mind is possible, “there” meditation is to be practised, there being no mention in Scripture of a special place, time and so on. “In a clean level spot; free from pebbles, fire and sand; favourable to the mind by reason of sound, pond and so on; but not hurtful to

the eye; full of caves and free from wind,—let one apply one's self (to meditation)” (Śvet. 2.10),—this text of the Śvetāsvatāras also speaks of a place favourable to the concentration of the mind, but not of any special place and so on, as evident from the concluding phrase: ‘favourable to the mind’. Hence, it is established that meditation is to be carried on in a sitting posture.

Here ends the section entitled “Sitting” (5).

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled “Until death”. (Sūtra 12)

SŪTRA 12

“Until death, for there also (it) is seen.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Meditation is to be carried on “until death”, since “there also” that “is seen” in the text: “Verily, having stayed thus as long as he lives” (Chānd. 8.15.1) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated above that the means are to be practised repeatedly. Now, the duration of meditation is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether meditation, denoted by the terms ‘contemplation’, ‘knowing’ and so on, is to be finished within a short time, or is to be continued till the fall of the body,—if it be suggested that it is to be finished within a short time, that much being sufficient to satisfy the demands of the scriptural texts which teach repetition more than one,—

We reply: “Until death”. Meditation is to be continued uninterruptedly until death. The word “for” states the reason for this: That there is the continuance of the thought of the object to be meditated on “there also”, i.e. during that period (viz. from the beginning till death), “is seen”, i.e. declared by the scriptural text: “Now, verily,
a person consists of purpose. With whatever purpose he departs from this world, that he becomes on departing to that world” (Śat. Br. 10.6.3, 1 1). The phrase: ‘consists of purpose’ means ‘is given primarily to contemplation’. Similarly, that there is the continuance of the thought of the object to be meditated on till life lasts is declared also by the scriptural text: “Verily, having stayed thus as long as he lives, he attains the world of Brahman” (Chānd. 8.15.1); and in the Śmrṭi passage: “‘Remembering whatever being he leaves the body at the end, to that alone he goes, O son of Kunti, ever permeated by its nature’” (Gītā 8.6). Hence it is established that meditation is to be continued day after day until death.

Here ends the section entitled “Until death” (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Although literally Śaṃkara interprets the sūtras 7–12 like Nimbārka, yet there is a great difference between them, viz. while Nimbārka is speaking here of the meditation which leads to salvation, Śaṃkara especially excludes such a meditation and speaks of that meditation alone which leads to worldly prosperity. Thus, he points out that the rule about the posture of meditation holds good only in the case of that meditation which leads to worldly prosperity (“abhyudaya-phalopāsanā”), but neither in the case of the meditation on the subordinate members of sacrifices (“karmāṅgopāsanā”), nor in the case of the meditation which aims at real knowledge (“samyag darśanopāsanā”), since the first depends on action, the second on object. 2 Similarly, the rule regarding the duration of meditation does not hold good in the case of the meditation aiming at knowledge, since a jīvan-mukta, i.e. one who has attained knowledge by meditation and has become freed thereby, need not carry on meditation further as long as he lives. 3

1 P. 806, lines 14-15.
Baladeva

He interprets the phrase: “tatrāpi” to mean ‘even after death’. That is, the devotee not only practises meditation as long as he lives, but even after death, i.e. even when 116 is freed, since the Lord is so beautiful that he is drawn to worshipping Him, though not enjoined to do so.¹

Adhikarana 7: The section entitled “On the attainment of that”. (Sūtra 13)

Sūtra 13

“On the attainment of that, (there follow) non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and prior sins on account of the designation of that.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There take place “the non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and prior sins” on the part of a knower. Why? “On account of the designation,” viz. “To one who knows thus, evil deeds do not cling” (Chānd. 4.14.3 ²), “All his sins are burnt” (Chānd. 5.24.3 ³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, for indicating clearly that if one wishes to have the obstructions removed in order that he may directly attain the place of the Highest Person, one should resort to the means with the greatest care, a discussion about the repetition of the means and so on was undertaken in the chapter dealing with the end. Now, the author shows how on the rise of knowledge all obstructions cease immediately.

The text: “Just as water does not cling to the lotus-leaf, so no evil deeds cling to one who knows thus” (Chānd. 4.14.3), declares

¹ G.B. 4.1.12, p. 15, Chap. 4. “Mokṣa-paryyantam upāsanam kāryam iti. Tatrāpi mokṣe ca.”  
² Ś. R. Bh. ŚK. R.  
that there is the non-clinging of the subsequent sins on the part of a knower. Again, the texts: "Just as a tuft of the Isikā-reed placed on a fire is burnt up, so all his sins are burnt up" (Chānd. 5.24.3), "And all his works decay when he who is high and low is seen" (Mund. 2.2.8), declare that all his prior sins are destroyed. Here the doubt is as to whether the non-clinging and destruction respectively, of the subsequent and prior sins on the part of one who has attained knowledge are justifiable or not. If it be suggested: In accordance with the declaration: "A work done, good or bad, must necessarily be experienced" (Br. V.P. 26.70) and so on, the consequences of the work done must necessarily be undergone. Hence the non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and prior sins are not justifiable; tho scriptural texts about such non-clinging and destruction simply refer to the cessation of works the consequences of which have already been undergone,—

We reply: "On the attainment" of knowledge, otherwise called 'steady remembrance', 'highest devotion' and so on, through the maturity of such a meditation, "the non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and prior sins" are justifiable. Why? "On account of the designation of that," i.e. on account of the designation of the non-clinging of the subsequent sins in the text: "To one who knows thus, evil deeds do not cling" (Chānd. 4.14.13),—this designation cannot be taken to be referring to the non-clinging of works the consequences of which have already been undergone, since in their case there being no question of clinging at all, there is no sense in the denial;—and on account of the designation of the destruction of prior sins in the passages: "So all his sins are burnt up" (Chānd. 5.24.3), "And all his sins decay when he who is high and low is seen" (Mund. 2.2.8). This designation too cannot be taken to be referring to works the consequences of which have already been undergone since the destruction of such works holds good equally in the case of a non-knower; and since the declaration: "A work which is not experienced does not decay even in hundreds of millions of ages. It must be experienced necessarily" (Br. V.P. 26.70) and so on, refers to the case of non-knowers, and to works which have begun to produce consequences. Hence it is established that the non-clinging and

1 P. 119, col. 2, line 12.
destruction of a knower's subsequent and prior sins, sprung up from thoughtlessness, are indeed justifiable.

Here ends the section entitled "On the attainment of that" (7).

Adhikarana 8: The section entitled "The other". (Sūtra 14)

Sūtra 14

"Of the other too, (there is) non-clinging thus, but on the fall."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since the good deeds also, aiming at selfish ends, are incompatible with salvation, just as the sins are, there result the non-clinging of the subsequent and the destruction of the prior (in their case too). Immediately after the non-clinging and destruction of the subsequent and prior (merits and sins), salvation arises at once "on the fall" of the body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the immediately adjoining sūtra, it has been said that there is the cessation of the knower's evil deeds, sprung up from thoughtlessness. Now the author points out that there is the cessation of his good deeds no less.

If it be suggested: subsequent and prior sins being harmful, let there be the non-clinging and destruction, respectively, of subsequent and prior sins, through knowledge. But such non-clinging and destruction of good deeds through knowledge are not justifiable, since they being enjoined in Scripture are not incompatible with knowledge,—the author extends the above reasoning here too thus: "Of the other too". That is, as in the case of sins, there must be non-clinging and destruction, through knowledge, of what is other than sins, i.e. of the good deeds too which aim at selfish ends. Why? On account of the designation of that, i.e. just as the evil deeds are designated as rejectible by one desirous of salvation, since they are incompatible with salvation, so the good deeds, too, are likewise
designated,—on account of that. And there is the designation of both good and evil deeds as equally rejectible, both being equally incompatible with salvation. The following texts refer both to good and evil deeds: “All sins return therefrom” (Chānd. 8.4.1). “He shakes off good and evil deeds” (Kauś. 1.4). “Verily, he crosses both these” (Brh. 4.4.22). Thus, when there are no more good and evil deeds, which are incompatible with salvation, salvation arises at once “on the fall”, i.e. on the fall of the body. The word “but” (in the sūtra) implies emphasis. Hence it is established that the non-clinging and destruction of the good deeds, too, are justifiable.

Here ends the section entitled “The other” (8).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrikanṭha

Interpretation of the phrase: “pāte tu” is different, viz. ‘There is the destruction of the good deeds, which facilitate knowledge, on the fall of the body and not here and now.”

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled “The works the effects of which have not yet begun”.

Sūtra 15

“But only those former (works) the effects of which have not yet begun, because till that.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the attainment of knowledge, “the former” good and evil deeds, the effects of which have not yet begun, alone perish. Why? Because in the scriptural text: “For him there is delay so long I am

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(he is) free; then I shall 1 (=he will) attain Brahman” (Chānd. 6.14.2 2), it is declared that salvation does not arise till there is the fall of the body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been established that both good and evil deeds are destroyed through knowledge. Now, to the objection, viz. Let there be the destruction of those good and evil deeds, too, the effects of which have already begun,—the author replies here:

On the doubt, viz. whether through knowledge there is the destruction of all good and evil deeds, i.e. equally of those the effects of which have already begun and those the effects of which have not yet begun, or of those alone the effects of which have not begun,—if it be suggested: since no specification is mentioned in scriptural texts like: “And his works perish when he who is high and low is seen” (Munḍ. 2.2.8), “All sins are burnt up” (Chānd. 5.24.3), there is the destruction of all without distinction,—

The author states the correct conclusion: “Only those the effects of which have not begun yet”. The “former” good and bad deeds the effects of which have not begun yet alone perish through knowledge, but not those the effects of which have already begun. Why? “Because till that,” i.e. because in the scriptural text: “For him there is delay only so long I am (=he is) not free; then I shall (=he will) attain (Brahman)” (Chānd. 6.14.2), it is declared that there is delay for the knower till the fall of the body. This being so, the non-specific texts are to be interpreted in the light of the specific text. Hence it is established that through knowledge there is no destruction of those good and evil deeds the effects of which have already begun.

Here ends the section entitled “The works the effects of which have not yet begun” (9).

1 See V.K. 1.1.7.
2 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
Adhikarana 10: The section entitled "Agni-hotra". (Sūtras 16–18)

SŪTRA 16

"But the Agni-hotra and the rest (are to be performed) with a view to that effect (viz. knowledge) alone, on account of the observation of that."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not to be apprehended that through knowledge there results the cessation of the duties incumbent on one's own stage of life, such as, Agni-hotra, charity, austerity and so on. They are to be performed indeed, as they foster knowledge. The scriptural text about sacrifice and so on, prove them to be productive of knowledge.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been stated that through the might of knowledge, there results the non-clinging of the other too, i.e. of the good deeds too. Similarly, there results the non-clinging of the daily and occasional duties incumbent on one's own stage of life. Hence they are not to be performed,—this objection the author disposes of now.

On the doubt, viz. whether the daily and occasional duties like the Agni-hotra and the rest are to be performed by a knower or not,—if it be suggested: Through knowledge there result the non-clinging and destruction of good and evil deeds. What is the use of performing them, seeing that there results the cessation of the Agni-hotra and the rest too, they too being good deeds equally?

We reply: The word "but" clearly indicates the speciality of the Agni-hotra and the rest. "The Agni-hotra and the rest," i.e. the daily and occasional duties incumbent on one's own stage of life, are to be performed by a knower "with a view to that effect alone", viz. the production of knowledge alone. Why? "On account of the observation of that," i.e. because the text: "Him, the Brāhmaṇas desire to know," by sacrifice, by charity, by austerity, by

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1 Oflation to fire.
2 "By the recitation of the Veda."
fasting” (Brh. 4.4.22) declares the duties incumbent on one’s own stage of life, such as, Agni-hotra and the rest, to be means to knowledge. Knowledge is to be acquired so long as life lasts. Hence the duties incumbent on the stages of life are to be performed so long as life lasts.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation of the phrase “tat-kāryāyā” different, viz. “for the sake of that effect (viz. salvation)”. That is, just as knowledge produces salvation, so does works like Agni-hotra and the rest. Of course, Śaṅkara points out that works are indirect means to salvation, i.e. produce knowledge which produces salvation; while according to Bhāskara, it is a direct means.

SŪTRA 17

“For (there are) also (good and bad works) other than these (to which refer the text) of some (about the division) of both (merit and demerit).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Other than” these works the effects of which have been produced, viz. those that are productive of knowledge, there are “also” works the effects of which have not been produced. To these refer the text of “some”, designating the division “of both” merit and demerit, viz. “The friends, the good deeds, the enemies, the bad deeds”.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. To what then does the following text refer to: “His sons inherit his property, his friends the good deeds, his enemies the bad deeds”?—the author replies:

1 Ś.B. 4.1.16, pp. 923-24; Bh. B. 4.1.16, p. 225.
2 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
“Other than these” works which are productive of knowledge, there are “also” good and bad works the results of which have been obstructed by some works of greater strength. “As” some works are undertaken for the sake of selfish ends and what is prohibited is performed through thoughtlessness, so the text “of some”, designating the division “of both” merit and demerit, refer to these above works only. The declaration of non-clinging and destruction, viz. “The friends the good deeds, the enemies the bad deeds” should be known to be referring to those works.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

They interpret the word “ubhayayoh” differently, viz. ‘(This is the view) of both (Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa)’.2

Rāmacanuṣa and Śrikanṭha

According to them the word “ubhayayoh” means ‘(There are works) of both (kind, i.e. either prior or subsequent to the rise of knowledge, which are obstructed from producing results)’.3

Baladeva

He begins a new adhikarana here (three sūtras), concerned with the case of some Nirapekṣa devotees. Hence the sūtra: “Because other than this (viz. the Chāndogya text) (there is) another (text of Śaṭyāyanins) also, (there is the destruction) of both (good and evil prārabdha-karmas in the case of some nirapekṣa devotees)”. That is, the Chāndogya text (Chānd. 6.14.2) declares that a man has to wait until those works the effects of which have already begun to operate are exhausted. But this rule does not hold good in the case of some nirapekṣa devotees, where, as declared by the text of the Śaṭyāyanins, even their prārabdha good and evil deeds go to their friends and foes respectively. Thus, some nirapekṣa devotees

1 All these works are other than those which produce knowledge.
2 Ś.B. 4.1.17, p. 925; Bh. B. 4.1.7, p. 226.
3 Śrī. B. 4.1.17, p. 418, Part 2; ŚK. B. 4.1.17, p. 448, Parts 10 and 11.
become free at once, without having to wait for the full exhaustion of their prārabdha-karmas.

SŪTRA 18

"Because 'What alone with knowledge'—so (Scripture declares)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For, with a view to indicating the strength and weakness of works, it is said, "What alone one does with knowledge" (Chānd. 1.1.10). The author here refers again to the greater potency of some works and the lesser potency of others, mentioned under the aphorism "For (there is) a separate fruit, (viz.) non-obstruction" (Br. Śū. 3.3.41).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The text: "What alone one does with knowledge that alone is more potent" (Chānd. 1.1.10) designates the greater potency of some works and the lesser potency of others. Among these, works of greater strength first begin to produce their own fruits. Hence, when such works of greater strength are about to produce their fruits, certain other good and bad deeds of lesser strength, performed with a view to attaining certain ends, remain without producing those results, like a weak cow kept off from water, grass and so on by a stronger one. When the knower becomes free immediately after the decay of those works the effects of which have already begun, those above works go to his friends and foes respectively,—this is the sense. Hence it is established that with a view to the rise of knowledge, the duties incumbent on his own stage of life, such as, Agni-hotra and the rest, are to be performed by a house-holder; and works like austerity, muttering of prayers and so on by one who is bound by chastity.

Here ends the section entitled "Agni-hotra" (10).

1 G.B. 4.1.17, pp. 26–28, Chap. 4. 2 Ś. R. SK. B.
COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

He takes this sūtra as forming an adhikarana by itself, concerned with the question of the two kinds of Agni-hotra, with or without knowledge, and points out that the former, of course, has a greater capability of producing knowledge, yet the latter too is not absolutely ineffective, but helps the rise of knowledge.¹

Bhāskara

He omits this sūtra, pointing out that it is merely superfluous.²

Baladeva

He continues here the topic of the immediate destruction of the prārabdha-karmas of some nirapekṣā devotees, and points out that since the celebrated Chāndogya text (Chānd. 1.1.10) shows the great potency of vidyā, it is possible that through the grace of vidyā even the prārabdha-karmas may be destroyed at once.³

Adhikarana 11: The section entitled “The destruction of others”. (Sūtra 19)

SŪTRA 19

“But having destroyed the other two by enjoyment, then (he) attains (Brahman).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“But having destroyed” the good and evil deeds, the effects of which have already begun, “by enjoyment”, he “attains” Brahman.

Here ends the first quarter of the fourth chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

¹ Ś.B. 4.1.18, pp. 925-926.
² Bh. B. 4.1.17, p. 226.
³ G.B. 4.1.18, p. 29. Chap. 4.
It has been established at the end of the third chapter that as the end, viz. knowledge, depends upon the cessation of the obstructions, viz. the works the effects of which have already begun, so there is no fixed rule with regard to the time when knowledge is going to arise actually. But here, it has been said that knowledge arises on the fall of the body. Now, anticipating the enquiry, viz. Whence arises the cessation of the two kinds of works the effects of which have already begun? On the fall of which body is there salvation?—the author replies:

On the doubt, viz. Whether the good and evil works—the effects of which have already begun, other than the good and evil works the effects of which have not yet begun, which are the objects of the non-clinging and destruction, and are mentioned under the aphorisms: “On the attainment of that, (there are) non-clinging and destruction, of the subsequent and prior sins, on account of the designation of that” (Br. Sū. 4.1.13). “Of the other too (there is) non-clinging thus, but on fall” (Br. Sū. 4.1.14),—are to be experienced in the body in which knowledge originates, or to be experienced in another body,—if it be suggested: Since another body is not desired, they are to be experienced in the body in which knowledge originates; on its fall, salvation arises,—

We reply: The word “but” is meant for disposing of the objection. “Having destroyed the other two,” i.e. good and evil deeds the effects of which have already begun, “by enjoyment”, whether in the body in which knowledge originates or in another body, one “attains” Brahman, in accordance with the text: “What is not experienced does not perish” (Br. V.P. 26.70). Hereby, the means to the removal of the obstruction to knowledge, exhibited under the aphorism; “In this world, if obstruction be not present” (Br. Sū. 3.4.10), too is explained. Hence, it is established that there is salvation when on the decay of the works,—the effects of which have already begun,—by enjoyment, there is the fall of the body at the completion of enjoyment.

Here ends the section entitled “The destruction of others” (11).

1 Vide V.P.S. 3.4.51.
2 Vide V.P.S. 4.1.14.
Here ends the first quarter of the fourth chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the holy Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Here he ends the discussion about the Nirapekṣa devotee, thus: “Having given up the other two (viz. the gross and the subtle bodies), (the Nirapekṣa devotee) then attains (i.e. joins) in the enjoyment (of the Lord)”.

Résumé

The first quarter of the fourth chapter contains:

(1) 19 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
(2) 19 sūtras and 14 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṅkara;
(3) 19 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
(4) 18 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
(5) 19 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkantha;
(6) 19 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Bhāskara omits sūtra 18 in Nimbārka’s commentary.

FOURTH CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

SECOND QUARTER (Pada)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "Speech". (Sūtras 1-2)

SŪTRA 1

"Speech in the mind, on account of observation and on account of scriptural text."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The text: "Speech merges into the mind" (Chānd. 6.8.6) denotes the merging in, i.e. the connection of the organ of speech with, the mind,—since it is found that the function of the mind continues even when the organ of speech has ceased to function; "also on account of the scriptural text": "Speech merges in the mind" (Chānd. 6.8.6).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said at the end of the previous quarter that the knower attains Brahman. Now, the knower's departure from the body for attaining Brahman and similar problems are being considered. First, the author determines the mode of departure which is common to a knower and a non-knower.

The doubt is as to whether in the text: "Of this person, my dear, who has departed, speech merges into the mind, the mind in the vital-breath, the vital-breath in fire, fire in the Highest Divinity" (Chānd. 6.8.6), the merging of the function of speech in the mind is denoted or of speech alone having the function. If it be suggested that the functions of speech and so on are directed to their respective objects by the mind. Hence the merging of the function of speech in the mind stands to reason—

We reply: Speech alone having the function merges in the mind. Why? "On account of observation," i.e. the function of the mind

1 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

( 807 )
is observed to continue even when the organ of speech has ceased to function. Apprehending the objection that this is possible even if there be the merging of only the function of speech, the author states the main reason: "And on account of scriptural text," i.e. on account of the text: "Speech merges in the mind" (Chand. 6.8.6). There is no text to the effect that the function of speech merges in the mind.

'Merging' is to be understood here as denoting 'connection' and not 'absorption', since the absorption of speech into the mind, which is not its material cause, is impossible, since in order that the non-knower may obtain another body, it is essential that speech should continue, and since it will be stated further on that speech and the rest are absorbed in the Highest Soul alone.

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṅkara and Bhāskara**

Interpretation different. In direct opposition to Nimbārka, who holds that the organ of speech is connected with the mind, they point out that the function of speech and not the organ of speech merges in the mind.

Further, the most fundamental point of difference between Nimbārka and Śaṅkara is that Śaṅkara all throughout makes a distinction between the higher knower and the lower knower, i.e. one who knows Brahman as identical with himself, and one who meditates on Brahman as different from himself. Hence, while according to Śaṅkara, this quarter deals with the path of gods belonging only to the lower knowers or worshippers of the qualified Brahman, according to Nimbārka, this is the highest path belonging to all knowers.

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1 i.e. a thing is absorbed in its material cause alone, a gold ear-ring into gold.

2 This mode of departure is common to knowers and non-knowers, as pointed out above, and a non-knower is born again.

3 Vide Br. Śū. 4.2.14.

4 Ś. B. 4.2.1, pp. 929-930; Bh. B. 4.2.1, p. 227.

5 While the higher knowers do not need to travel through any path to attain Brahman, but attain Brahman then and there as soon as real knowledge dawn. Vide Ś. B. 4.3.14. As we shall see, Śaṅkara takes the entire pāda as referring to lower knowers, except sūtras 12-16 (12-15 according to Nimbārka’s numbering).
Śrīkaṁṭha

He also holds that when Scripture says that speech merges in the mind, it means that the function of speech merges in the mind.1

Baladeva

He is of the opinion that both the organ of speech itself and its function are connected with the mind.2

SŪTRA 2

"FOR THESE VERY REASONS, ALL AFTER (SPEECH)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"After" speech, all the sense-organs merge in the mind, on account of that being observed and on account of the scriptural text: "With the sense-organs merged in the mind" (Prāṇa 3.9 ³).  

Vedānta-kaustubha

"For these very reasons," i.e. on account of observation and on account of scriptural text, "after" the organ of speech, all the sense-organs, too, merge in the mind. The fact observed, to begin with, is just the same as before.⁴ The scriptural text, on the other hand, is as follows: "Hence he whose heat has ceased attains re-birth with his sense-organs merged in the mind" (Prāṇa 3.9). Hence it is established that the sense-organs like speech and the rest are united with the mind.

Here ends the section entitled "Speech" (1).

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1 ŠK. B. 4.2.1, p. 451, Parts 10 and 11.
2 G.B. 4.2.1.
³ Š, R, Bh, ŠK.
⁴ Viz. that the mind continues to function even when the function of the organ ceases.
COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Here too they hold that the functions of speech the other sense-organs merge into the mind. They add a "ca" after "ata eva".¹

Śrīkāṇṭha

He too adds a "ca", as before, he holds that the functions of the other sense-organs merge in the mind.²

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "The Mind". (Sūtra 3)

SŪTRA 3

"That mind in the vital-breath, on account of what is subsequent."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And that is united with the vital-breath.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author points out that that is united with the vital-breath.

To the enquiry: In what does mind, connected with speech and the rest, merge?—we reply: "That", i.e. the mind, connected with speech and the rest, merges in the vital-breath. Why? "On account of what is subsequent," i.e. on account of the subsequent text: "The mind in the vital-breath" (Chānd. 6.8.6). Thus, it is established that the mind, connected with all the sense-organs, is united with the vital-breath.

Here ends the section entitled "The Mind" (2).

¹ Ś.B. 4.2.2, p. 931; Bh. B. 4.2.2, p. 227.
² ŠK. B. 4.2.2, p. 450, Parts 10 and 11.
COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

As before, they hold that the function of the mind is merged in the vital-breath. They add a "ca" after "ata eva".¹

Śrikanṭha

Śrikanṭha holds, as before, that the function of the mind merges in the breath.²

Adhikarana 3: The section entitled "The ruler". (Sūtra 4)

SŪTRA 4

"THAT IN THE RULER, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS APPROACH AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārljāta-saurabha

The vital-breath is united with the individual soul. Why? On account of the texts indicating "its approach", viz. "Thus, verily, do all the vital-breaths approach together to the soul at the time of death" (Bṛh. 4.3.38³), "He going out, the vital-breath goes out after him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2⁴), "Or, who staying should I stay?" (Praśna 6.3⁵). The vital-breath, connected with the individual soul, is united with fire,—this is the resultant meaning.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, the meaning of the text "The mind in the vital-breath" (Chānd. 6.8.6) has been determined. Now, the author states the meaning of the text: "The vital-breath in fire" (Chānd. 6.8.6).

On the doubt, viz. whether the text: "The vital-breath in the fire (Chānd. 6.8.6) denotes that the vital-breath is united with fire or with the individual soul,—the prima facie view is: Just as in the previous cases, it is known from scriptural texts that speech is united

¹ Ś.B. 4.2.3, p. 931; Bh. B. 4.2.3, p. 227. ² ŚK. B. 4.2.3, p. 462. ³ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. ⁴ Ś, R, Bh. ⁵ R.
with the mind and the mind with the vital-breath, so too, it is
definitely ascertained from a scriptural text that the vital-breath is
united with fire alone. Compare: "The vital-breath into the fire"
(Chând. 6.8.6).

With regard to this, we reply: "That, i.e. the vital-breath with
which the mind is united, merges "in the ruler", i.e. in the individual
soul, the ruler of the body and the sense-organs, i.e. is united with it.
Why? "On account of its approach," i.e. on account of its approach,
going after and staying. Thus, to begin with, the approach of the
vital-breath to 'the ruler' is declared in the scriptural text: "Just as
the servants go towards a king who wishes to set on a journey, so do
all vital-breaths approach together to the soul at the time of death
(Brâh. 4.3.38). The going after of the vital-breaths with 'the ruler'
is declared in the scriptural texts: "When he comes to breathe up-
wards" (Brâh. 4.3.38), "He going out, the vital-breath goes out after
him" (Brâh. 4.4.22). The staying of the vital-breath with 'the ruler'
is declared in the scriptural text: "'Who going out, shall I go out, or
who staying stay?'" (Praśna 6.3). The vital-breath, united with the
individual soul, is united with fire. Hence it is established that the
vital-breath being united with the individual soul is again united with
fire together with it.

Here ends the section entitled "The ruler" (3).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

As before, they hold that the function of the vital-breath is
merged in the individual soul.¹

Śrîkaṇṭha

He reads: "adhyakṣena" in place of "adhykṣe" ². Interpretation
same.

¹ Ś.B. 4.1.4, p. 932; Bh. B. 4.1.4, p. 228.
² ŚK. B. 4.1.4, p. 452, Parts 10 and 11.
Adhikarana 4: The section entitled "The elements". (Sūtras 5-6)

SŪTRA 5

"IN THE ELEMENTS, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL DECLARATION TO THAT EFFECT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And that (viz. the union) of that (viz. the vital-breath) which is connected with the soul takes place "with the elements", since in the text: "Composed of the earth, composed of water, composed of the air, composed of the ether, composed of fire" (Brh. 4.4.51), the soul is declared to be composed of all the elements.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been established that the vital-breath being connected with the ruler is connected with fire. Now the meaning of the word 'fire' is being considered.

'On account of its approach and so on,' the vital-breath is united with fire. Now, the question is whether the vital-breath is united with fire alone or with the elements together with fire. If it be suggested that on account of the scriptural text: "The vital-breath in fire" (Chand. 6.8.6) it is united with fire alone—

We reply: "In the elements", i.e. the words 'in fire' mean 'in the elements together with fire'. Why? "On account of the scriptural declaration to that effect," i.e. because in the scriptural text: "Composed of the earth, composed of water, composed of the air, composed of the ether, composed of fire" (Bṛh. 4.4.5), the soul that is moving on is declared to be composed of all the elements.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

"Tac chruteh" interpreted differently, viz. on account of the scriptural text to that effect, (viz. Chand. 6.8.6).
Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. "... atah śruteḥ". He interprets the word "śruteḥ" like Śaṁkara.¹

SŪTRA 6

"NOT IN ONE, FOR (SCRIPTURE AND SMṛTI) SHOW."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But such a union is not possible with one element. Scripture and Smṛti "show" that one element is incapable of producing effects thus: "Let me make each of them tripartite" (Chāṇḍ. 6.1.3 ²).

"These (elements), possessed of various powers but separate, were unable, hence, to produce beings without aggregation, (i.e.) without coming together entirely" (V.P. 1.2.48 ³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. the text. "Composed of the earth" (Bṛh. 4.4.5) and so on is justified even if it be admitted that the soul is united with fire and the rest successively (and not simultaneously),—the author says:

"As" the scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. "Having entered with this living soul, let me evolve name and form; let me make each of the three tripartite" (Chāṇḍ. 6.3.2-3), "These (elements), possessed of various powers (but) separate, were unable to produce beings without aggregation, (i.e.) without coming together entirely. Having come together through mutual conjunction, dependent on one another, beginning with mahat and ending in viśeṣa they produced, forsooth, the egg" (V.P. 1.2.48-50 ⁴) "show" that a single element is incapable of producing effects,—so "no" union of the vital-breath, joined with the soul, "with one", viz. with one of fire and the rest successively, is possible. Hence in the text: "The vital-breath in fire" (Chāṇḍ. 6.8.6) the word 'fire' means 'fire connected with other ele-

¹ Bh. B. 4.2.5, p. 228. ² R. B. ³ P. 19.
⁴ Excluding the 2nd line of verse 49 and 1st line of verse 50.
ments'. Therefore, it is established that the soul is united with all
the elements.

Here ends the section entitled "The elements" (4).

COMPARISON

Thus, we have four different views:

(1) According to Nimbārka and Rāmānuja, first the organ of
speech is connected with the mind, and then the other sense-organs;
the mind with the breath; the breath with the soul; the soul in the
elements.

(2) According to Śaṅkara and Bhāskara, first the function of the
organ of speech (and not the organ itself) is merged in (and not con-
nected with) the mind, and then the functions of other sense-organs,
the function of the mind in the breath; that of the breath in the soul,
and the soul abides in the elements.

(3) According to Śrīkanṭha, first the function of speech is merged
in the mind and then the functions of other sense-organs; and the
function of the mind in the breath. So far he agrees with Śaṅkara
and Bhāskara. But as to the rest, he agrees with Nimbārka, viz.
that the breath is connected with (and not merged in) the soul, the
soul with the elements.

(4) According to Baladeva, first speech is connected with the
mind both organically and functionally and then the other sense-
organs; the mind with the breath, the breath with the soul and so on.

Adhikārāṇa 5: The sūtra entitled "Up to the
beginning of the path". (Sūtras 7–13)

SŪTRA 7

"AND SAME UP TO THE BEGINNING OF THE PATH, AND THE (KNOWER
ATTAINS) IMMORTALITY WITHOUT HAVING BURNT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The scriptural text: "There are a hundred and one veins of the
heart. Of these, one goes out through the crown of the head. Going
up through it, one goes to immortality. The others are for departing in other directions” (Chānd. 8.6.6 ¹), declares that a knower, too, departs from the body through a particular vein. This being so, the mode of a knower’s departure up to the beginning of the path, i.e. till entering into the vein, is just “the same” (as that of a non-knower). The scriptural declaration of “the immortality” of the knower here and now, viz. “When all those desires which abide in the heart are loosened, then a mortal becomes immortal” (Bṛh. 4.4.7 ²) really means that a knower’s prior sins are destroyed and subsequent sins do not attach to him any more ³, and not that his connection with sense-organs and the like is destroyed all at once.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, it is being considered as to whether or not the mode of departing from the body is the same for both knowers and non-knowers.

On the doubt, viz. whether this mode of departure holds good only for one who does not know, or equally for a knower and a non-knower,—if it be suggested that as the Brhadāranyaka-text: “When all those desires which abide in the heart are loosened, then a mortal attains Brahman here” (Bṛh. 4.4.7), declares that a knower attains immortality here and now,—so the departure is for the non-knower alone,—

We reply: “And the same up to the beginning of the path”. The word “and” implies emphasis. The words: “up to” indicate the limit. “Up to the beginning of the path,” the mode of departure is the “same” for a knower and a non-knower; that is, up to the beginning of the path which begins with light, or prior to the soul’s entrance into the vein. The Chāndogya declares that a knower too departs from the body through the vein that passes out of the crown of the head. Compare the text: “There are a hundred and one veins of the heart. Of these, one goes out through the crown of the head. Going up through it, one goes to immortality. The others are for departing in other directions” (Chānd. 8.6.6). A difference, however, is stated with regard to the entering into the vein, thus:

¹ Ś, R, ŚK, B. ² Ś, R, ŚK, B.
³ Vide Br. Sū. 4.1.13.
"For the tip of his heart is lighted up. By that light, this soul goes out, either through the eye, or through the head or through any other part of the body" (Brh. 4.4.2). Thus, one who wishes to go to Brahman departs through the vein which passes out of the crown of the head; while a non-knower departs through the eye and the rest, and goes to heaven or hell—this is the difference.1

"And the immortality, without having burnt." The word "and" implies emphasis. The words "without having burnt" (anuposya) are a form of the root 'us' meaning 'to burn'. That immortality which one attains without having one's connection with the body, sense-organs and so on burnt, i.e. which consists in the non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and prior sins, is what is denoted by the text: "When all these desires which abide in the heart are loosened, then a mortal becomes immortal" (Brh. 4.4.7). Here the phrase "attains Brahman" means that one attains Brahman at the time of meditation through direct realization. Hence the departure of a knower too is justifiable.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

The term "anuposya" means according to him 'without having burnt (nescience)'. That is, the passage in question (Brh. 4.4.7) means that the lower knower (with whom the entire pada is concerned, according to Śaṅkara, as noted above) attains a sort of relative immortality only.2

SŪTRA 8

"THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF TRANSMIGRATORY EXISTENCE UP TILL ENTERING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"That" immortality is to be understood as that which takes place without one's connection with the body being burnt indeed.

1 Vide Br. Sū. 4.2.16.
2 Ś.B. 4.2.7, p. 935.
Why? “On account of the designation of transmigratory existence” up till release in the passage: “For him there is delay only so long I am (=he is) not free; then I shall (=he will) attain (Brahman)” (Chānd. 6.14.2 2).

Vedānta-kaustubha

“That” immortality is to be known as belonging to one who has not his connection with the body and the rest burnt or completely destroyed. Why? “On account of the designation of transmigratory state up till entering,” in the passage: “For him there is delay only so long I am (=he is) not free; then I shall (=he will) attain Brahman” (Chānd. 6.14.2), “Having shaken off sin as the horse his hairs, having shaken off the body as the moon frees itself from the month of Rāhu, I, with the self obtained, pass into the uncreated world of Brahman” (Chānd. 8.13). “Entering” means ‘attaining the nature of Brahman’, and this takes place when one has reached a particular region through the path beginning with light. Prior to that, the soul is subject to transmigratory existence.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different. They begin a new adhikaraṇa here (four sūtras), renewing the discussion left incomplete at the end of the adhikaraṇa previous to the last. Thus, fire and other elements, in which the soul has taken its abode, merge in the Highest Being. The question is: What is meant by the term ‘merging’ here? It may be suggested that it means absolute or complete merging, just like the merging of a thing into its own material cause. The answer is: “(It is only a relative merging and not absolute) since that (viz. the aggregate of elements continues to exist) up till entering, (i.e. salvation), on account of the designation of transmigratory existence.” That is, the aggregate of elements or the subtle body in which the soul has taken its abode, is not dissolved in Brahman at once at the time of death, but accompanies one till the rise of perfect knowledge or salvation.3

1 R. 2 See V.K. 1.1.7. 3 Ś.B. 4.2.8, p. 916; Bh. B. 4.2.8, p. 229.
Śrīkaṇṭha

He begins a new adhikaraṇa here. Interpretation same.

SŪTRA 9

"THE SUBTLE (BODY FOLLOWS) BECAUSE THUS IT IS KNOWN FROM PROOF."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The subtle" body of the knower follows, "because thus it is known from proof", viz. from the text: "To him he should say" (Kaus. 1.6 1), "'The real', he should say" (Kaus. 1.6 8).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, by the text: "Then a mortal becomes immortal" (Bṛh. 4.4.7), that immortality is referred to which belongs only to a knower who has his connection with the body unburnt, since "the subtle" body follows. Why? "Because it is known from proof." The proof to this effect is the text designating a dialogue between the knower, going through the path of gods, and the moon, viz. "To him he should say" (Kaus. 1.5), "'The real', he should say" (Kaus. 1.6). From this proof, the persistence of the subtle body is definitely known.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. "(The aggregate of fire and other elements which form the body accompanying the soul is subtle, because it is known to be thus from proof (viz. from the fact that the soul goes out through a small opening like the veins)".

1 R, B.
2 Correct quotation: "Satyam iti". Vide Kaus. 1.6, p. 114.
3 R, B.
4 Ś.B. 4.2.9, p. 936; Bh. B. 4.2.9, p. 229.
SŪTRA 10

“Hence not (the immortality which takes place) through the destruction (of the body).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Hence” the text: “Then a mortal becomes immortal” (Brh. 4.4.7) does “not” speak of an immortality which takes place “through the destruction” of one’s connection with the body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“Hence,” i.e. on account of the group of reasons stated above, the scriptural text: “Then a mortal becomes immortal” (Brh. 4.4.7) does “not” speak of an immortality which takes place “through the destruction” of one’s connection with the body.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. “Hence (i.e. on account of its subtleness), (the subtle body is) not (destroyed) through the burning (of the gross body).”

SŪTRA 11

“And of this alone (is) the heat, on account of appropriateness.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Heat,” which is an attribute of the subtle body, is felt in the gross body, “on account of appropriateness”, i.e. because when it (viz. the subtle body) is not present, that (viz. heat) is not felt.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“Heat” which is an attribute “of this alone”, i.e. of the subtle body alone, is felt in the gross body so long as it is alive. Why?

1 R, ŚK, B.
2 Ś.B. 4.2.10, pp. 936-937; Bh. B. 4.2.10, p. 229.
“On account of appropriateness,”—i.e. because when the subtle body is present, heat is felt in the gross body; when it is not present, that is not felt in it too. Thus, from such positive and negative evidences, it is known that heat is an attribute of the subtle body. For this reason also, the mode of departure of a knower and a non-knower is the same up to the beginning of the path,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

They add an “eṣa” after “upapateh”. Interpretation same.¹

SŪTRA 12

“If it be objected that on account of the denial, (we reply:) no, (that refers to the going out of the sense-organs) from the embodied soul, for (the text) of some (makes this) clear.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that on account of the denial, viz. “Now, he who does not desire, who is without desire, who is free from desire, who has attained his desire, who desires for the self,—his sense-organs do not go out” (Brh. 4.4.6 ²), a knower’s departure from the body is not justifiable,—we reply: There is no such contradiction, since that this is a denial of the departure of the sense-organs “from the embodied soul”, the topic of discussion, is clear from the reading “of some”, viz. “From him the vital-breaths do not depart” (Śat. Br. 14.7.2, 8 ³). Scripture denies their departure from that alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Under the aphorism: “And the same up to the beginning of the path” (Br. Śū. 4.2.7) it has been established that a

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¹ Ś.B. 4.2.12, p. 937; Bh. B. 4.2.12, p. 229.
² Ś,R, Bh, ŚK, B.
³ P. 1089, line 8. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B. I.e. the Kanva recension reads “tasya” which might have given rise to some misunderstanding. But the Mādhayandina recension reads “tasmāt” leaving no room for doubt.
knower, too, departs from the body. That does not stand to reason, "On account of the denial" of a knower's departure from the body, in the scriptural text: "Now he who does not desire, who is without desire, who is free from desire, who has attained his desire, who desires for the self,—his sense-organs do not go out. Having become Brahman alone, he enters into Brahman" (Bṛh. 4.4.6) and so on.

We reply: "No". This denial is not a denial of the departure of the soul from the body. Having referred to the embodied soul, the topic of discussion by the word 'him' in the text: "Now, he who does not desire", the text goes on to deny the departure of those sense-organs "from the embodied soul" by the clause: "His sense-organs do not go out", since by the sixth case 'his', the body, which is not mentioned before as connected with the sense-organs is not referred to. By the texts: "By that light, this soul goes out" (Bṛh. 4.4.2), "He going out, the vital-breath goes out after him" (Bṛh. 4.4.2), "He assumes another newer and a more auspicious form" (Bṛh. 4.4.4) and so on, it is suggested that during the state of transmigratory existence, the sense-organs of the embodied soul depart in order that there may be the origin of a new body,—and it is this that is denied here. Further, it is suggested that at the time of the knower's departure from the final body, set up so long by the works the effects of which have already begun, he is separated from the sense-organs,—and this too is denied. The sense is that these sense-organs accompany him as he proceeds through the path of gods, and are not separated from him prior to his attaining Brahman. In the reading "of some" branches, viz. "From him the sense-organs do not depart" (Śat. Br. 14.7.2, 8), there is an explicit denial of the departure of the sense-organs from the embodied soul, mentioned as the topic of discussion thus: "He who is without desire, who is free from desire, who has attained his desire" (Śat. Br. 14.7.2, 8), and indicated as an ablative by the fifth case-ending.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

He breaks it into two different sūtras: "Pratiśedhāt .... śārīrāt" and "spaṣṭo .... ekeśām", and takes the first as the prima facie view, the second as the correct conclusion.¹ Thus, he arrives

¹ Pp. 937-38.
at an exactly opposite conclusion to that of Nimbārka, viz. those who meditate on qualified Brahman, go out of their bodies and travel through the path of gods, and not higher knowers. Accordingly he takes this section, viz. sūtras 12-14 as referring to higher knowers only. But Nimbārka, as we have seen, makes no such distinction; according to him both knowers and non-knowers go out, only they travel through different paths.

SŪTRA 13

"AND (IT IS) DECLARED BY ŚMṚTI."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The departure of the knower "is declared by the Śmṛti passage". "But by it the soul is confined forsooth in all the abodes. It went out penetrating the crown of the head, and flew up towards the heaven" (Mahā. 13.7764b-7765a).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The departure of the knower is declared by the Mahā-bhārata thus: "He who has become the self of all, who has a proper perception of beings at his path, even the gods are perplexed, seeking a path for him who has no path" (Mahā. 12.9657). This Śmṛti passage denotes that the path leading to the attainment of the Highest Brahman is impassable. The phrase: 'who has no path' denotes that the knower, endowed with a subtle body, is devoid of a gross body. The phrase: 'seeking a path' denotes a special place.

It is declared at the end of Dāna-dharma too, beginning: "The sense-organs of him, the great-souled one went upwards" (Mahā. 13.7760b), and continuing: "But by it the soul is confined in all the abodes. It went out penetrating the crown of the head and flew up towards the heaven" (Mahā. 13.7764b-7765a). Yājñavalkya also says: "Of them, there is one that is situated above, penetrating the disc of the sun. Having passed the world of Brahman, one goes to a

1 Sū. 12-13 according to Nimbārka.
supreme place through it” (Yāj. Sm. 3.167 1). Hence it is established that a knower too has to depart from the body for attaining Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled “Up to the beginning of the path” (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

He quotes the same passage quoted by Śrīnivāsa (Mahā. 12. 9657) to show that a real knower has no departure.


dhikaraṇa 6: The section “Merging in the Highest”. (Sūtra 14)

SŪTRA 14

“THOSE IN THE HIGHEST, FOR THUS (SCRIPTURE) SAYS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The subtle elements like fire and the rest merge in the Highest. The Scripture says: “Fire in the highest divinity” (Chānd. 6.8.6 3).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the author states the meaning of the text: “Fire in the highest divinity” (Chānd. 6.8.6), the last one of the series.

It has been said that at the time of departure, the vital-breath, together with speech and the rest, enter into the subtle elements like fire and the rest through ‘the ruler’ (viz. the soul). On the doubt, viz. whether those subtle elements, accompanied by the entities beginning with speech and ending with the vital-breath, and forming the parts of the knower’s subtle body, proceed to produce their respective effects as appropriate or are dissolved in the Highest Self,—if the first alternative be taken to be true,

1 P. 75. 2 Ś.B. 4.2.14, p. 939.
3 R, Šk, B.
4 Beginning with speech. Vide Br. Sū. 4.2.1.
We reply: "Those" merge "in the Highest, i.e. in Brahman, the Highest, the soul of all. Why? "For" Scripture itself "says" "thus", i.e. says that the Highest Self is the resting place of the soul as He is during the state of deep sleep and universal dissolution, thus: "Fire in the highest divinity" (Chând. 6.8.6.). That is, 'fire', or those subtle elements like fire and the rest, enter into the supreme cause. The sense is that having departed from the gross body, having resorted to the subtle body set up by knowledge, having thereby reached the Virajâ, the best of the rivers, and having discarded the subtle body in the Highest, the knower attains the nature of the Highest. Hence it is established that those merge in the Highest.

Here ends the section entitled "Entering into the Highest" (6).

**COMPARISON**

**Saṃkara**

According to him, this sūtra too refers to the higher knower only and not to the lower knower. The subtle body of a real knower is directly merged in Brahman at once, (without having to travel through any path) ¹. This is sūtra 15 in his commentary.

**Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "Non-division". (Sūtra 15)**

**SŪTRA 15**

"Non-division, on account of declaration."

**Vedānta-pārijātā-saurabha**

Those subtle elements together with speech and the rest come to have "non-division", i.e. essential identity, with the Highest "On account of the declaration": "And their name and form are destroyed; it is simply called 'a person'" (Prāśna 6.5 ²).

¹ Ś.B. 4.2.15, pp. 940-941.
² Ś, B, B.
Now, the question, 'Of what kind is that merging', is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether the merging of the subtle elements, united with the vital-breath which is accompanied by the sense-organs discarded by a knower, is of the form of conjunction, like that of speech and the rest with the mind and so on, or of the form of essential identity, like the merging of rivers in the sea,—if it be suggested: Of the form of conjunction alone, since the word 'merges' in the first clause: “Speech merges in the mind” (Chānd. 6.8.6) is used everywhere as denoting 'conjunction'.—

We reply: Since speech and the rest have not the mind and the rest as their material causes, in their cases, 'merging' means conjunction only. But they have 'non-division' with Brahman, the universal cause, i.e. in this case, merging means essential identity. Why? “On account of declaration,” i.e. because Scripture, having designated the merging of the parts in the Highest Brahman thus: “So exactly, this seer’s sixteen parts, going towards the Person, disappear on reaching Him” (Praśna 6.5), goes on: “And their name and form are destroyed; it is called simply ‘a person’” (Praśna 6.5). Although there are seventeen parts in the subtle body, viz. the sense-organs like speech and the rest, the internal-organ, viz. the mind, five subtle essences and the vital-breath, yet in the above text, only sixteen are mentioned for designating the identity between the vital-breath and the subtle essence of touch. Hence, it is established that their merging in the Highest Self, the cause of the world, is of the form of essential identity.

Here ends the section entitled “Non-division” (7).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

As before, he takes this sūtra too as referring to the higher knower only. This is sūtra 16 in his commentary. Thus we find that according to him, only sūtras 12–16 refer to the higher knower, while the rest of the sūtras to the lower knower.

1 Sūtras 12–15 according to Nimbārka's numbering.
Adhikarana 8: The section entitled “His Abode”. (Sūtra 16)

SŪTRA 16

“(There is) lighting up of the forepart of his abode, with the door revealed by Him (viz. the Lord) through the might of knowledge and through the application of remembrance of the path which is a supplementary part of that (viz. knowledge), (the knower), favoured by one who dwells in the heart, (departs) through the hundred and first (vein).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is a vein, mentioned in Scripture thus: “There are hundred and one veins of the heart. Of these, one passes out of the crown of the head. Going up by it, one goes to immortality. Others are for departing in other directions” (Chānd. 8.6.51). When the knower comes to be “favoured” by the object to be known (viz. the Lord) who has become pleased “through the might of (his) knowledge and through the application of the remembrance of the path which is a supplementary part of that (viz. knowledge)”—then there results “a lighting up of the forepart of his abode”, viz. the heart. Then “with the door revealed” by the Highest Lord, he, knowing that vein, departs through it.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Under the aphorism: “And the same up to the beginning of the path” (Br. Śū. 4.2.7), the modes of the departure of the knower and the non-knower have been determined to be the same. It has been said also that the knower’s subtle body dissolves in the Highest and, as such, becomes identical with Him. Now, the points of difference between their modes of departure are being stated.

The Scriptural text: “There are a hundred and one veins of the heart. Of these, one passes out of the crown of the head. Going up by it, one goes to immortality. Others are for departing in other...
directions" (Chānd. 8.6.6) states that a knower departs through the hundred and first vein that passes out of the crown of the head, while a non-knower through others. On the doubt, viz. whether there is any difference between their modes of departure—if it be suggested: There is no difference, the knowledge of that particular vein being impossible,—

We reply: "Favoured by one who dwells in the heart". In accordance with the text: "And I am situated in the heart of all" (Gitā 15.15), such a "Being who dwells within the heart" is the Highest Person,—"favoured" by Him, who has become subject (as it were) to one devoted to Him alone and to none else, and who is the giver of intellectual union, befitting the devotee, under all conditions. This is the vein departing through which one comes to have real knowledge, as evident from the statement: "You shall come to (attain) similarity with me", in accordance with the declaration by the Lord Himself: "I give him intellectual union whereby they come to me" (Gitā 10.10). Through His grace alone, there comes to be "a lighting up of the forepart of his abode", i.e. of the place,—mentioned in the scriptural text: "Having taken these elements of light, he descends into the heart alone" (Brh. 4.4.1.),—belonging to the knower who has become the favourite of the Being who dwells in the heart. The phrase: 'lighting up of the forepart' means 'the revelation of the forepart', i.e. the vein becomes favourable (to the knower for departure). "With the door revealed by him," i.e. having the door or the base of the vein revealed by the same one who dwells in the heart (viz. the Lord), the knower comes out through that very hundred and first vein, which issuing forth from the heart goes up through the crown of the head, and becomes one with the rays of the sun.

The author states the cause of Lord's favour, showing thereby the absence of any partiality on the part of the Lord: "Through the might of knowledge and through the application of the remembrance of the path which is a supplementary part of that". That is, owing to the knower's might which consists in subjugating (as it were) the object to be known (viz. the Lord), and which is brought about by the full perfection of knowledge; as well as owing to the meditation on the path which is a supplementary part of knowledge, thus: 'One day,
the object, to be known through the Vedânta (viz. the Lord), will be obtained by means of this path recorded in the Vedânta';—the knower is favoured by Him. Hence it is established that the departure of the knower takes place through a special vein.

Here ends the section entitled "His Abode" (8).

Adhikarana 9: The section entitled "Following the rays". (Sūtra 17)

SŪTRA 17

"Following the rays."

Vedânta-pārljāta-saurabha

Having come out through the vein that passes out of the crown of the head, having then followed the rays of the sun, the knower goes up, in accordance with the assertion: "Through those very rays" (Chând. 8.6.5 1).

Vedânta-kaustubha

It has been said that the knower comes out through the vein that passes out of the crown of the head. Now the problem is being considered as to whether or not there is a fixed rule that, having come out through it, he follows the rays of the sun on his way.

The Chândogya, having stated: "Now, when he departs from this body, then through those very rays he goes up" (Chând. 8.6.5), continues: "Going up through it, he goes to immortality" (Chând. 8.6.6). From this it is known that having come out of the vein that passes out of the crown of the head, and having then followed the rays, the knower goes to the disc of the sun. Here the problem is whether it is obligatory for a knower to follow the rays of the sun, or optional. On the suggestion, viz. since one who has come out of the gross body during night does not follow the rays, it is not obligatory for a knower to follow the rays—

1 Ś, R, Bh, Śk. 13.
We reply: The knower proceeds by following the rays alone, in accordance with the assertion: “Then through those very rays he goes up” (Chānd. 8.6.5). That there are rays during night too is ascertained from the heat that is then experienced. During winter, however, no heat is experienced during night, it being overpowered by frost. Further, that there is a natural connection between the vein and the rays is declared by Scripture thus: “Now, just as a long road goes to two villages, this one and the yonder, so do the rays of the sun go to the two worlds, this one and the yonder. They stretch out from the yonder sun and creep into these veins. They stretch out from these veins and creep into the yonder sun” (Chānd. 8.6.2). Hence, it is established that there is a fixed rule that on his upward progress, the knower follows the rays of the sun.

Here ends the section entitled “Following the rays” (9).

Adhikārana 10: The section entitled “The night”. (Sūtra 18)

SŪTRA 18

“If it be objected that during night, not, (we reply:) No; on account of the relation lasting till the body does, and (Scripture) shows.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not to be said that there is “no” attainment of the Highest by a knower who dies “during the night”. Owing to the cessation of his connection with karmas, “lasting till the body does”, he can indeed attain Him, in accordance with the scriptural text: “For him there is delay only so long I am (= he is) not free. Then I shall (= he will) 1 attain (Brahman)” (Chānd. 6.14.2 2).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the problem, whether one who dies at night attains the Highest Brahman or not, is being considered.

1 Vide V.K. 1.1.7. 2 R, ŚK.
On the doubt, viz. whether a knower who dies during night attains Brahman, or not,—if it be objected: In accordance with the statement: “Day, the bright fortnight and the six months of the northern progress of the sun are excellent for those who are about to die. But the contrary times are condemnable”, dying during the night is condemnable, and hence even though one who dies “during night” may reach the rays of the sun, there is “no” attaining of Brahman by him,—

We reply: “no”, i.e. such a view is not reasonable. Why? “On account of the relation lasting till the body does.” That is, the non-clinging and destruction, respectively, of subsequent and prior sins, result from knowledge ¹; also as one’s relation with the works, the effects of which have begun to operate, “last till the body does”, they are destroyed on the fall of the body. Hence, there being no more obstructions to salvation, even a knower who dies during night can attain Brahman through the path beginning with light. “And” Scripture “shows” this: “For him there is delay only so long I am (= he is) not free. Then I shall (= he will) attain (Brahman)” (Chānd. 6.14.2). The statement: “Day, the bright fortnight” and so on, on the other hand, refers to a non-knower. Hence it is established that even a knower who dies during night attains Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled “The night” (10).

COMPARISON.

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

This is sūtra 19 in the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara. They interpret the phrase: “sambandhasya yāvad deha-bhāvitvāt” differently, viz. ‘because the relation between the vein and the rays lasts till the body does’.²

¹ Vide Br. Sū. 4.1.13.
² Ś.B. 4.2.19, p. 944; Bh. B. 4.2.18, p. 232; B.B. 4.2.19, pp. 53-54, Chap. 4.
Adhikarana 11: The section entitled "The Southern Progress of the Sun". (Sūtras 19-20)

SŪTRA 19

"AND HENCE DURING THE SOUTHERN PROGRESS OF THE SUN TOO."

Vedānta-pārijātā-saurabha

For the stated reason, even a knower who dies "during the southern progress of the sun" attains Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the problem, whether a knower who dies during the southern progress of the sun attains Brahman or not, is being considered.

The question is whether a knower who dies during the southern progress of the sun attains Brahman or not. It may be suggested that since it is found that Bhīṣma, a knower of Brahman, waited for the northern progress of the sun, one who dies during the southern progress of the sun does not attain Brahman. So, the author applies the above argument here too. "Hence," i.e. for the same reason, viz. on account of the connection lasting till the body does, it is perfectly reasonable to hold that even a knower who dies "during the southern progress of the sun" attains Brahman. Bhīṣma waited for the northern progress of the sun in order to promote pious faith and practice, and to show his power of dying at will.

SŪTRA 20

"DECLARED BY SMṚTI TO THE ASCETICS, AND THESE TWO ARE TO BE REMEMBERED."

Vedānta-pārijātā-saurabha

The Smṛti passage: "But at which time, there is non-return" (Gitā 8.23) declares two paths to the ascetics. "And these two"

1 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.
are to be remembered. Hence there is no fixed rule with regard to a particular time.

Here ends the second quarter of the fourth chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śāriraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

An objection may be raised: The passage: "At what time the ascetics departing return not, and also when they return, that time T shall tell you, O best of the Bhāratas. Fire, light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun,—departing there the knowers of Brahman go to Brahman. Smoke, the night, likewise the dark fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun,—the ascetics departing there, having attained the Light of the moon, return. The white and the dark,—these two are thought to be the eternal paths of the world. By the one, one goes who returns not; by the other, he returns again" (Gītā 8.23–26), enjoins a special time as the cause of the non-return of those who are devoted to Brahman, or as the cause of the return of those who are devoted to works. Hence it is not reasonable to hold that one who dies during the southern progress of the sun attains Brahman.

We reply: "No", since here the path called the 'path of gods’ and the path called the ‘path of fathers’ “are declared to the ascetics”; “and” since “these two are to be remembered”, i.e. are to be remembered as the subsidiary part of knowledge and the subsidiary part of work, in accordance with the conclusion: ‘‘Knowing these two paths, O Pārtha, an ascetic is never deluded’’ (Gītā 8.27). In the Śmṛti text, “At which time”, etc., the term ‘time’ means the path, connected with the presiding deities of time; and accordingly, the phrase “At which time” means ‘in which path, connected with the presiding deities of day and so on who are conductors of the soul’, it being impossible for fire and smoke to be time. Hence there is no fixed rule with regard to time. Therefore it is established that even a knower who dies during the southern progress of the sun surely attains Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled “The southern progress of the sun” (11).
Here ends the second quarter of the fourth chapter of the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsa texts by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the holy Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

He gives two explanations of the word “śmārte”, viz. these two rules regarding dying by day and so on are mentioned in Smṛti alone, but what holds good in Smṛti does not necessarily hold good in Scripture. The second explanation is like Nimbārka’s.¹ This is sūtra 21 in his commentary.

Bhāskara

His explanation of the word “śmārte” is like Śaṅkara’s first explanation.²

Résumé

The second quarter of the fourth chapter contains:

1. 20 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 21 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṅkara;
3. 20 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 20 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 20 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrikanṭha;
6. 21 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṅkara and Baladeva break sūtra 21 in Nimbārka’s commentary into two separate sūtras.

¹ Ś.B. 4.2.21, pp. 945-46.
² Bh. B. 4.2.20, p. 233.
FOURTH CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

THIRD QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikarana 1: The section entitled “Beginning with light”. (Sūtra 1)

SŪTRA 1

"Through (the path) beginning with light, that being celebrated."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It should be known that there is only one path, viz. that beginning with light. Hence through it alone the knowers go, since in the Chāndogya: “They reach the light, from light the day, from the day the waxing fortnight, from the waxing fortnight the six months when the sun moves to the north, from those months the year, from the year the sun, from the sun the moon, from the moon lightning. Then there is a Person, a non-mortal. He leads them to Brahman. Those who go through this, do not return to this human whirlpool” (Chānd. 4.15.5-6 ¹); in the Brhadāraṇyaka: “They reach light, from light the day, from the day the waxing fortnight, from the waxing fortnight the six months when the sun moves to the north, from the months the world of gods, from the world of gods the sun, from the sun lightning. A Person consisting of mind comes and leads those who have reached lightning to the worlds of Brahman” (Brh. 6.2.15 ²) and in other places too it is celebrated in the very same way.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, in the previous quarter, the problems concerning a knower’s departure and the rest have been considered. Now, discussions about the path through which he proceeds for attaining Brahman are being undertaken.

¹ R, B.
In the Vedāntas various paths are mentioned. Thus, in the Brhadāranyaka, one beginning with light is mentioned thus: “Those who know this thus and those who meditate on faith and truth in the forest, reach light, from light the day, from the day the waxing fortnight, from the waxing fortnight the six months when the sun moves to the north, for the months the world of gods, from the world of gods the sun, from the sun lightning. A Person consisting of mind comes and leads those who have reached lightning to the worlds of Brahman \(^1\) (Brh. 6.2.15). In the same treatise, a different path is mentioned: “When, verily, a person departs from this world, he comes to the wind. There it makes way for him like the hole of a chariot wheel. Through it he ascends higher up. He comes to the sun. There it makes way for him like the hole of a drum. Through it he ascends higher up. He comes to the moon. There it makes way for him like the hole of a drum. Through it he ascends higher up. He comes to the world” (Brh. 5.10.1).

The Kauśitakins, too, speak of the path in a different way thus: “Having reached this path of gods, he comes to the world of fire, to the world of air, to the world of Varuṇa, to the world of the sun, to the world of Indra, to the world of Prajāpati, to the world of Brahman” (Kaus. 1.3).

In the Chāndogya, again, it is mentioned in another way: “Now, whether they perform the crematory rites or not in the case of such a person, (the knowers) reach light, from light the day, from the day the waxing fortnight, from the waxing fortnight the six months when the sun moves to the north, from these months the year, from the year the sun, from the sun the moon, from the moon the lightning. Then there is a Person, a non-mortal. He leads them to Brahman. This is the path of gods, the path of Brahman. Those who go through this do not return to the human whirlpool, return not” (Chānd. 4.15. 5-6). In the very same treatise, it is mentioned once more as a relation between the vein and the rays thus: “Then through those very rays he goes up” (Chānd. 8.6.5).

It is, again, designated in a different way in another place: “Through the door of the sun they depart, passionless” (Mund. 1.2.11).

\(^1\) For correct quotation see above.
Here the doubt is, viz. whether mutually different paths are established by different Scriptures, or whether there is only one path, viz. the one beginning with light. If it be suggested: since they are of various forms, they are established by Scriptures as mutually different,—

We reply: Only one path, viz. the one beginning with light, is established by all the Scriptures. Through that alone, which begins with light, a knower of Brahman should proceed. Why? “That being celebrated.” That is, as some part or other of the path which begins with light is recognized everywhere in Scriptures, so that path alone which begins with light is celebrated everywhere. Hence it is established that through the mutual combination of the details mentioned in one Scripture with all the rest, only one path,—viz. the one beginning with light and qualified by all the details,—is designated everywhere.

Here ends the section entitled "Beginning with light" (1).

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṅkara**

According to him, the entire pāda refers only to the lower knowers and not to the higher ones. But Nimbārka takes it to be referring to knowers in general.

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**Adhikarana 2: The section entitled “The air”. (Sūtra 2)**

**SŪTRA 2**

"(The knower goes) to the air from the year, on account of non-specification and specification."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

After the year, mentioned in the Chāndogya-text, and before the sun, the knower reaches the world of air, mentioned in the Kauśitaki-text: "He comes to the world of fire, to the world of air" (Kauś. 1.3 1),
"on account of non-specification and specification", i.e. because in the text: "He comes to the world of fire, to the world of air" (Kaus. 1.3) the air is taught non-specifically; and because the text: "There it makes way for him like the hole of a chariot-wheel. Through it he ascends higher up. He comes to the sun" (Bṛh. 5.10.1), contains, a specification.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

It has been said that everywhere the same path is designated, viz. the one beginning with light. Now the process of arranging its stages, mentioned in different places, is being determined.

In the Brhadāraṇyaka-text: "From the months to the world of gods, from the world of gods to the sun" (Bṛh. 6.2.15), the world of gods is mentioned in between the months and the sun. But in the Chāndogya-text: "From the months to the year, from the year to the sun" (Chānd. 4.15.5), the year is mentioned in between these two. These two (viz. the world of gods and the year) are to be mutually combined, the path being the same in both the cases. The year is to be placed in between the months and the world of gods, mentioned in the Brhadāraṇyaka, since the order being day, after that the fortnight, then the six months,—the year is appropriate after the months.2 The world of gods is to be placed in between the year and the sun, mentioned in the Chāndogya.3

This being so, in the Brhadāraṇyaka-text: "When, verily, a person departs from this world, he comes to the world of air. There it makes way for him like the hole of a chariot-wheel. Through it he goes up. He comes to the sun" (Bṛh. 5.10.1), the air is mentioned before the sun. But in the Kauśitaki-text: "Having reached this path of gods, he comes to the world of fire, to the world of air" (Kaus. 1.3), the air is mentioned immediately after fire, consisting in light and denoted by the words 'world of fire'. Here the doubt is as to whether the knower goes to the air immediately after fire consisting in light,

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2 Here the progress is from shorter periods of time to longer ones.
3 Thus the preliminary order is: light, day, bright fortnight, six months of the northern progress of the sun, year, world of gods, sun. This, first of all, explains away the apparent inconsistency between Bṛh. 6.2.15 and Chānd. 4.15.5.
or immediately after the year, the stage which is indicated above, and before the sun. If it be suggested: On the ground of the order of textual sequence: “Having reached this path of gods, he comes to the world of fire to the world of air” (Kaus. 1.3), as well as the proximity between the effect and the cause being reasonable, the knower goes to the air immediately after fire,—

We reply: “To the air from the fire”. The knower enters the air immediately after the year and before the sun. Why? “On account of non-specification and specification.” Although in the Kauṣitaki-text: “He comes to the world of fire, to the world of air” (Kaus. 1.3), the air is mentioned immediately after the fire, yet the priority or posteriority of the air in the successive order of progress is not specifically known therefrom, but the air is taught non-specifically. Just as from the statement: ‘A student, having come out of the house of the teacher, goes to the house of Caitra, to the house of Maitra to ask for alms’, no specific order can be ascertained, viz. that he goes to the house of Maitra immediately after the house of Caitra,—so is the case here. On the other hand, in the Brhadāraṇyaka-text: “When, verily, a person departs from this world, he comes to the air. There it makes way for him like hole of a chariot-wheel. Through it ascends higher up. He comes to the sun” (Brh. 5.10.1), the air is taught specifically as prior to the sun. On account of these non-specification and specification—this is the sense.²

The words ‘world of gods’, mentioned in the Brhadāraṇyaka-text quoted above, mean ‘air’, i.e. the world or the dwelling place of gods (viz. air). The compound ‘world of air’, mentioned in the Kauṣitaki-text, is to be explained as a Karmadhāraya, since it has been said by the author of the aphorisms too: “To the air from the year”, and since there is the scriptural statement: “He comes to the air” (Brh. 5.10.1). The air can be appropriately viewed as a world, since it is the dwelling-place of gods, in accordance with the scriptural text: “He who blows is, forsooth, the cave of gods”. Hence it is

¹ I.e. fire arises from air. Vide Br. Śū. 2.3.7.

² Thus, secondly, we get the following order: light, day, bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, year, world of gods, air, sun. This explains away the apparent inconsistency between Brh. 6.2.15, Chānd. 4.15.5, Brh. 5.10.1, and Kaus. 1.3. The words ‘world of fire’ in Kaus. 1.3 means light. It will be shown just below that the world of gods = air.

³ That is, ‘world of air’ = the world that is air = air.
established that the air is to be placed in between the year and the sun.\(^1\)

Here ends the section entitled "The air" (2).

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṃkara and Bhāskara**

They do not identify the world of gods with air, but take them to be two separate places. Thus, according to them, the order is: light, day, bright fortnight, six months of the northern progress of the sun, year, world of gods, air, sun and so on.\(^2\)

**Rāmānuja and Śrikaṇṭha**

They interpret the phrase "aviśeṣa-viśeṣābhyām" differently, i.e. take it to be stating the reasons why the world of gods is to be identified with air, and not as stating the reasons why the air is to be placed after the year and before the sun. Thus, the phrase 'world of gods' denotes 'air', because the compound 'world of gods' generally implies the air which is the dwelling-place of gods; and because Scripture specifically says that the soul comes to the air.\(^3\)

### Adhikarana 3: The section entitled "Varuṇa". (Sūtra 3)

**Sūtra 3**

"**A**BOVE **L**IGHTNING, **V**ARUṆA, ON **A**CCOUNT OF **C**ONNECTION."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

"Varuṇa," mentioned in the Kauśitaki-text: "Having reached this path of gods he comes to the world of fire, to the world of air,

\(^1\) Thus, thirdly, we get the following order: light, day, bright fortnight, six months of the northern progress of the sun, year, air, sun. Note the difference from Śaṃkara's order.

\(^2\) Ś.B. 4.3.2, pp. 949-950; Bh. B. 4.3.2, p. 234.

\(^3\) Śr. B. 4.3.2, p. 451, Part 2; Šk. B. 4.3.2, p. 472, Parts 10 and 11.
to the world of Varuna, to the world of the sun, to the world of Indra, to the world of Prajāpati, for the world of Brahman” (Kaus. 1.3 1), is to be placed above lightning, mentioned in the Chāndogya-text: “From the moon to lightning” (Chānd. 4.15.5 2), “on account of the connection” between lightning and Varuna. And, Indra and Prajāpati are to be placed above him.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The place of air, mentioned in the Kauśitaki-text, in the path beginning with light has been stated. Now, the author points out the place of Varuna, mentioned immediately after it.

The question is whether Varuna, mentioned in the Kauśitaki-text: “To the world of air, to the world of Varuna, to the world of the sun” (Kaus. 1.3), is to be placed above the air, on the ground of the order of textual sequence; or elsewhere, on the ground of the sun being mentioned prior to the air in the Brhadāranyaka-text. 3 If it be suggested: on the ground of the textual order of sequence, he should properly be placed above the air alone, it being improper to suppose what is not mentioned in Scripture,—

We reply: “Above lightning, Varuna”. That is, Varuna is to be inserted “above lightning”, mentioned in the Chāndogya-text: “From the moon to lightning” (Chānd. 4.15.5). Why? “On account of connection,” i.e. on account of the connection between lightning and Varuna. Indra and Prajāpati are to be inserted above Varuna, the stated stage. Hence it is established that the order of logical sequence being of a greater force than that of textual sequence 4, Varuna is to be placed above lightning. 5

Here ends the section entitled “Varuna” (3).

1 R, Bh, Śk. 2 Ś.
3 Viz. Brh. 5.10.1. 4 Vide Pū. Mi. Śū. 5.1.4–7. 5 Thus, finally, we get the following order: light, day, bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, year, air, sun, moon, lightning, the world of Varuna, the world of Indra, the world of Prajāpati. Vide V.P.S. 4.3.5.
Adhikarana 4: The section entitled "The conductors". (Sūtras 4-5)

SŪTRA 4

"The conductors, on account of the indicatory mark of that."

Vedānta-pārijātā-saurabha

Light and the rest lead the approaching souls. As the text: "He leads them to Brahman" (Chānd. 5.10.2) declares that the non-human person leads the souls, it is known that the previous ones, too, do the same.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, the successive order of the twelve stages of the path, beginning with light and ending with Prajāpati, have been shown. Now the question is being considered, viz. what service do light and the rest render to the knower.

The doubt is as to whether those light and the rest are mere signs indicating the road to the knower who wishes to go to Brahman, or places of enjoyment, or conductors. With regard to this, it may be suggested: They may be signs indicating the road, like tree, mountain and so on. Or, since in the text: "To the world of fire, to the world of air, to the world of Varuṇa" (Kauṣ. 1.3), they are mentioned as worlds, they may be places of enjoyment,—

We reply: "Conductors", i.e. in accordance with the command of the Lord, they are the conductors of the knowers, devoted to the Lord. Why? "On account of the indicatory mark of that," i.e. because in the concluding passage: "Then there is a non-human Person. He leads them to Brahman" (Chānd. 5.10.2), the non-human Person is declared to be leading the souls. "That," i.e. the indicatory mark of conductorship, indicates that the previous ones, viz. light and the rest too, are conductors. The word 'light' and the rest should be understood as denoting the presiding deities of light, etc., respectively.

1 Ś, R, Bh, Šk, B.
COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Baladeva

After this sūtra, they insert another sūtra: “Ubhaya-vyāmohāt tat-siddheḥ”, not found in Nimbārka’s commentary. Śaṅkara explains the phrase: “Ubhaya-vyāmohāt” as ‘because of the perplexity (of both the souls and light and the rest)’. That is, when the souls leave the body to travel through the path of gods, their organs being incapable of functioning, they cannot control themselves, but need conductors to lead them. The light and the rest too, being non-intelligent, cannot conduct them. For these two reasons, we must hold that light and the rest are really conducting divinities.1

Baladeva explains the phrase thus: ‘On account of the untenableness of the two alternatives’. That is, light and the rest can neither be landmarks, nor persons standing on the path. Hence these two alternatives being impossible, the third alternative, viz. that they are conducting divinities, is the correct one.2

SŪTRA 5

“THENCE FORWARD, (THE SOUL IS CONDUCTED) ONLY BY ONE WHO BELONGS TO LIGHTNING, THAT BEING DECLARED BY SCRIPTURE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Above lightning, the knower is led by the non-human person alone. Varuṇa and the rest, on the other hand, are assistants conjointly.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. In accordance with the text: “From the moon to lightning. Then there is a non-human Person. He leads them to Brahman” (Chānd. 4.15.5), it follows that it is the non-human Person alone who leads the souls from lightning to Brahman, and that

1 Ś.B. 4.3.5, pp. 952–956.
2 G.B. 4.3.5, pp. 68-69, Chap. 4.
Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati, who are above lightning, are not conductors,—the author replies:

After the knower has reached lightning, as mentioned in the text: “From the moon to lightning” (Chānd. 4.15.5) he is led on, in order that he may attain Brahman, “only by one who belongs to lightning”, i.e. by the non-human Person alone who has come up to lightning. The Person who has come to the world of lightning as the conductor of the knower is said to be “one belonging to lightning”. Why? “That being declared by Scripture,” i.e. because in the Chāndogya-text: “He leads them to Brahman” (Chānd. 4.15.5), and in the Brhadāraṇyaka-text: “A Person, consisting of mind, comes and leads them who have reached lightning” (Bṛh. 6.2.15), that non-human person is declared to be leading the souls. The nine, beginning with light and ending with lightning, are conductors primarily; while the three, Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati, are so conjointly—this is the distinction.

Thus, having come out of this gross body by means of the vein that passes out of the crown of the head, having, then, mounted the rays of the sun, the knower wishes to go to the highest region. He is then highly honoured by the presiding deity of light, the conductor, and is led by him to the presiding deity of the day. In the very same manner, he is led by the latter to the presiding deity of the fortnight, by the latter to the presiding deity of the six months, by the latter to the presiding deity of the year, by the latter to the air, by the latter, who makes a hole in itself for him, to the sun, similarly, by the latter to the moon, by the latter to the presiding deity of lightning. After that, having reached the three conductors, Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati, who are dependent on the Person of lightning, and having pierced through sphere of the material world, he reaches the river Virajā. Having then discarded his subtle body in the Highest, having crossed the river, and having entered the world of the Highest Brahman, he attains similarity with Brahman. Hence it is established that light and the rest are conductors.

Here ends the section entitled “The conductors” (4).
Adhikārana 5: The section entitled "The effected". (Sūtras 6-15)

FIRST OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtras 6-10)

SŪTRA 6

"To the effected (Brahman), Bādari (holds so), because his going is reasonable."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The troupe of light and the rest leads the worshippers of the effected Brahman "to the effected Brahman", "because the going" to the effected Brahman alone is "reasonable".

Vedānta-kaustubha

The path beginning with light has been determined. Now the question is being determined, viz. Who are these who go through this path.

On the doubt, viz. whether the troupe of conducting divinities of light and the rest leads the worshippers of the effected Brahman, or the worshippers of the Highest Brahman, or the worshippers of the Highest Brahman as well as of the individual soul as unconnected with matter and having Brahman for its essence,—they lead the worshippers of the effected Brahman "to the effected Brahman", called Hiranyakāgarbha. Why? "Because his going," i.e. the going of the effected Brahman alone, occupying a particular place, i.e. his being the object to be approached, is "reasonable",—so the teacher "Bādari" thinks.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Unlike Nimbārka, he takes the view of Bādari as the correct conclusion. Literal interpretation same.
FIRST OPPONENT'S VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 7

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF BEING SPECIFIED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of being specified" by the word 'worlds' and the plural number in the text: "In those worlds of Brahman dwell the highest, possessed of the highest" (Brh. 6.2.16).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the text: "A person consisting of mind comes and leads them to the worlds of Brahman. In those worlds of Brahman dwell the highest, possessed of the highest" (Brh. 6.2.15), by the word 'worlds' and the plural number, the effected Brahman alone, occupying a particular place, is specified. Hence they lead his worshippers to him alone.

FIRST OPPONENT'S VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 8

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF PROXIMITY (THERE IS) THAT DESIGNATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"But on account of the proximity" (of the effected Brahman) to (the Highest) Brahman, owing to (the effected Brahman's) being the first-born being, the "designation": "Leads to Brahman" (Chānd. 4.15.5) is appropriate.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. the word 'Brahman' in the neuter gender, denotative of the Highest Brahman, cannot possibly refer to Hiranyagarbha,—the author replies:

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1 Ś, Bh.
2 R, Śk, B.
In accordance with the scriptural text: “He who creates Brahman” (Śvet. 6.18), Hiranyagarbha, the effected Brahman, is the first-created being, and as such “on account of (his) proximity” to Brahman, the cause, the designation of him, by the neuter gender, denotative of the cause, viz.: “Leads them to Brahman” (Chānd. 4.15.5), is appropriate.

**COMPARISON**

**Baladeva**

This is śūtra 9 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. “But the designation of that (viz. salvation) is on account of nearness”. That is, the souls are said to go to the world of Brahman and never return (Brh. 6.2.15) not because they obtain salvation directly, but because they are very near getting it.¹

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**FIRST OPPONENT’S VIEW** (continued)

**ŚŪTRA 9**

“On the dissolution of (the world) of the effected (Brahman), with its ruler, (the soul goes) to what is higher than him, on account of declaration.”

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā**

On the destruction of the world “of the effected” Brahman, the soul together with the effected Brahman, attains “what is higher than” the effected Brahman, “on account of the declaration”: “But they all, attaining the highest immortality, are freed in the world of Brahman at the time of the great end” (Mund. 3.2.6 ²).

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

An objection may be raised here, viz. The path beginning with light cannot lead to the world of Hiranyagarbha for the following

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¹ G.B. 4.3.9, p. 72, Chap. 4.
² R, Śk.
reasons: First, in the text: “This is the path of gods, the path of Brahman. Those who proceed through it do not return to this human whirlpool, return not” (Chānd. 4.15.5) and so on, one who has gone through the path beginning with light is declared to have no return; secondly, in the text: “Going up through it, one goes to immortality” (Chānd. 8.6.6; Kaṭha 6.16), immortality is designated (on the part of one who goes through this path); thirdly, the world of Hiranyagarbha is subject to creation and destruction; and finally, Hiranyagarbha being subject to creation and so on, in accordance with the text: “He who creates Brahma formerly” (Śvet. 6.18), one who has attained him has to return, as declared by the Śruti passage: “The world up to the world of Brahmapūra return, O Arjuna!” (Gītā 8.16). To this Bādari replies: “On the dissolution of the effected,” i.e. on the destruction of the world of Hiranyagarbha, together “with its ruler”, i.e. with the lord of that world who is possessed of knowledge, the soul which as entitled to knowledge has itself attained knowledge there as well, attains Brahman who is “higher than this”, i.e. the cause of Hiranyagarbha, the effected Brahman. Why? “On account of declaration,” i.e. on account of the declaration: “Going up through it, one goes to immortality” (Chānd. 8.6.6; Kaṭha 6.16), “Those who proceed through this do not return to this human whirlpool, return not” (Chānd. 4.15.6), and “But they all, attaining the highest immortality, are freed in the world of Brahman at the time of the great end” (Mund. 3.2.6).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

He, as pointed out above, regards the view of Bādari as the correct conclusion. Accordingly he holds that a lower knower, i.e. one who meditates on the qualified Brahman, can attain Brahman in this indirect way alone (viz. Krama-mukti) ¹. But Nimbārka, as we have seen, does not admit it.

¹ Ś.B. 4.3.10, p. 955.
FIRST OPPONENT’S VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 10

"ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF SMṚTI."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

This is known “also from the Smṛti passage”: “When the universal dissolution has come as well as the end of the highest, then they, with their selves realized, enter the highest place together with Brahman” (K.P. 12 1).

Vedānta-kaustubha

“Also on account of the Smṛti passage:” “When the universal dissolution has come as well as the end of the highest, then they, with their souls realized, enter the highest place together with Brahman” (K.P. 12), the non-return of even one who has attained Hiranyagarbha is justifiable.

SECOND OPPONENT’S VIEW (Sūtras 11–13)

SŪTRA 11

“TO THE HIGHEST, JAIMINI (HOLDS), ON ACCOUNT OF BEING PRIMARY.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

He leads the soul “to the highest” Brahman, since the word ‘Brahman’ in the text: “Leads them to Brahman” (Chānd. 4.15.5 2), primarily refers to the Highest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The troupe of conductors leads the worshippers of the Highest Brahman “to the highest” Brahman,—so the teacher “Jaimini” thinks. Why? Because the word ‘Brahman’ in the text: “Leads them to Brahman” (Chānd. 4.15.5) primarily refers to the Highest Brahman.

1 P. 139, lines 5-6. Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B. 2 Ś, R, Bh.
To the allegation, made above, viz. that the effected Brahman alone, occupying a particular place, being specified by the word ‘worlds’ and the plural number, the group of conductors leads his worshippers to him alone,—we reply: That the Highest Brahman who is all-pervading may voluntarily occupy a particular place is known from scriptural texts like: “He who is his ruler remains in the supreme void”, “That is the supreme place of Viṣṇu” (Kaṭha 3.9; Maitri 6.26) and so on. The eternity of His world, too, is denoted by the scriptural text: “Having my self realized, I reach the unerected world of Brahman” (Chand. 8.13.1). The plural number, too, is appropriate, intending to designate, as it does, the plurality of the regions of the world, in accordance with the declaration by the Lord Himself in the Droṇa-parva: ‘‘Those worlds of mine which are free from stains, which shine for ever and which are longed for even by the highest gods headed by Brahmā, go there quickly, O performer of the Agni-hotra at all time! Be like me, having Garuḍa as conveyance!’’ (Mahā. 7.6059-6060

COMPARISON

Śrikanṭha

Interpretation different, viz.: “(The souls are led to Nārāyaṇa) higher than (Hiranyagarbha), etc.”.

SECOND OPPONENT’S VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 12

“And on account of observation.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because the text: “Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form” (Chand. 8.2.23), declares that the Highest is the object to be attained.

1 P. 742, lines 13-14, vol. 2.
2 Śk, B, 4.3.11, p. 476, Parts 10 and 11.
3 R, B.
Vedānta-kaustubha

And also because the texts: "Going up through it, one goes to immortality" (Chānd. 8.6.6; Katha 6.16), "This serene being, having arisen from the body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.2.23), declare that a knower, who having come out through the vein which passes through the crown of the head, has proceeded by the path of gods, attains Brahman.

SECOND OPPONENT'S VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 13

"AND THE INTENTION OF ATTAINING (DOES NOT REFER) TO THE EFFECTED (BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"I reach the court of Prajāpati, the chamber" (Chānd. 8.14.1 1)—this intention does not refer to the effected Brahman, but to the Highest Self, He alone being the topic of discussion.

Vedānta-kaustubha

An objection may be raised here: The word 'Brahman' mentioned in the text: "Leads them to Brahman (Chānd. 4.15.5) does indeed denote the effected Brahman, since in accordance with the text: "I reach the court of Prajāpati, the chamber" (Chānd. 8.14.1) a knower proceeding by the path that begins with light aims at attaining the effected Brahman. To this we reply:

"The intention of attaining," i.e. the resolve for attaining, mentioned in the scriptural text: "I reach the court of Prajāpati, the chamber" (Chānd. 8.14.1), does "not" refer "to the effected" Brahman, but this intention of attaining refers to the Highest Brahman, since, as known from the text: "The evolver of name and form. That within which they are in Brahman" (Chānd. 8.14.1), the Highest alone is the topic of discussion.

1 Ś, R, Bh, Śk.
CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 14-15)

SŪTRA 14

"Leads them who do not depend on symbols—so Bādarāyaṇa holds on account of fault in both ways, and whose intention is that."

The troupe of light and the rest "leads those who do not depend on symbols",—i.e. those who meditate on the Highest Brahman, as well as those who meditate on their own imperishable nature as having Brahman for its essence,—to the Highest Brahman. Why? "On account of fault in both ways." That is, on the view that it leads only those who meditate on the effected Brahman, the following scriptural text will come to be contradicted, viz. "Having risen from the body having attained the form of highest light" (Chānd. 8.12.3 1). On the fixed rule, on the other hand, that it leads those only who meditate on the Highest Brahman, the following scriptural text will come to be contradicted, viz. "Those who know thus and those who meditate on faith and penance in the forest—reach light" (Chānd. 5.10.1 2). Hence in accordance with the scriptural text: "Just as the intention a man has in this world, so alone does he become after departing" (Chānd. 3.14.1 3), "he whose intention is that" attains that alone,—this is the correct conclusion, the reverend Bādarāyaṇa thinks.

Having set forth two views, the reverend author of the aphorisms is now stating his own conclusion.

The troupe of conducting divinities of light and the rest "leads those who do not depend on symbols,—so" the reverend Bādarāyaṇa thinks. That is, it leads other than those who meditate on name and the rest as Brahman, viz. those who meditate on the Highest Brahman, as well as those who meditate on the real nature of the individual soul unconnected with matter and as having Brahman for its essence. There is no fixed rule that it leads only those who meditate

1 R, B. 2 R, B. 3 R, Bh, B.
on the effected Brahman, or that it leads only those who meditate on the Highest Brahman. Why? "On account of fault in both ways." That is, because on the view of Bādari that it leads only those who meditate on the effected Brahman, the following scriptural text will come to be contradicted: "This serene being, having arisen from the body, having attained the form of highest light is completed in his own form" (Chānd. 8.12.3); and because on the view of Jaimini that it leads only those who meditate on the Highest Brahman, another scriptural text will come to be contradicted, viz. the one indicating that the knowers of the five fires proceed through the path beginning with light: "Those who know thus and those who meditate on faith and truth in the forest reach light" (Chānd. 5.10.1). Hence it leads the two kinds of worshippers—this the author says: "And he whose intention is that". In accordance with the scriptural texts: "Just as the intention a man has in this world, so alone does he become on departing" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "Just as one meditates on Him, so alone does one become" (Mudg. 3 1), one who aims at attaining the Highest Brahman attains Him; while, one who aims at attaining the individual soul, unconnected with matter and having the Highest Brahman as its essence, first attains such a soul and then the Highest Soul.

**COMPARISON**

Śaṅkara

Having completed the above topic by taking Bādari as representing the correct conclusion and Jaimini the opponent’s view, Śaṅkara begins a new adhikarana here, concerned with the question as to whether those who meditate on symbols too are led to (the qualified) Brahman. He reads "adośāt" instead of "dośāt". Hence the sūtra: "(The troupe of conducting divinities) leads those who do not depend on symbols, so Bādarāyaṇa (thinks), since there is no fault (in speaking) in two ways, and he whose thought is that". "That is, it has been said above 2 that all those who meditate go to the world of Brahman, while here an exception is made. But these two different designations involve no contradiction in accordance with the maxim of ‘As you sow, so you reap’. 3 This is sūtra 15 in Śaṅkara’s commentary.

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1 P. 384, lines 7–9. 2 Ś.B. 3.3.31. 3 Ś.B. 3.4.15, pp. 965-966.
Rāmānuja

He adds a "ca" after "ubhayathā".1

Bhāskara

Reading like Śaṅkara’s. Interpretation as follows: “(The troupe of conducting divinities) leads those who do not depend on symbols (i.e. excluding those who meditate on symbols, those who meditate on the effected Brahman are led to him, and those who meditate on the Highest Brahman are led to Him,) since this two-fold (view) involves no fault”, and so on. That is, to hold that those who meditate on the effected Brahman are led to the effected Brahman, while those who meditate on the Highest Brahman are led to the Highest Brahman does not give rise to any contradiction that even those who meditate on the effected Brahman do not return, for they attain a gradual release, while the former, immediate release.2

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading like Rāmānuja’s. According to him, those who meditate on the Highest Brahman alone are led to Him, neither those who meditate on Hiraṇyagarbhā nor those who meditate on Nārāyaṇa.3

Baladeva

Reading like Rāmānuja’s.4

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 15

“AND (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS A DIFFERENCE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The scriptural text: “As far as name goes, so far he comes to have freedom of movement” (Chānd. 7.1.5) and so on “shows” that

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1 Śri. B. 3.4.14, p. 460, Part 1, Madras ed.
2 Bh. B. 4.3.14, p. 240.
3 Śk. B. 4.3.14, pp. 477-78.
4 Bh. 4.3.15, p. 77, Chap. 4.
5 Ś, R, Bh.
symbolic meditation has a different result, independent of going (through the path of gods).

Here ends the third quarter of the fourth chapter in the Vedānta-pārījāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śāriraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the meditations on symbols, beginning with name up to the vital-breath 1, since the Highest Brahman stands in an attributive relation to the symbol, the symbol itself is the primary thing, and as such those who meditate on symbols do not meditate on the Highest Brahman. Hence they do not proceed by the path of gods and attain the Highest Brahman. For them, the holy Scripture, viz.: “As far as name goes so far he comes to have freedom of movement” (Chānd. 7.1.5) and so on, “shows” a different limited result, independent of going. Hence it is established that the troupe of conducting divinities leads those—who meditate on the Highest Brahman—as well as those—who meditate on their own real nature, unconnected with matter and having Brahman for its essence,—to the Highest Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled “The effected” (5).

Here ends the third quarter of the fourth chapter of the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śāriraka-mīmāṃsā by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the venerable Nimbārka, the teacher and founder of the sect of the holy Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Śrīkanṭha

Interpretation different, viz. “And (Scripture) shows the difference between Hiranyagarbha, Nārāyaṇa and Śiva).”

1 Vide Chānd. 7.1–7.15.
Baladeva

He takes this sūtra (sūtra 16 in his commentary) as forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with showing the special favour shown by the Lord for the nirapekṣa devotees. “And (Scripture) shows the special (rule with regard to the nirapekṣa devotees).” That is, the general rule is that the conducting divinities lead the devotees to the Lord. But in the case of the nirapekṣa, the Lord Himself comes down to fetch them to Him.

Thus we have five different views with regard to those who approach or the gāntṛ and the goal approached or the gantavya:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gāntṛ</th>
<th>Gantavya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. (a) Those who meditate on the Highest Brahman,</td>
<td>(a) and (b) The Highest Brahman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) as well as those who meditate on the real nature of the individual soul.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(This is the view of Nimbārka and Rāmānuja.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. (a) Those who meditate on the qualified Brahman.</td>
<td>(a) The qualified or effected Brahman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(This is the view of Śaṅkara.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. (a) Those who meditate on the Highest Brahman.</td>
<td>(a) The Highest Brahman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Also those who meditate on the effected Brahman.</td>
<td>(b) The effected Brahman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(This is the view of Bhāskara.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. (a) Those who meditate on the Highest Brahman.</td>
<td>(a) The Highest Brahman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(This is the view of Śrīkaṇṭha.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. (a) Those who do not meditate on any symbols, whether they meditate on the Highest Brahman or not.</td>
<td>(a) The Highest Brahman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(This is the view of Baladeva.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Résumé

The third quarter of the fourth chapter contains:—

(1) 15 sūtras and 5 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
(2) 16 sūtras and 6 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṅkara;
(3) 15 sūtras and 5 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
(4) 15 sūtras and 5 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
(5) 15 sūtras and 5 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrikantha;
(6) 16 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Sūtra 5 in the commentaries of Śaṅkara and Baladeva is not found in the commentary of Nimbārka.
FOURTH CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FOURTH QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇā 1: The section entitled "The manifestation on attaining". (Sūtras 1–3)

SŪTRA 1

"HAVING ATTAINED, (THERE IS) MANIFESTATION, ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORDS 'IN HIS OWN'.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabhā

"Having attained” the Highest through the path beginning with light, the individual soul becomes manifest in its own natural form. This is proved by the text: “Having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form” (Chāṇḍ. 8.12.3 1) “on account of the words ‘in his own’”.

Vedānta-kaustubhā

It has been established in the previous quarter that the very same path, beginning with light, is designated by all Scriptures, and that it leads the knowers to the Highest Brahman. Now the problem is being discussed, viz. in what form one, who has attained Brahman through that path, becomes manifest.

In the Chāṇḍogya Prajāpati’s declaration is recorded thus: “So exactly, this serene being, having arisen from the body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in its own form.” (Chāṇḍ. 8.12.3). Here the doubt is, viz. whether it is established by the text that one, who has attained the form of highest light, comes to have an adventitious form, or that having attained the Highest, the knower, becomes manifest in his own natural form alone. If it be suggested: From the words ‘is completed’ it is known that having attained the form of highest light, he comes to have an adventitious form like that of a god and so on,—

1 Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
( 858 )
We reply: "Having attained, manifestation". That is, having attained the form of highest light, the individual soul comes to have "manifestation", i.e. have its real nature and qualities, such as freedom from sins and so on, manifest,—this is what is established by the text. Why? "On account of the words 'in his own'”, i.e. on account of the adjective: 'in his own form'. Otherwise, an adventitious form being established by the mere word 'form', the adjective 'in his own' would become meaningless. The sense is that the individual soul, the real nature of which is veiled during its state of bondage, having attained the Lord through the path beginning with light, becomes manifest in its own unenveloped and natural form.

**COMPARISON**

**Saṅkara**

According to him, sūtras 1–7 of this pāda refer to the higher knower, the rest to the lower knower.

**SŪTRA 2**

"FREE, ON ACCOUNT OF PROMISE."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

It is said that he alone who is free from bondage is completed in his own form. Why? Because, beginning: "The soul that is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.7.1 ¹), Prajāpati promised: "But this alone I shall explain to you again" (Chānd. 8.9.3; 8.10.4, 5 ²).

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

To the objection, viz. One's natural form being ever present, what is the difference between the state of bondage and that of release,—the author replies:

One, who being subject to nescience consisting in karmas is surrounded by matter in its causal and effected forms, who is tormented...
by various afflictions, and who is deluded by various false arguments, is said to be eternally fettered. He does not know his own form, though ever-present. During the period when he desires for salvation also, though he comes to know his real nature through the grace of Scripture and spiritual preceptor, yet due to his connection with matter in its causal and effected states, he is not completed in his own real form. The very same person, coming to attain the form of highest light through the path beginning with light, and free from all fetters, is completed in his own form, and then he is said to be freed,—this is the distinction between these three states. Why? “On account of promise,” i.e. because beginning: “The self which is free from sins” (Chând. 8.7.1), Prajâpati promised: “But this alone I shall explain to you” (Chând. 8.9.3, etc.), which promise refers to the demonstration of the real nature of the soul, free from all faults, such as the three states of waking and the rest, and from the body and the like, their substratum. If there be no distinction, the promise of Prajâpati must be meaningless,—this is the sense.

SŪTRA 3

"THE SELF, ON ACCOUNT OF CONTEXT."

Vedânta-pârijâta-saurabha

“The self”, alone comes to have its real nature manifest, “on account of context”.

Vedânta-kaustubha

“The soul,” the real nature of which is veiled during its state of bondage, having attained the Highest Brahman, denoted by the words ‘highest light’ becomes manifest in its own form, i.e. is completed as having the qualities of freedom from sins and so on, but is not completed in another adventitious form. This fact is known from the introductory portion of Prajâpati’s declaration, viz.: “The self that is free from sins, without old age, without death, without grief, without hunger, without thirst, having true desires” (Chând. 8.7.1),—i.e. from the context, which refers to the individual soul. In the very same manner, Śaunaka declares: “Just as the lustre of a gem is not created by the washing off of the dirt, so the knowledge of the soul is not created
by the removal of faults. Just as water is not created by the digging of a well, only what is already existent is brought to manifestation,—for how can there be the origination of what is non-existent,—so the attributes of knowledge and the rest are manifested, and not created, through the destruction of the evil qualities, for they belong to the soul eternally."

Hence it is established that having attained the Highest Brahman through the path which begins with light, the individual soul is completed in its own natural form alone.

Here ends the section entitled “Manifestation on attaining” (2).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They interpret the sūtra thus: "(The light is) the soul (viz. Brahman), on account of context".  

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled “Seen as non-divided”. (Sūtra 4).

SŪTRA 4

“As non-divided, on account of being seen.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The freed soul realizes itself “as non-divided” from the Highest Self, which non-division is compatible with a division (between the two), since this truth is directly intuited at that time (viz. during release), and since Scripture too intuits this.

Vedānta-kaustubha

From the text: “Having attained the form of highest light” (Chāṇḍ. 8.12.3) and from the aphorism: “Having attained, manifestation” (Br. Sū. 4.4.3), it appears as if there is an absolute difference

1 Ś.B. 4.4.3, p. 968; Bh. B. 4.4.3, p. 242; G.B. 4.4.3.
between one who approaches (viz. the individual soul) and the goal approached (viz. the Lord). With regard to this, the author now points out:

On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul, the real nature of which has become manifest and which has attained the highest light, realizes itself as distinct from the Highest Self or as non-distinct from Him being His part,—the prima facie view is: In accordance with the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: “Stainless, he approaches the highest identity” (Mund. 3.1.3), “He enjoys all desires together with Brahman, the all-knowing” (Tait. 2.1), “They have come to attain similarity with me”’ (Gītā 14.2), it realizes itself as distinct.

With regard to it, the author replies: “As non-divided”. That is, the individual soul, freed from all fetters, realizes itself as non-divided or non-distinct from the Highest Self, the Highest Person. Why? “On account of being seen,” that is, because at that time (viz. during release) the Highest Self, the soul of all, is intuited by the freed soul. Through the influence of nescience, the individual soul comes to have a perverse notion about itself. But, when through the influence of the repeated practice of hearing, thinking and meditating, the Highest Lord is intuited, all the obstacles to the real knowledge regarding the real nature of itself as well as of the Highest Self are immediately destroyed, in accordance with the scriptural text: “The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are cut off, and all his works perish when he who is high and low is seen” (Mund. 2.2.8). Hence there can be no doubt whatsoever that the freed soul, a part of the Lord, having intuited the Soul of all, the Whole, realizes itself, all the more clearly, as non-distinct from Him. The individual soul, having Him for its essence, has no distinction from Him; and hence in spite of a distinction of nature between the individual soul and Brahman, there is still a non-distinction between them,—a non-distinction which is compatible with distinction,—just as there is between an attribute and its substratum. This relation between the individual soul and Brahman has been demonstrated many times before,¹ and a multitude of scriptural and Smṛti texts too has been quoted there. We do not mean to say that there is any non-distinction of nature between the

¹ Vide e.g. V.K. 1.1.1; 1.1.7; 1.2.21; 1.4.9; 1.4.20; 1.4.21; 2.1.13; 2.1.21; 2.2.33, etc. etc.
soul and the Lord, otherwise in accordance with scriptural and Smṛti
texts like: "The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning,
one only and without a second" (Chānd. 6.2.1), "All this, verily, is
Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "Vāsudeva is everything", "Know every-
thing Kṛṣṇa, the movable and the immovable, all souls and the
universe as Kṛṣṇa" (Mahā. 13.7391 1), there must be a non-distinction
of nature between the non-sentient and the Lord too, or,2—because
Scripture is found to refer to distinction and non-distinction. Hence
it is established that the freed soul realizes itself as non-distinct from
the Highest Self, which non-distinction is compatible with distinction.

Here ends the section entitled "Seen as non-divided" (4).

COMPARISON
Śaṁkara and Bhāskara

To understand the word "avibhāga" as absolute identity.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "Relating
to Brahman". (Sūtras 5–7)

FIRST OPPONENT’S VIEW (Sūtra 5)

SŪTRA 5

"As relating to Brahman, Jaimini (thinks so), on account
of reference and so on."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The individual soul becomes manifest as endowed with the
attributes "relating to Brahman", such as freedom from sins and

1 P. 258, line 7, vol. 4. Reading: "Sarvam kṛtām . . . viśvam enam".
2 An alternative explanation of the word "dṛṣṭatvāt".
3 Ś.B. 4.4.4, p. 969; Bh. B. 4.4.4, p. 243.
so on,—so "Jaimini" thinks, because freedom from sins and the rest, mentioned in the text about the 'small' as belonging to Brahman, are referred to, in the declaration of Prajāpati, as belonging to the individual soul as well; and because of eating and so on, as indicated by the words "and so on".

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said above that having attained the Highest Brahman, the soul becomes manifest in its own form. Now the question as to the nature of that form is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul becomes manifest in its own form, endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and so on; or in the form of mere consciousness; or in a form which is conformable to both kinds of texts,—Jaimini's view is as follows: The freed soul becomes manifest as endowed with the group of attributes "relating to Brahman", i.e. with freedom from sins and the rest which are recorded as belonging to Brahman. Why? "On account of reference and so on." That is, the attributes of freedom from sins and so on, mentioned under the meditation on the 'small' as belonging to Brahman, are referred to as belonging to the individual soul too in the declaration of Prajāpati, viz.: "The self that is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3) and so on. By the words "and so on" eating and the rest, as well as omniscience, etc., are to be understood. The teacher "Jaimini" thinks so.

SECOND OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtra 6)

SŪTRA 6

"IN INTELLIGENCE, AS THAT ALONE, ON ACCOUNT OF HAVING THAT AS THE ESSENCE, SO AUḌULOMI (THinks)."

Vedānta-pārījāta-saurabha

The individual soul, having approached Brahman who is of the form of intelligence, becomes manifest in the form of intelligence alone,

1 Chānd. 8.1.5. 2 Chānd. 8.7.1, 3. 3 Chānd. 8.12.3.
since in the text: “Consisting of intelligence alone” (Brh. 4.5.13), it is said to have that (viz. intelligence) as its soul.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

The individual soul, having approached “intelligence”, i.e. Brahman who is of the form of intelligence, becomes manifest “as that alone”, i.e. in the form of intelligence alone. Why? “On account of having that as the essence”, i.e. because the individual soul has intelligence for its essence, or is nothing but intelligence. The scriptural text: “Just as a lump of salt is without inside and outside, a mass of taste only through and through, so, verily, O! this soul is without inside and outside, a mass of intelligence only through and through” (Brh. 4.5.13) shows, by using the word ‘only’, that the soul is nothing but intelligence and devoid of any other attribute. The text designating freedom from sins and so on, on the other hand, simply establishes that the soul is free from changes and so on,—“so Auḍulomi” thinks.

**COMPARISON**

**Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha**

They read: “Citi-mātreṇa”.

**CORRECT CONCLUSION (Śūtra 7)**

**ŚŪTRA 7**

“Even so, on account of reference, on account of the existence of the former, non-contradiction, Bādarāyaṇa.”

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

Even if the real nature of the soul be established to be intelligence only, still owing to the manifestation of the real nature of the soul as possessed of freedom from sins and so on, there is “no contradiction”

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1 Ś, R, Bh, Šk, B.

2 Bh. B. 4.4.6, p. 243; ŠK. B. 4.4.6, p. 485, Parts 10 and 11.
—so the reverend "Bādarāyāna" thinks. Why? "On account of the reference" to freedom from sins and so on as belonging to the freed soul.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the reverend teacher of the Vedas states his own view in conformity with both the scriptural texts.

"Even so," i.e. even if the soul be established to be mere intelligence, yet "on account of the existence of the former", i.e. owing to the manifestation of the individual soul as intelligence by nature and as endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest, there is "no contradiction" with regard to the nature of salvation,—so the reverend "Bādarāyāna" thinks. Why? "On account of reference," i.e. because in the declaration of Prajāpati, freedom from sins and the rest, belonging to Brahman, are referred to as belonging to the freed soul as well. It cannot be said that in the text: "A mass of intelligence only" (Brh. 4.5.13), the word 'only' proves that the attributes of freedom from sins and so on do not belong to the soul, because they are clearly proved to be belonging to it by another text: "The self that is free from sins" (Chānd. 8.7.1, 3) and so on, and because the word 'only' simply distinguishes the self from non-sentient objects,—just as it cannot be said that in the text: "A mass of taste only" (Brh. 4.5.13), the word 'only' proves that colour, touch and so on do not belong to salt, because they are known from other means of knowledge, and because the word 'only' simply distinguishes salt from other objects. The purport is that Anūlomī's view, designating the freed soul as devoid of consciousness, is not acceptable. Hereby other logicians and the rest too, holding the freed soul to be devoid of consciousness, are refuted. Hence it is established that having attained the form of highest light, the individual soul becomes manifest in its own natural form as endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and so on, conformably with both the scriptural texts.

Here ends the section entitled "Relating to Brahman" (3).

1 Chānd. 8.7.1.
2 Just as a lump of salt has not taste only, but has also colour and so on, so the soul is not intelligence only, but has other attributes also.
He takes Jaimini to be representing the phenomenal point of view, Auḍulomi the transcendental point of view, and Bādarāyana as reconciling these two points of view.1

Adhikarana 4: The section entitled “Will”. (Sūtras 8-9)

Sūtra 8

“Through mere will, that being declared by Scripture.”

Vedānta-pārljāta-saurabha

The freed soul attains its fathers and so on “through mere will”. Why? On account of the scriptural text designating that: “If he comes to desire the world of fathers, through mere wish, his fathers rise up” (Chāṇḍ. 8.2.1 2).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said that having attained the form of the highest light, the individual soul becomes manifest in its real nature as a mass of intelligence and possessed of the attributes, beginning with freedom from sins and ending with true desires.3 Hence the freed soul has the power of fulfilling all its desires. But if the freed soul be devoid of consciousness, it cannot have such a power. With this in mind, the author is now showing the freed soul’s power of will.

Referring to the freed soul, it is declared in the Chāṇḍogya: “He roams about there, laughing, playing, enjoying with women, or with carriages, or with relatives” (Chāṇḍ. 8.12.3). Here the doubt is, viz. whether the freed soul’s meeting its relatives and so on arises from its will accompanied by effort, or from mere will. If it be suggested: In ordinary experience it is found that kings and the rest

1 Ś.B. 4.4.7, p. 971.
2 Ś, R, Bh, Šk, B.
3 Vide Chāṇḍ. 8.7.1, 3.
come to attain the implements of enjoyment through will accompanied by effort,—hence from effort accompanied by will alone,—

We reply: There is the attainment of relatives and so on, "through mere will". Why? "On account of that being declared by Scripture", i.e. because in the text: "If he comes to desire the world of fathers, through mere wish his fathers rise up" (Chāṇḍ. 8.2.1), it is declared that the rising up of the fathers and so on is brought about through will without any reference to any effort, and because it is not declared that will is accompanied by an effort. The kings and the rest do not possess the power of fulfilling their desires at will, and hence in their case it is reasonable to suppose that they attain what is desired through will accompanied by effort.

COMPARISON

Śaṁkara

He adds a "tu" after "saṁkalpaṁ eva",! He takes this and all the following sūtras as referring to the lower knower alone.

SŪTRA 9

"For this very reason, without another ruler."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The freed soul, which has the Highest Brahman as its essence, comes to have the attributes of true desires and so on manifest,—and for this very reason, it becomes "without another ruler", in accordance with the scriptural text: "He becomes a self-ruler" (Chāṇḍ. 7.25.2).²

Vedānta-kaustubha

As the freed soul’s power of fulfilling its desires at will becomes manifest, so it becomes "without another ruler", i.e. without any ruler except the Highest Brahman, the Whole, of which it is a part. That is, of one, who has Brahman for his essence, who has become

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¹ Ś.B. 4.4.8, p. 971.
² R.
freed from the world, and who has come to have lordship manifest through the manifestation of the attribute of true desires owing to the grace of Brahman, there are no other creators and lords like matter, time, Yama, Indra, and so on, in accordance with the scriptural text: “He becomes a self-ruler” (Chānd. 8.12.1). Hence it is established that the freed soul attains relatives and so on immediately at will.

Here ends the section entitled “Wish” (4).

COMPARISON

All others add a “ca” after “ata eva”.

Adhikarana 5: The section entitled “Absence”. (Sūtras 10–16)

SūTRA 10

“Absence, Bādari, for (Scripture) declares so.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Bādari” thinks that the body and the rest of the freed soul are absent, since the scriptural text: “When he becomes bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him” (Chānd. 8.12.1), “declares” the same thing.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been established that the freed soul attains relatives and so on through mere will. Now, with a view to showing that it may connect itself with a body, sense-organs and so on according to its will, the author is stating the view of another.

On the doubt, viz. whether the freed soul has a body and the rest, or not, or whether he has them or not at will,—the teacher “Bādari” thinks that they are absent, since the scriptural text: “Forsooth, when he possesses a body, he has no freedom from pleasure and pain;

1 R, B.
but when he becomes bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him”
(Chānd. 8.12.1) “declares so”, i.e. establishes, positively and
negatively, the absence of the body and the rest.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He reads “abhāve” instead of “abhāvam”.¹

SECOND OPPONENT’S VIEW (Sūtra 11)

SŪTRA 11

“Presence, Jaimini, on account of the scriptural statement of
variety.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Jaimini” thinks that its body and the rest are present. Why?
“On account of the scriptural statement of manifoldness: “He
becomes one-fold, three-fold” (Chānd. 7.26.2 ²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

“Presence”, i.e. the teacher “Jaimini” admits the existence of
the freed soul’s body and the rest. Why? “On account of the
scriptural statement of variety”, i.e. because under the doctrine of
the Plenty, in the passage: “He becomes one-fold, becomes three-
fold, five-fold, seven-fold, and nine-fold truly; then, again, he is said
to be eleven, hundred and ten, thousand and twenty” (Chānd. 7.26.2),
its manifoldness is recorded. Such a manifoldness refer to the body
of the free soul, since manifoldness is not possible on the part of
the soul which is atomic and indivisible. The scriptural text about its
having no body, on the other hand, refers only to the body which is
brought about by works.

¹ G.B. 4.4.10, p. 101, Chap. 4. ² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.
SUTRA 12

"Therefrom, Bādarāyāṇa (holds), of both kinds, as in the case of the twelve days' sacrifice."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The reverend "Bādarāyāṇa" thinks that through mere wish, the freed soul may or may not have a body, just as the twelve days' sacrifice is a 'satra' or an 'ahīna', in accordance with the texts: "Those desiring for wealth should resort to the twelve days' sacrifice"¹, "The priest is to offer the twelve days' sacrifice for one who desires for progeny"². So is the case here.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author states his own conclusion.

"Therefrom," i.e. through mere wish, the soul is "of both kinds", so the reverend "Bādarāyāṇa" thinks. That is, the freed soul may or may not have bodies and the rest according to its will. This being so, none of the texts is contradicted. "As in the case of the twelve days' sacrifice," i.e. just as the twelve days' sacrifice is of two kinds owing to the difference of wish. In accordance with the injunction of 'resorting': "Those who are desirous of prosperity should resort to the twelve days' sacrifice", it is a 'satra'; while in accordance with the injunction of offering: "A priest should offer the twelve days' sacrifice for one who desires progeny", it is an 'ahīna'. So is the case here.

Or³, the word "therefrom" is to be understood as "on account of two texts". There is a text designating the enjoyment of one who is bodiless, viz. "Having perceived these objects of desire by mind alone who enjoys in this world of Brahman" (Chānd. 8.12.5); and there is a text designating the enjoyment of one who has a body, viz. "He becomes one-fold" (Chānd. 7.26.2) and so on.

¹ R, Bh.
³ An alternative explanation of the term "ataḥ".
SŪTRA 13

"IN THE ABSENCE OF A BODY, AS IN THE CASE OF THE INTERMEDIATE STAGE (VIZ. DREAM), ON ACCOUNT OF POSSIBILTY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As "in the absence of a body" created by itself, enjoyment is possible on the part of the freed soul by means of the body and the rest created by the Lord during dreams,—so there is no fixed rule that the body and the rest are to be created by the freed soul itself.

Vedānta-kaustubha

As "in the absence of a body", i.e. in the absence of a body created by itself, the enjoyment of sportive pleasures is possible on the part of the freed soul by means of the group of instruments created by the Lord, so there is no fixed rule that the freed soul creates its body and the rest through mere wish. That is, the freed soul, having true desires, is able to create the world of fathers and the rest, as well as its own body and the like, yet it enjoys sportive pleasures by means of the instruments created by the Highest Person in sport. It has been demonstrated above 1 that during the state of dream, the soul in bondage enjoys chariots and the rest created by the Lord alone.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

He interprets the sūtra thus: "In the absence of a body, (the freed soul's objects of desire, such as, fathers and so on are mere perceptions and not actual objects), as during dreams, on account of possibility ".2

Bhāskara

According to him, the sūtra means that in the absence of a body, the freed soul enjoys pleasure and so on by the mind, as does the soul in bondage during its state of dream.

1 Vide V.K. 3.2.1.
2 Sk. B. 4.4.13.
SŪTRA 14

"IN (ITS) PRESENCE, AS DURING THE STATE OF WAKING."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

As in the presence of the body and the rest created by itself too, the enjoyment of sportive pleasures is possible on the part of the freed soul,—so it sometimes creates these through its own wish too, corresponding to the sport of the Lord.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

The words ‘on account of possibility’ are to be supplied. As in the presence of the body and the rest created by itself, the enjoyment of sportive pleasures on the part of the freed soul is possible, “as during the state of waking”, so there is also no fixed rule that the freed soul itself never creates its own body and the rest. Just as a man in the waking state creates,—so far as it lies within his power,—sons, houses, chariots and the like,—included within the sphere of His creation,—with the help of man, wood, stone and the rest, and enjoys them,—so the freed soul too having, through the Lord’s grace, the power of realizing its wishes, creates, in accordance with His sport, fathers, relative and the like, as well as its body and the rest, through its own wish, corresponding to His wish, and enjoys His sportive pleasures,—this is the sense.

**COMPARISON**

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

They interpret the sūtra thus: When there is a body, the objects desired by the freed soul have real existence.  

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1 Cf. the Śū. “Loka-vat tulita-kaivalyam” All objects are created by the Lord in sport. So the objects created by a freed soul conform to such sportive creative designs of the Lord.

SŪTRA 15

"THE ENTERING (INTO MANY BODIES IS) AS IN THE CASE OF A LAMP, FOR (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS THUS."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

The soul's "entering" into many bodies takes place through its attribute of knowledge, as of the lamp through its ray,—"for" the scriptural text: "It is capable of infinity" (Śvet. 5.9) "shows thus".

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

Apprehending the objection, viz. The manifoldness, mentioned in the text: "He becomes three-fold" (Chānd. 7.26.2) and so on, is not possible on the part of the freed soul even though it may have a body, since it is never possible for one and the same soul, which is atomic by nature, to pervade many bodies,—the author replies:

"The entering" of the freed soul, atomic in size and abiding within one body, into many bodies,—i.e. its complete entering into those bodies as their soul with the thought: 'This is my body and that as well'—is possible through its attribute of knowledge. "As in the case of a lamp." That is, just as a lamp, though placed in one place, pervades many places through its attribute, viz. rays, so is the case here. "For thus" Scripture shows, viz. "The individual soul is to be known as a hundredth part of the point of a hair, divided a hundred times, yet it is capable of infinity" (Śvet. 5.9).

**Śaṃkara and Bhāskara**

They interpret the sūtra a little differently, viz. Just as one lamp multiplies itself into many lamps—all lighted from the original lamp,—so the freed soul multiplies itself into many bodies, since it has the power of realizing its wishes.²

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1 R.
2 Ś.B. 4.4.15, p. 975; Bh. B. 4.4.15, p. 247.
SūTRA 16

"(The text) refers either to merging into one's own self or to attaining, for (this is) manifested."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The text: "Embraced by the intelligent self, he does not know anything that is outside, nor anything inside" (Brh. 4.3.21 1), however, does not refer to the freed soul, but "refers either" to deep sleep or to death. In the texts: "Verily, now he does not know himself as: 'I am he', nor indeed the things here" (Chānd. 8.11.1 2), "Having arisen from these elements, he perishes into them alone" (Brh. 4.5.13 3), "Verily, with this celestial eye, the mind, he sees these desires" (Chānd. 8.12.5), the soul's absence of knowledge during these two states (viz. deep sleep and death), as well as its omniscience during the state of release, are "manifested" or clearly declared by Scripture.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. It cannot be said that the individual soul can abide in many bodies even by means of its attribute of knowledge, since in the text: "Embraced by the intelligent self, he knows nothing that is outside nor anything inside" (Brh. 4.3.21), one who has attained the Highest Self is declared to be devoid of any knowledge of particular objects,—the author replies:

This text "refers either to merging in one's own self or to attaining", i.e. either to deep sleep or to death. "For (this) is manifested", i.e. because the soul's absence of all knowledge of particular objects during deep sleep and death, as well as its omniscience during the state of release, are "manifested" or clearly declared by Scripture itself. The text: "Verily, now he does not know himself as: 'I am he', nor indeed the things here. He has gone to utter annihilation. I do not see any good in it" (Chānd. 8.11.1), declares that the soul has no knowledge of particular objects during deep sleep. And the text: "Having arisen from these elements, he perishes into them alone" (Brh. 4.5.13), declares that it has no knowledge of particular objects when dead. The word 'perishes' means that its knowledge ceases to be

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1 R, Šk, B.  
2 R, Šk, B.  
3 Š, Bh, Šk.
manifest. Finally, the following texts declare that the soul is omniscient during its state of release: "Verily, with this celestial eye, the mind, he sees desires, and enjoys in this world of Brahman" (Chānd. 8.12.5), "Verily, the seer sees everything, attains everything everywhere" (Chānd. 7.26.2). Hence it is perfectly reasonable to hold that the freed soul possesses the instruments, such as the body and the rest, created by the Lord; may have, according to will, a body or not or many bodies; and is omniscient.

Here ends the section entitled "Absence" (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṁkara

He interprets the word "sampatti" as 'final release'. His view is that the lower knowers who meditate on the qualified Brahman do not attain kaivalya or absolute isolation as the soul gets during deep sleep and release, but only a particular condition when the knowledge of difference still persists.¹

Adhikarana 6: The section entitled "Exclusive of the activities in connection with the Universe". (Sūtras 17–22).

SŪTRA 17

"Exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe, on account of the subject-matter, and on account of non-proximity."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The lordship of the freed soul consists in something other than the activities in connection with the creation and the rest of the

¹ Ś.B. 4.4.16, p. 976.
universe. Why? Because in the text: “From whom, verily, these beings arise” (Tait. 3.1), the Highest Brahman is referred to as the subject-matter; and because the individual soul has no place therein.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

Now the question is being considered, viz. of what nature is the lordship of the freed soul, which has thus come to attain the highest identity.

The doubt is, viz. Whether the lordship of the freed soul consists in the activities in connection with universe or is exclusive of it. The *prima facie* view is that like the Highest Person, the lordship of the freed soul too consists in the activities in connection with the creation, maintenance and so on of the entire universe.

With regard to this, we reply: “Exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe”. That is, the lordship of the freed soul does not consist in the activities in connection with the controlling of the universe, such as its creation and so on. But the activities in connection with the creation of the universe belong to the Highest Brahman alone. Why? “On account of subject-matter,” i.e. because in the texts designating creation and so on, viz. “From whom, verily, these beings arise” (Tait. 3.1) and so on, He alone is the subject-matter; “also on account of non-proximity”, i.e. because in the texts designating creation and so on, the freed soul is never mentioned as the creator and the rest of the universe.

**COMPARISON**

**Śaṅkara**

As pointed out above, he refers all these sūtras to the lower knowers only.

**Bhāskara**

He too refers this and the following sūtras to those who attain the effected Brahman only.

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1 R, Šk, B.
"If it be objected that on account of direct teaching, no, (we reply:) no, on account of that which abides within the sphere of those entrusted with special offices being mentioned."

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

If it be objected: Since by the scriptural text: "He becomes a self-ruler. He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds'" (Chand. 7.25.2) the freed soul is proved to have the activities in connection with the universe, the stated view: "Exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe" (Br. Sū. 4.4.17) is not tenable,—

We reply: "no", since that text simply declares that the objects of enjoyments inhering in the worlds of Hiranyagarbha and the rest are the objects of the freed soul's enjoyment.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

If it be objected: The view, stated above, that the lordship of the freed soul is exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe, is not tenable. Why? "On account of the direct teaching": "He becomes a self-ruler. He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds" (Chand. 7.25.2). The word 'direct' means 'Scriptural'. By Scripture, i.e. by the Chāndogya and the rest, the lordship of the freed soul is taught as consisting in the activities in connection with the universe,—on account of that,—

We reply: "no". Why? "On account of that which abides within the spheres of those who are entrusted with special offices being mentioned," i.e. because "that which abides within the spheres of those who are entrusted with special offices", or the objects of enjoyment inhering in the worlds of Hiranyagarbha and so on too "are mentioned", i.e. established, by the Chāndogya-text, to be the objects of the freed soul's enjoyment.
COMPARISON.

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. The soul who has attained the effected Brahman has not unlimited lordship, since it depends on the Lord abiding in the disc of the sun and the rest.¹

SŪTRA 19

"AND THAT WHICH IS NOT SUBJECT TO CHANGE, FOR THUS (SCRIPTURE) DECLARES (ITS) EXISTENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The freed soul intuits Brahman alone, free from the changes of birth and the rest, an ocean of natural, inconceivable and infinite attributes, and possessed of super-human power, "for" Scripture declares the soul’s "existence" during salvation² to be "thus": "For when, verily, he finds fearlessness as a foundation in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has gone to fearlessness" (Tait. 2.7 ³), "Verily, he is the essence, for on attaining this essence one becomes blissful" (Tait. 2.7).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said the lordship of the freed soul is exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe. On the enquiry: In what, then, does it consist?—the author now shows that the lordship of the freed soul consists in a direct intuition of the Highest Brahman, possessed of super-human power, and thereby rejects the view—suggested by the statement made above that the objects of enjoyment, inhering in the spheres of those who are entrusted with special offices, are the freed soul’s objects of enjoyment,—viz. that the freed soul is just like the soul in bondage.

¹ Ś.B. 4.4.18, pp. 977-978; Bh. B. 4.4.8, p. 248.
² C.S.S. reads “mukta-sthiti”, (p. 91), also Brindāban ed. (p. 1354).
³ R.
The freed soul intuits the Highest Brahman alone, “not subject to change”, i.e. untouched by any change like birth and so on, free by nature from all faults, the one ocean of all auspicious qualities, and possessed of super-human powers. The word “and” implies emphasis. Scripture declares “the existence” of the freed soul to be “thus”: “For when, verily, he finds fearlessness as a foundation in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has gone to fearlessness” (Tait. 2.7), “Verily, he is the essence, for on attaining this essence, one becomes blissful” (Tait. 2.7), “‘Whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known’” (Chānd. 6.1.3). The sense is this: Even when the soul in bondage happens to go to the world of Hiranyagarbha, it does not find freedom from fear, in accordance with the declaration by the Lord: “‘The worlds up to the world of Brahmā do return, O Arjuna!’” (Gītā 8.16). But the freed soul, on attaining the Lord, possessed of supreme power, enjoys the pleasures belonging to the worlds of Hiranyagarbha and others too, which are included within Him as His particular power. This is declared by the scriptural text: “He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds” (Chānd. 7.25.2). All the worlds, which are powers of the Highest Brahman, abide in Him. This is declared by the scriptural text: “That alone is the bright, that is Brahman, that alone is said to be immortal. In him all worlds rest. Nothing surpasses him” (Kaṭha 5.8; 6.1). It cannot be said that the individual soul being other than the Highest must be subject to some fear, in accordance with the declaration: “Fear arises from a second” (Brh. 1.4.2),—because the freed soul is not a second something, distinct from the Lord, as a deer is from a tiger; and because it has been established many times before that the individual soul, because of having Brahman as its essence, is non-different from Him.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

“(The Highest Brahman) does not abide in effects (like the sun and the rest), for (Scripture) declares (His) existence (to be) thus.” That is, it has been said in the previous sūtra that those who attain the effected Brahman are subject to the Lord abiding within the sun

1 Vide, e.g., V.P.S. 1.1.1, 1.1.7, 1.2.21, 1.4.9, 1.4.20, etc. etc.
and the rest. But here it is shown that the Highest Brahman, who is non-qualified, does not abide in sun and the rest, but only the qualified Brahman does.¹

**SŪTRA 20**

"AND THUS PERCEPTION AND INFERENCE SHOW."

**Vedānta-pārījāta-saurabha**

Brahman alone is capable of the activities in connection with the creation and the rest of the entire universe. The following scriptural Smṛti passages "show" the lordship of the freed soul to be exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe: "He is the cause, the lord of the lord of causes²" (Śvet. 6.9 5), "The controller of all, the ruler of all" (Bṛh. 4.4.22 4), "With me as the ruler, prakṛti brings forth the movable and the immovable" (Gītā 9.10 5).

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

"Perception" means Scripture, "inference" Smṛti. These two, Scripture and Smṛti, "show" that Brahman alone, not subject to any change, is capable of the activities in connection with the universe. The scriptural texts are to the effect: "The lord of matter and souls, the controller of attributes" (Śvet. 6.16), "Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold" (Śvet. 6.8), "The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second"³ (Chāṇḍ. 6.2.1), "He is the Lord of all, he is the ruler of beings, he is the protector of beings, he is the bridge for keeping these worlds apart" (Bṛh. 4.4.22), "Verily, at the command of the Imperishable, (Gārgī), the sun and the moon stand held apart" (Bṛh. 3.8.9), "Through fear the wind

¹ Ś.B. 4.4.19, p. 978; Bh. B. 4.4.19, p. 248. The difference between Śaṅkara and Bhāskara with regard to these two aspects of the Lord—non-qualified and qualified—is that while Śaṅkara takes the former alone to be true, the latter false, Bhāskara takes the former to be real and eternal, the latter, real and non-eternal.

² Correct reading: "Karnāḍhipāḍhipa"—the lord of the lord of sense-organs (or the individual soul). Vide Śvet. 6.9, p. 70.

³ Not quoted by others.


⁵ R.
blows, through fear the sun arises, through fear fire, the moon and death as the fifth speed on” (Tait. 2.8), “He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of causes” (Śvet. 6.9), “In whom all the worlds rest. None, surpasses him” (Kaṭha 5.8; 6.1), “Krṣṇa, the one, the controller, moving everywhere, is to be worshipped” (G.P.T.1). The Smṛti passages are to the effect: ‘‘With me as the ruler, prakṛti brings forth the movable and the immovable”’ (Gītā 9.10), ‘‘Pervading the entire universe with a part of mine, I abide’’ (Gītā 10.42),‘‘I am the source of all, everything originates from me’’ (Gītā 10.8), ‘‘On me all this is strung, like gems on a piece of thread’’ (Gītā 7.7), ‘‘There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhananājaya’’ (Gītā 7.17).

The freed soul, however, though similar to the Highest Brahman, yet cannot possibly be the lord of all the sentient and the non-sentient, their controller, their supporter, all-pervasive and so on; and hence its lordship is exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe.

**SŪTRA 21**

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE INDICATION OF EQUALITY IN POINT OF ENJOYMENT ONLY.”

**Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha**

“And on account of the indication of equality in point of enjoyment only,” viz.: “He enjoys all pleasures together with Brahman, the all-knowing” (Tait. 2.12), the lordship of the freed soul is exclusive of the activities with regard to the universe.

**Vedānta-kaustubha**

“And on account of the indication” to the effect that the freed soul has similarity with the Lord in point of enjoyment only, viz.: “He enjoys all desires together with Brahman, the all-knowing” (Tait. 2.1), it is known that the lordship of the freed soul is exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe.

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1 P. 195.  
2 R, Bh, Šk, B.
SŪTRA 22

"NON-RETURN, ON ACCOUNT OF TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no return for the soul which has attained the form of the highest light and has become free from transmigratory existence. Why? "On account of the texts": "Those who proceed by this do not return to this human whirlpool, return not" (Chāṇḍ. 4.15.6), "But on attaining me, O son of Kuntī, there is no re-birth" (Gītā 8.16).

Here ends the fourth quarter of the fourth chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

By demonstrating that the freed soul has similarity with the Lord in point of enjoyment alone, it has been shown there is no similarity of nature between the two. It is to be known that the freed soul, different from Brahman, has no return, "on account of texts", i.e. in accordance with following scriptural and Smṛti texts: "Those who proceed by this, do not return to this human whirlpool, return not" (Chāṇḍ. 4.15.6), "They attain the world of Brahman, and do not return" (Chāṇḍ. 4.15.1), "This is immortal, fearless, this is the highest abode. From this, one does not return" (Praśna 1.10), "On attaining me, the great-souled ones who have attained supreme perfection, are not subject to re-birth, the abode of miseries and non-eternal" (Gītā 8.15), "But on attaining me, O son of Kuntī, there is no re-birth" (Gītā 8.16), "Resorting to this knowledge, they have come to attain similarity with me. They are not born at the time of creation, nor suffer at the time of dissolution" (Gītā 14.2) and so on. The repetition of the aphorism indicates the completion of the treatise.

1 Ś, Bh, B.
It is established that the lordship of the freed soul consists in a direct intuition of the Highest Brahman, the Highest Self, the soul of all.

Here ends the section entitled "Exclusive of the activities in connection with the universe (6).

I bow down to the author of the aphorisms and to him who explained them, through whose grace the Vedānta-kaustubha has been churned out of the ocean of Scripture for the well-being of knowers.

Here ends the fourth quarter of the fourth chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the venerable Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the sect of the holy Sanatkumāra.

This fourth chapter entitled "The fruit" is completed.

Résumé

According to Nimbārka and others, the fourth quarter of the fourth chapter contains 22 sūtras. The number of adhikaraṇas is 6 according to Nimbārka and Rāmānuja, 7 according to Śaṅkara and Bhāskara, 8 according to Śrīkanṭha and 10 according to Baladeva.

The End