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राजमारांदारायणिनिर्णितम्

THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI,
WITH THE
COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RAJA
AND AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.
BY
RAJENDRALAL MITRA, LL. D., C.I.E.
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PREFACE.

The doctrine of Pessimism as evolved by Schopenhauer and developed by Hartmann created quite a sensation in Europe. The novelty, the bold generalizations, the closeness and vigour of ratiocination with which it was set forth, endowed it with qualities which could not but attract attention and claim consideration. But, carefully analysed, it does not appear to have any pretension to novelty or originality to which its admirers lay claim.

The doctrine of evil as inseparable from the world is nearly as old as humanity. It was the dread of evil that drove the primitive man to seek the shelter of superhuman power, and laid the foundation of religion. There would have been no religion if there had been no dread of evil, here or hereafter. Nor would philosophy have had its birth had not the necessity arisen to discriminate between good and evil. Morality, too, presupposes a differentiation between that which is proper and that which is improper—of a consciousness, however vague and undefined, of future reward and punishment. Doubtless the doctrine assumes constant and unalloyed evil, and not a mixture of good and evil; but in so doing it only places the evil in the present condition, and transfers the
good to a hereafter, in a hazy, cloudy, dubious, undefined way, but does not absolutely deny it.

The preëminence of the unconscious Will is the most important element of the doctrine; and it, too, under the names of Freewill, Mâyá, Buddhí, and the like, has occupied men's mind and played its part in philosophy from a pretty remote period of antiquity.

Then comes the repugnance to worldly attractions, love, affection and joy; and under the form of asceticism it is almost as old as civilized man.

The denial of the existence of God is an assumption of no modern date; it unquestionably preceded the formation of human ideas about Divine Providence; and the assumption about the objectification of Will forms the corner-stone of the doctrine of Patanjali.

It might be said that, if thus the leading tenets of the Pessimist doctrine be old, their association into a compact and complete system is not so, and that in this respect it may well claim the full meed of praise for its originality. This, however, cannot be conceded. Even as are its tenets, so is it in its entirety as a system. What Schopenhauer enunciated in his 'World as Will and Idea' (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung) in 1819, and Hartmann worked out in his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' (Philosophie der Unbewussten) in 1869, is no other than the nihilist philosophy of Buddha put forth in a modern European garb, or, as an able writer puts it, a system "little more than Buddhism vul-
garised." It is the farthest from my wish to assert that the two German philosophers have surreptitiously, or deliberately, borrowed their system from the Indians: it is almost certain that Schopenhauer at the beginning of this century had no knowledge of any Buddhist Philosophy, and Hartmann, working on the model of his predecessor, had, probably, no occasion to consult the texts of the Sunyavāda system of the Buddhists as accessible to him in meagre abstracts in European languages. The similitude may be—nay, most probably is—purely accidental, the result of human mind set to thinking in a particular line of ideas arriving at the same conclusion; but it exists, and is as clear as possible, and that is all that is here intended to be emphasized.

The system of Śākya Buddha is a modification of a more ancient and more fully developed doctrine—that of Kapila, as known under the name of Sānkhya. Thoroughly logical in its scheme of ratiocination, the Sānkhya enunciates that there is no proof of the existence of a Supreme Divinity, and therefore leaves it entirely out of consideration in its scheme of primal causation. Its words, as summarised in the text book of the school, but which is obviously of a much later date than Kapila, are, Is'varāsiddheh: "It is not proved that there is a God." (Sānkhya, Aph. I, 92.) The idea is more fully developed and argued in a subsequent part of the work (Vide infra, pp. 31f). Śākya Buddha, less logical but more bold, adopted this idea in a positive form, instead of keeping the question open by admitting only the want of
dialectic demonstration. Schopenhauer does the same without any reserve, describing theism as "a tradition of the nursery."

The next subject is Soul or the vitalizing and conscious principle of life. Kapila's theory recognises its existence, assuming a separate soul for each living being. Buddha did the same. These souls are uncreate and eternal, never coming to an end. Buddha acknowledged and, indeed, made them the basis of his system, but practically, though not in so many words, he denied them absolute eternity, for his theory of Nirvāṇa assigned them an ultimate and final goal after many transmigrations in sunyatā, vacuity or nihility. It may be that his Nirvāṇa did not extend to absolute nihility, for there is nothing authentic and unquestionable in his sayings; but his immediate followers, who developed the Mahāyāna school, announce it in unmistakable terms, and for the purposes of the present comparison this is enough. The German philosopher goes a step further, and insists on the absolute negation of Soul. His words put in English are, "there is no psyche;" but unable to dispense with it altogether, he supplies its place by an "unconscious will" which plays the part of Soul. Practically this amounts to admitting Soul, but divesting it of its consciousness and eternity.

In the Sānkhyā system, the category next after Soul is Pradhāna, or Nature, having inherent in it the threefold qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or as the Sānkhyā-pravachana-bhāšya defines it, "the equilibrium of the three qualities,"
(‘triguna-sāmyam’). The terminology is archaic, but it implies the sum-total of the laws and forces of nature, which regulate the course of the phenomenal world. Buddha availed himself of this category to the full, and Schopenhauer does the same, using only modern terms in conformity with the physical science of the day.

The next is Intellect. It is common to all the three systems under notice, and alike unconscious in all. The Sānkhyas call it Mahat, the Buddhists Buddhī, and Schopenhauer Will, “the Reality, the absolute Existence, the Ultimate Fact, the universal and fundamental essence of all activities, both of the organic and the inorganic world, the primordial thing whence we and everything proceed.” In the Yoga system, the term used is chittā, which, in the following pages, has been rendered into ‘thinking principle;’ but would have been as well—nay more pointedly—expressed by will.

Kapila assigned real substantiality to matter. What the primitive Yogis thought about it we know not. Patanjali is silent on the subject in his Yoga aphorisms; but in his Mahābhāṣya he admits an absolute reality of it. He raises the question by saying, yadī tvād guṇasamuddāyo dravyam, “if you hold matter to be the aggregate of qualities,” (IV, 1.) and then refutes the theory, Buddha’s idea of Sunyatā necessitated the same theory in a more prominent manner. He could not admit absolute reality to any thing, and as the inevitable nihilistic consequence of his creed, matter had to assume the character of a phantasmal play of mental phenomenality—
PREFACE.

"—— A fleeting show
For man's illusion given."

The Vedánta took it up after him, Berkeley worked it out in England in the early part of the last century, and Schopenhauer has done the same in our own days.

As already stated the theory of evil—constant, ever-present evil in everything mundane,—is common to all the three schools. Kapila designed his system with the express object of removing "the threefold pain" which is inherent in existence (Aph. I). Buddha's dread of the ever-recurring pain of birth, existence, decay, and death, drove him to the shelter of nihility, and the Pessimists of our day look upon pain as constant and inherent in worldly existence. The Yogís, who represent a section of the SánkhyaS, sum up the fruit of worldly existence by the significant remark, "to the discriminating all are verily painful." (Yoga, II, 15.) According to Hartmann "the world is so bad that it had better not exist, and that it is steadily becoming worse."

Nor are the means devised for the removal of this evil different. Perfect knowledge, attainable by hard, unremitting study amidst the most rigorous asceticism and self-mortification, and total renunciation of the pleasures of the world, is the only remedy accessible to man. Neither Kapila nor Buddha would have any other, and Schopenhauer, after dwelling on the miseries of existence, and showing that even suicide was not enough to put a stop to them, asks, "Whence then is deliverance to come?" and the answer given is "In knowing that the world is radically and essentially bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for
that old affirmation of the Will to live; it leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of Will, that true *Nirvāṇa* in which there is no more Will, therefore no longer an ideal presentation, or a real world."

In so far the correspondence is as close as possible in works set apart by an interval of considerably over four and twenty centuries—between Buddhism of the 6th century before Christ and the Pessimism of our own times. A learned writer describes Pessimism as the "goal of modern thought" in Europe. If so, that "goal" was reached in India over four and twenty centuries ago.

Nor should the limit be set there. It is impossible to believe that Sānkhyaism, like Minerva, issued forth in all its perfection at once. It is but natural to suppose that many ontological and biological questions, such as God, soul, mind, primary causation, &c., must have formed the theme of speculation and enquiry from a long anterior period, to prepare the Indian mind for the conception and reception of so recondite a system as the Sānkhya. Kapila could not have conceived and brought it forth, had not his predecessors discussed and made themselves familiar with such philosophical ideas. There must have existed many doctrines, many dogmas, many theories to afford him the necessary materials to work out his scheme. Even as Bacon's *Novum Organum* was not the spontaneous generation of a novel thought, but the crystallization or solidification of ideas which
were extant at the time in a more or less undefined, nebulous way, so was Kapila’s Sánkhya. Various phases of philosophic thought were well known and current in his time, and his was the master mind which put them together to create a complete system. The bricks existed, and Kapila was the architect who used them in constructing a novel edifice.

How long before the time of Kapila metaphysical dogmas had currency among the Hindus we know not for certain; but the remarkable hymn in the Rīg Veda which discusses whether entity or non-entity existed before creation (X, 129) carries us to a remote period of antiquity beyond which we cannot speculate. The reference in the Sāma Veda to a Yati who condemned sacrifices, and whose wealth was transferred to Bhrigu, is equally germane to the point. According to the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa some such Yatis were punished by being thrown before jackals. In the A’ranyaka period of Vedic history, these rationalistic speculations and metaphysical controversies were of frequent occurrence, and the Upanishads have preserved for us the substance of some of the orthodox speculations on the subject. They afford us traces also of the heterodox dogmas which they were intended to combat. Kautsa was the leader of one of the rationalistic schools, and he is named by Yáska. Jábála was an atheist, and his name occurs in the Upanishads. Páśini alludes to atheists, sceptics, fatalists, and revilers of the Vedas. It may be taken for granted without any offence to reason that these heterodox people did entertain many dog-
mas in opposition to the received exposition of primal causation and other recondite doctrines of the Hindu faith. They could not have been heterodox if they had not adverse theories to propound; and they must have been met by counter theories to keep up the antagonism. One may go further and assume that these disputes led to the development of adverse schools of thought which have since been overthrown by later developments. The earliest Vedic cultus was purely ritualistic. It embraced prayers and peace-offerings—prayers in set forms, and peace-offerings in the form of sacrifices accompanied by libations of spirituous liquors. Those who reviled the Vedic religion opposed it principally on the ground of the futility, cruelty and unmeaning character of the offerings. The atheists, pure and simple, denounced the whole system as false. This, however, was a purely destructive course, and not calculated to win the multitude in its favour. Mere negation suggests the idea of the doctrine of Metrodorics, the Epicurean, which had for its main object the stomach. Society needed some check to vice by holding up a threat of future retribution, and absolute negation of divine providence and future life did not provide it. Besides, a future state being admitted, a preparation for it in the present state was felt a necessity, and a large majority of the opponents, therefore, appealed to self-torture and meditation for aid.

Meditation as a means of communion with the Divinity was known long before the date of the Sāṅkhya. Indeed, in all ancient forms of religion,
meditation occupies a prominent place as a religious exercise. In the Rig Veda the Gāyatrī enjoins the meditation of the divine light which vivifies the solar luminary as the most sacred act of devotion, and that meditation occurs in endless forms in the rituals of all subsequent sects and systems. This meditation is called Dhyāna, the word used in the Gāyatrī being the verb dhīmahi “may we meditate.” Now, this Dhyāna cannot be performed without fixing the mind on one particular object after abstracting it from worldly cares and enjoyments, and this fixation is called Dhāraṇā, or steadfastness. The abstraction necessarily implies some amount of asceticism and austerity, and this is called in the Vedas Tapas. A man must forego all worldly enjoyments before he can fix his mind on one unworldly object, and the fixation must take place before he can begin a meditation. Austerity, therefore, forms the first step in the process; fixation or steadfastness the second; and meditation the third; and all these exercises have enjoyed a halo of sanctity from a remote period of antiquity. No Rishi could live without his hermitage; none without performing Tapas; none without steadfast devotion; none without his meditation. These are the essential attributes of a Rishi. It would be a contradiction in terms to suppose a Rishi could be so, without them. They suggest the idea of communion with something superhuman, and create a feeling of mysterious awe and veneration in the mind of the common herd. At first the object of meditation was of course the Divinity in some form
or other; but atheistic philosophers soon found it practicable to dispense with that object, and they converted the objective thought to a subjective one, and thus produced the highest meditation of the Sāṅkhyaśa, a meditation in which the mind meditates on itself, or, as the philosophers of this class express it, on nothing. The next step was to dispense with the eternity of matter, to reduce it to a phantasmal character. The mind was all in all, and there was no necessity for an eternal co-ordinate, and this is the dogma of the Buddhists and the Vedāntists. None of these, however, dispensed with individual soul. That formed an integer in all the leading systems of early Indian philosophy. Nay, more, in order to provide for a future state of retribution, it was necessary to develop or retain the system of metempsychosis. It was seen that neither virtue nor vice always brought on its deserts in this life, and the necessity for a next life became unavoidable; and if the soul was to have a next corporeality of some kind to bear the deserts, there was nothing to hinder the transmigration many times. It may shock European ideas of the present day to be told of metempsychosis; but between worldly life, purgatory, and eternal hell-fire, or heaven on the one hand and metempsychosis on the other, dispassionate and unsophisticated logic will readily yield the palm to the latter. An English lady was once shocked at the sight of a Hindu lady with her nose bored for a nose-ring. She said, "how barbarous is this custom of yours, dear sister, of boring the nose?" "I fail," replied the Hindu, "to perceive the difference, Madam, between boring the two ears and
boring the nose." The Hindu controversialist may adopt this line of argument and ask, the matter not being susceptible of positive proof without the aid of revealed religion, "logically what is the difference between three corporealities and a dozen or more?"

But, however that be, all the ancient leading schools of India accepted metempsychosis, and the grand object they had in view was to devise the means for putting a stop to the ever-lengthening and never-ending chain of transmigration. And so long that was kept prominently before the masses, most of whom keenly felt, as they do now, and will always do, what Schelling calls "that sadness which cleaves to all finite life," the system propounded, however otherwise discordant in doctrinal points, had a fair chance of success, as a proselytising system, particularly if it were favourable to peace and welfare in this present existence.

Buddhism was peculiarly well-adapted for this purpose. It was the most attractive in its moral and social phases. No system of human religion has propounded a more perfect course of morality, humanity, mercy, and sympathy. The universal benevolence it preached could not but exert a potent influence on the mind of the people. At a time when sacrifices of animals by hundreds were everyday practices, and those sacrifices were often effected by driving wooden spikes into the heart of writhing victims, the dogma of total abstinence from all sacrifices and uniform mercy to all creatures could not but produce a marked revulsion of feeling against the current religion, and to draw large numbers of
men to the standard of the new faith. The doctrines of equality of man and of non-recognition of caste also contributed very largely to recommend it to the favour of those who had been for a long time ground down by caste rules. The result was wholesale conversions of the lower and the middle classes of the people in all parts of India—so much so as to make Buddhism the leading religion of the country. The intellectual classes, the men of leading and light, also appreciated these moral and social advantages, and were willing to accept them. They perceived, however, the worm in the flower, and were shocked by the sight. The atheism which forms the basis of Buddhist philosophy never obtruded itself on the perception of the multitude. It was unknown to them, and they cared not at all to understand its true purport. But the intelligent few felt it, and wished to avoid it. Even professed Buddhists could not always tolerate it, and many were the attempts made to gloss over it, or to supplant it in an insidious way so as to divest the system of its atheism without injuring it in its constitution. The Ais'varika system of the Buddhists was the outcome of one of these attempts, and the Vedânta and the Yoga systems with their various Gitâ, Tâtric and Purânic modifications represent the results of Hindu attempts at reconciling the higher philosophy of Kapila and Buddha with a theistic religion.

It is not my object here to enter into the vexed question of the chronology of these different systems. It would take more time and space than what are
at my disposal now. It is necessary, however, to state that in appealing to the Sánkhya, I appeal to the doctrine, and not to its text-books. There is abundant evidence, both in Hindu and Buddhist works of unquestionable antiquity and authenticity, of the Sánkhya and the Yoga systems having been current before the time of Buddha. The most prominent part of the exercise of those systems involved the most rigorous self-mortification, and that mortification was currently practised with the utmost rigour before the time of Buddha. Buddha himself notices this. According to the Lalita-Vistara :

“While at Uruvilvá, Sákya called to mind all the different forms of penances which people at his time were in the habit of submitting to, and which they thought raised the mind above all carnality. ‘Here,’ he thought, ‘am I born in the Jambudvípa, among people who have no prospect of intellectual redemption (ádhímukti), crowded by Tirthikas with diverse wishes, and at a time when their faculties are wriggling in the grasp of the crocodile of their carnal wants. Stupid men, who seek to purify their persons by divers modes of austerity and penance, and inculcate the same! Some of them cannot make out their mantras. Some lick their hands. Some are uncleanly. Some have no mantras. Some wander after different sources. Some abstain from fish and flesh-meat. Some mind not the annual duties. Some abstain from spirit and the water of chaff. Some beg alms from one, three, five, or seven tribes. Some indulge in tubers, fruits, mosses, kúśa grass, leaves, cow’s dejecta, frumenty, curds, clarified butter, molasses, and unbaked cakes. Some wash the body of charioteers, parrot-flyers, and news-purveyors. Some dwell in villages, or in woods for their livelihood. Some adore cows, deer, horses, hogs, monkeys, or elephants. Seated at one place in silence, with their legs bent under them, some attempt greatness. Some speak to only one person, others to seven. Some eat once in a day and night, some once on alternate days, and some
at intervals of four, five, or six days; some once in a fortnight, performing a chándráyana. Some put on themselves the feathers of vultures or owls. Some, seated on a board or a munjá mat, wear bark, kuśa grass, valvaja grass (Eleusine Indica), or blankets of camels' hair, or of goat's wool, or of hair, or hides. Some sleep more or less in wet clothes Some sleep on ashes, gravel, stones, boards, thorny grass, or pestles, with the face downwards, in a hut or the bare ground. Some wear one, two, three, four, five, six, or seven pieces of cloth; others go naked, making no distinction between fit and unfit places. Some have long hair, nails, beard, and matted hair, and wear bark. Some live upon a single meal of a mixture of sesamum and rice. Some smear themselves with ashes, cinders from altars, dust, or clay. Some carry on their persons and in their hands down, munja grass, hair, nails, rags, mud, or a cocoanut-shell alms-bowl. Some drink hot water, or rice-water, or fountain water, or water preserved in earthen jars. Some carry on them cinders, metals, astringent things, three sticks, skulls, alms-bowls, bones or swords, and by these means they hope to attain to immortality, and pride themselves on their holiness. By inhaling smoke or fire, by gazing at the sun, by performing the five fires, resting on one foot, or with an arm perpetually uplifted, or moving about on the knees, some attempt to accomplish their penance. Some seek salvation by killing themselves by entering into a mass of lighted chaff or charcoal, or by suppressing their breath, or by roasting one's self on (hot) stones, or by entering any fire or water, or ascending in the air. The syllables "om," "vashat," "svadhá," "sváhá," as also, blessings, hymns, lighting of the sacred fire, invocations, repetitions of mystic mantras teaching of the Vedas (lit. mantras), or fancying the image of a divinity in one's mind, afford means of purification to many. Some pride themselves on their saluting Brahmá, Indra, Rudra, Vishnu, Devi, Kumára, Mátri, Kátyáyaní, Chandra, Aditya, Vaisávána, Varuṇa, Vásava, Ásvina, Nága, Yaksha, Gandharva, Ásura, Garuđa, Kinnara, Mahóraga, Rákshasa, Preta. Bhúta, Kushmánda, Párhada, Gaçapatí, Devarshi, Brahmarshi, or Rájarshi. Some select some of them, others resort to the earth, the water, heat, the air or the ether. Mountains, rivers, fountains, tanks, lakes, long narrow sheets of water (taḍágas), oceans, vats, ponds, wells, trees, lotuses, herbs, creepers,
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Grasses, stumps, pastures, cremation grounds, courtyards, and bowers afford asylums to others. Houses, columns, stones, pestles, swords, bows, axes, arrows, spears, and tridents, are the objects of salutation to some. In curd, butter, mustard, barley, garlands, darbha grass, jewels, gold and silver, some seek their welfare. Thus do these Tirthikas, dreading the horrors of mundane life, seek their shelter. Some seek heaven and salvation in their offspring, and resolutely apply to them. They all follow the wrong road; they fancy that to be the true support which is untrue; they hold evil to be good, and the impure to be pure. I shall then commence that kind of vow and penance by which all hostile sects shall be overpowered. To persons deluded by works and sacrifices, I shall show the destruction of all works and sacrifices. To Devas, perceivable by meditation, as also to those who become manifest in divers forms, I shall exhibit a meditation by which they may be overpowered."—My Buddha-Gayā, pp. 24, et seq.

The meditations he practised were all in accord with the rules of the Yoga system, and even their technical names were the same. These facts demonstrate the antiquity of the Sāṇkhya and the Yoga doctrines; but this cannot be said of the text-books of those systems as we have them before us now. They are obviously of a later date than Buddha, and this may safely be predicated of all the six leading texts of Hindu Philosophy. The Sāṇkhya Sūtra quotes the Vais’ešika by name in two places (A. I., 25 and VI, 35), and refutes the doctrine of the Vedānta Sūtra. The Yoga Sūtra takes for granted the twenty-five categories of the Sāṇkhya as the basis of its doctrine, and copies some of its aphorisms almost verbatim. The Vais’ešika Sūtra recognises the Nyāya as well as the Sāṇkhya. The Nyāya Sūtra refutes the doctrines of the Vedānta, and of the Sāṇkhya. The Mimāṁsā either directly or practically
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by the mode of its refutation of adverse doctrines recognises the pre-existence of all the others, not excepting Buddhism. It also quotes Badari, a teacher, and Bádaráyaṇa, probably a grandson of Badari, and author of the Vedánta Sútras or later Mimáñsa, as also of a commentary on the Yoga Sútra. The Vedánta in its turn refutes adverse doctrines of all the five, and thereby admits their pre-existence. This state of facts can be reconciled only by the supposition that the different dogmas and the schools which cherished them existed for a long time before the dogmas were written down in the aphoristic form in which we have them now. Oral transmission must have been the principal means of their preservation for a long time. There might have been also text-books before, but they were set aside by the very complete systems which the new texts produced, and in the new systems the refutation of adverse opinions very naturally included all the theories which were prevalent at the time when the books were compiled, and not the theories only of the time when the original dogmas were first promulgated. This is also obvious in other ways. In the case of the Sámkhya Sútra, though it is usually attributed to Kapila, one of the mind-born sons of Brahma, we find it refers to an "ancient teacher" (A'chárya, A. V, 31), and to "venerable preceptors" (A. VI, 69). Sanandana and Pañcha-síkha are cited by name (V, 32, and VI, 69). Kapila is then said to have taught his doctrine to A'suri, who is described both as a brother and a pupil of the teacher. A'suri imparts it to Pañcha-síkha, who is, according
to the Purāṇics, again a brother. This Pañchas'ikha, again, according to the Mahābhārata, lived in the time of Janaka, and taught the Sāṅkhya doctrine to that king of Mithilā. Had Kapila written the Sūtra he would never have described in it his younger brother and pupil as an A'chārya.

In the Vedānta Sūtra, Bādarāyaṇa, the author, is several times named in the third person (I, 3, 26; I, 3, 33; III, 2, 41; III, 4, 1, 8, 19; IV, 3, 15, IV, 4, 7, 12). This is usually explained by the statement that a pupil wrote down the teachings of the saint. Colebrooke, arguing on these facts, came to the conclusion that the text-books are much later than the saints whose names they bear. Referring to the Sāṅkhya he says "the text of the Sāṅkhya philosophy, from which the sect of Buddha seems to have borrowed its doctrines, is not the work of Kapila himself, though vulgarly ascribed to him; but it purports to be composed by I's'varakrishṇa,—and he is stated to have received the doctrine mediately from Kapila, through successive teachers, after its publication by Pañchas'ikha who had been himself instructed by A'surī, the pupil of Kapila." (Essays, I, p. 93). Professor Cowell accepts this opinion in its entirety; he says "The Sūtras, as we have them, cannot be the original form of the doctrines of the several schools. They are rather a recapitulation, at a certain period, of a series of preceding developments, which had gone on in the works of successive teachers. The Sūtras mutually refer to each other; thus, those of the Sāṅkhya school, which in itself I should consider
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one of the earliest, distinctly refer to Vedánta tenets. They expressly mention the Vaiséšika in I. 25, V. 85; for the Nyaya cf. V, 27, 86, and for the Yoga I, 93.” (Colebrooke’s Essays, I, 354.) This is also the opinion at which I have arrived after a careful consideration of the bearings of the question; in short, my conviction is that the Sútras were written, like the Institutes of Manu and many other Hindu works, long after the date of their putative authors.

As regards the Yoga, the doctrine is described to be as old as Brahmá, and the text-book to be the work of Patañjali, who, says the commentator, “compiled the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them” (p. 4). That such is really the case, is obvious from the fact of the Yoga which Patañjali inculcates being identically the same which the Sánkhya accepted as the only means of salvation. It might be argued that the Sánkhya adopted the theory of the 25 principles, from the Yoga of Patañjali, and did not lend it to him. But the arguments against this theory are overwhelming. In the first place had Patañjali initiated the theory of the Tattvas he would have for certain defined them, and not left them to be inferred. He is very careful in his definitions, and he would never have left so vital an element of his system to be inferred. But following the Sánkhya no necessity was felt by him for any definition. It cannot be said that his Tattvas were different from those of the Sánkhyas, for that would make the necessity for a definition even more
imperative. Secondly, the author of the Mahā-
bandhāṣṭya cannot possibly be proved to have lived
before Kapila, or his doctrine. The learned Professor
M. M. Kunte, in his "Vicissitudes of Aryan Civil-
ization," has combated, with great tact and ability,
the arguments usually put forth to fix the date of
Patanjali; and it may be admitted that indivi-
dually each argument as put forth by Goldstücker
and others admits of refutation, and I may add that
a long chain of weak arguments is not stronger than
any of its links. Still the coincidence of a number
of names of a given period is one which in Indian
history cannot be easily set aside as purely accidental.
Confining, however, one's attention to the text-book
only, no one who has read them carefully can fail to
perceive that Patanjali has contented himself by
tacking a theistic appendage of no direct utility to a
positively atheistic model, without in any way blend-
ing the two ideas into any homogeneity or consistency.
Hence it is that the Hindus call it Sās'vāra Sāṅkhya,
or Sāṅkhya cum deo, as opposed to the former which
is Nīris'vāra Sāṅkhya, or Sāṅkhya sine deo.

The cardinal difference between the two rests on
their theistic and atheistic belief, but as already stated,
itis makes no difference in their systems. Isolation of
soul from thinking principle is the end sought in either
case, and meditation in Samādhi is the only means
available. The believer in the existence of the God-
head assumes that divine grace facilitates the end
sought, but he does not dispense with Samādhi, and
his belief, therefore, is of no material importance.
"In less momentous matters," as noticed by Colebrooke, "they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the exterior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. Patanjali's Yoga-sústra is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind: Kapila is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mistaken in its conclusions."

(Essays I, p. 265.)

And we have enough in these facts and reasons to infer that the Yoga text-book is posterior to the Sánkhya text-book, and that both the text-books are later than Buddha; but that the doctrines of the two schools are very old. Any how these are the immediate ancient Hindu archetypes of the nihilist theory of Buddha, and indirectly of the Pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann.

The Yoga, moreover, is the archetype of another modern doctrine, that of spiritualism with its occult appendage. In this case the relation is direct and more intimate. The eternity of soul is recognised by both; both look to a course of gradual progress which has perfection for its goal; both admit the existence of soul in higher and higher stages; both recognise the possibility of man's commanding departed souls to come down, to become visible, and to hold converse with him; both pretend by regulation of breath and other exercises to attain occult powers of the most
transcendental kind. The details and the rationale of exercise may be different in minor points, and a few of the dogmas such as the "material reality" of soul according to the spiritualists, and its pure spirituality according to the Yogis, may be apparently contradictory; but substantially the two are as closely related as two systems separated by a gap of five and twenty centuries can well be. The cardinal theory, that "the body is the prison of the soul for ordinary mortals" but it is not so in the case of the adept, is evidently the same in both. "We can see only what comes before the windows of our body, we can take cognizance of what is brought within its bars. The adept has found the key of his prison, and can emerge from it at pleasure. In other words, the adept can project his soul out of his body to any place he pleases." The whole system in either case is based on this doctrine, and even a cursory study of the 3rd chapter of the work now presented to the public in an English dress will, I believe, fully bear out this statement.

The name of the Yoga system as we now have it is Yogánusásana, or 'the Institutes of the Yoga.' This name, however, is rarely used, the work being better known as the Yoga-sástra or 'the science of Yoga,' or Yoga-sútra, the 'Aphorisms of the Yoga.' According to the commentary, commonly assigned to Vyása, one name of the work would appear to be Sánkhya pravachana, or 'an exposition of the Sánkhya.' The words of the colophon are Pátanjala-yoga-s'ástre sánkhya-pravachane, which may be translated into, in Patanjali's science of the Yoga, the Sa'ńkhhya pravachana.
Vyāsa, however, if he be the author of the exegesis, which I do not believe to be the case, must have used the term simply to imply that it is a text-book on the Sānkhya system, and not to indicate the specific name of the work, for in his remarks on the first aphorism he distinctly says, “the name of the work is Yogānusāsana,” (Yogānusāsanam nāma sāstram). Following this exegesis Colebrooke says: “the title of Sānkhya-pravachana seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to Patanjali’s Yoga-sāstra.” (Essays I, p. 244). In short, Yogānusāsana is the specific, and Sānkhya-pravachana the descriptive, name of the work. Anyhow it is obvious that the Yoga is recognised from an early period as a work on Sānkhya.

The Yoga text as we now have it comprises a total of 194 short, succinct aphorisms, divided into four chapters or quarters (paśas). The first contains 51 aphorisms, devoted to an exposition of the nature and character of meditation, and is entitled Samādhi-pāda. The second is called Sādhana-pāda, or the quarter on the exercise of meditation and its requirements, and contains 55 aphorisms. The third is called Vibhūti-pāda, and treats of the various occult powers which may be derived by the exercises enjoined in it. It is of the same extent as the second. The name of the fourth chapter is Kaivalya-pāda, and it gives an exposition of the nature and character of the isolation or detachment of soul from worldly ties, which is the object and aim of the exercises and meditations recommended. It is limited to 33 aphorisms.
The work opens with a definition of the term Yoga. It is derived from the root yuj, which means both "to join" and "to meditate." Some accept the first meaning, explaining it in the technical sense to imply the joining of the mind to the object of thought. Others prefer the second, but that makes no material difference in the purport. The technical meaning of the word as used in the text is a derivative one. Instead of giving prominence to the joining, it implies the detachment which that joining occasions. The definition is, "the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle." This suppression, however, need not be absolute in order to make the word applicable. It is used to imply all stages of abstraction of the thinking principle from worldly cares with a view to centre it in the peculiar meditation which serves to effect that abstraction. The word is of very ancient date. It occurs several times in the Rig Veda, but not in the technical sense. In the time of Buddha, six centuries before the era of Christ, it had acquired its technical meaning to perfection, and as Buddha, according to the view of the case set forth above, borrowed it from the followers of the Sākhya school, it may safely be assumed that it dates from long before the age of Buddha. In fact, the Tapas of the Vedic Rishis got the more expressive name of Yoga at a later period, and Kapila and his followers gave it prominence in their system by making it the sole means of salvation. Many other works have since used it to indicate communion with the divinity in some way or other, and the Bhagavad-
géita takes thirteen out of its eighteen chapters to be each a treatise on a separate kind of Yoga. The names are: 2, Sánkhya Yoga; 3, Karma Yoga; 4, Jñána-karma Yoga; 5, Karma-sannyása Yoga; 6, Dhyána Yoga; 8, Táракabrahma Yoga; 9, Rájuguhya Yoga; 10, Vibhúti Yoga; 12, Bhakti Yoga; 13, Kshetra-kshetrajña Yoga; 14, Guñatraya Yoga; 15, Purushottama Yoga; 18, Sannyása Yoga. In fact, every phase of devotion is described as a form of Yoga. The Tantras have a great number of others, and many variations of those named above, but they need not be noticed here.

The definition of the text suggests immediately the question, what are the functions that have to be suppressed? These must first be known before they can be overcome. The author, therefore, proceeds to describe them. They are said to be fivefold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory. These, directly or indirectly, comprise all the functions to which the thinking principle can possibly be directed. The means of suppressing these functions are next described. They include, (a) exercise, or "effort constantly made to keep the thinking principle in its functionless state," (xiii,) and (b), dispassion, or "the consciousness of being their subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects," (xv). The details of these are reserved for consideration in the next chapter.

The exercises and dispassion result in Yoga, of which there are two kinds, a conscious and an unconscious one. The former is that which is attended
by argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism or self-consciousness; the latter is devoid of such attendants. As long as the thinking principle argues what is good and what is bad; as long as there is deliberation as to the nature of the object of thought; as long as a person engaged in meditation feels a sense of joy; or as long as he retains a sense of his own individuality, (self-consciousness), he is said to be in a conscious state of meditation. This is, in the technical language of the school, Savīja-samādhi or “seeded meditation,” because there is in it some nucleus on which the mind is centered. When, by arduous and long-continued exercise, this seed is lost, and the mind remains divested of all thought, a mere state of consciousness without an object, it becomes seedless, nirvīja, or perfect, and this is the sumnum bonum which the Yogi exerts to attain. When this is attained, the bondage of the world, of transmigration, is entirely severed, and the soul is declared to be isolated or free.

The expedients aforesaid are always and imperatively necessary—nothing can be attained without them; but their action can be expedited by another means, and that is “Devotion to God.” This devotion is absolute resignation of one’s* self to the Divinity. In the language of the commentator, “it is thorough worship of God. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one’s actions to him, the preëminent guide.” This devotion is the means by which the theism of the current Hinduism is reconciled with the philosophy of
the school. Kapila did not care for this reconciliation, and his system, therefore, did not stand in need of a Divine Providence; but his atheism being repulsive to the thinking portion of mankind, Patañjali avails himself of it to give a theistic character to his system. It will be noticed, however, that he makes his Divinity one of several means to an end, and not the end sought. The God he invokes is defined to be "a particular soul which is untouched by affliction, works, deserts, and desires," one who is existent, but not the avowed Creator and preserver of the universe. His name is I's'vara or "the ruler," and that may imply providence, but nothing is said on this subject. In two successive aphorisms, He is described as one "in whom the seed of the omniscient attains infinity," (xxv,) and "who is the instructor of even all early ones, for, He is not defined by time (xxvi)." The indicator of this Divinity is the syllable Om, called Prañava, and it is by repeating it and reflecting on its meaning that the different states of meditation can be easily attained. The author could have scarcely put God and his name to a more subordinate position.

Turning now to the obstacles which stand in the way of the Yogi in the satisfactory accomplishment of his meditation, the author enumerates what they are, and suggests the means of overcoming them. The obstacles, or causes of distraction, are disease, languour, doubt, carelessness, idleness, worldly-mindedness, mistaken notions, unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and instability in the stage obtained (A. xxx);
and these are attended by pain, distress, trembling, and oppressive inspiration and expiration (xxxI). These tend to make the thinking principle unsteady, or unfit for meditation, and have, therefore, to be sedulously overcome. The means for overcoming them are various. The habit of concentrating the mind on one particular principle is the most efficacious, (xxxII,) and it is to be supplemented by cheerfulness, benevolence, compassion, complacency, and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue, and vice (xxxIII). It may be effected also by a system of regulation of breath, called Prāṇāyāma, which is supposed to exert a powerful influence in steadying the thinking principle, and warding off disease and other obstacles (cf. p. 41). Although this regulation of breath is a necessary element in all the earlier or lower forms of the Yoga, one is specially called the Yoga of breathing, and technically called Haṭha-yoga, from the letters ha and ṭha, meaning the sun and the moon, which are the mystic names of inspiration and expiration. This form is particularly esteemed for its efficacy in procuring occult powers. When the habit of meditation has considerably advanced, and the Yogi is able to realize sensuous objects in his meditation, or when the mind is thereby so illumined, it is of itself sufficient to ward off tribulations. Meditation in the passionlessness of accomplished Yogīs might also effect this (xxxvII). Reliance on dreams, or on the object of one's fancy, is, likewise, an efficacious remedy.

The author then enters into a more elaborate classification of the Yoga. The twofold division first
pointed out does not suffice fully to indicate the various shades of difference which the seeded form assumes under different circumstances, and to each of these shades he assigns a different name, and defines its nature. In course of this, he points out the theory of the mind becoming the object it thinks upon (xli), in other words that intense thought creates objects, or becomes objective. This is the basis on which the occult powers described in a subsequent chapter are founded. The seedless form is one and simple, and it is the ultimatum sought by the Yoga.

The second chapter is devoted to the details of the exercises necessary for the performance of the Yoga, and is therefore called Kriyā-yoga or "practical Yoga." In its earliest and simplest state practical Yoga is accomplished by a strict observance of asceticism, by the muttering of a mantra a great number of times at stated periods every day, and by devotion to God. The object of these observances is to weaken afflictions and give firmness to meditation. Afflictions arise from attachment to worldly affairs, and asceticism is the best antidote for them, and the practice of repeating a mantra for a long time serves to steady the mind.

The reference to afflictions suggests the question, what are they? They are ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life, or 'the Will to live' as Hartmann designates it. Some of these are subtle, others gross, (iii). The former are to be counteracted by acting against their natural bent, (x) and the latter by meditation, (xi).
The afflictions are described to be the root of all evil. They give rise to works, and works leave behind their stock of residua to be worked out in a subsequent birth, and in that subsequent birth other works are performed, and they leave their residua, and so on, the chain is never brought to an end. For instance, ignorance leads to the commission of a sin; the retribution for that sin comes in the next existence; while that desert is being borne in that existence another sin is committed through ignorance; that necessitates another birth for its retribution, and the series never breaks. And what is true of ignorance is equally so of the other afflictions. Nor does the rule apply only to sins; it applies equally to virtuous deeds. For instance, if instead of a sin a virtuous work be performed, its deserts have to be enjoyed in another existence, and the course proceeds exactly as in the case of sin. In fact, every work, whether right or wrong, has its apportioned desert, and it must be borne in a corporeal existence, and the succession of birth, decay, and death must, in the ordinary course of things, recur over and over again without a limit. The fruits may be joy or suffering according as the cause is virtue or vice, but to the discriminating they are invariably painful, (xv). They are, also inevitable, and must be borne. An act once performed must bear its fruit, and in so far there is no remedy. One may, however, avoid doing those works which bear fruit, and thereby break the spell, and the maxim is therefore laid down that only those pains are avoidable which are not yet come, (xvi).
The question then arises, what should one do to abstain from works, and avoid their consequences? and the object of the Yoga is to devise the means through which the abstinence may be effected.

In order to explain the rationale of the course by which the evil is to be brought to an end, the author next enters into an explanation of the mutual relation of Intellect and Soul. Intellect is called a spectacle, and it is said "to be of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is for the purpose of experience and emancipation," (xvii). It exists solely for the purpose of Soul, (xxi). Soul is called the spectator; "it is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas," (xx). When these two are in conjunction through ignorance (and it is ignorance which brings them into conjunction) they produce life and its consequences, (xvii,) or as the text puts it "the apprehension of the nature of the contact, power, and the lordship of power," (xxii) i.e., Soul thinks it is the experiencer and Intellect thinks it is the experiencer. Now, when the light of knowledge dispels the false impression the conjunction is dissolved. Intellect ceases to think that it is the experiencer, and Soul gives up the idea of its experience, and the ignorance is removed. In other words, the conjunction being removed Soul is isolated, and there is a period put to further birth and suffering. Now, ignorance being the sole cause of the conjunction, the great object is to remove that ignorance, and
this is to be effected by discriminative knowledge, or that which will rightly appreciate the true character of the relation which exists between Soul and Intellect. This knowledge then is what is to be sought, and the means are now provided by which it may be attained.

The knowledge in question passes through seven stages before it becomes perfect (xxvii). The first stage is that in which a person feels that "the knowable has been known by me." (2) He next feels that "there is nothing remaining to be known." (3) The conviction then arises that "my afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome." (4) This is followed by the belief that "discriminative knowledge has been attained by me." These four suffice to effect what is technically called "liberation from work," (Kārya-vimukti), for when these have been acquired there is no more impulse or wish left to perform works. These are followed, in course of progress, by three more successive convictions. These are,—1st "my intellect has accomplished its purpose;" 2nd, "the three qualities have finished their dominion over me, and can no longer affect me;" 3rd, "my meditation has been identified with my soul," that is the Intellect has merged into the Soul. These three are called "intellectual liberation" (Chitta-vimukti). The last is called isolation (Kai-valya), on the attainment of which the Soul is believed to be perfectly liberated.

In order to bring on this consummation the Yogi should apply himself to improve his understanding so
as to make it completely devoid of impurities. To effect this improvement eight means are recommended, and these are technically called 1, Restraint; 2, Obligation; 3, Posture; 4, Regulation of birth; 5, Abstraction; 6, Steadfastness; 7, Contemplation; and, 8, Meditation (xxix). Of these the first includes five negative acts, \textit{viz.}, abstention from (1) slaughter, (2) falsehood, (3) theft, (4) incontinence, and (5) avarice; and the second five positive acts, namely, (1) purification, (2) contentment, (3) penance, (4) study, and (5) devotion to the Lord. These two classes of acts are called \textit{mah\varitas}, or acts of primary asceticism. They are obligatory on all classes of the community, whether householders or ascetics, and none should neglect them. Slaughter is \textit{in se} sinful, and none should commit it, whether he be a householder or a hermit. Falsehood and theft are sins of the same gravity, and should therefore be shunned by all. Incontinence &c., are likewise reprehensible, and none should be guilty of them. Nor can a virtuous and peaceful life be secured simply by these restraints; it is necessary that one should keep himself free from filth, both material and moral; that he should be contented with his lot and not rapine; that he should submit to penance for his sins and for curbing his passions; that he should study the Vedas, and be devoted to the service of God. No one can be a good citizen who does not practice these restraints and obligations, and therefore they are recommended to all classes of the community. And if they are good and necessary for ordinary
people, they must *ipso facto* be so for the Yogi, who aspires to rise above the common herd. Nay, to him they are most imperative, for none can prepare himself for the Yoga who does not especially attend to them, as the first step in his career. The advantages of observing these restraints and obligations are described at some length; but they call for no remark here.

Restraint and obligation being thus common to both householders and Yogis the third of the eight means becomes the first special act of exercise to which a Yogi has to apply himself; this is the assumption of particular postures, which are conducive to the fixation of the thinking principle to any object to which it may be directed. No one can settle himself down for meditation while walking, or running, or doing something unconnected with his main object, and some particular postures are, therefore, deemed essential. The text contents itself by saying that it should be firm and pleasant (XLVI), and entail the least effort (XLVII); but it does not describe any particular posture as the most beneficial. Commentators, however, have supplied the omission, and described a great number of them, some of them most painful and difficult of assumption, *(cf. pp. 102f.)*.

When the Yogi has assumed one of the prescribed postures, he should begin the fourth exercise, the regulation of his breath. This consists in drawing the breath through one nostril; retaining the air for some time in the chest; and then throwing it out
through another nostril. The details of this process will be found on pp. 42f.

This process of breathing should be followed by the fifth exercise, the abstraction of the organs from their ordinary natural functions. As long as they are engaged in their own works, they do not allow the thinking principle to settle down for the act of meditation, and consequently prove obstruc-
tive. To overcome them, or to draw them away from works, is an essential preliminary. When they are abstracted, they merge into their primary cause, the thinking principle, and cease to disturb it.

All these five acts of Restraint, Obligation, Posture, Regulation of breath, and Abstraction are accessories or necessary adjuncts to Yoga, for without them no Yoga can be performed; but they form no essential part of the Yoga itself. Even all the five existing together would not constitute Yoga, though without them as preliminaries no Yoga can be effectual. These are, therefore, called "practical Yoga," or "accessories to the Yoga," but not Yoga. The last three, on the other hand, are essential constituents of the Yoga, and are therefore called "intimates" or antarangas. These three include Steadfastness (Dháraṇa), Contemplation (Dhyaná), and Meditation (Samadhi); and the third chapter opens with a description of these. "Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place," (L). As an exercise, it is of little moment to what object the thinking principle is applied: so long the thinking principle remains unswervingly attached to it, without for a
moment thinking of anything else, it is Steadfastness. When the understanding is brought to bear upon this fixation and the two act in unison the result is Contemplation (II), i. e., when the thinking principle thinks intelligently and steadfastly on an object it is Contemplation. Again when this contemplation is so intense that it loses all idea of its own identity, and enlightens solely one object, it is Meditation or Samādhi. The definition given points to something much more intense than what the English word meditation ordinarily conveys; it implies a state of extacy or cataleptic trance when both the body and the mind are dead to all external impressions, and the thinking principle is completely drowned in the special object of its thought, or in itself, but as the degree of intensity is not fixed and is admitted to vary considerably under different circumstances, I have used the word meditation as the most convenient and conveying the nearest idea of the mental act indicated by the Sanskrit term. When these three follow successively or are united, they have the common name of Sañyama. How this union is to be effected, or how this Sañyama is to be performed, is nowhere described at length; but it may be directed to diverse objects, internal and external, and, when duly and thoroughly performed, results in the most extraordinary occult powers.

A subject is the correlative of the three qualities of tranquillity, enlivening and latency, and as each quality becomes ascendant the subject varies; and these variations may be produced by the power of
Sañyama, apart from ordinary mundane causes. Hence the efficacy of the Sañyama in producing occult powers. Sañyama, however, should not be applied indiscriminately to all purposes. The proper rule is to follow the stages of perfection successively attained by a Yogí, i.e., it should not be applied to a subtile object, until it has been practised and perfected with regard to gross objects. In other words, it should be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of a Yogí is divided. Unless this is done no fruition follows (vi).

The occult powers, called Siddhis, derivable by the practice of the Sañyama are the most astounding possible. By it one may know the past and the future, the circumstances connected with his former existences, as well as the day and hour of his death. He may know what is in the mind of another person, or the meaning of the cries of animals. He may make himself or others invisible to bystanders, contract friendship with whomsoever he likes, or attain other superhuman powers. He may acquire a knowledge of things that are ordinarily too subtile, or too remote, for human observation, or so intercepted as not to be visible. He can observe the details of regions situated far away from the earth; of the stars and planets, their dispositions and their motions. He can have ocular knowledge of spiritual phenomena. He may know what is going on inside his body; subdue his hunger and thirst; or make his body so firm as none can shake it. It is possible for him, too, to make departed spirits visible, and to converse with them.
He can attain superhuman intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction. He may project his own soul into another's body, and then bring it back into his own. He can travel with the quickness of the mind through air or through water, and go wheresoever he lists.

When most of these powers have been attained and a Yogi is in a forward state for absolute perfection, the gods envy his success, and try to divert him from his onward course. They place temptations in his way in the forms of handsome women, great wealth, and other worldly objects of value, and thereby lead him astray (Li). In this they play the part of Mara in the Buddhist legends, and of Satan in the Bible. Great care and determination are necessary to rise above such temptations. According to the Tantras when temptations fail, resort is had to frightful forms, tigers, lions, serpents, ogres and the like, which threaten instant destruction to the Yogi. But if they are met by firm resolve, they are always ultimately overcome.

Great as are these and such like powers, of which a great many are described in the text, they are not the objects which a Yogi should seek. They are the results of his meditations, and they indicate the success he is gradually attaining, and the progress he is making towards his goal; but they are not that goal. The highest power is, even like the lowest, a part of the "seeded" or discriminative meditation. These powers are, nevertheless, of value, as they enhance the power of the understanding, and in their perfection result in the all-saving knowledge, tārakajñāna,
which makes manifest the relation between the thinking principle and Soul, and brings on the "seedless meditation." They are thus of use in consummating the isolation of Soul—the sumnum bonum which the Yoga promises to its votaries.

The fourth chapter is devoted to a consideration of such metaphysical topics as bear on the nature and character of Isolation. It opens by saying that special faculties may result from five different causes, (1). Some of them are described to be due to birth; such as the power of flying, or living in water, or with suspended animation for protracted periods. These are specific peculiarities of particular genera of animals which may be acquired by being born in such genera, and are not common to all living beings. Others are due to herbs, such as the effect of drugs in arresting sleep, hunger, or the like, or making the flesh proof against heat, or poison, or cold. Others, again, are due to certain incantations or mantras which are universally believed by the Hindus to have very extraordinary powers. Austerity or asceticism in the same way is credited with the power of enabling people to acquire special faculties. Of course, the tangible faculties in this case are not faculties strictly so called, but the effect of habit. And lastly, Samādhi is believed to produce the same results, and these are what have been described in the preceding chapter. The first four causes do not concern the author, and, therefore, no further notice is taken of them. The last is intimately connected with the question at issue, and great pains are taken to meet such objec-
tions as might be started against the theory of Samâdhi being the cause of special faculties. The objections are assumed to proceed from opponents, and the Sûtras supply the replies. In the second and the third aphorisms, an opponent is made to deny causality to Samâdhi, inasmuch as it has no influence on the body, and bodily changes are known to have been produced in this life. The explanation given is that the materials of the body undergo change of their own accord, and merit resulting from Samâdhi subserves only to remove all obstructions from their way. This is illustrated by the example of the husbandman, who removes the inequalities on the surface of a field in order to lead water to where it is wanted, and the water then flows of its own accord, or in obedience to the laws of gravitation. This satisfies the opponent, who thereupon, shifts his ground, and, admitting the possibility of the materials changing by themselves, raises the question as to how thinking principles, which are immaterial, can be so produced. Yogis pretend that they can, each of them, animate a number of bodies at the same time, and it is necessary that, for such a purpose, each body should have a separate thinking principle, and the questions raised are how is it provided? and how is the unity of the creating one preserved? The theory of spontaneous change in materials cannot explain this, and the reply given is that such thinking principles are emanations or scintillations from the creating one, and are therefore subordinate to it, acting in accord with the will of the creator, even as the different organs of the
body act in accordance with the will of the mind, (iii—v).

The possibility of Samádhi producing occult powers being thus settled, the question next comes as to the nature of those powers—are they of the same character as those produced by other causes? or are they different? The reply is that they are different, (vi). The faculties produced by the other causes are intimately connected with former births; the residia of former births are the active principles which animate them; whereas the faculties produced by Samádhi have no such background. They are spontaneous, and do not produce those after-consequences which the others do.

This leads to the classification of works leading to residua into four groups. Some are described to be white or meritorious; some are black or vicious; some are partly black and partly white; while others are neither black nor white. The first three groups belong to ordinary life, and leave behind residua; the last pertains to Yogis, and are not calculated to leave any remnant behind, (vii).

The after-consequences of ordinary works are two-fold, instinct, and kind, age and experience. The theory is that every work, every sensation, every form of experience leaves on the thinking principle an impress of its own, and such impressions, accumulating in course of a lifetime, become the stock of residua which, though for the time being latent, are susceptible of revival by proper stimulants in subsequent existences. (cf. p. 26—174). This
revival is Instinct, i.e., instead of believing Instinct to be spontaneous, self-evolved, intuitive reason, as European philosophers describe it, (cf. p. 175,) Yogis take it to be the fruit of the remembrance of former experience, revived by particular circumstances. These residua are also the causes of rewards and punishments in subsequent lives, and the rewards and punishments are represented by kind, age and experience; kind implying birth into higher or lower grades according to merit or demerit; age the span of life in such existences, which is prolonged or reduced according to one’s deserts; and experience sensations of pleasure or pain. Confining his attention here to Instinct, the author describes that the residua producing Instinct do not revive invariably but according to circumstances, even after breaks caused by dissimilar births, (viii). Nor do such breaks, produced by dissimilar births, localities, or times lead to any breach in the relation of cause and effect existing between residua and instinctive manifestations, (ix), inasmuch as the result manifests itself invariably at the first favourable moment.

The theory of residua as above propounded is open to the grave objection that it does not provide for the manifestation of instinctive action at the first birth when no residua can be predicated; but the author obviates it by assuming eternity of desires and consequently of the universe. That which is eternal can have no beginning, and consequently there is no room left for a first birth, (x). This involves a regressus in infinitum, but, assuming matter and the universe to be eternal, it is not objectionable, or illogical. More-
over, the necessity of keeping God apart from creation, renders the theory of eternity of the universe unavoidable. Admit God to be the creator, the necessity arises of making Him engage in work and derive its fruit; deny it, the universe must be accepted as self-evolved, and the theory of nothing comes from nothing not allowing of such an assumption, the author is driven to the only alternative left, that of eternity.

The opponent who raised the first objection now turns round and argues that if eternity be predicated of desires, how can they be removed? and if they are not removed the chain of transmigration will ever lengthen and never come to an end, and no redemption is possible, so that the performance of the Yoga for the sake of liberation from the fetters of repeated existence would be futile. To this the author replies by saying that the cause of desire is ignorance of the true nature of things; its effect is the body and its longings and their consequences; its asylum is the thinking principle; and its object is worldly enjoyment, and if these can be made inert or functionless, they would cease to produce their fruits; and if they ceased there would be no root left in re the individual in which they are made functionless to produce new residua, and consequently he would be free, (xi).

But, says the opponent, the thinking principle is ever changing under diverse influences, it cannot be in one existence what it was before, and consequently there is no unity, and therefore the theory of oneness, of omne ens est unum, is lost. This argument is met
by the theory of archetypes. Every category is eternal, all things are eternal, nothing is really created, or absolutely destroyed, and what we call creation or destruction is simply change of attributes, and in the case of the thinking principle it is nothing more. When it changes its present condition, it reverts to its former condition, or assumes a new one, but its unity is never lost, (xii). This is the theory of the moderate nominalists or conceptionalists, with their universalia ad rem, universalia in re, and universalia post rem. Change having been admitted above, the author proceeds to account for it. It is produced by the three qualities acting either on the subject, or on the object, or on both, (xiii). The action, however, is not simultaneous, only one of the qualities is predominant at a time, and therefore there is no diversity in the two, (xiv). This leads to the question are sensibles the causes of sensation? or sensations the causes of sensibles? The first idea is in accord with every-day experience. Sensation usually takes place when there is a sensible present to produce it. The relation of the two as cause and effect is, however, not constant, and under different circumstances the same sensible produces simultaneously very different sensations, and the simultaneous production of different effects by one cause is illogical and impossible. The commentator illustrates this by appealing to the different effects produced by a single handsome woman on amorous males, her rivals, and ascetics. He might have gone further, and adverted to representative sensations as distinct from presentative
ones. In fact, as Professor Müller, in his 'Elements of Physiology' (Baly's Translation, p. 1059), has observed, "external agencies can give rise to no kind of sensation which cannot also be produced by internal causes, exciting changes in the condition of our nerves." Sensations, too, remain on the sensorium after the sensibles producing them have been removed. Nor can sensation be the cause of sensible, or, in the language of the commentator, "if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle, then there would be nothing besides, when that thinking principle would be occupied with one particular thing." It cannot be said that the ideal presentation of things would be created and maintained by other thinking principles while one thinking principle is occupied with a particular thing, for in that case many diverse causes would be made to produce one effect. Applied to the world the inference would be that one world is the effect of many diverse causes, and, that not being possible, the alternative would be that the world is causeless. The solution afforded is that there is no relation of cause and effect between the two; they are eternal and move in different paths (xv); and their action upon each other is regulated by the triad of qualities, one or other of which predominates for the time and produce its effects. Patanjali is exceedingly brief and enigmatical, but his object is the refutation of the theory of ideal presentation as opposed to real substantiality of matter, i.e., of the Vivartavada doctrine of the Vedânta.

The preception above produced is still incomplete.
The thinking principle may undergo modification and assume the shape of the object presented to it, but it cannot, being unconscious, intelligently perceive what it sees, (xvii). The intelligent principle has still to be infused into it, and this is done by Soul. The reflection of the Soul acting on it makes it perceive directly what is presented to it. It is accordingly said that a thing is known or unknown according as there is a reflection of the Soul, or the absence of it, in the thinking principle, (xvi).

An objection is now raised to the effect that under the circumstances above stated, there being no stability in the thinking principle, knowledge derived by perception could not be constant. The reply given is that since the real perceiver, the Soul, is immutable, knowledge which depends on it must necessarily be constant. Inasmuch, however, as the thinking principle can undergo only one modification at a time, and the Soul perceives only that modification, and not the outside world, there can be only one perception at a time: two diverse ideas cannot arise simultaneously, (xix).

The objector is still unsatisfied. To obviate the necessity of calling in the agency of Soul, he suggests a multiplicity of thinking principles, saying let one perception or thinking principle be perceived by another. This, however, says the author, cannot be, for the second perception would require a third, and so on, and that would lead to a regressus in infinitum. There would, moreover, be no certainty, for in calling one idea to mind a host would arise, and there would
be nothing to show which is the particular idea that has been invoked, or is necessary to the elucidation of the perception at hand.

There is yet another objection to urge. Accepting that perception cannot be helped by one cognition cognizing another, the opponent suggests that in life persons always express the opinion of their knowing things, and how can this take place unless the thinking principle possessed self-illuminative powers? This is met by saying that the thinking principle, assuming the form of the immutable soul, attains the light of intelligence, and is then able to understand its own cognitions, (xxi) ; and the conclusion arrived at is that when the thinking principle is modified on the one hand by soul and on the other by objects of cognition, it is sufficient for all purposes of understanding, (xxii). The commentator here anticipates a number of other objections, and disposes of them according to the theory of the Yoga. (Cf. p. 197).

These explanations, however, are not enough. There is yet a lingering suspicion that the thinking principle has a will of its own, and this suspicion is developed in the form of a question as to what motive the thinking principle can have in engaging itself in its various functions? Naturally inert, it can have no object of its own, and in performing its functions it must be acting without a motive, and as nothing is done without a motive, the inference would be that it has a will of its own, and it gratifies that will by acting as it does. This suspicion is set at rest by the remark that since it acts in conjunction with others,
its object must be to subserve another's purpose, and that another is soul, (xxiii). The commentator explains that such conjunct action for another's purpose without any consciousness on the part of the actors is possible, as we see it in the organs of sense, which act for the purposes of the mind without knowing that they are doing so. The Sánkhya-káriká adduces the example of milk, an unintelligent substance, secreting for the nourishment of the calf. (Cf. v.'s lvii to lx). The example of the cart carrying saffron for the use of man is also generally appealed to.

Soul is described as the witness, spectator and experiencer of the actions of nature. Conscious and always present in the body, it cannot but witness what takes place in it. This is the idea which Fichte assigns to mind, when he says, it is, "as it were an intelligent eye, placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, surveying all that takes place there," (Morell, II, p. 95). But since soul has no action or desire of any kind, and as it is, moreover, eternal and immutable, how can it be said to have a purpose of its own, which the thinking principle has to subserve? This is a crucial question, and the answer given is practically an evasion. The premises are admitted, but it is said that, inasmuch as it is a shadow of the soul that sensitizes the thinking principle, and that shadow feels and observes, by indiscriminate use of language we call the soul to be the experiencer and witness, (cf. p. 194). The service done is, in the same way, service done to the shadow
and not to the reality, and the benefit derived goes to nature or Prakṛiti, which is entertained and ultimately relieved of all sense of pain, and not to soul, which is painless and ever free.

Patanjali now turns to the effect of the theory and practice propounded. When a person has duly gone through the course of practice enjoined and acquired the knowledge promised, all false notions that he before had on the subject of life subside, (xxiv), and his thinking principle is bowed down by the weight of knowledge and commencing isolation, (xxv). Worldly thoughts, however, still break out occasionally, (xxvi), and these should be carefully repressed in the same way in which afflictions and obstructions were originally overcome, (cf. II, xxviii). When this repression is effected, perfect knowledge rises in the thinking principle, and entirely sweeps away all remnants of afflictions and residua of former works, (xxviii—xxx). All obscurations are removed; the triad of qualities in regard to the individual concerned ceases from undergoing further change, (xxx); and the moment at last arrives when the qualities, having retired to rest, become defunct, and the soul abides solely in its own essence. This is isolation or salvation which is the aim and object of the Yoga doctrine, (xxxiii). This isolation is absolute and eternal, and the soul in regard to which it has been attained remains free for evermore.

Following the order of the text, the above summary does not afford a consecutive statement of the leading points of the Yoga system of theology and
metaphysics, and inasmuch as the dissertations on
the Yoga now available in the English language are
brief, obscure, and not too often misleading and in-
correct, it would not be amiss to attempt here a
categorical resume. The cardinal dogmas are, as
already above stated, taken from the Śāṅkhya system,
but there are differences, and the importance attached
to some of them, in their mutual cooperation is
markedly distinctive. The leading tenets of the
Yogīs are:

1st. That there is a Supreme Godhead who is
purely spiritual, or all soul, perfectly free from afflic-
tions, works, deserts, and desires. His symbol is Om,
and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to
Him by facilitating their attainment of liberation;
but He does not directly grant it. Nor is He the
father, creator, or protector of the universe, with
which He is absolutely unconnected.

2nd. That there are countless individual souls
which animate living beings, and are eternal. They
are pure and immutable; but by their association
with the universe they become indirectly the experi-
cencers of joys and sorrows, and assume innumerable
embodied forms in course of ever recurring metemp-
sychoses.

3rd. That the universe is uncreate and eternal.
It undergoes phenomenal changes, but, as a noumenon,
it is always the same. In its noumenal state it is
called Prakṛiti or nature; it is always associated with
the three qualities or active forces called goodness,
foulness, and darkness. Matter as an integral part of
the universe is, likewise, eternal, though subject to modifications like the world. Strictly speaking the modifications of matter produce the phenomenal world which is composed of it.

4th. That next to soul there is a noumenon called Chitta, or the thinking principle, or mind in its most comprehensive sense. It is subject to the three qualities aforesaid, and undergoes various modifications according to the prevalence of one or other of those qualities. It is essentially unconscious or unintelligent, but it becomes conscious or intelligent by the reflection of, or association with, soul, which abides close by it. It also receives through the organs of sense shadows of external objects, and thereupon modifies itself into the shapes of those objects. The consciousness reflected on it makes it think that it is the experiencer of all worldly joys and sorrows. In reality, however, it is merely the spectacle of which soul is by proxy (its shadow) the spectator. It is closely allied to Buddhi or intellect of the Sánkhya system, but it plays a much more important part in the system, than what Buddhi does, partaking as it does the parts of both Prakṛti and Buddhi in a prominent degree, and also of self-consciousness. It occupies the position of Will of the modern Pessimist system.

5th. That the functions of the thinking principle are five-fold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory, and that these functions are produced by the prevalence of one or other of the three qualities.

6th. That, like the universe, all sensible objects
have their eternal archetypes or noumena, which undergo phenomenal changes, but are never absolutely destroyed. When one object changes into another, it is merely a modification of its form, and the form assumed, when destroyed, passes on to some other form, but it ultimately reverts to its noumenal or primary state.

7th. That phenomena, as results of modifications of noumena, are real and not phantasmal.

8th. That sensibles are not the direct causes of sensations, nor sensations the causes of sensibles; but that the thinking principle receives impressions of sensibles under the influence of one or other of the three qualities, and the result is regulated by that influence. The influence extends both to sensations and to sensibles.

9th. That the thinking principle being changeable, constancy of knowledge is due to the immutability of the soul, and that no perception can take place until the thinking principle is made conscious by the soul.

10th. That impressions produced on the thinking principle leave on it certain residua (αναμνήσεις of Aristotle) which are causes of intuitions, desires, new births, and further experiences.

11th. That desires are the origin of pain in this world.

12th. That the universe being eternal, desires are likewise eternal, and it is needless therefore to enquire when residua first arose to create desires.

13th. That mundane existence is thus associated with pain, and it is the duty of every one to rise above that pain.
14th. That the pain may be finally overcome or removed only by withdrawing the thinking principle from its natural functions.

15th. That the withdrawal in question can be effected by constant and sedulous observance of certain prescribed restraints, obligations and steadfast meditation.

16th. That in the course of the exercises above referred to, the adept attains extraordinary occult powers.

17th. That when that withdrawal is complete and absolute, the soul is completely isolated from the world, and that when that isolation is attained, it is liberated from all liability to future transmigration. And this is the isolation, liberation, emancipation, or final beatitude which should be the great object and aim of human existence.

The general impression regarding the nature of the Yoga doctrine, has been hitherto exceedingly unfavourable among Anglo-oriental scholars. It is mystical, it is fanatical, it is dreadfully absurd, are among the mildest charges brought against it. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall is so disgusted with its tenets that in a fit of virtuous indignation he says, "As few of the twenty-eight Yoga works which have fallen under my inspection are at present read, so, one may hope, few will ever again be read, either in this country or by curious enquirers in Europe. If we exclude the immodities of the Tantras and of the Káma-sástra, Hindu thought was never more unworthily engaged than in digesting into an economy the fanatical vagaries
of theocracy. Not less, it is observable, have the Yogins of India transcended than they have anticipated the quietistic delirations of Bonaventura, de Sales, Saint Theresa, and Molinos," (Contributions, p. xi). Other writers, if not equally denunciative, are still very severe in the tone of their criticisms. I believe this is due principally to the subject not having been carefully studied. The subject is dry—exceedingly so—and the enigmatical form in which it is presented in the text-books is not conducive to any interest being created in its favour. Generally speaking Indian scholars do not study it, and the few ascetics and hermits who do seldom associate with the world. Pándits, when called upon to explain, frequently, if not invariably, mix up the tenets of Patañjali's Yoga with those of the Tantras, the Puráṇas, the Tantric Sañhitás, the Páñcharátras, and the Bhagavadgítá—works which have very dissimilar and discordant tenets to inculcate. Some of the later avowedly Yoga works are, moreover, exceedingly allegorical and mystical in their descriptions, and in them the purport of the instruction is buried in a mass of absurdity. Practices, too, have been inculcated in them which are certainly repulsive. (Cf. pp. 103, 117). In judging, however, of the nature of Patañjali's doctrine it is unfair to associate it with the vagaries of fanatical, deluded mendicants, or with the modifications and adaptations which it has undergone in the hands of the Tántrics and the Puránics.

The tenets of Patañjali are all that concern the
critic, and the summary of them given above will show to the unbiassed enquirer that they are closely similar to those enunciated by some of the greatest metaphysicians of ancient Greece. The similitude is in some cases so close that I would not be surprised to see some enterprising dialectician, intent upon proving everything good in India to be of European origin, demonstrate that the whole system has been nefariously copied from Greek philosophers. The tenets may not be the best of their kind—some of them are unquestionably futile,—but they are certainly, not such philosophic desperadoes as to commit outrages on the chastity of our thoughts, or so vile as to make us join in the hope so fervently expressed by Mr. Hall that the works which treat of them may not again be read by the curious enquirer. If the history of the human mind be a fit subject for study, if it be desirable to compare the progress of metaphysical knowledge among different nationalities at different times in different places, if the civilization of the Hindus be an object of enquiry, we should rather earnestly desire that the works should be thoroughly examined, and not neglected, and that without in any way pledging ourselves as their defenders. There is no reason to doubt that such enquiry will not only be useful to history, but reflect credit on the grasp of the intellect of the ancient Indian sages who matured the doctrine.

It would take more space than what I have at my disposal to go through all the tenets seriatim, and show their relation to European theories, but it may
be generally observed that even the most faulty dogmas do not, on sufficient examination, appear to be so bad as they are represented to be by hasty and adverse critics. The theory of isolation is certainly very startling, but it was the logical outcome of the conception of the absolute perfection of the Godhead reacting on the Upanishad doctrine of resolution into the Divine essence.* The Bhagavadgîtā thus sums up the Upanishad idea:

'He who all paths stops up, and in the heart
'Confines the mind, shuts up the breath within
'The head, adopts a firm devotion, utters
'The single syllable "Om"—the Soul Supreme,
'And thinks of me, and goes, abandoning
'The body thus, reaches the goal supreme.'

(Telang's Translation, p. 52.)

This idea, however, involves the necessity of additions to, and abstractions from, Divine perfection. The theory is that the human soul is specifically distinct from, though generically the same with, the Divine one, and as the two dissimilars cannot melt into one, they must always remain separate, and as joy, felicity, bliss and the like imply activity and enjoyment,—a concrete heaven inconsistent with the theory of final rest,—the Yogis obviate all philosophic and logical difficulties by contenting themselves with isolation, without predicating it with joy or bliss.

The threefold division of the intellectual man into purusha, chitta and ahankāra is the counterpart of νοῦς, ψυχή and σαμα of Plato and other ancient

* Dr. Weber probably refers to this Upanishad theory, and not to the Purāṇas as stated on page 208.
European authors. (Plato, Timæus, Aristotle, Politics.)

The theory of Prakṛiti, a noumenal absolute of the phenomenal world, or nature in the abstract, has been a stumbling-block to many Europeans, and the allegorical way in which it is frequently described, is certainly often misleading. Even among Hindus it has given rise to many frivolous and absurd stories. In the main, however, it seems to accord very closely with some of the latest European speculations on the subject. It is no other than the materia or plastic nature of Cudworth, which has been designed to avoid fortuitousness on the one hand and God's constant interposition on the other. Morell, in his 'History of modern Philosophy' (I, p. 208) commenting on one of the latest German systems, that of Herbarts, says:

'The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes to be felt is the following:—When we look round us upon the world in which we live, our knowledge commences by a perception of the various objects that present themselves on every hand to our view. What we immediately perceive, however, is not actual essence, but phenomena; and after a short time, we discover that many of those phenomena are unreal; that they do not pourtray to us the actual truth of things as they are; and that if we followed them implicitly, we should soon be landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example, what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, upon reflection, we discover not to to be so many real independent existences, but properties inhering in certain substances, which we term things. Again, when we examine further into these substances, we discover that they are not real ultimate essences, but that they consist of certain elements, by the combination of which they are produced. What we term the reality, therefore, is not the thing as
a whole, but the elements of which it is composed. Thus, the further we analyze, the further does the idea of reality recede backwards; but still it must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation.

Dr. Kay, in his remarks on this passage, observes—

‘This “essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation”—this which the European analyst arrives at as “the last result of the analysis”—is what the Saṅkhya expositor, proceeding, “more Indico,” synthetically, lays down as his first position. This is Kapila’s mūlaprakṛiti—the “root of all”—“the radical producer”—that which, variously modified, constitutes all that the ‘soul’ takes cognizance of. This primordial essence—among the synonyms for which, given in our text-book, are the ‘undescrete’ avyakta, the ‘indestructible’ akṣhara, that ‘in which all generated effect is comprehended’ pradhānaka, &c., is the ‘absolute’ of German speculation. The development of this principle, according to one of Shelling’s views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147, Vol. II) is ‘not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in the mind.’ So, according to Kapila, “From Nature issues Mind, and thence self-consciousness.”’

(Benares Magazine, Vol. III, pp. 284ff.)

This Prakṛiti is believed to be unintelligent, and yet it is described to be acting for another’s purpose, and this has often been stigmatized as a specimen of Indian absurdity. This theory, however, is exactly what Cudworth entertains in regard to his plastic nature, which, he says ‘doth never consult nor deliberate;’ ‘it goes on in one constant unrepeting tenor from generation to generation; it acts artificially and for sake of ends, but itself understands
not the ends which it acts for.' 'It acts neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor blindly, but must be concluded to act fatally, magically, and sympathetically.' ('True Intellectual System of the Universe,' B. I., Cap. III, 37.)

Again, Prakṛiti and necessarily matter are eternal, says the Yogi, and in the sense in which he predicates eternity, _i. e._, to noumena as distinct from phenomena, we have nothing more preposterous than the "eternal verities" of the European philosophers of even our own times—verities which even the Godhead cannot undo, such as the conception of a triangle invariably including two right angles. To such archetypical eternities few can object from a pure philosophic standpoint, apart from revealed systems of religion.

The two most repellent dogmas of the system are its faith in metempsychosis and its theory about occult powers, and even these have found defenders in quarters where they were least expected; and, carefully considered, they do not seem to be so absurd as one would at first glance suppose.

Extravagant as are the ideas regarding the occult powers, and purely imaginary as, at least, some of them doubtless are, it is worthy of note that belief in such powers was almost universal in the ancient world, and well-authenticated reports are not wanting to show that some of them were attainable. Mental prescience has manifested itself on many occasions. Mesmeric and other electric conditions of the body are now objects of scientific research; and they are well-known
to produce extraordinary phenomena. Many facts have been brought to light which show that physical causes may be, particularly in unsophisticated states of society, easily mistaken for occult powers. Sir David Brewster's theory of the objective projection upon visual organs of a subjectively conceived image may account for a good many occurrences which strike the mind of the masses with wonder, and appear as the result of superhuman agency. Many psychological conditions, which are known to arise and produce startling results, but the true nature of which has not yet been fully and scientifically examined and ascertained, would account for some so-called occult occurrences. But in the present state of our knowledge it is impossible to separate the wheat from the tares—to discriminate between what powers were really attained or attainable by Yogis and what they fancied they would attain by persevering in their practices. Doubtless the pretensions of the European psychics of the day are to a considerable extent false and fraudulent; still there are among them some good men and true, and their researches carried on on catholic, honest and scientific principles will hereafter bear some good fruit, and the time will then come to enquire how far the Yogis had anticipated them. In the meanwhile all that need be said is that the extravagance of some of their pretensions should not make us spurn the Yogis as all knaves and charlatans, and their psychical system wholly false and fatuous. Such a principle of action, however necessary and prudent in shifting the merits of a lawsuit, and even then under certain
restrictions, would be intolerable in history. If some obviously false, or improbable, or unprovable, statements in any author would justify our rejecting the whole of his testimony there would be no ancient author left whose testimony could be accepted, and I know not how few of our modern authors would escape the condemnation. No Yogi myself, nor anywise interested in the doctrine, all I feel in the cause of truth is, that there should, for the present, be a suspension of judgment, and the materials afforded by the Yogis should be subjected to examination and analysis.

As regards metempsychosis something has already been said, (ante, p. xiii.) It is a doctrine which even Plato thought fit to adopt, and much might be said in favour of it which cannot be readily disproved; but I shall content myself here with a quotation.

Perhaps the ablest metaphysician who ever came to India from England was the late Rev. Dr. Kay, principal of the late Bishop’s College. His strong Christian convictions did not by any means make him an indulgent critic of adverse faiths, but in commenting on the doctrine of metempsychosis as affording a solution of the question of the origin of evil, he says:

‘The doctrine of the Metempsychosis is, in fact, the Hindu theory on the great question of the “origin of evil.” The theory may be thus stated. Evil exists, and it is not to be supposed that evil befalls any one undeservedly. When, therefore, for example, a new-born child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffer-
ing evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If you ask how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer is ready—it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior, and so on. You have only now to apply the Newtonian principle—that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit—and then there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past time at which point its existence cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis of antecedent evil-doing; it follows (argue the Hindus) that the existence of evil is accounted for on this hypothesis; and further, they contend, it is accountable on no other.

‘If one will take the pains thoroughly to grasp the conception, and to view the matter, as a German would say, from the same stand-punkt as the Hindu, who, holding the past eternity of soul, denies that the regressus in infinitum here involves any absurdity, he will probably acknowledge that the doctrine of the metempsychosis, however false, is not to be treated as a fiction of the poets, when we are arguing with a Hindu. We try to make the Hindu give up the tenet—and we do well:—but we shall also do well to bear in mind that we are calling upon him to give up, without an equivalent, what he has been accustomed to regard as a complete solution of the greatest mystery in the universe—short of the primal mystery of “Being” itself. The Hindu’s explanation we regard as a delusion, and we must tell him so—
but we must beware how we allow it to appear as if we were provided with a substitute. The "origin of evil" has not been revealed. The requirement that we shall maintain our entire reliance on the goodness of God, in the absence of such revelation, is one of the trials—rather it furnishes the substance of all the trials—of our faith. This we have to teach—but we have no equivalent solution of the mystery to offer. On this point the words of Whately should be treasured by every Missionary among the Hindus.

We quote from the Preface (p. 12) of his 'Essays on some of the peculiarities of the Christian religion.'

"The origin of evil, again, not a few are apt to speak of, as explained and accounted for, at least in great part, by the Scripture-accounts of 'sin entering the world, and death by sin;' whereas the Scriptures leave us, with respect to the difficulty in question, just where they find us, and are manifestly not designed to remove it. He who professes to account for the existence of evil, by merely tracing it up to the first evil recorded as occurring, would have no reason to deride the absurdity of an atheist, who should profess to account for the origin of the human race, without having recourse to a creator, by tracing them up to the first pair." (Benares Magazine, III, pp. 286f.)

Elsewhere the same writer, speaking generally, observes, 'it may somewhat tend to check the mischievous consequences attendant on bluntly regarding any current and influential Hindu doctrine, that happens not to accord with our accustomed notions, as being self-evidently frivolous and effete, if it can be shown that the conceptions involved in the doctrine are still influential in directing the current of speculation in Europe, in quarters where that current runs (or is supposed to run) deepest.' (Opus cit., pp. 283f.)
To turn now to the life of Patanjali. The brief notices to be met with of him in Sanskrit works are so legendary and contradictory that little can be made of them to subserve the cause of history. He was a great scholar and unrivalled philologist of his time, and the life of every great man was, in ancient times, so encrusted with the supernatural that it is difficult to remove the covering, and come to the truthful core. Rev. J. Ward, citing the Rudrayamala Tantra, the Vrihannandikesvara Purana, and the Padma Purana, describes him to 'have been born in the Ilavrata Varsha, where his father Angira and his mother Satí resided, and that, immediately on his birth, he made known things past, present, and future. He married Lolupa, whom he found on the north of Sumeru, in the hollow of a "Vaṭa" tree, and is said to have lived as a mendicant to a great age. Being insulted by the inhabitants of Bhuta-bhanjāra, while engaged in religious austerities, he reduced them to ashes by fire from his mouth.' (Hindus, II.)

There occurs in the Sankshepa-s'ankara-jaya of Mādhava A'chārya a story, according to which the Devas, on one occasion, repaired to Mahādeva, and besought his aid in saving the world from the baneful doctrines which Baudhās and other heretics had widely disseminated among men. The god vouchsafed to them a kind reply, and it was arranged that certain chief divinities would from time to time appear on earth as Jaimini, Vyāsa, Patanjali, and S'ankara, and, uprooting all heresies, preserve the true religion from pollution. It fell to the lot of Vishnu and S'ankarshaṇa alias Ananta
to depute a portion of themselves to be born as Patanjali,* and Mahádeva himself appeared as S'ankara.† The only value of this story for historical purposes is the admission that Patanjali appeared on the earth long after it had been overrun by the Buddhists. Mádhava A'chárya of the 14th century is no authority for what happened sixteen hundred years before him, but the tradition in his time was that Patanjali was born long after Buddha in order to inculcate theism, and this supports the opinion expressed on page xxiii to the effect that the Yoga doctrine as we have it in Patanjali's work is of post Buddhist origin. It is in favour, too, of the deductions made by Goldstücker and others regarding the age of Patanjali from casual historical allusions in his great work, the Mahábháshya, entirely undermining, as it does, the arguments of Professor Kunte as given in his 'Vicissitudes of Aryan civilization.' It is true that the Yoga-sútra does not anywhere refer to Buddhism, and it is not easy to accept the theory of Professor Cowell that the relegation of benevolence (maítrí), which occupies a prominent place in the Buddhist system, to an ancillary or subordinate position in the Yoga is a direct allusion to Buddhism, (Sarvadars ana-sangraha, p. 273,) for benevolence as an element of religious observance is

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* सप्तम काश्मरम्बण्टः सुभाष्टा संयो तत् ।

† वज्रोथम्ब्रम्बण्टः महाधिपतिः सम्बन्धिताः संयोः।
common to all systems of religion, and reference to it cannot be taken as an unmistakable test; but apart from them, I believe, I have produced sufficient evidence to show that Patanjali cannot reasonably be believed to have lived before Buddha. Ananta is represented in the form of a many-hooded serpent, and, as an emanation of that serpent, Patanjali is frequently indicated by the homonym *phani* or 'serpent,' (cf. p. 1).

The references given of Patanjali in his Mahābhāshya entirely upsets the statements made in Mr. Ward's notice. The sage describes himself as the son of one Gopi, not Sati, and his place of birth was the eastern country, whereas Ilavrita is said in the Puranas to lie to the north of the Himalaya. These facts are thus given by Goldstücker in his essay on Pāṇini:

"Of the lineage of Patanjali all the knowledge I possess is, that the name of his mother was Gopi. It occurs in the last words of Patanjali on a Kārikā to Pāṇini. Of more importance, however, is the information he gives us of having resided temporarily in Kāshmir, for this circumstance throws some light on the interest which certain kings of this country took in the preservation of the great commentary.

"His birthplace must have been situated in the east of India, for he calls himself Gonardiya; and this word is given by the Kārikā in order to exemplify names of places in the East. Patanjali's birthplace had therefore the name of Gonarda. But that he is one of the eastern grammarians is borne out also by other evidence. Kaiyyata calls him on several occasions A'chāryadeviya. If we interpreted this word according to Pāṇini's rules V, 3, 67 and 68, it would mean "an unaccomplished teacher;" but as there is not the slightest reason for assuming that Kaiyyata intended any irony or blame when he applied this epithet to Patanjali, it is necessary to
render the word by the teacher "who belongs to the country of the Achárya." Now, since Kaiyyaṭa also distinctly contrasts áchárya as the author of the Várttikas, with Ácháryadeśiya, the latter epithet can only imply that Patanjali was a countryman of Kátyáyaná. Kátyáyaná, however, as Professor Weber has shown by very good arguments, is one of the eastern school; Kaiyyaṭa, therefore, must have looked upon Patanjali also as belonging to it.

'Another proof is afforded by a passage in the comment of Bhaṭṭo-jí Dikshita on the Phiṭ-sútras which I have quoted above. For when this grammarian tells us that the eastern grammarians attribute the accent in question of saha to Páṇini's rule VI, 3, 78, we find that it is Patanjali himself who gives us this information, and without any intimation of his having obtained it from other authorities.' (Goldstücker's Páṇini, p. 237.)

Meagre as these notes on the life of Patanjali are, they are of unquestionable authority, and we must rest content with them. In the 'Indian Antiquary' (IX, p. 308), Professor Max Müller has a note on the travels of I-tsing, a Chinese pilgrim, who visited India at the close of the 7th century, and therein mention is made of a Sanskrit grammatical work under the name of Juni or Chuni. The learned professor shows on very good arguments that the work could be no other than the Mahábháshya, and then very pertinently asks, "Is this (Juni) possibly a name connected with Goṇiká, the mother of Patanjali, who calls himself Goṇikáputra, or with Gonarda, his supposed birthplace, from which he takes the name of Gónardiya?" Few who have studied the subject would hesitate to respond in the affirmative to the first question.

In a note on a Páli inscription from Bhárat, published in the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for March 1880, I have quoted a
great number of instances to show that in India metronymics were used to indicate illegitimacy, or the forsaking of a child by its father. If this theory of mine be tenable, the use of Goṣikáputra in the case of Patañjali would suggest a bar sinister in his scutcheon. Under that supposition it would be futile to enquire about his genealogy. If Napoleon said, 'my genealogy begins with the battle of Austerlitz,' Patañjali might well appeal to his Mahábháshya as the root of his family tree.* Professor Weber, however, has been at some pains to find a genealogical tree for him. In his 'History of Indian Literature' he has several remarks with reference to Patañjali in connection with the Vedic Kápya Patamchala. He says, on page 137, 'Again, though only in the Yájñavalkíya-kánda, we have mention of a Kápya Patamchala of the country of the Madras as particularly distinguished by his exertions in the cause of Bráhmañical theology; and in his name we cannot but see a reference to Kapila and Patañjali, the traditional founders of the Sánkhya, and Yoga systems.' This is modified in a subsequent remark, (p. 223,) in which it is said, 'The name of Patañjali (we should expect Páṭ.) is certainly somehow

* Professor Weber refers to a tradition which, he says, 'identifies Pingala with Patañjali, the author of Mahábháshya and the Yoga-sútra,' but he justly adds, it 'should answer for itself; for us there exists no cogent reason for accepting it.' ('Hist. Indian Literature,' p. 231.)

† This grammatical correction has been suggested apparently with a view to make Patañjali a derivative of Patamchala to prop the theory of relationship.
connected with that of the Patamchala Kápya of the land of the Madras, who appears in the Yájñavalkyakānda of the Satap. Br. It occurs again (see below p. 737) as the name of the author of the Yoga-sūtras.' On page 236, we are told that, 'Kapila, again, can hardly be unconnected with the Kápya Patamchala whom we find mentioned in the Yájñavalkyakānda of the Vrihad A'raṇyaka as a zealous representative of the Brāhmaṇical learning.' This is repeated on page 284,—'Kápya Patamchala, with whom Kapila ought probably to be connected.' It is difficult to make out from these extracts a consistent account of what the real or actual theory is. In the first extract a single individual, Kápya Patamchala, is split into two persons, Kapila and Patanjali, and that as certainly as the phrase 'we cannot but see' can imply. In the second extract the Vedic personage is said to be 'certainly' connected with Patanjali only, and in the third we are told that the same individual can 'hardly be unconnected' with Kapila. In the fourth the phrase 'can hardly be unconnected' is replaced by 'ought probably to be connected.' No reason is assigned for the first two conjectures, but for the 3rd and the 4th the reason assigned is that Kápya Patamchala was 'a zealous representative of the Brāhmaṇical learning.' It happens, however, that Kapila was an atheist, who repudiated the existence of the Godhead, saying 'there is no proof that such a being existed,' and it is difficult to conceive how the relationship should be established on the ground of Kápya having been 'a zealous representative of the Hindu learn-
ing,' unless we admit that Hindu learning consisted in atheism. It is obvious that the learned professor has been led away entirely by phonetic resemblance, unless he should urge, which is not at all likely, that it is an ex cathedra opinion, without any reason to back it. Kápya has the letters k and p and so has Kapila, and Patamchala sounds very like Patañjali, and therefore he evidently concludes they are the same. This is a line of argument, however, which I cannot help thinking, is, to use the language of the learned Professor, 'of a very curious kind.' It reminds me, I must frankly confess, the ratiocination of Fluellen by which that jovial Welsh Captain proved the identity of Macedon and Monmouth. Had that flighty logician been reminded in the present case of the absence in Kápya of the letter l of Kapila, and of j of Patañjali in Patamchala, I can easily conceive how he would have completely dumb-founded his antagonist with the pithy remark: 'Why, I pray you, is not pig great? the pig, or the great, or the mighty, or the huge, or the magnanimous, are all one reckonings, save the phrase is a little variations.' I have nothing to show that Patañjali was not connected with Kápya by the father's or the mother's or some other side, in family or race, but I firmly hold that we have at present no proof worth the name in support of the conjecture.

The son of a Bráhman priest, and devoted to literary studies and ascetic practices from early life, Patañjali had little to do which could afford incidents fit for historical record, and it is not remarkable, therefore, that we have no account left of his career. He was
doubtless married and probably the father of a family, but we know nothing about those points. The only memorials of his life are his literary works,—his great commentary on the grammar of Pāṇini and the Yoga-śūtra. It is impossible to speak in too high terms of the first. It is the noblest monument of profound erudition, of keen critical acumen, of unrivalled philological perception, which has been left to us by any ancient scholar in any part of the world, and well may the Hindus be proud of the heritage that has been bequeathed to them by their renowned ancestor. The second forms the theme of this essay. There is an A'ryyā-panchāsāti on the Vaishānava theory of the relation between soul and nature which is also ascribed to him. The work has been published in the Benares 'Paṇḍit,' No. 50. He wrote also a work on medicine, but it is no longer extant. It would seem that he was, likewise, the author of a treatise on grammatical desiderata under the title of Isḥīs, and also certain supplementary notes on the rules of Sanskrit grammar (Vārtikas), but these exist now only in the form of quotations in the Mahābhāṣya. The manner in which they are cited in the 'great commentary' suggests the idea that at one time they had separate existences, but they are not met with now as a separate work.

To turn now to the Bibliography of the Yoga doctrine. The leading text is, as already stated, the Yogānus'āsana, but its different topics have been elaborated and expounded in a great number of subsequent treatises, and its literature is now represented
by a large mass of writings. In 1859, Mr. Hall, in his ‘Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,’ collected the names of 28 separate works. But recent researches carried on under the auspices of the Government of India enable me now to put in the Appendix a list including no less than 150 names. It is probable that further researches will bring to light the texts of several other works. It must be admitted, however, that while Mr. Hall’s list was compiled by a single individual after himself examining all the Mss. named, thereby obviating all risks of error, mine is a compilation from meagre reports, and it is likely, therefore, that there will be found in its mistakes of diverse kinds. Sanskrit works have many aliases, and it is possible that in some cases—probably very few—of works unknown to, and unseen by, me I have recorded the same work under two or three names. I have included, too, a few works which treat of varieties of the Yoga, the Tántric and Puránic forms of it, and not confined myself solely to the doctrine of Patanjali. The differences in some cases are so slight, that it was not possible for me, without carefully reading the works, to mark the distinctions. On the whole, however, I believe the new list will be found useful.

In preparing my list I have followed an alphabetical arrangement, a chronological one with anything like accuracy not being practicable in the present state of our information on the subject. If the Yoga-sástra-sútra-pátha, attributed to Yáñavalkya, be really his, it
is the oldest treatise known on the Yoga doctrine. Yájñavalkya lived long before Patanjali, and the Bháshya especially cites his name to prove that the Yoga doctrine was current from a much anterior period than the Yoga-sútra, which was compiled for the benefit of novices; but as I have not yet seen it, I can say nothing on the subject. Adverting to the work, Mr. Hall says, 'It is alleged that they (the aphorisms of Yájñavalkya) were noted down by Baudháyaná, as they were orally delivered by S'úkra to Yájñavalkya. Hence they are ascribed to S'úkra, who here has the epithet of Mahákavi. This work possibly deserves a closer examination than I can at present give it; but, it is, I suspect, of comparatively recent origin, and of little worth in any point of view.' (Contributions, p. 18.)

Passing it over for the present I come to the work of Patanjali, the Yoga-sútra alias the Yogánius'ásana or the Sánkhya-pravachana. It has the benefit of a host of commentaries, explaining its tenets from different standpoints. The most ancient of these commentaries is generally believed to be the one which is known under the different names of Yoga-bháshya, Pátanjalá-bháshya, and Sánkhya-pravachana-bháshya. It is held in high estimation by the Pandits of this country. It has the advantage, too, of two exegeses by eminent scholiasts, one by Váchaspati Mis'rá, and the other by Vijnána Bhikshu. It labours, however, under the disadvantage of being of doubtful authenticity as regards the name of its author. It has been twice printed, once
at Benares, edited by Bhairavadatta Dvivedi, and once at Calcutta, along with the gloss of Vāchaspati Mis'ra, edited by Pañdit Jívānanda Vidyásāgara, in 1874 (Samvat 1929.) I have also seen upwards of a dozen Mss. of it of different dates; but in the colophon of none of these have I met with the author's name. This is a remarkable omission, inasmuch as it is rarely that the author's name, where known, is dropped out from the colophon of a Sanskrit MS. The tradition is pretty common and old that Vyāsa, the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahābhārata, is the author of it. This tradition has been generally accepted by European writers, and it has the support of the two well-known and respectable exegesists named above. Vāchaspati Mis'ra in his gloss (ṭīkā) on the commentary (bhāshya) says, "Saluting the saint Patanjali, I attempt a short, clear exposition (vyākhyā), pregnant with meaning, on the commentary expounded by Veda-vyāsa."* The authority, however, of this writer is not, in matters connected with historical facts of olden times, of much weight. There were two writers of this name. One of them was a legist, and, according to the colophon of his S'udrāchāra-chintāmaṇi, court Pañdit of Mahárájá Harináráyaṇa, of Mithilá, and Harináráyaṇa lived in the middle of the 16th century. The other lived between the 10th and the 12th centuries, and commented both on the Yoga and the S'ankhya texts, as well as on the Vedánta-sūtras. Adverting to him

* नमस्ते पतन्जलिकृपारसे वेदतावेशे भारते।
ब्रजश्वास्थिकर्मणं माध्ये बांध्यो विषाक्षणे॥
Mr. Hall says, 'Váchaspáti's exact age has not yet been discovered. But he is mentioned, as are Udayana and Prasastapáda, in the Nyáyasára-vichára of Bhaṭṭa Rághava, which was written in the Saka year 1174 or A. D. 1252; and he quotes from Bhoja, who was reigning in A. D. 1042.' (Sánkhya-sára, p. 40.)

Vijnána Bhikshu dates from a much later time. According to Mr. Hall, 'in all probability, Vijnána lived in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. There is some slight ground, however, for carrying him back still further. His nationality is unknown; and so is his civil appellation even; for Vijnána Bhikshu is, without question, the style of a devotee.' (Sánkhya-sára, pp. 37f.)

He continues, 'In the Prayogaratna, a work on the sixteen sacraments, by Náráyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, son of Rámes'vara Bhaṭṭa, its author says, that he was assisted,

* This date is incorrect. It refers to the last Bhoja, whereas the Bhoja quoted must be the elder one, and elsewhere constructively admitted to be so by Mr. Hall himself. In the Preface to his 'Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,' he observes, 'that two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever was the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court; and the astrological compilation known as the Rájamártaṇḍa, and thus called in honour of him, may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work, so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate he came long after the date of the Sarvasvatskáṣṭhábharana; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet of Ranaraṅga-malla.' (Contributions, p. viii.)
in preparing it, by Ananta Dīkshita, son of Vis'vānātha Dīkshita. The father of one of Vijnāna’s disciples, Bhāvā-gaṇeśa Dīkshita, was Bhāvā-vis'vanātha Dīkshita; and, if the latter was one with Vis'vanātha Dīkshita, and if Bhāvā-gaṇeśa Dīkshita was brother of Ananta Dīkshita, we are enabled to form a pretty correct estimate as to the time of Vijnāna Bhikshu. For Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa’s youngest brother’s second son, Raghunātha Bhaṭṭa, dates his Kāla-tattva-vivechana in Samvat 1677 or A. D. 1620: Vijnāna may be placed fifty or sixty years earlier.’ But whatever the times of Vijnāna Bhikshu and Vāchaspati Miśra, it is futile to expect from such authors any precision as to the identity of a person who lived many centuries before them.

The name Vyāsa may be right enough, but there is nothing whatever to show that this Vyāsa was the same with the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahābhārata. In the Mahābhārata every epigraph gives the name of Vyāsa, and there is no reason why it should be omitted in the commentary. Then Vyāsa lived at a remote period of antiquity, in the beginning of the Kali Yuga according to Indian belief, and his classification and division of the Vedas existed long before the time of Patañjali, for we have unmistakable proofs of the existence of the classification in Pāṇini, Yāska, the Prātis'ākhyas, and other works of a much earlier date than that of the Yoga aphorisms, and it is impossible to reconcile the idea that he should be the author of an exegesis which could not have had a raison d’être before the Yoga-sūtra was
composed in the 2nd or 3rd century before the Christian era. That exegesis quotes, too, authorities which are of a more recent date than that of Vyāsa. The evidence of style is often a suspicious one, but no one who has any knowledge of the Sanskrit language will for a moment think it possible that he who wrote the Mahābhārata could be the author of the Bhāshya under notice. Compared with the works of leading scholiasts, the Bhāshya appears to be the production of a third class writer. It certainly cannot be compared with the ‘great commentary’ of Patanjali, or with the equally renowned exegesis of S'ankara on the Vedānta aphorisms, or with the commentary of Sabara Svāmī on the Mīmāṃsā; and, whatever his age, Vyāsa was by the unanimous testimony of the Hindus a far superior author and scholar to Patanjali, or Sabara, or S’ankara. Fairly good though it be, there is a looseness, an indecision, a want of logical precision, in the Bhāshya which are incompatible with the universal estimate of Vyāsa’s learning and scholarship. Bhojadeva treats it with withering sarcasm. Without naming it, but obviously aiming at it, he says, ‘all commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number,’ (p. 2). It may be that Bhoja had to justify his attempt at a new commentary by throwing discredit on his predecessors, but his remarks are not al-
together unauthorised. The invocation at the begin-
ing of the Bháshya is also against its authenticity. No work of the leading Rishis which has come down to us contains any such invocation, and Vyása would be the last to pray to Mahádeva in the way in which that divinity has been invoked in the Bháshya. The tone of the Bháshya is that of a third class mediæval scholium, and I am clearly of opinion, therefore, that it is not the work of the digester of the Vedas. Its author may have borne the name of Vyása, a common family name even to this day, but he was not the digester of the Vedas nor older than the latest ancient times, or, more probably, the early middle ages.

The next commentary I have to notice is the Rája-
mártaṇḍa, of which a complete English translation is now offered to the public. It is not so ambitious as the last. It styles itself a vṛitti or gloss, whereas the other is a Bháshya or commentary. It is mainly explanatory, when the other is discursive. It is modest in tone, when the other is dictatorial. Its author sets forth his object in writing the work by saying, 'Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patañjali for the edification of intelligent persons,' (p. 2). And he has faithfully carried out his resolution. He has interpreted all the leading words of his text, and given a very fair explanation of the meaning of his author, and the purport and bearing of his doctrine. It is, perhaps, not always quite so full in philosophical matter as its predecessor, but it
certainly omits nothing of importance for a correct understanding of the text.

It is generally taken for granted by Indian writers that Bhoja, king of Dhárá, who flourished in the middle of the 11th century, was the author of the exegesis; but the opinion is not tenable. Doubtless the colophon of the exegesis names Maharájádhirája Bhojadeva as its author, but there have been many Bhojas in India, (cf. my 'Indo-Aryans,' II, pp. 385f,) and it does not show which is the sovereign meant: it certainly does not announce that this Bhoja was the hero of the Bhójaprabandha and a sovereign of Dhárá in the century named. The title assigned him in the introduction to the work is Ranarangamalla, and this, as far as we know, was not borne by the Bhoja of the 11th century. The former is, moreover, described in the introduction to have written three works, a grammatical treatise on the government of words, a medical memoir under the title of Rájamrgán-ka, and the gloss under notice, and none of these is attributed by the Bhójaprabandha to its hero. On the other hand, that hero is known to have written or published in his name a work on judicial astrology as bearing on Smṛiti rites, under the name of Rájamártaṇḍa, and it is impossible to imagine that he assigned the same name to his exegesis on the Yoga aphorisms. Two such dissimilar works could not have been published under one common name. And even if one believed such a nomenclature to be possible or probable, the question would arise, how is it that in the introduction to the Yoga, the astrological work is altogether
left out of record? The astrological work is several times the size of the Yoga exegesis, and otherwise of considerable importance; it has been very largely quoted by subsequent writers, and it is not at all probable that an author, or his encomiast, who was particular in noticing the meagre and poor medical treatise should overlook it. It might be said that it was composed after the composition of, and therefore could not be included in, the Yoga gloss, but that would be a simple assumption without any proof, a mere begging of the question. That the Rājamārtanda is not a generic, but a specific, name is evident from the fact of an exegesis on the Sāṅkhya bearing the name of Rājāvārtika, which is believed to have been dedicated to Ranarangamalla. It is probable, therefore, that our author is the Bhoja of the 10th century, who was also a king of Dhārā. Adverting to him, Mr. Hall says, "That two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever were the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court, and the astrological compilation known as the Rājamārtanda and thus called in honour of him may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate, he came long after the date of the Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharaṇa; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet, Raṇarangamalla." (Contributions, p. viii.)
Of the other commentaries on the Yoga-Sūtra, the works of Bhavadeva, Nāgojī Bhaṭṭa, Bhāvā-gaṇeśa, Udayankara, Nagesa Bhaṭṭa, Nārāyaṇa Bhikshu, Sadāsīva, Rāmānanda Tirtha, Mahādeva, Ananta, Śaṅkara, Umāpati Tripāṭhī, and Kshemānanda, may be cited as samples. They are all inferior in importance to the work of Bhoja, and call for no special remark here.

The same may be said of the other works named in my list. Some of them treat of the various practices which Yogis resort to to acquire occult powers; while others describe modified forms of the doctrine of Patañjali, suited to Vaishnavava, Śaiva, and Śākta forms of worship, so as to lead the individual soul, in its longing for salvation, to subsidence in, or union with, the Divinity.

Among the works of the first group the most popular and noted is the Haṭha-pradīpikā or Haṭha-dīpikā. It comprises 395 stanzas, divided into 4 chapters or lessons, (Upadeśa), the first treating of postures, the second of regulation of breath, the third of gesticulation or mudrās, and the fourth of Samādhi. Its author is one Chintāmaṇi, son of Sahajānanda, but this name of his was what he got when living as a householder. On his becoming a hermit he took the name of Śvātmārāma, and received the title of Yogīndra, and is now generally known by the name of Śvātmārama Yogīndra. He makes a great mystery of the theme of his work. He says, “By Yogis wishing for perfection, this science should be carefully kept in secret, for it is most efficient when
kept secret, and worthless when disclosed."* Like the alchemists of old, he indicates simple things by round-about metaphorical names, and enjoins that none but adepts should know anything of his subject. This book is named Haṭha vidyā, or the science of the letters ha and ṭha, ha meaning the sun and ṭha the moon. This sun again stands for the breath inspired, and the moon for the breath expired, and the ultimate meaning of Haṭha-vidyā is thus the science of inspiration and expiration. Although by profession and habit a recluse who had thoroughly abandoned the world and its attractions, Śvātmārāma, indulges at times in language of a grossly carnal type. Thus in one place he says, "let beef be eaten and the immortal arrack (vārunī) be drunk every day. I reckon him who does so, to be a kulina (a noble householder); the rest are destroyers of their nobility."

† Here beef gomāṇa stands for the tongue, which should be reverted and made to touch the palate, and vārunī means the breath which passes over this reverted tongue. Again: "Let the youthful chaste widow be ravished on the land between the rivers Ganges and Yamunā; it is the highest glory of Vishnu."‡ Here the two rivers are the two nostrils, and the widow is the breath which is to be forcibly suppressed for a time. This style of

* सदधिया परं नाया ब्राह्मण विविभिन्नसा ।
स्वेद्योयोवसी मुग्न निर्माण्या नु प्रकटिता ॥

† नीमांसे मनष्ठेष्वित्य विसंगसपाचरो ।
कुछीं संपति समये दसरे कुछासाभ ॥

‡ नवपानजयोः सपक्षासाभात्यास्तपिशेऽः
पञ्चाकारावेष दक्षिणात्यश्च ॥ परमं पदं ॥
allegory and mystery is adopted by a great many mediæval writers on the Yoga. At the beginning of the work, the author has given a list of thirty renowned Yogis who had practised the science in question. At the head of these appear A'dinátha, who is generally identified with S'íva, who is believed to be the first and most renowned of Yogis. The work has been made the subject of comment by several writers, among whom Brahmánanda, the author of the Jyotaná, is reckoned to be the ablest.

It would seem that the Yoga doctrine was, at a very early period, translated to Persia, and disseminated in some form or other among different sects. The Sapásiyáns obtained it in its entirety. They believed on efficacy of discipline and austerity; they assiduously practised the regulation of breath enjoined in the Yoga; they divided the stages of their progress in meditation in the same way as the Yogis did; they held the highest meditation to be a state of trance identically the same as the Samádhi; they claimed occult powers* of the same nature and character as

* 'Of these illustrious personages they have many miraculous and mysterious deeds: such as, in the upper world, hiding the sun's disk; causing him to appear at night; making the stars visible in the day-time; and in this lower world, walking on the surface of water; making trees productive out of season; restoring verdure to dried up wood; causing trees to bow down their heads; also showing themselves between heaven and earth in the form of lightning; and such like: and, in the animated world metamorphosing animals; rendering themselves invisible to men; appearing under various shapes and forms: some of which wonders have been recorded in the Barmgah-i-durveshi-khusi. They relate that these great per.
PREFACE.

did the Yogis; they were familiar with the idea of the possibility of the soul at will passing from one body into another; they believed in metempsychosis; and, if they looked upon union with the Supreme Divinity as the sumnum bonum of their faith, they but accepted one of the several forms of the Yoga, different doubtless from the Isolation of Patañjali, but not independent of it. (Cf. Dabistán I, pp. 5f.) It is, however, not known whether the system of Sapásiyáns was founded upon any translation of a Sanskrit Yoga work, or on oral communication. Some of the Sapásiyáns admitted their obligation to Hindustán, but their text-books, the few and imperfect ones that are still accessible, have not yet been sufficiently examined to throw light on the question. The close relationship existing between the two systems, even in the use of technical terms, preclude the idea of spontaneous growth, and the avowed posteriority of the Persian doctrine leaves no doubt of its Indian origin; but as at present advised, we are not in a position to spot the exact text from which it was derived.

Of interpretations of the Yoga system in foreign languages the earliest appears to be an Arabic version of the text of Patañjali. The work is no longer
extant, but the testimony in favour of its having once existed is unquestionable. Abu Réhán al Niráni, in his Tárikh-ul Hind, which formed a part of his famous Kánún-i-Masúdi (A. D. 1025-36), says, 'I have translated into Arabic two Indian works, one discusses the origin and quality of things which exist and is entitled Sánkhya, the other is known under the title of Paññjali, which treats of the deliverance of the soul from the trammels of the body. These two works contain the chief principles of the Indian creed.' (Elliot's Historians, I, p. 99; Journal Asiatique, IV serie, tom. IV, p. 121; Reinaud's Fragments Arabes et Persans.) It does not appear that any Persian version of Paññjali was ever taken in hand in the time of Akbar and his successor, when so many Sanskrit works were rendered into that language. There is, however, an abstract of the Yoga doctrine in the Dabistán-i-Muzaháb of Mahsin-i Fáni. That author flourished in the middle of the 17th century, and, during a long residence at Allahabad as the Chief Judge (Sudder), collected a great deal of information on the subject. Depending evidently on oral information, he could not avoid gross mistakes in his account of the philosophy, but in regard to the details of Yoga exercises and the occult powers he has compiled as reliable an exposition as could be expected from such a source. He notices Gorakha-nátha and several other celebrated saints, and states that he had seen some Yogis possessed of wonderful occult powers, but he does not name Paññjali. (cf. Shea and Troyer's Translation, II, pp. 123f.)
In English the first attempt to give an account of the Yoga doctrine was made by Ward in his account of the Hindus, but it did not produce any satisfactory result. Colebrooke's résumé in the Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society, is much more philosophic in spirit and faithful in details, but Colebrooke took it up only casually in connexion with his essay on the Sānkhya, and did not notice much more than the first chapter of the work. Taylor, in the Introduction to his translation of the Bhagavadgitá, supplies the Kriyá-yoga with considerable fulness, and Windischmann's account, though brief, is tolerably good. In 1853 Dr. Ballantyne published a translation of the first two chapters of the Yoga-sútra with extracts from the commentary of Bhojadeva, and from it abstractions of the Yoga system have been compiled by Dr. K. M. Banerjea, and Rev. Mr. Mullins. The translation of Ballantyne was completed, in a disjointed way, by Pañādit Govindaram Sástrí in the pages of a Benares magazine called the "Pandit." The two fragments have lately been printed together by the Theosophical Society of Bombay. The text with an original commentary together with an English translation is now being printed in the Saddarsana-chintaniká of Bombay, and an abstract of the text occurs in Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarsana-sangraha. An account of Yoga practices may also be seen in a pamphlet by Nabinchandra Pál, published at Benares.

Little need be said in praise of Dr. Ballantyne's work. The profound learning and thorough conservancy with Hindu philosophy which that learned
scholar brought to bear on his undertaking, enabled him to produce a very accurate reproduction of the original. In his anxiety, however, to be accurate he had occasion to resort too frequently to parenthetical clauses, and they resulted in confused sentences, involving much trouble in understanding them. His extracts from the commentary are particularly amenable to this objection. The extracts, moreover, are somewhat disjointed.

When the Asiatic Society of Bengal first proposed to publish an edition of the Yoga-sūtra with the commentary of Bhojadeva, I undertook to reprint Dr. Ballantyne's translation with such additions as would complete the work. I soon found, however, that my work placed beside his produced a very patchy appearance, and his parenthetical style was not desirable for a proper and easy understanding of the text. I preferred, therefore, to translate the whole in my own way. The aphorisms will be found to be as closely literal as the idiom of the English language would admit of, and the commentary a fair reproduction of the spirit, sense and wording of the original, without being a verbatim reproduction.

Much difficulty has been felt in the treatment of the technical terms. Philosophical terms in the English language have not yet arrived at that fixity and firmness which would preclude possible variations. Different writers assign different values to even well-established terms, and their latitude is frequently varying; and such as they are, they are not exact equivalents of Sanskrit words, which in their turn vary
in meaning under different circumstances and in the hands of different writers. There are instances, too, of Sanskrit terms whose literal significations are very different from the philosophical ideas they are intended to convey, and in dealing with them, the translator has either to sacrifice precision of rendering for the sake of intelligibility, or intelligibility for the sake of precision. In the following pages I have borrowed the terms mostly from Colebrooke's translation of the Sánkhya-kariká, translating a few myself, and transliterating the Sanskrit terms in some cases. My reasons I have explained as far as I could in my notes.

When I undertook the task I had hopes of reading the work with the assistance of a professional Yogí; but I have been disappointed. I could find no Paññí in Bengal who had made Yoga the special subject of his study, and the only person I met at Benares who could help me was most exorbitant in his demands. He cared not for the world and its wealth, and the only condition under which he would teach me was strict pupillage under Hindu rules—living in his hut and ever following his footsteps—to which I could not submit. I had, therefore, to depend on my own knowledge of the Sanskrit language to arrive at the meaning of Patanjali, availing myself frequently of the aid of my learned friend Professor Mahes'achandra Nyáyaratna, of the Calcutta Sanskrit College, for the solution of difficulties. I had the assistance, too, of Professor Kámkhyánátha Tarkaratna, of that College, both in revising the text and in translating it. Both the Professors are distinguished
Nyāya scholars, and Paṇḍit Mahes'achandra commands a deep knowledge of the Sānkhya, and with their aid, I believe, I have been able to avoid gross misinterpretations of the text, though I cannot flatter myself with the idea that I have been able always satisfactorily to expound the meaning of Patanjali.

Manuscripts of the Yoga-sūtra are common enough in Bengal, but I have not met with any particularly old, or exceptionally correct text. In carrying the text and commentary through the press, I had the use of the following codices:


G. Ballantyne's reprint annexed to his translation.

H. From Bombay, copied for me from a MS. belonging to the Government collection preserved in
the office of the Director of Public Instruction. Generally correct.

I. From my family Library, a quarto volume in Bengali. Corrupt and little used.

In the text of Patanjali, no variation of any note has been met with in the above codices. The work appears to have been preserved with every care, as may be presumed from the circumstance of its having enjoyed the benefit of a host of commentaries and glosses. The commentary of Bhoja has not been so correctly preserved. There are many differences of reading in the different codices. But on the whole the differences are not so material as would justify the assumption of different recensions, or produce any marked changes in the meaning of the author.

8 Maniktollah, }

January 28, 1883. }
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ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page vii line 15 for chittva read chitta
" " 27 " some theory in a more read the theory of unreality in a
xiv " 8 " alternative " resource
" " 20 and its object is worldly enjoyment, read its object is worldly enjoyment;
xxxi " 4 " birth " breath
" " 24 " rapine " repine
xlvi " 26 " produce " produces
lxxi " 29 " Such a " If it did, the
lxxx " 6 after Bhāshya, add Vyāsa himself is the author of a different system of Philosophy, and one cannot reasonably suppose that he would condescend to expound the text-book of an adverse school.
" " 11 after this day; add, as a footnote, Brahmanya Tīrtha had a pupil named Vyāsa, who wrote the Tātparya-chandrikā on the Vedānta Sūtra.
17 " 1 for cive read conducive
19 " 18 " samāptti " samāptti
43 " 25 " thum " thumb
61 " 30 " word " phrase
77 " 24 " drishtā " draśhtā.
78 " 15 " the purpose of for " for the purpose of
83 " 9 " n " in
91 " 28 " devotion " steadfastness
96 " 30 " and naturally hostile individuals having acquired it live read and even naturally hostile beings live beside those who have acquired it
114 " 20-21 " steadiness " steadfastness
135 " 8 " (anyatus) " anyatus
152 " 27 " out " out of,
158 " 1 after attainment of " add or unlimited reach of organs such as
greatness
164 " 25-27 for country " read situation
168 " 16 " the perfections " Perfections
" 22 " boy " body
175 " 28 " eteology " etiology
176 " 7 " he " the author
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THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

INTRODUCTION.

Salutation to Gañëśa. May that semi-corporeal union* of Śiva and his spouse (Śivā) by the recollection of which man enjoys isolation,† hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings!

2. We praise that eternal Śiva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold pain‡ which besets mankind.

3. That unprecedented work § of the sage Patanjali wherein he describes the severance of the soul (Purusha) from nature (Prakriti) to be Yoga|| (true union) reigns supreme.

4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes¶ which are

* A fit of jealousy, according to the Kālikā Purāṇa, had caused a temporary separation between Śiva and his spouse Durgā. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

† Separation of the human soul from all association with nature. Vide p. 207.

‡ Viz., 1st, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. Vide Wilson’s Sākhya-kārikā, p. 2.

§ Lit., saying.

|| A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonmen of, lit. disunion from (viyoga), the world is a conditio sine qua non to the Yogi, which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is separation from sensuous objects is the union or dissolution of the thinking principle in its original source.

¶ Patanjali is believed to have been an incarnation of Ananta, and the title indicates that idea. Vide Introduction, p. lxvii.
even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they prosper!

5. The glorious words of the king Raṇarāgāmalla,* who, like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work on the government of words, who has commented on Patanjali, and written on medicine a treatise called the Rājamṛigāṅka†—may they prosper.

6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number.‡

7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patanjali for the edification of intelligent persons.

---

* A title of Bhoja.
† All these works of Bhoja are still extant.
‡ "Commentators each dark passage shun—
   And hold a farthing rush-light to the sun."
   St. Jerome "not versions but inversions."
   Italian, Tradutori traditori "Translators traitors."
   "Surrender rather than render;
   Not turning, but overturning."
THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.

INTRODUCTION.

Salutation to Ganeśa. May that semi-corporeal union* of Śiva and his spouse (Śivā) by the recollection of which man enjoys emancipation,† hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings!

2. We praise that eternal Śiva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold pain‡ (which besets mankind.)

3. That unprecedented§ work of the sage Patanjali wherein he describes the severance of the soul (Puruṣaḥ) from nature (Prakṛiti) to be Yoga|| (true union) reigns supreme.

4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes,¶ which are

* A fit of jealousy, according to the Kālikā Purāṇa, had caused a temporary separation between Śiva and his spouse Durgā. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union.

† Escaping from transmigration in one of four different ways, all implying equality with the Divinity in some way or other. These are: 1st, Śrādhī, or the enjoyment of equal supremacy with the Divine Soul; 2nd, Śāktya, or getting abode in the same region with the Divinity; 3rd, Śāyujya, or the merging of the human into the divine, from intimate union; and 4th, Sārāpya, or obtaining of the form of the Divinity. The 3rd is also indicated by the term Kaivalya, the word used in the text. It means abstraction or separation from nature and the products thereof.

‡ Viz., 1st, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. Vide Wilson’s Sāṁyka-kārikā, p. 2.

§ Lit., saying.

|| A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment lit. disunion (viyoga) from the world is a condition sine qua non to the Yoga which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is abstraction from sensuous objects is concentration in the Divinity.

¶ Various causes have been assigned for this title of Patanjali. Vide Introduction.
even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they prosper!

5. The glorious words of the king Rañaraṅgamalla,* who, like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work on the government of words, who has commented on Patañjali, and written a treatise on medicine called the Rājamrigāṅka†—may they prosper.

6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number.‡

7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting its inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patañjali for the edification of intelligent persons.

* A title of Bhoja.
† All these works of Bhoja are still extant.
‡ “Commentators each dark passage shun—
And hold a farthing rush-light to the sun.”
St. Jerome “not versions but inversions.”
Italian, Traduttori traditori “Translators traitors.”
“Surrender rather than render;
Not turning, but overturning.”
CHAPTER FIRST.

Now, an exposition of the Yoga (is to be made).

This aphorism explains the subject of the work, the object with which it is written, and the relation (it bears to the subject). (The word) "Now"* (atha) suggests (that) a (distinct) topic (here commences), and it serves also as a benediction.

(The word) Yoga means 'union,' or the application of the mind to abstract contemplation, from the root yug "to meditate." An "exposition" (anusāsana) is that whereby something is expounded or described through its characteristic marks, its real nature, its distinctive divisions, its causes and effects. (The two words Yoga and anusāsana form the compound) Yoganusāsana, (which means) "an exposition of the Yoga." This is to be understood to be the topic even to the end of this work (of Patanjali).

Yoga, with the means of performing it and its fruit, constitutes the subject, that being treated of in this Institute. The object of the work is the explanation of the subject, and the fruit thereof is the emancipation obtainable by the Yoga. The relation of the work is the connection which exists between that which treats, and the subject treated of, (or the Institute and its subjects). The connection between Yoga, the subject, and its effect, which is emancipation (Kaivalya), or the means and the end, is also its relation. The substance of this is—that in the work are described the instruments of performing the Yoga which is its subject—that Yoga the accomplishment of which leads to the consummation of emancipation called Kaivalya.

[Dr. Ballantyne has rendered the word Yoga into "concentration." That English word, however, in its ordinary signification, does

* Dr. Ballantyne's text has athātah "now then."
not convey anything like a fair idea of what Yoga means. The word meditation would have been more appropriate, but even that does not convey all the ideas which the Sanskrit term has been made to comprehend. A perfect English equivalent is not to be had, and I prefer, therefore, to use the original term to coining a new one. The commentator so explains the word Anusāsanana as to convey the idea that it is a verbal noun intended to explain the purport of the work. The commentary named Pātanjala-bhāṣya takes it along with the word Yoga to be the specific name of the work. (Yogānusāsanam nāma Śāstraṃ). If this be accepted, and it appears to be the most appropriate, the aphorism should be rendered into, "Now, the (work called) Yogānusāsanas, (will be expounded)." Vāchaspati Miśra, the annotator on the last named work, and Vijñāna-bhikṣu in his Pārtika, take notice of this subject. They also raise the question about the origin of the doctrine. They hold that Patanjali was not the originator of the doctrine, for it has existed from creation, and Hīranyagarbha was the first performer of the Yoga; but that he was merely the compiler of the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them. Nanu hiranyagarbha yogasya kartā nānyah purātana iti yogiyājna-valkyasmrteḥ, kathām patanjaler yoga-śāstrīvamityāsānikaṃ sūtrakāreṇa anusāsanamityuktam, śisṭaḥsahyānusāsanam.)

Now what is this Yoga? To this the author replies:

II.

Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle.

"Thinking principle" (chītta) is of the form of goodness without a taint. "Functions" (vṛitty) are modifications of the relation between each other of them. "Yoga" or meditation is described to be the "suppression" (nirodha), or dissolution in their primary causes, through the direction inward on the suppression of
CHAPTER FIRST.

the tendency outward, of the functions in question. This suppression is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking principle. Being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle, it is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—restless activity, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of activity (ksipta) is induced by an access of the quality of foulness (rajas). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, Titans, sons of Danu, &c. Addiction to evil actions without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (múgha) proceeds from an excess of darkness (tamas). It is common to demons (Rákshasas), ghosts (Pis'áchas), &c. Voluptuousness (viksipta) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness (sáttva), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes restlessly active; by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression, having an excess of the quality of goodness and following the others, are reckoned fit for that purpose.

The object of arranging the qualities of goodness &c., in a disorderly way is this: notwithstanding the two qualities of foulness and darkness being very detestable, the quality of foulness is first described, because unless activity is made intelligible, no suppression of it can possibly be grasped. Hence the reversed order. The object of placing the quality of goodness last is this: that by its excess, the two (subsequent) conditions become fit for Yoga. Of those two conditions, viz., concentration and suppression, that in which
the thinking principle is in a state of (exclusive) application to one point is called Yoga. What is the result of this? (It is this): by Yoga or concentration to one point the external functions cease, and on that cessation there is a complete dissolution of all functions with their residua. In both these conditions, Yoga meditation is practicable.

[The most important word in the aphorism is chitta which has been rendered into "thinking principle" by Dr. Ballantyne. In ordinary Sanskrit it is a synonym of the word manas "mind," and Dr. Ballantyne has used that word as a synonym in different places, and in the sense in which that word is used in philosophy — i.e., "that which perceives, feels, thinks and wills." (Taylor, Elements of Thought) "or that which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned," (Harris, Hermes, p. 227)—he is right. In the Sāṅkhya aphorisms of Kapila, its counterpart manas has been used in the same sense (Mahaddākhyanamādyam kāryam tanmanah, I, 71). But inasmuch as the philosophical writers of this country make a marked distinction between mind as above described, and as an internal organ of knowledge, the sensorium, it is desirable that the distinction should be marked by the use of a different word. In the Sāṅkhya aphorisms the word chitta does not occur, nor is it to be met with in the Nyāya. The Vedāntists use it sparingly, taking it to be a modification or another name of Buddhī (Vedānta-sāra). Its equivalent in the Sāṅkhya is Ādhyāvasāya, which is synonymous with Buddhī. (Ādhyāvasāya buddhīh, II, 13). It is called Mahat "the great one," because "it is the first and most important of the products of nature, presiding over and pervading the whole." (Mahattvam svetara-sakalakārya-vyāpakatvan-mahāikvāryādhcha.) It is mati "understanding," because every thing is understood by it, (manyati anayā); khyāti "familiar knowledge;" jñāna, and prajñā. That Patanjali implies the object of these words by chitta is evident from the fact of his making it the first product of nature and anterior to egotism, as the Sāṅkhya does, and by say-
the tendency outward, of the functions in question. The form is a cross-grained ascent of the "functions" of the thinking principle. That suppression being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—unquietness, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of unquietness (kṣipta) is induced by the access of the quality of foulness (rajas). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, and Titans, sons of Danu &c. Addiction to evil action without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (mūḍha) proceeds from an excess of darkness (tamas). It is common to demons (Ṛakṣhasas) and ghosts, (Piśāchas) &c. Voluptuousness (vikṣipta) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness, (sattva), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes active (or desirous); by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression having an excess of the quality of the goodness and foulness, successively placed, are reckoned fit for that.

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ing that the suppression of its functions results in the completion of Yoga. (Vṛitti-nirodhāt tatsiddhik, III, 31). Thus Vāchaspāti Miśra—chitta-s'abdenāntakaranam buddhimupalaksahayati. According to the order of creation prakṛiti comes first, thence chitta, thence egotism, thence mind, and thence the subtle organs &c., and this both according to the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems. The thinking principle is thus the same with intellect, and mind in the highest sense.

The next word is vṛitti. I follow Colebrooke and Wilson by rendering it into "functions." The functions are produced by modifications of the original principle produced by unequal exertions of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness. In so far they are allotrophic conditions of the same principle, and so, as Vijnāna Bhikshu expresses it, the world is merely a modification of form, of which prakṛiti is the materiality. (Parināmarūpam jagadupādānakaśavantu-prakṛitivam.) Parināma or change is the term usually employed as its equivalent, and Bhoja explains it by saying "they are modifications of the relation between each other of the functions." Vijnāna Bhikshu calls it transformation of Prakṛiti, (prakṛitivirūpam). Under these circumstances Dr. Ballantyne's use of the term "modification" affords the closest rendering; but Dr. Wilson prefers functions as more idiomatic and expressive.

The last word is nirodha, which means stoppage, or hindering, and suppression implies the same.

The definition of Yoga as given in the text and the commentary suggests the idea that the suppression of thought must be complete before Yoga can be accomplished, but such is not the object, for in the lower stages of meditation such is not the case, and yet it is Yoga. The Pātanjala-bhāṣya points this out by saying that since the word sarva "all" has not been used before vṛitti "functions," the form of Yoga in which there is a distinct recognition is also Yoga. (Sarvasabdāgraḥanat samprajnāto pi Yogah). It is remarkable that Bhoja should have overlooked so important a qualification.]
Now the author of the Sútras, wishing to describe the words \textit{chitta-vritti-nirodhah}, describes first [in two aphorisms] the word \textit{chitta}.

III.

Then (\textit{i.e.} at the time of meditation) there is abidance of the spectator in its own form.

"Then," at that time, the soul, as "the spectator," (\textit{drasht}ú) "abides" remains in its own form, which is simple intelligence (and nothing more). The meaning is this: that on knowledge being fully developed, there being no shadow of any sensuous object cast on the thinking principle, and the egotism of one's self, which is the actor, being gone, and intellect being fit for liberation, the soul abides or obtains location in Buddhi which is its own form.

[The spectator is the soul which, abiding in the body, and influenced by the thinking principle, beholds what is done by the organs, but does not partake of the pleasures and pains resulting from their action, and in the state of Yoga the functions being stopped there is the spectator without any spectacle to behold. This spectator is the soul.]

What then is the form (of the soul) when waking (or active, \textit{i.e.} other than in a state of meditation)? To this he replies:

IV.

At other times it is in the same form as its functions.

"At other times"—\textit{i.e.}, at times other than that of meditation. Its "functions" are those the characteristics of which will hereafter be described (A. V.) "In the same form" means to consist of it. The purport is this. Even as the functions, involving pleasure, pain and bewilderment, manifest themselves, so does the soul \textit{i.e.}, it appears so to itself. If so, it follows that that object, in which, in the state of modification produced by concentration, the power of understanding finds its own form, and which
being influenced by the functions of the senses resolves itself into worldly objects, and the soul appears manifest in the forms thereof, as the moon reflected in the moving ripples on the water, appears as if it were (itself) moving, is the thinking principle chitta.

[It is a dogma of the Hindu metaphysicians that the thinking principle or intellect assumes the form of the object perceived. And the aphorism explains that when that principle is immersed in complete Yoga it perceives itself and nothing more, but when it is active and influenced by external objects it assumes the forms of its excitants].

To explain the term function, (the third word in A. II,) the author says:

V.

The functions are fivefold, (and they are either) painful or not painful.

The “functions” (vr̥tti) are certain modifications of the thinking principle. The word panchatayi (five-fold) is formed by the addition of the affix tāyāp (Pāṇini v. ii. 42), and implies that the totality of the forms of the functions constitutes the form-bearer, and the functions severally are the forms thereof. The five functions are what are meant.

How are they? They are painful or not painful. “Those that are involved in sufferings of the kind about to be described are painful; those that are the reverse of these are not painful.”

[This aphorism is a verbatim copy of Kapila’s aphorism 33, Book II. It only propounds what are to be explained in subsequent aphorisms].

The five functions are to be described after being named.

VI.

(The functions of the thinking principle are) right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep and memory.

Of these the author gives the definitions successively.
VII.

Right notions are perception, inference, and testimony.

Here the author of the Institute has not given a separate definition of what right notion is, that being very well known, and it being made evident by the description of its different forms. In fact the real definition of right notion is that whereby is produced unquestionable knowledge.

"Perception" (pratyaksha) is that function of the thinking principle by which it acquires, through the medium of the senses brought in connexion with external objects having common and peculiar characteristics, a knowledge of the most important peculiar characteristic.

"Inference" (anumana) is the conviction produced by a previous knowledge of the necessary relation between a characteristic and that which bears it.

A trustworthy word is "testimony," (agama).

[Pramaṇa means right notion, as also the means of acquiring that right notion, i.e., evidence, and hence the two meanings are often confounded. As a function of the thinking principle it is right notion, and not evidence. The Yoga system follows the Sāṅkhya in admitting only three means of right notion, and in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā they are said to comprise every mode of demonstration. The Naiyāyikas, however, reckon four kinds, viz., preception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), comparison (upamāna), and testimony (śabda). The Vedāntīs follow this latter, and the Mīmāṃsakas recognise six, viz., perception (pratyakṣa), presumption (artha-patti), proportion (sambhava), privation (abhāva), comprehension (pratībha), and oral communication (aṅkhyā).

The word used for perception is pratyaksha, which means "that which is seen," but it implies knowledge acquired through any one of the five organs of sense, or, as Reid defines perception,
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"evidence which we have of external objects by our senses." For testimony Patanjali gives ágama, which means the Vedas, but the commentator has generalised it by giving for its synonym áptaraçhana "reliable words"; it is the declaration of one who knows the truth of that which he affirms, and whose authority may be relied upon. The scriptures, as revealed knowledge, naturally come at the head of testimony.

Having thus described the function of right notion the author speaks of Misconception.

VIII.

Misconception is incorrect notion, (or a notion) which abides in a form which is not that of its object.

"Misconception" (viparyaya) is a notion of something in respect of which it really is not; as the notion of silver in mother-o'pearl. "Which abides in a form which is not that of its object" is to say a notion which does not abide in that form which is its (real) form (in respect of which the notion is entertained). It amounts to this, that the notion does not reveal the real form of the thing. Doubt (saññaya) founded on the notion whether a thing abides in its proper form or not, such as whether a particular object seen is a man or the stump of a tree, is also a Misconception.

To describe the function of Fancy, he says:

IX.

Fancy is a notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words, but of which (there is) no object (corresponding in reality).

Knowledge dependant on words is śabda-jñāna. That which follows it, is śabda-jñānānupāti (the epithet used to define Fancy, which in the text has been translated by the word "notion founded on a knowledge conveyed by words"). Such a notion without reference to the real character of an object
is "Fancy." Thus the words, "the intelligence of the soul (purusha) is its own form." Here a notion is assumed by admitting a distinction as in the notion produced by the possessive case in the phrase "the blanket of Devadatta," though it does not really exist, for in fact the soul is intelligence itself (and there is no distinction between it and its intelligence, or of possessor and the possessed).

["In the soul
Are many lesser faculties, that serve
Reason as chief; among these fancy next
Her office holds; of all eternal things
Which the five watchful senses represents
She forms imagination's airy shapes,"

Paradise Lost, B. V.]

In order to declare what Sleep is, he says:

X.

Sleep is that function (of the thinking principle) which has for its object the conception of nothing.

Of that function which is based on the conception of nothing the name is as aforesaid (abhávapratyayá.) Hence it follows that "Sleep" (nádrá) is that function (of the thinking principle) which takes place on the quitting of all objects, in consequence of the quality of darkness always preceding it. That this is a function (of the thinking principle and not a mere blank) is proved by our seeing that one recollects (on arising from a sound sleep) that "I slept pleasantly," which could not have happened without a consciousness of it, (and no memory can exist of that which is not). Hence it is a function.

In order to describe Memory, he says:

XI.

Memory is the not letting go of an object that has been recognised.
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"The not letting go" (asampramosha) or not allowing to escape from our intellect an object which has once been recognised through (proper) evidence is "Memory" (smriti).

Of the five functions Evidence, Misconception, and Fancy belong to the waking state. When any of these, from vividness of impression, becomes perceptible (in sleep), it is a Dream (svapna.) But Sleep of itself has no cognisable object. Memory again is dependent on Evidence, Misconception, Fancy or Sleep.

[Bishop Hall says, "Memory is the great keeper or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been." It is said to be dependant on Evidence, Misconception, &c., because the impressions it preserves are the productions of those causes.]

Having thus described the functions (of the thinking principle), in order to explain the suppression (the fourth word in A. II.,) of these with the means thereof, he says:

XII.

The suppression of these (functions is effected) by Exercise and Dispassion.

"Exercise" (abhyaśa) and Dispassion" (vairāgya) will be defined in the aphorisms about to be given. The repression by these (Exercise and Dispassion) of the functions of the thinking principle which have the form of revealing, energizing and regulating, is "suppression" (nirodha). What is meant is the placing of the functions, which from their turning inwards have ceased to dwell on external objects, in the thinking principle, which is their original cause, and of which they are but potential attributes.

Aversion from sensuous objects is produced by "Dispassion" resulting from a knowledge of the evil influence of those objects (on the thinking principle), and confirmed steadfastness is acquired by "Exercise," which makes it a source of happiness and quiet; and by the (conjoined effect of the) two the functions of the thinking principle are suppressed.
[The purport of this aphorism has been given by Kapila in six aphorisms, 31 to 36 of Book III.]
With a view to describe Exercise, he says:

XIII.

Exercise is the (repeated) effort that it (the thinking principle) shall remain in its functionless state.

Sthiti or "functionless state" is that condition of the thinking principle in which it abides in its own (original) form, free from all functions; and the effort or endeavour (repeated) again and again to bring it to that condition is "Exercise" or abhyāsa.

He next mentions a special character of that (Exercise).

XIV.

It is again a firm ground attained by proper devotion for a long time unintermittingly.

It (Exercise) is a firm ground, i.e., it becomes steadfast, or acquires firmness, by being assiduously attended to for a long time unremittingly with an excess of regard. The meaning is that it tends to firmness.

He now mentions the definition of Dispassion (A. XII.)

XV.

The consciousness of being the subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects is Dispassion.

Objects are of two kinds, "Perceivable" (drishta) and "Scriptural" (anus'rávika). The Perceivable is that which may be apprehended here (on earth), such as sound and other objects (perceptible through the organs of sense). The Scriptural is that which exists in the regions of the Devas or elsewhere (where it cannot be grasped by carnal organs). *
That which is heard (anus'ráyate) from the mouth of a preceptor is anus'ráva or the Veda. What comes to our knowledge there-from (i.e., from the Veda) is what is meant by "one heard of" ánus'rávika. Giving up all eagerness for these two classes of objects, on account of their becoming distasteful at the end, the reflection which ensues (in the thinking principle) to the effect that these are my subjects, but I am not their slave, is called Dispassion (Vairágya).

[The word Vairágya (dispassion) is formed of the privative prefix vi, and rága, 'affection,' 'prepossession,' 'love,' 'desire,' the meaning being, in the technical sense in which it is used here, absence of desire for enjoyable objects. The absence, however, should not be accidental, as in the case of a child or of a stolid person where, owing to want of development of certain organs, it results without effort, but the fruit of due deliberation, and a conviction that the objects are not worth having, and that the desire for them should be suppressed.

The word vas'íkára-saunjñá literally means "consciousness of being able to subjugate," in this instance the passions; but the commentators take it to be a mere indifference or apathy, neither affection nor hatred. Thus the Pátanjala Bháshya: "devoid of hatred and desirability" (kṣyopádeya-sunyá); and Váchaspati Miśra explains the phrase by the words "a sense of indifference having neither attachment nor hatred" (áatátyadvaharhahitá upaktábuddhik).

The word rendered into 'perceptible' is drish'ta 'seen;' but, as illustrated by commentators, it means all worldly objects of sense; they may not be perceptible owing to excessive distance, extreme nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, inter- position of objects, &c. (Sádhkhyá-káriká. V. VII.), still they are perceptible on this earth under some circumstance or other, and therefore included in the term. The Pátanjala Bháshya illustrates the term by naming women, food, drink, and power, (stríyonnañapánaimsvarvānimiti). Dr. Ballantyne renders it into "seen," which is its lexicographical meaning, but which is quite
inadmissible here. Wilson, following Colebrooke, renders it into “temporal” which conveys the right technical meaning, but it becomes inappropriate under certain circumstances, as when we have to deal with adrishta, the antonym of drishta, in which case non-temporal would be unmeaning, for the word implies fate or what has not yet happened but may happen; the unseen is in that case the best.

The Sanskrit term for Scriptural is anusravika, which means “that which has been heard from another,” but it has not been used in that sense here. As the commentators show, the secondary meaning of anusrava is the Veda, which is also called sruti, or “that which has been heard,” and the object is to imply those rewards which the Veda promises to the performer of sacrifices &c. Colebrooke uses the synonym ‘revealed.’ The Patanjala Bhāṣyā takes the rewards to mean heaven, rudimental body, and dissolution into nature (svargavaidehyaprakritilayaḥ). Thus the dispassion implies not only indifference to worldly enjoyments and objects, but the same feeling also in regard to celestial and other forms of pleasure derivable by the performance of the rites enjoined in the Veda. The pleasures, both of this world and of the next, are equally temporary, and therefore should not be desired by one who longs for emancipation. Thus in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā: “The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others.” (Wilson’s Sāṅkhya-kārikā, p. 13). In fact it amounts to the moral imperturbability of Pyrrho.]

A peculiarity in it is to be described.

XVI.

Carried to the extent of indifference to the qualities it is the highest, as it is (then) conducive to a knowledge of God.

“**It** i.e., “Dispassion.” “Highest” (para) the most estimable. The first degree of “Dispassion” (A. XV) has regard to (ordinary) objects; the second, has regard to the (three) qualities, and it is
cive to a knowledge of the distinction between the product qualities and the (nonproduced) soul, from its extreme conduciveness to the perfect suppressive meditation.

[The object of this aphorism is to divide Dispassion into two kinds; one referring to enjoyable objects and called visavairagyga, and the other to qualities, i.e., to the knowledge of the relation between the discrete and the indiscrète, (vyaktavyaktadharmakebhyoviraktah). The latter is described to be the highest, or most estimable, because it is more valuable than the former, in the attainment of the final object. The word para is the leading term in the Aphorism, and stands by itself, being predicated by what follow. But Dr. Ballantyne has subordinated it, by reducing it into a predicate. He says “This carried to the utmost is indifference regarding the qualities.” This is obviously not the right meaning.]

Having thus stated the nature of Yoga, the author (next) mentions the differences existing between the nature of that kind of it in which there is consciousness (samprajñāta) and that in which consciousness is lost (asamprajñāta).

XVII.

Conscious, because it is attended with argumentation, deliberation, joy and egoism.

The word “meditation” (samādhi) is understood to be present after the word conscious to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism.

That which makes manifest without any doubt or error, i.e., makes thoroughly manifest, the exact nature of the object pondered is “Conscious meditation,” (samprajñāta samādhi). Samādhi or meditation is a kind of pondering (bhāvanā). The suppression or exclusion of every function (of the thinking principle) except that which relates to the subject pondered is Conscious or Discriminative meditation; it is the same with “Seeded meditation” — savīja-samādhi. And from there being distinctions of argumentation, &c., it is of four kinds, (namely) 1st, the “Argumentative” (savītarka); 2nd,
the "Deliberative" (sāvichāra); 3rd, the "Joyous" (sānanda); and 4th, the "Egoistic" (sāsmīta). "Pondering" is the taking again and again into the thinking principle of any particular object to the exclusion of all other objects. The object to be pondered is of two kinds; the Godhead (iśvara), and the categories or principles (tattvas). The last again are of two kinds according as they are "irrational" or "rational." The irrational are the twenty-four; the rational is the soul.

Among these (the four kinds of meditation), when accepting the gross elements and the organs as the objects, pondering is carried on with reference to which is antecedent and which is consequent, and the relation of the words to their meanings, it is called 'Argumentative meditation' (savitarka-samādhi). Should this pondering, however, be independent of the idea of their antecedence and their sequence and the relation between their names and meaning, it would be called "Non-argumentative" (nirvītarka). When pondering is engaged in with reference to something subtle, as the subtle elements and the internal organ, and to their qualities in relation to space, time, &c., it is "Deliberative" (sāvichāra). But should this pondering be in regard to those subjects themselves, without reference to their relation to time and space, and simply as substrata of qualities, it is said to be "Non-deliberative" (nirvīchāra). What have been described up to this time are called Tangible Forms. (Grāhya-samāpatti.)

When the quality of goodness of the Internal Organ tinctured with a little of the qualities of foulness and darkness is pondered, then consciousness being under the influence of qualities and the quality of goodness, which is full of the manifestation of happiness, becomes enlivened, the meditation becomes "Joyous" (sānanda). In this (kind of) meditation those of confined intellect who do not perceive the other (i.e., last of the twenty-five principles, or the chief soul) are indicated by the word "bodiless" (videha), because they have risen above their body and egotism. This is the Acceptance Form. (Graha-samāpatti.)
CHAPTER FIRST.

Next, the pondering which has the pure quality of goodness untainted by foulness and darkness for its object, is called Egoistic or ontric meditation, (saṁmita), because in it, from the enlivening of the intellectual power, the quality of goodness, which is the object of the pondering, is disregarded and its existence alone is perceived. It should not be supposed that there is no difference between this Ontric meditation and egotism, because where the Internal Organ knows objects with the use of (the word) I (i.e., with a knowledge of the distinction between itself and the object before it) it is egotism. But when mere existence is alone manifest in the thinking principle merged in nature from its reverse action resulting from its tendency inwards, it is egoism. In this (last kind of) meditation when contented (beings) do not perceive the Supreme Soul, and their mind is merged in its true cause, they are described to be Prakritilaya ‘resolved into nature.’

Of the persons, who enter into pondering, knowing the Supreme Soul, the manifestation of intelligence is called the Form of the taker, Grihitṛi-samāptti.

Even in the argumentative meditation all the four kinds exist potentially, and successively as each is abandoned the others remain, and all these four kinds are Conscious meditation, or that which has a distinct recognition, samprajñāta-samādhi.

[Meditation is described to be of two kinds, 1st, that which is carried on with a clear understanding of the object reflected upon as distinct from the meditator; and 2nd, that in which no such distinction obtains and the intellect is merged in the soul. In the former, the subject of the aphorism, there are argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism, when the objects meditated upon are irrational objects, such as the first twenty-four of the twenty-five categories of the Sāṅkhya system which the Yoga school adopts; and they may not exist when the rational soul is the object. The first or Argumentative form applies to gross matter; and the second or the Deliberative applies to subtile matter. In both these the quality of goodness plays a subordinate part. When that quality attains ascendancy the meditation becomes “Joyous;” and it
ceases to have connection with the body, or technically becomes dis-embodyed. When it prevails without any taint of the foul and the dark qualities, the thinking principle is then believed to have merged into primæval nature. This is, however, not the highest reward, for it does not put an end to transmigration: on the evolution of creation from nature, the merging ceases, and there is again a separation. It will be noticed that the first two forms, the Argumentative and the Deliberative, have their negatives the Non-argumentative and the Non-deliberative; and these four form a class called the tangible forms.

The next is the "Joyous" kind in which the sense of the existence of the body is lost, and this is called the "acceptance form." In this there is no negative form, nor is there any such distinction in the next kind, the "Egoistic," in which every thing is identified with the self. This is called the "acceptor" form. In all these six kinds of pondering, there is, it will be perceived, a distinct recognition or consciousness of individuality, and hence they all come under the term Conscious. When this consciousness is lost, we come to the next class which forms the theme of the next aphorism:

The author now describes that form of meditation in which consciousness is lost, asamprajñāta.

XVIII.

The other is that in which the residua are ended, preceded by the exercise of thought as regards the cause of rejection.

By viráma is meant that whereby rejection takes place, i.e., the abandonment of all anxiety about argumentation &c., (A. XVII). Pratyaya, "thought," added to viráma, "cause of rejection," produces the compound expression viráma-pratyaya. Exercise (abhyāsa) is reiteration of the idea in the thinking principle. In this condition of exercise, constantly rejecting with a nega-
tive, "not this, not this," whatever ideas spring up, the result is the other or Unconscious meditation, or that in which there is no distinct consciousness, which has nothing left, and in which the residua are ended. It is the opposite of the former kind, and it is asamprajñāta-samādhi. In this condition there is nothing to be known, and therefore it is called Unconscious, undiscriminating, or seedless meditation (nirviśa).

Now, there are four modifications of the thinking principle, waking, commencing meditation, concentration, and suppression of thought. Thereof (A. II) the waking state belongs to the two conditions of the thinking principle described as restlessness and mischievous ignorance. The quality of goodness being on the ascendant in the condition described as voluptuousness, it is that of commencing meditation. Concentration and absolute suppression are the final conditions. Each condition has its residua. Thereof, those residua which are present in the waking state are destroyed by those that are produced by the condition of commencing meditation, and those that are brought forth by the condition of commencing meditation, are destroyed by those due to the condition of concentration. The residua of the condition of concentration are destroyed by those of suppression. Even as lead melted with gold destroys the dross of gold as well as itself, so do the residua of the condition of suppression consume both themselves as well as the residua of the condition of concentration.

[The most important word in the aphorism is Sañskāra, and it is just the one which has unfortunately not been explained either in the commentary of Bhoja, or in the Pātanjala Bhāṣyā. In ordinary Sanskrit it has many meanings. In the Nyāya it occurs frequently in three different senses, viz., velocity (vega), thinking (bhāvanā), and elasticity (sthitisthāpaka). (Tarka-saṅgraha). Adverting to the second meaning the Bhāvanā-parichkṛṭa, says: "Sañskāra, called thinking, (bhāvanā), resides in sentient beings; and is imperceptible to the senses. Certainty
which has no inattention in its constituent, is its cause. It is also described to be the cause of memory and recognition.”

(Bhāvanākhyāstu sanskāro jīvavrittiratindryah.
Upekshānātmakastasya nischayah kāraṇam bhavet.
Smarane pratyabhijñāyāmapyasau heturuchyate.)

Thus it is not memory as rendered by Dr. Roer in his translation of the Bhāshā-parichhedha, for there it is described to be the cause of memory, and not memory itself. It is not sensation, nor impression, for it is not transient, but lasting. It is not perception, because that applies to the acceptance by the sensorium of something existing without, and does not serve as the cause of memory. It is not idea, for it is the result of former experience, and not spontaneous as an idea may be, nor eternal as the ancient Greek philosophers supposed ideas to be. Dr. Ballantyne renders it into “self-reproduction of thought;” but there is nothing like “self-reproduction” in it; for it is said to be revived by external stimuli, and not by its own effort. It is something then—a trace, a mark, a cellul, a psychograph—which perception, whether conscious or unconscious, leaves behind in the intellect, to be revived afterwards under particular circumstances, and it is more or less connected with all intellectual acts as cause or effect. In the language of Dr. Morell (‘Mental Philosophy,’ p. 95) “When a given mental impression is produced upon us, it remains for a time before the consciousness, and then gives way to others. We know, however, that it is not absolutely lost; for, if proper conditions occur, the impression is renewed. The conclusion is, that there must be something deposited within us which subsists permanently, and which is equally there, whether it be at any moment the immediate object of our consciousness or not. This something, then, we term a residuum, using the expression, it will be observed, without implying any theory on the subject whatever.” The Sanskrit counterpart of this residuum is Saṅskāra. Every sensation, every impression, every perception, every idea, nay, every dream, leaves its trace behind, and the traces or residua so obtained constitute the sum total of
our experience, and these are Saṅskāras. According to Indian philosophers these remain not only all life through, but even in subsequent states of existence, and they are, therefore, believed to be the cause of our instincts. The new-born infant takes to its mother’s breast from the saṅskāra it has in its mind from its experience in a former existence.

The next word is śesha, and it, too, has not been fully defined by the commentators. It means ‘remainder’ ‘balance,’ or ‘end.’ Compounded with saṅskāra the meaning is that in which the remainders are the saṅskāras, or that in which the saṅskāras are ended, or brought to a close. Bhoja accepts the second meaning, and he illustrates it by saying that in the state of Unconscious meditation in its perfection all previous saṅskāras or residua of former conditions, as well as those of the perfect state, are destroyed, even as in the process of cupellation, lead melted with gold not only destroys the dross existing in impure gold, but also itself, leaving nothing behind. Thus the Unconscious meditation is seedless or has no object whatever for contemplation. The Pātanjala Bhāṣya takes a different view. According to it, in the Unconscious stage all functions are set at rest and the resi-
dua alone remain behind. (Sarva-vṛitti-pratyangamaya-saṅskāra-
śeshah nirodhah.) And Vāchaspati Miśra emphasizes this by ad-
ding the word “alone”—saṅskāras alone remain—(saṅskāra-mātra śeshah.) This contradiction may be explained by supposing that the Pātanjala-bhāṣya has in view a meditation from which there is awaking, while Bhoja describes the final meditation from which there is no further waking; for he admits that in the earlier stages of the Unconscious meditation there are residua peculiar to it. Yogis admit that people do wake from the Un-
conscious meditation, and that that meditation is often practiced, and in such cases the saṅskāras must remain in a latent state to be revived by proper stimuli on waking. It is difficult satisfactorily to decide to what condition Pātanjali himself referred to. The way in which he has used the word śesha would suggest the idea that he has been correctly interpreted in the Pātanjala Bhāṣya. See A. L. at the end of the chapter.
The state of Unconscious meditation above described is subject to the condition precedent, that there should be repeated acts of contemplation or exercise of thought amounting to a habit, as regards the necessity of rejecting all causes of disturbance. Without it the final stage cannot be acquired. This exercise of thought, however, forms a part of the Unconscious stage, and is totally unconnected with the Conscious form. Váchaspati Miśra says—"the first word in the aphorism (which I have rendered into 'preceded by the exercise of thought regarding the cause of rejection,' and for the sake of idiom put at the end of the sentence) describes the means, and the other two define the nature of the meditation in question" (पूर्वपादरुपयाकथनांमुत्तराध्याम चास्वरुपाकथानम्). Dr. Ballantyne has mistaken the purport of the word, and made it the conditio precedent. His version is "The one [kind of meditation just described] is preceded by the exercise of thought in the shape of repose;—the other [—independent of any fresh antecedent—] is in the shape of the self-reproduction [of thought, after the departure of all objects.]" After what has been stated above, it is obvious that this version is not tenable. It may be added that it is not at all usual with authors of Sútras to repeat in a subsequent sútra what has been already explained in a previous one.

Having thus stated the distinctions and the nature of Yoga, and having briefly mentioned the method of performing it, the author proceeds to speak of those methods more fully.

XIX.

Of (the meditative states attained to by the two classes of aspirants technically called) the Unembodied and the Resolved into nature, the world is the cause.

The "unembodied" (वैदेहा) and the "resolved into nature" (प्रकृति लय) have been described in the aphorism on the argumentative and other forms of meditations (A XVII, pp. 18 f.)
Of their meditation the world is the cause. The word bhava-prataya is formed of bhava 'world' and prataya 'cause.'

The meaning is this: that such persons, from their entrance into the world (on account of their deserts), become participants of similar (inadequate) meditation. Not being conscious of ultimate reality, for them this is a mere exercise of the Yoga. Hence, exertion should be made for the knowledge of the ultimate reality and in the contemplation thereof, with a view to the attainment of deliverance. This is the object for which this has been said.

[In the commentary on aphorism XVII, among the conditions of Conscious meditation disembodiedness and resolution into primeval nature have been pointed out as high. Here the object is to show that those results are secondary, and of the earthy. They do not secure the ultimate end of Yoga. They are accordingly meditations, of which the world or Prakṛti is the cause. They are, nevertheless, desirable exercises as preparatory to the state in which the ultimate reality is revealed.]

Of others:—

XX.

(In the case) of others this (meditation) is preceded by Inclination, Energy, Memory, Meditation, and Discernment.

"Of others" i. e., of Yogīs, other than (those who have been described as) "the disembodied" and "the resolved in nature." "Preceded by inclination" &c.; that meditation which has śraddhā &c. as the first means, is called śraddhādipūrvaka. These, inclination and the rest, act successively as the means and the end, i. e. they serve as the means or instruments for the Conscious meditation. Thereof "Inclination" (śraddhā) is approbation in favour of the Yoga. "Energy" (virya) is strenuous exertion. "Memory" (sāmrāti) is not letting out what is once cognised. (A. XI, p. 12.) "Meditation" (samādhi) is intentness on a single point.
"Discernment" (prajñā) is thorough understanding of that which is to be known. Now, he who has "Inclination" gets "Energy," or becomes persevering in favour of Yoga. In the condition of "Energy" comes "Memory" of former states, in which the thinking principle meditates; and the thinking principle which has meditated knows thoroughly what it has thought upon. All these are the expedients of the Conscious form of meditation. From the (frequent) exercise of that meditation and from extreme dispassion Unconscious meditation ensues.

[This aphorism explains the practices which should be adopted by the neophyte in the first stage of his career as a Yogī. He must have Inclination for the exercise he cannot then undertake. The Inclination then, must be followed by Energy, or active exertion. Then there should be Memory of what he has learnt. Next, there should be frequent exercise of Meditation of some being or other to bring on the habit for it. And, lastly, there should be clear Discernment of what should be done and what should be avoided.]

Of the Yogis possessing the above mentioned expedients he next describes the sub-divisions according to the different expedients they adopt (for the attainment of their object).

XXI.

Proximate for the ardently impetuous.

(To complete the aphorism the words:) "The attainment of the state of meditation" are required to be supplied. "Impetuous" (sañvega), energetic exertion for the execution of a work. "Ardent" (tīvra), excessively, in a high degree. On the part of those who are thus ardently impetuous, the attainment of Meditation is "proximate" (ásanna). The fruition of Meditation is also proximate, i.e., quickly accomplished.

[Having in the preceding aphorism pointed out the practices to be adopted by Yogīs, the author in this lays special stress on the necessity for ardent application. A lukewarm feeling is not enough for immediate or early fruition. The application should be "ardently impetuous" to ensure quick reward.]

Who are then ardently impetuous? To this he replies.
XXII.

There is a further distinction, from there being the mild, the moderate, and the excessive.

There are specific distinctions among those who adopt these expedients, from the mild and other expedients being different. The divisions of the expedients are "mild" (mṛidu), "moderate" (madhya), and "excessive" (adhimátra). These are severally threefold, from their being severally subdivided into "the mildly impetuous," "the moderately impetuous" and "the excessively impetuous." And in accordance with this division there are nine classes of Yogís. The mild expedients are (severally) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The moderate expedients are (also) "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." The excessive expedients are (likewise), "mildly impetuous," "moderately impetuous," and "ardently impetuous." And great endeavours should be made for the attainment of the "ardently impetuous" form of the excessive method. So much for the declaration of the distinctions of Yogís.

[The object of this aphorism is to classify Yogís into different orders according to their respective arduousness. Some are mildly, others moderately, and others ardently disposed, and so each group forms an order. Again in their mildness and the rest there may be degrees varying from mildness to moderateness and ardency, and so each of the three orders has three sub-divisions, making a total of nine groups. The injunction is that Yogís should exert to pass through the several orders as quickly as possible, so that the attainment of the final stage may not be delayed.]

Now he mentions an easy expedient, distinct from the preceding expedients.
XXIII.

Or by devotion to God.

"God" (Īśvara) will be described presently (A. XXIV). "Devotion" (prāṇidhāna) is a form of resignation to Him. It is thorough worship of Him, and the consignment of all one's actions to Him. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one's actions to Him, the preëminent guide, is "devotion," prāṇidhāna. This is an important means of meditation and of its fruition.

[In this aphorism the author departs from the Sāṅkhya system, by introducing devotion to God as a facile and ready means of attaining the end. God, however, is not made the end, but the means to an end of which He forms no integral portion. The theory of resignation or dedication of the fruits of all actions to Him, is evidently borrowed from the Bhakti system in which it plays the most important part. In entire reliance on the providence of the Godhead, the Bhakta wishes for no fruition whatever. Whatever he does is for the service of the Divinity, and He in His mercy is to grant whatever He thinks proper. In the Bhagavad Gītā this is made the cardinal point of faith, (IX, 27,) and there it appears quite consistent; but in the Yoga system Kapila found no necessity for it, and Patanjali adopts it as a sort of compromise to give a theistic character to his system; but it plays only a very subordinate part.]

It has been just stated that meditation may be achieved through devotion to God. With reference to this he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature (XXIV), the proofs (XXV), the glory (XXVI), the name (XXVII), and the order of worship of God (XXIII), as also the fruit thereof (XXIX).

XXIV.

God is a particular soul which is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts and desires.
Those things which afflict are "afflictions" (klebhaka). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. "Works" (karma), are what are enjoined or prohibited (in the Såstras), as also what are mixed, i. e., partly one and partly the other. What ripen out of those works are "deserts" (vipåka). They are kind, age and experience. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (ásaya). "Untouched," (aparámrishka,) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). "Particular soul" (Purusha-višeṣha), is that which is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. "God" (Īśvara) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of afflictions does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the afflictions abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the afflictions in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to sempeternal excess of the quality of goodness. This excess is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependent, His wisdom and almightiness are not mutually dependent, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that goodness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of Prakriṣi and Purusha cannot happen except by the will of that Īśvara. The thinking principle in ordinary beings, undergoing modifications into pleasure, pain and delusion, becomes, on being touched in the body of the Yogi, by the reflection of the soul, known; but such is not the case with Īśvara. His superexcellent modification of goodness abides eternally without a beginning as the sole object of enjoyment. Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Īśvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by Såstric means (such as the Yoga, &c.). In His case, however, being always in that condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor
is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

[The most important word in the aphorism is Īśvara. Derived from the root Īś, it means 'ruler' or 'governor,' but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word is purusha, which means a man, or the soul of a man—that which abides (skete) in the body (puro); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but as the dualism indicated by European philosophers between soul or animal life (Ψυχή) and spirit, or rational life (Ψυχία) is not recognised by Hindu writers, I have accepted soul to imply the two collectively. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedántic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and, to avoid trouble, uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the accidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Achárya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus:

"Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well-known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit, or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahápáśupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Saivas as S'iva,—the Vaishnavas as Puru—
Those things which afflict are "afflictions" (kleśah). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. "Works" (karma), such as are enjoined or prohibited (in the Sástras), as also such as are mixed, i.e., partly one and partly the other. What ripens out of those works are "deserts" (vipáka). They are the results of actions, such as caste, existence, and enjoyment. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (ásaya). "Untouched," (aparámrishta,) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). "Particular soul" (purusha-viśesha), who is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. "God" (Īśvara) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of troubles does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the troubles abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the troubles in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to His sempeternal greatness in the quality of goodness. This greatness is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependant, His wisdom and greatness are not mutually dependant, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that greatness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of Prakṛiti and Purusha cannot happen except by the will of that Īśvara. In ordinary beings, the thinking principle is modified into pleasure, pain and delusion, but in the body of the Yogi, being touched by the reflection of the thinking principle (in its purity) it becomes known as reflected. Such is not the case with Īśvara. He is, by reason of His eternity, always solely of the quality of goodness and super-excellence; he exists as the object (of our meditation). Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Īśvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by Sástric means (such as the Yoga &c.). In His case, however, being always in that
condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almightiness attains its highest limit.

[The most important word in the aphorism is Iśvara. Derived from the root Iś, it means 'ruler' or 'governor;' but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler.

The next word is purusha, which means a man, or the soul of a man—that which abides (shete) in the body (pure); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent; but in philosophical works it is always used for soul, and to preserve the spirit of the text I have accepted that word. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedântic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and to avoid trouble uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the incidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Achârya's summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus:

"Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well-known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahápáśupatás as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Saivás as Śiva,—the Vaishnāvas as Puru—
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shottoma,—the followers of the Purāṇas as the great Father (Brahmā),—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatas as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed,—the Mīmāṁsakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worshipped,—the Chārvākas as Him who is established by the convention of the world,—the followers of the Nyāya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—why farther detail? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Viśvakarman,—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable Śiva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c., how can there arise any doubt? and what then is there to be ascertained?"—(Cowell's Kusumānjali, p. 2.)

For a theist, intent on proving the existence of the Deity, this summary is good enough; but it is not absolutely correct. The Chārvākas do not admit the existence of the Godhead as the supreme ruler. They are atheists, and do not acknowledge any Divine supremacy. The Kápilas, though not so outspoken, still hold that the existence of the Godhead cannot be proved. Kapila, in the Sāṅkhya aphorisms says, "It is not proved that there is a God." (Īśvarātīdheh I. 92.) This idea he works out elaborately in his Fifth Book, and, for ready reference, I quote Dr. Ballantyne's translations of the aphorisms on the subject.

Aph. 2.—Not from its [—the world's—] being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works [—i. e., by merit and demerit—] that this is accomplished,—["by works alone, which are indispensable,"—and if we do make the additional and cumbersome supposition of a Lord, He cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works].

Aph. 3.—[If a Lord were governor, then] having intended his own benefit, His government [would be selfish], as is the case [with ordinary governors] in the world.

Aph. 4.—[He must then be] just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise [than you desire that we should conceive of Him; for
"if we agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be something mundane,—just like a worldly lord;—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be liable to grief, &c.”].

 Aph. 5.—Or ["if whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then, let yours, like ours, be merely"] a technical term ["for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation,—since there cannot be an eternal Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an unobstructed will”].

 Aph. 6.—This [that there is a Lord] cannot be established without [assuming that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indispensable cause [of all energizing].

 Aph. 7.—Moreover were that [Passion] conjoined with Him, he could not be eternally free, ["and thus the tenet (of His eternal freedom) must be surrendered.”—"Pray (let us ask)—does Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be powers of Nature—(not properties of Soul—)or from an influence through proximity simply, —as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative”].

 Aph. 8.—If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which Scripture denies of Soul. "In regard to the latter alternative he says”].

 Aph. 9.—If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong to every one; ["that is to say,—if Thought obtains Lordship merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indifferently, experiencers in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) have Lordship, because it is just by conjunction with all experiencers that Nature produces Mind, &c.;—therefore your tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown”].
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Aph. 10.—It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord] because there is no real evidence of it, [—"in the first place, there is not sense-evidence, so that only the evidence of inference and of testimony can be offered; and these are inapplicable;" as he proceeds to show].

Aph. 11.—There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord], because there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken];—"and so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord; because, in such arguments as 'Mind, or the like, has a maker, because it is a product,' the fact of invariable concomitancy is not established, since there is no compulsion" that every product should have had an intelligent maker.

Aph. 12.—Moreover, there is scripture for this [world's] being the product of Nature [—not of a Lord]." (Sādhkhyā Aphorisms, pp. 114ff.)

I should add here that some Kāpilas do not wish openly to admit their atheism, and appeal for support from the aphorism in which Kapila says "The existence of such a Lord is a settled point," (III, 5 and 7), meaning by "such" an emergent Lord who has been absorbed into nature, and who is in no sense the governor of creation. The greater part of chapter III of the first book of the Vedānta Sūtra treats of this subject; but it is too long to be quoted here.

The Pāṇḍya Pāṇḍya Bālāṣya points out the distinction between the emancipated soul and the Godhead thus: "If isolation be it, then would there not be many isolated ones? (Not so.) For the isolated ones attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds, whereas in regard to God there never was and never can be such bonds. The emancipated implies previous bondage, but this cannot be predicated of God. Again, in the case of the resolved into nature there is possibility of future bondage, but it is not the case with God—He is sempeternally emancipated and sempeternally the Lord." Kaivalyam prāptāhastiki santi cha bahu- vah kevalinah. Te hi tripi bandhanām chhitvā kaivalyam
práptáḥ; īśvarasya cha tat sambando na bhuto na bhāvī. Yathā muktasya pūrvabandhakoṭīḥ prajñāyate naivamiśvarasya. Yathā vā prakṛitilīkasyaottard bandhakoṭīḥ sambhāvyate naivamiśvara-
sya; sa tu saḍeva muktah sadevaśvarah.]  

Having described the identity of God, the author next produces a proof that such a being exists.

XXV.

In Him the seed of the omniscient attains infinity.

In that God the seed of omniscience, as also of parvitude and magnitude and of knowledge of the knowers of the past, the future &c., attains its “infinity,” (niratisaya)* or highest perfection. Being the source like a seed it is called seed (vīja). It is well known that of the qualities of parvitude and magnitude, which have degrees, there is an absolute perfection. Thus, the perfection of parvitude is seen in atoms, and that of magnitude in the sky. In a similar manner knowledge and other manifest attributes of the thinking principle compared with each other must somewhere attain the highest perfection, and wherever they are in the highest perfection, that is God. Although from the general character of this inference no precise being is proved, yet in the Śāstras His omniscience and other qualities may be precisely learnt.

But how does He, without any impulse of His own, cause the union and separation of Prakṛiti and Purusha? Such a doubt should not be entertained. Being merciful, He finds in His mercy to creation the impulse. His impulse is the wish “I shall rescue all creation (from pain) at the periodical minor and great pralayas.” What ever is desirable to one, is his impulse.

[The logical force of this aphorism is not apparent. It is a mere assertion, and can scarcely be taken as a proof, as the Commentator puts it forward to be. He himself felt the difficulty, and escaped out of it by appealing to the authority of the Sāstra.

* Niratisaya, limitness, greatness, or infinity.
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The Sāstra here referred to is the Sākhya, and the P. Bhāshya quotes a passage from the work of Pañchaśīkha which shows that "the first knower, lord, and great sage, with a view to creation, in his mercy taught this science to the enquirer Suri." 

Having thus described the identity and proof of the existence of God, the author refers to His greatness.

XXVI.

He is the instructor of even all early ones, for He is not defined by time.

Even of the primary creators such as Brahmā and others, he is the "instructor," or preceptor, because "He is not defined by time," for He has no beginning, while the others are so defined, having a beginning.

[The word guru has been translated "instructor" in accordance with the text, and after the commentator who supplies the equivalent upadeshtā. It may be more appropriately rendered into "noblest" or "greatest," as it would make the reason assigned, undefined by time, more consistent, for want of beginning, or being not circumscribed by time, does not imply tuition. The object of the explanation, however, is to refer to the first tutor Maheśvara to whom reference has been made in the last note. In the P. Bhāshya no equivalent is given of the word, but the sense is explained by the word yathāsya sargasyādau prakarsha-gatyāsiddhak, tathātikrānta-sargādīsvapi pratyetavyah.

Vāchaspati Miśra explains the term by prakarsha "superior:" na vartate prakaršāya gatih práptih pratyetavya ágamát tadanena prabandkena bhagavánśivaro darśitah.

In giving the purport of the aphorism he uses the words: Samprati bhávatah brahmádibhyah viśeshamáha.]
Having thus described the greatness of God, the author now supplies His indicator, with a view to help people in their devotion.

XXVII.

His indicator is the Praṇava.

Of the Iśvara thus described, the "indicator," name, expressive word, whereby one is thoroughly (pra=prakarṣeṇa) lauded (nu) or praised, glorified, or hymned is—praṇava, which is the same with the syllable Om. (The sentence indirectly gives the derivation which is pra = "excessive" and nu = "to laud," whence Praṇava). Between the two (the name and the being denominated) the relation of the indicator and the indicated is eternal. This is conventionally expressed, but not produced by any one; (it is the same) as in the case of a father and his son, when one points out the existing relation (by saying) "this is the father, and this is the son," (though the relationship exists from before, and is not produced by the saying.)

[Praṇava is the technical name of Om, and the injunction is that that syllable should be frequently muttered. Care is taken to show that the relation between the indicator Om and the indicated God is eternal and not produced by man, and the example of the father and son explains what is intended. The Vedas, the Upanishads and all Hindu works recommend the same process, accepting the term as the most sacred name of the Divinity. See Chhāndogya Upanishad, Chapter I. In two short notes, published in the 'Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal' for 1865, pp. 46—208, I take the word to be the Indianized form of the Hebrew Amen and the English Amen.]

His adoration is next enjoined.

XXVIII.

Its repetition and the reflection on its meaning (should be made).
"Ita," i. e., of the Prāṇava, consisting of three and a half instants, "Repetition" (japa), pronouncing it in due order, and the "Reflection" (bhāvana), the perception repeatedly of the God indicated by it, are the means of concentration of the thought in it. Hence, for the accomplishment of meditation (samādhi) the Prāṇava should be repeated, and its meaning reflected upon by a Yogi. This is declared.

[Om is ordinarily declared to be a compound of the letters ऐ (a) ए (u) and ए (m), which supply the three instants, and the conversion of the m into the nasal mark * supplies the half instant. In prosody the word is a long syllable, but in modulated reading or recitation its prosodial quantity is a protracted circumflex sound.]

The fruit of such adoration is next described.

XXIX.

Thence the right knowledge of the reverted perception, and the removal of obstacles.

From that repetition and that reflection the right knowledge of the "reverted perception" (pratyakṣhetanā) is effected in the case of Yogis. That "perception" (chetanā) or power of seeing, which turns towards its own internal organ, withdrawing itself from (or in opposition to worldly) objects, is called "reverted perception" (pratyak "turning back," chetanā "perception") and a "right knowledge" (adhipama) of it is thereby acquired. The "removal" (abhāva), i. e., the counteraction of the power of the obstacles about to be described is also effected.

[The natural function of the senses is to extend outwards, in order to receive the impressions of external objects and carry them to the sensorium, but that being suppressed by the Yogi, the senses turn inwards and find their object within, and therefore the function is called reversed, or reflex. The object of this round-about way of description is to say that the senses hold communion exclusively with the soul.]
Now, a doubt arising as to what are the obstacles? he says:

XXX.

Disease, Langour, Doubt, Carelessness, Idleness, Worldly-mindedness, Mistaken notions, Unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and Instability therein; these, causing distractions, are the obstacles.

These nine, impelled by the force of foulness and darkness, become the causes of "distractions," i.e., by these enemies to concentration the thinking principle is disturbed. Of the nine:

1. "Sickness" (vyādhi) is fever and the like, resulting from disordered humours.
2. "Langour" (sthyāna) is an indisposition of the thinking principle to work.
3. "Doubt" (saṅśaya) is the disposition of the thinking principle which relies on both sides of a question, as whether Yoga is practicable or not.
4. "Carelessness" (pramāda) is a disposition not to exert, or indifference in performing meditation.
5. "Idleness" (ālasya) is a heaviness of the body and of the thinking principle, which is the cause of want of interest in matters relating to Yoga.
6. "Worldly-mindedness" (aviratī) is the inclination of the thinking principle to enjoy the pleasures of the world.
7. "Mistaken notion" (bhṛantidarsana) is wrong perception, such as taking a bit of mother-o'pearl to be silver.
8. "Unattainment of any stage" (alabdha-bhūmikatva) is not attaining, for some cause or other, a particular stage of abstraction.
9. "Instability" (anavasthītatva) is the condition in which the thinking principle having attained a stage cannot abide in it.

These being opposed to the practice of concentration of meditation, are called "obstacles," (antārāyāh).

To shew that there are other causes which produce distraction of the mind, he says:
XXXI.

Pain, Distress, Trembling, Inspiration and Expiration are the companions of distractions.

Whenever from any cause distractions are produced then pain &c., come on. Thereof—

1. "Pain" (dukkha) is a modification of the foulness of the thinking principle; it is characterised by pain, which living beings exert to remove.

2. "Distress" (daurmanṣya) is the agitation of the mind proceeding from external or internal causes.

3. "Trembling" (āṣṭigamejaytva) is the shaking of the body which causes unsteadiness in the posture (of a Yogi).

4. "Inspiration" (śvāsa) is a drawing in of the external air. The expulsion of the air from the lungs is "expiration" (prāśvāsa).

These existing along with the (other) distractions, should be removed by the exercise and dispassion already described; (A. XII) and therefore they are noticed here.

[Pain here referred to is described in the Pātanjala Bhāṣya as of three kinds: mental, physical and supernatural. That which affects the mind without touching the body is mental, that which proceeds from disorders in the body is physical, and that which proceeds from evil spirits &c., is supernatural. The Sāṅkhya Karika notices all the three. (Wilson’s Sāṅkhya Karikā, p. 2.)

The Pātanjala Rahasya gives pījā ‘disease’ as the equivalent of Dukkha.]

Another expedient for overcoming the obstacles with their accompaniments is now being pointed out.

XXXII.

For their prevention let there be exercise on one principle.
For the "prevention" (pratischedha) or obstruction of those distractions, let there be "exercise" (abhyása) or repeated application of the thinking principle to some one selected "principle," (tattva), from the force resulting from which arise the condition of concentration, and thereby the distractions subside.

[In former aphorisms meditation has been declared to be of two kinds: conscious and unconscious, or seeded and seedless. The object here is to inculcate the necessity of constant exercise of the first, or the seeded form, to steady the mind, and prepare it for the more arduous and difficult phase in which there should be no object upon which to meditate, or the state in which, in the language of Wordsworth, "thought is not." The highest form of conscious meditation is intelligent communion with the soul, but this too is not at once practicable, and the instruction is that any one of the twenty-five categories may be taken up for meditation, so that the mind may be trained to the habit of concentrating itself at any one point at pleasure, and of remaining in that state of concentration without fatigue.]

Now he describes another expedient with advertence to certain works which help to purify the thinking principle.

XXXIII.

The cheerfulness of the thinking principle, through friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue and vice.

"Friendliness" (maitrī) disposition to be friendly. "Compassion," (karunā) mercy. "Complacency" (muditā) to be pleased. "Indifference" (upekshā) to feel neither pleasure nor pain. These feelings should be felt, in due order, for the happy, the grieved, the virtuous, and the sinful. Thus, to the happy one should be friendly, (saying) "blessed is their happiness;" and not be envious to them. For persons in grief he should show mercy, and desire how to relieve them from their grief, and not remain indifferent to their suffering. To the virtuous, with a view to encourage virtue, he should express satisfaction, and not be envious of them (say-
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ing) "Forsooth, are these virtuous"? For the vicious a feeling of indifference should be practised, neither encouraging nor hating them. In the aphorism, the word "happiness" &c. are intended to stand for persons possessing those qualities. These feelings of friendliness &c., producing cheerfulness in the thinking principle, easily bring on the condition of Samádhi. These acts are external (and not intrinsic parts of the Samádhi). Even as in arithmetic, addition and the like are useful in the calculation of alligation, &c., (but are not in themselves integral parts of the main object), so the feelings of friendship, &c., antagonistic to envy, passion &c., producing cheerfulness, prepare the thinking principle for the conscious form of Samádhi. Passion and envy are the chief causes of distractions. When these are thoroughly eradicated, the cheerfulness induced, effects the concentration of the mind (to one object).

The Aphorism suggests a second expedient that of cheerfulness. Unless the mind is cheerful it cannot be steady, and this cheerfulness is to be brought on by friendliness towards the happy, compassion for those who are in distress, complacency in regard to virtue, and indifference in respect to vice. Indifference in respect to vice might at first sight appear a very mild feeling, but hatred, detestation or other strong manifestation of feeling towards vice would mar cheerfulness, and itself be a cause of pain and unsteadiness; hence it is avoided.]

He points out another expedient.

XXXIV.

Or by expulsion and retention of the breath.

"Expulsion," (práchkhārdana) means the throwing out of the air from the lungs in a fixed quantity through a special effort. "Retention" (vidhārana) is the restraint, or stoppage of the motion of breath for a certain limited time. That stoppage is effected by two acts—by filling the lungs with external air, and by retaining therein the inhaled air. Thus the threefold prānāyama, including the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention of breath, fixes the thinking principle to one point of
concentration. All the functions of the organs being preceded by that of the breath—there being always a correlation of breath and mind in their respective functions—the breath when overcome by stopping all the functions of the organs, effects the concentration of the thinking principle to one object. The Šākya proclaims its power of destroying all defects thus: “All obstructive functions are caused by faults.” Hence, by its destroying faults, it becomes effectual in producing concentration of the mind.

[The definition of “retention” (vidháraṇa) by the terms “stopping of motion” (gati-vichchheda) is obviously faulty, but as the aphorism refers to “retention” immediately after the “expulsion” (prachchhhardana) and the attempt to retain the breath after it has been fully expired would be futile, it is necessary to inspire before the breath can be retained, and the commentator is obliged to include that act along with the retention. The Pāñjala Bhāṣya calls the retention to be Praṇāyāma (vidháraṇa praṇāyamaḥ), and in the Śākhyā Sūtra this meaning is accepted. It is, however, not the generally accepted meaning. All other Yogic and Tāntric works regard the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention performed in specific order, to constitute the Praṇāyāma. The order is not always the same. Some have expiration first, inspiration next, and retention last. Others place inspiration first, retention next, and expiration last. The word mātṛa-pramāṇa in the commentary, which I have rendered into “fixed quantity,” has been rendered into svalpa or “little” or “slowly” in the Pāñjala Bhāṣya; but it does not express the true technical meaning. The object of the mātrā is to imply a fixed period of time. According to the Skanda Purāṇa a mātrā is equal to the time required in one breathing, (Eka śrāsamapi mātrā praṇāyāme nigadyate), and to imply that this breathing must be natural, the Yoga-chintāmaṇi adds that this breathing should be during sleep (when there is no violent effort). Nidrásangatasya puñoso yávaktálenaikaśvāso gachchhatyāgachchhati cha tavakālapraṇāyāmasya mātretyuchyate.) And this
period is equal to two and a half palas. (Śārddha svāsa paladvayātma) kālah, prānāyāma kāla siddhāh.) The pāla here means the period occupied by a twinkling of the eye. The mātrā is obviously taken as a unit, and of these from 1 to 24 are devoted to a prānāyāma according as it is inferior, middling, or superior. The mode of reckoning the time to be devoted to each act is regulated in one of two ways; 1st, by so many repetitions of the syllable Om, or the mystic mantra of the performer, or the specific mystic syllables (vīja) of that mantra; 2nd, by turning the thumb and the index finger of the left hand round the left knee a given number of times. The time devoted to inspiration is the shortest, and to retention the longest. A Vaishnava in his ordinary daily prayer repeats the Vīja mantra once while expiring, 7 times while inspiring, and 20 times while retaining. A Śākta repeats the mantra 16 times when inspiring, 64 times while retaining, and 32 times while expiring. These periods are frequently modified. The details vary according to each particular form of meditation, and the capacity of the performer. As a general rule it may be said that longer is the retention the more proficient becomes the Yogi. The usual mode of performing the Prānāyāma is, after assuming the posture prescribed, to place the ring-finger of the right hand on the left nostril, pressing it so as to close it, and to expire with the right, then to press the right nostril with the thumb, and to inspire through the left nostril, and then to close the two nostrils with the ring-finger and the thumb, and to stop all breathing. The order is reversed in the next operation, and in the third act the first form is required. This constitutes the Prānāyāma, and it may be repeated after short intervals according to choice for hours. The object avowed of this performance is the steadying of the mind. The Hāṭha-dīpikā philosophizes on this by saying, "by the motion of the breath, the thinking principle moves; when that motion is stopped, it becomes motionless, and the Yogi becomes firm as the trunk of a tree; therefore the wind should be stopped. As long as the breath remains in the body so long it is called living. Death is the exit of that breath, therefore it should be stopped."
(“Chale váte chalam chittam níschale níschalm bhavet, Yogi sthánutvamápnoti tato váyumni rodhayet. Yávad váyuḥ étito dehe tabajjivamamuchyate, Maraṇam tasya nishkrántistato váyum nirodhayet.”)

Elsewhere the text asserts that this Prápáyáma is conducive both to health and longevity, and all minor works on Yoga and the Tantras generally expatiate at great length on the sanitary and the therapeutic advantages of practising it regularly at stated times. The Haṭha-dipikā, in one place, says, “all diseases disappear in him who devotes himself to the Prápáyáma; without it in the state of practising Yoga every kind of disease arises.” (Prápáyámdádyuktana sarvaroga kshayo bhavet, ayuktáthyása-yogena sarvaroga samudbhavaḥ. The idea seems to have travelled to the far West, and the spiritualists in America have accepted it as a recognised maxim of their system. Many spiritualists practice this Prápáyáma under the name of “deep breathing,” and A. J. Davis, one of their apostles, in his “Harbinger of Health” (pp. 52-53), gives the following directions for curing diseases through its means.

“First, if your weakness be general, and the blood is loaded with cold matter, lay flat down on your back, and, while breathing deep, and slow, and uniformly, will yourself to become healthy—in your feet and hands, in your knees and elbows, in your hips and shoulders, in your bowels and liver, in your lungs and brain! The heart will take care of itself. In cases where the weakness is generally distributed, all you are required to practice (while so prostrated and respiring) is the art of concentrating your Will and desires simultaneously on the extremities first; then work upward and inward progressively; and when, in the lapse of ten minutes of steady, deep breathing, you have reached the brain, repeat the process in the ascending scale, as indicated in the manner aforementioned.

“By this Pneumogastric treatment of yourself, you will receive spiritual strength from the air—nothing is more certain! When, by practice, you can breathe deeply and heroically, and at the
same time put your Will upon the restoration of the general system, the art of fixing your mind upon some particularly diseased part will become less and less difficult. *Consumptive persons*, by simply breathing profoundly, and willing systematically, may *enlarge their chests and lungs beyond the possibilities of disease*. Persons of cold temperature, with irregular habits and bad practices, may "right about face" and become harmoniously healthy. Learn to depend upon yourself—use the infallible remedies of Nature—and, in spite of priest or doctor, you will 'pass from death unto life.'

"**Time of Exercises.**—In acquiring this psychological power over the destinies of your bodily state, and in becoming a Self-healing Institution, whether home or abroad—it may be necessary to practice (either while on your back, or standing, or walking, or riding,) perhaps three times in each twenty-four hours. Never just before meals, nor soon subsequent to them; but the true time is when chilification is going on; about 90 or 120 minutes after eating. The spirit world will aid you, by forming a secret conjunction with the *pneumogastric* conductor. It is certain, gentle sufferer; do not permit yourself to doubt. Nothing is too good in Nature, in matter, in spirit, or in truth."

In pointing out another expedient, he foreshadows the conscious form of meditation.

**XXXV.**

Or cognition resulting from sensuous objects may be the cause of steadiness.

"Of the mind" (*manasah* is understood to) complete the sentence.

"Sensuous objects" (*vishaya*) are odour, taste, colour, touch and sound, and that in which these reside as objects is *vishayavatī*, the cognition whereof causes the steadiness of the mind. Thus, by directing the thinking principle to the tip of the nose, the cognition of spiritual odour is effected. In the same way the cognition of taste may be effected at the tip of the tongue, the cognition of colour at the forepart of the palate, the cognition of touch at the
middle of the tongue, and the cognition of sound at the root of the tongue. Thus the cognition of spiritual sense-objects resulting through one or other of those organs becomes the cause of the concentration of the mind. This is to encourage Yogis in the belief that the Yoga has a fruit.

[By this commentary the meaning of the text remains perfectly unintelligible to the uninitiated. The reason is, the commentator takes for granted that the rudimentary principles of Yoga are known to his readers. The purport is that in the act of Prāṇāyāma (as explained in A. XXXIV) when the Yogi directs his mind to the tip of his nose &c., he derives in the places mentioned a sense of those objects which is ordinarily acquired by their natural organs, and having done so, he feels no inclination to exercise those natural organs, and his mind settles down into undisturbed contemplation of the object to which he directs his mind. The commentator uses the word divya for which I use "spiritual" as the equivalent. The P. Rahaga uses alaukika or "supernatural" as the equivalent. The word pravṛtti in the text has been taken by the P. Bhasya to be equal to saṁvīt or cognition. In the commentary above and elsewhere the word manas mind has been sometimes used for chitta, thinking principle].

He describes another expedient of the same kind.

XXXVI.

Or a sorrowless extremely luminous (disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle).

(The sense of the aphorism must be completed) by the terms, "disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle."

The word "lumen" (jyotis) means the manifestation (of the quality) of goodness. When it exists in its fulness, in any disposition it is called "extremely luminous" disposition (jotismati). "Sorrowless" (vīśoka) is that disposition in which the power resulting from the exercise of the delightfully pure element (goodness)
has removed the grief which is produced by the quality of foulness. It steadies the thinking principle. The purport of this is this:—when the thinking principle is in the quality of goodness located in the cup of the lotus heart as on the waveless milky ocean, and the sensuous functions are all destroyed by the light of knowledge, the steadiness of the thinking principle results as a matter of course.

[Briefly, the purport is that when the thinking principle is totally griefless, and manifest in the extreme refulgence of the quality of goodness, it is steady, and has no cause for vacillation.]

In course of pointing out another expedient, he describes the object of the conscious form of meditation—or discriminate meditation.

XXXVII.

Or the thinking principle taking a passionless object (becomes the cause of the mind’s steadiness).

The phrase “becomes the cause of the mind’s steadiness” is understood to complete the sentence.

“The Passionless” (vitarāga) are those who have abandoned all longings for sensuous objects, and their thinking principle, which has destroyed all pain, by being made the object of thought, becomes the cause of steadiness.

[The next expedient is the making the thinking principle of those who have overcome all passions the object of contemplation. Vāchaspāti Miśra explains this by saying “the passionless are Krishṇa Dvaipāyana and others. To make their thinking principle the object of thought is to rely thereon. Vitarāgāḥ Krishṇadvaipāyana prabhūtayah. Teshām chittam tadevāvalam-banam, tenoparaktamiti.] He describes another expedient of this kind.

XXXVIII.

Or reliance on knowledge resulting from dream or sleep.
“Dream” (svapna) is the perception by the thinking principle alone of the soul's agency when the functions of the external organs are dormant. “Sleep” (nîdrâ) has been already defined (A. X). The knowledge which results from “reliance” thereon, i.e., reliance on dream or reliance on sleep, produces steadiness of the thinking principle.

[Although sleep has been defined to be absence of consciousness, the Yogis believe absence of consciousness to be a kind of knowledge. (See. A. X.) Váchaspati Miśra gives an illustration to show how the beatific vision of an image of Maheśvara may, on waking, tend to steady the thinking principle in the contemplation of any particular object. Perfectly sound sleep of which on waking we know only that we have slept well and nothing more, is also favorable to steadiness in the same way, perfect calmness of the mind being thereby produced.]

Different men having different tastes, Yogis may affect each a different expedient according to choice, and by meditating thereon attain his object (scil. steadiness of mind). To establish this he says—

XXXIX.

Or by meditating according to one's fancy.

By thinking on anything according to choice, whether external, as the moon, or internal, as a plexus of arteries, the thinking principle becomes steadied.

[The object of this aphorism is to show that by constantly reflecting on any object of choice, the habit is acquired of keeping the thinking principle confined to one object. The choice of course does not extend to carnal objects, for they would tend to excite, instead of allaying, the passions. The moon, or the sun, or other similar object has no such tendency, and certainplexuses within the chest and the abdomen which are believed to be the seats of the thinking principle, are held particularly beneficial in producing steadiness.]

Having thus described the different methods, he proceeds to point out what the fruit thereof is.
CHAPTER FIRST.

XL.

His mastery extends from the minutest atom to the limit of infinite magnitude.

Having by these means acquired steadiness of the thinking principle, the Yogi, by thinking on minute objects, acquires unfailing "mastery" (raśikāra) over the minutest atoms, i.e., his thinking principle is not baffled even by the reflection of the most minute objects, such as the minutest atoms. In the same way, the reflection of big objects, like the sky &c., to infinite magnitude, never causes any disturbance of the thinking principle, i.e., it becomes independent everywhere. Such is the meaning.

[The purport is obvious. When steadiness is once fully acquired, the thinking principle acquires mastery over everything, and nothing can baffle it. The result of this perfect nature is transcendental power over all material and spiritual objects: of this full illustrations will follow in Chapter III. The P. Bhāṣṭya adds that when the thinking principle of the Yogi is perfect in this respect, it does not any longer care for the appliances elsewhere enjoined. Tadvaśikārāt paripūrṇam yogināśchittam na punarabhyāsakṛitam parikārmaṇāpekshate iti.]

What becomes of the condition of the thinking principle purified by these methods, he now proceeds to describe.

XLI.

To him of overpowered faculties, there are a concentration and a consubstantiation in (matters relating to) the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, as in a transparent gem.

He, whose faculties have been overpowered, is "of overpowered faculties" (kshinavṛiti). With reference to him there is, in regard to the objects of his faculties, no distinction about the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, and there result a "concentration" and a "consubstantiation." Tatsthatvā is concentration in it, (ekāgratā). "Consubstantiation" (ladvā-
natva) is becoming of it, for when the thinking principle is lowered, (or reduced in its carnal functions in the way described,) the object of meditation attains superiority. The meaning is, that such a condition (samápatti), or modification to that form, results.

Of this an example is given. In the case of "a transparent gem" or clear rock-crystal jewel, whatever colour it dwells upon, the same it obtains. In the same way in the transparent, clear thinking principle the form of the object thought of is imposed.

Although the text gives the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceptible, but, according to the order of precedence, the terms should be understood to stand as if written "perceptible, means of perception, and perceiver," for first the meditation is directed to the perceivable; then it is devoted to the perception; and then it is confined to the perceiver, which is mere egoism; for in the case of the soul alone there can be no thinking. Even so, the thinking principle tinged by a substantial or a subtile object of perception assumes its character. In this sense the condition is implied also to the perceived.

[The word kshína in the text means weakened, but this weakness is not general; according to the P. Rahasya it is confined to those subjects which are not thought of, the power remaining in full force in connexion with the special object of thought: kshína-vritteh álambanavishayátirikta - vishayani rúpita - vritti-sunyaśya. Tatotthatva is literally being in a thing, tat 'there,' and sthá "to be reposited;" but the commentator gives the equivalent concentration, ekágrată. Tadanjanatva is literally being tinged thereby, and the stock illustration of the crystal being coloured red by the shoe-flower placed in it is adduced; but the commentator prefers the equivalent tanmayatva "being of that substance." He is, however, not singular in these interpretations. The P. Bháshya amplifies the explanation by adding that when the soul, as agent or perceiver, is made the object of thought, the thinking principle becomes manifest in the special form of that soul, and when the emancipated soul is thought upon the think-
CHAPTER FIRST.

ing principle becomes of its special form. *Grihitripurushálambanoparaktam grihitripurushhasamápannam grihitripurushas-svarúpákáreṇa nirbhásate. Tathá muktapurushálambanoparaktam muktapurushhasamápannam muktapurushasvarúpákáreṇa nirbhásate.*

Having explained the conditions, he now points out its fourfold differences (in three aphorisms.)

XLII.

The argumentative is that which is influenced by the fancy of word, meaning, and understanding.

That which is perceivable by the organ of hearing, or is an explosion or bursting of sound (*sphota*), is (technically sound or) "word" (*sāda*). "Meaning" (*artha*) is (the sense conveyed by the word indicating) a genus (such as the cow or the horse). "Understanding" (*jnána*) is a function of the intellect in which the quality of truth prevails (in preference to the other two qualities). "Fancy" (*vikalpa*) has been already defined (A. IX) "Affected" (*sañkírña*) influenced by them, i.e., by the three, words &c. That modification, in which the three (words &c.) are apparent in an undefined fanciful shape, (i.e., their relations are doubtful in the mind), as the word *gao* "a cow," meaning a cow, and conveying the notion of a cow, is called "argumentative," (*savítaraka*).

[The conditions adverted to in the preceding aphorism are fourfold, and thereof the first is called argumentative, inasmuch as in that condition the thinking principle fancies or doubtfully accepts a thing without positive discrimination of the relations between a word or its meaning and the idea conveyed by it. The P. Bháshya explains it by saying, "*Gau* is the word, a cow is its meaning, and the idea is that of a cow, and accepting these distinct positions in an undivided form." *Gauriti śabdo Gaurityartho Gauriti jnánamityavibhágena vibhaktánámapi grahanam dṛiṣhtam.* The P. Rahasya puts it more clearly by saying "when on hearing the word there is a doubt as to whether the *gau* is a word, or it is
aphorisms of patanjali.
a meaning, or it is an understanding. Gauriti s'âbde s'rute suti gauriti s'âdovâ gaurityartho vâ gauriti jñânam vâ evamvikalpah.
(See p. 18.) This is an inferior condition.
The word Äphośa, which I have rendered into "bursting," is the technical name of the sound which is eternal, and of which spoken words are but manifestations. The theory of some grammarians is that words are eternal, and they become manifest when spoken. Dr. Ballantyne, in his essay on Hindu Philosophy, has given a full account of this dogma.] The opposite of it or the non-argumentative is next described.

XLIII.

That is non-argumentative in which, on the dissolution of memory, the meaning alone without any definite identity is apparent.

When the memory of words and of their meaning has subsided, and the shape rises manifest and distinctly grasping, excluding the sense of understanding, and appearing as if devoid of a definite identity, it is "non-argumentative."

[The P. Bhāshya explains the purport thus: when the intellect, intent upon the form of the object of acceptance, forsakes the accepting understanding which is like itself, and becomes solely of the form of the object, i.e., it becomes of the form of the object accepted, it is non-argumentative. Gráhyasvarúpaparakta prajñá svamiva prajñárupam grahamâtmakam tyaktá padárthamátrasvarúpá gráhyasvarúpápanneva bhavati sá nirvîlarkâ samápati.]

To indicate varieties of it, he says:

XLIV.

By this the deliberative and the non-deliberative as pertaining to subtile objects are also described.

"By this," i.e., by the explanation about the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions, the deliberative (sâvichârâd)
and the non-deliberative (nirvichárā) conditions have been described. How are the latter? “Subtile objects,” (sukshmamāvsaṣya)—“subtile” rudimentary matter and the organs are so called. By this the former two propositions are made to refer to gross objects. They are dependant on gross matter, whether connected with the ideas of words, meaning, and understanding (as in the case of the argumentative form,) or without them (as in the non-argumentative form.) “The deliberative” (savichārā) is that which is an abstract notion defined by place, time, quality, &c. “The non-deleberative” (nirvichārā) is that in which the abstract notion is manifest as a mere substratum of quality, perfectly independent of all ideas of place, time, quality, &c. These refer to subtile objects.

[The object aimed at is to assign the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions to gross matter, and the deliberative and the non-deliberative to subtile objects. The distinction seems to be purely technical, implying only slight differences.]

To explain how far this subtile object extends, he says:

XLV.

This subtile objectivity terminates in the indissoluble.

What has been described about the object of the deliberative and the non-deliberative conditions being subtile objectivity extends to the indissoluble. That which does not merge into anything, nor indicates or implies anything is the “Indissoluble” (aliṅga) or First Principle (nature, Prakṛti), and subtile objectivity extends to that limit. Now in the resolution of qualities, there are four stages, viz., 1, defined character, (aviśishṭa liṅga); 2, undefined character (aviśishṭaliṅga); 3, mere character (liṅgamātra); 4, devoid of character, or indissoluble, (aliṅga). The objects of defined character are the (gross) elements. Those of undefined character are the subtile elements and the organs. Mere character is indicative of the Intellect; and devoid of character, the First Principle. Hereby it is said that there is nothing more subtile than the First Principle.
[The word *liṅga* has been defined to be that which indicates or characterises, a mark or sign which is inseparable from it, and, I believe, the word character is its nearest equivalent. The First Principle or Prakṛiti is called *aliṅga* or that which is without an indicator, because by itself it does not specifically indicate anything, and is the subtlest of the categories, and there is nothing more subtle. "It may be urged," argues the P. Bhāshya, "that the soul is more subtle than the first principle, but, though it is true that the characterless (*aliṅga* or Prakṛiti) is more subtle than the characterised, still the same cannot be the case with the soul, since the soul is not the material but the instrumental cause of character, and therefore the utmost limit of subtility must rest with the First Principle." *Nanvasti purushah sukshma iti. Satyam yathā liṅgāt param aliṅgasya saukshmyam, nacháivam-purushasya, kintu liṅgasya anvayi-kāraṇam purusho na bhavati hetustu bhavatīti, atah pradhāne saukshmyam niratisay-\_am vyākhyātam.*

He now points out the necessity for these mental conditions.

XLVI.

These verily constitute meditation with a seed.

"These verily," *i.e.*, the conditions above described, exist with a seed or object. "With a seed," (*śaṇija*) means conscious meditation, (or Samādhi having a distinct recognition,) because such meditations have always something to rest upon.

[These four conditions have been already described in the commentary on Aphorism XVII, and call for no further remarks here.]

Now, these (conscious conditions) mature into the non-deliberative condition, and therefore he describes the fruit thereof.

XLVII.

In the purity of the non-deliberative (condition) there is intellectual contentment.
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"Non deliberativeness" has been already defined. (Aph. XLIV). "Purity" (vaisáradya) means freedom from dirt. The non-argumentative condition is superior to the argumentative. To that the deliberative which has a subtle object in view, (is superior). Again, the non-deliberative, which has no object in view, is superior to the preceding. When by rigorous practice "purity," as the condition of freedom from dirt, is attained "intellectual contentment" results, i.e., the thinking principle, being free from pain and longing, becomes fit to flow in an even course. This is the purity of the thinking principle, abidence in which is steadfastness (Aph. XXXII).

[The four conditions are graded in due order, and the last is declared to be the best of them, because in the highest purity of that condition there is perfect intellectual contentment, in which one can behold all knowledge like one seated in the palace of wisdom can look, as from the top of a mountain, upon groaning mortals below on earth, without being in any way disturbed. Prajnáprásádamáruh yā as'ochyah s'ochatojanán, Bhúmishtániva s'ailastakh sarván prajñanupasyati.]

He next explains what happens when this condition is attained.

XLVIII.

In that condition knowledge becomes truth-supporting.

That "knowledge" (prajñá) which supports the "truth" (rita) or reality, and never permits it to be covered by misconception (A. VIII) is "truth-supporting" (ritambhára), and in the condition (aforesaid) this is acquired. With the light of that knowledge the Yogi perceives everything in its true character, and acquires the highest Yoga.

[In the next aphorism it will be shown that this perfect knowledge is the same with the transcendental power of knowing things, independently of the ordinary means of ascertaining truth.]

Its distinction from other forms of knowledge is now to be explained.
XLIX.

The knowledge which results from testimony and inference is general, (and differs from this) which has a specific object (in view).

"Testimony" (śrutā) is knowledge founded on sacred texts. "Inference" (anumāna) has been already defined (Aph. VII). The knowledge which results from these two has generals for its object, since neither words nor characteristic signs are able, like the organs of sense, to convey a knowledge of particularities. While this knowledge (the one under notice), resulting from the purity (fulness) of the non-deliberative condition, is distinct from them, inasmuch as it has a speciality for its object. When one is in the condition of this knowledge, the truth of all subtle, intercepted, and remote objects becomes manifest in a clear form. The advice is, that for this reason it is proper that every exertion should be made by Yogīs for the attainment of this knowledge.

[The transcendental powers referred to above are here described to be the power of observing things which are so subtle, or so intercepted, or so remote that they cannot be observed by the ordinary appliances of perception.]

He now describes the fruit of this knowledge.

L.

The residuum of this is opposed to all other residua.

"The residuum" (saṅskāra Aph. XVIII) which is produced by that knowledge, obstructs all other residua, whether arising during worldly condition or during meditation, i.e., it renders them incapable of achieving their respective works. Since the residua produced by knowledge being absolute, are more powerful, they are able to preclude all residua resulting from non-absolute knowledge. The purport is that for this reason that absolute knowledge should be exercised.
CHAPTER FIRST.

[The purport of this and of the next aphorism has already been explained in the comments on aphorisms XVII and XVIII.]

Having thus described conscious meditation, he now explains the unconscious form of meditation, (Aph. XVIII).

LI.

On the removal of this also, everything being removed, there is meditation without a seed.

"Of this," i.e., of conscious meditation. "Removal" (niroodha) is dissolution. On its dissolution all functions of thought melting into their causes, and the mere residua which arise in this state being also rejected by the conviction "this is not, this is not," meditation without a seed becomes manifest. On this being accomplished the soul (purusha) becomes pure, and abides solely in its own nature.

[The P. Bhâṣṭya explains the aphorism thus: "That meditation is not only antagonistic to the impressions of the Samâdhi state, but also to the residua left by those impressions. But how do the residua of the suppressed (niroodha) state remove the residua of the meditative state? By the influence of the duration of the suppressed state the existence alone of the impressions produced by the suppressed thinking principle is perceptible. As the thinking principle then merges into its own natural form along with all the impressions of the waking, the meditative, the suppressed and the isolated states, their residua can no longer be antagonistic to the natural state of the thinking principle, nor the causes of its (separate) existence. And since the thinking principle, divested of its functions, along with the residua of the isolated state, is suppressed, and in that suppression the soul resides in its own form, it is called pure and liberated."

Now in this (chapter) have been described Yoga, the subject of the work (A. I), its definition by the words the cessation of the thinking principle (A. II), exercise (XIII), dispassion (XV), the
nature of the two means and their varieties (XVI, the conscious and the un-concious forms of Yoga, the inferior and superior Yoga (XVII—XVIII), the various means of exercising Yoga, easy means of accomplishing it (XIX—XXIII), definition of God (XXIV), his proof (XXVIII), greatness (XXVI), indicator (XXVII), mode of worship (XXV), and its results (XXIX), the perturbations of the thinking principle (XXX), and the pains thereon consequent (XXXI), the means of obviating them by study and benevolence (XXXII-XXXIII), regulation of breath (XXXIV), condition preceding the conscious and un-conscious meditations (XXXV), meditation with a seed, mental afflictions (XLI), their definitions (XLII-XLIV—XLV), their fruits (XLVI—XLVIII), their object (XLIX), and meditation without a seed (LI). Thus is the Yoga chapter explained.

[The above summary has not been translated literally. The original is interrupted by a number of participles and explanatory words which have been omitted as they would have served only to make an uncommonly long sentence very much involved.]

This is the end of the first quarter or Yoga chapter of the commentary entitled Rājamārtanda on Patanjali’s Institutes of the Yoga by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.
CHAPTER SECOND.

May the three-eyed Lord of the universe, by whom has been disclosed the several means of obtaining the occult powers of the difficultly-achievable Yoga, be favourable to the attainment of the desired object!

Having in the first chapter explained the Yoga for those whose thoughts are collected, together with the means thereof, the author now, anticipating the question what should be the practice of the means for the achievement of the Yoga for those whose thoughts are in a waking (worldly) state, describes the Kriyā-yoga (practical Yoga), with a view to establish the mode of accomplishing it.

[This chapter is designed for persons who have not obtained control over their passions, but who are nevertheless desirous of practising those works which are calculated to train them for the performance of the highest branches of the Yoga, and to enable them to acquire supernatural powers (riddhis). Inasmuch as this training can be attained only through active exercise of certain duties, and those duties form the topic of this chapter, the chapter is called Kriyā-yoga or "Practical Yoga."]

I.

Asceticism, muttering, and resignation to God constitute the Practical Yoga.

"Asceticism" (tapas) is the observance of the fasts called KṚichehbra, Chándrāyana and the like enjoined in another Sāstra (Dharma-sāstra). "Muttering" (sādhya) is the inaudible repetition of particular mantras preceded by the Praṇava, (i. e., the syllable Om). "Resignation to God" (Iśvara-pranidhāna) is the dedication to the Supremely Venerable all one's works, without
any concern for their fruits. These, it is said, are the Practical Yoga.

[This aphorism defines what Practical Yoga is. It includes the three acts of Asceticism, Muttering, and Resignation to God. The first includes all those acts of fasting and the like which the Smṛiti ordains for the mortification of the flesh. In this sense tapas would be best rendered by religious austerity or self-denial, but the examples given are included under the head of penance. The Yogīs do not exclude any of them, nor, except in the form of seats &c., add any new form of penance. The Kṛichchhara named in the commentary is by some believed to be the same with the Prājāpatya, and by others with the Sāntapana. The first is effected by eating once a day for three days in the morning, then once in the night for three days, then subsisting for three days on food given, unasked, as alms, and lastly fasting for three days. The fast is absolute, and not even a mouthful of water is allowed to be drunk. The second is effected by living for six days on the five products of the cow and water in which kuśa grass has been steeped, and absolutely fasting on the 7th day. The Chāndrāyana has several varieties, but all of them are regulated by the moon's age, the food being daily reduced by one mouthful from the first day, till on the newmoon no food is taken, and then on the next day beginning with one mouthful the full allowance is got on the day of the fullmoon. These penances are ordained for particular heinous sins. In citing their names it is not the object of the commentator to enjoin that these particular penances should be regularly practised, but simply to cite examples. The Haṭhadīpikā enjoins some forms of asceticism suited to the Rāja-yoga. The object is, there should be constant mortifying of the flesh so as to subdue its longings.

Muttering, like the last, is a part of the Smṛiti ritual, largely dwelt upon in the Tantras. Every householder has a particular mantra which he is required to repeat for a certain number of times every day, the number varying from twelve to many thousands according to choice. The muttering is so done as not to be audible to a bystander, but in a manner so that each repe-
tion may be clear and distinct, and fit to be counted by the mutterer. The P. Bhāṣya and the P. Rahasya add that śādhyāya implies either the muttering of a mantra, or the study of that sāstra which relates to emancipation. Praṇavādi-pavitrānām japo mokṣaḥ āṭrādhyayanam vā.

Resignation to God (praṇidhāna) has been already explained on p. 28.

These are essentially necessary as preliminary practices, but they do not constitute the Yoga itself.]

(To the question) of what use are these, he replies:

II.

It is for the purpose of the contemplation of Samādhi and for weakening afflictions.

"Afflictions" (kleśāḥ) will be presently described (II, iii.) To "weaken them" is to make them unfit for their respective works. "Samādhi" (meditation) has been already explained (I, xx.) Its "contemplation" (bhāvanā) is repeated cogitation of it in thought. That Yoga which has these contemplation and weakening for its purpose (artha), object, is so called (kriyā-yoga). What is said is this: These mortifications, &c. when practised, weakening the afflictions of the ignorance residing in the thought, become accessories to Samādhi. Therefore the advice is that the Yogi should first turn his attention to this Practical Yoga.

[The purport of this aphorism has been already anticipated in the remarks on the last preceding Aphorism.]

It has been said (above that the Practical Yoga is wanted) for the purpose of weakening the afflictions, and what those afflictions are he now describes.

III.

Ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life are the five afflictions.
"Afflictions" (kleśāḥ) are the five, ignorance, &c., which will be (presently) described. These, being of an obstructive character, i.e., producing distress, become the object of the term affliction. These, abiding in the thinking principle, strengthen the modifications of the (three) qualities which constitute mundane existence.

[Here the names of the afflictions are given, but their definitions are reserved for subsequent discussions. The reason why they are called "afflictions," is explained to be that they tend to promote those modifications of the thinking principle which the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness tend to for worldly purposes. In other words, those functions which attach the mind to the world are afflictions, because they stand in the way of emancipation.]

Although all these are equally afflicting, nevertheless ignorance, being the source (of all of them), is the chief, and to establish this he says:

IV.

Ignorance is the field of those which follow, whether they be dormant, weak, intercepted or simple.

"Ignorance" (avidyā) is delusion; it is in fact the assumption of that being the soul which is not soul. It is the "field" (kāhetra), or ground of production, of those which follow, i.e., egoism and the rest, and each of them may be in one of the four conditions of dormancy, &c. Wherever the reverse-idea-producing ignorance becomes weak, there egoism and the other afflictions are not seen to arise, for it is seen that where the mistaken notion exists there they arise, it follows, therefore, that ignorance is their source.

The "dormant, weak, intercepted or simple." Of these afflictions those which, existing in the thinking principle, do not, owing to the absence of an exciting cause, produce their
effect, are called "dormant" (prasupta), asleep. Thus in childhood. Though residing in a child in the form of instincts those afflictions do not, from want of co-operation of an exciting cause, flare up.

Those afflictions are said to be "weak" (tannu) which, becoming overpowered in their effort to perform their respective functions by their mutually contradictory inclinations, reside in the thinking principle in the form of instincts, but are not able to carry on their work without the aid of numerous auxiliaries. This is the case in the practising Yogí (who being engaged in one particular contemplation does not allow the afflictions to disturb his thoughts. They are in him, but in a condition of weakness produced by their non-indulgence).

Those afflictions are said to be "intercepted" (vichchhinna) which remain with their powers overcome by a particularly potent passion, as desire when the prevailing passion is aversion, or aversion when the prevailing passion is desire: being mutually opposed to each other, they cannot dominate at the same time, (one must for the time intercept the other).

Afflictions are said to be "simple" (udára) when, having their auxiliaries beside them, they carry on their respective functions. This is the case of the waking condition of those who follow not the ways of the Yoga.

Each of these four (afflictions) has ignorance for its root, and is also attended by it, for nowhere are the afflictions found existing by themselves as opposed to, or independent of, the attendant. When that ignorance, a mere falsehood, is removed by thorough knowledge, these afflictions, like roasted seeds, never sprout again. It follows that these are both rooted in, and attended by, ignorance; hence they are all implied by ignorance. The conclusion is that as all these afflictions are calculated to produce distractions of the thinking principle, it is the foremost duty of the Yogí to exert for their removal.

[In A. III the afflictions have been described to be five in number. In this the author shows that four of them owe their
origin, and are subject, to ignorance. He also shows that they are always present, though not always active. The causes of their want of activity are described to be dormancy, weakness and interception.

He now defines ignorance.

V.

Ignorance is the assumption of that which is non-eternal, impure, painful and non-soul, to be eternal, pure, joyous and soul.

The assumption of a thing being what it is not, is “ignorance” (avidyā). That this is its general definition follows from its distinctions as pointed out (in the aphorism). Thus the assumption of eternity in the non-eternal water jar and the like is ignorance. In the same way, the assumption of purity in impure objects, like the body and so forth, that of joy in pain, and that of the soul in the body (which is not soul, are results of ignorance). By these is explained the mistake of confusing vice with virtue and the useless with the useful.

[The P. Bhāshya argues that although the word avidyā is formed of the privative particle a with vidyā “knowledge,” it does not mean simple absence of knowledge, but a conception distinct and the opposite of it, and illustrates it by the examples of amitra and agoshpada, the former of which, though formed of a (absence) and mitra “a friend,” does not mean the absence of a friend, but an enemy, and the latter, formed of a and goshpada “the footprint of a cow,” does not mean the absence of the footprint of a cow, but a country. Tasyās chāmitrāgoshpada-vadavastu sa tatvam vijñeyam, yathā nāmitro mitrābhāvo na mitramātram, kintu tadāviruddhah sapatnah, yathā vāgoshpadam na goshpadābhāvo na goshpadamātram, kintu deva eva, tābhāyāmanat vāstvanāram, evamāvidyā na pramānām na pramānābhāvah, kintu vidyāvipaśīlam jñānāntaramāvidyāti.]

With a view to explain egoism, he says:
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CHAPTER SECOND.

VI.

Egoism is the identifying of the power that sees with the power of seeing.

"The power that sees" (dṛik-śakti,) is the soul (Purusha).
"The power of seeing" (darsana-śakti) is the internal organ produced by the quality of goodness unaffected by the qualities of foulness and darkness. What is said is, that the assumption of the two extremely different things,—the one being the enjoyer and the other the enjoyed—the active and the inert,—being the same is egoism (asmitā). Thus, when nature (prakriti), though really devoid of the power of enjoying and of intelligence, fancies "I am the enjoyer," "I am the intelligent," the blunder is the affliction called egoism.

[The internal organ is a modification of the quality of goodness, which marks the distinction between itself and the things around it. In this state it is egotism; but when that internal organ ceases to perform this function, and only a sense of mere existence is felt in the thinking principle without any distinction of the self and the things around it is egoism. This definition was anticipated by the commentator in his remarks on A. xvii chapter I, (p. 19) and the author gives it here.]

He defines desire.

VII.

Desire is dwelling on pleasure.

"Dwelling on pleasure" (sukhānuśayi) is lying on pleasure. The longing or thirst for pleasure on the part of him who had experienced it before, and is impelled by its remembrance, is the affliction called desire (rāga).

[The root ēśi is "to sleep" or "lie down," and literally the translation of anusayi should be the sleeper, or that which lies on something, but idiomatically I prefer dwelling, as it conveys more clearly the idea intended by the author. Obviously he means the
dwelling on, or keeping alive in the mind, the idea of some object or other. *Anuśaya* means "to follow" or "to pursue," and that would afford a very appropriate rendering of the term here, but in the next aphorism it has been used with reference to pain, and as no one pursues pain knowing it to be pain, that rendering cannot be adopted. It is true the word also means "repentance," and it may be assumed that the author has used the word in two different senses in the two aphorisms, but such an assumption would be unjustifiable in dealing with definitions. The author, in his aphorisms, has nowhere evinced any leaning for rhetoric or verbal ornament, and it is very unlikely that he should use the same word in two consecutive aphorisms in two contradictory senses, when his object is to make things clear, and not to confound.]

He next defines aversion.

**VIII.**

**Aversion is dwelling on pain.**

"Pain" (*dukkha*) has been already defined, (C. I, xxxi). That which one, having experienced it, and remembering it, is averse to its means as undesirable, is the affliction called "aversion" (*dvesha*).

[Three of my MSS. has *pratikula-lakṣṇam* for *ukta-lakṣṇam*. If that reading be adopted, the meaning would be "Pain is of an opposite nature," *i. e.*, in the case of pleasure there is a longing or thirst to get the object, while in that of pain, the feeling is the reverse, or avoiding to get it.]

He now defines tenacity of life.

**IX.**

Tenacity of life is an attachment to the body which relates to the residua of one's former life, even on the part of the wise.
CHAPTER SECOND.

The fear arising from the memory of pain from death endured in a former life prompts the constant wish, "May I not be separated from the body and its objects," and the attachment to the body resulting therefrom, an attachment which exists without an inducing cause, in all beings from Brahmā to an earthworm, is the affliction called "Tenacity of life." (Abhinivesha.) Thus, it is afflicting in the waking or mundane state. These afflictions should at the outset be destroyed by the Yogi by the exercise of concentration of the mind to one point.

[The only doubtful word in the aphorism is the first. It is formed of the three words, sva "one's own," rasa literally "wish," and vākī, "that which carries:"—"that which carries or keeps in current one's wish." The commentators have, however, not rendered it so. Without giving a synonym of rasa, the P. Bhāshya uses the word vāsanā in its place (maranadukkhānubhavādiyam vāsaneti), and that word is the equivalent of saṅskāra, which I have rendered into residua. In this way the term svarasavāhi means 'that which carries the residua of one's former life.' It proceeds from the memory of former experience, and since no one has in this life experienced the pain of death, it must follow that the fear of death must be the result of the unconscious memory of the experience of a former state of life—and this fear is the cause of attachment to life.]

Since it is not practicable to remove these afflictions without first knowing what they are, the author, having described their names (II, IⅢ) fields, (I, IV) divisions, (II, IV) and characteristics, (II, V to IX,) now explains the division of the means of destroying them, according as they are gross or subtle.

X.

These, the subtile ones, should be avoided by an adverse course.

Those are "subtile" (ṣūkṣma) afflictions which exist in the form of residua, but have not assumed a modification in the
form of active work. They are to be avoided (heya), eluded, by an adverse course (pratiprasava) or reflex modification. When the thinking principle, with its residua, has accomplished its course and entered into egoism, which is its source, how can these, (afflictions,) being rootless, exist?

[The five afflictions aforesaid are described under two heads, subtile and gross. They are subtile when they exist in the form of residua, i.e., they exist potentially, but are latent. They become gross when they break out into active operation. Now, the latent ones are to be overcome by an adverse course. The natural course is to allow them to manifest themselves through the stimuli of external objects; but if the thinking principle be directed inwards towards egoism, the course of action is adverse to the natural tendency of the residua; and, in the absence of stimuli, they cannot manifest themselves. They cannot sprout, and are, therefore, compared in the P. Bháshya to roasted seeds.]

He next describes the means for the destruction of the gross (afflictions).

XI.

Their functions should be avoided by meditation.

The functions of these afflictions in active operation, which manifest themselves in the form of pleasure, pain, and delusion, should be "avoided," destroyed, by meditation characterised by the concentration of the thinking principle on a single point. These, being gross, are suppressed by the mere exercise for the purification of the thinking principle, even as dense thick dirt on cloth and the like is removed by mere washing, while that which is subtile in it requires heating and other (arduous) means.

[The means of suppressing the gross afflictions, or those afflictions which are in active operation, is meditation, or confining the thinking principle to one action, and focussing it there to the exclusion of all other objects. The difference lies in this—that in the case of latent afflictions the thinking principle
is directed inward, and no opportunity is given to the latent ones
to become active; and in the case of gross ones or those which
are in active action, the thinking principle is confined to one
object, and thereby all others are excluded. In the one case a
desire is repressed by turning away from it, and keeping the
thinking principle occupied with another, and in the other no
opportunity is given for external stimuli to excite the latent
wishes.

The illustration given shows that the subtile ones are more
difficult to repress than the gross ones.]

Having thus defined the true character of the afflictions he,
with a view to explain the residua of works, says:

XII.

The residua of works have affliction for their root,
and are felt (either) in this manifest birth, (or) in the
unmanifest one.

By the term "residua of works" (karmās'aya) the nature of the
residua is explained, for all works are of the form of residua. By
(the phrase) "Have affliction for their root" (kles'amīlak) their
cause is indicated, for of good or evil works the afflictions are the
cause. By (the phrase) "felt in this manifest birth, or in the un-
manifest one," the fruition is described. What is felt in the present
existence is called "felt in this manifest birth" (dṛishtajanma-
vedanīyah); that which is to be felt in another existence is
called "felt in an unmanifest one," (adrīshtajanma-vedanīyah).
Thus, some virtuous actions, such as the worship of the gods and
the like performed with excessive ardour, produce fruits even in this
life in the form of kind, age, or experience. Thus, to Nandis'vara,
through the influence of his worshipping the lord Maheśvara,
change of kind was secured even in this life. Similarly to
Viśvāmitra and others kind and age accrued through the
force of penance. In the case of some kind alone is changed.
Thus in the case of Nahusa and others performing vicious acts
with excessive ardour kind alone was changed. So Urvasī was
metamorphosed into a creeper in the garden of Kártikeya. Thus is the rule to be explained distributively or collectively.

[The leading word in this aphorism is karmáṣaya. Formed of karma “works” and áṣaya “virtue and vice,” it implies the results which follow from the performances of works. The word áṣaya has been accepted in aphorism 24, chapter I, to be the equivalent of vásaná and saññákára, and for the sake of concordance, and in accordance with the commentators, I render it here in that sense, inasmuch as the results do not manifest immediately, but remain latent to even a second or subsequent life in the form of residua.

The works are described to have afflictions for their root, because all works proceed from ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity for life, technically called the five afflictions, (II, iii). No work can be performed unless impelled by one or other of these five, and so they are the roots of the residua that are left behind. The fruits of these residua are borne either collectively or singly, and at different times, either in this life or in a subsequent one, and the commentator cites instances to prove this. The story of Nandíśvara becoming a demigod occurs in the Vṛihannandikesvara Puráṇa. The Rámañña and some of the Puráṇas give the story of Visvámitra, a Kshatriya by birth, becoming a Bráhmaña. The Mahábhárata relates the story of Nahusa being changed into a snake by a curse. The story of Urvaśi’s becoming, like another Daphne, a creeper, occurs in the drama of Vikramorvaśí.]

Now he describes the varieties and distinctions of the residua of works with their fruits.

XIII.

The root existing, the deserts are kind, age, and experience.

The “root” (múla) is the afflictions aforesaid. As long as the afflictions are not removed, the deserts (vipáka), fruition of works,
good and evil, follow in the form of kind, age, and experience. “Kind” (jāti) means being a man or some other being. “Age” (āyus) is always remaining in the same body. “Experience” (bhoga) means sense objects, the senses, and consciousness of pleasure and pain, according as it is accepted in the passive, instrumental, or abstract sense.

The purport of this is this: That as the residua of works reposited in the thinking principle from time without a beginning, attain maturity, so they, according to their measure, lead to fruition in the form of kind, age, and experience. The afflictions existing with their roots uncut, the residua of works become the originators of deserts. Even as unhusked Sāli paddy, like unroasted seeds, are able to germinate, but husked grains, like roasted seeds, cannot, so the residua of works, unparted from the afflictions, become the germinators of deserts; though such is not the case when the afflictions are removed, or the residua are reduced to the condition of roasted seeds.

[The first difficult word in the aphorism is jāti. Its meaning is obvious enough, but I call it difficult because I can find no satisfactory equivalent for it in the English language. It is formed of the root jan ‘to be born,’ and means that which is born; but in philosophy it is used to imply species in a very comprehensive sense. It means caste, i.e., distinction of family; or species, that is one distinct from another, as several species in a genus or order; or broader distinctions than what is implied by species; as also the broadest distinctions which naturalists indicate by the term kingdom. The examples given show that the word jāti equally applies to the change of caste, as in a Kshatriya becoming a Brāhman; or to that of species; as in a man becoming a demigod; or to that of a kingdom as in a woman becoming a creeper: I know of no such comprehensive term in the English language. Dr. Ballantyne uses rank, but I doubt if the change of a woman into a creeper or a stone, the change could be idiomatically described as one of “rank.” Colebrooke uses
"birth," but the change may take place without a regular birth. For the sake of English idiom the best course would be to use different equivalents under different circumstances, but that would upset the line of argument of the author. Genesis appears to bear close approximation to jāti, and kind is its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In using "kind" as the equivalent, I use what appears less liable to objection than others, but it is by no means a good one.

The second word áyus has been so explained by the commentator as to imply longevity, but the word means simply "age" or "duration of life," which may be long or short according to circumstances:—a meritorious work leading to prolongation of existence in a particular body, whereas a vicious one tending to shorten the span of life.

The third word is bhoga, which Dr. Ballantyne renders into "enjoyment;" but inasmuch as here it means the endurance of pain as well as the delectation of pleasure, I prefer "experience," which covers both.

The purport of the aphorism is that the fruition of works leads according to circumstances to change of body into a higher or lower grade, to the prolongation or reduction in the span of life, and to the experience of pleasure or pain.

The P. Bhāṣṭya thus explains the time of fruition: "The deserts are of three sorts, kind, age and experience. In regard to them the questions are discussed, 1st, Is one work the cause of one birth, or is it the cause of many births? 2nd, Are many works the causes of many births or of one birth? One work is not the cause of one birth. Why so? Because there would be no regularity in the fruition of the remainder of innumerable works accumulated from time without a beginning along with a recent work. The objection would also be there would be no inducement for people (to perform many works). Therefore it is wrong.

Nor is one work the cause of many births. Why? Because if out of many works each work was to be the cause of many births,
CHAPTER SECOND.

there would be want of time for the fruition of all the remaining deserts. Therefore it, too, is wrong. Nor can many works be the cause of many births. Why? Because it is not possible for many births to happen simultaneously, and consequently it must be said to happen successively, and then the objection before urged (about want of time) would apply. It follows then that the diverse stock of residual of virtuous and vicious actions performed from birth to death remains in a dominant or a dominated form, and on a death taking place it becomes the cause of a birth, being itself liable to destruction on another stock becoming dominant."

The above described kind, &c. being the fruits of works, the author, in order to show that they produce fruition according to the works which are their cause, says:

XIV.

They have joy or suffering for their fruit, according as their cause is virtue or vice.

"Joy" (kláda) is pleasure, and "suffering" (paritápa) is pain. Those which have joy and suffering for their fruits are so called, (i.e., by the term kláda-paritápa-pákaláh).

"Virtue" (punya) is fortunate action, and the reverse of it is "vice" (apunya). Those which have virtue or vice for their cause are so called (by the compound term punyápunya-hetutva).

What is said is this:—those works which proceed from virtuous actions yield joyful fruition in kind, age, and experience. Those which result from vice have painful fruitions.

[The meaning is obvious, and calls for no remark.]

To all ordinary beings the fruition is thus of two kinds; but to the Yogi all are painful; to show this, he says:

XV.

To the discriminating all are verily painful, because of the adversity of the actions of (the three)
qualities, and of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua.

The meaning is, that to the "discriminating" (viveki) who has had experience of the afflictions, &c., all manifest sense objects are painful, like tasteful food infused with poison, and therefore should be known as adverse to him, since the thoroughly experienced Yogi feels oppressed by even the slightest pain. Even as the eyeball feels the acutest pain from the mere touch of a fibre of wool which the other organs do not, so the discriminating Yogi is distressed by even very slight pain.

To explain why it should be so, he says, "because of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua." Inasmuch as the longing for objects of enjoyment increases in the same ratio in which they are enjoyed, and the pain proceeding from their non-attainment is unavoidable, therefore pain always follows pleasure, and there is nothing but pain. This is the pain of sequence (parināma-dukhkhatva).

Again, since even in the enjoyment of pleasing objects there is always a feeling of aversion against that which is antagonistic to them, anxiety cannot be eluded even while in the enjoyment of pleasures. This is the "pain of anxiety," (tāpadukkhatā).

"Pain of residua" (sanskāradukkha). The sensation of pleasure, or of pain, arises in the presence of a desirable or an undesirable object, and a corresponding residuum is left on the field (of the thinking principle), and since from such a residuum a corresponding sensation is produced, and since from a great number of such residua the mundane condition is never cut short, therefore all residua are painful.

"From adversity of the action of the qualities" (guna-vṛitti-virodhat). The effects of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, manifesting in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, being mutually overpowering or overpowered, are hostile to each other. They are everywhere connected with pain, hence they are painful.
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What is said is this:—To the discriminating who is anxious to obviate pain to the utmost and absolutely, all the four causes above described, appear in the form of pain, and hence all deserts are said to be of the form of pain.

[The object of this aphorism is to establish that everything connected with worldly life is painful, and Yogis should, therefore, shun them all. To prove this, it is first shown that all joyous actions are followed by pain. (The word parináma in the text here is used for sequence or result, and not modification as in most other places.) There must be a change after the enjoyment of pleasure, and as there is an increase of desire from enjoyment there must be frequent disappointments, and they inflict pain. Even in the act of enjoyment there is always a dread of something that may disturb it, and so it is not unalloyed. Then all actions and all impressions leave behind residua in the field of the thinking principle, and they revive sensations of pleasure and pain. And lastly, the three qualities are adverse to each other, and therefore they create disturbances and cause pain. The conclusion is a state of pessimism, from which the only relief is to be had by totally cutting oneself off from all worldly affairs. This pessimism forms the basis of all the leading systems of Indian philosophy, and is not unknown in Europe. According to Hartmann, "if we balance our pleasures and pains, the latter greatly exceed the former." Schopenhauer goes further, and assigns a negative nature to pleasure, which is very much the same as the doctrine of Leibnitz who assigns a privative character to pain. He holds that "all pleasure causes an exhaustion of the nervous processes, and are in themselves indirect, resulting from the cessation or intermission of pain, and seldom emerges into consciousness, whereas pain eo ipso generates consciousness." He asks, "what, for instance, are all the pleasures of health, of youth, of freedom, of sufficient means? Are they anything but the absence of sickness, of old age, of slavery, of poverty? and is not work itself an evil? How great misery does it entail upon the toiling masses of
our fellow countrymen? Does any one work of his own free will?" He adds, "no amount of pleasure can compensate for any degree of pain." Again, "human life oscillates between pain and ennui, which states are indeed the ultimate elements of life." Hartmann holds pleasure and pain to be "qualitatively similar, and only different in quantity." (Philosophie des Unbewussten). Socrates aptly describes pleasure and pain to be "fastened together from one crown." (Plato, Phaedo.) Poets generally revel in the pleasures of this world, but Byron, one of the greatest among them, says—

"Count o'er the joys thine hours have seen,
Count o'er thy days from anguish free;
And know, whatever thou hast been,
'Tis something better—not to be."

The question then arises whence is the deliverance to come? and an able writer thus summarises the answer of the pessimists. "In knowing that the world is radically and necessarily bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for that old affirmation of the Will to live. It leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of the Will, that true nirvāṇa, in which there is no more Will, and therefore no longer an ideal presentation or a real world." (Westminster Review, XLIX, 128.) This is almost the very language of Kapila.

Since pain, residua, works, and the fund of deserts, as aforesaid, are produced by Ignorance, and since Ignorance is of the form of false knowledge, and should be destroyed by perfect knowledge, and since perfect knowledge is that which decides what should be rejected and the cause thereof, and what should be approved and its cause, he says this by way of explanation:

XVI.

Avoidable is the pain not yet come.
Inasmuch as the past is gone (and cannot be recalled), and
that which is being experienced cannot be avoided, that worldly
pain which has not yet come (but may come) is what should be
avoided. This is what is said here.

[The word *kēya* is derived from the root *kā* 'to quit,' and
means both that which should be shunned and that which
can be avoided. The English equivalent has not this double
sense, but it affords the nearest approach to the Sanskrit term.
The injunction is, since the past and the present are beyond
control, exertion should be made to preclude the possibility
of future pain. Dr. Ballantyne is quite right in rendering
the aphorism into "what is to be shunned is pain not yet
come," but when *kēya* is used as an adjective, this phrase "that
which is to be shunned," is too lumbering to be used with
convenience. Avoidance-worthy conveys the exact meaning, and
is more easy of manipulation, but it too is lumbering. A single
term is wanted, and, not knowing any English word of the
kind, I use what appears to me to approach the nearest to the
original, without being its exact equivalent.]

He now describes the cause of the avoidable.

XVII.

The conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle
is the cause of the avoidable.

The "spectator" (dṛiṣṭā) is the soul of the form of intelli-
gence. The "spectacle" (dṛiṣṭya) is the principle of under-
standing (intellect). The conjunction, "sañyoga, i.e., coming into
the relation of the enjoyer and that which is to be enjoyed, of
these two, without due discrimination, is the "cause," (hetu)
producing agent, of the "avoidable," (kēya) which is pain result-
ing from the modifications of the qualities, and that is the world.
The meaning is that on the cessation of that conjunction
worldliness subsides.

[In this aphorism "the avoidable" is used to imply the affairs
of the world. Those affairs result from the conjunction or
interaction of the soul and the intellect, and inasmuch as worldliness is invariably associated with pain, and that pain cannot be suppressed as long as that worldliness lasts, and for the sake of emancipation worldliness should be avoided, that which is to be avoided is here called the avoidable, or the avoidance-worthy. The word sañyoga means conjunction, but here a mere reflection of the soul is what is meant. The reflection results from propinquity. There is never an actual contact.]

Having described the conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle, he now explains the nature, the function, and the motive of the spectacle.

XVIII.

The spectacle is of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is the purpose of for experience and emancipation.

"Illumination" (prakāśa) is the nature of the quality of goodness. "Action" (kriyā) in the form of exertion, is that of foulness. "Rule" (sthiti), in the form of regulation, is that of darkness. That which has illumination, action and the rest for its essential nature is so called, (i.e., by the term prakāśa-kārya-sthiti-sīlām). By this the nature of the spectacle is defined.

"It is of the form of the elements and the organs" (bhūlena-driyātmakām). The "elements" (bhūlas) are, according as they are gross or subtile, the earth, &c. and the rudiments of odour, &c. The "organs" (indriya) are threefold, according as they are the organs of sense, the organs of action, and the internal organ. That of which these two (the elements and the organs), in the forms of the preceptor and the precept, are the natural modifications, not different from its own form, is called "of the form of the elements and the organs." By this its action is also described.

"Experience" (bhoga) has been already defined, (II, xiii). "Emancipation" (apavarga) is the cessation of worldliness result-
ing from discriminative knowledge. That which has these two, 
(Ūkṣa and āpavarga) for its "object" (arthā) or requirement, is 
the spectacle. This is the meaning.

[There would be no spectacle if there was not in it a power of 
manifestation, i.e., of illumination, or light. Without some 
action, too, it could not be manifest; and to be manifest it must 
have some rule or order. Hence the three are described to be the 
three essentials of its existence, or in other words its nature. 
The esoteric interpretation of this is that the spectacle is essen-
tially the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, 
which must be in action to produce spectacle. It is of the 
form of the elements and the organs. The organs could not alone 
produce spectacles, nor would the elements produce spectacles if 
there were no organs to perceive them and communicate them to 
the intellect. The independent existence of the two, unconnected 
with each other, would also fail to produce a spectacle. They must 
be brought together to do so, and therefore it is that the spectacle 
is described to be of the nature of illumination, and of the form 
of the elements and the organs. The purport of this round-
about expression is that the intellect is the spectacle when it is 
acted upon by the elements and the organs, or the elements and the 
organs are modified in the form of the intellect. The word used 
in the text is ātmā, and it is explained to be a modification not 
different from its natural form or identity (svarūpābhinnah pari-
ṇāmāh). What this natural form is is not apparent. Obviously 
the natural form of the intellect, or Buddhi, would be the mean-
ing, but from what follows, Prakṛiti would seem to be what 
is meant. I shall notice this lower down, (A. xix, xx).

The motive or object of the spectacle is twofold,—it ministers 
to our enjoyment, and it may be made to help us in our endea-
vours to attain emancipation from the bondage of the earth.

The word sthiti means fixity or abidance, but the Sāṅkhya-
tattva-kaumudi explains it to mean rule, regulation, or order. 
Had there been no order or rule, illumination and action would be 
continuous, and there would be no cessation or break. It is the
intervention of darkness that causes the break or order of the manifestation of light and action; this is implied by sthiti. It implies the quality of darkness.]

To describe the phases of this spectacle in its various conditions, in the forms of modifications which should be known as fit to be avoided, he says:

XIX.

The specific, the unspecific, the solely mergent, and the immergent are the divisions of the qualities.

"The divisions of the qualities," i.e., their specific conditions, should be known to be four—this is enjoined. Thereof the "specific" (viśeṣha) are the gross elements and the organs. The "unspecific" (aviśeṣha) are the subtile elements and the internal organ. The "solely mergent" (liṅgamātra) is intellect. The "immergent" (aliṅga) is the unmanifest or undiscrete, i.e., Prakṛti. This is what is said. Since the relation everywhere of this undiscrete of the form of the three qualities is necessary to be known at the time of commencing knowledge, the four divisions are defined.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain that the spectacle assumes different forms under different circumstances. It is "specific" or well-defined when it refers to the elements and the organs. It is "unspecific" or undefined when related to the subtile elements and the internal organ or the mind. It is "solely mergent" or mere thought when it refers to the intellect or the thinking principle. And it is "immergent" or unmanifest or undiscrete when referring to Prakṛti. Here Prakṛti is included as one of the forms or phases of the spectacle, though in the commentary on the seventeenth aphorism the spectacle has been defined to be the intellect or the principle of understanding (buddhitatvā). This inconsistency is explained away by saying that the intellect is but a modification of Prakṛti, and, inasmuch as its primary form is Prakṛti, the spectacle must include
Prakṛiti. The words used in explaining the term ātma in the commentary on the last aphorism—“a modification not different from its primary form” (śvarūpābhinnah pariṇāmah)—supports this inference. This is, apparently, different from the doctrine of Kapila who assigns 23 out of the 25 categories to the spectacle, leaving out the soul and Prakṛiti; but in reality there is no difference, except in the phraseology, as will be shown in the twenty-first aphorism.

The four terms have been differently rendered by different translators. The terms used above have been taken from Colebrooke and Wilson’s ‘Sāṅkhya Kārikā.’ Mr. Davies, in his ‘Hindu Philosophy,’ adopts the first two, but for “mergent” uses “attributive,” and for “immernent” its negative. Dr. Ballantyne uses “diverse,” “non-diverse,” “merely resolvable” and “irresolvable.” In translating aphorism 45 of Book I, I have rendered these words collectively with the subject, liṅga, into “defined character,” “undefined character,” “mere character” and “devoid of character.”]

Since the detestableness of spectacle must be first known, and it having been described along with its conditions, to show what should be accepted, the spectator, the author now says:

XX.

The spectator is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas.

“The spectator” (drashti) is soul. He is “absolute sentience” (dṛiṣṭimātra), sensation only. The object of using the term “absolute” (mātra) is to preclude the idea of the quality and the qualified, (i.e. he is himself sensation and not possessed of sensation). Some explain sensation to be an attribute of soul.

He, the spectator, ‘though pure,’ (suddhapi), i.e. although existing by himself in his own essence, being above all liability to modification and the like, “directly beholds intellected ideas.” “Intellected ideas” (pratyayas) are knowledge tinctured by
worldly objects. "Directly" (anu), without any intervention, or without any medium, he beholds (paśyati).

What is said is this. Soul attains his spectatorship by his proximity to intellect, which alone is tinctured or influenced by passing objects.

[The soul is sentience only, i. e., it consists of sentience and nothing more. In this condition it is absolutely pure, being unalloyed by any other object. It, nevertheless, directly beholds intellected ideas, or is the percipient, of all ideas without any intervention. This is effected by its proximity to the intellect, which receives the impressions of the outer world. The act of modification or change which perception implies is effected in the intellect, and does not extend to the soul. This distinction is necessary for the purpose of maintaining the immutability and perfect purity of the soul, for the admission of change would destroy its immutability and absolute purity.]

To show that soul alone is the experiencer, he says:

XXI.

Only for his purpose is the soul of the spectacle.

"Spectacle" (dṛiṣya) has been defined above (II, xviii). 'Its soul' (ātmā) is its true nature. It, "the soul of the spectacle," is required for "his purpose," for the purpose of consummating the experiencership of soul to the exclusion of all selfish ends. Pradhāna in activity does not work with a view to attain any aim of its own, but to accomplish the experiencership of soul.

[The meaning is that the true nature of the spectacle acts solely to accomplish the purpose of soul, and not for any purpose of its own, for it has none such. It will be noticed that the text says it is the soul of the spectacle, and not the spectacle itself, that subserves the purpose of soul, and the question arises what is its soul? The word used in the text is ātmā, which means soul, i. e., the soul of the spectacle subserves the purpose of the soul of a living being. The commentator explains ātmā by svarūpa "its own natural form,"
or true nature. In the commentary on A, xix, he uses the words स्वारुपाभिन्नपरिपालाः, or "a modification not different from its primary form," neither of which carries us directly to what is meant. It is obvious, however, from the use of the word Pradhāna—Prakṛiti in the commentary on the aphorism under notice, which in activity, is said, "not to work with a view to attain any aim of its own," that the "soul of the spectacle" is but another form of expression for Prakṛiti. That Prakṛiti itself activity is the spectacle is abundantly evident in the leading works of the Sāńkhya system. Thus, in the Sāńkhya-kārikā: "For the sake of soul's wish, that subtle person exhibits (before it) like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature's influence." (Verse xlxi). Again, "as a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul." (Verse lxi). Again: "Generous nature, endowed with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of the ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities." (Verse lx). Again "he desists because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation." (Verse lxvi). Similarly the Sāńkhya Sūtra: "Nature's creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous,—for she is not the experiencer,—just like a cart carrying saffron (for the sake of its master)." (Ballantyne, III, lviii). Again, "just like a dancer, does she, though she had been energising, desist, because of the end having been attained (in the shape of soul's aim)." (Ibid. III, lxx). Nor is there any inconsistency in this, for intellect does not differ from Prakṛiti except in being in activity; and "soul," "true nature," "original shape of the intellect," and other similar expressions must imply Prakṛiti or nature, and nothing else. This will explain the remarks made in the note on Aphorisms xvii and xix.

Commenting on the passages quoted from the Sāńkhya-kārikā, Mr. Davies observes, "Beautiful as poetry, but not very
philosophic, nor in direct harmony with other parts of the Sākhya philosophy. Kapila, or Iśvara Krishṇa, forgets that nature (Prakṛiti) has no personality, no powers, no volition, and no consciousness," (p. 95.) This is not fair towards Iśvara Krishṇa, who provides for such criticism by saying, "as the production of milk, which is unintelligent (unknowing), causes the growth of the calf, so the development of nature causes the liberation of soul;" (Verse lxx;) and Kapila cites the unintelligent cart carrying saffron for its owner.]

If the accomplishment of the experience of soul be thus the only aim, then, on the accomplishment of that object, Prakṛiti, having no other object in view, should cease to be active, and the cessation of all modification in it, itself being pure, (i.e., having the three qualities in equipose) all spectators should be free, and it would follow that the world would be cut short. Suspecting such a consequence, he says:

XXII.

Destroyed in the case of him whose purpose has been attained, she is still active, for she is common to others besides him.

Although she (Prakṛiti—nature) becomes "destroyed" (nashṭa), devoid of action, in the case of some one soul which has attained its purpose, (kṛitārtha), by experiencing the world till the manifestation of discriminative knowledge, yet she, being common to all souls, remains active (anashṭa) in other cases. It follows that Prakṛiti, being common to all experiencers, can never be totally destroyed, nor can the emancipation of one imply the emancipation of all. This is what is meant.

[The conclusion arrived at in the next preceding aphorism, to the effect that on knowledge being attained, Prakṛiti ceases to act, and becomes functionless, is calculated to suggest the idea that her cessation from her action would apply to all souls, so that on one soul attaining emancipation all souls would be free, there being no active ministering Prakṛiti to keep them supplied with
external impressions. This, however, is not the case. The destruction, or cessation, of action, is confined to the particular soul concerned. When a soul has, through discriminative knowledge, attained his aim he ceases to be influenced by Prakṛiti, and quod that soul Prakṛiti is destroyed; but as regards other souls which have not attained their aims she remains fully active; and this is indicated by the paradox “though dead, still she is alive:” na śṭōpya naśaḥtaṁ. This is the natural consequence of nature being one, and souls many. The P. Bhāṣya explains the reason by saying that the contact of the quality to the qualified is without a beginning; dharmaṁ naśṭasya śaṅkṛtāṁ dhammarāpya naśṭasyaṅkṛtāṁ.

Having described spectacle and spectator he proceeds to describe their conjunction.

XXIII.

Conjunction is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the inherent power and the lordship of power.

He defines it through its function. “Inherent power” (evaśakti) is the nature of the spectacle. “Lordship of power” (svāmiśakti) is the identity of the spectator. That “conjunction” (saṅyoga) which is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the two, existing correlated as the knowable and the knower, is the natural condition of the relation of the experience and the experiencer, and no other. Nor is their conjunction of a different character from their respective natures, which are eternal and all pervading. The character of the experience as the experience and of the experiencer as the experiencer is established from time without a beginning, and that is the conjunction.

[The purport of this is that there is an inherent relation between the experience as experienceable, and the experiencer as experiencer from time without a beginning; that is, this relation is not casual or adventitious, produced at particular times by particular causes,
but natural and always existing. This relation of the two is indicated by the term sañyoga or conjunction, and this conjunction or the natural relation of the two is the cause of worldliness. As will be explained afterwards, the conjunction is not actual or material, but a mere reflection of the one on the other.]

He now describes its cause

XXIV.

Its cause is ignorance.

That which has been described before (II, iv) as "ignorance" (avidyā), having the nature of doubt and delusion, is the cause of the conjunction which has the form of indiscriminateness.

[The object of the text is to say that ignorance is the cause of the conjunction of soul with intellect, and that conjunction produces indiscriminateness, or the want of power on the part of soul to distinguish between itself and intellect, and the failure to do so leads to the feeling of the pleasures and afflictions of the world being borne by it. When the differences of the two are distinguished, the conjunction dissolves, and soul is free. Dr. Ballantyne has been misled by the presence of the word ṛṣya in the preamble of the following aphorism into the supposition that that word is a part of the aphorism under notice, and having incorporated it he has interpreted it as such. The word, however, has been cited with reference to its use in a preceding aphorism.]

The avoidable (ḥyā) is the objective of the verb to avoid (ḥá), and to explain what that avoidance is, he says:

XXV.

From its absence there is absence of conjunction, and that is, avoidance. Thereupon results the isolation of the spectator.

"Its," i.e., of ignorance. On its "absence" (abhāva), i.e., on its being irradicated by perfect knowledge which is its essential
opposite, the effect of the conjunction ceases, or is absent, and this absence is called "avoidance" (hāna). The meaning is this: it is not, practicable to separate ignorance like an embodied object, but, on discriminative knowledge being produced, this conjunction, which has indiscriminitativeness for its cause, it of itself ceases, and this is its avoidance (hāna). That which is an avoidance of the conjunction, is assumed to be an "isolation" (kaivalya) of the eternally isolated soul. In this way the nature, cause, and effect of the conjunction is explained.

The meaning is that when ignorance is irradicated by a right apprehension of its relation to soul, its relation with soul ceases, and this surcase makes the solitary eternal soul isolated from ignorance and its consequences, and the soul remains isolated, as is its nature. All my MSS. give the reading "of eternally isolated" (nityakaivalyasya,) but Dr. Ballantyne, has found a different version; his text has nityam kevalasya, which would give the meaning "there is eternal isolation of the solitary or isolated"—kevalasya nityam kaivalyam. The isolation is in either case assumed to be everlasting, and hence this isolation is believed to be final deliverance from bondage.

The word kaivalya is derived from kevala, "alone," and "isolation" appears to be its most appropriate rendering; but, inasmuch as this isolation takes place by withdrawing or detaching the soul from the phenomenical world, Colebrooke and Wilson use "abstraction." The Sādhyatattva-kaumudi defines it to be "absolute suppression of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must, therefore, be something different from intellect and the rest which are the same thing as pain, and cannot effect a separation form their own essence." (Sastrāṇām maharshāṇām dinya-

lochanānām cha kaivalyam chāyantikaduhhka-trayaprasama-
lakshaṇam na buddhyādinām sambhavati, te hi duhkhātmakāh
katham svabhāvādibhih mochayitum sakyanti.) Vijnāna Bhikshu defines it in the same way, and calls it absolute extirpation of pain (duhkhātyantikochchhedah). Any way, it is the final reward
of the knowledge advocated and the practice of meditation enjoined in this system of philosophy.]

Now, by way of describing the means of avoidance he points out the cause of the acceptable.

**XXVI.**

The means of avoidance is the manifestation of undisturbed discriminative knowledge.

"Discriminative knowledge" (viveka) is the name of the knowledge (which shows) that qualities are distinct from soul. Its "manifestation" (khyāti) is the means (upāya) or cause of the "avoidance" (hāna) or rejection of the visible. How should this be? It should be "undisturbed," (avipāvat). That which has no interruptions, or breaks or repeated intervals of waking from meditation, is called undisturbed.

The purport of it is this: on the dissolusion of ignorance, from the contemplation of that which is adverse to it, the cessation of all ideas of relationship, agency, &c., the vanishing of the dirt of foulness and darkness, and the refluent modification of the intellect, the reflection of soul on intellect is called discriminative knowledge. And by the constant or uninterrupted prevalence of it the function of the spectacle ceases, and this is isolation.

[The object of the aphorism is twofold; 1st, to point out the means of avoiding the avoidable, 2nd, to indicate, by implication what should be accepted. The means of avoiding the avoidable, that is ignorance, is the cultivation of discriminative knowledge without any break or interruption. Light and darkness cannot exist conjointly, light must always destroy darkness, and as discriminative knowledge is light, and ignorance darkness, the one disappears on the other becoming manifest. Were, however, the light to be fitful, or interrupted, there would be certain periods of light and others of darkness, and to preclude this the injunction is added that the light "should be undisturbed" or uninterrupted.
The second object is implied, but not pointed out. If continuous light is necessary it follows as a matter of course that that is what should be accepted.]

Having described the enlightenment which takes place in the soul on the taking place of discriminative knowledge, he defines the nature of the discriminative knowledge.

XXVII.

Of that there are, up to its utmost stage, seven kinds of enlightenment.

"Of that," i. e., of the produced discriminative knowledge, the "enlightenment" (prajñā), with the understanding of what should be known is, to its "utmost stage," (prāntābhi) i. e., to the stage of Samādhi, along with all its accessories, of seven kinds.

Thereof four are liberation from work, viz., (1) The knowable has been known by me. (2) There is nothing remaining to be known. (3) My afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome. (4) Knowledge has been acquired by me, discriminative knowledge has been attained by me. Thus, in these states, by rejecting all other conceptions, these kinds of understanding are produced. This understanding, which is pure knowledge regarding work, is called liberation from work.

Intellectual liberation is of three kinds, viz., (1) my intellect has accomplished its purpose. (2) The qualities have finished their domination over me; like stones fallen from the crest of a mountain they cannot go back to their place; for, tending to dissolution in their own cause, and there being a want of the original cause which is ignorance, and in the absence of a motive, how can there be springing up of the evil ones? (3) And my meditation has been identified with my soul. Such being the case I am existing in my real nature. These three kinds are intellectual liberation. Thus, on the springing up of this sevenfold knowledge to the utmost stage (of meditation) the soul is said to be isolated.
The knowledge which is the aim and object of this system of philosophy is, according to its different states of perfection, classed under two heads; one relating to works, and the other to intellect. The first of these two heads is then divided into four, and the second into three sub-heads, making altogether seven stages. The lowest stage is that in which the Yogi feels that he has known all that has to be known. The next is that in which he, in addition to the first, feels that he has nothing more to learn. In the third there is, in addition to the first two, the conviction, that all impediments to knowledge have been destroyed, and there is nothing more to destroy. These three lead to the conviction that the full amount of discriminative knowledge has been acquired, and this constitutes the fourth. All these refer to external nature, and since they are connected with the active creation or works, they are called liberation from work. The second group refers exclusively to the intellect or the thinking principle. The convictions, 1st, that the intellect has done its office by pointing out the distinction between soul and nature; 2nd, that the qualities which govern the functions of the intellect have lost their influence; and 3rd, that the intellect has merged in the soul, refer to the relation of the intellect to the soul, and as the conviction is that the intellect has lost its power on the soul, therefore, it is called intellectual liberation. All these, it will be perceived, are dependant upon judgment, or consciousness of the effects of certain actions, and therefore relate to conscious or seeded meditation. (Cf. B. I, A. 17.) The function of deliberation or judgment resulting from ratiocination is in every instance present, and the ideas of, I, me, and mine, govern the whole. But when the judgment is brought to this final stage there is nothing more to do, and then follows the unconscious condition which is absolute isolation.]

Having described that the cause of discriminative knowledge is the cessation of conjunction, he now explains what are the means of its origin.
XXVIII.

On the decay of impurity through the practice of the accessories of the Yoga, there is an illumination of the understanding till discriminative knowledge (results).

"The accessories of the Yoga" (Yogāngā) are what will be presently described, (xxix.) "The practice" (anushṭhāna) thereof is the intelligent exercise of the same till discriminative knowledge results. "On the decay of impurity," (asuddhikṣhaya), i. e., on the decline of the impurity which is of the form of afflictions of the character of an envelope to the manifestation of the thinking principle, whatever "Illumination of the understanding" (jñānadipti) takes place, greater or less, by the modification of the principle of goodness till the time of the manifestation of the discriminative knowledge, the same becomes the cause of that manifestation: this is the meaning.

[The commentary explains the aphorism in a roundabout way. The purport is that by the practice of certain exercises the impurities which surround the thinking principle are gradually destroyed, and as they are destroyed so there results a gradual enlightenment which culminates, on perfect maturity, in discriminative knowledge.]

The decay of impurity by the practice of the accessories of the Yoga having been thus described, the question arises what are those accessories? (To this question) he replies.

XXIX.

Restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, abstraction, devotion, contemplation, and meditation are the eight accessories.

Some of these being directly beneficial to profound meditation are intimate accessories, such as devotion, &c. Others subserve profound meditation by eradicating hesitation and adverse
feelings of slaughter, &c., such as restraint, obligation, &c. Among them posture and the rest are successively subservient (to samádhi). Thus on the acquisition of posture there is steadiness in the regulation of breath. The successive ones are to be explained in the same way.

[These eight are classed under two heads, 1st, general or extrinsic, and, 2nd, special or intrinsic. The first two are general, because they are obligatory at all times; the other six are intrinsic, because they subserve the purpose of the Yoga, but are not otherwise necessary. What these eight are will be explained in the following aphorisms.]

He now successively explains their nature.

XXX.

Restraint includes abstinence from slaughter, falsehood, theft, incontinence, and avarice.

"Slaughter" (khiśśā) is work which requires the destruction of life; it is the root of all evils, and its absence is "non-slaughter," (akhīśśā). As slaughter should be avoided at all times, its absence implied by non-slaughter is first mentioned.

"Veracity" (satya) is confirmity in mind and speech with fact.

"Theft" (steyā) is forcibly taking another's property; and its absence is "non-theft" (astiye).

"Continence" (brahmacharya) is subjugation of carnality.

"Non-avarice" (aparigraha) is the non-acceptance of objects for the promotion of enjoyment.

These five, non-slaughter, &c., are indicated by the term yama, restraints, and reckoned as accessories to Yoga.

[These restraints figure prominently in all Hindu systems, and are by no means peculiar to the Yoga. They obtain equal prominence among the Jains and the Buddhists; the latter call them Páramitáś. Using the term restraint, for Yama, I have found it necessary for the sake of English idiom and uniformity of expression to use the roundabout form of abstinence from false-
hood, &c., instead of the direct positive terms veracity (satya), &c., which the text employs. They form the ground-work without which no religious superstructure is possible.]

He points out a peculiarity of these.

XXXI.

These are the great austerities of all stages, irrespective of kind, locality, time, and compact.

"Kind" (jāti), such as Brāhmaṇhood (conf. ante, p. 71). "Locality" (deśa), such as particular sacred pools, &c. "Time" (kāla), such as the fourteenth lunation and the like. "Compact" (samaya), the requirement of a Brāhmaṇa, &c. These are called the great austerities (mahāvratas). They are imperative in all conditions or stages of the thinking principle, "irrespective" (anavackekhinna) of these four conditions of kind, &c., i.e., it does not mean that "I shall not kill a Brāhmaṇa," "I shall not kill any one in a sacred pool," "I shall commit no slaughter on the 14th lunation," "I shall not kill except for gods, Brāhmaṇas, &c.,” implying four specific conditions, but that "I shall not for any purpose whatsoever, kill any one at any place, at any time." The others should be explained in the same way. Thus, when these practices are universal, without any qualification, they are called "great austerities." Their interrupted observance is not so.

[The purport is that these restraints should be observed with reference to all kinds of being, at every place, at all times, and under every circumstance, without any qualification whatsoever. The object of adverting to "compact" is to leave no room for religious sacrifices, such as the Vedas enjoin. They are, in the estimation of the Yogi, as objectionable as unauthorised slaughter.]

He next describes obligation.

XXXII.

The obligations are purification, contentment, penance, study, and devotion to the Lord.
“Purification” (śaucha) is of two kinds, external and internal. External (vīhya) means the washing of the body with earth, water, &c. The internal (autara) is the washing, by means of friendliness and the like, of all dirt from the thinking principle. “Contentment” (santosha) contentedness. The others have already been explained. These, purification and the rest, are indicated by the term niyama, “obligation.”

[These obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise. They must be attended to very carefully as much to prepare oneself for the performance of the Yoga, as for the well-being of ordinary worldly life.]

How these are accessories to the Yoga, he next explains.

XXXIII.

By the exclusion of the questionable the thought of its opposite (is acquired).

(Those things which) cause doubts or questioning are “questionables” (Vitarka), and these, including slaughter and the like, are inimical to the follower of Yoga. When they are obstructed or excluded by the thought of their opposites, then Yoga becomes easily achievable, and the restraints and obligations consequently become accessories to Yoga.

[The restraints keep one from the performance of certain questionable acts, and the obligations train one habitually to avoid the questionables, and thereby the thinking principle is prepared for undisturbed concentration in the performance of the Yoga. The restraints and the obligations necessarily become accessories to the Yoga, and are therefore so called.]

Now he successively describes the natures, the distinctions, the varieties, the causes, and the fruits of the questionables.

XXXIV.

The questionables are slaughter and the rest. (Whether) they are done, caused to be done, or abetted; (whether) preceded by longing, anger or delu-
sion; (whether) slight, moderate or excessive; they have pain and ignorance for their endless fruits. Hence (the necessity) of the thought of opposites.

The aforesaid slaughter and the rest are first divided into three kinds, viz., done, caused to be done, and abetted. Thereof those which are accomplished by oneself are "done" (krīta). Those which follow from orders to the effect "do them," "they should be done," are caused to be done kirīta). Those which, on being accomplished by others, are encouraged by (the saying) "well done, well done," are "abetted" (anumodita). These three forms are described to prevent mistakes respecting them; otherwise a dull-witted person might fancy, "the slaughter has not been completed by me, so no fault rests on me."

To indicate their causes he says, "proceeded by longing, anger, or delusion." Although longing and anger are first noticed, yet since delusion, which is characterised by its accepting that to be soul which is not soul, the source of all pains, and since longing and anger arise from distinctions about differences of relation as to one's own or another, delusion should be known to be the root, i.e., all faults proceed from antecedent delusion. "Longing" (lobha) is thirst. "Anger" (krodha) is an inflammatory function of the thinking principle, which sets aside all sense of discrimination about what is proper and what is improper. Each of these is threefold, according as it is distinguished by being done, caused to be done, &c., and slaughter and the rest are divisible into these according as they are caused by delusion, &c.

They are again divided into three kinds according as they are "mild, moderate, and excessive." "Mild," (manda) are slow, i.e., neither excessive nor moderate. The "moderate" (madhyama) are neither mild nor excessive. The "excessive" (adhimātra) are ardent, neither mild nor moderate.

Thus there are nine kinds, and these being three-fold the total becomes twenty-seven. Again, of the mild &c., each being divisible according as it is mild, moderate and excessive, becomes
threefold. The combination to be made as it becomes appropriate; thus mildly mild \((mṛidu-mṛidu)\) "mildly moderate" \((mṛidu-madhyā)\), "mildly ardent," \((mṛidu-tīvra)\).

Their fruits he describes (by the words) "having pain and ignorance for endless fruits." Pain \((dukkha)\) is a function of the quality of founness, manifesting itself in the form of repugnance. "Ignorance" \((ajñāna)\) is false knowledge in the form of doubt or error. Their fruits are indicated by (the compound term) \(dukkha-ajñānānanta-phalāh\). From such pain and ignorance proceed "endless" \((ananta)\) unintermitting fruit. What is enjoined is that these should be overcome by the Yogi, who has known their nature, cause, &c. by thinking on their opposites.

[The works condemned by the restraints and the obligations have been lumped together under the name of questionable \((Vitar-ka)\) for easy treatment, and then their natures, distinctions, varieties and fruits are generally described. They call for no explanatory remark.]

In order to explain how perfections arise successively by ardent exercise of these (duties) he says:

XXXV.

When non-slaughter is confirmed (there is) near him abandonment of enmity.

In the neighbourhood of him who is confirmed in non-slaughter there is "abandonment of enmity" \((vairatyāya)\), or harmless abidance even on the part of the naturally cruel, such as of serpents and mungooses. The meaning is, those that are addicted to injury, give up their injurious nature.

[The purport is obvious. When the restraint from slaughter has been acquired there cannot exist any feeling of enmity, and, naturally hostile individuals, having acquired it, live in peace and harmony, like serpents and mungooses, which are naturally hostile to each other, and yet under the influence of the virtue may dwell together without injuring each other.]
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He next describes what becomes of him who practices veracity.

XXXVI.

In the confirmed in veracity (there is) asylum of the fruit of works.

"Works" (kriyāḥ) are the sacrifices, which, when performed, yield the fruits heaven, &c. The Yogi who practices veracity rises to such greatness that he attains the fruits without performing those works, and at his bidding they may be attained by any one soever, without performing those works. Such is the meaning.

[Veracity or abstinence from falsehood is here described to be as meritorious as the sacrificial rites enjoined in the Vedas; i.e., by practising veracity with unswerving faith one acquires the same merit which the sacrifices yield, and that without its being tainted by the cruelty which attends sacrifices. The P. Bhāshya explains that he becomes virtuous, and as a virtuous person attains heaven (which is the reward of virtuous works), and his speech becomes fruitful. (Dhārmika bhūyā iti bhavati. Dhārmikah svargam prapnūhī ti svargam prápnoti, amoghaṁya vāg-bhavati.]

He now describes the reward of him who abstains from theft.

XXXVII.

Jewels from all sides approach him who is confirmed in abstinence from theft.

When a Yogi practices abstinence from theft, and that abstinence rises to a high pitch, jewels from all sides come to him without his wishing them.

[The object here is to show that what may be acquired with great trouble by theft, may be had unsought by scrupulous abstinence from theft.]

The fruit of continence he next describes.
XXXVIII.

Attainment of vigour in confirmed continence.

Whoever steadfastly practices continence obtains, on its attaining its highest pitch, "vigour" (śīrya), or manly power comes in him. Conservation of manly vigour is continence, and on its attaining a high degree, vigour comes in plenty in the body, the organs and the mind.

[The meaning is that there is always a loss of vigour by incontinence, and therefore the Yogi should abstain from it in order to conserve his vigour.]

He next points out the fruit of non-covetousness.

XXXIX.

On non-covetousness being confirmed there is conscience of all about births.

The word kāthanta is the abstract form of katham 'what,' or 'what all about,' and janma-kāthanta means all about births, and the full knowledge thereof is its "conscience" (sambodha). The meaning is that he knows all about the questions, "What was I in a former birth? Who was I? What did I do?"

Covetousness is not confined to objects of enjoyment; it extends to the soul's desire to have a body, for that too is covetousness, since the body is needed for enjoyment. And such being the case, the knowledge of principles cannot prevail, while the inclinations are disposed outwards from the excess of the quality of foulness. Now, when on giving up all desire for the body and the rest, an indifference is attained, then to the indifferent being, devoid of foulness, an acquaintance with all past and future existences becomes a cause of thorough knowledge.

[The reward here spoken of is transcendental; it enables the observer of abstinence from all covetousness to see by his mental eye all that has happened to him in former births, and what will happen hereafter.]

Having thus described the perfections of the restraints, he now describes the obligations.
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XL.

From purity (proceed) loathing for one's own members, and non-intercourse with others.

For him who practises purity there is a "loathing" (jugupsá) or detestation produced for even the members of his own body from discrimination of their nature and cause. (The idea then is) "This body is impure, no fondness for it should be cherished." And for the same reason there results a "non-intercourse," (asaṅsarga) absence of relationship, or avoidance of mixing with "others," (paraik), i. e., with other embodied persons. This is the meaning. How can he who loaths his own body from perceiving its this or that fault, wish to have intercourse with other bodies of the same description?

[The purity as defined in the commentary on A, xxxii. (p. 94) is obviously confined to contact with dirt and consciousness of the body being naturally impure. Here the latter phase is magnified to the extent of making the embodied loath his own body, and à fortiorari all bodies.]

He describes other fruits of purity.

XLI.

Moreover, purification of goodness, complacency, concentration, subjugation of the organs, and fitness for beholding soul.

(The words) "are produced" are required to complete the sentence. "Goodness" (sattva) consists of light, joy, &c. Its purification, is its not being oppressed (or overcome) by the qualities of foulness and darkness. "Complacency" (saumanasya) is mental satisfaction from non-perception of distress. "Concentration" (ekágratá) is fixedness of the thinking principle on any sensuous object to which it may be directed. "Subjugation of the organs" (indriyajaya) is the abidance in themselves of the organs diverted from their objects. "Fitness of behold-
ing soul" (atmadarśanayogyatva) is the adaptation of the thinking principle to do so on the manifestation of knowledge. To one who is practised in purity these, purification of goodness and the rest, successively manifest themselves. Thus, from purity comes purification of goodness; from purification of goodness, complacency; from complacency, concentration; from concentration, subjugation of the organs; from subjugation of the organs, fitness to behold soul.

[This aphorism is the sequel of the preceding one; it enumerates advantages in addition to those previously described. The advantages noted are of obvious import.]

The fruit of exercising contentment.

XLII.

From contentment, (proceeds) superlative felicity.

From contentment becoming excessive such internal felicity arises for the Yogi, as cannot be equalled by the pleasures of external objects, even to the extent of a hundredth part of it.

[The meaning is obvious.]

The fruit of austerity.

XLIII.

Through austerity results the perfection of the body and the organs, from decay of impurity.

Through the decay of impurity of the form of distress and the like by the exercise of austerity there arises in the mind a "perfection" (siddhi) or superiority of the body and the organs. The meaning is this, the afflictions of the thinking principle decay by the performance of Chándráyana and other fasts. From that decay the organs acquire the power of perceiving the minute, the hidden, and the remote, and the body (the power of assuming) at pleasure the form of a molecular, or great magnitude.
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[Briefly the purport of the aphorism is that by attaining perfection in austerity, a Yogí acquires transcendental powers; his organs are then able to grasp all kinds of objects, whether they be so minute as not to be ordinarily perceivable by the senses, or so hidden as not to be accessible to the senses, or so remote as to be beyond their range.

The reference to the Chándráyaña is a mere illustration, the object is to imply austerity generally, and not to such only as are enjoined as penances. The object is not penance or expiation for sins committed, but the general mortification of the flesh.]

The fruit of muttering.

XLIV.

Through muttering results the cognition of the desiderated deity.

On the perfection of "muttering" (sádhyáya) characterised by the repetition or the like of a selected mantra, there results a cognition on the part of the Yogí of the deity desiderated: the meaning is that that deity becomes visible to him.

[The word svádhyáya means the study of the Vedas, but here it is used in the technical sense of muttering or inaudibly repeating a great many times any selected mantra. This is closely analogous to the counting of the rosary.]

The fruit of contemplating on the Lord.

XLV.

Meditation is completed through the contemplation of the Lord.

Whoever is thus devoted to the Lord, in him "meditation" (samádhi) of the kind described (C i A L.) becomes manifest, because that Divine Lord, being pleased, excites meditation by removing all obstructive affections (from the way).

[The theoretical character of Patanjali's doctrine is here established by the admission that the divinity may, when contem-
plated, help to promote the object of the Yoga. Kapila repudiates the idea."

Having described the restrictions and the obligations, he now proceeds to describe posture.

**XLVI.**

Posture (is that which is) firm and pleasant.

"Posture" (āsana) is that whereby one sits, such as Padmásana, Dandásana, Svastikásana, &c. When that seat becomes "firm" (sthira) or devoid of agitation, and "pleasant" (sukha) or not uncomfortable, then it is reckoned as an accessory of the Yoga.

[The word āsana ordinarily implies the material adapted for sitting upon, such as a rug, a mat, a board, a chair, or the like, but here it has been used for particular modes or attitudes of sitting, and therefore I have translated it into posture and not seat. The aphorism recommends such postures as ensure steadiness and comfort; but the postures as described in other works do not convey a worldly understanding any such idea. Brahmánanda, in his commentary on the Haṭhapradipikā, says that Vaśishtha, Yājñavalkya and other ancient sages had described 84 postures as appropriate for Yogis, and that Siva, the greatest of Yogis, was their author. He adds that Gorakshanátha, a Yogi of a later date, but of great renown, reckoned the total number of appropriate postures at 84,000. (Chaturasi-tīlakshāṇi cha taduktam Gorakshanāthena.) Of the 84 some are common, some are more important. Śvátmárama, in the Haṭhapradipikā, describes ten as "more important" for the performance of the Haṭhayoga. These are called, 1, Svastika; 2, Gomukha; 3, Víra; 4, Kúrma; 5, Kukkuṭa; 6, Uttána-kúrmaka; 7, Dhanuḥ; 8, Maṭyandáha; 9, Mayára; 10, Sava. The most important ones are: 1, Siddha alias Mukta alias Gupta; 2, Padma; 3, Siṁha; 4, Bhadra alias Goraksha. The P. Bháshya does not enter into any detail, but names the following as examples, viz., 1, Padma or lotus; 2, Víra or heroic; 3, Bhadra or decent; 4, Svastika or the mystic diagram so called; 5, Daṇḍa or staff-like; 6, Sopáśraya or self-reliant; 7, Pury-akṣa or bedstead-like; 8, Krauschha-nisidana or like the posture of the seated heron; 9, Hasti-nishidana or seated elephant; 10, Uṣṭra-
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nishidana or seated camel; 11, Samasansthána or evenly poised. The following are brief accounts of the ways in which the postures are assumed.

1. Padmásana. The right foot should be placed on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right thigh; the hands should be crossed, and the two great toes should be firmly held thereby; the chin should be bent down on the chest; and in this posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose. It is called Padmásana, and is highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases.*

2. Vírásana. Place each foot under the thigh of its side, and it will produce the heroic posture Vírásana.†

3. Bhadrásana. Place the hands in the form of a tortoise in front of the scrotum, and under the feet and this is Bhadrásana.‡

4. Svastikásana. Sitting straight with the feet placed under the (opposite) thighs is called Svastikásana.§

5. Danḍásana. Seated with the fingers grasping the ankles brought together and with feet placed extended on the legs.||

6. Sinhásana. Let the ankles be placed under the testes, the left ankle on the right side of the suture (the mesial line) and the right on the left side of the suture; let the hands placed on the knees, and the fingers extended; let the mouth be wide open, and the sight be directed to the tip of the nose while one is in deep contem-
ylation; and it will produce the lion posture *Siṅhāsana*, the adored of all Yogis.*

7. Put the right ankle on the left side of the chest, and similarly the left ankle on the right side, and the posture will be *Gomukha*, or of the shape of a cow’s mouth.†

8. Closing the anus with the two ankles crossed while the mind is under control, produces, say the knowers of Yoga, the tortoise posture, *Kūrmāsana*.‡

9. Having established the lotus posture, if the hands be passed between the thigh and the knees and placed on the earth so as to lift the body aloft, it will produce the Fowl seat, *Kukkuṭāsana*.§

10. Having assumed the fowl posture, should the two hands be placed on the sides of the neck it would make the posture like that of the tortoise upset; it is called upset tortoise posture, *Uttánakūrmāsana*.||

11. Hold the great toes with the hands, and draw them to the ears as in drawing a bowstring, and this is called the bow posture, *Dhonurasana*.¶

12. Place the right foot on the roof of the left thigh, surround the right knee with the left, foot, and sit with the body twisted, and it will result in the *Matsyanāthāsana* or posture *Matsyanātha*.★★

* गुष्ठी च हरिषम्राष्ट्रः चैवनमा: पार्शेवः: विषेषः ।
विषेषम् ज्ञातं सुसुधाः स्वप्नाय च ।
वाष्पिको निरूपेत बापाढ़ दुष्याचित्तः ।
विषेषन्य भवेदेवस पृतिः वैसंप्रयोऽशः ।
† स्वयं दशिनकाश्चा द्रुतायाय निवेदयतेः ।
दशिनाचित्त तथा गर्भ स्वरुपने साचाशास्ति ।
‡ गुढ़ निवेद्य गुष्ठाय नवतंसेन चाचाचित्तः ।
कुष्ठायं भवेदेवतस्वशो योगस्वरुपः विदुः ।
§ पायायाय संस्कारः शास्त्रः श्राकायामनाः कूकुकृतः ।
निवेदेण शुचः संयोज्य योगः कूकुकृतः ।
|| कूकुकृतकाश्चा देवभारायं समन्याय कुरुक्कृतः ।
पश्चात् कूकुकृत्वा मे गुष्ठाया श्राकायाय ।
प्रायः कुकुकृत्वाय गुष्ठाया श्राकायाः कुरुक्कृतः ।
¶ पायायाय न निवेदस्य वनस्या वाचामिषः ।
योगः कुरुक्कृतकाश्च वाचामिषः ।
★★ बाणेपालानिमित्तश्च व अजायनिविनिविष्ठश्च वाचाय ।
प्रम्बः सीतेः परिवेंद्रायः चैवनमहामनाय चिन्तस्य तत् ॥
CHAPTER SECOND.

13. *Mayūrāsana.* Hold the earth with both hands placing the elbows on the sides of the navel, and keep the body erect like a staff: this is called the *Mayūrāsana* or peacock posture.*

14. *Siddhāsana.* Place the left ankle on the membrum virile, and thereupon put the right ankle, and it completes the *Siddhāsana.*†

Besides these *Asanas,* Yogīs have a great many postures or gestures which they reckon under the name of *Mudrā,* to which, however, no mention is made here in the text. In Tāntric rituals the technical difference between an *Asana* and a *Mudrā* depends upon the organs employed. An *Asana* or seat is by its very nature connected with the disposition of the lower limbs, whereas the *Mudrā* depends upon the motion of the upper limbs; and in the Tantras all symbols produced by twining the fingers or placing the hands in particular positions are recognised as *Mudrās.* The Yogīs have also some *Mudrās* of the same kind; but in their more important *Mudrās* the distinction is entirely lost sight of, and hands and feet alike come into play to produce the *Asanas* as well as the *Mudrās.* The great and most remarkable distinctive character of the *Mudrā* appears, however, to be its connection with the regulation of breath. The *Gheranḍa Saṁhitā* describes in all twenty-five *Mudrās,* and the *Haṭhādipikā* recognises ten of these as the most important “in warding off decay and death,” (*jarāmaraṇanāsanaṇa.*) These are — 1 Mahāmudrā; 2, Mahābandha; 3, Mahāvedha; 4, Khechari; 5, Uḍḍiyāna; 6, Mūlabandha; 7, Jalandhara; 8, Viparita-karani; 9, Vajroņi; 10, S’aktichalana.‡ The following are brief descriptions of these gesticulations and of the advantages to be derived from them:

1. *Mahāmudrā.* Pressing the perineum by the heel of the left foot, the right foot should be extended, and then held fast by the two

* *चराबत्तय कर्त्तवेऽस्तङ्कृतप्राणितयारिच्छिश्याम।  
उदाहोरः राज्यव्यूहिनः खात् समयमेतत् प्रवत्तिम पीढः ॥
† *सङ्कृतप्राणितयारिच्छिश्याम।  
मुखासारस विभिष्य विश्रावविशिष्टं भवेत् ॥
‡ *सङ्कृतप्राणितयारिच्छिश्याम।  
उदाहरैः भूत्वर्जनं अक्षुभितयारिच्छिश्याम।  
कर्त्तिविनिरालिङ्गिः श्रीशी विविषालिङ्ग।  
इति मुद्राश्च चराबत्तयारिच्छिश्याम।  ॥

14
hands. Then closing the throat the wind should be held above.
Even as a snake struck by a staff stretches like a staff, so the coiled
S'akti (breath) suddenly becomes straight, for then she is in a state of
dying in the two nostrils. Then the wind should be discharged steadily,
but not forcibly. The wisest of the wise call this Mahamudra.*

2. Mahabandha. Let the heel of the left foot be put under the
perineum, and the right foot on the left thigh, and, having drawn in
breath, let the chin be pressed hard on the chest, and the wind be held
fast in the heart. After holding the wind as long as one is able, let it
be slowly expired. When the expiration is complete, let the operation
be repeated on the right side. (This shows that the breath in the
first instance should be drawn by the left nostril.)†

3. Mahavedha. While performing the Mahabandha should the
Yogi effect the suppression of the breath in the Khechari style by
closing the passage of the wind by the throat Mudra, and then,
putting the hands evenly on the ground, drive the wind slowly to-
wards the buttocks, it is Mahavedha.‡

* Sambhavam sarvam kshetra nirmale chitra chitra
pravartaks parva jamara sarvendra.

† Sambhavam sarvam kshetra kshetra kshetram nirmale chitra chitra
pravartaks parva bandho.

‡ Sambhavam sarvam kshetra kshetra kshetram nirmale chitra chitra
pravartaks parva bandho bandho.
CHAPTER SECOND.

1. **Khechari.** When the tongue is reversed and pressed into the hollow of the head and the sight is fixed at a spot in the middle of the two eyebrows, the posture is called *Khechari.*

5. **Uḍḍiyānabandha** is that posture in which the wind flies upwards by the susumna vessel from the right side of the belly above the navel.

6. **Mūlabandha.** When the heel is pressed against the perineum, the anus is contracted, and the Apāna wind is by force directed upwards, it is *Mūlabandha.*

7. **Jālandharaabandha.** When the throat is contracted and the chin is pressed hard on the chest it is *Jālandhara* posture, the destroyer of decay and death.

† श्रीयालयामिण : बयोके दुध्वाचा रावाड़ जूथिते यम : ।
सकादुरुप्तार्जीयितेवेच वैगिषिनिः प्रसारतः ।
अयुज्योंक्रियार्ज्यानि मत्यात् उपरेती ।
भिन्नमार्जिला विशिष्टाणि वासं ग्रांतवशेणान्तः ।
या प्राप्तः प्रतस्था धृतिततः उपरेतीविनिः ।
काविरपार्थवेष मनः दत्तात्र्यविशुधविनिः ।

‡ भाषावाचित्र भाषावाचित्र वैविषिनिः प्रसारितः ।
रुक्मिणी स्रुवेत स्वास्थ्यविनिताम मत्यातः ।
रुक्मिणी तद्वर स्वास्थ्य वैविषिनिः ।
उदाहरण परिचय वारेन्द्रेदेव वारेदेवः ।
रुक्मिणी वैविषिनिः प्रसारितः ।

§ विशेषार्जित विशेषाचित्रेदेहुतः ।
पाणमूलमार्जित वैविषिनिः ।
प्रेमार्जितकर्मणि वै सत्त्वमुखानुजाः ।
प्रसारितः प्रार्जस्तुमं बच वैविषिनिः ।
विशेषार्जित विशेषार्जित विशेषार्जितः ।
8. **Viparitakarani.** Place the sun (expiratory air) above, just below the hard palate, and the moon (inspiratory air) below, just above the navel, and the Viparitakarani is completed. It promotes hunger, &c., &c. *

9. **Vajroli.** The exercise by which the several secretions are drawn upwards is so called.†

10. **Saktichalana.** Seated in the Vajrasana posture, let the feet be held firm by the hands and the anus be pressed by the heels, then putting the air in motion by the bellows of the chest, let it be suddenly stopped, and, contracting the forehead, let the wind be

---

* "...

† "...

† "...
CHAPTER SECOND.

directed that way for two muhúrtas and when it comes to the susumná vessel, stop it and this is S'aktichášana. (Loosely translated.)

According to some the Bandhas, on distinct form the Mudrás. (Cf. N. C. Pál's treatise on the Yoga.)

Treating of a system of philosophy Patanjali has not thought proper to enter into details, regarding age, sex, caste, food, dwelling, &c. as bearing upon Yoga, but other works supply information about them to a considerable extent. A few notes derived therefrom may not be unfitly added here. The first question that would arise would be—who are fit to perform the Yoga? On this subject the Hatha-pradípíka fixes no limit. It says, "by the practice of Yoga, every one may attain perfection, whether he be youthful, or old, or very old, or diseased, or decrepit." The next point is the selection of a proper place. "A small monastery, a dwelling not larger than a cube of six feet, situated in an out-of-the-way place where there is no danger within a circuit of a bow, of hail, fire and water, in a country abounding in food and free from danger of wars and the like, where religion prevails, in a thriving kingdom," is the most appropriate. The cell or mathiká should have a small door and no window; it should be free from holes, cavities, inequalities, high steps and low descents; it should be smeared with cow-dung, devoid of dirt, not infested by vermin, with a terrace in front, a good well, and the whole surrounded by a wall. Dwelling in such a place, avoiding all anxieties, the Yogi should follow the path pointed out by his teachers in the exercise of

* सति व्याष्णे पाठीं तराभां धारेराव्रतुः।
कुन्तुर्वेदन्वेदारो षगं तत्र प्रवीक्षेण।।

† दुध्वा दृश्यितिकृता धार्मिकासुम-westāpyayi।
अभावाधातुः भिन्नस्मायाति।
the Yoga. He should avoid all excess of food, violent exertions, and vain disputations. His food should consist of wheat, sáli rice, barley, śāhstī rice (or that which matures in six days), the ayāma and the nivāra grains, milk, clarified butter, coarse or candied sugar, butter, honey, ginger, palval, fruits, five kinds of greens, mún pulse, and water,” and all soothing sweet things in a moderate quantity, avoiding flesh-meat and too much salt, acids, and all stale, putrid, decomposed or acrid substances. The quantity of food taken should be such as to leave one-fourth of his appetite unappeased.

He describes the means of making the seat firm and pleasant.

XLVII.

Through slightness of effort and attainment of the infinite.

The construction of the sentence is that through slightness of effort and through attainment of the infinite the seat becomes firm and pleasant. When the wish is formed, ‘I shall adopt this posture,’ and that posture is accomplished even with “slightness of effort,” i. e., without difficulty, and when the thinking principle is reposed in the infinity of space or the like, and by understanding it becomes of it, then from absence of the body and of egotism the posture does not become painful. When this control over posture is accomplished agitations of the body and such other obstructives to meditation do not arise.
CHAPTER SECOND.

[The object here is to point out that when by practice one becomes able to assume any position at will, without any difficulty, and, adverting to the dogma that the thinking principle assumes the form of the object it thinks of, when by thinking on any infinite object, such as the sky, it becomes itself infinite, it feels no pain or uneasiness in assuming any posture, however painful it may otherwise be. The means of attaining firmness of seat thus are practice and the contemplation of boundless objects.]

A fruit thereof when accomplished.

XLVIII.

Thereupon non-embarrassment by the pairs.

The meaning is that on the control of posture being accomplished, the Yogi is no longer oppressed or embarrassed by the pairs, i.e., cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and the like.

[This is the ultimate fruit of attaining perfection in assuming the different postures above adverted to.]

Having thus described how to control the postures he describes regulation of breath.

XLIX.

On its being accomplished the regulation of breath (which is) interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration.

On posture becoming firm that auxiliary of the Yoga which is regulation of breath and of which firmness of posture is the cause, should be practised.

How is it characterised by the interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration? Inspiration and expiration have been already defined (B. I. A. xxxiv.) The "interruption" (vīchkheda) or stoppage of the twofold "flow" (gati) or current in places outside and inside produced by means of expelling or filling of the breath is called Prāṇāyāma or regulation of breath.
Here the true Práyñáyáma is accepted to be the interruption or break in the flow of the breath. The inspiration and the expiration are the functions of which the stoppage is the most effectual act for the attainment of perfect meditation. It is called kumbhaka, or quiescence, and the longer it is sustained the more proficient becomes the Yogi. When perfect control has been attained in this respect, the Yogi can live buried under earth for months and years without performing any organic function whatever.

For its better understanding, he describes its nature after showing its distinctions.

L.

That, again, is an external, an internal, and a stationary function; it is divided by place, time, and number; it is protracted or subtile.

The “external function” of breath is expiration, or expulsion of the breath outward (rechaka). The “internal function” is inspiration or filling in (púraka). The function of stoppage inside is kumbhaka. Because the vital air at that time remains quiescent or motionless, as water in a jar, (kumbha) therefore that condition is called kumbhaka.

This regulation of breath is of three kinds, according as it is specialised by space (des'a), “time” (kála), and “number” (saññhya). It is also “protracted” (dúrgha), or “subtile” (sukhama). It is specialised by place, as (when we say) “twelve distant from the nose,” meaning as far as twelve fingers from the nose. It is specialised by time, as (when we say) “of the duration of thirty-six instants.” It is specialised by “number,” when (we say) “many times done.”

By these inspirations and expirations the first udgháta is produced, and to know this a numeral figure has to be used. Udgháta is the striking of the head by the wind propelled upward from the navel.
CHAPTER SECOND.

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the Prānāyāma. It is an operation which includes the three functions of inspiration, quiescence, and expiration. The breath must be drawn in first before it can be retained within; the retention cannot last long, and so after a time there must be an expiration. The first and the third, however, are regulated by the capacity of the lungs, and by the time necessary for the expulsion of a given quantity of air, and cannot be much modified, and the second alone, therefore, concerns the Yogi most, for he can control it to a considerable extent, and hence it is held to be the most important element of the Prānāyāma; not oftener, as in the last preceding aphorism, it alone is described as the Prānāyāma. The threefold operation is specialized by the time devoted to each operation, by the extent of space from which the breath is drawn, by the number of times it is repeated, by the period for which it has been practised, and by the subtlety or grossness of the operation.

The operation of udghāta is mysterious. I cannot find out from any work or person how the internal air is made to strike particular internal organs.]

Having described the three members of the regulation of breath, he, with a view to enunciate a fourth, says:—

LI.

The fourth is dependant on the recognition of the outer and the inner spheres.

"The outer sphere" (vāhya-vishaya) of the breath extends far as twelve (fingers) from the nose. The "inner sphere" (ābhyantrara-vishaya) is represented by the heart, the navel and the like. That quiescence or stoppage of motion, (which ensues) on recognizing or taking into consideration these two is the "fourth" regulation of breath (prānāyāma). Its difference from the third form, called kumbhaka, is this: The latter without taking any note of the outer and the inner spheres suddenly assumes quiescence,
like a lotus falling on a hot stone, while this is a stoppage which results from a recognition of the two spheres. This, like the preceding, should be known to be divisible according to place, time and number.

[This is purely intellectual, and involves no change in the order of the operation. It is the same operation, but performed intelligently.]

He now describes the fruit of the fourth kind.

LII.

Thereby is removed the covering of light.

"Thereby," i.e., by that fourth form of regulation of breath, the "covering" (ávaraṇa) of the form of afflictions which envelope the "light" (prakás'a) which is the thinking principle abiding in the quality of goodness, is destroyed. This is the meaning.

[The purport is that this fourth form of Pránáyáma is specially useful in removing all those ideas of pain and suffering which are ordinarily associated with the thinking principle.]

Another fruit.

LIII.

The mind's fitness for steadiness.

"Steadiness" (dhárayá) will be defined presently (B. III, A. 1.) The mind (manas), divested of its defects through the instrumentality of these forms of regulation of breath, remains fixed to whatever it is applied, and does not suffer from distractions.

(Here the word manas has been used as a synonym of chitta, thinking principle).

He gives the definition of abstraction.

LIV.

Abstraction is the assumption by the senses of the original nature of the thinking principle, from want of application to their respective objects.
CHAPTER SECOND.

That by which the senses are abstracted, or from a feeling of opposition, withdrawn from their respective objects, is Abstraction (pratyāhāra). How that may be effected is thus explained. Of vision and the other senses the respective objects are form and the rest. "Application" (samprayoga) to them is advancing towards them. The want of such advance is the forsaking of them and abiding in their original nature. When that forsaking is effected the senses become the imitators of the original nature of the thinking principle. Since the senses follow the thinking principle as do bees their king, they all become of its nature. Thus when the thinking principle is subdued these become abstracted.

[The natural tendency of the senses is outwards, towards the objects which are designed for their entertainment, and the great object of the Yoga is to divert them from those objects, in order to bring them to a focus in the thinking principle. When this is effected they cease to act, and are restored to the natural state of the thinking principle of which they are emanations. That natural state, again, is quiescence, and consequently the senses become quiescent, and this is their abstracted state.]

Having described abstraction, which is the imitation of the nature of the thinking principle by the senses, he now describes the fruit of the act.

LV.

Thence the complete subjugation of the senses.

The meaning is—that by the practice of abstraction the senses come so completely under control that do not proceed, according to their natures, outwards to their respective objects even when excited thereto.

[The chapter opened by enquiring, what the exercise of the Yoga was, and having described in detail that exercise with all its concomitants, it now closes by describing the fruit of that exercise. The fruit is complete subjugation of the senses.]
Thus then has been described the practical exercise of the Yoga which forms the theme of the first chapter. The practical Yoga is first defined (1), then follow its use (ii), in the weakening of the afflictions (iii), its origin from ignorance (iv), the definition of ignorance (v), do. of afflictions (vi to ix), means of obviating them (x and xi), works, their sources and fruit (xii to xiii), afflictions, their character and why and how they are to be got rid of (xv to xxvii), discriminative knowledge (xxviii to xxxvi), postures, &c., (xxxvii to lxi), and the advantages thereof (lxxi to lv). [Not literally translated, but only the substance of the commentary is given here for reasons elsewhere assigned, p. 58.]

Now this Yoga, through restraints and obligations, assumes the form of a seed, which sprouts through postures and regulation of breath, flowers through abstraction, and bears fruit through contemplation, retention and meditation, and these are explained in this chapter on exercise.

This is the end of the second quarter, or the quarter on practice, of the commentary entitled Rājamārtanda on Patanjali's institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.
ADDENDUM.

The note on Aphorism xxxii on page 94 is calculated to mislead unwary readers. The remark that purification and other obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise, is quite correct with reference to the text. The obligations are as imperative on Yogis as they are on householders, and none should neglect them; but purification is here taken in its ordinary acceptation, and does not refer to certain peculiar acts of washing or Saucha which some Yogis, particularly the followers of the Haṭhayoga, recommend. They hold that ordinary washings &c., are not enough. They have accordingly devised complicated, and in some respects very repulsive, forms of purification, which they regard as absolutely necessary as preparatory steps towards the attainment of fixity of seats. These they describe under the collective name of Shaṭkarma or “sixfold work,” as they are reckoned under six different names. These names are—I., Dhauti; II, Vasti; III, Neti; IV, Laukiki; V, Trāṭaka, and VI, Kapālabhāti.* These are variously subdivided by the Gheraṇḍa Saṅhitā, the Niruttara Tantra, the Aḍiyāmala the Brahmayāmala, the Grahayāmala, the Budrayāmala, the Śivasaṅhitā, and other Tantras. I shall follow the first in the following notes:

1. Dhauti means washing, and it is known under four different names according to the parts of the body to which it is applied. These are, 1st, Antardhauti or washing of the intestines; 2nd, Dantadhauti or washing of the teeth; 3rd, Hridaḥauti or washing of the stomach; and 4th, Mulasodhana or washing of the rectum.†

The first is effected in four different ways, viz., (a) by contracting the mouth in the form of a crow’s bill, and drawing in a full draft of air into the intestines, where it is retained for a time and

* शौकिष्कास नेति: शौकिष्कास प्राठ्य तथा।
कपालभाग्ययोग्य निषेध्य घसारस्य।
† शौकिष्कासीग्नायोग्यावशयमं शौकिष्कासीग्नायोग्यावशयम्।
शौकिष्कासीग्नायोग्यावशयमं शौकिष्कासीग्नायोग्यावशयम्।
then thrown out.* As wind is the means of washing in this case it is called Vātasāra. (b) By drinking a large quantity of water up to the throat, and then forcing it down so as to expel it by the lower orifice.† This is called Vāriśāra. I know not how this can be effected, but to the occultist everything is possible. (c) By stopping the breath and then striking the navel a hundred times against the vertebral column.‡ This is called Agnisāra. (d) By taking in air through the mouth contracted into the form of a crow’s bill, retaining it in the intestines for an hour and a half, and then expelling it through the lower orifice.§ (Vaiśikaraṇa.)

2nd. The Dental washing includes the purification of the teeth, the tongue, the two ears, and the foramen on the crown of the head.|| For the teeth a dentrifice of catechu or clean earth is recommended as appropriate.¶ For the tongue scraping with the index, the middle and the ring fingers is held sufficient.** For the ears, rubbing the orifices with the index and the ring fingers,†† and for the foramen

* कालाक्रमस्यवारोको विखेलायु र्हवे: श्रेणः ||
कालेवेदुर्वर्ण पपािार्यामां देशस्यदेशः ||
† कालेश्वर पुरुषेश्वर विकाश च विवेष्याम् ||
कालेवेदुर्वर्ण चोवरारेष्येदशः ||
‡ मात्स्यपात्रिशेखरे स्तत्तावशेष बालेश्वर ||
साधुरामर्गरमणा चौतिरीवातिनां चेतावितादा ||
ध्यानार्थकं नामकं भथरार्थः प्रवाहेत् ||
§ कालेवसुधा चोथितविभा पुरुषेश्वरस्तरः सब्बवेत् ||
धर्मार्थेश्वरामना कालेवेदेवोकालम् ||
ेया चौतिता घरा मोहा न प्रकाश्य किराणेन ||
||
एतमुखं जिन्दकाः परमां रामद्युक्तयोऽयम्
ध्यानार्थके पवेताः इन्द्राय्निविवेकीपेणे ||
¶ कालेवेदुर्वर्ण विशिष्ट च मुखव च ||
साधुरामर्गरमणां चार्मुख विशिष्टवारंशः ||
** सर्थिगीत्वापिसामास: स्तहुसूक्ष्मविभरः ||
रेष्केतुवियोऽय मान्यवाष्कारस्य ||
श्रेणः भूमिस्यानाशितिः कपालार्थ निवर्जेत् ||
†† सर्थिगीत्वापिसामासांस्याब्रह्मवृत् रक्षायोऽयम्
कालेवेदुर्वर्णां चार्मुखार्थ निवर्जेत् ||
CHAPTER SECOND.

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on the crown of the head rubbing with the thumb are enough.*

3rd. The purification of the stomach is effected in three ways: 1st, by passing the tender leaf-shoot of a plaintain, or a turmeric plant, or a cane, through the mouth into the stomach, and, after shaking it drawing it out (Daṇḍadhauti); 2nd, by drinking a large quantity of water and then vomiting it out (Vamandhauti); 3rd, by swallowing a strip of cloth three inches wide and fifteen cubits long and then drawing it out (Vāsadhauti).†

4th. The purification of the rectum (mūlasodhana) is effected by washing the part with water aided by a finger or the stalk of a turmeric plant.‡

II. The purification of the fundament (Vāstisodhana) is effected by repeatedly contracting the fundament while seated firmly in water up to the navel (jalaavasti) or on dry land (ethalavasti).§

III. Neti is the technical name of thread, a span length of which is passed through the nostrils and drawn out from the mouth with a view to purify the nostrils.||

IV. Laukiki Yoga is the practice of shaking or swinging the
intestines repeatedly from one side to the other.*

V. For the purification of the eyes, the recommendation is that the eyes should be fixed on one point, the tip of the nose for instance, without permitting any twinkling, until tears flow in abundance. This is called Trātaka.†

VI. Under the last head of Kapālabhāti, three practices are recommended: 1st, drawing the air through the left nostril and expelling it by the right, and then reversing the operation, and performing it alternately several times, (Vatākrama); 2nd, drawing in water by the nostrils and throwing it out by the mouth, (Vyutkrama); 3rd, by sucking up water by the mouth and throwing it out by the nostrils, (Stūkrama).‡

The Tantras describe several other modes of purification, and suggest many variations in the rules above quoted; but it is not worth while to quote them, particularly as first class Yogis denounce all such purifications as quite unnecessary, if not actually futile.

* श्रमण्वेंद्रे तुस्च वामेयेषुवचारे आः ।
शब्रेंद्रा विद्वन्नीष देवनासनविवर्णे ॥

† विनमण्यते स्वयम् तलाण्युग्मा निरीतवर्त्युः ।
साध्वयूक्ति वतल्लिता चाटके प्राप्यते वृषे: ॥

‡ रुद्रा पुरुषेनार्यं रूपमेव पितका पुजः ।
पितकानां पूरयिला वृद्धिन्ते रूपयेत् ॥
पूरक रूपक खलव वैदेशि न गु वारयेत् ।
सामालासेवेलं कपादीयं निवारयेत् ॥

राज्ञीं वारमहान्यूर्वार्थ्यो रूपयेत् ।
पारं पारं वाक्लेषम् श्रवयिरऽविनवारयेत् ॥
शोतत्त्वानं वौलयं विभूतिं ब्रह्माबासेत् ।
सामालासेवेलं कपादीयं निवारयेत् ॥

ज तथेऽव मार्गेकां ब्रजः भृगु प्रवाहयेऽः ।
अव्रेहर्ष सत्कादेश्य कपादीयं निवारयेत् ॥
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(Continued on third page of cover.)
CHAPTER THIRD.

May Bhūtanātha, (the lord of elements,) by the thought of whose lotus feet, the occult powers of Animā and the rest are attained by thinkers, be to our prosperity!

With a view to describe the three accessories of the Yoga, Dhāranā, &c., already referred to, (C. II A. xxix) and to explain the external, the internal, and other Siddhis, Patanjali begins this chapter, adverting first to the explanation of the term Sañyama.

[The occult powers (vibhūtis) are the following: 1, Animā, "molicularity," extreme minuteness, or parvitude, or invisibility; 2, Laghima, "extreme lightness," levity, tenuity, or incorporeality; 3, Prāpli, "accessibility," or touching anything at will, as touching the moon with the tip of one's finger; 4, Prākāmya, "wilfulness," or irresistibility of will, fulfilment of every wish; 5, Garimā, "excessive pondrosity," magnitude, or illimitable bulk; 6, Iśitā "sovereignty," or supreme dominion over animate and inanimate nature; 7, Vaśitā, "subjugation," the power of changing the course of nature; 8, Kamāvasāyitā, "self-controil," or the power of suppressing all carnal longings. These are also indicated by the term piddhi, and also by siddhi or perfections. Inasmuch, however, as siddhi is applied to other perfections it is sometimes qualified by the term mahā. The powers are also indicated by the terms bhūti and aśvarya.]

Thereof, he describes the nature of steadfastness.

I.

Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place.

"To one place" (deṣe), i.e., in the navel-wheel, the tip of the nose, or the like. "Confinement" (bandha) of the thinking
principle is making the thinking principle steady (on one object) by excluding (the thought of) all other objects. This (confinement to one place) is called Dháraná or the steadfastness of the thinking principle.

The meaning is this:—The Yogi, who has purified his internal organ by benevolence and other acts of refining the thinking principle, who has accomplished the restraints and the obligations, who has acquired mastery over his postures, who has subdued the vital airs, who has abstracted himself from the field of the senses, who has conquered the pairs (cf. C. II A. xlvi), should, in a quiet place, and in an erect posture, by fixing it to one object, such as the tip of the nose, produce steadfastness of the thinking principle for the practice of discriminate meditation.

(The preliminary obligations and restraints having been accomplished, and the habit of assuming the various kinds of seats having been acquired, the Yogi should engage himself in training his thinking principle so as to be able to keep it unswervingly steady to any object to which he may wish to direct it; and this unswerving fixity is called Dháraná, or steadfastness. This steadfastness cannot be acquired without a substratum. There must be some object to which the thinking principle can be applied, whether it be the tip of the nose, or a plexus of nerves in the belly, or the crown of the head, or the ether, or the sky, for without it, in the preliminary stage, the thinking principle would be wandering. And inasmuch as there must be a substratum, the steadfastness of thinking produced by it comes under the head of discriminate meditation (samprajñáta-samádhi). (C. I A. xvii.) Practically it is a state of steady, immovable abstraction, but the word abstraction would be an indirect and not a direct definition of Dháraná, inasmuch as abstraction gives prominence to the act of withdrawing or separating, leaving the result of the act in the background, whereas Dháraná gives prominence to the fixation of the thinking principle to one point, leaving the separation or withdrawing from other things to be tacitly implied.)
The P. Bhāšyā defines "Dhāranā to be the fixation of the function of the thinking principle on the navel-wheel, or on the lotus of the heart, or on the light in the head, or on the tip of the nose, or on the point of the tongue, or on such other place, or on some external object." (Nābhikhakre kṛidayā-pondarīke mūrdhni jyotishī nāsikāgre jāhūgra-ityādīshu des'ēho vā vyāhe vā vishaye chittasya vṛttimātrenā bandha iti bandho dhāranā.)
The "external object" of the commentator is explained by Vijnāna Bhikshu to mean the image of a divinity.

Having defined steadfastness, with a view to define contemplation he says:

II.

Contemplation is unison there of the understanding.

"There," in that place where the thinking principle is confined. "Of the understanding" (pratyayasya) of the knowledge. Whatever unison (or harmonious blending) is obtained through the Instrumentality of avoiding untoward modifications, and what knowledge constantly arises through dependance on that on which steadfastness is reposed, is called "contemplation" (dhyāna).

[The word dhyāna is usually translated into meditation, for it implies that profound and abstract consideration which brings its object fully and undisturbedly before the mind. Inasmuch, however, as there is deliberation and consideration in this act, contemplation appears to me to be a more appropriate equivalent, the highest state of contemplation, which is Samādhi, being indicated by the term meditation.

The P. Bhāshyā defines Dhyāna to be "an even current of thought undisturbed by other thoughts." (Sadriśa pravāka-pratyayāntareṇāparāmṛishto dhyānam.)

He now describes meditation, the last or highest member of the Yoga.
III.

When that (contemplation), existing as if without its own identity, enlightens solely one object, it is meditation.

"When that," i.e. contemplation as defined above (A. 11). When "solely one object" is enlightened, i.e., when the object produced by application to the form of an object, negating all other forms of consideration, and the thought appears as if devoid of its own identity, it is called "meditation" (ṣamādhi). That which brings the mind together thoroughly, (samyag-ādhiyate), i.e., brings it to one centre by avoiding all disturbing causes, is Samādhi.

[The P. Bhāṣya defines Samādhi to be "that in which contemplation so realizes the form of the object contemplated as to make its own identity, as it were, void from the prevalence of the nature of the contemplated object. (Dhyānameva dhyeyakāra-nirbhāsam pratyayātmakena svapñepena sūnyamiva yadā bhavati dhyeya-svabhāvāvesāt tadā samādhiriyuχyate). As stated in the foregoing note, Samādhi is only a more advanced state of contemplation than Dhyāna. In the latter the ideas of other objects besides the one contemplated are subdued and kept down, but not entirely suppressed; but in the former it is so complete that not only exteraneous ideas are suppressed, but even the distinction between the thinking and the thought are lost, so that the former, as it were, merges into the latter, and nothing but thought remains. Such being the case, the body ceases to be influenced by external stimuli, and a state of catalepsy or trance is produced. Hence it is that Samādhi is not unfrequently translated into trance or catalepsy. Catalepsy, however, takes note of only the cessation of the organic functions, leaving unnoticed the state of the thinking principle, whereas Samādhi brings the intensity of the thinking to the fore, without caring for the organic functions, and the English equivalent used should therefore convey this idea. Medi-
tation it is true does not give the measure of the intensity, but since that intensity varies greatly under different circumstances, meditation is by itself enough for ordinary use.]

In order to supply for use in his work a technical term for the three constituents above described, he says:

IV.

The three together constitute Sañyama.

In this Sástra the application of the three operations of contemplation, (dhyána) steadfastness (dháraná), and meditation (Samádhi), to one object is indicated by the use of the term Sañyama.

[The word Sañyama is formed of the intensive particle sam prefixed to yama "restraint," and means vow, binding or confinement, and in this work indicates the absolute restriction of one's self to the practice of the three means of accomplishing the Yoga. In connexion with the ceremonial of the Smriti, it is used to indicate the day preceding that of the rite itself, because on that day the performer has to place himself under certain restrictions about food, drink, and occupation, the nature of which varies according to the character of the rites. The word is defined with a view to prepare it for subsequent use as a technical term for the three most important acts of Yoga.]

The fruit thereof.

V.

From success thereof comes the light of understanding.

"Thereof," i. e., of Sañyama. "From success" from its becoming similar (i. e., freely blending with each other so as to be the same) by practice. "Understanding" (prajña), i. e., the nature of the object to be known. The "Light" (āloka), (understanding) expands. The meaning is—that which has to be known becomes thoroughly manifest.
The purport is obvious. When a person is proficient in performing the threefold acts of Sañyama, he attains the light of understanding, or the power of knowing thoroughly the nature of the object to which he directs his attention.

Its application.

VI.

It is to be applied according to its stages.

According to "its," i.e., of the Sañyama, "Stages" (bhūmi), it should be applied to the varying conditions of grossness and subtileness of the substratum of the function of the thinking principle. The Sañyama should be practised in a higher stage after subduing or attaining proficiency, or knowing thoroughly, the lower stages of the thinking principle, for the fruition is not effected by practicing the Sañyama in the highest stage without first bringing into control the lower ones.

[The subject matter of this aphorism is a mere detail: it is the rule that Sañyama should not be attempted for the higher stages of perfection until after it has been practised in the lower stages, i.e., it is to be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of the Yogi is divided. See C. II A. xxvii.]

A doubt having arisen why in the chapter on the appliances (C. II) he should have described only five after naming the eight members of the Yoga, and omitted three, the author says:

VII.

The three are more intimate than the former.

"Than the former," i.e., of restrictions and other members of the Yoga, which are the appliances of meditation in a secondary degree. (C. II A. xxix.) The three members, steadfastness, &c., "are intimate" (antarâhga, lit. skin,) to discriminate meditation, since they establish the true character of meditation.
CHAPTER THIRD.

[In C. II A. xxix. the accessories of the Yoga have been described to be restraint, obligations, postures, regulation of breath, devotion, steadfastness, contemplation, and meditation. Of these the first five are subsidiary or ancillary to, and the last three integral parts, lit. members of the body of, the Yoga, and this idea is developed in the aphorism under notice by the statement that the former are strangers and the latter intimates. The first five only prepare a person for the performance of the Yoga, but the last three constitute the Yoga, for without them there can be no discriminate Yoga having a specific object of thought.]

To point out that it is nevertheless a stranger compared to another, he says:

VIII.

It is still a stranger to the seedless.

"To the seedless" (nirvijasya), i. e., to the meditation which depends on nothing, or carries on pondering with reference to vacuity. To it the threefold members of the Yoga are strangers, (vahiran\(\text{\textipa{g}}\)a,) because they are only secondarily subservient.

[Having in the next preceding aphorisms described the last three of the eight members of the Yoga, to be essential to the Yoga, the author makes a distinction, by saying that though they are essential in the case of discriminate meditation, or that in which there is a specific object of thought, they are not so when the Yogi, rising above all specific objects, makes vacuity (\(s'\text{\textipa{n}}y\)a) the object of his pondering. This form of meditation is called "seedless" (\(c'f.\) C. I, A. lxii), and it needs no aid and can derive no help from steadfastness, contemplation and objective meditation.]

Having now clearly explained the subject of Sañjama, wishing to disclose the nature of perfection of the different members of Yoga, he describes successively the three modifications.

IX.

The suppressive modification is the moment of conjunction of the thinking principle with suppres-
sion on the overthrow and success of the twofold residua of waking and suppression.

"Waking" (vyātihāna) includes the three conditions of agitation, bewilderment, and voluptuousness. "Suppression" (niruddha) is that modification of the thinking principle in which the quality of goodness becomes a part of it, or retires to it. When successively the "overthrow" (avibhava) and success "prevalence" (prādurbhāva) of the residua of the two, i.e., of the waking and the suppressive conditions, are produced, then at the moment of "suppression," the conjunction (avuaya) which takes place from the thinking principle having then both functions is called "suppressive modification" (niruddhaparināma). "Overthrow" is the condition of incapacity to perform work, there being a contempt for it. "Prevalence" is the condition of manifestation in the present condition. The meaning is this:—When the residua cognate to waking are pacified, and the residua of suppression are prevailing and the thinking principle appears connected with both from its being the substratum of quality, then that state is indicated by the word suppressive modification (niruddhaparināma).

Although there is no stillness of the thinking principle when affected by the functions of the qualities, nevertheless this modification is called still or motionless.

[Having explained the exact position of the threefold exercise of Sañyāma, the author now proceeds to describe what follows that exercise, and in doing so first defines three terms, and the first of them is suppressive modification (niruddhaparināma). This is defined to be the time when all the residua of the waking state being overthrown, the thinking principle begins to be worked by the residua of the suppressive state; it is the moment of transition from the one condition to the other that the term indicates. The P. Bhāṣya thus defines the term: "the residua of the waking state are the attributes of the thinking principle, but they are not intelligent. The residua of suppression, produced by the intelligence of the suppressive state, are also the
attributes of the thinking principle. On the overthrow and the success of the two, the residua of the waking state are put down, those of the suppressive state rise up, and there is then a correlation of the thinking principle, and the changes, thus constantly occurring in a thinking principle is suppressive modification."

(Vyutthāna-saṃskārāḥ chītadharmā na te pratyātmacā iti, pratyaga-nirūdhena niruddhā nirodhasaṃskārā api chītadharmāḥ, tāyorabhīhava-prādurbhāva vyutthāna-saṃskārā hīyante nirodha-saṃskārā ādhiyante, nirodha-khaṇḍam chīttamānteti tad ekasya chītasya pratyikshaṇaṇam idam saṃskārānyathātāvam nirodha-paṇīṇamah.)

In explaining the text, Bhoja uses a term which, as playing an important part in subsequent explanations, requires a few words of comment. The word is vartamānādhyāna, a compound of vartamān "present" and adhyāna "a road," but here "time" (adhyānaśabdā kālavrakṣaṇah,) which I have rendered into "present condition." The theory is that every image, shape, or idea exists from eternity in a latent form; circumstances make it manifest, and when those circumstances are overcome it reverts to its former condition. The first is anagatādhyāna, or the un-manifest or antecedent condition; the second or what we see is the vartamānādhyāna, or the present condition; and the third is atītādhyāna, or the postcedent condition, which is reversion to the first condition. The image existed in the marble in a latent condition; the sculptor brings it to its present condition, and when it is broken it passes on to its postcedent condition. This theory is the same which prevailed in Greece in ancient times. Thus, says Sir William Hamilton: "Plato agreed with the rest of the ancient philosophers in this—that all things consist of matter and form; and that the matter of which all things were made, existed from eternity, without form; but he likewise believed that there are eternal forms of all possible things which exist, without matter; and to those eternal and immaterial forms he gave the name of ideas. In the Platonic sense, then, ideas were the patterns according to which the Deity fashioned the
phenomenal or ectypal world." So Tiberghien, (Essai des Con-
naissance humaine, p. 207,) "Seneca considered ideas, according
to Plato, as the eternal exemplars of things, Cicero as their
form, Diogenes Laertius as their cause and principle, Aristotle as
substances."

The word sañskāra, which, for the sake of uniformity, I have
rendered into residua, would have been more pointed here if
translated into idea.]
The fruit thereof.

X.
Its tranquil flow from residual habit.

"Its," of the thinking principle, "tranquil flow" (pras'ánta-
vākhitā) is produced by the residua of the suppression aforesaid.
The meaning is, from voluptuousness being removed the thinking
principle flows in its own modification.

[The advantage derived from the suppressive modification is
that, when it is attained, the thinking principle becomes tranquil,
and abides in its own nature, that is, it is no longer subject to
agitation from the prevalence of the adverse qualities of foul-
lessness and bewilderment.]

Having described suppressive modification, he now defines
meditative modification.

XI.
The destruction of multifunctionality and enliven-
ment of concentration of the thinking principle is
meditative modification.

"Multifunctionality" (sarvārthatā) is the quality of voluptu-
ousness of the thinking principle, which results from its
accepting many objects from its versatility. When one object is
depended upon there is a similar modification, and it is "concen-
tration," and that too is a quality of the thinking principle. The
"destruction" and "enlivenment" (kshaya and udaya) of the
two are successive, i. e., the destruction or extreme overthrow of
the quality of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or full mani-
festation of the quality of concentration are successive. The condition in which there is a junction of the two in the thinking principle, when it has the quality of goodness in excess, is called "meditative modification" (samádhi-parináma). This is distinct from the former, (i. e., suppressive meditation). In the former there are the overthrow and the prevalence of the two residua, i. e., the contempt for the nature of the former waking residua and the prevalence in an unsubdued state of the latter or the residua of suppression. In this, however, there is destruction and full enlivenment. Destruction is entrance into the condition beyond that of reproduction, of the voluptuousness of multifunctionality, from extreme hatred. Enlivenment of the quality of concentration is its manifestation in the present condition.

[Suppressive modification as defined in A. ix, is confined to the point of time when the waking state passes on to the suppressive state; but in the meditative modification, there is a farther advance. The waking state has then been entirely overcome, and the meditative state is in full prevalence. The one is the commencement, and the other the consummation, of the condition of meditation. The P. Bháshya explains this by saying "multifunctionality is an attribute of the thinking principle, so is concentration; the meaning is there is destruction or disappearance of multifunctionality and the enlivenment or manifestation of concentration." (Sárváratí chittadharmah ekágratá chittadharmah, sauváratíyáh kshayastirobháva ityarthah, ekágratáyá udaya ávirbháva ityarthah.) Briefly this is a higher state of concentration.]

The third or the concentrative modification.

XII.

The concentrative modification of the thinking principle is that in which both the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are equally recognized.
Unity of idea is a special function of the abstracted thinking principle. "Tranquil" (sûnta) is that which has entered the postcedent condition. "Enlivened" (udita) is manifestation in the present condition. From the thinking principle being in a collected state, the two are equal, and from their object being one, are similar cognitions (pratyayas). When the collected thinking principle abides correlated with both it is called concentative modification.

[In the suppressive modification the worldly state is just passing away, and the meditative state is just commencing, and the thinking principle is becoming tranquil; in the meditative state the first stage is passed, and concentration is in prevalence or fully enlivened; and when the tranquil and the enlivened conditions are in full play, the condition is called the concentative modification. The P. Bhâshya explains this by saying, "of the controlled thinking principle, the first cognition is tranquillity, and the next after it is a similar one that of enlivenment, and the thinking principle in meditation is correlated to both, in the same way" (samâhita-chittasya pûrva-pratyayah sûnta uttarastat-sadriśa udilah samâdhi-chittamuhayo-ranugatam punastathaiva). As in the last case so here, we have in this an advance over the last preceding condition.]

Having described the forms of the modification of the thinking principle, he assigns them to other subjects.

XIII.

By this the modifications of property, time, and relation in elements and organs have been described.

"By this," i. e., by the threefold exposition of the modifications of the thinking principle (A. IX, XI, XII.). "In elements," (bhûteshu,) both the gross and the subtile. "In the organs" existing severally as Intellect, organs of function, and internal organ. It is to be understood that the three modifications of property, time, and relation have been described (by the above aphorisms).
CHAPTER THIRD.

When, on the cessation of a former property, the subject undergoes the modification of another property, even as the subject clay, forsaking the form of an undefined mass, assumes another property, that of a jar, it is called the modification of property (Dharmaparināma). The "modification of time" (Lakṣaṇa-parināma) (is thus indicated)—when that jar, giving up its antecedent condition, assumes its present condition, or forsaking it, takes up its postcedent condition. The modification of relation (Avasthāparināma) is the correlation of the jars, in the first and the second conditions, for the train of the functions of qualities is always moving, and does not remain unchanging for even a moment.

[This aphorism applies the theory of eternity of ideas enunciated in the three preceding aphorisms to things in general. The object is to show that even as in ideas, latency, manifestation, and disappearance follow successively, so in the thinking principle ideas appear and disappear under particular circumstances without radically changing its original nature. Change in matter is not absolute, nor radical conversion of one thing into another, but a modification of property, or of time, or of relation. A mass of clay converted into a jar is a change of property, and not of the radical elements of clay. This change is next altered by time, as the breaking of a jar into potsherds; and there is a further change going on in its condition, and the new jar of yesterday is not the same with the jar we see to day, for there has been some change in it since yesterday, for change is constant and cannot be retarded for a moment. The first change is called Dharmaparināma, the modification of property. The second is Lakṣaṇaparināma, the modification of time. The word lakṣaṇa ordinarily means a sign or character, but it has been explained by commentators to mean time (kālabheda). The third is Avasthāparināma or change of relation.]

Now, a doubt arising as to what the property is, he defines the nature of the propertied, i.e., the subject.
XIV.

The subject is the correlative of the qualities of tranquillity, enlivening, and latency.

"The tranquil" (sántah) (qualities) are those which, having performed their respective functions, have entered the postcedent condition. "The enlivened" (udilah) qualities are those which, forsaking the antecedent condition, perform their functions in the present condition. "The latent," (avyapadesyah) qualities are those which, abiding potentially, do not produce action. Thus everything is comprised in everything, and so on. By the word property (dharma) is implied that simple potentiality which abides distinctly correlated as effect and cause. Whatever proceeds and admits of correlation with that threefold quality is called the "propertied" (dharmit) which is the subject of tranquillity, enlivening and latency. Thus gold, giving up the quality of the form of a necklace and assuming that of the form of a svastika cross, still appears as a golden form, i.e., when in these slightly different characters the subject appears as a common property, it is subject, but when it abides as a distinct mode it is a property, and therefore it is described as the correlative of qualities.

[Properties do not always exist in the same form in the same way. Sometimes they are tranquil, at others active, or enlivened, and sometimes latent, and these properties are called dharma, and the thing with which they are correlated is the "propertied," or the substratum of qualities, or Dharmi—that which has the Dharma. A thing cannot be called a subject until it is correlated to a property, and a property ceases to be so when it qualifies nothing. On the other hand, by change of relation a subject may become a property and a property a subject—a subjective law or its objective outcome.]

To remove the doubt as to how a single (propertied) subject undergoes many modifications he says:
CHAPTER THIRD.

XV.

The diversity of succession is the cause of the versatility of modifications.

*Krama* or "succession" of property as defined above and *anyatva*, "diversity," which is every moment visible, make the compound *Kramányatva*, (which has been rendered into "diversity of succession" in the text). And that is the "cause" (*hetu*), mark, or indicator of the (*anyatva*) or multiplicity or diversity of the modifications aforesaid. The meaning is this: Constant motion or succession, as from powdered earth into clay mass, thence flattened plates, thence a jar, shows the manifest form of the versatility of modifications. And whatever the motion in the subject of the modifications of time and condition, the same should be understood to be the argument in support of the versatility of modification. For certain all conditions appear constantly changing by constant motion, and the versatility of modification from constant mutability is thereby established. Of all mutable objects, like the thinking principle and the rest, some qualities are grasped by perception, such as pleasures, conditions and the like, and some are known by inference, such as fate, residuum, power, &c., and the propertied subject not being distinct from property is to be explained in the same way.

[Both the text and the commentary explain the subject in a very roundabout way. The purport is that the diversity of phenomena in the versatile world, is due to constant motion, or uninterrupted succession of changes. The three qualities are never at rest, they are flowing in a constant round of changes, and every change brings on some change of property, for were not properties to change, there would be no perceivable change. And the thinking principle, associated directly with the functions of the three qualities, must accordingly with these changes, be the agent of a multiplicity of functions, and that is its multifunctionality. The changes under notice are either perceivable]
by the senses, organs, or felt by the mind, but in both cases they apply to the thinking principle.]

Now, with a view to describe Siddhi (perfection) by showing the object of the Sañyama already described, he says:

XVI.

The knowledge of the past and the future is acquired by Sañyama over the threefold modification.

The threefold modification resulting from distinctions of attribute, time and relation has been already described. By the Sañyama, i.e., by practising the controul s aforesaid in connexion with this object, Yogís acquire a full knowledge of the past and the future. The purport is this: When a Yogi, knowing that in any given subject this is the attribute, this is the time, this is the relation, and it having performed its work in the present condition has entered the postcedent condition, performs the Sañyama by surmounting the obstructions, he knows everything, all that is passed, or that is to happen, because from the manifestation of the pure quality of goodness in the thinking principle, he then constantly rejects all obstacles caused by ignorance to the power of perceiving the purport of all and everything. When by these means all obstacles have been set aside, then, through concentration, the power of perceiving the property of all and everything becomes manifest as in a stainless mirror.

[Having explained the rationale of the action of the thinking principle on worldly objects, the author now proceeds to describe the effect of Sañyama on that action, and the occult powers which may be derived by that exercise. The first occult power or perfection noticed is the power of knowing the past and the future. This is acquired by directing the Sañyama to the threefold changes described in A. xiii, i.e., by meditating about them till the light of truth rises in the thinking principle of the Yogi and makes everything manifest.]

He describes another kind of perfection.
CHAPTER THIRD.

XVII.

A confused comprehension of word, meaning, and knowledge (arises) from indiscriminate understanding. By Sañyama with due discrimination, (is acquired an understanding) of the cry of all creatures.

A "word" (śabda) is a sound formed of letters joined in a fixed order, perceptible by the organ of hearing, and always conveying the same, single, distinct meaning; or it is a mere explosive sound having in it no fixed order, but still intelligible to cultivated understanding. In either case it forms words and sentences, for both are adapted to convey a fixed meaning. "Meaning" (artha) implies kind, quality, action, &c. "Understanding" (pratyaya) is knowledge, or the function of the intellect in which it assumes the form of the object (implied). By accepting in our intellect these naturally distinct word, meaning and understanding as one, there is confusion. Thus, in saying "bring a cow," the meaning is a cow (go), belonging specifically to the species cow, and having dewlap, &c.; the word is the indicator; and the understanding is the appreciation of it; and all these are grasped without any distinction. It is not used with a clear perception of the word cow being the indicator, the meaning being what is indicated by the word, and the understanding that which accepts the two; and if one is asked what is the meaning? what is the word? what is the understanding produced by it? he gives only one answer to all the questions by saying 'a cow.' Were he not to conceive all these to be identical, how could he give the same answer to all the questions? In this state he who makes the "distinction," (pravibhāga) that the essential nature of a word is that it is the indicator (vāchaka), that of its meaning is the indicated, and that of the understanding is making it manifest, and, making this distinction, places himself in Sañyama about it, acquires the knowledge of the cry (ruta) or word of all creatures, including feral and domestic quadrupeds, birds, reptiles, &c., i. e.,
he knows with what particular motive a specific sound has been made by a particular animal.

[Words are correlated with meanings, and meanings with ideas. When sounds are reduced to speech there is a fixed relation between their constituents, and this relation is fixed by orthography and syntax; but when, in the cry of an animal for instance, this relation of sounds does not appear to be so fixed, it is not to be understood that there is no such relation, for without it the sounds could not convey meaning and idea. And the relation being admitted, it must follow that the cry of animals, which are intended to convey ideas, must have some such relation, and this relation can be learnt by directing the Sañyama to it. Ergo when the Sañyama is accomplished, the Yogi who performs it is able to understand the meaning of the cries of animals.]

He describes another form of perfection.

XVIII.

A knowledge of former existence by making the residua apparent.

Twofold are the residual impressions of the thinking principle. Some are simply productive of memory; others are the causes of the deserts, kind, life, and enjoyment, called virtue and vice. When Sañyama is performed in regard to these residua, the performer, enquiring into his former actions to the effect—thus has that object been perceived by me, thus has that act been performed by me, remembers all the past by the mere reflection, the residua being by themselves excited without any separate stimulants, and gradually visibly sees in the self-excited residua the kind, &c., experienced in former existences.

[As explained in A. xviii, C. I., the residual impressions are of a twofold character. One class of them produce memory, that is when excited by a stimulus, the impressions which lie latent in the mind become vivid, even as an action done in childhood and afterwards entirely forgotten, is brought up in the mind many years after by the sight of the locality or other circumstance]
connected with it. Involuntary impressions received in dreams and the like are also so produced. The second class of impressions are those which bring on the desert of works; they are perfectly involuntary, and are mostly residua of former existences. By applying Sañyama to these, they are excited and become visible to the Yogi, and thereby he is able to know the events of his former existences.]

Another form of perfection.

XIX.

With reference to cognition, a knowledge of another's thinking principle.

"Cognition" (pratyaya) as indicated by some characteristic sign, such as the complexion and the like, of others. When a Yogi has performed the Sañyama with reference to it, he attains a knowledge of another's thinking principle. The meaning is, that one's own thinking principle, by entering the thinking principle of another, comes to know all its attributes, whether it is excited or otherwise.

[The principle explained above applies also to the thinking principles of other persons. The Sañyama applied to them brings them within the range of the understanding of the Yogi. The theory being that the thinking principle which thinks upon a thing assumes the form of that thing, it follows that the mind of the Yogi performing the Sañyama becomes the mind thought of, and thereby knows it.]

He now describes a peculiarity in the knowledge of other thinking principles.

XX.

(But) not along with its object, that not being the object (of the thinker).

But he is not able to know another's thinking principle (in the text represented by the pronoun it) "along with its object" (sálambana), i. e., along with the object to which it is directed,
because none of the characteristics of the object is made the subject (of the Sañyama). From the characteristic of the object not being reflected upon the thinking principle alone of another is known, but not that it is blue or yellow, because Sañyama cannot be directed to that which has not been made the object of it, and there can be no recognition where it is not made the object. Hence another thinking principle along with its object is not cognizable, the object not being taken into account. Now, the qualities of the thinking principle will be included. When contemplation is made as to what is the object, then from that Sañyama a knowledge of the whole subject is acquired.

[This aphorism qualifies the sense of the next preceding one. It says that by thinking on the thinking principle of another one can know it, but not its objects, unless those objects are also included. When they are included the knowledge is perfect.]

He describes another perfection.

XXI.

From Sañyama with reference to the shape of the body, the power of vision being benumbed, and the correlation of light and sight being severed, there is disappearance.

The "body" (káya) is the human frame, and its shape (rupa) is that quality of it which is perceptible by the eye. The meaning is—of such a body such is the shape. Through Sañyama the power of the eye to perceive things becoming 'benumbed' (stambha), i.e., obstructed through contemplation with reference to that shape, and "the correlation of light and sight being severed," i.e., the luminousness of the eye which proceeds from the quality of goodness being "severed," or rendered incapable of performing its function, there is a disappearance of a Yogi, i.e., none can see him. By this it should be known that the disappearance of sounds &c. is also implied, i.e., by this exposition of the means of the
disappearance of shape, &c., the disappearance of sounds, &c., the objects of the ears, &c., is described.

[Objects are perceivable by the light which the quality of goodness throws on them, but if this light be withdrawn by the quality of goodness being confined in the thinking principle, they cease to be so. Accordingly, when a Yogí performs Sañyama with reference to his body or any part of it he withdraws therefrom the quality of goodness, and the body or the part of it so acted upon ceases to have the quality of perceptibility, and the Yogí becomes invisible, inaudible, &c. When an object has no power of visibility in it, it necessarily becomes invisible. This is how the Yogí makes himself invisible.]

He describes another form of perfection.

XXII.

Works are deliberate and non-deliberate, and by Sañyama about them a knowledge of the final end; or by portents.

Life is the consequence of former works. They are of two kinds, "deliberate" and "non-deliberate." Thereof the "deliberate" or anticipatory (sopakrama) is that in which there is an anticipation of consequences in the attempt to produce a result, as in the spreading of wet cloth in a hot place in order that it may dry quickly. The reverse of the former is the "non-deliberate" (nirupakrama), as the leaving the same cloth in a lump in a cool place where it may dry after a long time. Whoever performs Sañyama with reference to these two kinds of work, (enquiring) 'whether my work will mature quickly or slowly,' in him, through firm contemplation, a knowledge of the final end is produced. "Final end" (aparánta) is the separation of the body from the soul, i.e., death. A "knowledge of it," i.e., 'at such a time, at such a place my death shall happen,' he acquires with certainty.
"Or by portents" (arishṭāhyāvas). Portents are of three kinds, spiritual (ādhyātmika), material, (ādhibhautika) and supernatural (ādhidāivika). The spiritual is that (which is conveyed in a spiritual way, as) when one with the ears closed does not hear the sound of the vital air in the stomach, or such like (the said sound being ordinarily audible). The material is the sudden sight of a frightful human form, or the like. The supernatural is the accidental sight of invisible things, such as paradise, &c. By them one knows the time of death. Although knowledge may be acquired through portents by other than Yogīs, it is in their case general and doubtful. In the case of Yogīs, on the other hand, the time and place being certain, the perception is as certain as actual sight.

[The efficacy of this Siddhī depends upon the precision with which the events of past existences are realised in the mind by reviving their residua through the power of Sañyama. When their memory is perfect, one can easily calculate which of his former acts will bring on death within a short time, and which are destined to retard it. It will be seen that in the Yoga system residua or deserts play the part of fate, and if the nature of the residua be known, one knows his fate.]

In order to explain the perfection acquired by the purifying processes (Chap. I, A. xxxiii, p. 40) he says:

XXIII.

In friendliness, superhuman powers.

By performing Sañyama in regard to friendliness, mercy, complaisance, and indifference, super-human powers are acquired with reference to them, i.e., in the performer friendliness, mercy, and complaisance attain such great excellence as to enable him to contract friendship with all (persons).

[The sense is obvious, and needs no comment.] He describes another kind of perfection.
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XXIV.

In powers, the powers of the elephant and the like.

By performing Sañyama with reference to the powers of the elephant and the like, powers like those of the elephant, &c., become manifest in the Yogi. The meaning is this: He who performs Sañyama in regard to the power of the elephant, the force of the wind, or the vigour of the lion, wishing it to be in him, becomes possessed of those powers.

[As obvious as the purport of the last preceding aphorism.]

Another perfection.

XXV.

From contemplation of the light of the extremely luminous disposition, a knowledge (is acquired) of the subtile, the intercepted and the remote.

The light of the extremely luminous disposition has already been described. (C. I, A. xxxvi). The "light" is that which expands the manifestation of the quality of goodness. From "contemplation" (nyása) of all things appertaining to it, i. e., from thinking of the objects irradiated by it, a knowledge is produced, in one's own internal organ and the organs of sense endowed with special power, of the "subtile" (sukshma) such as atoms, &c., of the "intercepted" (vyavahíta), as mines under the earth, and of the remote (viprabhíkṣa), as the elixir of life existing on the other side of the Meru mountain.

[The clear light of the quality of goodness is what is meant by "the light of the extremely luminous disposition."]

Another perfection of a similar description.

XXVI.

From Sañyama in the sun, a knowledge of regions.

He who performs Sañyama with reference to the manifest sun, obtains a definite knowledge of whatever regions and towns exist in the seven spheres, including the terrine, the aërial, and the celestial. In the preceding aphorism the subject is the
manifestation of the quality of goodness, here it is material, that is the distinction.

[The *P. Bhāṣṭya* gives a long account of the seven principal regions and their subsidiaries, taken from the Purāṇas, but it is not worth quoting. In Wilson's Vishṇu Purāṇa the details are given at length.]

Another perfection by means of reliance on material manifestation.

XXVII.

In the moon, a knowledge of the disposition of the stars.

By performing Saṅyama with reference to the moon, a knowledge is derived of the disposition (*vyūha*), or the order of arrangement, of the starry luminaries. As the stars lose their light on the manifestation of the sun, Saṅyama with reference to the sun cannot suffice to afford a knowledge of the stars, therefore a different means is (here) ordained.

[The reason given why the Saṅyama with reference to the sun does not suffice to give an idea of the arrangement of the stars and planets appears ludicrous. Bhoja cannot have seen a star in day light. The *P. Bhāṣṭya* does not refer to it.]

Another perfection.

XXVIII.

In the Polar star, a knowledge of their motion.

A knowledge is produced of the "motion" (*gati*) of the particular time and position of each of the stars by performing Saṅyama with reference to the Polar star (*Dhruva*), the chief, the fixed star. This is a star, that is a planet, this is the period within which it will reach a particular constellation,—all these are known. What is said is that this is the fruit of knowing their times.

[The *P. Bhāṣṭya* adds that the Saṅyama applied to the firmament above suffices the purpose. (*Uṛddha-vimāneshu kṛita-*)
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sañyamastāni vijānyāt). It is not obvious why Bhoja has omitted this.]

After having described perfections regarding externals, he now attempts to describe internal perfections.

XXIX.

In the navel-wheel, a knowledge of the disposition of the body.

A knowledge is acquired by the Yogi who has performed Sañyama with reference to the "wheel" (chakra) of sixteen radii which exists in the middle of the body, and is called "navel" (nābhi), of the "disposition" (vyūha) obtaining in the body of fluids, excrements, humours, tubes, &c. What is said is this—the navel-wheel, situated in the middle of the body, is the root of all the widespread tubes, therefore by knowing it, one fully understands how they are disposed in the body.

[Down to the last aphorism the effect of Sañyama applied to external objects formed the theme of comment; now the author turns to objects situated within the body. The first is the navel-wheel, which is said to have sixteen radii. How this idea got into currency I cannot make out. Ancient Hindus must have seen the human abdomen dissected, and having seen it, it is impossible to imagine, how they conjured up the idea of a wheel with sixteen radii. There must be some recondite metaphor involved in this, but I know not what it is.]

Another perfection.

XXX.

In the throat-well, the subdual of hunger and thirst.

The well in the throat is "throat-well" (kantha kūpa). It is a pit or well-like place (and therefore called a well) behind and below the tongue and palate. By the contact of the vital airs with it (the sensations of) hunger and thirst are produced. The hunger
and thirst of the Yogi who has performed Sañyama with reference to that well, are subdued. The streams (of the vital airs) being satisfied below the uvula, this kind of perfection is accomplished.

[The throat-well is the pharynx where the air from the mouth and that from the cavity of the nostrils meet.]

Another perfection.

XXXI.

Firmness in the tortoise tube.

Firmness of the mind is acquired by performing Sañyama with reference to the tube, called the "tortoise" (kúrma), which is situated below the throat-well. The meaning is—that on the mind entering that spot there happens no vacillation, in other words, such a firmness of the body is produced that no one can cause it to shake.

[The tortoise tube is the lower part of the larynx including the bronchí.]

Another perfection.

XXXII.

In the coronal light, vision of perfected ones.

In the skull there is an aperture called Brahma-randhra. It is called "light" (jyotiḥ) because it is the site of light. Even as the spreading effulgence of a jewel in a closed room collects at the keyhole, so the light of the quality of goodness in the heart spreading collects at that aperture. And by the performance of Sañyama in it by Yogíś, those perfected ones, or celestial beings, who dwell in the space between the earth and the sky and are invisible to ordinary people, become visible, i. e., Yogíś see them, and hold converse with them. This is the meaning.

[The point at the crest of the frontal bone remains open in childhood when the parietal bones are not sufficiently developed; at maturity this opening is closed; but, its existence having once been proved, it is believed to exist always, and is called Brahma-
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randhra. Life is said to depart through this aperture in certain cases, and spiritually it is reckoned to be the most important part of the body. In the Tantras it is referred to with great reverence.

This is the only aphorism in the Yoga system which may be assumed as recognizing the truth of the spiritual manifestations of modern European spiritualists; the rationale, however, is entirely different.]

He now describes the means of becoming all-knowing.

XXXIII.

Or from Pratibha, everything.

Pratibha is that knowledge which is independent of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved. By performing Sañyama with reference to it this Pratibha knowledge, called Tāraka or emancipator, which results before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, arises. Even as the light which becomes apparent before the rising sun, so this Tāraka, or knowledge of everything before the manifestation of thorough knowledge, becomes apparent. When this is the case, the Yogi can know everything without resource to any particular Sañyama.

[The P. Bhāskya explains the word Pratibha by the phrase Pratibham nāma tārakam, which may mean the Morning Star, the one which is visible a little before sunrise, or that it is an emancipator. Patanjali, perhaps, referred to the star, as the light of that star prepares the way for the illumination of the universe by the sun; but Bhoja, having set a limit to external objects at the close of the 28th aphorism, is compelled to take the Pratibha to be something different. According to his definition, it is a sort of instinct, or intuition, "the knowledge which is independant of cause, produced solely in the mind, uncontradictory, and suddenly evolved." He has, nevertheless, been obliged to preserve the relation of the star to the sun by referring to the illumination resulting from sunrise. The
morning star is not, like the Polar star, always the same, different planets serving its place at different times, and this uncertainty must have told against the material meaning being accepted as the right one. Whether the practising Yogi should think on the morning star, or intuition is a question which I cannot decide, but Bhoja has obviously the best of the argument.]

Another perfection.

XXXIV.

In the heart, a consciousness of the thinking principle.

"Heart" (kridaya) is a particular part of the body. The locale of the internal organ is within a small, inverted lotus placed in that part of the body. By performing Sañyama with reference to it, a knowledge of the thinking principle of one's own and of another person is obtained, i.e., the Yogi comes to know all the residua in his own thinking principle, as well as the passions, &c., in other thinking principles.

[The description of the heart is obviously rhetorical. As the seat of the thinking principle it is described as the must appropriate spot to which attention should be directed to know it thoroughly.]

Another perfection.

XXXV.

Experience is an undefined conception of the quality of goodness and the soul, which are totally unconnected. From Sañyama for its own object, and not for another's object, proceeds a knowledge of the soul.

"The quality of goodness" (nattva) is a particular modification of nature (pradhāna); it is characterised by illumination and joy. 'Soul' (purusāha) is the experiencer in the form of a ruler. From the distinction of the experiencer and the experience,—
of the rational and the irrational—there is total unconnection between the two, i. e., they are separate. "A conception" of the two without any distinction, not knowing them distinctly, is experience. Hence whatever consciousness of pleasure and pain is felt by the quality of goodness assuming itself to be the master is experience. Goodness having no object of its own, its work is for "another's object," (paráthá), i. e., for the object of the soul. That which is distinct from it is its "own object," (svárthá); which is reliance on the true nature of the soul, or the connection of the shadow of the soul with the quality of goodness (sattvá) devoid of egotism. By the performance of Sañyama in that connection, a knowledge of the object of the soul is derived, i. e., the soul knows reliant perception to be in this way dependant on the quality of goodness. Nor does there arise any difficulty about the soul, the knower, becoming the object of knowledge, for the objection will be met by the argument of knowability (i. e., that which is the knower cannot be the knowable); because the knower and the knowable are quite contrary.

[The soul is the experiencer of joys and sorrows; it experiences them by its being reflected on the intellect, which is the immediate experiencer. The two are essentially different; one is sentient, the other inert; one the enjoyer, the other the enjoyed. An association of the two is brought about by the former being reflected on the latter, and then the former experiences what is produced in the latter. The latter, however, being irradiated by the former, acts the part of the agent or actor, and whatever it thereby feels is called enjoyment. This feeling, however, is for another's purpose, i. e., for the purpose of the soul, its own purpose being the merging in that soul. In the one case it works for another, and falsely imagines itself to be the actor, and in the other it acts with a view to attain its own end. When Sañyama is performed with this discrimination and with the object of knowing the soul, the knowledge is acquired.]

He now describes the fruits of this Sañyama.
XXXVI.

Thence proceed intuition, audition, taction, vision, gustation and olfaction.

"Thence," from performing Sañyama in the said quality of goodness, or practising it; even in the waking state these faculties are produced. Thereto "intuition" (Prātibhā) is the knowledge already described (A. xxxiii) on the manifestation of which minute objects become visible.

"Audition" (Śrāvana) is the knowledge produced in the organ of hearing. Therefrom the highest celestial sound, or that which is produced in the heaven, becomes audible.

"Taction" (Vedanā) is the knowledge produced by the organ of touch. That by which is known that a thing exists (vidyāti anayā) is Vedanā; it is a Tantric term which has been used here. Therefrom proceeds the knowledge of such celestial things as are subjects of touch.

"Vision" (Ādarśa) is that knowledge which is produced by the organ of sight. Whereby is seen (dṛṣṭyati) or perceived thoroughly what every form is, is ādarśa. When it is in its full development a knowledge of celestial forms is produced by it.

"Gustation" (Āsvāda) is the knowledge produced by the organ of taste. That by which a thing is tasted (āsvādati aneneti) is āsvāda, and on its full development a perception of celestial taste is produced.

"Olfaction" (Vārtā) is the sensation of smell. In Tantric terminology the word vṛitti means the organ of smelling; that in which resides (vartitute) the objects of smell (is vṛitti) and that which proceeds from that organ of smell is Vārtā, i. e., the sensation of smell. When that becomes fully developed celestial smells become perceptible.

[This aphorism explains the collateral advantages of performing Sañyama with reference to the soul. These advantages are superior or transcendental powers in the organs of sense. Nor
are those powers confined to the meditative state; when once acquired, they are retained permanently, and even in his ordinary worldly waking state the Yogi can exercise them, so that in his ordinary faculties he becomes infinitely superior to common mortals.]

Of these different fruits he now describes the respective provinces.

XXXVII.

These are obstacles in the meditative condition (but) perfections in the waking state.

"These," the different fruits described above. In the state of meditation they are "obstacles," (upasargas,) hindrances, disturbers, because from joy, wonder, &c., resulting therefrom, meditation becomes relaxed. In the state of waking (vyuña), i.e., in the ordinary state of life, they are, however, perfections (siddhayah), because then they yield desirable fruits.

[The perfections described are of the world worldly, required for worldly purposes, but useless for higher meditation, i.e., for meditation having isolation for its aim. Nor are they simply useless, but positively obstructive, for they interfere with the even tenor of calm meditation. In the waking state they may be gratifying, and, indeed, they are useful only in that state, but apart from it they are not wanted.]

He describes another perfection.

XXXVIII.

From slackness of the cause of bondage and from a knowledge of the process, the entrance of the thinking principle into another body.

The consciousness which results of the experience and the experience, acting from the constant relation existing between the soul and the intellect residing inside the body and from pervasion, is called corporeal bondage (sarirabandha). When through medita-
tion the cause of bondage, which is work in the twofold form of virtue and vice, becomes slack, or attains attenuation, and when a Yogi knows the process, i.e., the way in which the thinking principle issues from the heart through the organs towards worldly objects, knowing full well this is the tube called chittavahā through which the thinking principle circulates, and it differs thus from the tubes through which the vital airs and the rest circulate, and also knows the passages in his own body and that of others, he can enter, by the passage through which the thinking principle circulates, into the body of another, whether it be dead or alive. The thinking principle, after entering another body, follows the bent of the senses even as honey-bees follow the queen bee, (lit. king bee). And the Yogi who has entered another body uses it as his own body. Since work is the cause of circumscribing the fruition of the pervading soul and the thinking principle, if that circumscription be weakened or destroyed by meditation, fruition may result everywhere from the independence of the thinking principle.

[The transfer of one's own soul into another body plays a prominent part in the legendary lore of India, and the idea was not unknown at one time in Europe. How this transfer is effected is explained in this aphorism. The bondage of the soul to the body is due to works and their deserts, works having been performed their deserts must be borne by the soul in association with the body; but when through meditation the residua of works are obliterated and the bond is loosened, and the Yogi knows the way in which the soul goes out and comes into a body, he can, at will, make the soul travel by that way and enter another body, whether dead or alive, and again, at will, withdraw it from that body, and bring it back to its own. And wherever the soul rests there it works upon the organs, and enjoys their experiences, or in other words, the organs follow the soul as do working bees their queen.]

Another perfection.
CHAPTER THIRD.

XXXIX.

From subdual of Udána, ascension and detachment from water, mud, thorns, &c.

The simultaneous waking, like the flaming up of burning chaff, of the functions (of the body) is indicated by the phrase vital air, (Jívana), and from differences of action, that vital air is indicated severally by the terms Prána, Apána, &c. Thereof one form of air is called Prána, because it passes (pranayanát,) from the heart through the mouth and the nostrils. That air which descends (apanayanát) from the navel down to the great toe is called Apána. Another is called Samána, because, surrounding the navel, it permeates everywhere (samantánayanát). Another is called Udána, because it ascends from the back of the neck to the head (unnayanát). Another air pervades the whole body, and is called Vyána, because it circulates over the whole body, (vyápya nayanát). From the subdual of the Udána, through Sañyama, the other airs being suppressed and the tendency being upwards, the Yogi does not suffer from "water," i.e., in large rivers, &c., nor from large collections of "mud," (kardama,) bogs, nor from sharp "thorns" (kañtaka), i.e., from his lightness he rises, like a floss of cotton, even when drowned in water or the like.

[The body is kept alive by five vital airs, and of these that which is called Udána is characterised by its tendency to rise upwards. Now, by making Sañyama in reference to it the tendency of the other airs are overcome, and the whole body tends upwards, consequently there is no gravitation, and the Yogi is neither drowned in water, nor submerged in a bog. The attenuation of his body at the time is such that it cannot be pierced by a thorn.]

XL.

From subdual of Samána, effulgence.

From the "subdual" (jáyát) of the air called Samána which surrounds the fire (of the stomach), i.e., by bringing it under
control through Sañyama, that unprotected fire ascends, and the Yogi appears effulgent as if flaming in glory.

[The stomach is the seat of the fire which keeps up the heat of the body and consumes food; and this fire is surrounded and kept in its place by the air called Samána. Such being the theory, it follows that when by Sañyama the air in question is overcome or rendered inapt in its special function, the fire, from its natural tendency upwards, should rise up and escape from the body in lambent flames of glory. The Buddhists, who developed the Yoga system to its utmost limit, declare that the crown of the head, the space between the eyebrows, the mouth and the shoulders are the places whence these flames usually issue. In the Sanskrit Buddhist literature of Nepal these flames are frequently described as issuing from the person of S'ákya Buddha, whenever he immersed himself in a profound meditation, and in ancient sculptures images of Buddha are often represented with these flames occupying the place of halo, nimbus, aureola, or glory of European art. A physical cause for these flames may be found in the electric flames which have been noticed by Reichenbach on the persons of highly electric tendency under certain conditions. Of course it is an open question as to whether Yogis had seen such electric flames and derived their descriptions therefrom, or drawn them from their fancy.]

Another perfection.

XLI.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the organ of hearing and ether, a superperfect organ of hearing.

"Organ of hearing" (Śrotra) is that organ which perceives sound, and is produced by egotism. "Ether" (Ākáśa) is sky, the result of the subtle rudiment of sound (Śabdatanmátra). The "relation" (sambandha) between the two is that of the site and the situated. The Yogi who has performed Sañyama with reference to it attains a superperfect organ of hearing (DivyāsŚrotra), and
becomes able to hear simultaneously subtle, intercepted, and distant sounds.

[The ether is the product of the rudiment of sound; and the organ of hearing is dependant on it for the performance of its function; and if the relation between the two be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to ether, the performer obtains the power of knowing it under all circumstances.]

Another perfection.

XLII.

From Sañyama with reference to the relation between the body and ether, travelling in ether, from acquisition of levity, like that of cotton.

The "body" (kāya), is the form made of the five elements. By performing Sañyama with reference to the relation which exists between the body and ether which yields space (for objects to abide in) a levity, like that of cotton and the like, is effected, i.e., they become alike. Having effected this and attained the levity, the Yogi, walking at will over water, or on a spider's web, or on the rays of the sun, at his choice travels on ether.

[The rationale of the operation in this case is very much the same as in the last; the body is kept down by the ether, and if the ether be under control, the body acquires the power of rising over it.]

Another perfection.

XLIII.

The function independent of external functions is the great incorporeal. Therefrom the destruction of the covering of light.

That mental function which is out of the body, i.e., independent of it, is named the "great incorporeal" (Mahāvidēha), because it is exclusive of the steadfastness of the relation between the body and egotism. "Therefrom," from Sañyama performed with reference to it, the destruction of the covering of light is
effected, *i.e.*, the covering consisting of affictions, works, &c., which obstruct the light of the thinking principle centered in the quality of goodness alone, is removed. The meaning is this: The external functions of the thinking principle which result from the body and egotism are called factitious (*kalpita*). When, abandoning the feeling of body and egotism, there arises an independent (or self-reliant) mental function it is non-fictitious (*akalpita*). By performing Sañyama with reference to it, all taints in the thinking principle of the Yogí are removed.

[The covering produced by the qualities of foulness and darkness prevent the true light of the quality of goodness from being seen to perfection. If that covering be removed the vision is perfect. When retiring under this covering, which is no other than consciousness under the name of egotism, the mind entertains factitious ideas, and produces factitious works, which are consequently false. Divested of this covering it works differently, and whatever it produces is real. Sañyama performed with reference to the relation existing between the body and egotism removes the covering, and thereby cleanses the thinking principle.]

Having thus described the different forms of perfection, including anterior destruction of objects, posterior destruction of objects, and the middle condition; having also explained the knowledge of the externals, regions, &c., of the internals, the formation of the body, of the powers of friendliness, &c., which effect particular objects; having, further, described the conditions of internal and external organs and such like expedients for meditation, as also the conditions of the vital aire, Prāṇa, &c., and other perfections for producing stedfastness in the thinking principle and earnestness in meditation; he now, with a view to point out the various means for the perfection of the seeded and the seedless meditations for the visual inspection of the soul, says,

XLIV.

From Sañyama with reference to grossness, nature, subtlety, concomitance and fruition, conquest of the elements.
By performance of Sañyama with reference to the five specific conditions or qualities, such as grossness, &c., of the five elements, earth, &c., the conquest of the elements is effected, i.e., the elements become subservient. Thereof “grossness” (sthula) implies the specific forms in which the elements are perceived. “Nature” (svarūpa) implies respectively their effects, such as smell, viscosity, heat, impulsion, and impenetrability. “Subtlety” (sukshma) implies successively the subtle conditions which are the causes of the elements: these are the subtle or rudimentary forms of matter (tanmātra). “Concomitancy” (anvaya) includes the qualities of shape, disposition, and existence, which are everywhere seen to co-exist. “Fruition” (arthavatva) is that power in the qualities which lead to enjoyment and emancipation. Thus, by performing Sañyama in regard severally to the five elements, nature and conditions aforesaid, the Yogi conquers the elements. This is to be done in this way,—first in the gross form, next in the subtle form. To the performer of Sañyama in this order, nature and the elements become fulfillers of desires, even as cows follow calves.

[The object of this aphorism is to explain the advantages derivable from the performance of Sañyama with reference to the five elements. The elements brought under control subserve the wants and wishes of the controller, even as cows subserve the acquirements of calves by following them wherever they ramble.]

He now describes the fruit of this conquest over the elements.

XLV.

Therefrom proceed attenuation, &c., as also excellence of body and the indestructibility of its qualities.

1. “Attenuation” (animá) the attainment of the form of atoms (molecularity).

2. “Levity” (laghimá) attainment of lightness like that of a floss of cotton.

3. “Ponderosity” (garimá) attainment of great weight.
(4) "Illimitability," (mahimā) attainment of greatness, or the power of touching the moon or the like with the tip of one's finger.

(5) "Irresistible will" (prákámya) non-frustration of desires.

(6) "Supremacy" (isī́tva) highest authority over the body and the internal organ.

(7) "Subjection" (vasī́tva) prevailing everywhere, i.e., the elements being subservient to him do not disobey his behests.

(8) "Fulfilment of desires," (kámaśasāyī́tva) accomplishing one's desire everywhere, i.e., in whatever object a desire is formed, the Yogí becomes accomplished in that, or brings it to fruition by attaining it.

These, attenuations, &c., as accessories to meditation, become prevalent in Yogís on their conquering the elements. Thus by attaining molecularity he can enter into (the substance of) a diamond. The other cases should be explained in the same way. These eight qualities, attenuation, &c., are called great perfections, (mahásiddhis). "Excellence of body" (káyasampat), which will be presently described, is also obtained. "The indestructibility of its qualities," means that the shape and the other qualities of that body are not liable to destruction by any means. Neither does fire burn its shape, nor wind dry it up, and so on.

[The exact nature of the advantages to be derived from Saññyama with reference to the elements, not having been described in the next preceding aphorism, the author supplies the omission in this aphorism. The advantages are the eight siddhis or perfections an account of which has already been given on page 121. They include many of the perfections described in separate aphorisms. I fail to perceive any marked distinction between the 5th and the 8th. The explanation of the 8th given on p. 121 is Tántric.]

He next explains what excellence of the body is—

XLVI.

Colour, loveliness, might, and adamantine hardness constitute the excellence of the body.
CHAPTER THIRD.

"Colour, loveliness, and might" are well-known. "Adamantine hardness" (vajrasaṅkhananatva) means that hardness is produced in one's body like that of the diamond. These are the excellences that become manifest in the body.

[While yearning for the severance of all bondage to worldly objects, the Yogis cannot get over the natural love which ties the mind to the body. The body is one's own, and it is always desirable to have it in a perfect state of beauty, and the means are here provided to give it perfection. Of course it is introduced here as the effect of a particular kind of Sañyama, and not as a thing to be desiderated.]

Having thus explained the excellence of the body, he now describes the conquest of the organs by one who has attained his (proper) stage.

XLVII.

From the performance of Sañyama with reference to perception, nature, egoism, concomitance, and fruition, (proceeds) the conquest of the organs.

"Perception" (graññana) is the function of the organs directed to their (respective) objects. "Nature" (svārāpa) is ordinary manifesting power. "Egoism" (asaṁdha) is consciousness. "Concomitance" (anvayatva) and "fruition" (arthavatva) as explained above (A. XLIV, p. 157). By performing Sañyama with reference to these five conditions of these organs the Yogi becomes the conqueror of his organs.

[The five conditions of these organs include 1st, their nature, i.e., their power of making objects manifest; 2nd, their function when in active operation; 3rd, their consciousness of being active; 4th, their concomitance or relation to each other or mutual interdependence; and 5th, their fruition or the result they produce. If all these conditions be brought under control by performing Sañyama with reference to them, the organs necessarily come under complete control.]

The fruit thereof.
XLVIII.

Therefrom proceed quickness as of mind, uninstrumental perception, and the conquest of nature.

"Quickness as of mind" (manojāvatva) is the attainment by the body of extreme quickness of motion like that of the mind. "Uninstrumental perception" (vikaraṇa bhāva) is the accomplishment of the functions of the organs without the aid of the body. "Conquest of nature" (pradhānajaya) is bringing everything under subjection. These perfections are attained by those who have overcome their organs. In this science these are called honey-drops (madhupratītha). Even as every drop of honey has its taste, so each of these is tasteful, and therefore they are honey-drops.

[The advantage of having control over the organs as described in the last preceding aphorism is, that the Yogi is then able to perceive things without the aid of his material organs, and to do so with the quickness of the mind, i.e., instantaneously. He also acquires mastery over nature in every way. The nature here referred to is the Pradhāna of the Sānkhya categories, the highest of the twenty-five, next only to soul.]

Having described the conquest of the (external) organs, he now points out the conquest of the internal organ.

XLIX.

Supremacy over all conditions and omniscience, the moment the distinctive knowledge of the quality of goodness and the soul (is attained).

The knowledge of the distinction between the quality of goodness and the soul which results from performing Sañyama with reference to the modification of pure goodness, is "distinctive knowledge" (anyatākhyāti). From the subsidence, through the influence of the Sañyama, of the conception about the qualities being agents the Yogis, who are in that condition, attain in their meditation supremacy over all conditions and omniscience.
CHAPTER THIRD.

"Supremacy over all conditions" (sarvakarádikshákátritva) is the attainment of power like a master over all modifications of qualities. "Omniscience" (sarvajñatritva) is correct knowledge of those qualities as they exist in calm, (sánta,) enlivened, (udita,) and latent (anyapadisya) conditions. In this science this perfection is called "sorrowless perfection" vis'okasiddhi, while those that have been described before are indicated by the term vas'ikára (controul).

[The object of this aphorism is to describe the effect of getting control over the mind or the internal organ. That control enables the Yogi to perceive the difference between the quality of goodness and the soul, and endows him with absolute mastery over all conditions of existence and thorough omniscience. The omniscience directly refers to the conditions of the three qualities, but indirectly to all and everything in the universe. Everything in the universe depends upon the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, and those qualities are either in a calm state, or in a state of excitement, or latent; and if one comes to know their conditions he necessarily knows all and everything that proceeds from them. This state of supreme knowledge is called Vis'oka or sorrowless perfection, for when it is attained there cannot possibly be any cause for pain or sorrow; whereas in the perfections previously described there is always some room for sorrow, or longing of some kind or other. The latter ensure control over the things they refer to, and the control is more or less perfect according to circumstances, and they are fitly called Vas'ikára or 'control.' They do not, however, secure absolute immunity from pain, and this necessitates the marked distinction in the designations.]

Next he describes another stage.

L.

From indifference even to this (perfection) through destruction of the seed of evils, (results) isolation.
When the Yogi becomes indifferent even to that sorrowless perfection, then ignorance, the seed of the evils such as passion, &c., being destroyed by the root, "isolation," (kāvalya,) absolute cessation of pain, results, i.e., on the termination of the influence of the qualities the soul is restored, placed permanently, in its own state.

[Nor is the sorrowless perfection the ultimatum. When the Saṅyama is exercised freely it produces an indifference in the mind in regard to it, and this indifference destroys ignorance, the root of all evil, and leads to isolation, or the detachment of soul from the bondage of worldly ties.]

He now points out the means of remaining in this meditation.

LI.

Avoidance should be made of association with, and encouragement of, celestial temptations, from apprehension of evils recurring.

There are four classes of Yogis; viz., 1st, those practisers of the Yoga on whom the light is just shedding; 2nd, Ritambharas, or those who possess the knowledge which holds to the truth; 3rd, those who have conquered the elements and the organs; 4th, those who have exceeded all objects of contemplation. Thereof, to those who have attained the fourth meditation, when the seven surrounding stages of knowledge have been attained, and the final stage of "honeyed knowledge" has been interviewed, the celestial (stáninah) gods become tempters, i.e., they offer presents of handsome women, elixir vitae, &c. With such temptations no association should be made, nor any encouragement be given to them. From association there is a fall into the enjoyment of worldly pleasures. With regard to them therefore both association and encouragement should be renounced.

[When the Yogi attains the last described sorrowless stage, he is exposed to a great danger. The gods envy his high excellence, but, unable to exercise open enmity, they try to divert him from
CHAPTER THIRD.

his purpose by insidious means. They place temptations in his way, offer him handsome women, inexhaustible wealth, long life, and so forth to bring him back to the ways of the world, and thereby frustrate his purpose of attaining isolation. They act the part of Satan in the Bible and of Māra in the Buddhist system. In Hindu legends Indra is the chief god who envies men who are about to rise superior to carnal weakness, and the means he employs are the courtesans of his court, who descend on earth and tempt all Yogīs by their celestial charms. According to the Tantras when such temptations fail, resort is made to fear. Frightful forms of all kinds assail the Yogī when he is engaged in his meditations; venomous serpents hiss around him; tigers prowl about him; ogres come with wide open mouth to devour him. These are, in the technical language of the Yoga system, called Vibhitikā. The lukewarm yield to these, break their meditation, and are lost; the determined take no note of them, and attain their object. It is believed that these frightful forms never do any actual mischief; their object is to frighten, to put to test the determination and firmness of the Yogī, and not to do any positive harm. The advice given in the Tantras is not to give any encouragement to such temptations, nor to be depressed or frightened by the dangers which become manifest. Firmness suffices to overcome them. The text here does not refer to frightening.]

In connexion with the manifestation of this fruitful understanding, he describes a means besides the Sañyamas above described.

LII.

From Sañyama with reference to the course of moments (proceeds) an understanding born of discriminative knowledge.

"Moment" (kṣaṇa) is the smallest division of time, which can no further be reduced in quantity. "Course" (krama) the suc-
cessive modifications of such moments of time. By performing Sañyama with reference to the course of moments, the aforesaid understanding of discriminative knowledge results. The meaning is this: This is a moment of time, it is subsequent to another, therefore the first is antecedent to this. For him who has performed Sañyama with reference to this course, interview with the minutest is effected in the course of a moment, and so is the interview effected of the subtle nature. This is manifestation of discriminative knowledge.

[The next step of the Yogi is to perform Sañyama with reference to the progress of time, and when this is accomplished, discriminative knowledge becomes thoroughly manifest.]

He now applies this Sañyama to a special subject.

LIII.

Therefrom results the knowledge of the difference between two similars when that difference is not marked out by kind, character and habitat.

“Kind, character, and habitat” (játi, lakshana, des’a) are the means of differentiation of things. Sometimes “kind” (játi) is the cause of distinction; as this is a cow, this is a buffalo. When the kind is the same, “character” (lakshana) may be the cause of distinction; as this is spotted, this is tawny. Where kind and character are alike, the cause of distinction may be “habitat,” (des’a); thus with two emblic fruits of the same size and colour, one may be of one country and the other of another. There are again cases in which distinction cannot be determined, as particles of white earth of one country. When Sañyama is performed to ascertain distinctions in the last class of cases, a knowledge of distinction is produced, and by its exercise distinctions of even the exceedingly subtle categories may be perceived. What is said is this: When distinctions cannot be ascertained by any other means they, including a knowledge of such
distinctions in the subtile categories, may be known through this Sañyama.

[This aphorism explains what is meant by discriminative knowledge. Under ordinary circumstances discrimination is made by attention to kind, character and habitat. But this is not possible in the case of the subtile categories which are not amenable to such tests. For them Sañyama is the only means, and it should be brought to bear upon them. When the Sañyama is accomplished, the power of discriminating them is fully acquired, and this is discriminative knowledge.]

To explain the name, object, and nature of the aforesaid knowledge resulting from discrimination, he says.

LIV.

The knowledge resulting from discrimination is emancipating, omni-objective, semper-objective, instantaneous.

The knowledge which results from the power of the aforesaid Sañyama at the last stage is “emancipating” (Tāraka). That whereby Yogīs are ferried over the unfathomable ocean of the world has the significant name of Tāraka, (the emancipating). He describes its object; it is a “omni objective” (sarva-vishaya); all categories from the Mahat downward are its objects, and therefore it is omni-objective. Its characteristic is its semper-objectivity (sarvathāvishAYatva). That which has for its objects the categories in all conditions, whether gross or subtile, in all their modifications, and existing in all forms, is always semper-objective. Another characteristic of it is “instantaneousness” (akrama). Being finally modified it has to make no progress in accepting two, three or one form, hence “instantaneous,” i.e., (a Yogi in this stage) perceives everything at once, like an emblē fruit in the palm of one’s hand.

[The discriminative knowledge aforesaid is here more fully explained. It grasps all the categories and therefore the whole
universe. It makes them its object at all times, and its knowledge is never absent. It acts instantaneously, because it has the whole thing before it, and needs no process of observation and reticulation to come to an understanding. And everything being known by it, it effects emancipation, for emancipation means true knowledge.]

He now says what results from this emancipating knowledge proceeding from discrimination.

LV.

On the purification of the quality of goodness and of soul becoming equal, (there results) isolation.

"The quality of goodness and soul" have already been defined. When their purification becomes equal there is isolation. The "purification" (suddhi) of the quality of goodness of the thinking principle is effected when, on the cessation of the assumption of agency, it merges into its first cause. The purification of soul is the absence of its factitious enjoyment. When the two are equally purified (in this way), isolation is effected with regard to the soul, i.e., it is emancipated.

[The thinking principle ordinarily fancies itself to be the agent of all work, i.e., it is conscious of being the actor in all cases, and this is its natural function; but when this feeling is removed by discriminative knowledge, it reverts to its primary original condition, and ceases to cherish any idea of its being the actor, and this is its purification. Similarly soul, though itself devoid of action, is always engaged in an unnatural factitious enjoyment of the fruits of work by its association with the thinking principle, and when that association is removed it is purified. And this double purification, the cessation of the thinking principle from fancying itself the actor and consequent submersion into its original cause, and the removal of the association between the soul and the thinking principle, effects the isolation or separation of the soul from all attachments, and this is emancipation from the bondage of the world.]
Thus have been described in this chapter the three principal components of the Yoga, (i—iii); their collective name Sañyama, (iv); the merits of that Sañyama, (v—x); the three modifications of things, the antecedent, the middle, the postecedent conditions, (xi—xvi); the Siddhis (xvii); the external perfections giving knowledge of regions (xviii—xxviii); the internal perfections, giving knowledge of the organization of the body (xxix—xli); the organs (xli); the stages of control of matter and organizations (xli—xlvi); the means of attaining discriminative knowledge, the emancipating knowledge, the highest Samadhi (xlix—l); the subsidence of the thinking principle in its primary cause and isolation (l—liv). These are the subjects described in this chapter on perfections. (Condensed as before.)

This is the end of the third quarter, or the quarter on perfections, of the commentary, entitled Rājamārtanda, on Patanjali’s Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

I adore that solitary, unborn Isána who is made up solely of thinking principle and bliss, and by whose fiat isolation is produced without (the aid of) any special means.

Now the author commences the chapter on Isolation with a view to establish by inferential arguments and by refutation of errors resulting from mistaken convictions, the true nature of Isolation. And by showing that the perfections aforesaid result from birth and various other causes, he demonstrates that they appear with the help of the power resulting from the practice of Samádhi in former births and from causes in this life from the time of birth. Further, with a view to afford assurance that no harm is done to Samádhi which may be achieved in course of many births, and to prove the preeminence of the completion of Samádhi as also for the consummation of the isolating Yoga, he says:—

I.

The Perfections are produced by birth, herb, incantations, austerity, or Samádhi.

Some perfections are caused by birth, as the power of flying in the air and the like in birds, or the perfected qualities of knowledge manifesting themselves immediately after birth, as in the great sage Kapila and others. Perfections from herbs—as firmness of the boy, &c. produced by the use of elixirs in Pátála and such like places. Perfections from incantations—as ascent in the air by the repetition of particular mantras. Perfections from austerity—as in the case of Visvámitra and others. Perfections from Samádhi—as already described in the preceding chapter.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

These perfections result in those persons who have destroyed pain in previous births; hence, as in the case of perfection by Samádhi, so in the case of others, the real cause is the practice of Samádhi in former births; incantations, &c. are merely instruments.

[The word Siddhi comes from the root sish 'to accomplish,' and means something accomplished. Transcendental powers attainable by the performance of Sañyama, are perfections accomplished by special means and therefore called Siddhis or perfections; and having used that English equivalent elsewhere I have thought fit, for the sake of uniformity, to use it in the above aphorism. It is, however, not fully expressive here. Special powers, or faculties would have been much more expressive and to the point, the purport of the aphorism being that some faculties are derived from birth, some from herbs, some from incantations, some from the practice of austerities, and some from Samádhi. This general principle is laid down with a view to prepare the way to what follows.]

It might be contended that since in Nandíś'vara and others the change of kind, &c., were effected in this life, how can you then establish the causality of the practice of Samádhi in previous lives? In reply to this, he says:

II.

Change of kind (results) from transmutation of the material cause.

The "change of kind," &c., in Nandíś'vara and others in this life (were produced) by "the transmutation of material causes" (prakṛitydpúrát). Future materials (or materials which are ordinarily produced in a subsequent life, come up and), produce in this life the transmutations, i. e., they change themselves into other kinds.

[The general principle having been laid down in the first aphorism that special faculties are produced by five causes, the question arises, how does the body, which is produced by birth, change even in this life, the material cause remaining unaltered,
and the Samádhi performed in a previous life no thaving effected any change at birth? The reply is that Samádhi is not the material but an instrumental cause, and it prepares the way for the selfmutation of the material cause.

Prakriti is here used in the sense of material cause, or the materials of which the body is made up. Ápráraṇa is to fill up. The two words together mean “the materials fill up,” i.e., they undergo the necessary transmutations to change one kind into another. The purport is that even in this life the materials of the body may so change as to convert a Bráhmana’s body into a divine one, as in the case of Nándisvarara, or a Kshatriyá body into a Bráhmana one, as in the case of Visvámitra, and consequently the exception taken to the argument put forth in the first aphorism to the effect that “birth, &c. are causes of perfection” is not tenable. By the use of the word páśchátya, ‘future’, the commentator means that the changes which in ordinary course would take place in a future life, take place in exceptional cases in this life.

It may be argued that merits, demerits, &c., are in such cases seen to be resulting (in this life when their fruits would not under the theory be liable to manifestation), how can we then attribute to them causality in the transmutation of the material cause in this life? To this the author says:

III.

In the mutation of the material cause merit is non-efficient: from it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman.

“Merit” (nimitta), virtue, &c. In the transformation of the material cause merit is non-efficient, for a cause cannot be set in motion by an effect. Where then is there the operation of virtue, &c.? To this he says: “From it proceeds the piercing of the covering, as in the case of the husbandman.” “From it,” from the performance of virtuous acts, &c., proceeds “the piercing” (bheda) or destruction of whatever “covering” (varaṇa) obstruc-
tion, such as vice, &c., exists, the two being mutually antagonistic, and the obstruction being destroyed, the material causes themselves become effective in their desiderated work. This he illustrates by an example. "As in the case of a husbandman." Even as a husbandman or farmer, wishing to carry water from one field to another, pierces only the obstacle to the flow of water, and that being pierced, water itself assumes the modification of expansion, without any exertion on the part of the husbandman to the expansion of water, so should be understood to be the case with regard to virtue, &c.

[Following the line of argument adopted in the preceding aphorism, the author shows that virtue, &c., are not the immediate causes of the change which takes place when a Brâhmana becomes a god, as in the case of Nandîśvara, but that they serve the subsidiary purpose of removing the obstacles which stand in the way of the change, and the change takes place by itself. The illustration given puts this very clearly. The husbandman does not make the water flow, he only removes the obstacles, and then the water flows by itself from its own inherent tendency to follow the law of gravitation.]

When a Yogî, who has a mastery over the cardinal principles, with a view to enjoy at once the fruits of his actions, from the perception of his own superior transcendental powers, wishes to assume many bodies at the same time, whence does he derive many thinking principles (to vitalize those bodies)? In reply to this question the author, says:

IV.

The created thinking principles (proceed) solely from egoism.

The thinking principles which animate the bodies created by a Yogî, proceed through his will solely from their original cause, i.e., from egoism. They emanate at once as sparks from a fire.

[Among the perfections mentioned in chapter III the power of multiplying one's own body, so as to produce many where there is one, is not mentioned, but here it is taken for granted that
an accomplished Yogi possesses this power, and that he does produce them to effect quickly his emancipation by simultaneously performing in many bodies those works which promote his end, and the question is raised as to how does a Yogi, who creates many bodies and himself animates them all, provide a thinking principle for each of them? The answer given is that through his will he makes his egoism send forth the needful, even as a fire sends forth sparks from itself. This multiplication of bodies is called खययुष्व योग or the Yoga of many bodies.]

Then, how do numerous thinking principles, having diversity of objects, produce one effect? To this, he replies:

V.

In the diverse tendency of the many the impelling thinking principle is one.

"In the diverse tendency" (प्राविश्विषेव) or multifunctionality of the many thinking principles the one thinking principle of the Yogi is the impelling force or actuator, because it is the ruler, and therefore there is no difference of object. The meaning is—that as in its own body the mind directs the eyes, the hands, &c., according to its will, from its being the ruler, so does it in the other bodies.

[In the preceding aphorism the question having been solved as to how a single individual can provide thinking principles for many bodies, the question arises as to how can many thinking principles act in concert and preserve the unity of the creator? If this unity be not admitted, there would be so many independent individuals, each following the bent of his own mind, and the idea of one individual acting as many without any loss of individuality, would be lost. This doubt is removed by the explanation that the thinking principles provided to the many are in reality one, and entirely controlled by the primary thinking principle, of which they are mere scintillations.]

The thinking principle which belongs to the perfections resulting from birth, &c., are produced by the same five causes,
and yet the thinking principle produced by Samâdhi is distinct from the others. To show this he says:

VI.

Thereof the meditation-born one is without any residua.

"The meditation-born" (dhyânaja) thinking principle or that which is produced by Samâdhi, is, among the five, the one which is "without any residua" (anásaya), i. e., without any residua of (former) work. This is the meaning.

[Thinking principles are said to be of five kinds, because they proceed severally from birth, herbs, incantation, penances, and meditation (A. 1). The word used (ja), means "born," but the object is not to imply that the thinking principles are actually born of herbs, incantations, &c., but to indicate the training, habit of thought, disposition or impurities which it acquires under the five different circumstances. The first four are said to depend on the residua of former works, and the last to have nothing to rest upon, it being self-supporting, i. e., not resulting from the residua of any former work.]

To show that the thinking principle of the Yogi is distinct in its work, even as it is distinct from other thinking principles in being devoid of pain, &c., he says:

VII.

The work of a Yogi is neither white nor black: those of others are of three kinds.

That work which produces good fruit, such as sacrifices, &c., is "white" (sukla). That which produces a bad result, such as Brâhmaṇicide, is "black" (krishṇa). That which is mixed up of the two, is white-black (sukla-kṛishṇa). Thereof, the white work belongs to wise people, to those who are engaged in charity, asceticism, the study of the Vedas, &c.; the black belongs to the vicious; and the white-black (or mixed kind) to ordinary men. As regards Yogis, who have performed the Sañyama, work is of a
different character to these: their work produces no fruit, for they undertake it after renouncing all desire for fruition.

[In the first three kinds of work fruition is inseparable. The wise give alms, perform penances, read the Vedas, display their benevolence, &c. &c. and derive the fruits thereof; the vicious commit wicked actions and suffer for the same; ordinary mortals are sometimes engaged in good actions and sometimes in bad ones, and suffer or enjoy accordingly. The Yogis, who renounce the fruits of all actions, can neither suffer nor enjoy from what they do, and hence their work is declared to be distinct from the works of others. They are, in the language of the Bhagavadgītā, like the lotus-leaf which, lying on water or having water on it, is never wetted.]

Now he describes the fruit of such works.

VIII.

Thence proceeds the manifestation of the residua which are suitable to its fruition.

Now, the residua of works produce two sorts of fruits, one sort being memory only, and the other, kind, age, and experience. Thereof, those residua which have for their fruition kind, age, and experience which are derivable in one or many births, have already been described above (p. 69). Of those the only fruit of which is memory, the manifestation proceeds from the same works. Even as work produces a body, whether as a Deva, or a human being, or a lower animal, so does it by its maturity lead to a corresponding manifestation of residua (vāsanī). The meaning is this. Should a celestial or other body once acquired by a certain work be acquired even after the interposition of a hundred other births the memorial residua of the former state will manifest themselves again. Their memory revives according to circumstances, even when residing in other regions. In the intermediate states, though existing, they remain in a latent condition. Nor do the residua produced in course of existence in hell and other places become evident then.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

[For the sake of verbal fidelity I have used memory as the equivalent of the Sanskrit term Smṛiti of the commentary; but the object aimed at is not memory in its ordinary signification, but the remembrance in one life of appetites, desires, and affections of a preceding one. These results manifest themselves in, what in European philosophy is called, instinct. They are remembrances, because they arise without any conscious purpose, though they are not without consciousness. European philosophers, who do not recognise transmigration, finding Instinct to be opposed to Reason, take it to be something distinct from it—a distinct faculty. In its widest signification it extends to living beings in general—to plants as well as to animals,—but for psychological purposes it is limited by Dugald Stewart to Appetites, Desires, and Affections. Butler changes Desires into Passions, but without any material change of purport. Dr. Bain says "Instinct is untaught ability," (Mental and Moral Science, Bk. III, c. IV), and this is amplified by Hamilton into "an agent which performs blindly and ignorantly a work of intelligence and knowledge." (Reid's Works, p. 761a.) Paley has "a propensity prior to experience, and independent of instruction." Milton calls it "Reason discursive or intuitive." These definitions have been summed up into "untaught ability," "untaught propensity," "unconscious purpose." It is opposed to Habit, which is the result of tuition and exercise, and distinct from Reason, which presupposes argumentation and deliberation. The memory of our text is Instinct as defined above; but our author does not recognise spontaneity in anything, nor purpose independent of Reason. He attributes the etiology of Instinct to residua left in the thinking principle by rational action, and the said residua lie dormant till they are made vivid in a subsequent life. Habits leave their residua exactly in the same way as other actions, and they not only become manifest in the next life, but also in the progeny, as in the cases of pointers and other animals. In short, according to our author, Reason is one and the sole faculty of all knowing, the only principle of certain,
ty, and it manifests itself as Reason or Instinct differently under
different circumstance. Anyhow, the meaning of our author
will be best understood by replacing his Memory by Instinct.

The aphorism under notice explains the fruit of work as mani-
fested by Instinct. Having already described that work leads to
two kinds of fruit, Instinct and deserts, or in his language memory
and kind, age and experience, he now says that Instinct does not
manifest itself uniformly at every successive birth, but according
to circumstances when it is needed in subsequent lives, even
after many interruptions, the residua for it remaining dormant
during such interruption. Thus, a man born in the next life
as a dog having no occasion for his human instincts, acts as a
dog, but twenty or more generations after, when he is again
born as a man, his early instincts revive, and he acts according
to them. This is the theory which the aphorism explains by
saying that residua manifest themselves in conformity to the
fruition of work. When a work entails existence as a serpent,
those residua become manifest which are appropriate to such an
existence, but not those which are appropriate for other forms
of life. In other words, residua remain dormant or in a
potential state until the necessary excitants are in operation.
The S. P. Bhāshya, explains this by saying, “when a celestial
work is in fruition, it does not become the cause of manifestation
of the residua of infernal, brutal or human states; it then enlivens
only those residua which are conformable to a celestial existence.”
(Na hi daivam karma vipachyamānam nāraka-tiryaḥ-manushya-
vāsanābhīvyakti-nimittam bhavati kintu daivaṇugunā evāya
vāsanā vyajante). The purport is that each kind of existence
brings to light its own appropriate residua.]

Doubt having been produced of there existing any causal
relation in these residua, he establishes it by saying:

IX.

From the uniformity of memory and residua there
is uninterruptibility of relation, even after breaks by
caste, locality and time.
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Of worldly beings transmigrating in diverse forms, when one, after experiencing one form, attains that form again after an interruption of a thousand other births, the residua of impressions appropriate to that state, which had been formed at the first birth and had become latent from want of the necessary conditions, become manifest on the attainment of that suitable state. Thus, there is, notwithstanding breaks caused by caste, locality and time, an "uninterruptibility" (ánantarya) or continuity in producing their own necessary fruit of memory. How so? "From the uniformity of memory and residua." Thus, on the performance of a work there is produced a deposit of residuum on the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, and that is the germ of the fruits of heaven, hell, &c.; or it is the residua of works such as sacrifices &c. It exists as a latent power, or as a power of the actor in relation to experience and experiencer. From these residua proceeds memory, from memory the experiencing of pleasure and pain, and from that experience again come residua, memory, &c. It is true that where memory and residua are different there is, from want of uninterruptibility, a difficulty in producing a relation of cause and effect; but in our case here, where impressions become residua, and residua merge into memory, and they reside in concord in one thinking principle, the relation of cause and effect is not difficult or hard of effectuation.

[According to the preceding aphorism the residua of former births are the causes of manifestation of certain effects; but, since concomitance is necessary between cause and effect while the intervention of many dissimilar births between two similar causes an interruption, it may be argued that residua are not the causes of memory, as alleged. This objection is met by saying that the memory remains, and therefore sequence is obviously not broken. The memory of sucking the teats on the part of an infant returns after many births, whenever that infant is again born as a human being, though it does not manifest itself when the same infant is born as a bird or a serpent, and it shows
that the memory is not lost. Hence the relation of cause and effect is not broken.]

Admitting the uninterruptibility of residua, and their relation as cause and effect, it may be asked when an impression first takes place is it caused by residua, or without a cause? To solve this doubt, he says:

X.

There is no beginning about them, because of the eternity of desire.

"About them," i.e., about or in regard to residua. "No beginning" (anāditva), that which has no commencement. The meaning is, these have no beginning. How? "Because of the eternity of desire." This "desire" (āśīha) or longing of an intensely delusive character—(manifesting itself in such wishes as) 'may the means of effecting my pleasure be always mine; may there never be a separation between me and them'—is the cause of residua, and that being eternal there is no beginning. This is the meaning. What is meant is this: From the proximity of the cause the tendency of the functions of impressions and residua cannot be checked, and the thinking principle, from its expansible and contractile character, pierced by the impressions, residua and the like, modifies itself when it attains each appropriate existence.

[The theory of Instincts being the result of action in former lives is open to the grave objection that it does not account for Instinct in the first instance. A being born for the first time should have, according to the theory, no Instinct. The initial impression must therefore be causeless, and so there is no reason to admit that residua are the causes of effect, i.e., of birth, age and experience. This objection is met in this aphorism by saying that Desire is eternal, and therefore there is no necessity for a beginning. Desire is essential to existence; there would be no existence if there was no Desire; and that Desire produces residua, and so there is no break in the course of eternity. The
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opponent wished to expose the fallacy of the argument regarding residua being the cause of Intuition by showing that there could be no residua at the first start, and the author accepts a regressus in infinitum to surmount the difficulty. According to him the universe had no beginning and will never end, and therefore there is no occasion to seek a beginning.

From their infinity it being doubtful that the residua can ever be destroyed, he points out the means of destroying them.

XI.

Since they are agglomerated by cause, effect, substratum and support, their absence would produce the absence of the others.

Conception (anubhava) is the cause of residua; desire, &c., are the causes of conceptions; and of them the cause is ignorance. Thus is (ignorance) both the immediate and the mediate "cause" (hetu). "Effect" (phala) is body, memory, &c. "Substratum" (āśraya) is the intellectual principle. "Support" (ālambana or object of desire) is the same for both conceptions and residua. Now, since these infinite residua are collected by these cause, effect, substratum and support, when they are absent, i.e., when they may be likened to roasted seeds, on their being burnt by knowledge and Yoga, there being no root left, the residua cannot sprout, nor lead to action, and thus they are destroyed.

[Now the question is raised, how can one undo that which is eternal? and the answer given is—since desires proceed from, or are the sum total of, cause, effect, substratum and support, one has to remove those conditions which produce desires, and that removal ipso facto removes desires. The removal is effected by the aid of Yoga. Yoga knowledge parches cause, effect, substratum, and support by exposing their real nature, and when so parched, they become, like roasted seeds, unfit for germination, and their destruction follows as a matter of course. Of course this is limited to the individual who effects the parching, and does not extend to the world at large.]
It may be questioned, that since the thinking principle is being constantly destroyed, and there is a difference in their relation as cause and effect from their want of simultaneity between residua and their effects, how can there be a unity? To prove the unity, he says:

XII.

(The thinking principle) exists in its proper nature; the past and the future (result) from differences in the condition of qualities.

The (possibility of) production of things which are absolutely non-existent is unreasonable, from their want of relation to existence. Nowhere has there been any relation to existence in the horns of a hare.

In the case of a nonentity as an effect, with what design can causes proceed to act? None enters into action for a false object, and it being opposed to entity there is no relation of nonentity to it. When truth attains its own identity, how can it become baseless and untrue? The meaning is, it cannot accept an antagonistic form. Hence from there being no possibility of the destruction of existence, and from the impossibility of the origin of non-existence, the qualified, convertible by qualities, always remains in one form. The qualities, alone, change into their threefold conditions. Attaining each condition, the qualified forsakes its original form, and, remaining in the present condition, attains the state of objects of enjoyment. Hence in this science are established the distinctions of the past and future conditions of qualities, and of their relation to each other as cause and effect. Hence, too, the same thinking principle is made to exist as the qualified until isolation, and none can prevent it.

[The removal suggested in the preceding aphorism suggests the idea of destruction; but that is not possible. Nothing can proceed from non-existence, and no existence can be absolute non-existence, and the difficulty is solved by referring to the
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doctrine explained in A. 14 C. III which recognizes a threefold condition of existence, the antecedent, the postcedent, and the present. Matter is eternal, and remains always an existence; but its conditions vary; accordingly when the present condition of a thing is destroyed, the thing reverts to one or other of its two other conditions, and the parching of the seeds implies their resolution into the antecedent condition. This is the theory of Moderate Nominalism or Conceptualism with its threefold condition of Universalia ante rem, as thoughts in the mind of God; Universalia in re, as the essence (quiddity) of things; and Universalia post rem, as concepts. The text looks to thoughts or ideas or plastic types without reference to God.]

He now describes of what forms these qualified and the qualities are.

XIII.

They are individualised or subtile, and consist of qualities.

The qualities and the qualified described above are divided into the individualised and the subtile. The “qualities” (gunāḥ) are of the forms of goodness, foulness, and darkness. “To consist of” (tadātmānāḥ) is to be of that nature, or to be modified to that form: this is the meaning. Since there is seen a concomitance in all persons, both externally and internally, through goodness, foulness, and darkness in the forms of pleasure, pain and delusion, of individuals and conceptions, and since it is found that which is concomitant is also its modified form, as in the case of jars which are concomitants of earth are also modified forms of earth, therefore the modification of qualities is evident.

[The simple proposition in this aphorism is that all attributes are mere modifications of the three primary qualities. Circumstances may make them subtile or gross, but, whether one or the other, they consist of nothing but the three qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness modified in some one form or another. They are mere modes of being, but not radically different beings.]
Apprehending the doubt that if all these three qualities be the chief causes everywhere, how can we talk of one qualified (or one substratum of quality) ? he says:

XIV.

From unity of modification (results) unity of a thing.

Although there are three qualities, yet their modification into the member and the membered, (in some cases goodness becoming the membered, in some cases foulness, and in others darkness,) being one, "unity" (tattva) or oneness is admitted. Thus, in the examples this is the earth, this is the air, &c., (in which unity is observed, for earth is a modification of darkness, and air of foulness.)

[The purport is that as only one modification can take place of the thinking principle at a time, the unity of a thing is never disturbed. The thinking principle under similar circumstances changes exactly in the same way, and no difference can possibly result. In other words, as the three qualities can be only separately ascendant, one at a time, the simultaneous perception of the effects of all the three cannot be effected; and this meets the objection raised in the preamble.]

Had objects existed distinct from cognition it would be proper to talk of the unity or multiplicity of objects, but when cognition itself from the influence of residua existing in the relation of cause and effect, appears in different shapes, how can you say so? In reply to this question, he says:

XV.

Even in the sameness of object, the course of the two are distinct, from diversity of the thinking principle.

"Of the two," of the cognition and the cognizable, the course is distinct, follow different or separate roads. How so? From diversity of thinking principles even in the sameness of object.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

Even in similar things, as the attainment of women and the like, differences of thinking are noticeable in different observers from the resulting sensations of pleasure, pain and delusion. Thus, on beholding a beautiful and attractive woman, pleasure is felt by an amorous person, enmity by her rival, and disgust by an ascetic. And since these different kinds of feeling arise from one object there can be no agency in the thing itself. If it be said that object is the effect of our thinking principle only, the object would appear in one form only. Also, if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle then there would be no other thing extant when that thinking principle would be occupied with one thing. (If it be said) be it so, we deny it. For how could that thing then be beheld by many others? And since it is so beheld, it cannot be an effect of the thinking principle. If it be said that it is created by many at the same time, the reply would be that there would be a difference between a work produced by many, and a work produced by one. And if the difference be not admitted, then there being difference of cause without a difference of effect, the universe would be either causeless, or uniform. What is said is this: should there be no difference of effect when the causes are different, then the whole universe resulting from many causes would either be of one form, or not following the different causes, be causeless from its independence (of the causes). And if it is so (it may be asked) why does it not, being made of the three qualities, produce in the same percipient the sensations (simultaneously) of pleasure, pain and delusion? The case is not so. Even as the object consists of three qualities, so is the thinking principle made up of three qualities, and in its perception of objects, merits and demerits are accessory causes, and from their prevalence or depression results the manifestation of the thinking principle in such and such (varying) forms. Thus in the presence of a woman near an amorous person, his thinking principle, disposed towards merit through the influence of the quality of goodness, becomes full of pleasure. From the co-operation of the quality of foulness, which is auxiliary to vice,
for all rival wives, it becomes painful. Similarly from the co-operation of the quality of darkness, which is attended by ardent vice, it becomes to angry rival wives the cause of delusion. Hence the cognizable object is independent of cognition, and consequently cognizable and cognition, being contradictory in their natures, cannot bear the relation of cause and effect. Thus it being possible without any difference in the cause for the existence of a difference in effect from their relation, the independence of cognition from the object is established.

[The question discussed in the preceding aphorism raises a doubt as to whether perception is due to objects or to the cognitive power. It cannot be said that objects produce perception, for in that case a given object would always and everywhere produce the same sensation, as a given cause cannot produce dissimilar effects. A handsome woman should be a handsome woman to all beholders, without a distinction. In the world this is, however, not the case. A woman produces very dissimilar feelings in different beholders, and she, as the object, cannot therefore be said to be the cause of perception. On the other hand, the thinking principle cannot be the cause, for if you accept it to be one in all persons, it, as a cause, cannot produce different effects; and if you accept it to be different in different individuals, dissimilar causes would lead to one uniform result, which is impossible. The solution offered is that thinking principle and object are different, but inasmuch as both are governed by the three qualities, the prevalence of a particular quality at a particular time in the thinking principle produces a difference in the perception of an object. The "diversity of the thinking principle" in the text implies a diversity in its condition as regards the state of the qualities working within it. The argument here is the same which European philosophers discuss with reference to sensations and sensibles; and the optional use of jñāna and vijñāna by our author shows that he means cognition or sensation and perception, and not the higher knowledge elsewhere indicated by the
word jnána. I have used for it cognition after Mr. Jardine, who defines it as "a general name which we may apply to all those mental states in which there is made known in consciousness either some affection or activity of the mind itself, or some external quality or object." ('The Elements of the Psychology of Cognition,' p. 1). The object to which this jnána or cognition is applied is jneya or cognizable, which is just the same with idea as used by Locke, who says, "it is the term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks; I have used it to express whatever is meant by phenomena, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Idea, however, has been used in so many varying senses by European metaphysicians that I have thought it safe to confine myself to cognizable or object, as least likely to cause misconceptions. The theory of eternity of matter is here made the basis of the argument.

Since a cognition, being an illuminator, is by nature perceptive, and the object, being susceptible of illumination, is by nature perceivable, why should cognition not perceive and recollect all things simultaneously? With a view to remove such doubt, he says:

XVI.

A thing is known or unknown from its dependence on its change of form in the thinking principle.

"Its" of the object. "From its change of form" (uparágát). From its producing forms in the thinking principle, an external object becomes known or unknown. The meaning is this: in the attainment of their production all things depend on the conjunction of their causes. The production of the cognition of a blue or other colour depends on the accessory cause of the form being brought forward as an object through the passage of the organs of sensation; perception being impossible without the object, since there is no correlation. Hence, by whatever object is the form of cognition modified, that object is brought
into cognition, i.e., that object becomes known. That which does not give its shape (to the thinking principle) is held to be unknown. Similarly, recollection is produced of that object which, having been known before, has left residua in the mind, and which residua, excited by a similar object, acting as the accessory cause, brings it to our knowledge. Hence, neither cognition, nor memory is constant everywhere, nor is there any inconsistency.

[The argument mooted in the last aphorism is further developed by saying that the effect of the qualities is transmitted to the thinking principle through the object seen, and the thinking principle is thereby modified differently under different circumstances. The qualities act from two different directions, first in the thinking principle apart from the object, and next in the object, and through it in the thinking principle. A man in a passion has the quality of foulness prevalent in him, and then that foulness affects everything he sees, though it is not foul; and when all the qualities are calm in him, he sees a foul action, and the foulness of that action enters within him and tinges his thinking principle from without.]

To remove the doubt that since the perceiving soul does not perceive a yellow colour when it perceives a blue, there is liability of its assuming, like the thinking principle, different shapes, or being modified from its being at times the perceiver, he says:

XVII.

The functions of the thinking principle are always known, for its presiding soul is unmodifiable.

All the functions of the thinking principle—characterised as they are by proofs, misconceptions, &c.,—are "always," i.e., at all times, known to its percipient soul, since it is unmodifiable, or wanting in liability to change from its being of the form of the intellect (chidrīpa). Were it mutable, the constant perceptibility of those functions would not follow, the mutability
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being (necessarily) occasional. The meaning is this. The soul of
the form of intellect always remaining as the presiding principle,
and its intimate associate, the pure element, the thinking principle,
being also always present, by whatever object it (the latter)
is modified in shape there is the probability of that object
being always brought into contact with the shadow of the
former (soul, chit); and such being the case it is established
that there is constant perceptibility, and never can there be
any apprehension of change.

[Having explained the relation of cognition to cognizables,
and the rationale of the process by which things become known or
unknown, the author proceeds to explain how it is that the thinking
principle, which, under the circumstances alleged, is always chang-
ing and assuming new forms, should still be able to know different
objects, or have the power of understanding: The thinking
principle is admitted to be in se unconscious, and is itself under-
going constant modifications, and cannot therefore exercise intelli-
gence, and be itself the cause of knowledge. But, says the author,
its presiding soul is constant and immutable, and associated with
that soul it derives reflected intelligence, and by its aid it is always
able to know whatever external object casts its shadow on it. In
other words, though the thinking principle is itself unconscious,
it derives intelligence from the soul which is pure intelligence
and absolutely immutable. The P. Bhāskya explains the aphorism
by saying, “had the presiding soul been liable, like the thinking
principle, to constant mutation, then objects or the functions
of the thinking principle would have become, like sounds and
other objects, sometimes known and sometimes unknown to it;
but constant consciousness (lit. perceptibility) of the mind is
indicated by the immutability of its presiding soul.” (Yadé
chittavat prabhurapi purushah parinameta tataddivishayā chitta-
vrīttayah sabdādivishayavat jñātājñātāh syuh, sadājnātātvantu
manasastatprabhoh purushasyāparināmitvamanumāpayati.) This
idea is further developed in other commentaries.]

Now it may be said that since the thinking principle itself,
from excess of the quality of goodness, it can from its self-illumination, illuminate both itself and the object, and the act of perception can thereby be completed, what is the use of the assumption of a separate percipient? To allay this doubt, he says:

XVIII.

It is not self-illuminative, since it is perceptible.

"It," the thinking principle, is not "self-illuminative" (svābhāsa), expositor of itself, but it is perceptible by the soul. How so? Because it is "perceptible." A perceptible is known by a percipient, as in the case of a water-jar or the like. The thinking principle is an object of perception, and therefore it is not self-illuminative.

[The argument in the next preceding aphorism would suggest the idea that the thinking principle, whether directly or indirectly, was itself the perceivcr, and that being the case there is no necessity for assuming a separate perceiver. Where one assumption is sufficient, two are not needed. This objection of the opponent is refuted in the aphorism under notice, by saying that the thinking principle cannot be the percipient, or self-illuminative, because it is itself an object of perception. That which is an object of perception cannot itself be percipient; and the commentator illustrates this by citing the example of a water-jar, which, as an object of perception, cannot know itself. The P. Bhāṣya elaborates the argument by saying, "Even as the other organs and their objects, such as audition, &c., cannot be self-illuminative from the circumstance of their being perceivables, the mind should be so known. Nor can fire be an example in this instance; for even fire cannot make its own hidden identity visible. Manifestation is seen to result from the conjunction of a manifestator with a manifestable, and such conjunction cannot take place with one's own identity. Besides if the theory of self-illuminativeness of the thinking principle be admitted, it would not be perceptible to any body else." (Yathetarāṇīndriyā-
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ni šabdiādayetaka drisyatvānna svābhāsāni tathā manopī pratye-
tavyam. Na chāgiratra dṛṣṭāntam. Naḥyagnirāmsvarūpam-
prakāśam prakāśayati. Prakāśaśchāyam prakāśya-prakāśaka
saṅyoge dṛṣṭah, na cha svarūpamātreśī saṅyoyah kiṃcha svā-
bhāsam chittamityagrāhyameva kasyachiditi.) The illustration
of fire becomes appropriate on the assumption that it owes its
luminosity to itself. But the luminosity contemplated by the
term svābhāsa is knowledge, and not light. In fact, the light
of the text can be understood only by substituting for it the
word knowledge, throughout the discussion.]

It may be said that the argument here has accepted the pro-
position, (i. e., it involves a petitio principii), for the percepti-
bility of the thinking principle has not yet been established.
Besides, in men the functions of accepting that which is good
and rejecting that which is injurious are made manifest through
the consciousness of one's own intellect; and such feelings as
"I am angry," "I am afraid," "I have no desire," cannot be
produced without the consciousness of the intellect (and since
they are, the agency of the soul is not needed.) To meet
this argument, he says:

XIX.

Attention cannot be directed to both at the same
time.

The understanding of an object is the establishment of its
usefulness by (knowing it to be) this—this is the object which
is the cause of pleasure or pain. The understanding of the intellect
is the establishment of the use of that object through pleasure or
pain in the form of I (or the ego). In the perception of an
object two such kinds of understanding cannot be effected at the
same time, for there is a contradiction. There is no possibility
of effecting two contradictory actions simultaneously, and there-
fore it is not possible to perceive "both," i. e., cognition and
cognizable at the same time. Hence, it is laid down that the
thinking principle is not self-illuminative. Further, even if
two such actions could be accomplished, their fruits could not result, for there cannot be an apprehension of the two fruits, because the thinking principle being directed outwards to grasp an object cannot know itself. The result is confined only to the object, and not to itself. This is the meaning.

[The opponent again comes to the charge, and says that the intellect or understanding may supply the place of the soul, for the thinking principle may see, and the intellect may decide about the nature of the sight. The author demurs to this by saying two such functions cannot take place simultaneously, or the thinking principle cannot see and argue at the same time. The sensation of hunger is first felt, and then its nature discussed. The thinking principle must undergo two modifications, once to feel, and then to consider, and these it cannot undergo at once; so these two acts can never take place simultaneously, and consequently it cannot be said that the thinking principle is alone sufficient to account for consciousness and knowledge: a separate cause must be assigned for these two feelings, and that cause is the soul. The P. Bhāṣya pithily disposes of the question by saying, "It is not possible to behold one's own self and another at the same time, for it leads to the theory of the momentarists who hold action, effect and cause to be the same." (Na chaikasmin kshane svapararūpā-vadhāraṇam yuktam, kshanikavādino yad bhavanam saiva kriyā tadeva cha kārakamityabhhyupagamah.) The meaning of the aphorism is simply that the thinking principle cannot perform the two acts of perception and self-knowing at the same time, and therefore it is obvious that it cannot by itself be the cause of intelligence.]

Let it be admitted that a cognition cannot be self-perceptive, still may it not be perceived by another cognition? Assuming such a question, he says:

XX.

If one cognition be the perceptible of another, there would be an excessiveness of cognitions to
cognitions, and also a confusion of memory.

If one cognition could cognize another, then that cognition being itself unintelligent and unable to illuminate another, we must assume a third cognition and for it another, and so on, and a thing could not be perceived in the whole lifetime of a man. Nor can an object be known when the cognition remains unknown.

It leads also to "confusion of memory." On a particular colour or a taste being produced in a cognition there would arise an endless series of cognitions to perceive it, and when the resida left by a former cognition would attempt to recall it to memory there would arise, from there being no break in the ideas of cognitions and objects, cognitions and memories simultaneously, and hence, it being impossible to make out with reference to what object the recollection has arisen, there would be a confusion of memory, i.e., it would not be known that this is the memory of colour and this is the memory of taste.

[The explanation above given leaves the door open to the assumption that one cognition may perceive another, and thus obviate the necessity of assuming the agency of the soul, i.e., each individual may have many cognitions which co-operate with each other in producing knowledge of a particular object. To preclude this theory, the author brings forward the argument of regressus in infinitum. If one cognition could perceive another, we would require a third to perceive the second, and so on, and there would be no end to the chain. It would, he urges, also lead to a confusion of memory, for on one idea being called to memory all its attendant ideas would arise to infinity, and it would be impossible to determine which is the particular idea that has been revived.]

The question may then be asked, if, in the absence of self-perceptive power in cognitions (buddhi), one cognition cannot be known by another, how do we use the idea this is the perception of an object? To remove this doubt, he expounds his conclusion.
XXI.

The intellection of its own cognition takes place when it takes its form through the non-transitional soul.

"Soul" (purusha), being of the form of intelligence, is called chiti (intellect). It is "non-transitional" (apratisañkramā), that which has no transition or passing into another place is so called: by this is meant that it does not mix with anything. In the modification of the member and the membered, the (three) qualities, (as members) in passing into the qualified or membered, assume their forms, and in the world atoms, moving on, produce the forms of objects; but the power of intellection (i.e., soul) does not do so, because it always retains its own form, inasmuch as it exists in itself. Hence when the thinking principle, being near it, assumes its shape, intellection takes place; and when the soul, by its contact with the function of the thinking principle being endowed with understanding, cognizes, then the knowing of the thinking principle of its own self takes place.

[The soul never undergoes any modification, but by its reflection on the thinking principle that principle derives its intelligence, and that intelligent state is therefore said to be attained through the non-transitional soul. It is then chiti or intelligence, because for the time being it has intelligence in it, and this is explained by the commentator. When the thinking principle in its intelligent state assumes the form of an object, it is able to know its own notions. The P. Bhāṣya explains the text by saying, "unmodifiable is the power of experiencing; it is also non-transitional. On its reflection falling on the excessively modifiable (the thinking principle) the functions of the latter reflect on it. Thereupon people call it the function of understanding from its imitating the function of the thinking principle enlivened by intelligence, though it is devoid of the function of understanding." (The force of the argument here depends upon the distinction made between intelligence and the function of understanding, for the soul, though intelligence itself, does not exercise any
function.) (Aparināminī hi bhoktrīśaktirāpratisaṅkhramā cha pariṇāmyayārthe pratisaṅkhraṇteva tadvṛittimananupatati, tasyāt-
cha prāptachaitanyopagraharupāya budihivṛtteranukārīmāntra-
tayā budihivṛtyaviśiṣṭā hi jñānavṛittirākhyāyate).

Paṇḍit Govindadeva Śāstri, following some later commentators, explains the text so as to mean that the soul itself undergoes the modification. The earlier and more reliable commentators, however, do not accept that meaning, and as the sequel shows them to be right I have accepted their interpretation.]

To show that thus the self-perceptive thinking principle, being able to perceive all objects, becomes fit for all purposes, he says:

XXII.

The thinking principle, modified by the knower and the knowable, is (able to perceive) all objects.

"The knower" (drashtā) is soul. To be modified by it is to seem to be of its form from its propinquity. To be modified by the knowable, is to undergo the modification of assuming the form of the (object) perceived. When this (double modification) takes place, then it becomes able to perceive all objects. Even as a transparent crystal, or a mirror, or the like is fit to receive the reflection of all images, so the quality of goodness, unstained by foulness and darkness, is able, from its purity, to receive the reflection of the soul (chit). Not so foulness and darkness, owing to their want of purity. The quality of goodness, divested of all association with foulness and darkness, from its being liable to only one modification, and being able to receive the reflection of the intelligent soul, remains like a steady lamp-flame till the attainment of emancipation (mokṣa). Even as in the vicinity of a loadstone motion is produced in iron, so in the vicinity of the intelligent soul manifestible intelligence is reflected on the quality of goodness. Accordingly, in this system of philosophy two powers of intelligence are recognized, the eternally present (nityodita) and the manifestible (abhinayanāgā). The eternally
present power of intelligence is soul. The manifestible power of intelligence is the quality of goodness, which derives its power by its contiguity to the former. From extreme propinquity, it, as an intimate friend, effectuates the experientership of the soul. And as that quality is the resting place of Purusha, the supreme soul, the Sāṅkhya, who recognise an actionless Brahma, attribute to it the experience of pleasure, pain and delusion. (The epithets "supreme" and "Brahma" are meaningless here, for the human soul is all that is meant: God as Brahma is not indicated).

Now, though from the extreme abeyance of some one quality and of its prevalence at certain times and in some cases, all the three qualities are constantly modifying in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, and the thinking principle is not pure, yet when that principle modifies its form into that pure quality of goodness, which is the essence of work, it attains its perceptibility. The pure primary quality of goodness of the thinking principle, on the one side reflected upon by intelligence or the soul, and on the other covered by the thinking principle modified into the forms of external objects, and becoming conscious from the effect of the reflection of the soul, becomes able to feel pleasure, pain and delusion, though it is devoid of intelligence. Thus the experience, from its extreme propinquity to soul and from want of due discrimination, is said to be of soul, though it is unexperiencing. To this effect has Vindhyaśaṅkī said: "the sufferingness of the quality of goodness is the sufferingness of soul." Elsewhere it is said. "Even as an image produced by the reflection of a reflected image on a mirror is called a reflection, so the manifestation of the shadow of intelligence, like the intelligence of soul, is implied by the word pratisaṅkrānti or contact."

It might be argued that, though the reflection of the ever-modifying may be seen in a transparent body, as a human face in a looking-glass, how can there arise the reflection of the absolutely transparent, all-pervading, unmodifying soul in the comparatively untransparent quality of goodness? To this the reply is—Not knowing the true nature of reflection you
have said this. The display of the manifestible power of intelligence in the quality of goodness, by the propinquity of the soul, is called reflection. Even as is that sentient power, abiding in the soul, so does its reflection appear in the quality of goodness.

Again, since it has been said that soul is absolutely pure, how can it be in contact with the (comparatively) untransparent quality of goodness? This argument is not correct, for the contact of the sun and the like (which are highly transparent) is seen in water and the like which are less transparent. If it be said that there can be no contact of that which is undefined, that too would be inconsistent, because we see the all-pervading sky (ākāśa) reflected in a looking-glass, or the like. And such being the case, there can be no objection to the effectuation of the reflection (under notice).

It may be argued that what has been said about there being an apparent or external contact by propinquity of the sentient power with the quality of goodness of the thinking principle, there should be the experience of pain and pleasure on the part of soul, is inconsistent, for how can the quality of goodness of the thinking principle be produced without a modification of Prakṛiti? and for what object should there be a modification of Prakṛiti? To this it is replied, that Prakṛiti has to effectuate soul's experience of the objects of mundane existence, and, its duty being to effectuate the object of soul, the modification is proper.

It may be urged that this is not proved, for the effectuation of the soul's object is impossible. The duty of effectuating soul's object implies the consciousness on the part of Prakṛiti that "it is my duty to effectuate soul's object;" but how can there be such a consciousness on the part of the unsentient Prakṛiti? If you admit the consciousness, how will you maintain its unsentience or inertness? The reply to this is that in the two forms of progressive and regressive modification, there are the two natural powers (of progression and regression), and they are called the duty of effectuating soul's purpose. Those powers are natural to the unsentient Prakṛiti. Its progressive modification (anu-
aphorisms of patanjali.

loma-parināma) is the outward one, extending from the intellect to gross matter; while entering through its cause and ending with the annihilation of egoism is its regressive modification, (pratiloma parināma). Hence on the completion of soul's experience, the two natural powers being destroyed, Prakṛiti, having achieved its object, ceases to modify. In performing such duty for soul on the part of the unsentient Prakṛiti, there is no inconsistency.

Again, it may be argued, if there be two such powers naturally possessed by Prakṛiti, then why is exertion made for salvation (moksha) by those who long for it? and if salvation be no object the science of those who advise it is worthless. The answer is, the relation of soul and Prakṛiti as experiencer and experience is from time without a beginning, and that being the case, when pain is felt on the part of Prakṛiti in action, from the assumption of its being the agent or actor, there arises the desire—"how can there be absolute stoppage of my suffering?" and hence there is a necessity on the part of Prakṛiti for the advice of the science which points out the means of stopping the pain. The substance of the advice of the science is the quality of goodness of the thinking principle as governed by work. In other works on philosophy this has been accepted to be the nature of ignorance (avidyā). That nature, exerting for salvation, relying on the help of the advice of such sciences, obtain the reward called salvation. All works influenced by the (necessary) conjunction of causes attain their own selves, and it is established by proof that of the work called moksha, which is acquired by regressive modification, this is the conjunction of causes, because it cannot be attained by any other method. Hence without that cause how can it be effected? It follows, therefore, that the quality of goodness of the thinking principle modified by worldly objects in contact and enlightened by the shadow of soul, conducts, through the conviction of (the reality of) those objects, all worldly affairs. Deluded people, looking at such thinking principle, imagine it and all such thinking principles to be the world. They should be enlightened.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

[Having met all the principal objections to the theory of the thinking principle being sensitized into intelligence by a reflection of soul which is intelligence, the author enunciates that the thinking principle, modified on the one hand by the soul and on the other by external objects, is brought into play in every case of sensation. The word used in the text for the double transformation is uparakta, which is a compound of upa 'excess' and ranja 'to colour' or 'tinge,' meaning that the thinking principle is doubly tinged or influenced; and this conveys the true meaning of the text. The P. Bhāṣya accordingly cites the example of the crystal vase tinged by the coloured object put in it. Inasmuch as the theory, however, is that the thinking principle assumes the shape of the object in every instance of cognition, and the same epithet is used for the double tinging, it is necessary, for the sake of consistency, to adopt the same phraseology everywhere; I have accordingly used the word modified.

Bhoja, after explaining the text, enters into a long dissertation on the various objections that may be started to the doctrine, and refutes them seriatim. The first and most obvious objection is—how can a shadow of soul produce in an object on which it falls the quality of the original? Soul may be intelligence, but its shadow cannot reasonably be said to convey that intelligence on the object on which it falls. The commentator sees no harm in this, for, says he, such action is manifest in the motion produced in iron by the propinquity of a loadstone. He describes soul's intelligence to be two-fold; one is Nityoditā or always and eternally present, and the other Abhivyayāgā or manifestible, and it is the latter that sensitizes the thinking principle.

The next argument is, if it be the thinking principle that is sensitized, how can soul be said to be the experiencer? The reply is—that soul is really not the experiencer, but since experience is felt by the agency of its shadow it is in an indiscriminate way called experiencer.

Then the question arises how can reflection take place of
a perfectly transparent object like soul, on a comparatively untransparent object like the thinking principle with the quality of goodness prevalent in it? This is met by saying that the word reflection here simply is the technical name of the influence of soul on the thinking principle.

An argument like the last is raised with reference to the contact of the absolutely pure soul with a comparatively impure thinking principle. This, however, is held possible, as we see the sun reflected in foul water. The contact of that which is illimitable with a finite object is also possible, as in the case of the sky reflected in a mirror.

The objection next urged is that why should Prakṛiti or nature change to produce effects? The answer is, it subserves the purposes of soul. This answer is, however, not enough, for Prakṛiti or nature being unintelligent, cannot have such a consciousness of duty, and act up to it. The reply is that Prakṛiti has two inherent powers in it, that of progression and of regression, and acting under their impulses it subserves the purposes of soul, and therefore there is no inconsistency.

The admission of the two powers aforesaid suggests the objection that, if they be natural they will run their course of their own accord, and there is no use in controlling them. The effect of the regressive action is salvation, and that must come of itself; none needs try for it, and, if so, what is the use of Yoga as a means of salvation? This is met by saying that it is Prakṛiti when in action that feels pain and, wishing to put a stop to that pain, wants to know how to do so, and hence arises the desire for salvation, and the Yoga points out the means of doing so. Without such advice Prakṛiti would go on working for ever.

The P. Bhāṣya has not mooted these discussions.

Suspecting that it may be argued that if all purposes are accomplished by a thinking principle of this kind, why should we acknowledge an experiencer of which there is no proof, he gives the proofs (in support of the existence) of the spectator.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

XXIII.

It exists for another's purpose, though coloured by uncountable residua, because it operates by association.

"It," the thinking principle, "coloured," i.e., assuming many forms, through the influence of an uncountable number of "residua" (vásaná) (existing in it), effectuates for "another's," i.e., a master's, "purpose" (artha) the work of experience and final reward. How so? "Because it operates by association." "Association" (sañhatya), i.e., by fully joining together, operates to accomplish a purpose. We see that works performed jointly are for another, as in the case of a bed or a chair. The co-operators (in this case) are the qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, which, modifying in the form of the thinking principle, jointly work for another, and that "another" is soul.

It may be urged that through the force of the example by which the subservience of another's purpose by an embodied stranger, as a bed or a chair or the like, is established, a similar (embodied) stranger may be proved, but you contemplate an unembodied "another," and, the opposite being proved, your argument becomes destructive of the object. The reply is thus given: Although in the example pervasion of the premiss has been accepted as general in regard to effectuating another's purpose, yet on consideration of the specific distinctions of goodness in the qualified, the distinction will be evident, and the position that the experiencer is another is established. Thus, as in inferring the existence of fire in a mountain covered with fuel of a particular kind from the smoke seen there, the inference that fire is produced by fuel and is distinct from other fires is taken for granted, so here in inferring that the specific experience called goodness is for another's purpose. In the same way the experiencing superior is proved to be another of the form of intelligence and isolated. Although he appears as the other and the noblest of all, yet the body is superior to objects resulting from the quality of darkness, because it is manifest, and the asylum of the organs. The organs
are superior to the body; to them the illuminating quality of
goodness is superior; and he who is the illuminator is distinct
from illumination and of the form of intelligence. How can then
there arise this conjunction? (i.e., there is no actual conjunction
but a mere shadow).

[The explanations given in previous aphorisms still leave the
door-open to the argument that the agency of the soul is
redundant and not wanted. If the thinking principle doubly
modified as above stated is sufficient for conception, why make
the soul the experiencer of worldly joys and sorrows? To this
question the reply given is that, though the thinking principle is
actuated by innumerable desires resulting from the residua of
former works, it nevertheless acts for another's purpose, and not
for itself, since it acts by the co-operation of many causes, and not
of its own motion. Though there are innumerable residua in it,
they cannot work until external agencies are brought to bear
upon them, and that shows that the thinking principle has no
power of action suo motu. It is unconscious too, so that it can
have no will of its own. It acts only when it is worked
upon, and this is indicated by the phrase "operates by associa-
tion." Inasmuch, however, as its action may tend to bring on
liberation which is for the good of the soul, it is to be inferred
that in its other actions it subserves the gratification of that
soul. No line can be drawn between what actions are for the
soul and what are not, and logically what is true for a part, i.e.,
for liberation, must be true for the whole. This idea is expressed
in the Sāṅkhya-kārikā by the verse "generous nature, endued
with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without
benefit (to herself), the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is
of qualities," (lx). It should be noticed, however, that the
functions which are usually attributed to nature or Prakṛiti in
the Sāṅkhya are invariably assigned to the thinking principle
(chītta) in the Yoga of Patanjali. In fact, in the Yoga system,
chītta plays a more-important part than the Buddh of Kapila,
and appertains to itself the character both of Buddh and Pra-
kṛiti, but the commentator does not mark this distinction. In
his works Kapila frequently refers to Prakṛti where Patañjali confines himself to Chitta. The action of the unconscious thinking principle for another's purpose is usually explained by the illustration of the saffron cart, which, unconscious as it is, subserves the purpose of man by bringing him a desirable condiment.]

He now proceeds to show by ten aphorisms that the fruit of this philosophy is isolation.

**XXIV.**

For the knower of the difference there is a cessation of the idea of self in the thinking principle.

Thus the quality of goodness and soul being proved to be distinct, whatever idea exists of his self being the thinking principle, in him who knows them to be distinct, that is the one is different from the other, the same surceases, *i.e.*, the idea ceases of the thinking principle being the actor, knower, and experiencer.

[Having disposed of all metaphysical questions bearing on the subject-matter of his work, the author now reverts to the thesis, how isolation is effected. The metaphysical questions above set forth, when thoroughly understood, enable a person to divest himself of the idea that his self or ego is his thinking principle, and to believe that his soul is the real self. He knows that the thinking principle is unconscious and not his self. The idea, in fact, is altogether set at rest, and his soul is so far freed from the natural wrong belief that the thinking principle is the ego.]

(To the question) what happens when this takes place, he says:

**XXV.**

Then the thinking principle is turned towards discriminative knowledge, and bowed down by the weight of commencing isolation.

The thinking principle, which was turned outwards by igno-
rrence, to derive the fruit of experiencing worldly objects, deflects now towards "discriminative knowledge," (viveka) i.e., turns inward towards the path of discriminative knowledge, and is "bowed down by the weight of coming isolation," (kaivalya-pragbhara) i.e., the fruit of isolation, or the commencement of isolation.

[When the belief aforesaid is effected, the thinking principle drops the cosmos, and turns inward to the cultivation of discriminative knowledge, and is overpowered by the sense of isolation which begins to sprout in him.]

Now, by describing the causes of the impediments which occur in the thinking principle flowing towards discrimination, he points out the means of overcoming them.

XXVI.

In the intervals thereof other impressions arise from residua.

"Thereof," i.e., of the thinking principle engaged in meditation. In the "intervals" (chhidreshu), in the void spaces of the thinking principle, whatever "impressions" (jnánáns) or ideas of the waking (or worldly) state arise, the same proceed from the now-fading residua of the former waking state, in the forms of "I," "mine," and the like. What is said is that by means of extirpating the internal organ their avoidance should be effected.

[While isolation is progressing there are opportunities when a person is not actually engaged in meditation, i.e., during the breaks in his meditation, for worldly ideas to sprout from the residua of former existences still clinging to the mind. These are calculated to disturb the process of isolation, and are so far impediments, which should be destroyed.]

He now says that the means of avoidance has already been explained.

XXVII.

The avoidance of these should be (the same) as already described in the case of afflictions.
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The avoidance of these should be effected in the same way in which the avoidance of afflictions, ignorance, &c., has been already pointed out (C. II. x—xi). Even as they, scorched by the fire of knowledge, do not, like roasted seeds, sprout in the field of the thinking principle, so are the residua, (rendered infructuose).

[The ideas should be destroyed in the same way as afflictions, for which provision has been made in a previous part of the work, (C. II. x—xi).]

He now describes the means by which a Yogi, on his meditation becoming steady by the non-production of other thoughts in the way aforesaid, may attain excellence.

XXVIII.

On the completion of the series there is produced the meditation (called) the Cloud of Virtue, even in the case of the non-aspirant, from the appearance of constant discrimination.

"On the completion of the series" (prasāṅkhyāne), i. e., after careful contemplation of the nature and respective peculiarities of all the categories arranged in due order. On that being accomplished even in the case of the “non-aspirant” (akusīda), or one who does not wish for any fruition, there is produced from the appearance of constant discrimination, on the cessation of all foreign thoughts in his thinking principle, the meditation called the Cloud of Virtue. That which showers (mehati) or irrigates profusely the virtue (dharma) which is neither black nor white, (cf. IV, vii,) and which is subservient to the attainment of the summum bonum is the “Cloud of Virtue” (Dharmamegha) By this is shown that the highest virtue is the cause of knowledge.

[When the series of works enjoined above for the perfection of Yoga meditation have been completed, then there arises in the mind of the performer a meditation called Cloud of Virtue, which means that all virtues are showered on it, even when
it does not wish for them. The sense is that though the Yogi may not wish for any reward, still the reward comes. The word in the text is *akusīda*, from a meaning negation and *kusīda* interest, that is disinterestedly. The theory is that the perfection of virtue results spontaneously in a person who completes his *Yoga* duties as described in the text.]

He explains next what results from that Cloud of Virtue.

**XXIX.**

Thence follows the cessation of afflictions and works.

The meaning is, that on the manifestation of knowledge, their antecedent causes being removed, there is a cessation of the afflictions resulting from ignorance, and of all the works which are, according as they are white, &c., of three kinds. (vii).

[The object of the cloud is now described. On its appearance there results a complete cessation of all afflictions and all works; there is no longer any sense of affliction left in the mind of the Yogi, and he has neither any desire for work, nor any residua of former works left in his mind.]

He next explains what happens on this cessation.

**XXX.**

Then the knowable becomes small from the infiniteness of the knowledge free from all coverings and impurities.

“Coverings” (*āvaranāṇī*), are those whereby the thinking principle is covered; they are the afflictions; they are also impurities. Free from them, means devoid of them. From the knowledge (*jñāna*) becoming free, like the sky bereft of cloud, and “from its infiniteness” (*āntyāt*), i. e., from its being without a break, or all-pervading, “the knowable” (*jneya*) becomes “small” (*alpa*), or fit to be counted or grasped. The meaning is, that the Yogi can easily know everything.
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[The next advantage is that the objects of sense are reduced to a minimum. Knowledge then becomes limitless and free from all impurities and coverings or interruptions; and placed against such knowledge, knowables or cognizables become insignificant, i. e., that knowledge which can grasp everything, finds no difficulty in understanding small matters. Not that there is a reduction in the number or quantity of cognizables, but, placed besides limitless knowledge, they, by comparison, become insignificant.]

He then states what takes place after this:

XXXI.

Thereupon takes place the termination of the succession of the modifications of the qualities which have accomplished their end.

Those which have "accomplished" (kṛita), completed, soul's purpose or object in the form of experience and emancipation are called kritārthāh, or those which have accomplished their end. The "qualities" (guṇāh) are goodness, foulness, and darkness. "Their modifications" (parināma) are their conditions of existence in relation to each other as members and membered, in a progressive or a regressive state to the time of the completion of the purpose of soul. Their "succession" (krama) is to be presently described. Its "termination" (parisamāpti) is its finality, i. e., it does not arise or happen again.

[Proceeding onwards, the next effect of the Yoga is a cessation of the tendency on the part of the qualities to undergo change. The qualities are the most active agents in worldly life, and it is their modifications that produce the various impressions of life, and when they cease to change, there is ipso facto a cessation of worldly impressions. It is the duty of Prakṛti to minister to the purposes of soul, and as the qualities are inherent in Prakṛti, the qualities may be taken as synonymous with Prakṛti, and those qualities, having done their work, cease]
from labour. The work of the qualities is said to be two-fold; they have to minister to soul’s experience of the world, and then to bring on its emancipation; and when the state above described is attained, the qualities have already accomplished both these works, and, having nothing else left to do, stop work in re the soul concerned.]

He now describes the succession above referred to.

XXXII.

The succession is the counterpart of the moment perceptible at the end of the modification.

“Moment” (kshana) is a short amount of time. Its “counter-part” (pratiyogi) is another distinct moment. “Perceptible at the end of the modification” means that which is accepted as the totality after perceiving a number of moments, and this is called the “succession” of moments, for no succession can be perceived in unperceived succession of moments.

[The word “succession” (krama) used in A. xxxi, is explained in this aphorism to mean the following of one moment after another. The object is to say that the lapse of time is reckoned by the succession of one moment after another, though there is no break between them; one totality is divided into many parts only for facility of reckoning.]

He now defines the specific nature of isolation, which is the result.

XXXIII.

Isolation is the regression of the qualities devoid of the purpose of soul, or it is the abidance of the thinking power in its own nature.

“The regression” (pratiprasava) or the non-production of change on the completion of the regressive (or refluent) modification of the (three) qualities, on the accomplishment of soul’s (two-fold) purpose of experience and emancipation is called “isolation” (kaivalya); or, it is the abidance of the thinking
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power (soul) solely in its own proper nature, on the cessation of its identification with intellectual functions (or objects).

[Having described the Yoga in all its details, the author concludes the work by announcing the ultimatum to which it leads. This ultimatum is *kaivalya*, and it is defined to result on the reabsorption of the triad of qualities in their original cause, on their having done their duty to soul, or on the abidance of the soul in its own nature without any association with the qualities; that is to say, when it has no longer the thinking principle near it to cause its shadow to fall thereon.

The commentator does not explain the word *kaivalya*. The *P. Bhāṣṭha*, suggests its meaning by saying “when the power of intelligence becomes alone, and remains always after in that state it is *kaivalya,*” (*chiti-taktireva kevalā tasyāk sadā tathaiva vasthānam kaivalamiti*). It is the same goal which the Sāṅkhya assigns to its votaries, but it uses, instead of *kaivalya*, the word *apavarga* which, though not radically synonymous, conveys the same idea, that of liberation from the trammels of nature. The *Sāṅkhya-kārikā* adopts the term *kaivalya*, and says, “when separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final *kaivalya* accomplished,” (v. lxxvii). Gaṇḍapāda contents himself by saying, “*kaivalya* is the abstract form of *kevala,*” (*kevalabhadvāt kaivalyam*). Vāchāspati Miśra and Nārāyana take it to mean “exemption from the three kinds of pain,” (*dukkhatraya-vigamam dukkhavināsam*). The lexicographical meaning of *kevala* is ‘one,’ ‘alone,’ ‘only,’ and in the derivative form it means, ‘oneness,’ ‘singleness,’ ‘solitariness,’ ‘exclusiveness,’ or ‘individuality,’ i. e., deliverance from the association of nature. Colebrooke translates it into ‘deliverance,’ and Wilson adds ‘liberation.’ Mr. Davies, in his translation, prefers ‘abstraction.’ All these may be resolved into *isolation*, the word used in my version, the idea being that the soul is freed from all association, material, phenomenal, or noumenal.
The epithets ‘absolute’ (aikántika) and ‘final’ (átyantika) used in the Sáňkhya-káríká, and the word ‘always’ (sadá) in P. Bháshya show that this isolation is to last for ever, and no future association of any kind is possible. To quote Mr. Davies, “the soul’s perfect and final deliverance from the bondage of matter has been gained. No new character can be assumed; no birth into any kind of bodily state, even that of the gods, can follow. The drama of life is ended, and the actors retire from the stage for ever.”

This eternal quietude of the soul after isolation amounts, in the opinion of M. Cousin, to “nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme;” but where existence forms the primary condition of the theory, nihilism cannot logically and fairly be predicated. The question is, does the soul exist or not after salvation? and since the Yoga, like many other schools of philosophy, both Indian and European, insists that it does, (cf. Sáňkhya-sútra I, 45, 46, 47), there is no room left for a charge of negation against it. Professor Wilson, following the Indian exegetes, more correctly explains the case by saying, “it is merely intended as a negation of the soul’s having any active participation, any individual interest or property, in human pains, possessions, or feelings.” Professor Weber, in his ‘History of Indian literature,’ (pp. 238-9), has entirely misrepresented the case. He says, “one very peculiar side of the Yoga doctrine—and one which was more and more exclusively developed as time went on—is the Yoga practice, that is, the outward means, such as penances, mortifications, and the like, whereby this absorption into the supreme Godhead is sought to be attained.” To those who have attentively read the preceding pages, it will be obvious, that the idea of absorption into the Godhead forms no part of the Yoga theory. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive how so well-read a scholar, as the learned professor, could have formed this opinion, unless we believe that he has not read the Yoga, and has borrowed his theory from the Bhagavadgítá, and Puránic and Táentric modifications of Yoga.
Patanjali, like Kapila, rests satisfied with this isolation of the soul. He does not pry into the how and the where the soul abides after the separation. This condition of philosophic abstraction, however, not being satisfactory to worldly-minded people longing for a peaceful hereafter, a necessity arose for the elaboration of a more concretely blissful scheme, and the modifications above noticed were offered by the Purāṇas to meet the requirement. They devised other forms, but those require no description here.

This completes the work; but Bhoja takes this opportunity to compare the condition of the soul as described in the Yoga with what other systems propose, and thereby to demonstrate its superiority. The first is the Buddhist doctrine of momentary existence.]

Nor is it only in our philosophy that the knower of the field [of action] in its isolated condition is recognised to exist in this form of intelligence; on reflection it will be seen that in other systems of philosophy also it remains in the same form. Now, in the worldly condition soul appears as full of agency, experientership, and inquisitiveness; if this one soul, the knower of the field, be not admitted to be so, then in the absence of all antecedent and postcedent enquiry in momentary consciousness, (i.e., believing consciousness to be existent only for the time being, which cannot look into the past or the future,) there would be no constant relation between soul and the fruits of works, and the objection would arise of the destruction of that which has been done, and the coming into existence of that which has not been done, (i.e., no desert would follow works done, and desert would result from undone work). Acknowledge him to be the experiencer (of deserts) by whom an act enjoined by the Śāstras is performed, and there will be an inclination on the part of all to perform works for the acceptance or avoidance of good or evil. Since all actions characterised by the desire of avoidance or acceptance are subject to enquiry; since there would be an impossibility for enquiry in the case of mutually distinct moments; (i.e., the
moment when one action is done being distinct from that in which another action is performed); and since in the absence of enquiry there would arise an impossibility for any kind of action to take place, it is established that that which is the agent, experiencer, and enquirer is the soul. In the condition of liberation, there being an absence of all actions characterised by the idea of the acceptable and the acceptor, sentience alone remains behind. That sentience is apparent only as sentience, and not by knowing itself, since the nature of sentience is to perceive objects, and not to perceive itself. Further, when an object is perceived by the thinking power, the idea is "this" (ayam), and when the identity of that power is to be implied, the idea is "I" (aham). Two such mutually discordant actions, characterised as the profluent and the refruent are, cannot be achieved simultaneously, and since the two actions cannot be performed at the same time, soul remains as sentience only. Hence it is reasonable (to believe) that in the liberated condition, when the qualities are defunct, soul remains solely as sentience. In the mundane condition agency, percipiency, inquisitiveness arise in regard to that soul. Besides, there is a relation between Prakṛiti and soul, which is that of experience and experiencer; it is natural, and exists from time without a beginning. It is due to the prevalence of want of right notion. And that being the case, in the presence of the two powers for the advancement of the object of soul, (cf. IV, xxii), all modifications in the form of Mahat and others take place. And since the power of the soul as the supreme agent, and of casting its quality of sentience on the thinking principle, and of experiencing the result of the conjunction of that reflection, proceed from conjunction (with Mahat), and since the consciousness of agency and experiencership of the intellect proceeds from the influence of sentience on the intellect, and consequently of the conduct of all enquirable actions, what use is there in other unprofitable agglomeration of fallacies?

[Bhoja does not say that the theory he combats is due to the
Buddhists, but the dogma of momentary consciousness was prevalent among the Mādhyamikas, and hence I infer that he means the Buddhists. The theory is, that all things are momentary, and their cognition is also momentary, produced by the concatenation of complements of unconscious causes, without a permanent intellectual back-ground, (cf. Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarsana-saṅgraha, p. 15). It is refuted by the allegation, that such consciousness could not be made subject to moral responsibility. The consciousness that would perform an action now, would have no relation to the one that had acted before, or to that which would act in the future, and the responsibility of the one could not be transferred to another. There could be no such idea as ego, for the ego of one cognition would not be the ego of another, and yet as ego is the basis of cognition and consciousness, no theory can be valid which repudiates that. There could be under such circumstance no incentive to, nor necessity for, moral action. A permanent individual consciousness is unavoidable, and that is found in the thinking principle enlivened by a reflection of soul.]

Again, if, rejecting this course, it be accepted that agency is soul's essential attribute, then arises the admission of its being subject to modifications, and as modifications are non-eternal or temporal, its character as soul is destroyed. Nor can perception of mutually different conditions be effected in one form at the same time; and accordingly, in the condition in which soul is perceived associated with some produced pleasure, can the condition of pain be perceived. Thus the conditions being various, the conditioned must likewise be various, and from variety and modificability there can be neither spirituality nor eternity, (i.e., that which is modifiable cannot also be eternal or spiritual, and eternity and spirituality are essential attributes of soul). Hence it is that those Sāṅkhyaś who believe in a peaceful Brahma, acknowledge soul to remain in the same form both in the mundane and the liberated conditions.

[This is apparently the theory of the Vais'ēśaṅkikas, who believe
soul to be the real actor. The objection to this theory is that action implies change, and if soul be the real actor, it would be subject to change. The idea of change, however, is, in the opinion of Patanjali, incompatible with the spirituality and eternity of soul; it would cease to be soul if it were changeable like material objects, and therefore this theory is not tenable.]

The theory of the Vedantists, who believe liberation to be that condition of soul in which it is solely sentience and joy, is not correct. Joy being the identity of pleasure, and pleasure being manifested by perceptibles, and perceptibility not being produced without perception, the doctrine of unity is destroyed by the admission of the two, the perceptible and the perception. Again, their saying of cognition itself being the joyous soul would be prejudiced by the incompatibility of two antagonistic qualities abiding together. Perception and perceptible cannot fitly be called one. Again, soul is said by the non-dualists to be of two kinds, the working or conditioned and the unconditioned or supreme. But if you admit that form in which the working soul becomes the experiencer of pleasure and pain, to be also the form in which it exists as the supreme soul, then the supreme soul becomes, like the working soul, subject to modifications, and pertain, the nature of ignorance. If it be said that the experiencership is not direct, but accepted as a present (by the soul) while remaining as a neutral superior, the case would be the same as in our system of philosophy.

The assumption about the joyous form (of soul) has already been refuted. It may be added that if soul be admitted to be of the character of ignorance, there would be no separate existence left for working souls, and which should then be the object of philosophy? Certainly not the unconditioned soul, for it is eternally free; nor the working soul, for it is (admitted to be) of the character of ignorance, and thus will result the falsification of all systems of philosophy. If the creation be admitted to consist of ignorance, the question would arise, whose ignorance is it? It cannot be that of the supreme soul, for it is
eternally free, and of the form of knowledge. It cannot be of
the working soul, for that being without a separate existence,
how can it be connected with ignorance? It would be like the
admission of horns of a hare (a mere fiction). It might be said
that the ignorance of ignorance consists in its not being the sub-
ject of demonstration by argument. It may, like the dew on the
earth with the rays of the sun (playing on it), melt away under
ratioication, and yet it may be ignorance. This, however, cannot
be. Whatever does something must be distinct from, or identical
with, something else, and since the agency of ignorance in the
development of the universe must be admitted, and admitting
it, if ignorance be indeterminate, then nothing whatever will be
determinate; even Brahma itself will be liable to be put down
as indeterminate, (but if it be described to be determinate, it will
cease to be ignorance). It follows then that the form of soul
cannot be other than that of a supervisor. This supervisorship
is mere sentence only, for there is no evidence of its having any
other quality.

[The Vedantic doctrine is refuted on two grounds; 1st, because
it involves a duality which the Vedantists themselves repudiate;
2nd, it makes soul liable to be affected by ignorance, thereby
destroying its absolute purity, and if we admit that soul may be
involved in ignorance then it will become indeterminate, and
there would be no certainty about anything.]

It is alleged by the Naiyāyikas and others that soul is sentient,
because it becomes so by contact with sentience, and that sentience
is produced by the union of soul with its mind. They say that
desire, knowledge, exertion and other attributes are produced by
the contact of soul during its working condition with mind,
and through those qualities, the soul knows itself to be the
knower, the agent, and the experiencer. In the state of liber-
ation (moksha), when false notions are suppressed on the suppres-
sion of the residua (dosa) which are produced by them, there
results an absolute annihilation of the specific attributes, know-
ledge, &c., and soul is acknowledged to reside in its own essential form. This, however, is not a correct assumption, for what would you accept to be the peculiar soulness of the soul in that condition? (You cannot urge that pervasion, immensity, and eternity are its constituents, for) the qualities of pervasion and the rest pertain to ether and others, and to differentiate it from them, some determinate form must have to be admitted. You may say that the specific character of soul is its own speciality (or kind to which it belongs). But this cannot be urged, for such speciality exists in all things, (i.e., everything has its specific distinction as a particular kind). It is necessary, therefore, to admit some other differentiation of the soul, apart from speciality, and this can be effected by admitting its supervisorship, from its being of the form of sentience, and in no other way.

As to what is believed by the Mīmāṁsakas about soul being both worker and work, the position is not tenable. They believe that soul is indicated by the use of the word I, and by the use of I, both the agency and the objectivity of soul are included, (i.e., soul is the ego, and nothing else can be ego, and the soul being the ego, the ego must include both soul and work, for in knowing the soul work must appear to be soul and no other). But this cannot result, because they are of contradictory natures. Agency implies him who measures, while work means that which is to be measured or proved, and the assumption of these two antagonistic qualities cannot be effected in one at the same time. When two antagonistic qualities are assumed, then there can be no unity, as positive and negative, and so are agency and objectivity antagonistic. Should it be said there is no antagonism between agency and objectivity, but there is between agency and instrumentality, we deny it, because the assumption of antagonistic qualities is the same (in either case). Rejecting then the theory of perceivable by the use of I, we hold the soul's supervisorship as proved, and thence its sentienceless.
CHAPTER FOURTH.

The theory of those who hold soul to be finite, defined by the body, and mutable, because it is reckoned among matter, tumbles down as soon as it is started. By the admission of mutability, the sentience form of soul is destroyed, and in the absence of its sentience form, how can there be any spirituality in soul? Hence those who desire to uphold the spirituality of soul must admit its sentience form, and that is its supervisorship.

[This is the theory of the Arhatas or Jains. (Cf. Cowell and Gough's Sarvadarsana-saṅgraha.)]

Some fancy soul to be of the form of the actor. They believe that the action of knowing, which results in the presence of a perceptible object, has for its fruit the cognition of that object; and in that cognition as the fruit, the true form of soul, being of the form of illumination, becomes manifest; and objects being perceptible, the soul becomes the perceptor; for it is produced in some such form as "I know the pot," (in which "I" is the perceptor, "know" is the cognition of the form of illumination, and the "pot" is the perceptible object). The cause of action is for certain the actor, and therefore actorship and experiencership constitute the form of soul. This, however, is inconsistent. (If cognitions be the root),—the question arises, Does the actorship of those cognitions arise simultaneously, or successively? If you say, that the actorship is simultaneous, then its actorship shall cease a moment after. If you say, it happens successively, it cannot be predicated of that which is uniform, (i.e., soul). If you say the actorship of soul is effected always in one or the same form, then that one form being always present, all fruities would become of one form. If the actorship be multiform, then there would be mutability, and there being mutability, there can be no form of sentienceness. It follows that those who believe in soul's sentienceness, should not maintain its direct actorship. The way in which the actorship of the uniform, eternal, sentient soul is proved by us, is the most consistent.
Those who by such arguments maintain that the self-manifest soul becomes the perceptor through the cognition of objects, will find their refutation by the same line of argument.

Some hold that the reasoning (vimarsa) form of soul is its sentience form, (i. e., its sentience is no other than its reasoning power). They say that the sentience form of soul cannot be ascertained without reasoning; the sentience form is said to be distinct from the inert, and without reasoning it cannot be defined, and without reasoning, there is nothing left behind. This is, however, untenable. Reasoning is the discussion which has the form of “this, thus, and so,” (i. e., every process of ratiocination involves the assumption of something like this, this is, this is not, thus it is, thus it is not, it is so, it is not so, and without them there can be no reasoning,) and that cannot arise without egoism (or consciousness), and when reasoning is brought to bear on soul it is brought into cognition in the form “I am of this form,” and thus the soul, the subject of discussion, being brought to light by the word I, no advance is made beyond a fancy, and fancy is a form of conviction, which is the function of the intellect, and not of sentience. But as sentience, uniform and eternal, remains always in one shape, there can be no entrance of egotism into it. It follows then, that this assumption of reasoning in the soul is a mistaken assumption of the intellect for soul, and not a knowledge of the identity of the self-manifest soul, the great soul.

Thus in no system of philosophy can the form of soul be ascertained by any means, without admitting its supervisorship. Supervisorship implies sentience form, which is distinct from inertness. Because it exists supervising in the form of sentience, therefore it derives the quality of experience (in objects), and that which is supervised by sentience becomes fit for worldly usage. And such being the case, other systems of philosophy, if they decline to accept what we have said about the isolation of soul as resulting on the cessation of the functions of Prakṛiti after it has accomplished its duty have no
resource. It has, therefore, rightly been said that isolation is the abidance of the sentient power in its own form after withdrawing its shadow from all functions.

The sources of perfections, (i); the manner in which the transmutation of material causes are effected, (ii); the mode in which merit cooperates in this process, (iii); the origin of created thinking principles, (iv); their relation to their original source, (v); the superiority of Samâdhi-born thinking principle, (vi); the nature of various kinds of work, (vii); the conformity of works to residua, (viii); their invariable relation, (ix); the eternity of desires, (x); their nature and susceptibility to destruction, (xi); the relation of the thinking principle to works, (xii); the natures of the qualities and the qualified, (xiii); unity of things proceeding from unity of modification, (xiv); the relation of cognition to cognizables, (xv); the process of cognition, (xvi); its permanence, (xvii); thinking principle not self-illuminative, (xviii); it cannot be directed to two things at the same time, (xix); multiplicity of cognitive power not admissible, (xx); how it perceives its self, (xxi); how it is made fit for all purposes, (xxii); its subserviency to another's purpose, (xxiii); progress of isolation, (xxiv—xxxii); nature of isolation, (xxxiii)—these are the subjects treated of in this chapter on isolation. [Only the substance of the commentary has been given here, for reasons explained before.]

He, who is the asylum of fame and majesty, whose orders are received on the crowns of their diadems, by kings prostrate at his feet in acts of service and salutation, the lotus of whose mouth having been attained by the goddess of speech, she became uncommonly proud, even he, the auspicious Bhoja, lord of the earth, composed these notes on the aphorisms of the lord of serpents.

This is the end of the fourth quarter, or the quarter on isolation, of the commentary entitled Râjamârtanda, on Patanjali's Institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva.
APPENDIX.

A DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF WORKS EXTANT ON THE
YOGA SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

Abbreviations.

B. G. C. Bühler’s Gujarat Catalogue.
Bh. D. M. C. Catalogue of the Bháú Dájí Memorial.
Bh. R. Bhandárkar’s Report, 1881-2.
H. C. Hall’s Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of
the Indian Philosophical Systems.
K. C. P. C. Kielhorn’s Central Provinces Catalogue.
K. P. R. Kunte’s Punjab Report, 1881.
M. N. Mitra’s Notices of Sanskrit MSS.
N. W. P. C. North Western Provinces Catalogue.
N. W. P. & O. C. “” “” and Oudh Catalogue.
O. C. Oudh Catalogue.

1. Āchārapaddhati. Duties and exercises of Yogís. By
Basudevendra. B. G. C. IV.
2. Ajāpagáyatri-puráscharaṇa-paddhati. Use of the Gáyatri
in Yoga meditation. By Śáṅkara Ā’chárya. H. C.
3. Amanaska. On steadfastness of the mind. N. W. P.
C. V.
C. I.
5. Ashtáṅga-hřidaya-sañhítá. Meditation on eight parti-
cular parts of the body. B. G. C. IV.
6. Ashtáṅga-yoga. Meditation on eight particular parts of
the body. By Śáṅkara Ā’chárya. B. G. C. IV.
8. Dattátreya sañhítá alias Dattátreya-yoga, or Dattátreya


31. Kapila-gitā. Dissertations on the importance of Yoga meditations and the mode of performing them. by Kapila. M. N. IV.
34. Laya-yoga. Yoga emancipation. B. G. C. IV.
35. Mahā-rāmāyaṇa alias Vaśishṭha rāmāyaṇa. A version of the history of Rāma distinct from that of Vālmīki and designed especially to expound the principles of the Yoga doctrine. M. N. VI.
38. Nāḍi-jñāna-dīpikā. On the knowledge of the arteries or nerves bearing on the Yoga. M. N. I.
APPENDIX.


45. Pātanjalā-sūtra-bhāṣya. A commentary on Patañjali's Yoga-sūtra. By Bhavadeva Mis'ra, Māhāmahopādhyāya. Probably the same with No. 42. M. N. V, and VI.


S'áṅkhya-pravachana, vide Yoga-sútra.
S'áṅkhya-pravachana-bháshya. Vide Pátiñjala-bháshya.


59. Saptabhumiká-vichára. The seven stages of perfection of Yogis. B. G. C. IV.

60. Saragítá. On Yoga breathing, probably an extract from a Puráṇa. By Vyásá. H. C.

61. Sárasamúchchhaya alias Yoga-sárasaṅgraha. The leading tenets of the Yoga. By Harisevaka Mis’ra. M. N. II.

62. Saṭchakra. The six principal parts of the body which should be meditated upon. B. G. C. IV.


69. Svarodaya. Yoga breathing. (Probably only on divination from the flow of breath). By Vyásá. B. G. C. IV.


73. Tattvāvindu-yoga. On a peculiar form of Yoga. By Śīva. N. W. P. C. I.

74. Tattva-vindu-yoga. Defining the various divisions of the Yoga. By Rāmcandra Paramahāśīsa. H. C.


76. Vās'ishṭha-sāra. An abridgment of the Yoga-vās'ishṭha Rāmāyaṇa, containing only its metaphysical portion. By Tīrthasūrya. M. N. III.


78. Videha-muktādi-kathana. "It handles sundry tenets on the Yoga craze." H. C.


84. Yoga-chandrikā. By Ananta S'armā. M. N. Vol. II.


91. Yoga-dṛiṣṭi-svádhyāya. (Contents not known). Bh. D. M. C.
92. Yoga-granṭha. A treatise on Yoga with a commentary. By Vyaṅkaṭácharya. N. W. P. C. V.
101 Yoga-nyása. Dedication of certain parts of the body in course of meditation. Op C. I.


122. Yoga-s'íkshá. By Haricbara. B. G. C. IV.


136. Yoga-tattva. The principles of the Yoga doctrine. B. G. C. IV.
   Yoga-vāsisṭha. Vide No. 35.
140. Yoga-vichāra. The nature of the Yoga doctrine. An extract from the Kāśikhanda. B. G. C. IV.
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अथ योगानुशासनम्॥ १॥

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२ अथःश्रद्धाधिकारशाहीम वाङ्कान्तरस्व । चुः: ‘योगः’ वचनानं,
तात्त्वाद्विभाषयो वाङ्कान्तरस्वपरस्ववेदनेऽति।
तत् ‘वाङ्कात्’। योगानुशासनं ‘योगानुशासन’।
तत् ध्याः-खऽपरियममालकविशत मेहसमन्यतः।
तथा भाङ्क्षतः युथादकर्तवः
योगः समाधि: वाङ्क्षे: सम्भितवः। तद्द्वियादशस्त्र फलं, युथादिः।


1 वारे 2 खण्डः

तां योगक वैवखं पांढः। वाच्याभियोगः प्रतिपाद्यपरिवारकः-
भावसारः। वसमा, हरिभेद्यकः योगक तपस्याम् त्य कैव्यकः
साध्यसाधनभावः। एततुः भवति, वाच्याभिय योगक साध्यानि
शालेव प्रदश्ये, तत्ताभाष्याद्वारे योगः कैव्याक्यो जःसुत्वादिः-
चतोति। ॥ १ ॥

तत्र वेय योगः दृढः भवः।

योगप्रेततितनिरूपः। ॥ २ ॥

'विन्द्र' निर्क्षितचापरिषामामुः प्रथा: 'द्राच्यः' जन्मार्कः-
वाच्यपरिषामामुः प्रथा। 'निरीक्षः' बन्धुष्मुक्तपरिषामामुः
सुधुक्तर्या प्रतिपाद्यपरिषामिनि खःकार्ये। खथं, 'योगः', द्राच्याऽ-
स्वायते। श व निरीक्षः मञ्जरां विन्द्रक भूणी।। ॥ हरिभेद्यान्या
रथ्यं कदा चित्तु क्षास्त्राद्वमावानुमूलेनि। तत्र चित्तं, सूर्यं,
विन्द्रां, राजः, निक्षुः दृश्यं विन्द्रभ स्वामि:। विन्द्रभावक्षां-
विशेषः।। तत्र चित्रं, राजः हद्रेकादिनिं।। बन्धुसुधुक्तर्या सुधुकः,
उद्विश्ये काश्चििसु व्यवस्थिते व्यवस्थिते वा राजः प्रेरितं।।
तत्र यदैव देवदलादारिनाः। मूर्तं, तस्मिन चद्रेकादिनिः
विभागमलामेवः कार्यादिविन्दुसुधुक्तेऽयक्तेऽनियमितं। तत्र यदैव
विच्छिन्नवादारिनाः। विच्छिन्न, हद्रेकादिनिः परिप्रेतुं:खः-

* दसनेण निर्माणसाध्यपरिबारमुत्यासासामिति वजःकुमकावस्मतः पाठः।।
† खच्चैरेण हस्ती A चिन्हितपुष्कावाशः।।
‡ दसोनामिति C चिन्हितपुष्कावाशः।
तत्परे नेतृत्वारे

तत्परपत्रास्थते अध्यक्षेण प्रवर्त्तते। तत्र वर्देन देशस्य प्रतिष्ठा, राज्य रक्षणेन, समये परास्थरत्वादि, नै लोकस्य रक्षण संबंधित वस्त्रे व भाषा, रक्षकांशुपाते रे १ लोक्यांशकांशमण्डलमुळे अनेकत्रे लोकस्थापितवरीले नयनमित्रेन्द्रियांकें तर्चर रण: प्रवर्तः

प्रभृत्य वर्णने, वास्तविकता नलिकाः प्रकटे दर्शितात.

अनुरक्षणम् रजस्य अध्यक्षांनां भरतीचे प्रस्ताव प्रदर्शन।

द्वारा बोपेक्षोधिपिनवित्ते चन्द्रशेर-प्रकाशमन्त्वः स्वेदकीत्वारूपम् परिशालयात् । अर्थानुसारे द्वारा ज्योतिषिराधाः, लिखिते असाह्य अखंड प्रकाशयोगि हस्तिनात। अन्यायार्थे भूमिका-

निरोपः वनानिं भाषातुकाम:

१२. साहदेवस्यामसः ॥ ३॥

१३. प्रभृति 'लोकस्य विपणवतायाम्'

चन्द्रशेरकी 'अपविपणवतायाम'
माभावान् किंवा किंवा सुखार्चार्यांतः सुखप्रमाणपात्, युक्तानमः
खळ्पेशावानं सिद्धितेजनस्यि ॥ २ ॥

युक्तानमः तत्त तस्मां सिद्धिमिहाय ।

दस्तिसारुप्यमितरण ॥ ४ ॥

‘दस्तण’ वोनादमापिनिका कादे, दस्तणा वा सिद्धमापिनिका:।
ताभि: ‘सिद्ध’ तद्देवम:। जयमवर्घ: वादुश्रो दस्तण: सुख-सुख-
मोहामकाः: प्रातुरभवती, तादुरूप एव संबोधते वाक्षर्मिकः
पुष्पः। प्रतीतेऽ तदेवं, ययिसितकाण्यता भर्षिते वसति फिष्कोऽः।
सिद्धिन् भुजे प्रतिधानं भवति, ययिसितकाण्यता विषादीर्थे विषादा-
कारे भर्षिते पुष्पस्वादकारे हि भर्षिते, यथा जलस्फळः
शलमु शलस्फळचित्र प्रतिमातरे, ततःसन ॥ ४ ॥

दस्तियप्य वायात्माच।

दस्तण: पश्चत्य: सिद्धार्शिष्टः:। ॥ ५ ॥

‘दस्तणः’ वसीक्षा परिणामविचित्रः।। दस्तिसारुप्यमितरणः
विनाय वा अज्ञवर्घः दस्तणस्वाद्यः तद्देवमितः।। एतद्दूषः भवति।
पद्ध दस्तणः। कीर्तुः: ‘सिद्धार्शिष्टः’।। होमिर्यान्तमापिनिकाला
‘सिद्धः’, तन्निरितेताः: ‘सिद्धः’, ॥ ५ ॥

* प्रतीतेऽदस्तियप: B विषितपुष्पर: नाथिकः।
† विविधकारे दस्त: B विषितपुष्पपादः।
‡ सिद्ध अशिष्टः हाव: B विषितपुष्पस्यायः।। सिद्ध अशिष्टः
हाव: P विषितपुष्पस्यायः।
शाधनं सुखवादनेत्रेव व्रजादिभु प्रत्यक्षः। तथं श्रद्धेऽद्वागः

एतदुर्ज भत्ति, रजसा प्रधनिन्दपं, तमसा परापकारिन्तं,
वचन् सुखमवऽ चिन्तं भवतीति। एतानादबिकमंत्रां न समाधानवुपयोगिन्यः।
एकांगनिहिनुष्ठपों दे च शबोकार्षायोऽसरमवऽ
खिततात्त्व समाधावुपयोगं भजेते। शब्दादिकमयुक्तः सत्यमभिन्न,
दृश्यार्थेन रशस्मयोरतवस्त्वयं तद्वेद्यं रजस: प्रथमसुपादानं।
याचव प्रदूषितमतं नावबिशुलिनिं शक्ते दशरथमिति
दृश्यार्थविधा धर्मं प्रदर्शनं। सन्तख लेनदद्यं पवतरुपम प्रदर्शनं।

धवत तथोककबङ्गोंसं दे भृंगी योगापोषाणिवऽविति चनन्ति
देशोंकार्षायोऽहारितकिम्याप्रियहस्तीकायतारुपः परिषामः श्र
योगमः। किसुकं भवति, एकापे वस्तुस्मर्योरियोः, निःस्त्रें
सार्यां दुनां संस्काराणि प्राविषय दत्ति। जनोपारेव भुज्यो
चोंगे वञ्चव॥ २ ॥

इतरां सूचकादिभिः द्वितीयाविकरीषददानि वाक्याविकामः
प्रयतं चिन्तपदे यापेत॥

तदा रुहुः स्रुवेदस्वास्यानम्। ३॥

"रुहुः" पुश्चक्ष, तस्मि काशे, "स्रुवे" विकाचधपतायामः,
"वास्यान" चतिः: भवति। प्रयत्यः, जनयत्ववफळेत्तिष्टांसुहुः

* परिष्कर्षाद्वागानेन दति F चिन्तपयाजवादः।
† शब्दास्यामिवे लेभमिति B चिन्तपयाजवादः।
माधवान्त् कर्त्तेलाभिमानविनंष्ट्रै प्रेमकुपरिश्वासमाध्, बुधवान्त:।
खछुपैश्वासाणं खछुपमित्वतीनि। ॥ ॥

तुत्यान्द्रशयं तस्य किं खछुपमित्वः ।

दद्धितसारूप्यमित्वरच ॥ ४ ॥

‘दद्धर’ योगाद्यक्षिणं काले, दद्धयो या वाच्यमाणालब्धः।
ताभि: ‘शाक्श्’ तद्रपलं। अच्यमयः, चादुधो दद्धयः सुख-दुःख-।
मेघाक्षिण: प्रातुभविनि, नातेदृष्टी प्रव चबैहुने अयुहर्थभिः।
पुष्प:। प्रतिनयः* तदेवं, वस्मित्रेकियविधा परिषमटे वस्तुहि चिंत्यकः।
खछुप् रूपे प्रतिहारं भवति, वस्मित्रेस्वियुध्दस्यद्रारतेऽविवाह-।
कारेऽपि परिष्मटे पुष्पअद्दातार यद्व परिभाषेते, तथा जलतक्राचू।
चलायु सच्चिदानंविव प्रतिभाषेते, तत्सीतं ॥ ४ ॥

दद्धतप्पं वाख्यातमाद ।

दद्धयः: पवमतयः स्मितास्मितमः† ॥ ५ ॥

‘दद्धयः’ बिवयं परिषामाविवेश्यः। दद्धितसारूप्यदुःखांवाय-।
विदेना या अभववर्गा दद्धसारूप्यदुःखां तथंप्रवः। एतद्वां भवति।
पव दद्धयः। कौन्ते:। ‘स्मितास्मितमः’। लोकेऽव्यभिचारास्मातैः।
‘स्मितमः’, तद्विपरीता: ‘अस्मितमः’, ॥ ५ ॥

* प्रतिनयः दद्धितप्प: B विविषाध्वः गाधिः।
† विविषाध्वः दद्धितप्प: B विविषाध्वः गाधिः।
‡ स्मितमः अस्मितमः दद्धितप्प: B विविषाध्वः गाधिः। स्मितमः अस्मितमः दद्धितप्प:।
†† बिविषाध्वः दद्धितप्प: B विविषाध्वः गाधिः।
भाषणः सुखराधीनेनेव भमादिशु प्रहसः। तच बदौव देवानाम्। एतदुर्भ भवति, रजस्य प्रभुंदिश्यति, तमस्य परापकारित्वं, वनेन सुखस्वमयं चित्तं भवती। एतासिंघसिस्तनवस्त्रा न वसाधानुपयोगिनः। एकायतृतवः दृश्यन्तः ब्रह्मचर्यायोऽसरबप्रमुखलात्। वसाधानुपयोगिनः भॅते। वसाधानुपयोग तथाये लघुभिन्मायः। विद्यार्थिनः रजसम्बोधतः सति तद्यथा रजसः प्रधानसुपादाय। वायु प्रभु सुप्रभुसुप्रभु सति। उपदेशं ब्रह्मचिन्तितो भवते, देवस्य देवस्य देवस्य। वायु नेतृदेवः पवातु प्रधानः। यत् तस्य अर्थमात्रेऽत्रे देवहि योगायोगिनवानाति अनन्तोऽदेवमेकायतृतवः भॅतां। परिसामायः योगः। किंसैं भवति, एकाया वाकाया राधाः। निन्दूः सर्वोपरि हर्षी च सर्वकारणः प्रविष्ट दत्त। अनन्त्योरेव महायेश्वरः चामकः भवः।। ॥ २ ॥

ददानी खर्कार्किष्ठद्विते-निरोधपद्रद्व वाक्यात्कामः प्रधानं चित्तपदं यथाते।

तदा द्रष्टः क्रूरपेःवस्यानम्।। ३।।

'द्रष्टः' पुष्पस्य, तस्मिन कालः, 'कर्क्रे' चिक्षाचरुपतायामः, 'अवस्यानं' चित्तं: भवति। प्रधानः, जर्जुलबीक्ष्यातिसयस्यस्य।

* परिहर्षःक्षास्याधीनेनेव दत्त F चिन्तितपुलम्बः।
† वसाधानुपयोगिनः लघुभिन्मायः ब्वरीक्षितपुलम्बः।


of page
पालनके सेवकों

ता एव पद्म वहनयं: स्वसुहिं वाक्यायमेन्

प्रमाण-विपर्यय-विकल्प-निदर्श-सृजनयं: || इ ||

चायी क्रोध चचनमाइ

प्रत्यक्षानुमानाग ग्रो: प्रमाणानि || ७ ||

चतुर्थित्विशेष्यानि प्रमाणानि: चालकारेण बहुविकल्पकेलायत-गतविश्लेषणं, तथापि तत्त्वं तत्त्वं चतुर्थ तत्त्वं चतुर्थमः। प्रमाणवचनानु ज्ञान-संवादित्यं, तत्त्वं प्रमाणभिन्नता। दक्षिणमारुङ वायुविश्लेषानं विशेष तद्विभया वामानविशेषार्थं विशेषावधारणं प्रधान द्वितिः: 'तत्त्वं'। श्रीसत्तमस्मार्थिनिन्त्य: निम्निन्त्य: सामान्य-व्याख्यानाध्यायं: 'चनुमानं'। चतुर्थवचनम् 'वागम:.' || ७ ||

एवं प्रमाणवचनं द्वितिः वाक्याय विपर्ययवधारणास

विपर्ययं विश्लेषाना सम्बन्धप्रतिश्रुतम् || ८ ||

प्रत्यक्षाभितरेऽत्प: तथेऽत्पद्धतमान् स्वान् 'विपर्ययं'; वा च दुर्विद कार्यं समस्तायं। 'अत्तर्तप्रतिश्रुतम्' द्वितिः। तस्मात्त्वं चतुर्थं न तत्सिद्धि शुचे प्रतिहतं, तस्मात्त्वं च च स्वभाविकं शुचं न तत् प्रतिभावधारणं द्वारं। कश्चिद् विश्लेषान्तप्रतिश्रुतान्तरं 'विश्लेषानं', च च च खाण्डुः पुस्तेन वैति || ८ ||

विकस्तन्त्रं वाक्यायमाश

* द्वितिः सन्तुप्पोक्तिः इति इति B पढ़ितमपुस्तकारः।
† उपप्रतिश्रुतिप्रतिभावधारणानिति E पढ़ितमपुस्तकारः।
‡ प्रमाणवचनाध्यायं स्वानि E पढ़ितमपुस्तकारः।
শব্দশানানন্দপানী বস্ত্রশৃণী বিক্ষয়ঃ ॥ ৮ ॥

ইত্যাদি। যথা পুনর্ব্যপুনর্ব্যপুনর্ব্য ইত্যাদিচরণ কঠিন ইত্যাদি ইত্যাদি হৃত শীতঁ যথেষ্ট বিশেষ্যায় মহারাণী বরিষ্ট রাখিতে।
ধাতুমণি ধাতুলম্বে পুণ্ডু। ॥ ৮ ॥

গির্জা আখ্যাতামাস।

শ্রভাবপ্রত্যাখ্যাতনন্দনা উটিনিন্দ্রা ॥ ১০ ॥

‘শ্রভাবপ্রত্যাখ্যাতনন্দনা উটিনিন্দ্রা যেহেতু যাতে যে ভক্তি। অন্ততু ভক্তি যা বক্তাবিশ্বামদেশায় যে বিশ্বামিদাস প্রকাশি
‘ষটি’ যা ‘গির্জা’। যুক্ত্বায় যুক্ত্বায় যুক্ত্বায় যুক্ত্বায় সমরা প্রকাশ্যায় যুক্ত্বায় যুক্ত্বায় যুক্ত্বায়। ॥ ১০ ॥

স্তর্তি আখ্যাতামাস।

গুণমূলতিউষ্ণপ্রকাশমূলঃ স্তৃতি: ॥ ১১ ॥

প্রকাশে গুণমূলক ‘শ্রভাবপ্রত্যাখ্যাতনন্দনা’ সর্বমুখ।

* সামারোথায়ব্যক্তঃ হি উপপ্যকাঠামো।
† সম্প্রতি: সামারোধাতনস: হি উপপ্যকাঠামো।
‡ অক্ষাৰ্থঃ উপপ্যকাঠামো।
धारेण बुद्धारुपप्रसः यः 'ख्यातः'। ततः प्रमाणाविषयविचलितकालां जापदेशः। तस्य धर्माद्विभवमात्रं प्रायःपारमायापारसदां खः। 
नित्या लघुसमाजविनिर्शः। सत्तिष्ठ प्रमाणाविषयविचलितनिविनिर्मिनिला॥ १२॥

एवं हनुमान्यामाय प्राप्यं निरीक्षं वांछयात्माद्।

अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तिलिरोदः॥ १२॥

'अभ्यासवैराग्यो' वक्ष्यामायसचः। ततः तस्या प्रकाशप्रसदनिविषयकारणं विचारस्तोल्लातः। यत् प्रतिश्रवणं यः 'निरीक्षं'। किंसूः भवति, तस्या विनिष्ठान्तरात्मानिविनिर्मितामायामायामसुखवतः खः कारणं एव 
विचारस्तोल्लातः। ततः विनिष्ठान्तरात्मानस वैराग्याय 
तदेवसुखसुयुतः। अभ्यासेन च सुखसमयं प्राप्तस्वरूपदेशः।
हुँ ख्यातसुखसुयुतः द्वाराभ्यां भवति विचारस्तोल्लातः॥ १२॥

अभ्यासं वांछयात्माद्।

* तदर्शनं ए, द चिन्तितपुकारदेशः।
† प्रवचनशास्त्र हस्ति ब चिन्तितपुकारः।
‡ विचाराद्भोगसाध्वितो वा चिन्तितो वस्तुति वांछयाय वस्तुति प्राप्तय च।
या तु केवलप्राप्तभाराविशेषविशेषतविषयः सा कालाधिकारः। संसारप्राप्त भाराविशेषविशेषतविषयः पायावतः। तत्त्व वैराग्येऽविभववचतिस्तविते, विनिष्ठान्तरात्माय वस्तुति उपायेते, दर्भायाग्रहाविशेषतविषये विचारस्तोल्लातः।
§ प्रकाशप्रवधितप्रकारवात्मानिविनिर्मितः ब चिन्तितपुकारः।
|| सुखासनप्राप्तवायकप्रवधितप्रकारवात्मानिविनिर्मितः एक्ष्मप्रकारः।


तत्त्व खिती यथाभ्यासः ॥ १३ ॥

उद्देश्यविधिक विकस्तः खङ्कणिद्वारे परिषामान: 'खिते'ः तथा
'घम'ः उज्जायः, पुनःपुनःसङ्गारेन चेतिष्व विनिवेशनम् 'घमयासः',
हलुयते ॥ १४ ॥

tताषिः विशिष्टमात्र ।

स तु दौर्षकालीन नाशसत्त्वारसेविता हटभूमिः ॥

॥ १५ ॥

क्षिपः नारूणारूणारूणारातिबहिष्य ्ते चेताहान: 'हटभूमिः'ः
खिरे प्रभवति, दार्थेऽय प्रभवतीवर्षः ॥ १६ ॥

वैराग्यस्य लघुसमाता ।

हतानुमश्रविकविध्यविद्याश्च वशीकारसज्ज्वा वैराग्यम् ॥ १७ ॥

द्विविधो विषयो द्रुष्ट भानुमश्रविकविध्यमानः
'द्रुष्टः' इदैवप्राप्याध्यामः
ब्रजस्वादः। देवलोकान्* भानुमश्रविकः। अनुरूपते गुहसुखाविभवः।
अनुसूक् वेदः तत्र भागातः** भानुमश्रविकः।
तयार्द्धयोग्यां विषयोऽर्थे: परिषामविरूपलद्धनात्
विगतगुङ्खः, य वशीकारसज्ज्वः' समैते

* देवलोके हरितः F पुक्कापाठः।
† तत्वार्गिकः हरितः B, C चिंतकपुक्कापाठः। तत्र भागातः भाव
हरितः F पुक्कापाठः।
†† विगतरागशेषिः B, D चिंतकपुक्कापाठः।

2
वष्णुः नाषिसो बस्त्र हृदि चोरवं विविधः॥ तत्र 'वैराग्यम्' जवते ॥ १५ ॥

तत्त्वेव विशेषमात्

ततो परं पुरुषस्यातेर्पुर्वेष्यात्मम्॥ १६ ॥

'तत्र' वैराग्यं, 'पर' जल्लां। प्रथमं वैराग्ये विषयविषयं, द्वितीयगु मुश्विषययुपयुपुष्पविवेकात्मेयं भवति निरोधङ्गमाधिरेख जनानुजसमात्॥ १६ ॥

एवं चोगिस निर्धारणुष्रुक्तमात्स्रुगः सम्प्रजातामुर्गमात्रस्त्रृष्णेनभेदमात्।

बिंतक्षतिचारानन्दिकादितिसामान्यमात् सम्प्रजातः॥ १७॥

समाधिरिति श्रेष्ठः। सम्यक् संशयविपङ्कराद्विन्तितम् प्रमाणाते प्रकर्षण झारते भावम्भ सच्चां चे च 'सम्प्रजाता'। समाधिरिति नाविषेधः। चोयानिकतकस्तनितीर्थः सम्प्रजातः चवीकज्ञाना भिरितिव चाचन्तु। श्रविकादिभेदाद्वितीयविचारः। श्रविकादिभेदाद्वितीयविचारः। बाधनः। जागिरस्य। बाधा च भावाः॥ विष्णुः च भक्तिः

* वष्णुः संस्क्रं नैते वष्णुः द्वितीय पुस्तकपातः।
† विभागः द्वितीय पुस्तकपातः।
‡ उत्तमस्ययश्वार्तेयेष भवतीति B चिन्तितपुस्तकपातः। उत्तममुखः बुधवास्यस्य चिन्तितपुस्तकपातः। उत्तममुखः बुधवास्यस्य चिन्तितपुस्तकपातः। उत्तममुखः बुधवास्यस्य चिन्तितपुस्तकपातः। उत्तममुखः बुधवास्यस्य चिन्तितपुस्तकपातः।
§ समाधानभेदमात्राः B चिन्तितपुस्तकपातः।
|| वाचनम् द्वितीय पुस्तकपातः।
बैठक पूजा पुराणांबद्धां

भावम दिधा

दैवकालानि

तांगापि व दिधा जड़ाजड़मेधात।

स्थानि च पालायिताः।

चक्रः पुष्करः

ततः च यदा महाभृतेद्रियांशि खुलानि विशवेनादाय धुर्वापरासुमभानेन भवार्यौखेकमवेंद्रेनि

च भावना प्रवर्तते, तदां

वनिताः

समाधिः।

अनौग्रेवाचावने पूर्वापरागुश्यन्त्रभार्याः

भुक्तेव च यदा भावना प्रवर्तते, तदा निर्विवाचः।

तद्दानामःकरणाः

सन्निधि विश्वमालमा

तथा देशकालाण्डीक्रेत्रेनि च यदा भावना

प्रवर्तते, तदा

विवाचः।

तदानौग्रेवाचावने देशकालाण्डीक्रेत्रेन विना धन्यभाबावमावनिलेन भावना क्रियमाया

निर्विवाचं

dेवि

यो

चेते।

एवं विद्या

समाधिनियः

वामापन्नितिः

धारिताः

चेते।

यदा

रजसोवेलोशानुतिस्वहत्तरः

करणांभ भावते, तदा गुणभावतं विद्वानः

धृत्राकामयुः

सत्याचारमानव्यावाहां

साथं

समाधिभुवनि।

अनौग्रेव वामापिः ते बद्रुखत्यास्वानांतः

प्रधानपूवसयुं

पन्नृति

ते

विनावदशाक्षारांतः

विवेर्णमववाचः।

दृधपक्षमार्पणः

ततः

परं रजसोवेलोशानुभिस्वतं

हर्षेन

सत्याचारमानव्यावाहारिः

या

प्रवर्तते

भावना, तर्पं

प्रायः

वस्तु

नागभावाभिमेलेक्रेत्रेन वस्तामार्।

* जसः

पुष्करः

दृढः

A पुष्करपादः

परम्परं

सतीचीला।

† चन्द्रि F पुष्करपादः।

‡ प्रभृतिकेशभृतेनिति C पुष्करपादः।

प्रभृतिकेशभृतेन यदृचि

† पुष्करपादः।

‡ प्रभृतिकेशभृतेनिति C पुष्करपादः।

†† सत्यदेशकालाण्डीक्रेत्रेनिति F पुष्करपादः।

†† प्रायःमापन्नितिः

पृथ्विषतपुष्करपादः।

Digitized by Google
विरामप्रत्ययाभासपूर्वकं संक्लारेवेऽन्यः। १८॥

विरम्यते नेनेति ‘विरमः’ वित्तकाण्डिशिष्याद्यागः। विरामाधिक्रमत् प्रत्ययेर्वति ‘विरामप्रत्ययः’, तत् ‘अभासः’ पैनः पुनः पैने विविधेयं, तत् या कान्तिः दुर्लभ्यत तस्यां नेति नेतीति नेतिनिर्यायः पहुँचस्य तत्पुरुषां सम्प्रभातस्माधिः। वंशाक्षरे; तत्पुरुषां सम्प्रभात स्वतः। न तत् किंतु देहां सम्प्रभाते देहां निर्विभेदः व्याख्यातः। १९॥ शास्त्रविचारिकृतस्य परिवारः। व्याख्यातः, समाधिमार्कः, एकाण्ततः, नित्तोषः। ततः

* वंशारदिशिष्येऽन्यः दिति E पुस्करापः।
† सत्यपुरुषः सम्प्रभातसमाधिमार्कः उपस्थापः परस्परं न समीचिनः।
§ संस्कारविशेष दिति E पुस्करापः।
¶ समाधिमार्कः दिति D पुस्करापः।


शिष्यः शिष्यभूमी युथां। विषिध्वम्मः चषोट्रेकात् सामाधिप्रारम्भ:। एकायताणन्दस्तु पत्थोन्मभूमिः। प्रतिपरिशामसंख्याः।

ततः युथाणागनीता: संख्याः। सामाधिप्रारम्भे:। संख्यारङ्गाने।

तद्भाष्कः कामाने। निरानाजनितेर्कम्याताः। संख्याः:। खँडङ्खः।

यथा खुफः खुफः खुफः श्रिय्यां स्वर्णमाग्रां। सुवर्णमाग्रां। निर्बंध, एवमः काकायताणागनीताः। संख्यारङ्गाः। निरानाजनिता:। खँडङ्खः।

निर्बंधः। ॥ १८ ॥

तदर्न योगसः श्रुत्यं बहुःप्रेयोपायः भाभाभिष्ठते। विषिद्योपायः।

भवप्रत्ययः विषिद्योपायः। ॥ १८ ॥

"विषिद्यः", "प्रतिध्वम्बः", च विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः।

तेव्रा समाधि: "भवप्रत्ययः", भव: संख्याः। एव प्रतिध्वम्बः। कारणः चक्ष: च भवप्रत्ययः। भवप्रत्ययः। भवप्रत्ययः। भवप्रत्ययः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः।

भव: परतत्त्वार्धमात्राः। योगसः। चुक्षिप्राशाय यक्षः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः। विषिद्योपायः।

तदनेवामः।

* स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः।
† स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः। स्मृतिः।
श्राचीयेचृतिमाधिप्राप्तापूर्व्यः इतरेषाम्। २०।।

विदेशप्रलिपिवाक्यलिपिक्रियान्य खेड़ीनां, श्राद्धपूर्व्यः, श्राद्धयः। पूर्णे उपाया बल्क श्राद्धपूर्व्यः। तेन श्राद्धयः। श्रांसा-

पापायेपघावेन प्रवर्तिताणामः सम्प्रज्ञाततः श्राद्धस्पप्तां प्रतिष्ठा

चनने। तत्र ‘श्राद्ध’ योगविषये चेतत: प्रशासः। ‘वीरं’ ज्ञानं।

‘स्वति’ श्राद्धवपेश्चमः। ‘श्रास्ति’ ‘विधेय’ अनुसारः। ‘श्रास्ति’ प्रशासनां

वाविकः। तत्र श्राद्धाते गौरीं जायते, योगविषये उज्ज्वलवाभि

भवति। बेलाराध्य पाषायात् अभिन्नु स्वतिष्ठवायते। तत्त्वाः-

शान्तः चेतः समाधीयते। श्राद्धिष्टरुक्तिश्च भावं सम्बन्धितोभावः।

त एते सम्प्रज्ञातमन्विष्ठपापाणा:। तशास्त्रावलूणि प्रायाब्राह्म

वधयमः। २१।।

उक्तोपायवां खेड़ीनामुपायवेदात्र भेदावात्।

तीर्थसंबेगानामासः। २१।।

श्राद्धिष्ठम दन्तिश्र:। ‘स्वेगः’ जिथा हृद्दुर्धरः खंडकारः॥

‘तीर्थः’, खेड़ीमाधिमात्रोपायानं, तेषां ‘श्रास्ति’। श्राद्धिष्ठाम:।

श्राद्धिष्ठपश्चाद्यश्च भवति, श्रीशेष नियमतं द्वैतं। २१।।

ते ते तीर्थसंबेग द्रव्यतं भाषा।

* समाधिशाश दशि C, F, G युक्तक्रमेऽवु पाठः। चच्चैः समाधिषाश दशि पाठऽच टीकायां श्राद्धिष्ठाम दशि प्रेयश दर्शि पाठः नापि।

तदाच समाधिशाशभव्ये बहुसाध्यकायस्य च भुवायविज्ञायभाविक-शितिनि निष्ठोयते।

† तेषां समाधिभ्रुवति जाथ दशि D युक्तावापाठः।
ब्रह्मध्याधिमार्गावतात् तत्तापि विषेषः || २२ ||

तेभस्य उपाध्येयं ब्रह्मादिभेदं विशेषं उपाध्येयं 'विषेषः', भवति।
'ब्रह्मादिप्रचारम्', श्रद्धार्थाभेदम्। ते प्रथमं ब्रह्मवेगः-मध्यवेगः-
नीर्मवेगादेवात् चिन्तिता। तद्वतेन न नव धारिगेः भवन्ति।
ब्रह्मपापः, ब्रह्मवेगः, मध्यवेगः, तीर्मवेगः। मध्यपापः, ब्रह्म-
वेगः, मध्यवेगः, तीर्मवेगः। अधिमार्गावः, ब्रह्मवेगः,
मध्यवेगः, तीर्मवेगः। अधिमाचार्येः तीमि ज संवेगे महान्
वल्लेक्ष: कर्भवेः दृष्टि मेंदौपेन्द्रे: || २२ ||

द्विद्वानीतुपायविक्षेपं चुम्भसुपायानारमासः।

ईश्वरप्रशिक्षानादः || २३ ||

'ईश्वरः' ब्रह्मध्याधिमार्गावतात् 'प्रशिक्षान' तत्र भविष्यविशेषः। विशिष्ट-
मुहारमं सर्वज्ञात्याहारामपि तचार्थरं। विपयसुखालिकं फलमिन्द्रणः
सत्यं: किरुमार्मानु परममार्गार्ष्यविद्यति, तत्त 'प्रशिक्षान'। समाधिकतृत्-
फलासभ्यक्ष च प्रकट उपायः || २३ ||

ईश्वरसः प्रशिक्षानात् समाधिकां विद्यमानं। तत्वेश्वरसः सहर्षं,
महापरंपरं, प्रभावं, वाणं, उपाध्यायानं, तत्वतथानासं ज्ञेयं वक्तमानः।

हरिमान्यकारविपाकाश्यररारसः पुरुषविशेषं ईश्वरः ||

|| २४ ||

किरुमांति 'हेम्सः' भविष्यात् वध्यमानं। विशिष्ट-प्रशिक्षृप्रतिष्ठ-
ग्रामिकांश्यविचारं 'कर्भवृंचि'। विपश्चल दृष्टि 'विपाकः' कर्भवेः भासनी

* फलमिन्द्रिपी C, F मुख्रकाहः।
प्रातःश्रेे थेामाङ्चे

झातायुभिर्मागः। चरावशिवपाकात् विनाभुविै त्रेतत 'श्रेयः' वालनाथः। संक्षारः। तैः 'श्रेयचारः' विखिप्न कालेशु न संक्ष्टः। 'पुरुषविवेशः' अनेकेश् पुरुषवेशाः विनिष्टत दृति विशेषः। 'देष्टः' देवनाशिः, रक्षामाणिः नक्षत्रजगूदुर्घः:-

ध्रुपिः वर्षेवामात्रां केशादिसृंगां नाक्षि तथापि विनिगतकशेषानुपतिक्षते। यथा थोर्कातै जयपराजहै खाजनिः। च्रमः तु विखिप्न कालेशु नेवारापोहपिति केशादिपिरामिः। नासीवतः। विक्षेपण एवं भगवानीवः।

तस्तः क तथापविभेदीपश्चातदेः सचोत्त्वः। चोत्त्वकर्षेऽरुः मतस्वानादेः। न चानयोः क्षमायद्वारितेः राजस्मथः,

परसर्यामपेशकः। तेहै श्रानैवर्थयावरितेः राजायथः, सम्बन्धः। प्रभुसितपुरुषसंगमे-वियोगेऽरुवेशायतातीर्थेः केशानुपनः।

यथे तेष्वे व्रतिः कालेशु कर्मात्मेः अनावरि धर्मः। तथाविशेषे वन्येन तथानादिलिभ मनमाः प्रभुसितपुरुषैव-वियोगेरुवेशायतातीर्थेः केशानुपनः।

यथे तेष्वे व्रतिः कालेशु कर्मात्मेः अनावरि धर्मः। तथाविशेषे वन्येन तथानादिलिभ मनमाः प्रभुसितपुरुषैव-वियोगेरुवेशायतातीर्थेः केशानुपनः।

तस्तः केवल एवं वाचिकः। परिषाय उत्कर्ष्यानानास्त्येऽविभेदकालिः। नासीवतः। अनिर्माताः। पुरुषविवेशः कर्षणानारिविन्यासस्त्ये।

तस्तः। पुरुषविवेशः कर्षणानारिविन्यासस्त्ये।

पुरुषविवेशः। विशेषः। नासीवतः। अनिर्माताः। पुरुषविवेशः कर्षणानारिविन्यासस्त्ये।

उत्कर्ष्यानास्त्येऽविभेदकालिः। नासीवतः। अनिर्माताः। पुरुषविवेशः कर्षणानारिविन्यासस्त्ये।

उत्कर्ष्यानास्त्येऽविभेदकालिः। नासीवतः। अनिर्माताः। पुरुषविवेशः कर्षणानारिविन्यासस्त्ये।

उत्कर्ष्यानास्त्येऽविभेदकालिः। नासीवतः। अनिर्माताः।
एवमीश्ररख स्त्रयमभिधाय प्रमाणमाधः

तत्च निर्तिययं सर्व्वग्विज्ञं ॥ २५ ॥

तक्षिण्ण भगवति, सर्व्वक्ष्यस्य यत् 'वीज' प्रतीतानागतादिविहरणानीत्याविषयं* महत्व, मूलाद्रिजिमव वीजं, तत् 'त'निर्तिययं कांति प्राप्। दूषा हि अशुलमस्चादिनीि धर्मोऽथातिसानां कामात्मकः। यथा परमाधावुलस्वाकाः च परमत्वस्य।

एवं शान्तादिपि विनधोक्षरतमेव परिष्करणात्: काशिकर- नित्रश्यतामापादयति२ च चैते निर्तिययः च देवः। च चपि यामन्यमोचनमास्य पर्यवसितालक्ष्यविशेषार्थः स्वभाववति, तथापि राख्यश्रृः सर्व्वशाल्यद्वो विशेषा अवग्रहमः। च च श्राहास्यनाभावे कथं प्रकृतिपुस्वयः: संवर्गविश्वयोगावापादयतीती गामश्रव्यायं।

तथा कार्तिकाल्पवालापुरुष एव श्राहामः। कल्य-प्रकृति अश्रुप्रशस्तेतु निप्रेषान्त संवारिण ज्ञुद्विरामीति तस्याधिक्यायः।

यथा इह तत्सक्त प्रयोजनमति ॥ २६ ॥

एवमीश्ररख स्त्रयं प्रमाणश्चाबिधाय प्रभावातः

स एव पूर्वेशामपि गुहः कालेनात्रव्यश्चेदात् ॥ २७ ॥

आयानां श्राह्यं ब्रह्मविनामयिः, 'गुहः' उपदेशा, यत्: 'वः',

* अतिरिक्तदागतादिइत्रस्त्रयस्याल्कमति B, C, D, E पुस्तकां पाठः।
† अशुलमस्चादिनीमति A, E पुस्तकपाठः। यथासत्य सर्व्व ऊ- 
-श्रृःकथार्थे कपिलश्रव्यवधारः।
‡ निर्तिययतामापादयति D पुस्तकपाठः।
पात्रह्रे येगाद्रे

शाक्तिविपक्षान् चित्तभुदाम् भे्रत दति 'अभ्या:
वाक्यनक्ष: संख्या:। तैः 'अपराधः:' विश्वापि कारे्पु न संबंधः।
'पुंसनविशेष:' अनेवः पुंसवेषः विश्वापत दति विशेष:। 'ङ्गरः'
'झेनश्रीः', लघुकातिष उक्तजगदुधर्मः। यथापि विषयोऽ
कारकान् कृष्णापिनी नामि तथापि विनिमयकृष्णापिनिर्देशः।
थथा थाहृढ़ते जयपराजया भा्मिनः। दस्य तु विनिमय कारे्पु
तथाविषेधापि कृष्णाष्ट्रामण्डः नास्तीबतो: ् विनिमय: एव भवावा
नीसः। दस्य छ तथाविनिमयवित्तात्रादेवः संसारस्तुः। विनिमय
स्वाख प्रकृत्यानावेदः। न चालयःः क्रान्तिविनरिते राष्ट्राथवं,
परस्परपेश्चादृतः। ते दे क्रान्तिर्ग्राहरः लघुकान् नर्मातान्मे अनिदि
भूते। तथाविनेत्र कारे्पु नालानादिरेव समभा, प्रकृतिपुस्तविशेष
विनिमयवारीत्तथात्मित्त्वेकानगुप्तः। विनिमयश्रेणः श्रेणि: एव
दुःखोऽहत्वा विपरिताय चिन्त: निरध्वन्ते श्राकिनेष यथार्थात्प्रभेके याबि
शरीरे प्रतिियां चित्तायास्मातोः संवेदं भवति, नैवमीखरः।
दस्य नेवस एत शालिक: परिषाम जत्वयातानादिकयादेवान्ने भोगम
तथा ज्योितः। धर्मः: पुष्पादित्वविविधपत्य: ् एवायः। स्मृताक्रान:।
पुन: कृष्णापिनी लोकीः क्रान्तिधुपायः निवर्तिन्तः। चतुः पुन: विषेष
तथाविनिमयकृष्णानादिकः सुकृष्णतुधर्मः। न चेस्त्रारामनकांकः तेषा तुष्कालिप
भिन्नभ्रान्तालः कृष्णात्नुजपने:। उक्तार्थपुष्पाहले एव
उक्ताः ् एव एव क्रान: ् तचैव गोविस्मादादस्वर्गायः ॥ २४ ॥

* क्रान्तिधुपायः दति A पुस्तकायान्: परस्परं न समीचिनः।
† न च तत्यारिः C, Fः पुस्तकायान्य:।
एवमीवर्षेयः स्थलपरिभाषेयः प्रमाणेष्वः

तत्च निरूपितस्य सत्यवाक्यविहः \(\text{२५५} \) \(\text{॥} \)

तस्मिन् भवति, स्थलस्य यत् ‘वीज’ अनुजीतानाग्नागादिप्रकरणः
पञ्चायनं भवति, मूलकेशवाः वीजस्य; तत् ‘तच’, ‘निरूपितम्’
कार्त्तिकं प्रार्थं। दृष्टं चि ऐशुलमच्यादिनीं। धर्मीणां धानिश्चार्यां
कार्त्तिकं:। यथा प्रमाणात्मकः कालकाशने च प्रमाणस्य।
एवं नागाम्बापि विनामन्त्रान्तरायुं निरूपिताभागं: कान्तिरक्ती
तिरാस्तलापदार्थं:। यथा जैहै निरूपितय:। रक्तेऽपि
यथा प्रमाणात्मकः कालकाशने विशेषाविभागं:। स्थल, तथापि
स्थलामसुचारूणाम् प्रमाणस्य विशेषाविभागं:। स्थल, तथापि
स्थलामसुचारूणाम् प्रमाणस्य विशेषाविभागं:। व च
कष्टप्रयोगनाभाभे कर्त्यं प्रज्ञानुपुष्येऽं: संबधाबंध्योगानापदार्
तीति नाशेऽवर्त्तियं। तत् कालिणिकालः
एवं प्रयोजनं। कल्याणक्षेत्रः प्रज्ञानुपुष्येऽं
विशेषानुसारं स्थानानिद्यते। नाशेऽवर्त्तियं।
यथा उपर्युक्त: नाशेऽवर्त्तियं। \(\text{२५६} \) \(\text{॥} \)

एवमीवर्षेयः स्थलपरिभाषेयः प्रमाणेष्वः

स एस्पूर्वेयमापि गुहः कालेनानववक्ष्ये। \(\text{२५६} \) \(\text{॥} \)

श्रीदामां स्त्रीधार्मामपि, ‘गुहः’ उपदेशं, चत: ‘यः’,
“कालेन, नावस्थियते निन्दिलात्। तेषां पुनःदीर्घावर्त्ती कालेनावचेती।” ॥ २६ ॥

एवं प्रभाववुक्ता उपाध्योपयोगाय वाष्कमात्र ।

तत्स्य वाष्कः प्रश्नः ॥ २७ ॥

इत्यत्त्वदष्टपदां देशरस, ‘वाष्क:’ प्रश्निधायकः।* प्रत्येकः गूढः स्थायते नन्देते। नैति नैतीति वा ‘प्रश्न:' चोख्यात।। ततेऽऽत्स्
वाष्कवाष्कावलश्रवस्यवधनो निीतः सुधृतेन प्रकाशते, न तु शेषानि
जिते, यथा पिपुषोऽधोरिष्मयमः शम्मोऽश्चायं पिता अश्चायं
पुष दत्त केननिः प्रकाशते। ॥ २७ ॥

उपाध्योगकः

तद्वप्तत्त्वद्भावनम् ॥ २८ ॥

‘तत्’ सादृश्यिमाणस्य प्रश्कः, ‘अप:’ यद्यावस्तुराय, तद्वप्तत्त्वे-
खरसा ‘भावं’ प्लु: पुनःशेषत्वि विनिवेश्यं, एकायताया उपायः।
अतः समाधिबिद्वाहे योगिना प्रश्चो अयः, तद्वप्तत्व भावनीचः।†
इत्यत्त्व भवति। ॥ २८ ॥

उपाध्योगकः: फलमात्र।

ततः प्रायक्षेत्रतनाधिगोदायधायतायाभावं।‡ ॥ २८ ॥

तद्वप्तत्त्वात् तद्वप्तत्त्वादात् च योगिनः: ‘प्रायक्षेत्रतनाधिगोदायधायतायाभावं।

* वाष्कोऽमिन्धायकः प्रश्न योगार्थ हिति A, D दुस्क्रवधयः।
† तद्वप्तत्त्वत्त्व भावनीच हिति B, D दुस्क्रवधयः।
‡ चेतनामेता: भावहिति A, C, D, F दुस्क्रवधयः।
गमः’ "भवति। विषयमात्रिकूलेन खान्त-कर्षणाभिमुखमयित, " या ‘चेतना’ दुक्षितः,ि संस्कृती, तथा ‘विधिगमः’ खानं, "भवति। ‘चतुराया’ वच्चामाखान, तेषां ‘प्रभावः’ श्रीमात्रिशिबः, भवति॥ ९॥

चतुराया:ऽ द्वयंश्रीबायामाखान ।

वायु-स्थान-संश्य-प्रमादस्क्षाृविरित-अन्निदर्शः-
नालाबधाममिकाळावशिष्ठत्वानि शिष्विशेषपालात्त्वायामः॥ ३०॥

भीते रात्रिमोक्षात् प्रवर्तमाना: ‘विष्यविभेदः’,ि भवति, सैरेकावराविरोधाधिकारिते विशिष्याऽधिकारः। तथ ‘वायुः’ धातु-वैयव्यमिलितो या राजःः। ‘खानं’ धार्मिकं विशिष्य। उभयको-व्यासमनः। विशिष्यां ‘संवृतः’, बोधः बाध्या वा न वेदितः। ‘प्रमादः’ अन्ननुष्ठानश्रीकरणतः, स्वाभिः काओब्राह्मणोऽसदार्धीये। ‘ब्रह्मसः’ काव्यस्य-निर्गुणलयः, बोधविधाये प्रत्यस्मात्वादे शेषः। ‘विभवति’ विशिष्य

* प्रथम्चेतनागमम इति C, D पुस्तकध्वजपाठः।
† खान्त-कर्षणाभिमुखमयितः या दुक्षिततिरितिः B पुस्तकध्वजपाठः। खान्त-कर्षणाभिमुखमयितः या चेतना दुक्षिततिरितिः A, C पुस्तकध्वजपाठः। खान्त:-कर्षणाभिमुखमयितः प्रथम्चेतना दुक्षिततिरितिः तथाधिकम् इति D पुस्तकध्वजपाठः।
‡ बच भें तेलपाया इति C, E पुस्तकध्वजपाठः।
§ विशिष्य विरोधः इति A, C पुस्तकध्वजपाठः।
¶ उभयको-प्रावुर्दशितिः C पुस्तकध्वजपाठः। परश्वं न समीचिनः।
‖ बोधः साधः: खान्त न वेदित A, C पुस्तकध्वजपाठः।
२०  यात्रानं योगाच्ने

विषयसम्योगानं गडांः०। 'भानिल्लें' प्रविषिकार्य रजत्व-विद्तमं विषयविधानं। 'चरणम्भरमिकलं' कुतिन्तू गिरिमात्र सम्बाधितस्यस्यि सम्बन्धयोक्तम्याचार्यिः। 'चरणविशिष्टम्' समावश्यायामणि समाधिक्षेत्र सिष्क्ष तस्मातिष्ठ। त-एते समाधिक्षेत्रायां यथावेगे प्रतिपधानं 'चरणावानं', दृढः उष्णे॥ १०॥

विषयविषयकारानुपर्यायसाधनं प्रतिपादव्युत्तमसः।

दुःख-दौर्मनंस्कारेज्ञन्यत्व-सास-प्रश्नासा विष्णेपस्य-भुवः॥ ३१॥

कुतिन्तुण्यितादुपकेवु विष्णेपेतैः दुःखाद्यः प्रवर्णः।
तत् 'दुःखां' विष्कार रागाः॥ परिषाम: बाधनामांमः, यदाधाना प्राणिन्द्रयवाचाराय प्रवर्णः। 'दौर्मनं' वाशाभायन: कारणेश्वरीयो वाजाः। 'चरणविशिष्टम्' सम्ब्धेत्रिणैौ वेपः। 'चरणम्भरमिकलं' सम्बाधिक्षेत्रमणि वायुः। प्राणेय यदां वायुमार्गामिति य: 'सासः'॥॥ यत्काहां वायुं निष्पाधयसिद्धः व 'प्रश्नाः'। त एते विष्णेः॥ सत्स वर्णामाणा

* विषयसम्योगायो गडां हरि इति C पुस्करेषां।
† रजत्वविद्तीमिः A पुस्करेषां।
‡ समावश्यायात्मिः E पुस्करेषां।
§ विष्णेपेतैः हरि इति C, E, F पुस्करेषां।
¶ विषयसाधनं इति A पुस्करेषां।
†† चरणम्भरमिकलं इति A पुस्करेषां।
** प्राणो यवां वायुमार्गार्थिः स व्यासौ इति B पुस्करेषां।
‡‡ निष्पाधयात्मिः A, B, D पुस्करेषां।
††† ते यवां व्यासौ इति A, F पुस्करेषां। यवां व्यासौ इति B, E, D पुस्करेषां।


चतुर्दशीताभाष्यमध्ये-पौराणिकां निरोधाया ईश्वासुपरदेशः। १ १ ॥

सप्तद्वितिप्रतिवधार्यसुपाणान्तरमात्र ।

तत्तत्रतिवधार्यस्मकर्तत्वाभासः। १ २ ॥

तेषां विचेत्तरणाः प्रतिवधार्यं विनेत्रधार्यं, 'एकधिनं दक्षिणीत्रतमसे, 'तत्रे' 'श्रव्याः', चेतनं पुनः पुराणिनविषयं कुर्यात्।

चतुर्दशीताभाष्यमध्ये प्रतिवधार्यस्मकर्तत्तवाः अभासमुपाणान्तरमात्र विवेचन। १ ३ ॥

इदारी विचारसङ्कनाराजपादवर्तिपारिकर्त्ताधिकातं पूर्वकसुपाणान्तरमात्र ।

मैथिली-कल्पण-सुदृढ़तापेक्षायां सुखदः-कपुष्यापुष्यविषयायां भावनातिबिष्क्तसादनम्। १ ३ ॥

‘मैथिली’ वैदिकाः। ‘कल्पण’ कप। ‘सुदृढ़ता’ कप। ‘श्रव्या’ कप।

एता यथायां सहितेनु, दुःखितेनु, पुष्यवस्तु, अपुष्यवस्तु भावयेत्। तथासे सहितेनु शाखेवः सहितेनु भावयेत्। शाखेवाः सुखायां सुखायां शाखेवाः सुखायां बीत नैसे। दुःखितेनु कत्यां पुष्यवस्तु नामेवाः दुःखितेवं सुखायां शाखेवाः सुखायां बीत नैसे।

पुष्यवस्तु वैदिकसङ्गकर्त्ता भावयेत् नानुसेवनं न देवं। सुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुकीकर्त्ता:। तदवें मैथिलिपरिकर्त्ता: चित्तेऽ स्रीकर्त्ता:। दुःखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽसुखेऽ

* विचारसङ्कनाराजः परिकर्त्ताधिकातं पूर्वकसङ्कनाराजादि तिथिः अ, अ पुष्यवस्तु भावयेत्।।
† परिकर्त्ताधिकातं पूर्वकसङ्कनाराजः तिथि दिनादि, धिनादि रसादिकातं पूर्वकसङ्कनाराजः तिथि।
‡ परिकर्त्ताधिकातं तिथि दिनादि पुष्यवस्तु भावयेत्।।
प्रक्षेपः  विधारणां वा प्राभ्यः ॥ ३४ ॥

'प्रक्षेपः' यत् कौङ्ख् वाणोऽ: प्रक्षेपविधारणां वस्त्रिनिविधारणं । 'विधारणं' मात्रप्रक्षेेपां प्राणशास्त्राय: गतिविषेषः ।

श्च द्वारां प्रकारांम्, वस्त्रशास्त्रापूर्वकं, पूर्वितक्षण वाष्पायः विनिरीखयां । तदैव रेतकपूर्वकलङ्कमेवें चिन्हः प्राणस्थायम्:

प्रक्षेपः विनिविधारणां विनिविधारणां विनिविधारणां।

रेतकपूर्वकलङ्कमेवें चिन्हः प्राणस्थायम्: 

वस्त्रशास्त्रिविनिविधारणां प्राणप्रति पूर्वकलङ्कमेवें मनः प्राणशास्त्राः।

द्वारां प्रकारांम्, वस्त्रशास्त्रापूर्वकं, पूर्वितक्षण वाष्पायः 

प्रक्षेपनिविधारणां प्रक्षेपनिविधारणां प्रक्षेपनिविधारणां ॥ ३४ ॥

द्राक्षीरसुपायनानेव अपेक्षेपेः सम्प्रश्राति समाधि: पूवर्वः 

करोति ॥

* विनिविधारणां वाणोऽ: A, D प्रक्षेपः 

† पूवर्वः करोती व B प्रक्षेपः ॥
विषयति वा प्रहरतितप्यत विशिष्टिनिवधनी।

मनव दति वाक्ष्रेषः। विषय गम्भ-रस-फू-रस-शब्दः ते विषयं पलबनं यथा: या ‘विषयम्’, ‘प्रहरि’ः, मनवः कृष्यं करेऽति। तथा हि नायाये विनम्बर्त्ते विषयमन्विनिवधनं उपजायते।

तां देव जिष्ठाये रूपसमित्। तां देवे रूपसमित्। जिष्ठाये सर्व्य-हनित्। जिष्ठामुः सर्व्य-हनित्।

जिष्ठामुः सर्व्य-हनित्। जिष्ठामुः सर्व्य-हनित्। अर्थेऽवस सर्व्य-हनित्। च भूतेऽवस सर्व्य-हनित्।

विषयाः का योतिन्याः।

प्रहरतितप्यत विलक्ष विशिष्टिनिवधनीति वाक्ष्रेषः। योतिन:–

शब्दे सालिकः प्रकाशः उच्चाते, व प्रकाशः भूतारसिनिवधवांश विलक्षे यथा: या ‘योतिन्याः’, प्रहरि:।

‘विषयका’ विषये: चुरुचं-तलाभायमभास्वाः रजःपरिलोकः यथा: या, चेतस: विशिष्टिनिवधनी।

प्रकाशेऽ चुरुचंसुप्ताये प्रशस्ताकालोक्षविरोधविश्वाये

विलक्ष्णं समकाल्य: प्रशस्ताकालः सर्व्य-हनितपरिस्थिरे चेतस: चेतस:–

उपास्मार्गार्थं प्रत्येकम् समस्तात्मकः समाःर्थविश्यं उर्ध्वति।

वीतरागविषयं वा चिन्तं।

मनव: विशिष्टिनिवधनं भवतीति वाक्ष्रेषः। ‘वीतराग:’
परिधानविश्वासभीषणः, तथा यत् 'चिन्ता', परिधानविश्वास तद्दास्तनी-दत्त, चेतनः स्खल्लितेवभिन्नति || २७ ||
एवंविषयेैैपायानातरमासः।

स्म-निद्रा-शानावलम्बन वा || २८ ||
प्रत्येकक्षितवाश्चतिर्निद्रायिनंगामाविशेषः वच भगवतमार्गः: वः
'स्मरः'। 'निद्र' पूर्वाराज्यजः। तद्दास्तनी शानावलम्बनेन, निद्रायिनं
वा 'श्लां', श्रावणारम्ब, चेतनः स्खल्लितं करेऽति || २८ ||
नानाद्रिष्टेन धारिता प्राचीनो शब्दम् कस्मिन्विदृढः सन्धिनः सर्वाः
भवति। तथा धानेनापि भवत्यस्तस्यविद्वृहरितं प्रतिपाद्विलिमारः।

यथाभिमतथायानादः || २५ ||
यथाभिमते वक्तुनि वाक्ये वज्रादृशः, अभिव्यक्ते नान्दीज्वलादृशः वा
भावान्विते चेत: स्खरं भवति || २८ ||
एवव्यपायान् पदः शत्यभावान्वितमारः।

परमायु-परमसमुखालो भस्मिकारः || ४० ||
प्रभिप्याजीतकां कृत्यं भावते योगिनः शुचिविश्वासभवं
दारे वस्मिकारः:'भस्मिकार, च' अन्तिधारात्, जायते, कार्थि
परमायुधानं सुचीविश्वासभवं मनो न प्रतिप्यत देयः । एवं
शुचिविश्वासभवाधिपरमायुधानं भावतो न कार्थि चेत: प्रतिधातु
उपयोगी वर्णं श्रावणं भवतीवर्षः || ४० ||

* पूज्येवाश्चतिर्निद्रायिनः भुक्तकापः।
† स्खल्लितेवभिन्नति भुक्तकापः। चेतःस्खल्लितेवभिन्नति भुक्तकापः।
एवमेकाल्यावरः संख्यात्सा चेतनः कौद्यादेशं भवतीतः।

श्रीविण्नेतेभिजातस्येव मणेश्वरेश्चित्त-चिरहस्तान्त्रीयुषु
तत्त्व-तद्वत्त्नतासमाप्तिः || ४१ ||

चीरा दृष्ट्या चतुर्वेद्य: स: ‘चीरागुप्तसः’, तत्त्व: ‘चारीवर-चार्त-चार्तीयुषु’
श्रवीष्यन्ति-श्रीवेद्यूपूः, ‘तत्त्व-तद्वत्त्नतासमाप्तिः’, भवति। ‘तद्वत्त्व’
तत्केकांवतः। ‘तद्वत्त्वान’ तद्वत्त्वान, न्यायश्चो च विषयश्च भावानि
मानकेत्येकस्यातः। तथाविधा ‘समाप्तिः’ तदविपरीतेऽऽध्वनितः। भवतीतनेनः।
हूःत्वा बृहस्पतिसः ‘भ्रमात्सोत्तम: श्रीलः’, द्रव्यतः चषया ‘भ्रमात्सोत्तम’ निर्द्धार्यः,
श्रीकोलमः। तत्त्वापि अध्यात्मशास्त्रवाचनात्तुपातिपति:। एवं श्रीभाष्यामि
निर्द्धार्यः विषयार्थ्यात्स तद्वत्त्ननीवश्च श्रीवाचनात्तुपातिपति:। यथविपि
राहस्ता-राहस्ता यात्त्वायुषुः, तथापि भ्रमिकाक्रमवाचाः याहा-राहस्ता
याहीतद्विति बृहस्पति:। यतः प्रथम याध्यानिधि एव समाधिखोऽतः
पुलिसनिष्कतो ‘ज्ञातासचाः’ पश्चादिलिहः, एवर्थाय दुःश्च याहीतः
भावानि भवताः। तत्त्व युत्तेव श्रीवाचनोपरम् चिन्त तत्समाप्तिः
भवति। एवं यद्येव याहीतद्विति य समाप्तिः खेळवे || ४१ ||

राहस्तानीवमास्य एव समाप्तेश्च श्रीवाचनेवेदमासः* ।

श्रवीष्यन्ति-श्रवण-विकल्पः सक्षीर्या सवितकाः || ४२ ||

श्रवीष्यन्ति-श्रवण-विकल्पः सक्षीर्या सवितकाः || ४२ ||

श्रवीष्यन्ति-श्रवण-विकल्पः सक्षीर्या सवितकाः || ४२ ||

* चतुर्विठ्ठलमाहाविति C गुत्सपातः ।
पात्रेष्वे योगवेष्टेन

वस्त्रायेते ब्रम्हाद्विभूत: परस्रामायेन विक्रमस्वेतेः प्रतियास्वेते,
गौरितिब्रद्र, गौरितयर्थः, गौरितिसारः, श्रवणेनाकारेण तथा
‘सविन्द्रः’, समाप्तिसत्तुष्यते”॥ ४ ॥

अण्वलवण्विपरीताः निर्विन्तकामाइ स।

सूतिपरियुक्तैः श्रुत्यप्रांतोवायमाः चार्यनिहोसा निन्तिकांकी॥ ४३ ॥।

श्रव्यायंसूतिप्रवचनं, प्रतिहुदितःत्तयाश्चाकारसतिभाषितं नवं
भुतस्मातिरेणाम् ‘श्रुत्यप्रांत: ४३’, ‘निहितकांकी’, समाप्तिः॥ ४ ॥।

वेदांतरं प्रतियाद्विष्वतमाः।

एतथैव सविन्द्राः निन्तित्वां श्रुत्यप्रांतो व्याख्याता॥ ४४ ॥।

‘एतथैव’ सविन्द्रां निन्तित्वां श्रुत्यप्रांतो व्याख्याता, ‘सविन्द्रां निन्तित्वां
व्याख्याता’। कोरुजी ‘श्रुत्यप्रांतो’ श्रुत्यप्रांतो चेदिराच्छिन्नः! विवेयो चन्द्रो तथा जेशयो। एतेऽप वर्षेष्वः श्रुत्यप्रांतो निन्तित्वसं भवति, तत्र व श्रव्यतातास्तम्भना श्रव्यायं-श्रमान-विक्रमस्वेतेन
तद्रस्वितलने च। देशकालयाध्यायविच्छिन्नः श्रमापश्च: प्रतियास्वेते
वस्त्रायेते तथा ‘सविन्द्राः’। देशकालस्थिर्वद्वितिते धर्मिनमाजयतथा।

* समाप्तिसत्तुष्यति हि युक्तकायः।।
† चार्यर्वेष्टेन हि युक्तकायः।।
‡ तत्प्रतिर्वेष्टेन हि युक्तकायः।।
§ श्रव्यायं-विक्रमस्वेतेन प्रतियास्वेतेन हि युक्तकायः।।
পাঁচি ৪৭ খেলাম।

ফ্রোয়েল্কমানেন্ড্রিয়েম: প্রতিভাতি বলা ক্ষয়া যথা 'নিবিষ্টরা।

ফ্রোয় এবং ফ্রোয়েল্যান: || ৪৪ ||

কিং পর্ক্যা: ফ্রোয বিষয় দ্বারাট।

ফ্রোয়েল্যানযত্ত্বাল্কিণ্যক্ষয়েঙ্কারা০ || ৪৫ ||

নিবিষ্ট'নিবিষ্টরা: সমাপকচৰ্চেং 'ফ্রোয়েল্যান'ে ফ্রোয়। ন
ফ্রোয চৰ্চেষু ন কহিমন্ত্বিতন গমনয়তি প্রথাগুণ,
তত্ত্বয়েষু ফ্রোয়েল্যান। তথা দে দুষিতন পরিণামে পথােন পত্রাপি,
বিভিন্নলিঙ্গে, বিভিন্নলিঙ্গে, লীলামাত্র, লীলাক্ষীত। বিভিন্নলিঙ্গে
ভুতনি। অনিবিষ্টতান নত্ত্বাল্কিণ্যেরিয়াপি। লীলামাত্র বুদ্ধি।
লীলাত্ম প্রামাণিত। দ্রাপণ: পরা ফ্রোয়েল্যানীমেন্ড্রিয়েন
ভরতি || ৪৫ ||

এতায় সমাপণেৰা প্রক্টে প্রযোজনমায়।

তা এব’ সবীজ: সামাদিঃ || ৪৬ ||

তা এব’ জ্ঞানবিক্ষণ: সমাপনাঃ, যহ বিজেন ধ্রুবব্যবহেন
কর্তন দ্বারা ’ব্যোজ:’ সম্প্রাণ: সমাধ্যাৃং, দৃশ্যতলে, সম্প্রাণ সা-
খুনলাতন || ৪৬ ||

অঘোগরায় সমাপণেৰা নিবিষ্টরফিৰকলাত’নিবিষ্টরা: নিবিষ্টরা: কলাম।

নিবিষ্টরিৰিীর্থে সংযোগ্যগতসাদ: || ৪৭ ||

'নিবিষ্টরিীর্থ জ্ঞান্যাত্ম। 'ব্যোজ' নীর্ধেৰং। নিবিষ্টরা খুনী-

* ফ্রোনি ঠাকুরায় এতা বর্ণনি এ প্রুষমায়: ||
† নিবিষ্টরা: প্রায় বর্ণনি এ প্রুষমায়: ||
विषयामपेन्य निर्विशेषकवाय: प्राधान्यः। तत्त्वंपि श्रुताविश्वातः। चविशारणः। तत्त्वंपि निर्विशेषकपुष्पवाय निर्विश्वारणः। तत्त्वातः निर्विश्वारणः। प्रसन्नाभावशालात् ‘वैशारणः’ नैर्खयो विति, ‘श्रुताद्व-प्रसन्नः ’, वसुन्धरायते, वित्त अहेस्वर वान चद्वल्लासयां भवति। एतदेव विनाश वैशारणः, चतुर्भूति दाधः॥ ४३॥
तत्स्मृतः विति किं भवतीदयानः।

ञङ्गत्तभरा तथ प्रशा॥ ४८॥

“ञङ्गं” तथं निर्भरस्तु ददाय ददाय न विश्वरेष्टाशायते, या ‘ञङ्गत्तभरा’, ‘प्रशा’, तत्स्मृतः विति, भवतीदयानः। तत्स्मृतः प्रशाः लोकानां
सबं धयावतं पशुनु चोगी प्रह्हां चोंगी प्रशा अनाति॥ ४८॥

प्रशा: प्रशांकरादू वैशारणमाहः।

श्रुतानुमानप्रशाःभाबमन्यविषयः विश्वार्थर्थात्॥ ४५॥

‘ञङ्गं’ प्रागमनानं, ‘ञङ्गुमानं’ उक्षलवेनं, ताभ्यं या जाते
प्रशा खा सामान्यविषयं। न चि चन्द्रज्युधयस्रितानि ध्रेंति
शामिवः। ददं पुरे चिंताविश्वारणवरथिपुष्पवेत॥ प्रशा ताभ्यं विश्वसः

* तत्सा भयोति B पुष्पवापादः।
† प्रशाःभाबसभावशादिति B पुष्करपादः।
‡ तत्स्मृतः प्रशा इति F पुष्करपादः।
§ श्रुतानुमानप्रशाःभाबमां सामान्यविषयं इति II पुष्करपादः। परस्परं न
समीचिनः।
|| निर्विश्वारणवैशारणवस्तुनुवेदिति B, E पुष्करपादः।
विषेषविवेचनात्। चतुर्थं हि प्रश्नां खसा-व्यवस्थित-विश्लेष्यनामांपि विषेष: स्थुतेनैव द्रव्येन प्रतिभाष्ये। अतसखः हि प्रश्नां चोग्निना परः प्रयत्नः कर्माणि द्रव्यपरिणां भवति॥ ४८॥

खसा: प्रश्नाणि फलमाह।

तज्ज�: संस्काराः त्यस्यसंस्कारप्रतिविन्ध्यं॥ ५०॥

तथा प्रश्नाः जनितः व: ‘संस्कारः’ चोग्निनाः वाक्यन्यान् समाधिः। संस्काराः प्रतिविन्ध्ये, संकायकर्षणामां करो-तीव्र्ये। यत्कालपः तथा जनिता: संकारा वाक्यवचनं प्रतत्त्व-कृष्णप्राप्तानिनियमं संस्काराः वाचितं प्रकृतान्त। अतसखाः प्रश्ना-सम्भवेदित्वं भवति॥ ५०॥

वें सप्रकाशं समाधिभिधायायायाम्प्रश्नां वकृताः।

तत्सापि निरोधे सब्जंनिरोधानानिरीजः समाधि:॥ ५१॥

‘तत्सापि’ सप्रकाशं सापेक्षा, ‘निरोधेय’ प्रविष्टवे, विषि, ‘सब्जां’

चित्रहारानाः, संकारेय प्रविष्टवा वा संकाराभाषा व्यतिरिक्ते, तस्य तत्सापि निरोधे बहुतां पर्यप्रेक्षानां ‘निर्बर्ज:’ समाधिः,

स्थाणी विषि पुष्प: स्खलनप्रृतिः। नृति भवति॥

तद्वाधिकारिः रोगः खसा, विनिरोधाणिं पदारमाः यथा-

* सप्रकाशसमाधिभिधायायाः पुष्करणाः।
† पर्यप्रेक्षानां दिति B पुष्करणाः।
‡ स्खलनप्रृतिः इति B पुष्करणाः।
खान, सभाव-वैराग्यकल्ण, नवीपावमरुः, हरभं मेदर्शाधिवाश श्रम्प्रशातायम्म्प्रतात्म्येतं होमस्व ऊष्ण्युष्ण्येवेसुक्ता धोगाभाषा-प्रदर्शन्यपूर्व्यां विक्ष्याणोपायान्त्र प्रदर्शन सुमोपावासद्वरपत्तन दैवश्रुः हर्षप-प्रमाण-प्रभाव-वाचकोपायामान्य-निल्कार्य निर्णय चित्त विचिेपाक्षिकामुख्य दुःखादीन विस्तरेशु न तन्त्रतिथिधोपाय-थानेककल्याणाध्यात्मीयानि प्राणयामादीनि श्रम्प्रशातायम्म्प्रतात्म्य-मन्त्रभूतविषयकतीन्तितिविद्यातीनि निदेश्येवार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्थार्...
चबय द्वितीयः पादः।

तै ते दुष्यावपीयार्द्ध्यतिसबृह्ये धेर द्विषिता॥

उपाया: ध जगतःतंत्रावेयो त्रायितमन्त्रे॥ १॥

ततःेव प्रथमे पादे समाधिभविन्यसं धोपायं धोमगमिकाय
बुद्धिविषस्त्रापि कथोपायाभाग्यङ्कवं धोम्। साधनांत्वपातिनि
तत्त्वाधनानुगताप्रतिपादङ्क जियायोगमभ।

तपःः साध्यायेवस्रप्रशिधानानि जियायोगः॥ १॥

‘तपः’ भ्रात्ताब्रेष्टेण कष्टं धास्यायादि। ‘साध्यायः’
प्रथ्यथ्यांपार्वतं मन्यानां जप। ‘देवप्रशिधाः’ सर्वक्रियांता तस्मिन्
परस्मिरी क्रमिपेरुपथा धम्मम्यं। एनानि जियायोग देहुःचते॥ १॥

भ जिमथेव द्वायत्र भाष।

समाधिभवानायः जोगतूनकरायाखं॥ २॥

‘क्रिसाः’ कथमापः। तेषा ‘तपुकरणः’ स्थायेकरणप्रतित्वक्षः।
‘समाधिः’ ज्ञातचषः। तथा ‘भावाः’ चेति पुनःपुनानिवेशवं।
‘भाषः’ प्रथ्योजायं ध्यं तथेऽः॥ एततुतु भवति। एते तपःः
प्रध्वायस्थमानास्थिततामिज्ञायाद्वारेरूः। जोगानुः श्रियजीविन्यं।
समाधेद्वाकररतः भजने। तत्त्वात् प्रथमत: जियायोगाधानपरेऽष
चोगिन्या भविताहसिन्यपदिष्ठः॥ २॥

जोगतूनकरायाखस्तुः ततः के क्रिसा द्वायत्र भाष।
ञ्जिनिस्मितां-राग-द्वायाभिनवेशां पञ्च ज्ञेयां॥
॥ ३ ॥

‘ज्ञेय:’ चारिद्वयों वायुमार्गांशः पञ्च। तेन वायुवात्रं परितापसुपसोनाः। क्रेमश्रवद्राया भयभोजित। ते स्र्व खेतिष्ठित्वा प्रवर्त-माना: संघारसंज्ञाः। सुकारणेण द्रव्यनिल। || २ ॥

यथार्थ च यन्त्रयं तु मे ज्ञेयां मूरणमहाद्विशिष्टां। प्राधान्यं प्रतिपादित्यतु॥

ञ्जिनिः ग्रंम्मुनतेरूपां प्रसूत-तन्तु-विचित्रीइदाराणां॥
॥ ४ ॥

‘ञ्जिनिः’ मोक्ष:, चानात्मन्याभिभास्मान दृति चावत्। या ‘ज्ञेयं’ प्रवक्ष्यभिमित्। ‘उत्तरायं’ ब्रह्मतीर्थाण्यां प्रयोक्त प्रसूतादिके देहां विद्यानां। यतो ज्ञाना विचार्यव्यवस्थानुसंध्या विद्युतीश्वरी, तत्त्वस्मात् च भवनस्थानमेव च तेवासु-व्यवस्थानान्तः स्थितमेव मूलमानविशिष्टाः। ‘प्रसूत-तन्तु-विचित्रीइदाराणां’, दृति तत्त्वेते ज्ञेयाः ज्ञेयभास्मां दृतिः: प्रवेधकाशां चक्रायं नागरनो: ‘प्रसूत:’ [ए] तत्त्वाय। यथा वायुविशिष्टां। बालिका हि वायुवात्रेषु चिन्तां अयथो ज्ञेय: प्रवेधकाशायं भावेन: भालिकाय महानो:। तेते ‘नव:’, ये स्र्वान्तिपप्पलभावायं विद्युतीश्वरींद्रात्मकाश्वायं ग्रंम्मुतेरूपां वायुविशिष्टतथा चेतत्वलेख्यां: प्रभुतां द्वायाभिव्यक्ते॥

* संख्यार्थशास्त्रार्थि ब पुस्तकपाठ: ॥
† विचार्यव्यवस्थानुसर्यविशिष्टाः दृति ब पुस्तकपाठ: ॥
‡ खेतिष्ठित्वादिके साराभाष्यानेति ब, च पुस्तकपाठ: ॥
ERRATA.
(Sanskrit.)

Page 2 line 1 for साध्विनिः read सिवुत्सिनि:
5 1 " परिशालाच " परिशालाचः
8 3 " बिबधा " बिबधा
10 14 " शाबास " शाबास
11 2 "ङ्गावि "ङ्गावि
12 7 " शष्टी " शष्टी
13 2 " गात्र " गात्र
16 4 " निराह " निराह
19 6-11 " शाल " शाल
20 10 " भद्वात् " भद्वात्
22 15 " अयथाः " अयथाः
23 4,5,6,7 " विनु " विनु
24 16 " परसाधणा " परसाधणा
27 5 " चतु " चतु

(English.)

Page 2 line 11 for fo read of
11 " 30 " word " phrase
17 " 1 " cive " conducive.
43 " 25 " thum " thumb

F पुस्तकपाठः।
† सिद्धांतस्यायामविचारात्मविभिन्निः B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
§ वल्लिदब्दारिति प्रतिभास हृति D पुस्तकपाठः।


- सक्षारण्यवादाभिषेक युक्तकरळः
- खिततेवं मृतम्बिवाया इति युक्तकरळः
- खेतपादकश्रुतिभाविनावेति B, C युक्तकरळः
न खकार्य्सांभः अनंतः। येनाक्षुवतं दि चैषिनिः। ते ‘बिन्धिचिया’,
चे केनचिद्दु ब्रह्मवता लोकेणाचिनितस्यस्यस्यस्याभिन्नति। येषा देशायत्वायो
रागः, रागावः वा देवः। न चत्वयः: परस्मापन्नस्यन्यगतः
नामावतिका। ते ‘खक्षा’, चे प्रामाण्यिस्करियिधयः ख्त्तां कार्यम-
भिन्नित्वादिन्नाः। येषा स्वैदैव बोगपरिपन्ने खुलासाद्वायाः।
एवं प्रत्येकं चतुर्सिद्धानामाणि मुख्यतवे ज्ञितात्वाविद्‌क्षिणेन
प्रतीत्तते। न चत्ति कथितपि क्रेयां विप्रय्यास्वयनिरपेक्षावांः
ख्त्तप्रभुपालः। तस्मात् विन्यासामान्याविद्याः। मन्त्रक्षेत्रेण
निवर्तिताः द्रुध्वोजस्वायाः। एवं न कत्व धर्मोऽस्वाति
विद्यानिस्मित्तास्वयनिरपेक्षावां निवर्तिताः। ततः: सब्जेवविद्यास्व-
देशभाजः। बर्च्यक्षेत्र क्रेयां चिन्तित्विद्यावरित्रात् देशाणि येषाणि
प्रथमतेः यतः: कर्त्ते हस्ति। ॥ ॥

अविद्याया ख्त्तपालः।

अनियाभुत्य-दुःखानामसु नित्य-शुचि-सुखाम-
ख्त्तरितिविद्या ॥ ॥

अतिक्रियासत्त्त्वभाष्यः: ‘अविद्या’, हस्ति अविद्याया: खामान्यस्यबः
तस्मा एव भैदिगतपादः। ‘अनियाभु’ घटादिवः, नित्यलाभिभाषः:

* खुलासाद्वायावभाषः B पुस्तकपाठः।
† विप्रय्यास्वयनिरपेक्षावभाषः B, E। विप्रय्यास्वयनिरपेक्षावभाषः
 F पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ खामान्यस्य ख्त्तात्वाविद्यावभाषः B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
§ अतिक्रियासत्त्वभाष प्रतिभास हस्ति A पुस्तकपाठः।

5
পাতাটি দেয়া হলেন

প্রতিইতোষতে। একন্ত ৰ্মিয়িসিয়ু কাহারাদিত্য, মৃকিবারামান।
ধূৰ্মিয়ু চ শিকলশূন, সুখামামান।* শংসাভূমি ঘিরে, শাখাবাৰামান।†।
এমনাপরে পুকুরসেষাণন শার্মালো কাহারাত। II ৫ II।
চরিত্রাং শাখাতমাস।

হগুর্জনশক্তিতেরকাতমৈত্রায়াসিতাং II ৬ II।

‘ধূৰ্মিয়ি’ পুকুর। ‘ধূর্জনশক্তি’ রাজসাধামৈমানমিনিতাঃ।
শাল্কিত্রি চ পরিশারসোঙ্কানঃ। তন্ত্রেরামৈগোকুলন জগুজলবেন–
পায়ন্ন ভিয়ারি: ‘অবতারামান’ শক্তিতাঃ। শাখাত। যথা
প্রজাতিবৃহত্ত। কর্ণল-বৃকুলবর্ণতাপি কর্ণহ বৃক্ষকামনামিনিতাং।
চন্দ্রধারণায় বিশ্বস্মিত। কোষ: II ৬।।

রাগৰ্গ কোষামাস।

সুখানুমাণর রাগঃ। II ৭।।

সুখানুমাণে দতি ‘সুখানুমাণর’, সুখান্ত সুখানুমাণরপুঞ্জক: পুকুর–
ধানেন্দ্র শার্মাদের গৌরী: ‘রাগস্বর্ণঃ’ কোষ: II ৭।।

দেয়া কোষামাস।

ধূৰ্মিয়ুনুমাণর দেয়ঃ। II ৮।।

* সুখামামান দতি B, C, E পুকুরশামাস।
† শাৰমামান দতি B, C, E পুকুরশামাস।
‡ রাজসাধামৈমানরমিনিতাঃ দতি B, E পুকুরশামাস।
§ সুখানুমাণর রাগ দতি B, C, E পুকুরশামাস।
|| মাত্রঃ রাগস্বর্ণঃ দতি B, E পুকুরশামাস।
¶ ধূৰ্মিয়ুনুমাণর দেয় দতি B, C, E পুকুরশামাস।
"न चालाताना तेषा परिधारः श्रेष्ठः कर्ममिति तत्तथाताय तेषा उद्देष्यं चेचं विभागं संधिं। चालैवाय स्वसंघः अभिभिनवः तत्र तेषा प्रशस्तापत्रिभागमानं।

ते प्रतिप्रसवेहेयः: सूक्ष्मः: ॥ १० ॥

* प्रतिलोकशाब्यामिति B, C, E पुक्तकाराः।
† अनिष्टावतेऽय निन्दा इति B पुक्तकाराः।
‡ अभिभिनवमार्शेहिति H पुक्तकाराः।
§ तथा क्षणोभिनवेश्च इति C पुक्तकाराः। अत्यन्तः पाठाः भाष्य-कारिकेऽ सूक्ष्मः।

॥ पूर्वज्ञानार्थवस्त्रं वासुविशेषाः जातिः B पुक्तकाराः।
॥ सत्यसैज्जार्थवस्त्रं जातिः C पुक्तकाराः।
** एकायुपमांत्यामैत्रेये C, E पुक्तकाराः।
†† विभागक्षणशब्देः E पुक्तकाराः।
‡‡ प्राचीनकारांमार्शेहिति B, C, E पुक्तकाराः।
ते चष्ठाः, केस्सा, येव वाचनात्मकेषाः वाचित्ता न हुतिकृत्यः परिष्मान्मार्दि। ते, ‘प्रतिभवेन’ प्रतिभोमपरिष्मानेन, ‘देवा’। चक्षुस्तः। चक्षूरांशिष्याः क्तताः चवासनं चित्रं वदा प्रनिर्देश
भवति, तदा क्ततां कुमारां निदर्शानां संक्षबोः। ॥ १० ॥

कृक्षानं हानेपापमावः।

आनन्देयाद्वृत्ताः। ॥ ११ ॥

तेऽवं क्षेत्राणामार्धकार्याः था: सुबदुःक्षेत्राकाविकः।
‘देवा’, ता: ‘आनेवैव चित्रनीकापापार्धकारणाः, ‘देवा’। चात्मवा दलाः।
तिल्पार्धकारणां कार्याधिकारीयाः खळीयात् ताः निदर्शालंभवति, चया
वस्त्राणि चन्द्रि खस्त्रो भागः। क्षेत्राणामार्धकारणां निवर्तते। चस्थः ततः
संक्षमथा य टेस्सेत्वा चहवान्त्वादिश्यानमार्धकारणां निवर्तेः। ॥ १२ ॥

एवं क्षेत्रानं तत्त्वाभिधाय क्षेत्राधिकारिभाभिधातः।

क्षेत्रमुखः कर्षांश्यो हुतास्त्रपालकवेदनीयः। ॥ १२ ॥

‘कर्षांश्यः’, दश्तनेत तस्म खळीयामभिस्तेन, ततो वाचनार्धपालक
कर्षांश्यः। ‘क्षेत्रमुखः’, दश्तनेत कार्यामभिस्तेन, तत: कर्षांश्यः प्रभृतितः
प्रभानानि केस्सा एव निर्विचारः। ‘हुतास्त्रपालकवेदनीयः’;† दश्तनेत
प्रभान्तः। अभिश्रेष्ठ अवसीय अनुभववाची: ‘हुतास्त्रपालकवेदनीयः’॥

* ख्रप्रतिप्रमिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
† कर्षांश्यमधिष्टातुश्रेष्ठिति H पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ हुतास्त्रपालिकवेदनीयः ऋति B, E पुस्तकपाठः। अभिश्रेष्ठ ऋति C पुस्तकपाठः।
§ हुतास्त्रपालिकवेदनीयः ऋति E पुस्तकपाठः। अभिश्रेष्ठ ऋति C पुस्तकपाठः।
अद्यासरामभवनीकऱ्या: 'श्रव्यशक्तिप्रदेशदीक्र्या।' तथापि कानिष्ठत पुष्पाणि
कर्मांचि देवताराध्याणादीनि तीमविवेकेनेि ज्ञानि दृष्टेव ज्ञानि पल्लि
जातायुभुणगखणप्राक्षणि, यथा नन्दीपार्ष महेश्वरेण्यराधानि-
बलात्श्रेष्ठ ज्ञानि जातायद्यो विशिष्टाच्या तापुवा:। एवमन्येणां
विश्वासनिवादीणि तथ:प्रभावश्वायांशी। केशवस्वातिरिते, यथा
तीमसंगगेन दुष्टकर्मसंग नवशादीणि जातायद्यपरिशामः, ज्ञेश्वाचार
कार्तिकेयवेि खताद्यपत्या। एवं वशस्मसक्रुङ्गेनेि चधायांगेि
राज्यां। २॥

dनानी कर्तीयादह समेदिक्षां पश्चादात।

सति मूळे तद्दिपाको जातायुभोगाः। १३॥

'मूळे त्वस्माचाव: क्ष्रागः, तेजवनमिष्टतेः' 'कइसु, कर्मणि कुञ्जसिष्ट-
कुञ्जशिक्षापारः 'विप्राकः' पल्लि, 'जातायुभोगाः' भवसिः। 'आतिः'
मनुष्यालिवः। 'चायुः' विरकाणु शरीरप्रमः। 'भोगाः' विषयाः
द्रष्टिर्वाणि सुवकुलःकर्मिनि, कर्मकर्मभाववधानसुप्यतः भोग-
विषयः। दयाच सारम तात्त्विक विषयोऽनि चनाधिकासविधिः: कर्मवाणा
चथा चथा पाकसुप्यालिवः, चथा चथा गुप्तप्रधानगावेन खिरि
जातायुभुणगकखणप्रकायांबर्मनि। २॥

* जातायुभोगविषिक्षा दाति B, C, E पुस्तकापात।
† तत्त्वाक्षणा कर्षित B, E पुस्तकापात।
‡ वशस्मसक्रुङ्गेनेि B, E पुस्तकापात।
§ कार्यरसमासागुप्तप्रणिति H पुस्तकापात।
पत्त्याचे ये गुरूंते

उत्सानं कर्मसंसारं ज्ञात्यादीनां खण्डारणकृताखण्डविषयं कार्य-कर्ममार्गः।

ते खाद-परितापकाळं: पुत्रापुत्रकोपुत्वात्* ॥ १४ ॥

'खाद:' सुखं, 'परिताप:' दुःखं, खाद-परितापी पारे चेष्टा 'ते' तथोऽकालं। 'पुत्रं' दुःखं कर्मं, नादिपरों 'चापुत्रं', ते पुत्रापुत्रं
कारपे चेष्टा तेवा भावितात्। एतसु भवति, पुष्कर्ष्णार्थं
आत्यायुम्भेना खादकालं। चापुत्राभिरव: परितापकालं:॥ २४ ॥

एतसु प्रशिक्षाचारपेत्यम् शैविधाय, योलिनस्त्र सब्ये दुःखितायािः

परिशाम-ताप-संक्षारं:खेतुङ्गुप्रतितिविरेतायाच सब्ये
दुःखेवः विवेकिन:॥ १५ ॥

परिशामात्सर्वादविवेकस्त्र परिरूणामां सकलेवे भोगसाधनं
शविश्वासाक्रयस्त्रं 'दुःखेवं' प्रतिकृतब्रवेदनीयभेदािः। चस्मात्यायुम्भेना-
भिषानं:॥ योगी दुःखेवेच्यायुम्भेनयते॥। यथायायुम्भेच्यायुम्भेन-
माषों माणों प्रीतामभवति नेतरस्त्रं, तथा विवेकी खशुद्धु-
मुप्राणापि विरुध्यते। कथंभिताः 'परिशाम-ताप-संक्षार-

* पुत्रापुत्रकोपुत्वातिठि E पुन्नकपाठः।
† दुःखेवः सब्ये विवेकिन हिः E पुन्नकपाठः।
‡ शविश्वासानिः H पुन्नकपाठः।
§ चस्मात्यायुम्भिसान हिः H पुन्नकपाठः।
|| दुःखेवेच्यायुम्भेच्यायुम्भेति B, E पुन्नकपाठः।
¶ खशुद्धुःखायस्मायापीति C पुन्नकपाठः।
\\  
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हुळ्ये। विषयाणांपूर्वकमाणां वर्णार्थं गर्दःबिन्दुःखशवापतिः
क्टत्व दुःखारिशार्यभायांतु दुःखारिधाराधनास्यकृते दुःखपतेति
परिषामदुःखं। जप्पुबंधनेषु सुखाधवेशु तत्प्रतिपन्नः प्रति
देशशक्तेवर्धाबस्यलिन्वान सुखानुभवकारेओऽति तापदुःख दुःखारिशाः
रसिति ‘तापदुःखतः।’ ‘संक्षारदुःखम खामम खाममतांभिमातिविषयां
विधाने सुखविधारोपायमाना तथाविधेयेन स्थिरेने संक्षारमार्गते, संक्षाराच पुन्यवाणविधिर्विद्वंदुभव द्वापरिमित-
संक्षारोत्तप्यितिरेषं संक्षारानुक्षेत्रात् स्थिरेने दुःखं। ‘गुणणखट्ट-
निविरोधाष्ट्र’ दत्तं, गुणणाः स्वरुपांस्यथा दत्तम: दुःखदुः
खोस्युःः परस्मिनिर्विधानाभिव्रक्कलेन विविद्वा जावले, तत्सा
स्वरूपेन दुःखानुभवाद दुःखं। एतदमभवति। ऐपीकाकिनी खायां
स्वरूपे दुःखस्वितिमिष्टे विद्वेकिन जासूक्ष्मकारणस्याद्वर्त्यां
यात्रेण स्वश्व प्रविष्टतया विमानितमति। तद्भवात् खाया
क्रिष्यायुप एवेऽयुक्तं भवति। १५।

तदेवधृतः कृत्येकालभिवाद्व-विपाकररीविधायमाणवलात् अविष्कायां
मिथ्यामिनिकेतथं वषयांगुणानामैवेशेवलात् वषयांगानस्य च वषयाः
वठोधादेवाधाराधाराद्विधानायाः

हेयं दुःखमनागतं । १६॥

* तदुपपतिन्वनं हतित इति E पुस्तकपाठः। तदपपितिप्रणालिनतः C पुस्तकपाठः।
† तदेवधृतिः B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः। एवतेवधृतिः C पुस्तकपाठः।


\textbf{रामसः क्षेत्रं}

भृत्स्मातिश्रान्तान् सन्तुभृत्मान्सः क्षेत्रसः सधुस्मृतिलात् सनाग-
तमेव बधारुऽहं हात्विमित्यस्म भवतिः॥ १६॥

हेयेरेतुमभाज।

\textbf{द्रूष्-हम्ययोः संयोगे हेयेरेतुः॥ १७॥}

‘द्रूषा’ बिज्याः पुष्पः। ‘द्रूष्या’ पुष्पिलच्छ। तथेऽविवेकस्मात्विषुज्याः
का चावशी ‘संयोगा’ भेगामद्भृजक्षेत्रविविधान, ये, ‘हेयेरे’ दुःखः
गुणपरिश्रामांगुणः संवारात्, ‘हेयेरे’ कारणः, तत्रिष्टस्य संवारानि-
हस्तिःम्बन्दित्यस्मः॥ १७॥

\textbf{द्रूष्-हम्ययोः संयोगा देव्यकः, तत् दुःखः खच्छपः कार्याः प्रयोज-}

गद्याः।

प्रकाश-क्रिया-स्थितिर्लीलाः भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं सेवाः
पवर्गायं हस्यं॥ १८॥

‘प्रकाशः’ वस्तुखः धर्मः। ‘क्रिया’ प्रवद्धतिः प्रथमः। ‘स्थिति’
नियमश्रुपः निर्मातिः। ता: प्रकाशक्रियाक्षेत्रः. ‘श्रीविवयिक’ खच्छपः,
रत्न तत् तथाविधां, दृश्य प्रकाशानि निश्चितेः। ‘भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं’,
दृश्य। ‘भूतानि’ खूलक्ष्मेणेत्रं प्रभ्यवायदीनी गम्भीर्यकार्यादीनी च।
‘द्रक्कियाणि’ गुणद्रक्कियाणि-कर्मंका.कर्ममेनेत्रं जिविधानि।
उमय-वेलेसु चाङ्गा-दशाःक्षुप्तं ‘भाष्याः’ खच्छपाभिवः परिश्रामः, वस्तुं तत्

* खयिणान्तलाधिधिति हुस्कपाला। निमक्कालाधिधिति ए, स, ्

पुस्तकपाला।

† डुबुस्वामिति हुस्कपाला।


দ্যাধিক্ষ, দ্যাধানে কাব্যেকাগাম। ‘ভোগত’ কালজ্যল। ‘শ্রবণঃ’
ধ্বংসাঘোষিয়াতে তণ্ডুব্ধেদীন। তীর্থার্থপ্রকাশণ। ’থাধাং’ প্রথমে
থাধাধান নির্ভরতাত্ত্বিক ব্যাঙ্কেথ চাত্মান। ৯১।

তথা যুগাখন নানাযনাধিক্যান্তাধিক্যা চৈত্যেন ব্যাঙ্ক
থাধান কাব্যেকাগাম।

বিশেষাবিশেষ-লিঙ্কমাণ্ডালিন। বুধপ্রবীণ। ২১।

‘গুণান’ ‘প্রেক্ষণ’ অর্থাবিশিষেকাকালন। সাতত্ব। নয়পদ্ধী
ভবতি। তথা বিষেষণ। নষ্ঠাধানেতেতমিয়াণ। ‘বিষেষণ’ তপাণাফ
নায় জ্ঞান। ‘লিঙ্কমাণ’ চুক্তি। ‘অব্যাহত’ অর্থ রূপস, নয়পদ্ধী।
সর্বমান বিজ্ঞাপ্তাটিতাধিকায়লিন। প্রথমে ভাষ্যানাদত্তক্ষণ সাতরথেন বয়ঃকারে
ব্যাঙ্কি প্রথায় নির্দিষ্টান। ৯২।

এবং চৈত্যেন যুগাখন প্রথম ব্যাঙ্কান নানাযনাধিক্যান্তাধিক্যা
থাধান ব্যাঙ্গাধান ত্ত্বাদিপ্রয় ক্ষুট্টর থাকেপাশ।

দ্যাধাবস্তান: বুধবিপ্রস্ত্রান্তাপ্রস্তং। ২০।

‘দ্যাধার’ পুষ্প। ‘দ্যাধাবস্তান’ চেতনামাগাম। মাজামান ধার্মি
কাব্যেকাগাম। তেবিণেত্ত চেতনামাণ্ডাল। ধার্মিকানন। ৫: ‘দ্যাধা-

* দ্যাধান বভবতি র, এ পুলকাসাধ।
† বভবতি র, এ পুলকাসাধ।
‡ চেতনার। ভর্তি এ পুলকাসাধ।

6
‘उपि’ परिशालिनां स्वस्तिग्रं, ’प्रत्यावानप्रमः‘। ’प्रत्यावा‘
विषयोपरसि रिता नाणि, तति ’भूत‘ चयवधानेन परिसंकलाभातः
भावेन, पमा ति। एतदुबः भवति। जातिविषयोपरायामेव बुढा
वाचिरागामाचेसैव पुष्पस्य दृश्यलमिति। २०॥

तद्यथे एवः हस्यस्यात्मा॥ २१॥

’हुःस्या‘ प्रामुखविधास्या, ’चाथ्या‘ यथा श्रूर्तं, एवः ’तद्यथे‘। तत्र
पुष्पस्य भोगवाद्यादानं नाम खांस्यपरिअरेष प्रयोजनं। न वि
प्रभाणं प्रवर्तस्मामामादान। विभिन्त प्रयोजनमपेक्ष प्रवस्तैं, किंचि
पुष्पस्य भोगवाद्यादानायं निर्देशं। २१॥

वते पुष्पस्य भोगवाद्यादानेव प्रयोजनं, तदारं मन्तरिदि
तविश्राविन्यसोजनं विरतवारं प्रातः, तविश्राविन्य परिवृतस्य
मुख्यसातु सवं देश्या रमणेऽति: इति। ततारं समायांकेतु
रसिःश्चायात्।

हताथः प्रति नष्ठध्यायनम् तद्यथे समस्मातिष्ठारणायात्।

२२॥

चढापि विषयेक्षारितपर्यत्स्या भोगवाद्यादानात् कमपि ’हताथः’,
पुष्पं, ’प्रति’, ’तत्’, ’नष्ठ’ विरतवारं, तथापि ’सर्वपुष्पवायाद्’

* स तद्यथे दसेवति, B, E पुष्पापाठः।
† भेम सव्याद्यानामीति, G, H पुष्पापाठः।
‡ यदिं पुष्पस्य भोगवाद्यादं तदेव प्रयोजनस्थिति, B, E पुष्पापाठः।
§ तदानीतिः B, E पुष्पापाठः।
2 वादे २४ सन्नि।

रणनात् यज्ञान् प्रति ‘अनन्यापारिः भवतिष्ठे।’ जन: प्रधानस्य
वस्कलभोग्याधारणात् न कदाचनापि विनाशः, एकमुक्ता वा
न सार्वभूतक्रियान्त: इत्यूक्तभवति॥ २ ॥

इत्यचाृट्टारै वाक्याय संयोगं वाक्यात्मकः।

स्व-स्वामिरक्षतयो: सर्पपोपपलिष्ठेतुः संयोगः॥२३॥

कार्यदर्शनेि सिद्धं करेतरि। ‘सर्पकिः’ इत्यादिर्वायान।
‘स्वामिरक्षतयोः’ दृष्टः सर्पं। तथेऽवर्त्तरिपि संवेष-संबेककलेन व्यव-
सिद्धांवियो ‘सर्पपोपपलिष्ठेतुः’, तथा: कारणं या ‘संयोगः’; भ च
वस्कलभोग्य-मोक्षाभावःरक्षानः। न च तथेऽवर्त्तरियोऽवपक्षेऽसर्प
सर्पपोपपलिष्ठेतुः कारणं संयोगः। चत्रेव भोगयश भोगवतः,
भोगर्द्ध भोगर्द्ध अनादिनिहस्तं च एव संयोगः॥ २ ॥

तस्तस्ता पि कारणमाचः।

तस्य हेतुरळिवः॥ २४॥

यथा पूर्वं विप्रविवाचित्का भोगर्द्ध ‘शविन्दा’, वाक्यात्, या
तथा ब्रविवेककालित्तक्षणसंयोगः, कारणं॥ २ ॥

हेतुं शान्तक्रियाकृतायते किमपन्थद्रामलयात्।

* द्वन्द्वस्तवापारीभवतिष्ठयं धर्मं A पुलकपाठम॥
† न कदाचित्स्पीति B, E पुलकपाठम। न कध्विद्वीति C पुलकपाठम॥
‡ मयं हेतुरविवेच्येि B, E पुलकपाठम। तस्य हेतुरविवेच्येि G
पुलकपाठम। परम्पराप्रणालीमयात्रस्य समावाद्यणुग्रहकेवलस्यात्, भायायम-
दृष्टुक्तलाभ न समावाद्यणं॥
§ चिं पुनर्विचारसंबोधित B, E पुलकपाठम॥

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तद्भवात् संयोगाभावेऽ छान तद्वैः कैवल्यं ॥

‘तखः:’ अविधाया: सच्चिदेश्वरं सम्यग शानेनामूलिताय:,
‘येद्यं ’ ‘शभाव्’, ”तस्मिन धनि, तत्कार्यः ‘संयोगः’, क्षण
‘शवाव्’, तत् ‘छान’ द्विचोटे । अवधारं: नैसन्धूपविवधवत्
परिधानो घुमये, किंच जातायां विवेकस्यात्विविवेकस्यात्मः
निषिद्धः:* संयोगः: खयेव निरक्षृत दृष्टि तस्म छान । यदेव च
संयोगः छानं ‘तत्’, पव नियमकृष्णार्थपि पुरुषव ‘कैवल्यं’, व्यप-
दिशते । यदेव च संयोगः सख्यपि कारणः कार्यभ्रमिता॥ २ ५ ॥

चद्ध शानेनायक परमवदेश: उपदेशकारणमाह ।

विवेकस्यात्मिकत्वा छानोपायः ॥ २८ ॥

रूचे युक्ता: रूच: पुरुष दत्तेवं विविधः ‘विवेकः’, ‘व्यासः’
परिधा, या ‘छानः’ दृश्यपरिधाग्निः, ‘अपायः’॥ कारणः। कृदुः
‘भविष्यः’ न विद्ये विद्ये विष्णुदेवानाकाराः\ वन्याकारः
चद्धः: या ‘भविष्यः’।

दन्मच तत्पथं । श्रातिश्रावस्याबोधात् भविषयाविधिहि विनि-

* अविवेकस्वरूपः दर्शि B, G पुलकस्वरूपः ।
† दिति कृदुः विविधोऽसः H पुलकस्वरूपः ।
‡ तदेवं दृश्यं संयोगसः प्रमिति B, E पुलकस्वरूपः ।
§ दृश्यपरिवर्त्त्यापः दर्शि B, E पुलकस्वरूपः ।
∥ नामनाबन्धनस्वरूपः E पुलकस्वरूपः ।
हुस्नशाल-कर्त्तव्यधिभिमानाया रजस्थानव्यवस्थायाय बुधदेवन- 
डुंडाया तथा विकस्यायांकामः या विवेकात्मातिरितुपथात 
तथास्त्र 
बनातमविचारकृतः प्रहसाया गुप्तात्मकारिकानिषण्डवंभवलेव कैलखं। 
॥ २६ ॥

जयप्रजाविवेकक्षारः पुरुषस्य वाक्यभूमी प्रश्ना भवति, ततः कथयन् 
विवेकात्मात्वेव ख्रियपमाश।

तस्य समया प्राणन्युस्मी प्रश्ना गुप्तात्मकारिकानिषण्डवंभवलेव कैलखं। 
॥ २७ ॥

‘तस्क’ जयप्रजाविवेकक्षारः, ज्ञाताविवेकक्षारा ‘प्रश्ना’, ‘प्राणन्युस्मी’ 
कलस्मात्मकारिकानिषण्डवंभवलेव, कैलखमारा भवति।

तव कार्यविशुलकिष्ठाः सत्यप्रकारः। श्रावं मया चौरः। ग 
श्रावं निषुलकिष्ठ। जीणा से क्रेशा, न न निषुलकिष्ठ वेदयमलि।
श्रावं मया श्रावं, गुप्तात्मकारिकानिषण्डवंभवलेव प्रश्ना भविष्यते।
ईश्वरेश्व प्रश्ना कार्यविवेकनं निषुलकिष्ठां श्रावं कार्यविशुलकिष्ठं जगते।

पित्रात्मकारिकानिषण्डवंभवलेव। चारताया से बुड़ि। गुप्तात्मकारिक 
क्रेशा। गितरिकारिकानिषण्डवंभवलेव श्रावणे न पुनः स्विति 
श्रावणे, व्रतार्थे प्रश्नात्मकारिकानिषण्डवंभवलेव श्रावणे 
भावात्मकारिकानिषण्डवंभवलेव कुङ्क। प्रेष्ठ।। श्रावणे ने 
भावात्मकारिकानिषण्डवंभवलेव। तवाकर्मां पृथ्वीप्रहसायां जगते।

- सम्बन्धित अंश, C पुस्तकारः।
- उद्धृताविवेकात्मातिरितिः C, E पुस्तकारः।
योगाज्ञानुसार शान्तिसिद्धावेक्ष्यायें शान्तीमिराविवेकाध्यायः || २८ ||

'योगाज्ञानी सत्यमणानि। तेषां 'हरुषानात्' शान्तनुभक्तकारः
भ्यावत्, 'शारिवेक्ष्यातेः', 'अमुदेविवेचेः' विनिश्चित्र श्रवामानेव
रणलक्षणप्रभुपुष्पादिक्षेत्रे, या 'शान्तीसि' तारतम्येन चालिकः
परिषामः, विगतातिपर्यङ्कः। यस्तहाः स्थाते तेनादिर्भियः। ||

|| २८ ||

योगाज्ञानुसार शान्तनुभियं तत्त्वः, कालि पुनमणि योगाज्ञानीति
तेषां जग्गमाः।

यम-नियमासन-प्राणयाम-प्रत्यावार-धारणा-ध्यान
समाधयोध्यावज्ञानि || २८ ||

इत्यथा कालिनिबन्धायें वाणादपकरकलेनमराक्षानिते यथा 'धारणादिनी। कालिनित्र प्रत्यक्षभूतविवाहित्वपनेकामूलबादारः।
भमाधिदपकुपृतः, यथा ‘यम-निधमादय:’। तच्चामादीनामुसरे- 
परस्यनकारकं यथा सत्यायनयि प्रशास्यामकैवि। एवस्वन- 
चापि येहाँपुरुष:॥ २५॥

कविनेष्य एवं खरुमपाण।

अहिंसा-सत्यालेय-ब्रह्मचर्यापरियङ्गः यमाः॥ ३०॥

तत्र प्राणविद्योपप्रायोजनवापारे हिंसा। या च स ब्रह्मण्येन:।

तदभावः ‘अहिंसा’। हिंसाया: वर्णकाश्वेतवा परिधार्यालात् प्रथम् 
तद्भवावरपाया अहिंसाया निद्धेशः। ‘अध्य’ वाङ्गनयोष्ठर्याधिकलिन:।

लोकं परस्परमारं। तदभावः ‘अस्तय’। ‘ब्रह्मचर्य’ उपस्थतं।

‘अपरिप्तः’ भोगवाधिनाममुक्तीकरणं। त एते|| अहिंसादयः पश्चात् 
‘यमान्यद्वात्चा: भोगानखलेन निद्धिधः॥ ३०॥

एवं विशेषमाण।

एते जाति-देश-काल-समयानविचित्रः: साध्वंसी- 
ममहात्रतम॥ ३१॥

‘जाति:’ ब्रह्माणलावदि:। ‘देश:’ तीरथादि:। ‘काल:’ चतुर्दशादि:।

* नाथामिति G युक्तकपाठः।
† साध्वंन्योि-वेदि B, C, E युक्तकपाठः।
‡ वाङ्गनयोष्ठर्याधिकलिन: B, E युक्तकपाठः।
§ खरार्धि C, E युक्तकपाठः।
‖ तत्र ते अहिंसादय: इति C, E युक्तकपाठः।
¶ एते एवति B, E युक्तकपाठः।


तदेवमीमः वसविधायां प्रकाशुमिमप्रक्ष्यायाः सुप्रभातायां पुष्यः।
वेवः रत्नायते॥ २७॥

विवेकाध्याति: कर्त्योगमाथाय रेसुक्तियुक्तः। तस्याध्यात्त्येऽवः निन्दितेनिद्रण जातः।

योगाध्यायानुवादयुविस्मये शास्त्रदीर्घरविवेक- ख्याते॥ २८॥

'योगाध्यायि वक्त्रमाणानि। तेषां 'श्लोकानां' श्लोकपर्वकारे-
भाषात्, 'विवेचनक्षयादः', 'सर्वदिवसक्षे वितिस्थलक्ष प्रकाशाव-रणमुखप्रकाशपापुवृवृत्तविषये, त्य 'शास्त्रदीर्घि' तारंभेन वाच्यक: परिशामः, विवेचनांनिजयमः॥ तस्यः ख्याते हेतुरिवृत्यः॥
॥ २८॥

योगाध्यायानुवादयुविस्मये दृश्यायं, कानि पुनःस्वानि योगाध्याय- नीतिः तेषां उद्देश्यमातः।

यम-नियमायसन-प्राध्यायाम-प्रत्यााः-धारणा-धारण- समाधयोद्भवत्वानि॥ २८॥


d कालिजरूप्याधानि: शाकाळुपकारकलेवनाभरामक्षणानिे यथा 'धारणादीनि। कालिजिनु प्रलिपक्षतंक्षयानिंतितेऽकौमुख्यदृशेः

* इत्युत्तः भवतीतिः ब, ए स्वस्त्यादः।
† क्षेत्रस्थायिक्ष्य दति ब, ए स्वस्त्यादः।
‡ विवेचनांनिजयमः दति ब, ए स्वस्त्यादः।
§ अन्तर्दीर्घानाति ब, ए स्वस्त्यादः।
य वाणे ११ खऱ्यम्।

समाधिस्पुष्पकृती, यथा चमः-नियमादयः। तत्राश्रावदीनामसुरेऽपरंशुपकारकलं यथा सधावनजये प्रणायामक्रूर्यं। पवसृतर-चापि गर्भः॥ २५॥

क्रमेन एवं स्द्धपथः।

श्रिवंसा-सत्यास्तोऽ-श्रवणर्थायापरिमल्या यमः॥ ३०॥

तन्त्र प्राणविषोग्यवोधनवाचारो रंगः। या च सयान्यक्रेशः।

तदभावः। 'श्रिवंसा'। रिंगयाः। कर्मकालेन शिरस्वार्यमात्र प्रथम तदभाववर्ज्या वशिष्याया निलः॥। 'सया' वाक्स्यथोर्थायार्थाः।

सों परस्परः। तदभावः। 'श्रीलोकः'। 'श्रवणर्थः' उपर्युप्यमः।

'अपरिम्' भोगवाणानामनकीकरः॥। त एते॥ श्रिवंसादयः पदः।

'यमन्यवाचः: भोगात्मकः निलः॥ ३०॥

पर्यां विष्णुमाषः।

एते॥ जाति-देश-काल-समयात्मकः। साँवंभी-ममांहृतम॥ ३१॥

'जाति:' ब्राह्मणमादिः। 'देशः' नीतिहासिः। 'काल:' चतुर्दशिः।

* व्याकरणमिति C पुस्तकपाठः।
† सार्वप्रत्येकेऽैव C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ बालकोटिशार्यायामिति B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
§ संस्कृत, रूढः C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
|| तत्र ते चथिरीवंसादय रूढः B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
¶ एते लिङ्गित B, E पुस्तकपाठः।
‘সময়’ রাজ্যপ্রবোধিতা। এতেহতঃ ‘সন্ত্রস্ত’, পূর্বে না অস্তিত্ব চাঞ্চল্য যা ভাষা সর্বাধিক বিনায়ক ভাষা: মহামায়া ডাক্তারলে জন্মান। চৌদয় বিহারীর বিনায়ক কিছু বিশ্বাস না ভাবায়, তাহে কঙ্কন না বিনায়ক, পালায় না হ্রদাবাণী, তুমোল-রাজ্যাশ্রমবিশিষ্টেরোক্ষ না বিন্যাসী- যোনিপত্তিনির্ধারণের কথা ফরমান কে পালায় কাষ্ঠিত কালিন্তু কাশীদর্শনের না বিন্যাসীত্যক্ষপ্রকাশ। এবং সত্যবিনয় ধর্মায়নোত্তর: আজ্ঞা।

বর্ণমাণীভূত: নামানবেজগ প্রথম: মহামায়ালোচনাতে, ন পুনঃ পরিক্রিয়াধর্মচরণ্যে। § ১ §

নিয়মার্থে।

শৈল-সন্তোষ-তপঃ সাধ্যায়েশ্বরপ্রিয়নিয়মান নিয়-
মান। § ২ §

‘শৈল’, স্তিঙ্গ বাঙ্গালামান্তর বাণ্ড নক্ষত্রদিব্য: কাযাতি-
প্রাচীন। বাণ্ড নক্ষত্রদিব্য: কাযাতি-প্রাচীন। শান্তি ভৌতিকবিশিষ্ট মহামায়া প্রথম শৈষ্ঠ। বাণ্ড নক্ষত্রদিব্য। এতে শ্রীবাণ্ড: ‘নিয়মার্থে বাণ্ড। § ২ §

কলের্ণ বোগালকলিত শাস্ত।

* দেবসাহিত্যপ্রযোজননিয়মতিনির্দেশ কমপিতি ব, চ, এ পুস্তকাং।
† কস্তুকিতীলিত হইত হ পুস্তকাং।
‡ ন পুনঃ পরভূত্যরূপেরোক্ষপ্রবেশন পুস্তকাং।
§ নিয়মার্থেরোক্ষ পুস্তকাং।
|| প্রাগোব আকাশা হইত হ, চ, এ পুস্তকাং। ভূত্যরূপে হইত হ পুস্তকাং।
वितक्बाधने प्रतिपक्षभावनं ॥ ३३ ॥

वितक्क्रिया द्रटि ‘वितक्क्रि’ चोगपरिपन्नने हिङ्गसाध्यः। तेषां प्रतिपक्षभावने श्लोक, यदा वाणा भवति, तदा चोगः सुकरो भवतीति भवयेव यथानियमानं चोगाज्ज्ञानं ॥ ३४ ॥

द्वारानी वितक्षणां स्वकृपां भेदं प्रकारं कारणं फलवृत्त क्रमेणाशः ॥

वितक्रम हिङ्गसाध्यः सत-कारितानुसादिता लेघ-क्रोध-मोहपूर्वका खटु-मध्याधिमाचा दुःखाभानानादनकाला द्रटि प्रतिपक्षभावनम् ॥ ३५ ॥

ऐते पूँजोका: ‘हिङ्गसाध्यः’, प्रथमं निधा भिन्नने ‘सत-कारितानुसादिताति’। तत्र स्वयं निप्पादितः ‘सता्ः’। कुष्ठकृतिः प्रयोजकायापैरे वस्तुपादितः ‘कारिता्ः’। श्रीमेन् विचारान्ता: वासू वायुत्सिन्नीततः: ‘तनुसादितः’। एतत्व वैविध्यं परस्मयाभावानिवारणंवथेत्। अन्यथा मन्त्रमित्रेवं मन्त्रेत् न मया स्वयं हिङ्गा क्रोधेति नाकिने से दृष्टं द्रटि। ऐतेषां कारणं प्रतिपादनायावः, ‘लेघ-क्रोध-मोहपूर्वका्ः’। द्रटि। यथापि लेघः क्रोधः प्रथमं निर्दृश्यः तथापि अन्यकोशानां लेघाभानाभावात्।

* यदि वाणा भवतीति E, A, D, F पुस्क्रपाठः। यथा वाणा भवतीति C पुस्क्रपाठः।
† साधत्यक्ष्यित द्रटि A पुस्क्रपाठः।
‡ नेत्रमिनिवारयावेत्तु द्रटि B, E पुस्क्रपाठः।
§ क्रोधः प्रथमं निर्दृश्यः द्रटि C पुस्क्रपाठः।
भिमाननमक्षुष्न निर्माणलाभः तद्विष्णु ब्रह्मा स्वरविभागपुरुषभक्तेन लोभः क्रोधादि नामुर्ज्जनातृः मृतज्ञवेशेः। सोहृपत्तिका वल्लो दैवजातिनिर्विश्वायः। 'लेखः' लयाः। 'काव्यः' क्रियान्तयांविवेशेन्मूलकः प्रज्ञवनावस्यसतत्त्वः। प्रयोक्तं क्रियाविद्वेषेन चिन्तकांश्रिपि सिङ्खाद्येऽभोजानिकारणः चिपा भिष्यो। तेषामेव वृत्तकेषां श्रवणविषये 'धृतुः ध्वधधाराधामाः'। 'धृतुः' मन्द्रा न तीव्रः नाराय मथमः। 'केशवः' न मन्द्रा नाराय तीव्रः। 'धृतधामाः' तीव्रः, न मथा नाराय मन्द्राः। द्रतिं नव भेदः। दुर्बैृत्तिष्णुः ब्रह्मः विषयिति ब्रह्माणिविश्वाय। ततु यादायां येतः ततु। यथा धृतुः। धृतुः ईमान्यः धृतूः द्रतिः। एवं फलमाहुः 'दुःखानागृहः' द्रतिः। 'दुःखः' प्रतिकृत्तविकारवाभासमानः राजस्य विखिर्विध्यः। 'मद्यः' मिथ्याज्ञानः श्रवणबिप्रेयस्येष्यः। ते दुःखानागृहः अनुवां अधिष्ठितः। 'फलः' एवं ते तयोः। द्रत्यं तेषां श्रवणः कारणादिविद्वेषेन श्रातानः प्रतिप्रबधानया चोगिना परिधारः। कर्त्तच्छ इत्युपरिवर्धितं भवति॥ ॥

एवामुल्भायात् प्रकर्ष्ण गच्छतामु मिल्यादिनः। विद्वृत्तो चषा भवति, तथा कलेण प्रतिपादित्यवत्माः।

* समुद्वारिद्विं ब, ए युक्तकपाठः।
† द्वितीयं नवं भेदः। द्रतिः ब, ग, ए युक्तकपाठः।
‡ संशयकविप्रेयस्येष्येष्यं भवति ग युक्तकपाठः।
§ भृपारिसंपैनेतिः ग युक्तकपाठः।
अशिष्टाप्रतिष्ठायायं तत्सन्निधी वैरत्यागः ॥ ३५ ॥

तस्यादित्वां भावसन्तं, ‘प्रविध’; परंतपस्य संस्करणं स्वादिनं वैरत्यागं निर्माणस्य वाच्रानं भवति। धिन्यार्थं धिन्यतं परियज्ञानीर्वार्यः ॥ ३५॥

साधारणम्: किं भवतीवाचः।

सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाकलासायतनम् ॥ ३६॥

क्रियमािना चि ‘क्रिया’ यागादित्नः, ‘फलं’ खोर्दिकं, प्रवचनं।

तस्य हि साधारणस्य चेन्न: तथा सदृशं प्रकटस्न: तथा च भ्रातायां यामपि क्रियायो योगी फलमार्गायी। तद्रच्छरवः यस्य कस्मिन्तु क्रियामसुस्वेतांपि क्रियाकला भवतीवार्यः ॥ ३६॥

साधारणम्: प्रतीकः।

अस्तेयप्रतिष्ठायां सर्वद्रापस्यानम् ॥ ३७॥

‘प्रायययः’, यहां भवति योगी तदा तस्य प्रकटस्नं निर्मित्याख्य्याय: ‘सर्वंते दृष्टमः’ तर्कानुपलितस्वः ॥ ३७॥

सर्वार्थंसादादायांपि प्रतीकः।

प्राचर्यप्रतिष्ठायां चर्येप्रामाथः ॥ ३८॥

* छन्दः, अशिष्टाप्रतिष्ठात्यायाभिविधिकापः G पुस्तकेन ग्राह्या।
† छन्दः, समाधिविधिपतः G पुस्तकेन ग्राह्या।
‡ प्रतीक अन्त्याग्निपतः B, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
§ समवेत्ते दिक्षानावृत्तिः G पुस्तकपाठः।

પ્રયોગમાશાંત પ્રકઃ ગાજ્યલામનુ સદાભિદિના: ચારુખો ચારા ભવનનુ, તથા કલેન પ્રતિપદાધિતમાણા: 

* સામુદ્રાંદિવત બ, c પુલક્યાણાઠ: 
† દર્શન નવ મેડર દત બ, c, e પુલક્યાણાઠ: 
‡ સંભનાય ચવયાલામાંનુ ભિવષું c પુલક્યાણાઠ: 
§ ખાક્યારાંદમં દન પુલક્યાણાઠ: 

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ष पादे ३५ चौत्तम्।

श्रद्धसाप्रतिष्ठायां* तत्सन्निधी वैरत्यागः ॥ ३५ ॥

'तन्शांत्रियं भावतं, बन्धियः,' बस्मविरोधिनामयाधिन्तु- ब्राह्मीयः 'वैरत्यागः' निमेषकर्तव्यावस्थानं भवति। भिषारत्ता दिन्स्त्रलं परिवृत्तःनीयं ॥ ३५ ॥

चत्याभ्यासवत् हिं भवनीवातः

सत्यप्रतिष्ठायं किरयाफलायत्रवम् ॥ ३६ ॥

किर्मयामाणि न हि 'किर्मः' यागांविद्या, 'पल्ल' सर्गादिकां, प्रथममनि।

तस्य हि सत्याभ्यासवते चैत्यमिनिं तथा तथ्य प्रकटतेन, तथा भक्तता- यामपि किर्मायां रथगी यामिनिनि। तदहनां तथ काशिनिः

किर्मायामुक्तंतोपि किर्मायां भवतीवर्षः ॥ ३६ ॥

अलोकयाभ्यासवत् पलमाहः

अलोकप्रतिष्ठायं सत्यरूपाप्यानम् ॥ ३७ ॥

'अलोकः', यागाभ्यसिन् रथगी तदा तस्य प्रकटात् निर्लिप्तसाम्य- चापि 'सम्बूकत्विलुँगः'? रथानुपतितम् ॥ ३७ ॥

अलोकायाध्यास्मापि पलमाहः

अलोकायप्रतिष्ठायं रथगीलाम: ॥ ३८ ॥

* झुः, श्रीसंप्रतिष्ठायाम्बित्यात् ग पुस्तकेन नान्वति।
† झुः, श्रीसंप्रतिष्ठायाम्बित्यात् ग पुस्तकेन नान्वति।
‡ रुमायाध्यायिनीति भ, C, E पुस्तकपाठः।
§ सयात्ता दिक्कृष्टानीिति ग पुस्तकपाठः।
प्राणवनेत्रे वेगभूने

थ: किष्ठ ‘ज्ञात्यत’, ज्ञात्यति, तथा तत्परवशार्चारित्वम् ‘दीवे’
शामथे ज्ञात्यते आविभेदति। दीवनिर्विहे वि ज्ञात्यथे तथा ज्ञात्यार्च-
सा रीरत्रसिरयमनः वीर्यं प्रकर्षं मास्कक्ति॥ १५ ॥

अपरियापश्चात्मकस्य वक्तामासः

अपरियापश्चात्मकथे ज्ञात्यक्यात्मानास्मः॥ ३८ ॥

कथमिवत्तः भवः ‘कथनः’। जन्मः कथनः ‘ज्ञात्यक्यात्मनः’
तथा: ‘समोधः’ समग्राणः। जन्मान्ये केशवमाय जीव्वत्र: वि
कार्य्यकारीति जिन्धश्यायः सत्वेति समग्राणानातित्वः।

न केवलं भोगशायनपरिपाः एव परिपाः। किन्तु यावदायम्
वज्ञपरिपाःज्ञपापि परिपाः। भोगशायनलक्ष्यार्च्छ।

तस्मानुः शति

रागानुमभामः कहिंसुखायासेव प्रस्तुता न तात्तिकश्चायनानुमभावः।

यदा दुःषः। वज्ञरानुदिपिरिकर्षेनिर्पेतः माध्यमवलङ्गः तदा मथ-राक्षस
रागादिक्यायानेत समग्राणेनःसांवन्नेव पूर्वार्यज्ञानस्मः॥

॥ ३८ ॥

उत्तर चमानां सिद्धः। राध नियमानागः।

श्रीचात स्वाजनुगुणः परेरसञ्चानसः॥ ४० ॥

थ: ‘श्रीर्ष भावति, तथा ‘स्वाजनुगुण’ कारणक्षेवप्तेिणः
सा रागानुमभामः ज्ञात्य, कस्थुपायते। जुआसिरित्वम् कायः वाचार्यः
कर्मयं द्वस्तृतिं इत्युतं ‘परे’। ज्ञात्येश्वर कायवचः, ‘ध्यानम्’ सवर्कः।

* रामानुमानादिति ॥ पुस्करसः।
† माख लक्ष्मेष दति ॥ पुस्करसः।
भानः संसारपरिवर्त्यांभिनित्वं। अंकित सम्बन्ध कार्यं अनुपरते सत्ताद- 
वचस्यरूपानां कार्यं परकाशस्यायस्य: कार्यं: संसारमनन्वतं।।

श्रीचैव फलाण्तरमानां।

किम्च सत्त्वशुद्धी-सौमनस्यायतेन्द्रियज्ञानस्यामद्वेशन- 
थेरायतानि च।।

भवनायिनः वक्यमिश्रः। "सच्चे प्रकाशसुखायाद्यादकः। तस्क 
'प्रदूषितं' रजस्मेभायुमनिभवः। 'सौमनस्यं' ब्रह्माण्डवेणे मानवी 
प्रीति।। 'एकायता' नियतेन्द्रियस्यविषये। चेतस: सैन्यः। 'द्रिष्टिय- 
ज्ञानः' विषयपरासुलानात्मित्रियाणि सारमविषयानि। 'त्रात्मद्वेशने' 
विषयक्षात्तस्ये, चित्रस 'थेरायत'। श्रीचारायवते पृथ्वी सत्त्वशुद्धा- 
द्रव्य: कालेण प्राशुभविनः। तथा श्री श्रीचारा प्रत्येकः।।'सत्त्वशुद्धे: 
सौमनस्यं।' यौमनस्यायादेकायताय।। एकायताय।। द्रिष्टियज्ञानः 
हस्तिरयज्ञानादादेकायतायायशंभित।।

शान्तोऽयायायायः फलमानाः।

सर्वोषाद्वन्तम: सुखाभं।।

* संस्कृतम् इति H पुस्तकपाठ।।
† विख्याताः नवरसार्गार्पुलस्ताक्षर्य नामितः ग्रन्थु भाष्यकारेऽवत् चतुः।।
‡ सम्भवतार्थित H पुस्तकपाठ।।
§ प्रकाशसुखायानित्यित्वत्र B, E, C पुस्तकपाठ।।
|| नियतविषये इति B, C, E पुस्तकपाठ।।
· श्रीचारात् सत्त्वशुद्धिहितिपत्र: A, B, C, D, E, H पुलस्ताक्षर्य नामितः।।
· यौमनस्यायानित्यित्व G पुस्तकपाठ।।
· द्र्यन्यादितिग G पुस्तकपाठ।।
भ: किंतु ‘श्रवणयु’, अभयाग्य, तस्मि तत्प्रकारण्योत्सर्वतिष्ठयं ‘वीर्य’
शास्त्रीयाम्बिकवतः। वीर्यनिरिक्ष्यं हि श्रवणयुंति तस्मि प्राकर्षणयुः
रीरेवर्यमः सु वीर्यं प्रकर्षमागच्छति ॥ ५४ ॥

अयपरियाद्वाययेष्यां प्रभुमायः

अयपरिरहस्योऽयं जनमकयन्तासापभोधः ॥ ५५ ॥

कथनिषयं भावः ‘कथना’। जनम: कथना ‘जनमकयन्ता’।
तस्म: ‘सम्बोधः’ समग्नजानं। जनमान्येऽऽपरिश्चयं कोल्कुशं: किं
कार्यकारीनितिः ज्ञात्ऐयां सर्वंसेव समग्नजानात्मकाःः।

न केवलं भोगाध्यात्माः एव परियः। किंतु शाब्दात्रः
श्रवियोऽयपरिश्चयं परियः: भोगाध्यात्माः एव श्रवियोऽय
तस्मान् श्लोत रागालुप्तम्यः वर्त्तुत्तायाः सवद्भावं न ताल्लकश्चाप्राप्तम्।
यदा पुनः श्रवियोऽयपरिश्चयं परियः बाध्यस्यमवलयते तदा मथ
खर्सा रागाविद्यायाम् समग्नजानशेषंभवतेऽव पूर्वार्थरजापभोधः ॥

५६ ॥

जया चमान्या सिद्धः। जय नियमानाहः।

श्रीचात् स्वाञ्जुगुणं परैसांसर्गं: ॥ ५७ ॥

य: ‘श्रैचं भावति, तस्मि ‘श्रवन्यमिपि कारणब्रह्मपाल्यथे:’
दारेण ‘जुगुणा’ घुणा, समुपजायते। अगुण्यवर्यं कायः नाचाराः
कर्षयु दिन्यस्येव श्रुतां सये ‘परे,’ अष्टिक्षु कायविधः,’ अष्टिमुः’

* रागालुप्तम्यवादिति ॥ पुःक्षिणः।
† माया संख्युः रतिः ॥ पुःक्षिणः।
भावः संस्कर्पपरिवर्जनानामित्यः। वः किष्म ख्रेबेव कार्यं शुभ्यते तच्चद-वधद्ध्नात्र तथैव परब्धेष्यजायाभिनः। कार्यं: संस्कर्पमुलभित्यः। ॥ ४० ॥
शौचशैव फलान्तरमाह।

किष्मः सत्ययुजि-सौमन्येवकृतेनित्रिक्यज्ञायामदर्शन-योग्यत्वानि च। ॥ ४१ ॥

भवनतीतः वाक्षेषः। 'सत्यं' प्रकाशशुभायायामकारः। तस्मा 'शुद्धा' रजसोभायानमन्मिवभवः। 'वौमसं' ख्रेदात्मभवेन मानवी प्रीतिः। 'एकायदा' विनितेनित्रिक्यायाः। वेयशः ख्रेद्रीः। 'दिनिय-जया' विषयपरसुखानामानिनित्रिक्यायां सात्त्विकवश्यानं। 'भामद्धर्जने' विमक्खणातिैः। विषयशं 'थ्रोग्यन्ति। बौवाभाववतं पति सत्युज्या-द्रयः। कोणेण ग्राम्यवन्ति। तथा चि श्रीचारु सत्युज्या। ॥ ॥
शौचशैव फलान्तरमाह।

शन्तोशाद्वृत्तमः सुखाभः। ॥ ४२ ॥

* संभोगभाव हि द्वि पुकारः।
† किष्मविपातः। विश्वादशपुलकेष्व नाशि। परन्तु भाष्यकारः।
‡ विश्ववशीलिनि हि पुकारः।
§ प्रकाशशुभायामानित्वमिति B, E, C पुकारः।
|| नित्यवधयो हि B, C, E पुकारः।
¶ शौचाची सत्यविज्ञातिपाटः A, B, C, D, E, H पुकारेष्व नाशि।
** सौमन्येवकृतेनित्रिक्यमिति G पुकारः।
†† देशायमादिति G पुकारः।
च: किलं ‘श्रद्धाचयः’, अभासति, तस्य तत्प्रकर्षांसिद्धिर्प्राप्तेण ‘वीणी’
बांधने चारीनवति। वीणानि रसावस्य तस्य प्राकर्षेष्वा
रीरार्निम्नयमण्यासु वीणे प्रकर्षेष्वा गणति। || ९५ ||
अपरिम्बोष्टाभ्यासक पञ्चमाद ||
अपरिम्बोष्टादृह्याय जन्मकायन्तासम्बोधः || २८ ||
कथंभियाय भावः ‘कथना’। जनान: कथना ‘जन्मकायन्ता’।
तस्य: ‘सम्मोऽ’ समग्राण। जन्मः नारहमार्श्वे कीदुःष्टासः किं
कार्यारीतिः निश्चितायाः सर्वसेव समग्राणातीवः।
ग: भौवलं भोगधानपरियं एव परियं। किंतु यावदादामः
परियं: भेषौधानलाभीर्निरुः परियं: तस्मान घटिः
रागानुभावः। वहिशुुस्यायामेव प्राप्तसं न तालिकसाराप्राप्तसेवः।
सं च: प्रत्येकप्रत्येकप्रेठ्याहेतु माध्यमवलयते तदा मध्य
खः रागादिध्यायामात् समग्राणेहृत्यविभूष्येष्वे पुण्यवर्जुकसम्बोधः। ||
२८ ||
जः च: चाँगणां विक्ष्यः। चः नियमानाहः।
शोचात्तु स्वातःगुप्ता परैसंसर्गः || ४० ||
च: ‘ब्रृह्सं भावति, तस्य ‘सासोपि कार्यास्तुपपरयोऽलोकण
द्वारे: ‘अगुप्ता’ घृणा, चवचुपजापते। ब्रह्मचर्यादृ: कायः:
नारायणायः कर्तव्य दयामृते हेतुतुता ‘परे’ ‘श्रीवेश्व कायवद्धः,’ ‘सरसनु:’ च्चःकरः—
* रागानुसत्त्वादिति H पुष्करपाठः।
† माख सुबः दृश्यः E पुष्करपाठः।
भावः संस्कृपरिवर्जनामित्वः। यः किष्क खेलेव कार्य जुगपते तत्तद-बधद्रेष्ठात्र कार्य परक्रियेश्चास्ते: कार्यः संस्कृपनुभवति ॥ ४० ॥
शौचकेश्वर फलान्तरामाः।

किष्कः सत्यसुविधा-सौमनस्वेकायतनेत्रिविजयायात्मदर्शिन-योगयत्वानि च ॥ ४१ ॥

भवन्तीति वाच्येष्वः। 'सत्रः' प्रकाशुधाायः ॥ तस्मां द्वादशि रजस्यसशायामनभवः। 'सौमनस्यं' खंडानामुख्येन मानवी प्रीतिः। 'एकायता' निघटेतीस्विचायेऽरस्य सैताय सैताय। 'हिन्निय-जयः' विषयपरालसुधामनभवः। सामस्यावस्यानं। 'एकायते' विषयपरालसुधामनभवः। सामस्यावस्यानं। तथा ति गीताय खंडानामुख्येऽरस्य सैताय सैताय।

सन्तोषायात्रसि ॥ ४२ ॥

सन्तोषायात्रसि ॥ ४२ ॥
‘सम्प्रतिकर्णं’ चोगिनवधाविवधानकरं सुखाविनिर्भवति यस्य वाणं वियसुखं ऋतुशिनापि न समानं भवति।] ४२।।

तपसः फलमाह।

कायेरिधिसिद्धीसुदिस्स्यात्पति: ॥ ४३ ॥

‘तपः समधिकमानं चेतनं कृपातिचक्राभिषेकयदर्शे।।
‘कायेक्ष्विवाण’ चिन्द्रि उत्तरं चारुधाति।।

प्रायमध्ये। चाणक्याचारिणा चिन्द्रिक्षेत्रेण।। तत्त्रचाणिरिवर्षाणं
सुखा-यविसन-विश्रामंत्रास्याभिषेकामध्ये निर्वचनं च, कायस्य चायेक्ष्वम-पुस्मंहाचारीनि।] ४४।।

साध्यायस फलमाह।

साध्यायाप्रदेयोघातसमाहें। ॥ ४५ ॥

‘श्रविन्तमंसपादिवर्षेः ‘साध्याचे प्रत्ययभागेः, चोगिनः
‘दश्याचे चिन्द्रिक्षेत्रा, ‘देवतया, ‘सम्योगः’ भवति।। वा देवता
प्रत्यजीभवनीवयस:।] ४५।।

देवस्यप्रक्षामेषस्य फलमाह।

समाधिसिद्धिरोत्स्वर्प्रक्षामेषाः ॥ ४६ ॥

* समाधिसिद्धिरोत्स्वर्प्रक्षामेषाः हस्ति C पुस्करिणाः।।
† समधिकमानं चेतनं H, G पुस्करिणाः।।
‡ भवतीवर्य मात्र G पुस्करिणाः नास्ति।।
§ संग्रामिनिचक्राभिषेकयदर्शे B, C, E पुस्करिणाः।।
|| ज्ञापादयतिः B, C, E पुस्करिणाः।।
२ पाद ४३ छात्रम्

‘कृत्रिम थेगहनं भक्तिविवेकसुक्तात् घामेहे’ तत्साधनम्,
ञ्जविभागों भवति। घामेहे भवसाहीनः प्रश्नः चौजनारायणपूर्वः
केशवन् परिश्वतः समाधिभूषणभवति॥ ४ ५ ॥

चम-निमानानुजः श्रावणमाहः

तत्† सिरसुखमासनम्॥ ४६॥

श्रावणे ‘श्रावणे’ पर्यायस्वरूपासन-कृष्णकाश्यादिः।
तदु यदा ‘सिरे’ निम्नवर्त्ते, ‘सुखे’ चन्द्रसेवके भवति, तदा थोगाना
प्रज्ञा भजते॥ ४ ६ ॥

तत्क्रिया सिरसुखमासन्यासस्यापायमाहः

प्रयत्नश्रीविश्वासन्यासमापतिभायम्॥ ४७॥

tद्रास्यं ‘प्रयत्नश्रीविश्वासन्यासमापतिभायम्’, च सिरे चुक्ष
भवनीति सम्बन्धः।

यदा यद्रास्यं ब्रम्हानीति हृद्यां करेति तदा प्रयत्नश्रीविश्वासन्यासमापतिभायम्-हृद्येनैव तद्रास्यं नियघाते। यदा श्रावणश्रीविश्वासंगते श्रावणे थेवः
समापतिः जियते प्रक्षालनेि ताद्रास्यं नियघाते, तदा देहाः श्वारं
भावास्थां दुःखजनक भवति। श्रीविश्वासनजये विदि समाधिनारायणस्यापायमाहः न प्रभुः दुःखजनक जयवलादयः॥ ४ ७ ॥

तत्क्रियावानुप्राप्तिश्च पञ्चमाहः।

* अवस्थेवति G पुस्कापाठः।
† प्रेषितं श्रवणः A, B, C, D, E, F, G पुस्कापाठ नाति। परलो प्रभुः भाष-ज्ञातः चतः।
‡ चन्द्रसेवके थ्यनिति G पुस्कापाठः।
ततो इत्यादिभागः || ४८ ||
तस्मिन्त्रामितं विति "दृश्ये" श्रीतंशसु-चुनिष्ठादिविवी: श्रेगी नामित्यनुमय तथाः: || ४८ ||
श्रथनश्यामनन्तरं प्राश्याममाणि
तस्मिन् सति श्रास्त्र-प्रश्नासयोगविविष्णु: प्राश्यायामं: || ४८ ||
श्रथनश्यामेऽसु तस्मिन्, तस्मिन्त्रामितं: प्राश्यामलबने योगाः विविष्ण: प्रतुच्छे: भवति। कोम्यू: "श्रास्त्र-प्रश्नासयोगविविष्णु: ध्रुवाः। श्रास्त्र-प्रश्नासौ कलनलबने। तथादयथा रेवक-पूरुत्काढा: रेवखी श्रास्त्र-अन्तरेऽङ्गे नामेव "नये: प्रवाहस:। "विशेषे" धारण:। "प्राश्यामाः।"
जयते || ४८ ||
तथेति सुश्रुण्यमाणि विभज्य स्मृतं कथयति।
स तु वास्याभ्यन्तरसम्भवतेऽतिदेशकाशस्त्राभिः परि-हट्टे दृश्यतः || ५० ||
"वाश्यसाभि: ायास: रेवकः। ब्रणादस्ति: प्रश्नाः। पूरकः। ब्रण-श्रास्त्रादस्ति: कुस्कः। तस्मिन् जलविष्कुस्के निश्चलनया प्राश्या: प्रक्षयाप्यनेने दति कुस्कः।"

* श्रास्त्रनामादवतरस्तिः ग पुस्कष्यागः।
† तथारिष्का रेवक-पूर्वाकारकारेऽतिः आ, द, फ, ग पुस्कष्यागः।
‡ दश्यावतिः ब, ग, ए पुस्कष्यागः।
§ प्राश्यावश्यायाल दति च पुस्कष्यागः।
नाम प्रशांतमानिनिधि: शतुर्महिमिदामासः।

वाश्याभ्यन्तरविषयाद्वेषी चतुर्थयः। ५९॥

‘योत्र’ वाश्या विषयः गामयाद्वादमानिदतः। ‘श्रेयस्तोरि विषयः’

वर्गाभिमाणिकादि:। तै: दौ विषयो भाष्यः पर्यालोकः घ: भाषा-

तपो गतिविषयः ५ ‘चतुर्थः’ प्रशान्तमः। तदीयाभ्यानि कृष्ण-

काश्याद्वादमास विशेषः। द वाश्याभ्यन्तरविषयाद्वादमासे । वश्याभ्यन्तरविषयाद्वादमासे निरोधः। धय तु

विषयविषयेऽपि निरोधः। धय तू पर्वधेषि देशोपः काश्याभिमानि-

तपो चतुर्थः ५९॥

उतः चतुर्थः प्रकाशात्मकमि ५२॥

‘ततः’ तदानि प्रशान्तमानि ‘प्रकाशस्य’ चिन्ता विषयाद्वादमानिदतः। धतू

चावर्ता होक्षेषु नातु ‘जीयः’ विषयातिवर्ज्यः। ५२॥

वेंकुलित्विमानादिहिमासेः दति B पुस्तकापादः।

ततानि वदानि धति B पुस्तकापादः।

G पुस्तके चर्चा उद्भव इश्वर उद्दात दति पाठः।
धारालाबू च वैमयतता ममसः ॥ ५३ ॥

‘धारणा:’ वर्णमानलबिजः*। तासु प्रशाचिमि: चीत्रदेवीं मने चंच चंच धार्यते, तण तण खलरं भवति। न विशेषं भजते॥ ५३ ॥

प्रत्याहारः लघुपानाः।

स्वल्पविधयसम्रापनाभावे विनाश्य लघुपानुकारः
इन्द्रियाः प्रत्याहारः ॥ ५४ ॥

इन्द्रियाणि स्वल्पविधयेभः प्रत्याहारः प्रमुखम् तत्साधिवन्ते-
अशिनु हृति ‘प्रत्याहारः’। च च कथं निष्पादत द्वाहः। चबुर्गा-
दीनां इन्द्रियाः क्ष: को वित्याः कुपादः। तेन ‘सम्ययोगः’
धारितमुखोः प्रवर्तनं। नधारितभिमुखः परायणः लघुपानाः
वियाचेतानां। अशिनु हृति विनाशः पानुकारीष्ट्रियाः
भवनि, चतुर्विषमन्वर्मानानि मधुकराराजिव मधुमचिकः॥,
वर्णःः इन्द्रियाः प्रस्तोत्ते। अष्टिविनिरोधः तानि प्रत्याहतानि
भवनि॥ ५४ ॥

तेषां तत्स्थापानुकारः प्रत्याहार उजः। फलमातः।

ततः परमा वस्मनेनीरियाः ॥ ५५ ॥

* वर्णमाला हृति H पुस्करपाठः।
† चीत्रदेवीमि C पुस्करपाठः।
‡ विनाशकावतीः B, E पुस्करपाठः।
§ स्वविश्वाससम्रापे हृति B, E पुस्करपाठः। स्वविश्वाससम्रापे हृति
B पुस्करपाठः।
|| मधुकराराजिव मधुमचिकः हृति B, E पुस्करपाठः। मधुकराराजिव
मधुमचिकः हृति G पुस्करपाठः।
भाष्यमार्थे द्विप्रथमादृश्ये तथा 'वक्ष्यान्याच्यानानि' दौन्द्रियापलिष्युतम् चौप्रथमादृश्ये चतुर्थम् वात्स्यायन' वाचि मौर्यान्यापि न धानीस्यथे।

तदेव प्रायमपादद्रोणलक्षणस्य योगान्याच्या कारणं चतुर्थं फलदौद्धता कारणां मपि भेदं कारणं ख्यात्मं फलश्चारिषीयव विपाकस्य स्थलं कारणशास्त्रभिः।

तत्त्वाधारान् क्रियाधारीनां, शास्त्रतिरिक्तेन त्यागशास्त्रकालात्।

तत्त्वाधारान् क्रियाधारीनां, शास्त्रतिरिक्तेन त्यागशास्त्रकालात्।

तदथ चौध्रो योगान्याच्यानां धार्मिकायानि।

हत्वा महाराजाधिराजायास्मृतेविरिष्टियां राजमार्गस्याभिधायां पातक्षयेग्रामशास्त्रसङ्कलनां द्वितीया: याधनपादः॥४॥

* योगान्यामिति G पुस्तकापादः।
† प्रवेक्षणपाद अयोगुप्तान्यामिति B, C, E पुस्तकापादः। परस्परलक्ष्यः प्रवेक्षणान्यामिति G पुस्तकापादः।
‡ कुशलम् इति G पुस्तकापादः।
§ विचारान्यासमारिः अभिधारिति H पुस्तकापादः।
ঘট্টীয়: পাদঃ ।

ধারাভাষ্যস্তরা আবিষ্কারিত বিভূতয়।

বৈবিক্ত প্রতিবিশ্বা ভগবান: এ ভগবান।

তত্ত্ব পূর্বায় ধারাভাষ্যব্যতির নিঃস্ব দলমকে নিঃস্ব মির্জাবাহানীর পূর্বক বাজকাখান রিশিতে বিভটিতপ্রসঙ্গ।

তত ধারণায়া: খ্যায়।

ঝর্জাভ্যন্তস্ত ধারাবাচার্য*। ৯।

'ঝর্জাবাচার্য' নামভক্তনামাজনি। পিন্না 'বনাঞ' বিশ্বাসাতারপরি প্রারবৃত্ত হত পিন্না স্থানান্তরে যা 'পিন্না ধারণা', চলতে।

প্রথমং: মেহাদ্রিষ্টপরিপ্রেক্ষাপ্রতি করকেন ধামনিময়তানা জিতাবধুন পরিবর্তনশিল্পন্ধ হিসাবে নিঃস্ব প্রতি মেহাদ্রিষ্টান্ত জিতাবধুন ঘোষিত নামস্তে তথ্য: স্থানান্তরে কর্কথিতিত। ৯।

ধারাভাষ্যব্যতি ধামনিময়তামাত।

তত প্রথমং প্রতি তাতান্ত্যান্ত্যান্ত্যান্ত্যান্ত। ২।

'তত' তাতান্ত্যাদে যদি পিন্না ধরত তত। 'প্রথমং প্রথমং।

* পিন্না প্রাচীত। B পুস্থসত্তাপ।
† গলির্বর্ণ থাতে B, E পুস্থসত্তাপ।
রায় পাঠের অনুজ্ঞানী

তদেব ভগবান সমাধিভিঃ

তদেবার্থমাষ্টান্ত সহরস্তান্তানিমিত সমাধিঃ প্রতিষ্ঠানী

যা অন্যান্ত বিশ্বৈর্যাপরিশ্রামার বংশবক্ত ধারাকথা গায়নে অকে নথিমণ্ডলের মধ্যে পাঠভাঙ্গা বেদান্ত সমাধিঃ প্রতিষ্ঠানী

পরমাণু যে গায়নে নথিমণ্ডলের মধ্যে পাঠভাঙ্গা বেদান্ত সমাধিঃ প্রতিষ্ঠানী

ব্যবহারিক সংযম প্রতিষ্ঠানী

চর্চার নিসর্গে ধারাকথা সমাধিভিঃ প্রতিষ্ঠানী

তথাধান দৈত্য প্রমাণ প্রতিষ্ঠানী

তথার্থ কথমাণী 'চর্চাত্মক বিভাগ বাক্যাত্মান প্রমাণ প্রতিষ্ঠানী

তথার্থ কথমাণী 'চর্চাত্মক বিভাগ বাক্যাত্মান প্রমাণ প্রতিষ্ঠানী

* সহরস্তান্তানিমিত পুস্তকাং
† সমাধিভিঃ পুস্তকাং
‡ ব্যাখ্যাকারণী পুস্তকাং
शास्त्रविवेककथिपातः। 'शालोकः' प्रश्रेण भवति। प्रश्न चार्यं
रामब्राह्मणवायतीयः। ॥ ५ ॥

तथापयोगमाहः।

तस्य भूमिष्ठ विनियोगः। ॥ ६ ॥

तस्य संयमसः, 'भूमिष्ठ' कृष्णश्रावणमेवेदेन विनासुः
चिन्तनसंपुष्ये, 'विनियोगः', वर्णः। चधिरामधरः चिन्नभूमिः
जित्यां जितां शालोकायां भूमिः संयमः कार्यः। ॥ न यमनासी-
क्षाधरभूमिः जनरथायां भूमिः संयमः कुरुवंशः फलभागः भवति। ॥ ७ ॥

धार्मिकपर्यं योगानुसारव्रतिः पञ्चानं चार्यं विधाय चप्पासं
कर्म न हततिमयायाहः।

शयस्तरमें पूर्वभें। ॥ ८ ॥

'पूर्वभें' यमादिभो योगानुसः पारम्येष समाधेषुपकार- के भें। धारणादियोगानुसः सम्प्रवृत्तात्संच यमाः: 'शयस्तरः', संमा-
धिक्र्यापानह्यातमः। ॥ ९ ॥

तस्यापि समाधिरातरपेजय विहिर्जुलमाहः।

तद्वपि विहिर्जुल निवर्जिज्ञः। ॥ १० ॥

'निवर्जिज्ञः' निराकरण समुद्रभावनापरपर्यायायाः यमाः:।
एतद्वपि योगानुसः 'विहिर्जुलः', पारम्येषापाकारकलात्। ॥ ११ ॥

* प्रसादेष महत्वदिति D पुस्तकमात्रः।
† अवश्यताधिकिति E पुस्तकमात्रः।
द्राजी योगाज्जिथिराक्षातुकामः संभवस्य विचयपरिशुद्धिः
कर्तुं क्रेयेश परिषामचयमाशः

व्युत्थान-निरोधसंस्कारयोगसीव-प्रादूर्भावी निरोधक्षणंचितानवयो निरोधपरिषामः ॥ ८ ॥

'व्युत्थान' विन-मूृत-विचितस्यं भूमिस्थयं 'निरोध' प्रहंस-च्छार्ग्यात्वम् चेतः परिषामः। ताभ्रो व्युत्थान-निरोधार्थो चै जनितो 'संस्कारो तथोऽर्ग्यात्त्वम् भूमिस्थ—प्रादूर्भावी', यदा भवतः।
'भूमिस्थ' न्युम्भूनतया कार्यकरणायमशिय्यावस्तां 'प्रादूर्भाव' वर्णमानः च्छायो आभ्यक्षण्यात्वयावस्तां। तदा निरोधवछोः,
'चित्ताभायत्स्तिस्वरूपं 'र्वषयं', य: ह्य: 'निरोधपरिषामः' द्वेयुक्ताः।

अथवः। यदा व्युत्थानसंस्काररूपः धर्मः विबरीमृतो भवति,
निरोधसंस्कारक्षणार्थमल्लक्ष्याविभवति, धर्मिक्षणतया च चित्तसुभव्याच्छिपिच्छिपिवस्तिः चेतयेन प्रतीत्त्वम्, तदा इ निरोधपरिषामक्षणेन अवश्ये चतुर्द्वितीयात्त्वम् चेते निविद्यं नान्ति, तथायेवक्षुपरिषामः िैवेऽसुक्ताः।

तत्ष्य प्रशान्तवाच्छिता संस्कारान् ॥ १० ॥

'तत्ष्य' चेतः, जुक्षाज्जिरोधसंस्कारान्, 'प्रशान्तवाच्छिता', भवति।
परिषामविशेषत्वम्भेष्ट्वप्रवासपरिषामि चिन्तं भवतीत्वयः। ॥ १० ॥

निरोधपरिषामज्ञानभिधाय धमाधिपरिषामभमाः।

* सिद्धराक्षातुकाम दति D पुस्तकाधिपते।
सर्वाधिकारपत्तयोः श्रवणद्वयो विनम्र समाधिपरिष्काराः ॥ ११ ॥

'धर्मरथा' शुल्कानानाविधाध्यर्थस्य, विनम्र विचेषः धर्मः।
एकाधिकारावयवस्यने स्वापनरिपाणिता एकायता,'* शारिरं विनम्र धर्मः।
तथार्थातः ज्ञेयः। 'श्रवणद्वयः। 'सर्वाधिकारद्वयः धर्मः
चयः।' प्रयत्नसंशयेऽभ्यः। 'एकातःशक्तिः धर्मः प्रादुर्भवोऽविचारः।
वामः। 'विन्म्रः' ज्योतिरसच्चा, चतुर्वित्वावस्यां समाधिपरिष्काराः।
श्रवणद्वयः।

पुरुषाकान्ति परिक्षादयत्वं विशेषः। तत संस्काराद्वयोर्ध्वायस्याऽ-रञ्जिता गुरुभवः।
पुरुषः व्युष्यान्वकारसच्चद्वयः धर्मः
अयमः। उत्तरक निरघुर्वकारसच्चद्वयोऽविचारात्मकाव्याः।
द्वर्त अवशेषावतः। सर्वाधिकारपरिक्षेपायनान्तिरकादु-ज्ञानसन्याता वाणः।
एकातःशक्तिः धर्मः संक्षोष्ये वर्षमानेऽविश्वत्वं प्रकटः। ॥ १२ ॥

श्रावणद्वयः तुल्यप्रत्येकः विचारकाग्यात्मिकायमाः। ॥ १३ ॥

समाधिपरिष्कार 'विनम्र', एकायते द्विविशेषः। 'श्रावणद्वयः'

* श्रावणद्वये H पुस्तकपाठः।
† तद्योगः H पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ श्रवणसंतरस्येति H, C पुस्तकपाठः।
चतुर्विनिमांग् प्रविष्ट। चापरंशु चतुरंशित। वर्तमानेनिधिन चिन्तित।
द्वारिष च समाविष्टिविस्तरो तुरस्य एकपरमपम्य विस्तरो, 
श्रवणी। उभयचारी समाविष्टिविस्तर सिद्धांतायचिन्तामणींत्रां 
चतुष्म्: 'एकादशानग्नमः', दशुष्मण्ये।| १२ |
विन्ध्यपरिशालोजनाकुपमन्यातिरिद्रवाधः

tेतेन गृहोतिर्युधु धर्मां-मक्खावस्तानिविशावायोऽपि
स्मातां:।* | १३ |

tेतेन' जिविध्योग्येन विन्ध्यपरिशालोन। 'भरतेशु' हृदन-हृदेशु। 
'दत्तेशु' गुप्तकर्मानंकरणेनाविशिष्टेषु। 'धर्मार्थाचारणसमे 
विभिन्न भिन्नियोऽपि परिशाले स्मातात्मावनिवान।

विश्वासित: धर्मर्त: पुर्वधर्मचिन्तो धर्मानन्तरपारिवर्त्यपरिप्रेय 
वासम्।, यथा धर्माचरण: धर्मर्त: विष्ठलपधर्मपरिशयागं गटृप- 
धर्मानन्तरविचारे:। 'धर्मपरिशाल:। दशुष्मण्ये। 'लघुपरिशाल:।' 
यथा तस्मां गटृपमाताध्यपितायान वर्तमानवधानर्विचारे:। 
स्मातात्मावनिवान। 'धर्मापरिशाल:।, यथा तस्मां गटृप 
प्रार्थितीतियोऽथुक्म्यवर्षेयार्थित्रियोऽपि। चतुर्विन 
गुप्तनां नापरिशालां चक्षुषपाठे।| १४ |

* धर्मानन्तरपारिशयाक्रोऽवाच्यात्र हर्ष दसित ० मुखमालः।
† गुप्तकर्मेनाविशिष्टेषु निवार्थित ५ मुखमालः।
‡ चतुर्विनिमांग प्रविष्टेषु हर्ष मुखमालः।
§ गटृपपरिशालोजनातिरिद्रवस्मातात्मावनिवान। दसित ० मुखमालः।
गणु कऱ्याच्या धर्मात्माने धर्मांषो स्वयमाणः।
तत्त्वामातः शान्तोदितायपदेशःधर्मानुपाती धर्मीयां ॥ १४॥

'शान्तामातः' वे जलसंवधानार्थ चतुरस्रोतानुप्रविष्टः। 'छत्रिनः' वे चतुरस्रोतार्थ वर्षनामात्शासनीस्वा स्वयमाणः उपस्थितः।
'राजपदेशः' वे राजस्वप्रदेशे सूत्ता ब्रह्मदेशु न उपस्थितः। चतुरः स्वयमानः धर्मानसमावेशार्थः। नियोजकार्यकारणमध्ये थोग्यतः। धर्मस्वमानः धर्मदेशाग्रहीयते। तं चिन्तनमय धर्मस्वमणे स्वयमाणे धर्मस्वदेशाग्रहीयते। चतुरः धर्मस्वमणे स्वयमाणे धर्मस्वदेशाग्रहीयते।

एकछ धर्मार्थः कथनमेव परिणाममा द्वायास्रमपनेवनमाणः।
कमायतः परिणामान्यातो हेतुः ॥ १४॥

* तन्त्रित्वमः धर्माधिकारिणीपुनःसङ्केतः। परतुः भाष्यार्थः
धर्माधिकारीपति परिणामकारीय परिणामात्माय धर्मात्मा०

† "द्वायास्रमसळिता: धर्मात्माः प्रकाशितेऽधर्माः।" इत्यं भाष्यातः
धर्मात् स्वयमानः संवधानां वर्षनामाः परिणामात्माय धर्मात्माः।

‡ तेथां वचने त्वं स्वयमानमात्माय धर्मात् अङ्काणि पुस्तकाद्वः।
तेथां वचने त्वमकर्मात्माय धर्मात् सङ्केत अङ्काणि पुस्तकाद्वः।

§ सुभिन्द्राधिकारस्वमात्माय धर्मात् सङ्केत अङ्काणि पुस्तकाद्वः।

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ধর্মাযুগেশ্বরে৷ বলে: 'বসন্তে', তখন ধর্ষ প্রতিচ্ছয় 'সন্যাস', পরিগৃহেশ্বরে৷ 'পরিসমাপতি' অক্ষরেশ্বরে৷ 'সন্যাসে' গনাজিণীয়, 'বসন্তে' প্রচলিত, বহিত। চিহ্নিত শ্রাপ বহিত। চর্চায়, চোরায় নিয়ন্ত্রণে৷ সম্পূর্ণত স্থপিত বস্তুত; কাপালিনি তৈরি ঘট দেখিতে রূপ পরিগৃহেশ্বরে৷ পরিসমাপতি নিয়ন্ত্রণে। তথ্যেই এবং ধর্মীয় যো কাজপরিসমাপতি অবক্ষপ্রাপ্তে বসন্তে খামে৷ সেই২৪ দিনে্ন নিয়ন্ত্রণে পরিসমাপতি পরিসমাপতি পরিপূর্ণতাপূণ সময়ে সমাপ্ত হয়ে গমনের প্রতিক হয়। সমূহ এবং এই ভাব নিয়ন্ত্রণ করছে প্রতিচ্ছয় পরিসমাপতি: পরিগৃহেশ্বরে৷ চতু৷ পিক্তু কমান্ত্রানুপরিসমাপতি। বিসাদনাবা সর্বজনীনী পরিসমাপতি বাঁকিত ধর্মীয়: প্রীতিরে৷ প্রথম বলে পরিপূর্ণ অনুপরিসমাপতি; যথা সুখাদৃষ্ট: সংসারাদৃষ্ট:। কেন্দ্রে৷ নৈ৷ অনুপরিসমাপতি: যথা ধর্মীয়-সংশ্কার-শ্রাপিতানুপরিসমাপতি। ধর্মীয়-সংশ্কার- 
বিক্রমপতিঃ সর্বজনীনী সমাধিঃ।

পরিসমাপতি সন্তমাদিতে৷ অভিগত সমাপতি পূ৷ 
ধর্মীয়-সংশ্কারে৷ ভাগ্যে বলে৷ 'পরিসমাপতি অন্তৰ৷ তথা 'সংশ্বমাদিঃ'

* পূ৷ পু৷ ২৪ চৈতন্ত হ পুলকেয়াদানুপরিসমাপতি সন্তমাদিতে৷
* বলে: সিংহ কমান্ত্রানুপরিসমাপতি সন্তমাদিতে হ পুলকেয়াদানুপরিসমাপতি।
* ইবিসাদানুপরিসমাপতি হ পুলকেয়াদানুপরিসমাপতি।
* কর্ম-সংশ্বমাদি-শ্রাপিতানুপরিসমাপতি ইতি বৃণ, এ পুলকেয়াদানুপরিসমাপতি।
* ধর্মীয়-সংশ্কার ভিক্ষবিক্রমপতিঃ বলে হ পুলকেয়াদানুপরিসমাপতি।
* পূ৷ প্রদানশীলতাপূণ বিক্রমপতিঃ বৃণ, এ পুলকেয়াদানুপরিসমাপতি।
गनु केवल धर्मीयायामक धर्मों ओ धर्ममान तथा
तत्त्व शान्तोदितायप्रेमद्धामानुपाते धर्ममानात् तत्त्वमात्

‘शान्ता’ जस्ता शान्तयापारा शान्ततेवधान्यनुक्रिया। ‘शिद्रता’
जस्ता शान्तघातमानपरित्यज्यवर्षमानिकायती शान्तयापारा शान्तायप्रेमद्धामानुपाते
‘शान्तीयाप्रेम’ जस्ते शिद्रतसत्त्वा शान्तीप्रेम शान्तघातमानुपाते
शिद्रतायप्रेम सत्त्वा शान्तघातमानुपाते शान्तघातमानुपाते
सत्त्वा शान्तघातमानुपाते शान्तघातमानुपाते

एकादश धर्मों कथमनेव परिधानां दृष्टान्तामपत्तेवभावात्

शामान्यत्वं परिधानामान्यले हेतुः || ९४ ||

* तथातिरं भाख्यायामक धर्मीयामक धर्मीयामक नासिक। परतु भाख्यायामक
श्रस्तायामनिक परितयात्वभायायामकालोपिताय श्रस्तायामकालोपिताय वावावायामकालोपिताय।
† “देवताविद्वान धर्ममानि प्रशिक्षित धर्ममानि” इत्यादि भाख्यायामक
शास्त्रों सुधितायामनिकोपमानुपाते श्रस्तायामनिक श्रस्तायामनिक।
परतुपायं न समीपायां: वार्षिकधाराय उपायमानु प्रस्ताविताय श्रस्तायामनिक।
†† तेयायं वाया श्रस्तायामनिकोपमानुपातेः प्रतिपधिः। तेयायं वाया
श्रस्तायामनिकोपमानुपातेः प्रतिपधिः।
‡‡ श्रस्तायामनिकोपमानुपातेः प्रतिपधिः।
पादे १५.

ध्वनांप्राकृतततपदाः यः 'कमः' तस्य चतुृ प्रतिच्छ यथा 'चन्द्रयं', परिशुद्धमान, 'परिशाम्' चक्षुचचच, 'आये' नानाविधाने, 'हेतुः' भिन्न शापक भवति। अधमयः। योऽयं निष्ठकमः, मन्दूरांत सन्तप्त: कपालसी तैः घट दृष्टं रूपः परिशुद्धमानः परिशामस्यान्त्यमावेदयति। तस्मिन एव धर्मेण यो खः परिशामस्याविवाहपरिशामा च कमः स्यायमेव न्यायेन परिशामान्यः गमोऽवगतः। यथेऽऽव पः भावः निष्ठतेनैव कलेशं प्रतिच्छ परिशामाना: परिशुद्ध्यो चतुृ: भिन्नः कमाण्यात् परिशामान्यः। चिनार्दीना कर्मार्थः परिशामानार्थः कैषविचित्तः धर्मः: प्रत्येकोपाश्च ध्येयः, यथा सुखादयः संख्यादायथः। वेदीर्को-नेनामानगमयः, यथा धर्मः-संख्यार्थः भविष्यपथयः। वर्णचानुगमः। १.५।

देवानीसुक्रः संयोजना विषवादर्शनादेवेशिरः प्रतिपाद-विद्युमाहिः।

परिशामस्यसंयोजनादतीतितानागतमां १५।

धर्मः-संख्याविवाहेदेन यतृ 'परिशामचयः जनः। तत्व 'संख्यात्'

* पूर्व्य द्वध चेरि H पुस्तकापाटः।
† अतः सिद्ध कमाण्यां कमाण्यात् परिशामस्यान्त्यमाविषमिति H पुस्तकापाटः।
‡ विख्यातिनागमिति H पुस्तकापाटः।
§ कर्म-संख्यार्थः भविष्यपथयः इति B, E पुस्तकापाटः।
|| धर्मिनार्थः भविष्यवाच्यतेनिति H पुस्तकापाटः।
¶ प्रदर्शविच्छिन्नाहि B, C, E पुस्तकापाटः।
तस्मिन विशेष पूवोमासं वंभवं करणात, 'मतीनानागमण्यं',
प्रोगिनः महयानाविलोकणः। द्रमण तात्वायः। तस्मिन् अद्वितीय सर्वं
भवः। दर्शेऽस्मि, द्रमस्ववः पाणागमाद्वायः। गणेश वर्ण्यमाणे
क्रिष्णम् छः धारां विधायानात्मस्यां प्रश्वमानीवं विश्वमिते
पत्या यद्दं शंभवं करोती, तदा ज्ञानं चित्तविद्विक्षानमण्यमं वा
तड़ित्वं भोजी भानाति। श्रवण्यस्मि द्रमकुशवकाणास्ति
श्रवण्यस्मि नामविद्विक्षितविन्यासं परिश्रमिते। यदा तु
तत्रेऽधारायुतःऽविन्यासं: परिश्रमिते, तदा निद्रासांशकाणास्ति
श्रवण्यस्मिनः अपिनेजात्वादिविन्यासं विश्वामति। ॥ १६ ॥

श्रवण्यस्मि चर्चाः।

श्रवण्यस्मि-प्रत्ययानामनिर्देशाय श्रवण्यस्मि
विभागसंयमात् सम्बन्धः तथा

‘ब्रह्म’ अवेशनिर्देशाय निवार्तकमवस्थात्मा नियतेकार्यप्रतिपाद-
वश्छ:। यदि वा कर्मविशेषः क्षोटाः ध्वनि: श्रावण्यस्मिनुस्कृतः,,
उभयापि पद्यमो वाचकः। तथोरेकार्यप्रतिपादः ध्वनायात्।
‘प्रत्यय’ ज्ञाति-गुरू-विनिधादि:। 'प्रत्यय' कारण विषयाकारणा बुद्धिदृढः।
एवं श्रवण्यस्मानां वचारे 'इदंतराध्यायातु' भिषानामपि
दुस्कृतप्रताद्वादात् बन्धीवनं। तथापि गामाधोपेशु: कस्यविदु
गोकुण्डलेऽगोलजायतकाशिचं वाचार्यदिस्तत्पिन्युपरं, ब्रह्म तदवर्षकः,
श्रावण्यस्मि निद्रासांशकाणास्ति विन्यासं। न लोक गोकुण्डः वाचकः,
चर्चा गोकुण्डः वाचसः, तथोरितं भाष्करं भाष्येति अत्रेय भवरति।
चर्चा वि बाल्यमर्यादा, कौर्चम ब्रम्मः किंतु शास्त्रमिति ग्रहः स्वर्ग-कैकुलपेमेववारं द्वारति गौरिति। एतदेव कैकुलपं न प्रतिपदः कथेकुलपमुचयं प्रयत्निति। एतक्षणाविष्टे चोद्वं 'श्रविभागः', इत्य ब्रह्मचर्य तथा यद्रापशंकलं नाम। इदमसंध्या यद्रापश्चातः। इत्य शास्त्र गद्य प्रकाशम्। दृष्टि प्रविभागं विद्याथ तस्मिन गद्यावाने वा: 'संव-महद्विति, तस्मां 'स्वर्गं भुतानां वग्न-प्रद्य-पञ्चि-'सरीरस्वार्दीनां वचन 'हतं' व: श्रमः। तत्र 'श्रानः', उत्पयते। जनेनाहिमिरुक्तेति श्रानिकायः श्रमः: समुक्षारित दृष्टि सवं ज्ञानिति॥ १७॥

विद्यानारामाः।

संस्कारसाधारान्तः पूर्वेषाजनिताः॥ १८॥

दिविधास्मिक्षा वास्तवारुपः: 'संस्कारः। वैशिष्ट्य श्रावनित्योप-द्रुपः। वैशिष्ट्यायुर्मणीशक्तिविपक्षेत्रः। यथा भगवानःश्रवः। तेषु संस्कारेऽयदा संष्टिं करोति, एवं सबा बेलरण्तनुभतः, एवं सवा या चिक्षा विद्यार्थिते पूर्वेष्मवं सञ्चितमुपन्धृष्टा भावनयं प्रेमवधकमन्त्रेऽण उद्वृष्टसःस्कारः। स्वर्गमतीं हरत। क्रेतेष बाचातु-कतेपुद्धवे संस्कारेऽण: 'पूर्वेषाजनानुभावार्थि जायादीनाः प्रवचित्तुयम्॥ १५॥

* सर्वेनेत्रेत्यसारमिति E पुस्करपाठः।
† वदतीति H पुस्करपाठः।
‡ चतुर्विश्वास्ते दृष्टि H पुस्करपाठः।
§ दिविधास्मिक्षा तदः E पुस्करपाठः।
|| सासात्कारेऽण वस्त्रार्थिति B, C, E पुस्करप्राणः।
विद्यानामात्रः।
प्रत्ययः परचित्तार्थः॥ १४॥
'प्रत्ययः' परचित्ताः केनचित्तूनुर्खरागादिगा बिषुण्ड महीनस्य।
यदा संयमं करोति तदा 'परकीयः' चिन्ना 'श्नानं', उत्पयंते।
शरागमस्य चिन्मा वीररागं वेति परिचित्तगतानापि स्वानेव 'ध्वनानं' जागातीवर्धः॥ १५॥
श्रेयं परचित्तार्थः विशेषोऽः।
न तत् सालमनं तस्याविषयीनमुत्तवात्॥ २०॥
तत् परस्त्रय, वाचस्य 'तत्', 'सालमनं' स्थाकायाहमनेत वाच्यं,
'म्', प्रस्तते शाशवं। शालमनस्य केनचित्तूनुर्खरागादिबोधिततः।
विज्ञानर्मार्मचं परस्त्रावर्त, न तु नीचविषयमस्य चिन्म, पोत-विषयिनिः। यथै न महीनं संयमं कहोऽनुष्ठालं।
न भवति परचित्त यथा विषयस्तु शा से। तस्मात् परकीयसं
नालमनस्य शाशवं गतते। तस्मात् सालमनस्यां
तत्त्वाकार्यं पुनर्ववेशी एव। यथा तु निमोशाः विनिवितसिः श्रेष्ठानं करोति
तदा तस्मात् तत्तत्त्वानु तदनिविषयमिः शाशवं उत्पयंते एव॥ २०॥
विद्यानामात्रः।
कायस्यसंयमाचार्यः श्राश्वस्तिसम्भवे चक्षुः प्रकाशसारं
शोभावत्तानं॥ २१॥

* प्रथनस्तिः स युक्तायात:।
† एवतत्त्वसं यागामसुमुमिते योगसाध्यपुष्करः नार्यः।
‡ प्रथमेऽव्यस्त्र स युक्तायातिः स युक्तायातः।
§ प्रबधवार्यस्तिः, न तत्त्वाज्जनीयोऽदिदृश्यसं यागामसुमुमिते योगसाध्यपुष्करः नार्यः।
‘कायः’ शरीरं। तस्म ‘चक्षुः’ चचुर्यांश्रो गुणः। तस्मिन् काये
दृष्टे रूपविन्दितं संबंधतें। तस्म रूपः चचुर्यांश्रोऽलङ्करया वा
‘श्रीमः’। तस्मा: ‘सङ्गो’ भाववाचार्यः प्रतिवन्धे। ‘चक्षुः’ प्रकाशाश्रोऽन्तेः;
‘चक्षुः’ प्रकाशाः सत्यप्रीतीं। तस्म ‘षष्ठयोगः’ तद्वर्धितस्य वापराते
भावे। योऽन्ति: ‘श्रीमानः’ भवति। न अभिश्चिबद्वः कुमारः द्वाराते।
एतेन ब्रह्मचर्यानुसर्ष्य वेदिनवः। एतेन रूपायानङ्गोऽत्पाद्यः
प्रदेशनेनेव ब्रह्मादीनः शोचायाप्रायाणमाहऽन्तैः एकं भवति
॥ २।

शिल्पस्तुब्धम्।

सेपकम् निष्पक्षम् यस्मे तत्संयमाद्यपरातान्नयानरसिद्धेऽधो च॥ २२॥

अध्यवःपकं ध्वनि पुर्विहितं ‘कसी’, तद्विप्रकारं, ‘चेपकम्
‘निष्पक्षम्’। तच ‘चेपकम्’ धनुः प्रलक्षननाथ यहेपकमेनेष द्वारं
कार्यारुधीर्मुखेन वर्त्तेत। यथा उष्णप्रदेशः प्रसारिताभावः नीवरेष
ग्रुद्धाः। इह्वाकविरीतं ‘निष्पक्षम्’। यथा तदेवाभावः संबंधिते

* तष्क्राश्रयस्थिनः कारे रूपजीतिः चिन्तितपुर्वकः। तस्मिन्
शाखिनः कारे रूपजीतिः पुर्वकः।

† पुर्वकः चिन्तितपुर्वको ‘एतेन ब्रह्मचर्यानुसर्ष्य सत्यान्तः’ द्वाराते भवः ज्ञातारेष
व्यवहारवः। परनब्रह्मचर्यानुसर्ष्य भावानुसर्ष्य कार्यारुधे नीवरेष
पुर्वको भावानुसर्ष्य। तत्र प्रचारसत्तिमेव ‘एतेनेति’ इति भायापराँ
विषयः कार्यारुध्यस्य प्रसारितायान्तः तद्वर्धितस्य शोचायाप्रायाण
प्रायाणमाहः। अश्रावणन्त्राय ब्रह्मादिनः शोचायाप्रायाणमाहः व्यवहारवः।
व्यवहारवः पुर्वकः अश्राप्रायाणमाहः।
मनुष्यांनी तिरण त्राशेती। भ्रामण तिरिदे कर्षण वा ‘शंकरं करोति, किं मन कर्म श्रीगंधिरपंक किं चिरंगंधिरपंक्तं धान्यद्रान्त ‘आपरातमाणं’, त्योग्यायते। ‘आपराणं’ श्रीरवियोगः।

तस्क्षण ‘व्यातं’। चसुक्त्विन्द काले प्रसुक्त्विण्ड देसे मन श्रीरवियोगानांभवायतीत निम्नं क्रमं ज्ञाति। ‘मार्गेथेऽया’। शरिष्टानि चिर-शिभ्रानि धश्याविधकारिणिःविकारिणिःभौतिकेऽपें। तत्ताश्वात्मकानि पितृपक्षं बालसववेंच न देशोति दश्यावमादीनि। भार्ध-भौतिकानि भ्रक्तुषात् विक्षमपुश्च्वर्त्तानादीनि। भार्धिस्विधिकानि भ्रक्तुषां एवं क्रुद्धश्रक्तुषांगांदियद्रान्त्वणादीनि। तेभः शरीर-वियोगकारं ज्ञाति। यथयोग्यानांमात्रस्त्रेभं: प्रधेण श्वासस्त-लघुतये, तथापि तेषा धामान्याकारण तत् संभवप्रत्य। योगिनां ध्वनिं तत्त्वात्मकेऽपेत्यथा प्रध्यावदायभिषचरं ॥ २२ ॥

पतिक्षणिनिविवादिन्त: विभूर्ति: प्रतिपादद्धिथितमाह ॥

मेल्यावदिः बलानि ॥ २३ ॥

‘मेल्यावदिः कहुण्यासुद्रितेपेतासु यो विशिष्ट: शंकम: तस्मां ‘बलानि’,

नावं मेल्यावादिहृ धम्मबोधी प्राप्तेनवनि। मेल्यावदिः कहुण्यासु-स्वरूपः स्वात्मा गच्छिन्ति,

धान्यशंक्त्विकारिणिः भौतिकेऽपें। ॥ २३ ॥

विद्वृत्तरमाह ॥

° बच्चाक्ष उच्चेदि ॥ पुस्करप्रथम ॥

† परिवारविषयत्रेणाङ्गशंक: विधीयिति ॥ ३, ५' पुस्करप्रथम ॥
बहेशु स्तितबलादिीनि ॥ २४ ॥

इत्याविद्यसमविभु 'बहेशु', क्षतसंयमस्य इत्याविद्यसमविभु चापिवित्ति। तद्यथः।। बहेशु इतिलबे लावुवागे मिलिवीयं वा तद्यथाभावेन* संबंधं करोति, तद्वयज्ञवार्तायं मूलस्य प्राप्तरूपनीयः। ॥ २४ ॥

सिद्धान्तरामाशः।

प्रवच्यावेशाध्यायात ् दृश्य-यवतित-विप्रत्रक्षयनः ॥ २५ ॥

'प्रवच्यावेशाध्यायात ् दृश्य-यवतित-विप्रत्रक्षयनः' योतिष्ठती स प्रागुका। तस्का चोस्य
'श्रालोकः' शालिकपकारणपरि;।। तस्का निकितेशु विषयेषु 'व्याबाल' नद्याक्तानां विषयाणां भावातः;।। खानमः करणेविनिक्रियेषु च प्रकट-
श्रिमानवेषु॥ 'दृश्याक्त' परस्मािदेः, 'यवतित' भ्रिष्कतात्न निधारै;॥। 'विप्रत्रक्ष' जेवेथर्यात्संगिनेः रसायनादेः, 'श्रालोक',
विद्यादेः। ॥ २५ ॥

एतत्तमानद्वताना सिद्धान्तरामाशः।

भवन्तानं दृश्यं संयमात् ॥ २६॥

* तन्त्रयोगमावेनेिति ् पुलक्षपातः।
† दृश्य-यवतित-विप्रत्रक्षयार्थान्तिति ् पुलक्षपातः।
‡ शालिकपकारणा द्विति ् पुलक्षपातः।
§ भावादिरि ् पुलक्षपातः।
|| प्रकटशरितार्थार्थाल्पिति ् पुलक्षपातः।
¶ निधानार्थाल्पिति ् पुलक्षपातः।

10
"चुर्मी" प्रकाशमें, या वंधनं करोति, तथा तत्त्वं भरुःवाचः—
प्रभुतिकु लोकेशु यानि 'भुवनानि तत्त्वालिकवेदभावः पुराणः, तेषु
द्रव्यवर्धः 'शानं', जत्यते। पूर्वीमन्यु येषे ब्राह्मिकप्रकाशः
 आकाशनत्रोक्त दृश्य तु मैतिक दशित विशेषः || २६ ||
 मौतिकप्रकाशान्तराकाशनदारणेऽविकाशराजः ।

चन्द्रे तारायुक्तमां || २७ ||

'ताराणं' योतिषं, या 'बृह' विशिष्टाविषेष:, तत्त्विन्
'चन्द्रे', हलत्यंत्रमं 'शानं', जत्यते। हलल्यप्रकाशेऽ वहतेष्कलः
ताराणा, हलल्यंत्रमाण्त्वा न यशोति भवितभिति हस्यगुपायः
मन्यिते: || २७ ||
 विकाशराजः ।

अहुऽ तदुगतित्वमां || २८ ||

'अहुऽ' निदोक्ते योतिषा प्रधाने, हलत्यंत्रमं तायं ताराणा
या 'गति:', प्रेमेकं नियतकाशा नियतवेशा न तस्मा: 'शानं',
जत्यते। द्वमं तारा प्रथं राष: द्वयता कालेऽ द्वसं राशिमिः नवंचं
नायकत सदि क्षेत्रे आनातिकारं । द्वमं कालशासनपालनादः
भवति || २८ ||

वासा: शिक्षा: प्रतिपादनवर: शिक्षा: प्रतिपादवितसुपकमते ।

नाभिष्क्रम कालयुक्तमां || २८ ||

शरीरमधवस्यं 'नाभिष्क्रमं चतुः शोधायां 'चकं', तत्त्वसं हल-
संयमस्य सोगिनः, ‘कायम्यतः चोरेत् ‘चूचः’ विषिष्टं रक्ष-मख्षधातु- 
नादासीनामवस्त्रां, नर ‘श्यामः’, जपयते। ददसुमय भवति। 
कालीनां श्रविक्ष मध्यवर्षीं वर्षित: प्रश्नताना नादासीनां सृष्टिः 
दसरथ जनावधानस्य समयः चुक्षेवैरो तद्यावदभावितः॥ २८॥ 
विष्णुरमाच्।

कष्टक्रुपे स्नूपापानिन्दितः॥ ३०॥

कष्टक्रुपे: विष्णु-तन्वोरधाल्यान्तः कष्टक्रुपे गरीकारप्रदेशः। 
प्राश्नाध्यत्त्यक्षात् चुतीनपानादाय: प्रादुर्भवति। 
विष्णु जलस्यमस्य सोगिनः ‘चुतीनपानादाय’ निवर्तने। गांधकाय- 
स्वातः गोत्राभावमानेन्तः तविष्णु भाविते भवद्वेबविधा शिखः॥ ३०॥ 
विष्णुरमाच्।

कृपेनाबाद्यं स्मैयः॥ ३१॥

कष्टक्रुपखाध्यक्षात् यथा ‘कृपेनाय नाजः’, तत्रात्म जलस्यमस्य,
केतसः ‘स्मैयः’, जपयते। तत्श्चानमप्रविभाषा चपलतात् न भव- 
तीतयः। विष्णु च कायम्य खैर्येनुतप्ततः, न चेनविर्द्धेन सन्नादुिः 
वर्षम द्वारः॥ ३१॥ 
विष्णुरमाच्।

* चर्चावदाध्विवसतीति B, C, E पुस्तकापाठः। 
† विष्णुवपूव्रद्वादिति F पुस्तकापाठः। 
‡ चोरेति धार्मिकमा इति F पुस्तकापाठः। 
§ चहेति C पुस्तकापाठः। चहेति H पुस्तकापाठः।
पालानले नेमकरे

मूर्ष्योतिषिष सिद्धदर्शनं ॥ ४२ ॥

श्रीकपले श्रियन्नास्यं द्वित्रु प्रकाशात्माजान् 'क्योति:।
यथा श्रावण्यस्य लक्ष्यः प्रवर्भी प्रभा कुस्तिकाविवर्धन्यः
वाप्ते । तथा स्वयं: सामान्य: प्रकाशं प्रश्नस्य स्वयं
भते । तत्र जस्तः जस्तः, येन श्रव्य-श्रुद्धिवर्धन्यः
'चित्ते:। दिया: खुद्वा:ः, तेषान्तिराश्रयं श्रुद्व्यानं
तस्य दर्शनं भवति । तातः
प्रभाति, तैंव श्रावण्यं द्वायथः ॥ ४२ ॥

वर्ष्णः उपायमायः

प्रातिभासां सम्वः ॥ ४३ ॥

निमित्तानापेक्षःमनोमार्जनमविसंबाद्यं द्रागुप्तसमानं
श्राम प्रतिभाः । तथां संधाने निमाणे‘प्रातिभ’ विवेकाहार:
पूर्वशासी तारकं श्रामं, उदेलिरे । धारोद्वनम्: सवितं:॥ यूञ्ज्य प्रभा
आदुभवति । तदद्विवेकाहारे पूर्वे तारकं‘स्वर्विषयं श्रामवस्त्री
भवति । ताः श्राम संधानानाश्च: श्रमं जानातीविधः ॥ ४३ ॥

शिभुकारमाः

हड़्ये विसंसवितः ॥ ४४ ॥

'हड़ये'हरिश्च द्रुद्विषेषः । नास्तिकाह्योहुखस्यचप्पूर्करीकाब्यनानि

* कुस्तिकावरे वर्ष्णप्रेयो सभृष्टं दृश्य प्रसे ।
† सुनिकाेमणेषे भविर्यो H खुशज्ञातः।
‡ भाविमण्यमार्ज्ञाति D खुशज्ञातः।
§ उदात्तं दृश्य B खुशज्ञातः।
|| वर्ष्णायद्विरी शभिन्दीरिद्व D खुशज्ञातः।

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२ पादे ६५ खरणमृ।

'खरणमृ। तष्ट्र हस्तमवस्थ स्व-परिध्वज्जानशुद्याधारे। सविन्यासात: तृणी वासना: परिवहनार्था रागार्दीन्न जाने-

नोकळीः ॥ १४ ॥

विष्कारत्रामात्र

सत्चपुरुष्योदयनातस्त्रकीर्त्येऽऽ: प्रत्याविषेषते भोगः्

परान्यस्यस्वस्यसंयमात पुरुषवांनः ॥ ३५ ॥

'खरण' प्रकाशमुखातः: प्राधामिक: परिणामविषेषः। 'पुरुषः'

भोगा: श्रीहानस्याधारः। तयोर्भन्दु-भोक्तुधपलात् जेतनाचेतनालाब

प्रायनांश्रकीर्त्येऽऽ: भजनातिहये:। तयोर्ख: 'प्रदयस्यस्वस्य्

भोगा: नान्यान्त्राभायः, व भोगः। तत्त्वात् सत्तैव सत्तैव प्रायांने वा खर-

दु:ख्यातिः व 'भोगः' सत्तैव सत्तैव प्रायांने 'परार्थः' पुरुषार्थः।

तस्ततः वा: 'सार्थः' पुरुषवैशम्पातालम्बः: परियास्यहार्दाः

वत्ते वा विष्कारत्रायंकानिः। तत्र शतस्मातः 'पुरुषविषयं' खरान,

ञ्जहैते। तत्देव तृतीयः खरान ज्ञातिः पुरुषः ज्ञातिः।

ग पुपः पुरुषः खरान खरान विश्वास्याचारायपर्ये, शालापते:।

शालकज्ञ्यायोरयनापरिवर्धते। ॥ ३५ ॥

शालकज्ञ्यायोरस्वस्यसं समाधानात।

* अनात्रःकरणार्थति H पुलकपाठः।

† प्रत्याविषेषःकात्रे भोग हर्ति H, B, C चित्रमितस्यादापः। परिस्व-

नामकष्टके मुखवेदेशस्य शुस्यवस्स्यायः हर्ति चाहृता हर्ति तः।

‡ अनौन्थ्यािद्धर्ष वर्ति H पुलकपाठः।

§ अनन्तः परिभाषनमभिति D पुलकपाठः।

|| पुरुषविषेषःस्वस्य हर्ति H पुलकपाठः।
तत: प्रातिभ-आवश्य-बेदनाद्वारस्त्राहाद्वाराः जायते

‘ततः’ पुश्चनंदक्षरस्यवाचस्यान, युज्यविनयापि जागानि जाचले। तत्र ‘प्रातिभ’ पूवेन्द्रश्च श्रानं, तस्याविभवनात् च स्वकालिक-भर्षी पञ्चार्थ:। ‘आवश्य’ खणेरनिर्बन्धमा श्रानं, तस्याधि प्रक्षतं दिव्य दी-वि भवं क्रिय आगान्ति। ‘बेदना’ खणेरनिर्बन्धमा श्रानं, विवेदानवत्यं ज्ञातं तस्यातु दिव्यपञ्चनं विप्लवत्यं ज्ञातं ज्ञानाज्ञानार्जितं ज्ञानाद्वार! उपजायन्ते। ‘आवश्य’ खणेरनिर्बन्धमा श्रानं, द्रामान्ना दृष्टं पुनर्ज्ञने स्वयं ज्ञातं ज्ञानाद्वार! उपजायन्ते।
‘आवश्य’ खणेरनिर्बन्धमा श्रानं, खणेरनिर्बन्धमा उपजायन्ते।
‘वार्षी’ अनुवानसिद्धिः, र्रीवंक्रमस्य नावनिर्बन्धस्य विधिः, वर्षम् आनंदविश्वासः प्रक्षतं, तस्यां पञ्चनं विप्लव वार्षी अनुवानसिद्धिः, तस्यां पञ्चनं विप्लव वार्षी अनुवानसिद्धिः, तस्यां पञ्चनं विप्लव वार्षी अनुवानसिद्धिः।

एतेऽः विद्विविभागाः विद्विविभागमाः।

ते समाधायुपसर्गी ज्ञातानं सिद्धं। ३७।

‘ते’ प्राकृतिपादित्यं: विद्विविभागाः, ‘समाधे: प्रक्षेलं गच्छत:।

* तस्याविभवानादिनिहं पुलक्षापः।
† गम्भर्षिस्यं च हं पुलक्षापः।
‡ विद्विविभागानादिविविभागानादिनिहं पुलक्षापः।
§ गच्छायं प्रक्षेलं गच्छतीतिहं पुलक्षापः।
'उपसमा:' उपद्रवा विन्ध्यः। तत्र देव-विगुरुवार्तकाण्डे समाधि: 
शिलीभवति। 'सुखवने' पुनर्भवचारदशायाः, विश्वस्त्रकलापणात 
'विद्युष:', भवति। || ६३ ||

विभुवाकापासः।

बन्धकारकशैविश्वात् प्रचारसंवेदनाशोऽधिष्ठयत्स्य
परश्रीरामेषं।|| ६५ ||

आयुक्तलालानाथचर्चीयायायत्कर्मवार्तादेव शरीराण्तरगतयोग्यार्थे भो- 
कु-भोगमभेवन यतं संबंधनुस्मार्यते, न एव शरीरभवं दृष्टिभूतसे। 
तत् बलद समाधिस्मार्यतु 'बन्धकारणं धर्मार्थंतः कर्मे शिलीभवति-
भवति, तानवमाप्पर्यते। विचारं च श्रीवीरि 'प्रशारण:' शदयप्रवृ- 
वादिनिप्रवेदार्थं विवाहाभिमुखः स्थानः, तस्मां संबंधन: श्रारं दृष्टं 
विचार्य नारी, भनवऽ चिन्तं वहति, दृष्टं प्राणातिविनाभे 
नारीग्यो विकालनः दृष्टि स्थानश्रीरयोर्यथा बस्यां जागरति, तदा 
पर्वतनं श्रीरं न्द्रतं जीवन्नेत्रं वा चिन्तं स्थायार्थं प्रविष्टितः। 
विचारं परश्रीरे प्रविष्टम् विनयानुवर्ते, मधुरराजस्मिन्मधु- 
भविष्या:।। भ्रातं परश्रीरप्रवृत्तो धोगी खथरीरेषे तेषाय ववहति, 
यथो वाप्या शृद्धिपुष्यशयोभयं सन्नाराकारं कर्मे, तदेक्ष महामा-
थिना विश्रूते तदा खानवासा सर्वभूतं स्मृतिमन्विन्ध光泽:।। ६५ ||

* विधर्मालिका इतः || युक्तकायः।
† परश्रीरम्यायः इतः || युक्तकायः।
‡ गंधर्वकायः इतः || युक्तकायः।
§ खथरीरे प्रवृत्तेऽनुथूलों 'विस्तृत' गान्तакायः।
विभाजनरास ।

उदानजयाञ्जल-पञ्च-कष्टकाौङ्गसङ्गु उत्तमालिनिष्ठ ॥ ३५ ॥

षमङ्गामिनिःख्यानं तुवस्त्रावसूत्र श्रुति: श्राज जीवनःक्रमवाच। तस्या: सियाभेद्वात् प्राणायामादिविंशतिः अभिन्येदेष:।

तथ षुद्धायमुख्यानिकार्याणि बायो: प्रत्यक्षनात् पाण्य द्वयुक्तते।

नाभिःप्रदेशात् पाद्यकुशर्यमवस्तपवनवादपायात्। नाभिःप्रदेशं परिवेष्ठ

षमनाचर्यानात् ज्ञानात्:। ककटाकार्यादिन्यकेषोपर्ष्ठत्वादानु- द्रान:। अन्य नयनात्म षमश्रीवन्यापी वाच:। 'उदानस', षममद्रसा- रेण 'जयान', इतरेवा वायुः निरोधा दुख्गामिलेन 'अहे' महान-धानी, महत्व वा कहिने, तीर्थेशु कष्टकेशु वा न महत्व द्वात्।

षमुणासूपिष्ठवज्जादौ निम्ममोक्षपः उद्भक्ष्तिविंशति:॥ ३६ ॥

विभाजनरास ।

समांजयात द्रुतालनं॥ ४० ॥

सम्मिद्वेष्ट्वादिविंशतिः 'षमानाश्वस वायो: 'जायन' धन्यसेन बर्मिकारात्, निरक्षादिणेषुद्वालोकोषाः अधिबधिय धारी प्रतिपीवतिः॥ ४० ॥

विभाजनरास ।

* सचिवाल्पसो D पुस्तकापादः।
† उपरिग्रहिती विंभि इति E पुस्तकापादः।
‡ समानजयब्धिः प्रतीत C चिन्तितपुस्तकेः काशाः सहितवेयोमभावस्य-पुस्तकेः च वर्णिते।
শ্রীচাকাশয়ো: সম্ভবসংযমামাহিব্যঃ শ্রীঃ।। ৪১।।

‘শ্রোত্র’ বদ্ধযাদ্ধকাস্তকারিকমিদ্বঃ। ‘শ্রাকাশ’ থেম বদ্ধ-
তজ্ঞাত্ত্বকাঃ। তথ্যঃ ‘বদ্ধঃ’ দ্রষ্ট্‌-দ্রষ্টিরাভাবকাঃ। দ্রষ্ট্রা- জননয়-
নাশ চোভিনঃ ‘দিয়া শ্রোত্র’ প্রবর্তিত্ব, যুগপত্ত সৃষ্টিত বিপ্লবেত-
মন্ত্রব্যাপ্তিঃ ভবতীতাঃ।। ৪১।।

বিখ্যাতমাণ হ।

কায়কাশয়ো: সম্ভবসংযমামাহিব্যুখতসমাপেথ্যায়-
কাশগমনঃ দী১।

‘কায়’ প্রাক্তনিতিক ব্রহ্মত্ব তাত্স শ্রাকাশে প্রকাশদায়কেন
য়: ‘বদ্ধঃ’, তত স্থস্য বিপ্লবে শুচুনি ‘দুঃখাদি’ যা সমাপনঃ
নন্ত্রায়িকালাব্যতি, তু বিপ্লবে প্রাক্তনিতিক প্রথমে প্রথম
যোদ্ধাত্ত্ব জগৎ ভঙ্গু কলোণ্ডমায়ামাতন্ত্রালেন স্বর্গবরম্য আতে-
কথায়ে যোগাযোগমাত্রে গভীরতে।। ৪২।।

বিখ্যাতমাণ হ।

বিহিংসকল্পিতা দ্রুতমহাবিশ্বেষ্ণ তত: প্রকাশাব-
র্জাশয়: দী১২।

বৃহীরাত্ত ‘বিদি’, যা সম্য: বৃহীরাজপন্থেন ‘দন্তি’; যা ‘মহাপা-
বিদ্ধাঃ’, যা বিগতভূরীরাজসূন্দারদীনাণ্ডারেন্দ্রোপায়ে। ‘তত’ তত্ত্বাঃ

* প্রকাশালূগ্রহণাশ্বিত্য পুষ্পকামান।
† স্থবিত্য পুষ্পকামান।

11
हतानां चन्द्रमानां, 'प्रकाशावरंशम्' सार्विकदेश तिनस्य च: प्रकाश-
क्रम यथार्थं भूतानन्द तथा चक: प्रतिभवनये भवति। तथाच: ।
वरोहास्त्तिरे शतिः यथा मनोऽविन्दनि: यथा कार्यंसिद्धान्ते। तथा
पुनः वरोहास्त्तिराभ्यां परिवर्य भाषाश्लेष मनोऽविन्दनि: यथा
अक्षरोऽभिन्न, तथां वधानानं शास्त्रिनि: यथैं चिन्मलः चीतमोऽडीस ॥

तदनेव पूर्वालोकितस्य श्रद्धाराधिकार्य सध्वभावाश श्रीमती: प्रति-
पादाणानवरं शुवनमंगानन्त्रशिशुपत्रवाच:ः, काव्यशास्त्रिक्या शास्त्र-
मन्तराः, परिकारांज्ञाग्नेऽभावाश 'मच्छालिबु बचानि' इत्येवमाश्चः,
काव्यार्थमायिनीक्षास्त्रमः; करणविशिष्ठतिष्ठत्यशमाः; प्राणादिवा-
युधभावाश शिष्टीमिन्नदारांश समाधे: काव्यास्त्रायायांथे प्रतिपाध
हर्षानी भस्मोपयोनिशव्याज-विनिर्विशेषमाधिविच िविविहारयायास।

स्थूल-स्वरूप-श्रमान्यायायथोऽसंयममात्रुतज्जयः ॥१४॥

पद्मानां प्राच्यादीनां भूतानां च पद्मावशाविशिष्टपां धर्मा:
स्थूलाष्ट्रः तथा शतांवनावनं 'शराजः', भवति, भूतानि बमाना-
क्रमावशायामां। । तथार्थां भूतार्थां परिशुक्लाश्च विषयाकारप्रदूपं
'स्वूल' 'स्वरूपं' दैव धमाम काष्ठम गमन-र्चृःस्य: वर्षावकार-
व्रानश्च। 'शूलं' तु येवाम भूतानां कारणोऽविशिष्टाः अन्य अन्य कारण
गम्भीरभिन्नावश्च। 'स्वत्विक' गुप्ता: प्रकाश-प्रदूप: स्ववित्वपत्तमा

* श्रीराधेस्याश्रावृत्ति: C पुस्तकमातः।
† भूताश्चर्थ बमानीवश्च इति H पुस्तकमातः।
‡ दार्शनिकस्य अध्यायमातः H, B पुस्तकमातः।
पर्यंतनोत्स्वरुपेन

‘अर्थवचन’ तेषां गुणोत्तर भोगार्थयोग्य- मारुगामका धन्म्। तदेव भूतेऽपि पक्षेऽपि ज्ञानविवाचार्यापेऽपि
प्रायम्यां च विश्वासनां कुम्भने चोगी भूतजयी बहवति। तदेवा, प्रचं म्या-रूपे वंभान विभाय तदृसु श्रवणे दृश्यें करणें तथा जरणं- 
सर्वात्मानविविधाविषयो कथानुसारिण्य द्व गावे भूतमजनायो
अवलोके II ४४ II

तस्यं भूतजयं पक्षमहे॥

ततोषियमादिमा० दुःखोऽवः कायसत्यसत्यसम्भवानभियागातः॥ ४५ II

‘अशिष्मा’ वरमाणपुष्पपतिः। अशिष्मा तवलिप्कवेशपुनुस्सतः।

गद्याली गुह्यपक्षः। गद्याली महाभासिः। भूमीख्येः वस्त्र- 
स्मरणार्जनः। प्राक्षे द्रृश्यानन्दिः। द्रष्टान्नः करणेऽपि 
प्रक्षे। अवलोकिताद्वितिषम्, अवलोकितो भूताणि अनु- 
रागिवो त्वदुम्न नातिनांसिनि। कामावस्थायीं षष्ठिं काम- 
वच्यः, वाचानु विवेच्योऽपि कामः द्रृश्या भवति, तस्मिन् 
विवेच्ये धेरोनेन्द्रवायो भवति, तेन विवेच्ये सीकारदारे विविधाय- 
समानिष्टाः तद्यतिरंगः। तत्र तैं अशिष्माय: समाधुपोषिनिः 
भूतजयोऽवः धेरोनेन्द्र:। चत्रा परमपुष्प समातः।
वश्चादीनामयानः प्रविष्टः। एवं स्वर्गम चोज्यं। एते सुभिमा- 
द्योहोः गुणा मद्धविद्धुर वश्चुषये। 'कायसयत्' वश्चमाया, तात 
प्राप्तः। 'तद्न्द्राणिनिः पवित्र' तस्य काव्यम पेने धीमा रूपादयके 
भविष्या नामो नाम ज्ञनसिद्धिपि भवति। नास्य रूपम्यिर्देवत 
ग च वायुः श्रोत्यति द्वादशि चोज्यं। ॥ ४५ ॥

कायसयमद्वाः ।

रूप-लावक्ष-वल-वजसंघनमन्मानि कायसयमद्वाः ॥ ४५६ ॥

'रूप-लावक्ष-वसानि' प्रविष्टः। 'वजसंघनम' वश्चम निहित 
वंशजनसा राजेन ब्रह्मी भवतीयायन:। दक्ति कायसयविभूतमसयमद्वाः ॥ ४५७ ॥

एवं भत्रयमायिवमाय प्रासङ्कमविशेष्यत्यजमास्य।

ग्रहण-रूपासिस्तानावायाय वससंयमादिन्त्रियजयः ॥ ४५७ ॥

'सर्जन' दक्तित्यायान्विविषायमुखी दक्ति:। 'रूपय' सामान्येन 
प्रकाशखं । 'अधिकान' पर्वारहारणम:। 'श्ैवार्थविः' पूव्यवस्थाप 
प्रविष्टिस्यक्षमामवश्चाप्नें पूव्यवस्थ: संयम कला 'दक्तित्याय 
भवति ॥ ४५७ ॥

तस्य फलमासः ।

ततो मनोजविशिं विकराबायः प्राधानयक्ष ॥ ४५८ ॥

शरीरस्य मनोविद्युमन्मानिः। 'मनोजविशिं। कायसयिर्धेन-

* मनोविद्युमन्मानिः दक्ति ० पुष्करापादः ।
চানাদিত্বারাণি দুলিখাল: ‘বিকারশাষ্ক’। সর্বপ্রথম ‘দ্রাক্ষ-বিন্ধ’। এনা: পিতৃনাগ: মিত্রকীর্তন প্রান্তনির্বিভ। তাঙ্গ প্রাপ্তের মধ্যপ্রত্য ভূমিপালী হয়েছে। যথা মধ্য একদশেরপি খন্ডিত এবং প্রথেক-নেতা: পিতৃনাগ: সর্বন্ত দ্বিতি মধ্যপ্রত্য। ॥ ৪৫ ॥

লুলিখাল: করণজগরনাছ।

সর্ব-পুরুষার্থতাত্ত্বিকমাত্র সর্বভাবার্থিষ্ঠাস্তব সর্বব্যাখ্যাতত্ব ॥ ৪৬ ॥

তাঙ্গত ব্যাখ্যা বাক্যের পরিশেষে কত্তবমৃদঃ ন ও বন-পুরুষব্য-স্ভাবযতে বিচিত্রত্ব: যা ‘আন্তরিকা’। গুণান্তু করিনিনাগ: মানবিকলীভাবতাপালকাসাসাহায্যু। তথ্যেত বিন্দুশাল ধৰ্ম্মের পোদার: ‘সর্বভাবার্থিষ্ঠাত্ব’, ‘সর্বব্যাখ্যাতত্ব’, সমাভীতত্ব। সর্বজ্ঞাং গুণ-পরিধিরাণী ভাবানী স্ত্রীবিদ্যা সম্পন্ন ‘সর্বভাবার্থিষ্ঠাত্ব’।

তেজনেত রাগাৎিতাত্ত্বিকপ্রত্যঢনে স্বত্ত্বা যথাবিদ্যানাসাহায্যু।

তথা এ সত্যত বাক্যে পর্যায় ব্যাখ্যামৃদঃ প্রাপ্তারা বিপুকার্ত্তন নাম বিদ্রীকিত্বত যথা ৪৮ ॥

কলেখ স্বরূপকারমারে।

তহারার্থাপি দোপবিজ্ঞানী স্থানান্ত্য ॥ ৫০ ॥

তথ্যামৃদ বিশ্লেষণঃ বিচিত্রী যদা বেলাম্বিতিপ্রত্য গোনিঙ্গঃ, তথা তথ্যাং ‘দোপাণী’ রন্ধার্থান্ত্র, তথা ‘বিশ’ অধিব্যাপ, ‘তথ্যাঃ’।

* কর্ত্তবভিমানশিক্ষাভাবসূচ্য তথ্যার্থেতি ১ পুস্তকাঁটা।
প্রাতাহ্ম্মিতে প্রথমীতি

তাহতাত্ত্বিকতাকে দুর্ঘটনার সাধনার লক্ষণটি:। পৃথিবী সম্ভাব-নামানাদিকার সংশ্লিষ্ট।। ৩৯০ জ্ঞানপাঠবিষয়ে সমাধ্যায়নায় খালিদান নগ্ন।।

খ্যাত্যায়নমক্কলে সজ্জ-সাহায্যকরণ পুনর্নিদ্রাস্ত্রুত।। ১১

খাল্লীয়ে চিনিনে ভবন্তি:। তথা ভাবাশবান্ধাব্যলক্ষ্যায়োতি প্রথম:। চতুর্থাক্ষরং৪ দ্বিতীয়ঃ। ভাবতশ্রীতিবাচক মাত্রায়। চতুর্থাক্ষরাদিকলক্ষ্যায় তত্ত্ব চেতুক্ষরে প্রথমে: প্রান্তব্যাতিকালিক বুদ্ধিবিন্যাস।। অন্যাং বুদ্ধিমানীবচ্ছায়া ভবন্তি: যাত্রাতুর্বুদ্ধি: খানিনো ইত্যাদি। ব্যন্ত্রে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ভবন্তি: দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে রাজ্যবিশালকাতারে ব্যন্ত্রে দিব্যাকৃতিরাজ্যবিশালকাতারে।

* প্রান্তব্যাতিকার সাধনার্থিতি B, C পুস্তকাপাঠ:।
† প্রান্তব্যাতিকার সাধনার্থিতি B, C পুস্তকাপাঠ:।
‡ প্রান্তব্যাতিকার সাধনার্থিতি B, C পুস্তকাপাঠ:।
§ প্রান্তব্যাতিকার সাধনার্থিতি B, C পুস্তকাপাঠ:।
|| প্রান্তব্যাতিকার সাধনার্থিতি B, C পুস্তকাপাঠ:।
†† প্রান্তব্যাতিকার সাধনার্থিতি B, C পুস্তকাপাঠ:।
क्षत्तक्रमयोऽः संयमादिविवेकजं भानं || ५२ ||

'चण: ' श्रवणेऽः काशिववयः। यथा कश्चा प्रविभमुि न ब्रह्मते।

तद्धात्तिवधानां काशिववणां च: 'चण: ' पौर्वपर्येंः परिश्रामः। तत:
'संयमां' प्रागुः 'विवेकसं हारं', अत्र धते। संयमचीः। च तद्धात्ति
क्षोऽसः काशिववणातुसः। श्रवणसातु पूवः दृशुवैविषे अतो
'संयमध्यात्त्वसः' क्षोऽसः स्थिते। तद्धात्युच्च वही प्रविभमुि न ब्रह्मते भाविनि शाश्वः।

आति-लक्ष्य-दृश्येऽर्न्यत्तानविद्वत्तामुक्त्योपसनः प्रतिपति: || ५३ ||

पदार्थानां वेदुस्तेन: 'आति-लक्ष्य-दृश्या भविनि। क्षिप्दुप्पुश्येन: 'आति: ', यथा मन्त्रिसं महिषवामिनि। आत्या तुव्राय: 'लक्ष्यः ',
वेदुस्तेन: यथा द्विकः क्षिप्दुप्पुश्येन:। आत्या लक्ष्यनेन शामिल-िरोऽपुश्येन: 'दृश्यः ', दृष्टः। यथा तुस्तामान्योरमोक्षयोभिन्देऽवि
'विवेकसं हारं'। च च यून्मेदेऽविषारिणुः न ब्रह्मते, दृशुवैविषे अतो
'विवेकसं हारं'। च च यून्मेदेऽविषारिणुः न ब्रह्मते, दृशुवैविषे अतो
तद्धात्युच्च वही प्रविभमुि न ब्रह्मते भाविनि शाश्वः।

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* विवेकचाराज्यितं हुकंस्याः।
† विवेकचाराज्यितं हुकंस्याः।
‡ विवेकचाराज्यितं हुकंस्याः।
पाचें में देवा ब्यावधारित ब्रह्माण्ड बंधनात्मक वायूवेद शब्दमानितपणे: सवाराण्य तत्तानि ॥ ५२ ॥

ज्ञान विवेकज्ञम्यानां संज्ञा विवर्ण सम्भवे यायांतमाः

तारकं सवर्णिघं तस्मां सवर्णाहविषयमकम्भेतति विवे-क्रजं तानं ॥ ५३ ॥

षक्ष्यंद्वैदाण्यायं भूमिकायासुत्पति 'शार', 'तारक', दृढः। तारवत्यगाधातु संख्यानवोऽवेगः। यथाकि द्वारश्चिम्भा बंधनं 'तारकं', द्वस्य पथन:। अवस विवधमाः, 'वर्णाविषयं' दृढः, सवार्णि तत्तानि महादृढार्थ विषयोश्रेष्ठैति 'वर्णाविषयं'। सवार्णाभ्यास सवर्णाविषयम्याः। यस्माभिरस्वार्णमः भू-सवार्णादिविभेदेन नैस्ते ।

परिबष्ठे: यस्माबिशेषः रेष्याकारेष्याविष्ठिताः तत्तानि विषयोश्रेष्ठैति 'वर्णाव

विषयं'। सवार्णाभास्वाच । 'ब्रह्माण्डं' दृढः। निषेधनावविषय-परिष्ठानोऽवेकाववाः नाश ब्रह्म करो विन्यासे दृढः 'ब्रह्माण्डं'। सवें करंतानांसंधवंगुपातु पण्डितत्वां: ॥ ५४ ॥

ब्रह्माण्ड विवेकज्ञतात्त्वताकाख्यातानि किं भवतीताः।

सवस्य-पुज्ञायो: दुःसिद्धाय सैव च ॥ ५५ ॥

'ब्रह्माण्डे' अनंतचरण:। तथा: 'दुःसिद्धाये कैवचन्यं'।

* संसारसार्गारार्तित ॥ पुस्तकपाठः।
† निषेधनाववायित्रस्वार्णाभास्वाच दृढः ॥ पुस्तकपाठः।
निषेधनाववायित्रस्वार्णाभास्वाच दृढः ॥ पुस्तकपाठः।
विभिन्न बयनवाले कर्त्त्वविभागंगतिःक्रमयुक्तमुखमयः प्राचिनः। पुढ़क प्रणवपरिमाणायाइयामायः। रत्न इत्यतः समानाया पुढ़क कैलाया जन्तयते, सेषो भवऽतिडः।

तदेवमन्त्रकथ्योगांगकारकसंबिधाय तत्त्व एव बङ्गवण्ड्या श्रवः बङ्गवण्ड्या बिवधप्रद्धनायः परिणामस्थमुखपालसंबंधवण्ड्या शरणवण्ड्या काश्युक्तसाधसंबिधायः। प्रदानं समायथवेदाऽग्याप्रकाशाः दिनाश्चिकारः। प्रदानं परमपुद्धार्थसंपद्धितः यथाजीवभित्तः रत्नस्त्रेयस्यम्युक्तव्याख्यः। यथाय वि-वेक्षणोत्पत्तिः ताँत्रिकः पुष्पान्, उपन्यासः तारकसंबंधवण्ड्या श्रवः समायथवेदाऽग्याप्रकाशाः। कैलायुक्तधम्मसधसंबिधाय तदःमातृसंबिधाय तत्त्वाद्वैकर्ष्यं विभिन्न रत्न वाहनोऽविश्विपदः। ॥ ५.५ ॥

रत्नि महाराजाधिराज्जीभोजदेवविररिताया राजमार्गसं-भिधाया पातलाऽग्यायाः। सिंहः २ ॥

———
पादः १

यदान्येव कैवल्यं विनोपां: प्रजायते ।
तदेकाकामेप्रभानं विद्यानन्दमवं दृष्टं ॥
हरियं विन्महापतिविमहाभानिनिरक्तेण युक्तं कैवल्याधुषः-
पावश्यापनायः कैवल्यापात्रायमार्थव ॥

तथा यथा: पूर्वंसुधा: विनोपसां नानाविध्यक्षादिकारणार्थः
पात्रन्दारवेर्वेन वेदन्तिः एताः।
विनोपसां नानाविध्यक्षादिकारणार्थः
पात्रन्दारवेर्वेन वेदन्तिः एताः।
विनोपसां नानाविध्यक्षादिकारणार्थः
पात्रन्दारवेर्वेन वेदन्तिः एताः।
विनोपसां नानाविध्यक्षादिकारणार्थः
पात्रन्दारवेर्वेन वेदन्तिः एताः।

जन्मोषधि-मन्त्र-तपः-समाधिः: सिद्धूऽ ॥ १ ॥

काशु ‘जन्मोषधि-मन्त्र-तपः-समाधिः: सिद्धूऽ । यथा पतज्ञानाद्विवासः
समाधानः । च वा विषमसार्वस्मात्मानां जन्मोषधित्वमास्तीगें यज्ञेऽभागः श्रद्धा
समाधानानां श्रद्धा: श्रद्धिनिका गुणः:।
‘विषमसार्वस्मात्मानां जन्मोषधित्वमास्तीगें यज्ञेऽभागः
श्रद्धा: श्रद्धिनिका गुणः:।
‘विषमसार्वस्मात्मानां जन्मोषधित्वमास्तीगें यज्ञेऽभागः
श्रद्धा: श्रद्धिनिका गुणः:।
‘विषमसार्वस्मात्मानां जन्मोषधित्वमास्तीगें यज्ञेऽभागः
श्रद्धा: श्रद्धिनिका गुणः:।
‘विषमसार्वस्मात्मानां जन्मोषधित्वमास्तीगें यज्ञेऽभागः
श्रद्धा: श्रद्धिनिका गुणः:।

कैवल्याधुषं पावश्यापनायेति ० पुष्पपाठः ॥
न्यासां विद्वानां समाधिरेव जन्मान्तरभर्षणं कारणं, मन्नादीनि
तु नियममात्रांतः ॥ १ ॥

ननु नन्दिष्ठरातीनां जात्यादिपरिशामं प्रक्ष्यापेव जन्मानि
दृष्ट्यते तत्तः कथं जन्मान्तरभर्षणवस्मादेः कारणसबूतं
तत्र ज्ञात्यत् ॥

जात्यन्तरपरिशामं प्रक्ष्यापूरुतां ॥ २ ॥

व्यायंतत्रत्र जन्मानि नन्दिष्ठरातीनां 'जात्यादिपरिशामं' यः
'प्रक्ष्यापूरुतां' पाण्डवा एव ति प्रक्ष्यापेत्याः प्रक्ष्यानि विकारा-
नापूर्यत् जात्यन्तरकारिणि परिशामति ॥ २ ॥

ननु धर्मां धर्माभावैः सरियाणां उपस्थितये, तत्तः कथं प्रजा-
नीवामापूर्वे कारणसविवाहः

निमित्तमप्रयोजकं प्रजातिनां वर्णमेद्वतु ततः
श्रेष्टिकवत् ॥ ३ ॥

'निमित्तं' धर्मादि । तत्तं 'प्रजातिनां', प्रजातितरपरिशामसे न 'प्रवेश-
जनं' न दि कार्यां कारणं प्रविभागं । बुँधु तर्थं तस्म धर्मादेवत्यापर
दृष्ट्यात् 'वर्णमेद्वतु ततः श्रेष्टिकवत्' । 'ततः' तस्मादनुविद्यमानानु-
धर्मादि । चन्तं 'वर्णं' शाेंवर्कं प्रधानादि । तथीव विरोधिलात्
'भेदः' चयं । धीरं, तस्मान प्रतिविद्यवे चिये चतुर्थं शब्दमित्र-
मतकार्यां चारभविः । वृद्धानानाम । 'श्रेष्टिकवत्', चया श्रेष्टिक:

* कारसमाधान उपभाषां १ पुस्तकाणि ।
पात्रेण वेग्युने

हस्तिः वेदारातु वेदारामार जाय निन्युः जस्माॅऽिन्यत्व-वरणेर्दरार्थ करौती, तत्प्रेम भिषे जाय स्वशेष प्रयत्नश्रूण परिषमां भग्नाति, न तु जलवररथे तथा कारण्य प्रयत्नः। एवं ध्वनीर्दशाक्षुः॥ १॥

चतु वाचात्तत्तत्ततः धारिने दुःखपत्त कर्ष्णपत्तोपमोगाया-क्षीराननिशचनविभुवमुनिभावाः। दुःखपदनक्रमरीरिक्षविभासा उप-बाच्ये तदा कुतकाणि ध्वनिः प्रबलकीर्त्याः।

निम्बोपाणिन्यमतस्मितामाताः॥ ४॥

धारिना: श्रव निर्मितिः कावेषु धारि ‘प्रविष्ठाः’, तानि मुख-कारणाः ‘प्रविष्ठात्मावात', एव तद्विक्रमश्रूण, प्रश्नांविस्वुल्लिङ्गा एव दुःखपत्त परिषमनि॥ ४॥

गनु कल्याणि प्रतिस्थान भिन्नाभिप्रायायलक्षणकार्यं कार्यं स्वास्ति-लयाः।

प्रकृतिस्वेद् प्रबेधाजनं चित्तमेकमनेक्षणाः॥ ५॥

तेन्तं ‘चन्द्रेषु’, चेतना, ‘प्रकृतिस्वेद्’ यापराज्याले ‘एकः',
धारिना: ‘कालम्’, ‘प्रदोषक’ प्रेमकम्मधिदात्रिनेः। तेन न भिन्नततम्।
चयं रथं च चाभीये भरीये मन: चोः पापानुपरि चवेष्टं प्रेमकम्मधिदात्रिनेः, एवं कायान्तरेवस्यपति।॥ ५॥

* नितिर्द्वयकित्रियस्वःभवायत्ति C पुलकपाठं।
† अभान्तरेवस्यपति B पुलकपाठं।
तत्त्व-विविध-कारणों तथा विलक्षणों के अनुसार तत्त्व-परिच्छेद

निर्भविकारणों और निर्भविकारण-विधियों के अनुसार तत्त्व-परिच्छेद।

तत्त्व-विविध-कारणों तथा विलक्षणों के अनुसार तत्त्व-परिच्छेद।

निर्भविकारणों और निर्भविकारण-विधियों के अनुसार तत्त्व-परिच्छेद।
निर्धारः । यात्रु ख्यातिमहासाक्षातां ख्यातिमहासिद्धिः कर्षणः ।
चेन कर्षणं याहूऽकृ श्रीरामरथं दृवे-मनुष्य-मितर्यादिभिः ॥, तथा
विपाकः यथा: ‘श्रीगृहा श्रीनृपण वाचनः’, तासामेव तथात् ‘श्रमी-
विधि’, ‘वासनाः’, भर्ति । श्रवणः: चेन कर्षणं पूर्वं दृवता-
दिशारामरथं जातनर-शत्यसज्ञा-पुनस्कारविभिः श्रीरामसरथं
नदनृपण एव ख्यातिमहासिद्धिः वाचनः: प्रकटीभवन्ति । श्राविनिर्धारः-
वार्त्यं तथा स्त्रायां जायने । दत्तात्र वय्योपिन न गुह्यताष्ट्री-
सिद्धिः ॥ न तथां दशया श्रामिको दिशारोपिणो वाचना
ख्यातिमहासिद्धिः ॥ ५ ॥

श्रामिको वाचनान्तः कार्यकारणान्तः गुप्तपरिचितमहाशक्तः समर्थ-
विदुम्भः ।

जाति-दृश्य-काल-व्यवहितानमयानन्तायः स्त्रिति-
संक्लार्येरेकरुपितवातः ॥ ५ ॥

इह मानायोविनु भुमन्तः संघारिनः कास्थियोविनिमुखस्य यदा
धान्यकारशस्यवधानेन पुनःसामेव योगिन्मृतिधायने, तदा तथां
पूर्वःनुभतायः चेनी तथाविधश्रीरार्यनकारेश्च वाचनाः चा:
प्रकटीभवता ख्यातिमहालिङ्गश्रीशास्त्रवाचनाचरितेरूपः: पुनस्कारविधि-
व्यवहितश्रीरामाद्वैः प्रकटीभवन्ति । ‘जाति-दृश्य-कार्यविचारनेमथि
नास्ता खानुपस्थत्वादिद्धितवधाने ‘श्रामनिति’ नेर्वायाः सेवन । कुतः: ॥

* दृवमुख्यभेयार्दिभिः दिमहितिः ॥ पुज्ञमणः ।
† स्त्रिति-संक्लार्येरारुपितवातः ॥ पुज्ञमणः ।
‘क्षतिकारिकायो रूकइपलान’। तथा वि अनुशीलयनात् कर्षणश्चिन्
कचे वासनानूपः बंस्कारः बलुपयचतेत्, व व सर्नरकारीनां पहलाका-
छाडुर्बधावः। कर्षणो वा चागारीनां भक्षिकश्चित्रात्वावशायः, कर्षणों तथ्याविधभविभोगकृत्यां सामयः, बंस्कारात् चत्ति:, चत्तेष सुह-
दुःखापोमः, तदनुभवां पुनर्पि संस्कारस्थायाः। एववच वक
क्षतिकारिकाराद्यो भिन्नाङ्कानन्तरायभावे दुर्भमः कार्यकारण-
भावः। अमारको यदानुभव एव संस्कारीभवित, संस्कारशक्तित-
र्षतवा परिधानमेव, तदा एकाक्षीव चिन्तामलनुस्माद्येव विनमलात्
कार्यकारणभावे न वर्ज्यः। ॥ ६५ ॥

भवलायत्वम् कार्यकारणभावस वासनानाः। यदा तु प्रयत्न-
भेजानुभवः प्रवचनेत् तदा कं वाशनानिनित्त जन निन्दित्वमिति इति
श्रद्धां विषेजत्वात्। ॥ १० ॥

‘ताख’ वाशनानाः। ‘ब्रह्मालिप’ न विचारे ब्रह्मायणां तस्मा
भवलायत्वम्। भ्रामार्चितापिन्नायथः। कुलः ‘ब्रह्मस्थित नित्यपुणयाः।
चेयमार्चितापिन्नाराशीष्टको बदेव सुखदान्तारात्मेव भवायसः। सा कदन-
चुर तैनेद्वियो ग्यायद्विति यथा ताज्यविडितयो वाशनानाः कारां
तस्मा नित्यालात्मदिनादित्याथः। प्रदुर्गेभवति कारणशक्तिशत
लादनुभवसंस्काराद्यां कार्यां प्रत्यायः। वेन वाप्रयाते, अनुभव-

* कुल हि वमत्त श्राहेिति F पुललयात् ।
बंकारावस्थाविवेकं भंजिरां-विकारांपरं विनं तत्रतात्मयंविकारांपकेशं दारोण। तत्कालकपपत्या परिशमत द्वार्रयः॥ १०॥

श्रावणान्त्यान्त् श्रानं करं सक्तविनिष्ठान्यं श्रानेपावमाः॥

हेतु-फलाफलायासम्बन् सकृत्तीतवादेयामभावे

तद्भाव॥ ११॥

वासनानामनुभवं हेतु:। तद्यत्तमभवं गारादा:, तेषामविषय

गृहं सातारम परम्यं ख हेतुः। 'फलं' भस्त्रारं द्वारणां इ।

'श्रामथं' वृद्धिचं। 'श्राकरं' चतुर्विनिष्ठान्यभवं तदेव वासनां।

प्रत्येकं हेतु-फलाफलायासम्बन्:। ग्रामनानामवेत्त्र वासनां 'वृद्धिचं-

बृहं', तेषां हेतादीन्यं 'श्राफवे' श्राययोगायों द्रागविनिष्ठान्य विषयं,

निश्चित्तखण्ड न वासना: प्रेसातिः न कार्यावभवं द्वितीय तार्कं 'श्राफवे'॥ १९॥

मनु प्रतिचयं वित्तखण्ड नगरोपायक्षेत्रावनां तत्कालकपपत्यादेयामभावं

कार्यकार्यविवेत्तायुक्तविवावनां मेवेक वेदमेर्कतविनिष्ठायकं एकल-

समयाद्याच॥

अतीतानागतं स्वरूपतथाक्षयभेदादिरङ्गा॥ १२॥

ः ऋश ऋक्षानमयं भावावाचूपपितरे दुक्षितमश्च प्रस्वयं मेवेक-

म्हेक्यान्ताः। नोति श्राविनिष्ठानादीन्यं कार्यकथं स्वच्छमभवं उष्टे:।

निस्पापे च कार्यं किमप्रशुपर्क कार्यवान्ति प्रवतसर्यगुः। मनुस्मृतं विन-

* प्रेसातिः भूपाल्यान्ति B, F मुण्डक्यपाठः॥
चमालोष्ठ कक्षिन्त प्रवर्तते। वतानपि विरोधाधानामोदमग्निकिल। गतु क्षुद्रेष्ठ सहस्त्रांके तत् कर्तं निष्पाक्षात्मभावावक्षेपततां भजते, न विद्वृ कृं धृवं श्रीकर्वातीवर्धे। तस्मात् वर्ता नागास्वातत्
स्रीकर्वात्यायान्त्रिते नैसोपेक्षाविशिष्टमानो धर्मी यदैवहृदयं एवावतिष्ठते। क्षेत्रस्वतः ते वधकलेन व्यवस्तिता।* वधिनिव वधिनिवधिनि
व्यवस्थिता: क्षुद्रं वर्जनः,† वर्मानानेवधिनि व्यवस्थिता: वेशबं भोगयतां भजने। तस्मादुपौषोऽधर्मेऽर्जुनं सुमन्तानिव धर्मिनु दृष्टे वर्तिष्टे, तस्मादप्रक्षेपोऽधर्मेऽ
वेशमेव चिन्न धर्मिनानुवर्तमानं न निकोतू पार्थ्ये॥ १५॥

त एते धर्मं-धर्मिने: विक्रमादित्याय।

ते व्यथः-क्षुद्धा गुणात्मकाः॥ १५॥

च एते धर्मं-धर्मिने: प्रोक्तः: 'ते', 'व्यथः-क्षुद्धमेव व्यवस्थिता।
'गुणः' कलरकानमोक्षपः। तदाधानान्तरक्षुद्रान्तरियानमहन्द्रपः
दायः। चत: सर्वरकानमोक्षपः: पर्यायः वाचा-भक्तहिंसागर्भावत्वायां तिस्ते, यथा वदन्वि
तत् तत्त्वानियानमः दृष्टे। यथा घटादयो व्यद्विता वत्तमिना-
महन्द्रपः॥ १५॥

येश्ये च चेति गुणा: सर्वेऽ मृतकारणं कथनेको धर्मिनि व्यवस्थितं
द्वायात्मकाः।

* वधकलेन चैवाशिवालेन व्यवस्थिता दृष्टि F पुस्तकापातः।
† न क्षुद्रं लज्जनिति C पुस्तकापातः।
पात्तके येग्रंथे

शंकारार्थनुविदेः शंकोत्सक-विकाराधर्मि चिन्मय तत्सदभिविख्यकार्यपक-साभात् तत्प्राक्क्लक्षया परिश्रमत द्वारम् \(10\)

आभामानन्त्यात् शानं कथं संक्रवतीत्वार्थी शानेपापाभावेः।

हेतु-फलात्मकायाश्चात् तस्कृतितत्वात्वादेवाभामावे
	तद्भावः \(11\)

वासनानामुभवो हेतुः, तत्सार्धवश रागादयः, तेषामविशा
हृति शालात् परामर्श्येष च ‘हेतुः’। ‘कथं’ प्रतिरादि शूर्यादि च।
‘आभायं’ बुझितचं। ‘आभामं’ चदेवादमुभसः तदेव वासनानाः।
‘अतः’ हेतु-फलात्मकायाश्चात्; भवनानामाति वासनानां ‘संगती-लान’
तेषां हेलारों ‘शाकाः’ श्रान-योगाः द्रष्टव्या काक्षे महते
विष्णुसशालूः न वासनः प्ररूपणति तः कार्यमारबन्ध द्रति
तात्त्वा ‘शायंः’ \(11\)

तनु प्रतिचरण विनाश गम्यलोकयवेवावसनाः तत्प्राक्क्लक्षया
कार्यकर्तार्णभावेनायुगप्रकारविनात् भेदं कथनेकलविनात्त्वा
एकल-समर्थनायाच्।

शरीतानागतं सच्चपोतास्यध्वनिद्रायमोक्षा। \(12\)

इद्द्रश्वनामवतं भवानामुजस्ति दुःखिदती तेषां सच्चम-भोगवचार।
नष्ठि श्रावित्रायारीयैं कार्यदिपि सच्चमप्रामृत दृष्टः।
निद्रापके च कार्येकं निद्राहुतिः कार्यनाति प्रवर्तनः। निद्रानां विषक-
यमालोण्य काहणिं प्रवर्तते। तत्थापि विनेकापाडाभावम्बूळेति।
चतुर्युपेश संबोध्यांतरं तत् कर्त्य निगुणपाडाभावम्बूळेति अभ्रते, न विद्वान् धृष्टं चैएकरोतीसंवर्चणं। तस्मात् चतुर्युपेश तत् बाबास्वाभावत् ज्ञानस्त्वात् तत्साधोत्त्वाभावात् नेतौर्द्धवृत्तथर्विपरीतमानसे धर्मः कथैकः श्रवण्य एवावलिते। धृष्टं ते धवधक्षेन व्यवस्थितः। धवधक्षेऽधवधृष्टं धवधिकां धवधिनः। धवधक्षेऽपि धवधिनि धवधिकां धवधिनि धव�िनि। धवधक्षेऽपि धवधर्ममन्वितो धवधिनः। धवधक्षेऽपि धवधर्ममन्वितो धवधिनः। धवधक्षेऽपि धवधर्ममन्वितो धवधिनः। धवधक्षेऽपि धवधर्ममन्वितो धवधिनः। धवधक्षेऽपि धवधर्ममन्वितो धवधिनः।

त एते धर्मं-धर्मिनं: किंचिं द्वादश।

ते व्यक्त्त-व्यक्त्ता गुणात्मानं: || ११||

य एते धर्मं-धर्मिनं: प्रोक्तः: 'तेः', 'व्यक्त-व्यक्ते व्यवस्थितः।

'गुणा': चतुर्युपेशमेवः। तदावाभावात्सुभावान्त्यपरिषमणसंहः

द्रवयिः। चतुर्युपेशमेवः। चतुर्युपेशमेवः। चतुर्युपेशमेवः। चतुर्युपेशमेवः। चतुर्युपेशमेवः। चतुर्युपेशमेवः।

यो चिदाधियो महाबिंसृताय स्तम्भितं स्तम्भितं

मधुप: || १२||

युध्यते च, यो गुण:। वर्ध्यं मूर्ख कारणं, कथमेव धर्मीति वयदेवः

द्वादशाति।

* धवधक्षेऽपि चैवतिण्यक्षेऽपिं व्यवस्थितः हर्षं F पुस्करपाठः।
† न धृष्टं बजगनीति C पुस्करपाठः।
परिषामैकावासलुस्यं ॥ १४ ॥

यथेष्ठे चोरा गुणाक्षारणि तेषामक्षारिनिभावगमगमज्ञानो थः
‘परिणामः’ कष्टिः शतमात्रिः कष्टिः: काष्टिः तसः इत्येवंचयः
तथा ‘एकमात्’, ‘बस्तनः’, ‘ततः’ एकलसुधेिते । यथेष्ठे धृतिः
स्रोतं वायुरियावर्दि ॥ १४ ॥

गयु विज्ञानविधिरिति यदादृश्व वल्लकमनेिक वा वर्षु घुष्ठेि चदा
विज्ञानसेव वायुवाचनात् कार्य्यकारणभूिभेनाविखिंतं तथा तथा प्रति-
भानि, तदा कथभेत्तक्षयेि वायुविद्यावशास्त्र ।

वस्तुसाम्ये चित्रमेदास्योऽयायाविविधः पन्यः ॥ १५ ॥

‘तथा’ स्नान-ब्रजेऽिः, ‘विविधः पन्याः’ विविधोऽि भागेवेद दृि
खातः । कर्तर्थं वस्तुसाम्ये चित्रमेदात्रां, इमाने वस्तुि यथारुुपः
अभागाधि गानानेमात्रां चित्रमेदाः सुख-दुःख-शोभक्षत्रवा सुधुप-
श्येिते । तथाविश्विंैष सक्षुजावसवायिं घोषिंि उपविभागायाः
वराहसंख वस्तुषुपशः, वस्मावः देवः, परिषामैकावासलुस्यं
वस्तुि नागानिधिनीदयात् काष्ठिः प्रकार्यन् वस्मा: । एकादिनी-
कार्यः वस्तु एकादिनीपतवावावाचिेित । विद्यिः चित्रकार्यः वस्तुि
वस्तु विद्याय वस्तु वस्तुैत्ताः, ताभिः अध्यायेऽवाचिेि वस्तुि तदात्
नाभविन्निः खातः । भविन्निः चेति । देवः कथभेत्तक्षयेि वस्तुषुपशः
प्रति सक्षेत्तैष चित्रकार्यः । चयु गुणपदकः चष्ठयः: ब्रजेऽि तिस्ते
नदा वायुरियावर्दि ॥ एकादिन्नातितरैष खातः । चवि

* कार्य्यकारण ४ पुस्तकावणः ।
वेळजने नेबते तदा कारणेशे वति कार्यांनेनांभावे निर्भर- वेकरून व बसात् खात् । एततुकुं भवति वायुपक भिनेक कारणे वदिर् कार्यासांबेखळ; तदा समर्थ जगठानागमधिकारणयं सेकरून खात, कार्यावेदनानुसार खातांना निर्भरतुक वा खात् ।

यथेवं कर्तं तेन चिन्तितायनांने वेदनाप्रति कमात्; सुख-दुःख-नौसाच- वाणि शातानि जन्ये । मेवः। यथा चर्याविनिवृत्तिकारुणिया प्रसादः। बुद्धीश्रवनीकार ।

नातुः चतुर्विवः भवनामिनिगुणां तेन तेन रप्याभिविधा।। यथा च कार्यावेदनानुसार निर्भरत्वे धर्मस्वरूपां विष्णू सचिवालयां परिशिष्टां सुखमयं भवति । तत्वेवाधिकारिकारुणि रच्योऽठितवः। दुःखमयं सप्तसीमां भवति । नीतिविद्याधिनीसंसारसंघात तमेहस-स्वता भवनानिवारीति तमेहस्- क्षेत्रानां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति तमेहस-स्वतां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति तमेहस-स्वतां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति तमेहस-स्वतां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति तमेहस-स्वतां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति तमेहस-स्वतां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति तमेहस-स्वतां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति तमेहस-स्वतां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति तमेहस-स्वतां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति तमेहस-स्वतां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति तमेहस-स्वतां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति तमेहस-स्वतां कार्यकार्याति तदेविष्मार्यभवनानिवारीति

यथेवं श्रामं प्रकाशकलालव चर्याविनिवृत्तिकारुणिया प्रकाशकलालव \* ।

* धर्मशास्त्राचार्य हस्ति C पुस्तकांपाठः।
† वाणिज्य हस्ति C पुस्तकांपाठः।
‡ विज्ञानविद्यासाधिति F पुस्तकांपाठः।

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टदुपरागापेक्षित्वातिंत्रस्य वस्तु भाताप्रान्तं। १००।

‘तः’ श्रव्य, ‘उपरागाधकारकसंप्रेक्षान, चित्रे वाक्यं ‘वस्तु’
‘भाताप्रान्तः’ भवति। चर्चयः, वर्णः प्रधानः शास्त्रावै शास्त्र-श्रीपेश्चते, निष्कर्षबिग्रहनिवायायमां इन्द्रियप्रणालिका यमानातमर्द्धाप्रामाण्यकेश्वे वातार्किकारणलेखपेः वातार्किकारणस्य नम्भाभावाकार्यस्य वातुर्यामीवैकस्त्वतान्तु। ततवः देववयेन तथा शालष्या श्रव्यपौप-रागः हतः देववयेन तपनां यवहारयोगमात्रायं गयति। ततवः
देवांगी श्रान्ति दयुधते। देव चाकारो न समर्पितः वेदांश्चतबैन
वात्सर्यते। परिवर्त्त्वानुभूते यथा शास्त्रार्थिर्य: वस्त्रकालसूदमोध्ययः
वस्त्रकालिकारणस्य अतिकरणे तत्तत्त्वांत्र्यायं वस्त्रकालिकारणे दर्शि
वर्णम न श्रान्ति, गापिवर्ण वातार्किकारणस्य न कम्विदिरूपः॥ १०६॥

यथेवं प्रभुस्तुन युक्तं धान्यं कारे नीतं प्रबोधयते न
तत्त्वं कारे पीतं तम्बिस्वस्वमापि करारित्रिवर्षीदलालाते
कारकारणे परिषामितं प्रामाण्यावादार्थः।

सदा श्राताप्रान्तस्यसंयक्तंभोः पुस्तकारिकारण-मातृ। १०७॥

या एताः ‘पित्रः’, प्रमाण-दिवादिभुजास्य: ‘छत्रं’, तसः
‘तत्र’ तसः ‘पित्रः’ प्रवाहितः, ‘पुष्करः’, ‘सदा’ वर्णकार्ये,
‘धिकः’, तसः विधिपतया ‘परिषामात’ परिषामिलाभावादार्थः।

* कम्विदिरूपः हर्षः ११ पुस्तकारणः।
† पुस्तकारिकारणभद्रादिगति भाषीपुष्पभावावादार्थः।
चतुर्दशी परिषाली खान्दरा परिषामक्ष कादायिक्षाकालारूणि चिन्ह-मिठीमां यद्य शान्तं नेपपसायते। यथार्थमेव, पुरुषस्व चिन्हपुष्कर वर-वाधित्यिकम् यथाज्ञानस्व यथस्वर्यं निर्देश्यं वचं तद्वापि वर्षेबाव-सिद्धमात्र तद्येष चेनार्थीनेपरम् भवति तथाविश्वायार्यस्व वर्षेव चिन्हायार्यं साधनमिवाम्। तथां यथां चिन्हं यद्य शान्तलमिति न कदाचित्तपरिषामितीिणाम्॥१०॥

भद्र चिन्हमेव खलोन्त्वयादि प्रकाशकं तद्रा खपरकालेखप-लात्। खान्दरामर्यादिः प्रकाशवत्वनि तावतेि यथाश्रया माति झिं यथीश्चारेि रािश्वायापनेतुः।

न तत् खाभारतं हस्यावलात्॥२८॥

'तत्' चिन्हं, 'खाभारतं' खपरकाण्डं, न भवति, पुरुषबचं भवतीति खातव। तुत: 'हुआलात्', तत्र चिन्हं खुम्भं तद्वन्दवबचं, यथा चतादि।

हुआलात् चिन्हं तद्वापि खाभारत॥२८॥

भद्र खायाविधियों देशं: हुआलात् चिन्हाविधिः, किञ्च सबुख्यावनेवत्त्वं पुरुषावां हितायिकास्वपिरिहारया दुःखयो दुःखने, तथाबि खुम्भं भेतां शीम स्वं राग द्वेषयाच्च अनिवादुस्ते-रस्वेदनारोपप्रतियाच्छां निर्दशुभाद।

रक्तसमृये चोभायावनवधारण॥१५॥

यथार्थमेव चिन्हनिरिद्वया यथाश्रयोग्यतापादयां यथार्थमेव: सुख-

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* खपरप्रायात्मकार्यरतिः सुखस्यपाठः।
† चेत्यार्थिः सुखस्यपाठः।
चित्तानाद्रेशु बुद्धिवृढः। ज्ञानसिद्धार्थः॥२०॥

चरित्र हि बुद्धिवृढःकारणः यथेष्ठतः तदा धारी दुष्टः। खयमभूतात्
बुढङ्गनारं प्रकाशविशिष्टसंयमेष्टी तस्य पाण्डवं बुढङ्गनारं कपोलनीपं
तस्य अत्यन्ततःविद्यनेवभाना तु पुलिवाचीयदिनेवत्ती तस्य खात्।

जर वैलीवानायाठार्थः। जराती भवति। ज्ञानिशारदः प्राप्तोति।
हृदे रघो तस्य रघुद्राशिकायकासतानां बुढङ्गा-
शुपान्यवृढःप्रकाशितः। संसारीश्वरः वायस्कात्यः जियकः। तदार्घ्युद्वे-
रघुद्राशिकायकासतानां रघुद्राशिकायकासतानां। काशिधार्यशास्त्रितरसृ-
त्वपि तथायत् भावम्यकालात्। 'ज्ञानिशारद', तर खादियं रूपसिद्धितियं
रक्षातिरितिन्द्र न भाषेत॥ २०॥

* खयमभीत्रायमानारामधिरितिः ० पुष्पकमातः।
† खरणां तन्त्र दत्तः १ पुष्पकमातः।
ननु बुद्धे: ख्रमकाश्लाबाहे बुद्धनारेण पारिवेदने कथमनं
विषयवेदननन्यो व्यक्तार द्रामदास वाचितुलामानि

चित्रे प्रतिसंख्रमायासदायारापी खुबदिसंबद्धनं

$२१$ देवा

पुत्रसिद्धिरङ्गनां ‘चिन्ते’ या ‘प्रतिसंख्रमा, न विचरे प्रतिसं-
काल गर्भं चक्षः या तथोऽका अन्येवान्धनीर्णि धावतः। यथा गुणा
प्रजाक्रियाभावः’ परिशेषे प्रक्षिनं गुणितसुस्पष्टकामम्बं तद्रूपता-
विवापछैं, यथा वा लोके परमावर पथगतो विषयवारोपणः
नैवं ‘चिन्तनं’, तदाः: वर्णदैशिकपत्यं ख्रमभित्तितत्वं व्यवहितत्वात्
अतसास्यकिंत्रे यदा बुद्धिसाहार्यारामपमते शेतेवोपाल्याते,
बुद्धिर्निर्विभिन्नाय बुद्धिः व्यवस्थष्टिर्निर्वञ्जताः यहा विच्छिन्न: बुद्धित्वप्रज्ञामयते
नेत्रेऽद्वा तदा बुद्धे: सदाशाने वेदवं सक्ततीविभाः॥ २१ ॥

इत्यं ख्रमचिन्तिं चिन्तं ख्रमेयक्षुण्यात्त्यां ख्रमयक्षुण्यारामभमर्यं
भस्मीयाः।

$३२$ देवा

‘इश्वरः’, तेन ‘चपर्णः’ तबबिधाने तद्रूपतामविवासः।
‘दृष्टापरम’ गंधीविभायाकारपरिशेषं, यदा भवति तदा तदेव
ख्रमयक्षुण्यारामथं जावते। यथा निर्विभिदितिकारणाश्च प्रतिवेशी
ख्रमयक्षुण्यारामभमर्यं एवं रजसात्मकामनाभिभुतं वतस्तं
पुत्रस्याच्छ्वाहा काहा

* बुद्धिकाले भविभाषकाले इति $F$ पुस्तकापाठ: ।
† पुद्मिभिन्निनिर्वञ्जतया इति $F$ पुस्तकापाठ: ।
‡ समस्यात्मिक भविभाषितं $F$ पुस्तकापाठ: ।
यथवसमयं भवति, न पुनर्गृह्यस्वामकरकमवि। तत्त नभ्वतः-रक्षकोऽभ्यंषितं च च निभुवणस्वरक्षकायां स्वेदीक्षान्त रङ्गमात्रां परिषमायं विष्ठलाः योग्यायां योग्यायां सबवेदान्तवाय। चत्वारितं च स्थितं स्थाययम्यविवर्तत्वा चैतन्यं। श्रत्त एवांमर्तु दृष्टे न दृष्टे श्रवणी निधरतांद्विभवत्काष्ठम्। निधरतांद्विभवत्काष्ठशं सत्तनिष्ठानिष्ठायायां स्थानमत्तवयुक्तवायां श्रवणवायस् विष्ठलाः।।

* प्रतिरुत्थास्वाय दृष्टि C पुस्करपाठः। विष्ठलास्वाय दृष्टि H पुस्करपाठः।
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नामार्थिनिश्चयः गिथपरिशास्त्रः निर्धारिते हृदाय, चत्र गुरुवर्ष दर्पणे।
अर्थार्थिनिश्चयः थापकर्तः चुपरिषाहिमः पुरुषः तथारूढः निर्धारिते वाचे कथं प्रतिविमयसंपर्कपते। जनयते। प्रतिविमयः संकृतवनमः
क्ष्यता भवनेदवधार्या। चैव ध्यागताया लक्ष्यक्रियाकर्त्तिफः पुरुषः बाध्यक्रियार्कर्तिफः। चैव प्रतिविमयनुष्टते। वाचुद्वा पुरुषः
ग्रंता विचक्षाक्रियाया तत्तताविशेषतः। वद्दुष्मार्कृयाकर्तिफः
पुरुषः कथमार्कृयाया सिद्धी प्रतिवर्णकालिती तत्तताविशेषतः। नैषैष्यः
उपक्रमेऽपि जालाद्र। आर्यिव्याद्रः प्रतिवर्णकालः चुम्बुवल्लकः।
वद्दुष्मप्रतिवर्णकालः नासिका प्रतिवर्णकालितिद्वायाः। चैव
तत्तताविशेषतः। एवं वस्त्र न कार्षि
नूपपत्तः। प्रतिविमयविरङ्गः।

नूप वाच्यकर्ताकर्ताकर्ताया चुम्बुवल्लकः पुरुषविविधाना वाधिक्रियाया
वाधिक्रियानेत्रि प्रकारारंभकालः पुरुषः चुम्बुवल्लकः भोग लघुकृतः
तदनुसवस, तरैव विनयचं प्रकर्तारपरिषाताया कथं रमणविन्यः,
किमर्थसः तथा: प्ररिशाम:। ततोद्वारे। पुरुषार्थिरं भोग्यभवायः
तथा कर्ष्यसः: पुरुषार्थिक्रियता तथा चुम्बु एव परिशाम्।।

नूपपत्तः पुरुषार्थिक्रियता एवानुसवस:। पुरुषार्थिरं मत्या
कर्ष्यं विनाशयः अविश्वासः: पुरुषार्थिक्रियते, अध्यायः
प्राप्ते: कथेविनिश्चयः अविश्वासः। अश्री वेदधावशाय:, कथं जडूऽ।

* नित्यावरिषामेति ० पुलस्यः।
† तथार्थिनिश्चयः ० पुलस्यः।
‡ अयोध्यात दर्ति ० पुलस्यः।
प्रशोधि। अनुसेर्यते । अनुहोमापतिबन्धनः परिशालस्य वस्तुं भक्तिद्वयसम्बन्धः
तदेव पुरुषार्थकार्यानन्दः। यथा भक्तिरेखनाया: प्रशन्ते वहना एव ।
तथा भद्रातिसाध्यतपार्थने भवेऽ वहसुिहवषयनुक्षेत (परिशालः)।
पुनः खार्यार्थनुस्खर्द्वत्सताया: प्रतिविद्या: परिशालः। इत्यं
पुरुषस्वाभोगपरिमेयः। श्रज्ञानन्दित्यवयः ज्यात्या प्रश्नित्वेऽ पुनः
परिशालस्यार्थः। तथा विधायाः पुरुषार्थकर्पक्तायाः गहया च च
प्रश्नितः कार्य्यसुपस्तः।

गच्छो दृष्टीतः श्रवः: श्रवव्रध्यागारस्य ततै भिन्नमेऽऽोऽर्था
धिरः। मोराय चाबः: त्यक्ते, मोरः चार्यार्थनीयः तुष्परेश्वशस
श्रवार्थार्थः। उच्चतः। थेहां प्रकाशिते पुनःरोरोराधिर्मेयः
भोगभावम्भणः: बनः, तस्कि तति बशक्षेतनाया: प्रशन्तः
कर्मवार्थार्थार्थः: दुःखालुभः तति कशार्थः दुःखितस्तिकारः
निकी मम स्वार्थार्थः भक्त्यवार्थव्यः। चाई दुःखितस्तुतः
बोधप्रकृतीभावसंक्षरदशेशायाः प्रमाधि। तसादुतत्तेव कर्मनुृपः
गुणिष्ठाः: श्रास्कप्रेरदशाः विषयः। द्रव्यतारूप्यविषयविवेच्येऽवाविषय
स्थभावः: श्रास्किद्धिक्यते। तथा संचाय प्रयामान एववविषयेवेत
श्रास्कप्रेरदशाः सक्तारिष्यमेंश्व मोप्याः प्रमाधार्थः। श्रास्किद्धिक्य
कार्यार्थः प्रातिनारायणाः याम्याः। श्रामां स्मार्थेत्, श्राम च ओतिकोम
परिशालदार्शनवियाः मोरायाः शार्याः श्रवक्रम शाम्याः
प्रमाधार्थः निखिता, प्रकारानन्दकार्यः। अर्थात् विना कर्मः

* तदर्थिधिरितिः पुस्कुष्पाटः।
† कब्रेनादश्यं गृहिवचैनितिः पुस्कुष्पाटः।
† समयायां सम्यग्रामितिः पुस्कुष्पाटः।
प्रारंभिक भाषांतर

'तत्त' एतिहासिक, 'ध्यानात्माकामिनि', 'वाष्णात्मि', 'चित्रमपि' नानांपि, 'परास्य' पर्याय सामान्य भोक्ता गायकवांगिन्यातुम् वाधवतीला। केंद्र्यं, 'संयुतकारिल' क्षेत्र समूह विशिष्ट शिक्षक अन्य-अन्य विज्ञानकारिला। यश संयुतकारिला कार्यकारिणीं वृद्धिं, यशा श्रयोतांबाबूंद्रा। रत्न-रजस्मांचि व विनाशपरिणामात्मकणीं संयुत-संयुत्कारिली, प्रारंभिक यथासम्भवं व पुढे परं क्षणं।

नुसर यादृच्छिकप्रयागनारायणाम् परेन प्रारंभिक भवना परारंभिकविशेषः। तह्यादेशवल यादृच्छिक यथा व परं विषयन, यादृच्छिक भवना परारंभिक-रुपेत्वा भिन्निकत्वादित्यत्वले पितृविद्यार्थीत्वात्। उत्तरते।

* संयुक्तभाष्यद्वारा निर्देशितत्वि C पुस्तकपाठः।
† भाषुपालित हति C. भाषुपालित हति F पुस्तकपाठः।
‡ गदघरिति C पुस्तकपाठः।
§ चित्रमधीति C पुस्तकपाठः। परम्परां न समीचीनः।
‖ पारारंथेनुसारहस्ति F पुस्तकपाठः।
‖ चित्रात्मकविशेषता नेतिरिति C पुस्तकपाठः।
चिद्धपिष शामानेन पराधक्षमाः आक्ष्यस्तिःता तथापि चतार्दी-
शिवशस्ध्वलिप्यालोकणम् नातिना एव भोक्ता परः सिद्धिति ।
धा चेमनादीते ग्राहारिषि शिवशाहुसागारप्रकारस्मिनियक्तमां रतन-
वन्दिलिप्यालोकणप्रभवः एव प्रतीजनेन द्वारालपूर्वमिश्यते शिवशस्का
श्चाल्लेक्ष्य भोग्यक्ष पराध्यानेनमीलिमाः तद्विविधः एव भोगार्धिनः
हाता परनप्रकारप्रेषेष्वंस्ततः सिद्धिति । बद्धि वा तत्त परम
श्वाल्लेने स्त्रीणे प्रतीजनेन तथापि ताम्रेयो विप्रेषः प्रकारं तत्र
प्रकारप्रेषेष्वंस्ततानां प्रक्षार्धिनः । ततेषां शिवशस्काद्विलिप्यालोकणम् ।
ततेषां शिवशस्काद्विलिप्यालोकणम् । ततेषां शिवशस्काद्विलिप्यालोकणम् ।
शिवशस्काद्विलिप्यालोकणम् । द्विपि प्रकारं एवं प्रकारं प्रकारं ।
तथापि शिवशस्काद्विलिप्यालोकणम् । द्विपि प्रकारं एवं प्रकारं एवं
भवति कुलक्ष्य अंशतां ॥ ० ॥

drāṇāṁ śāstraṁ kāśīṁ niṁśēṣu dṛṣṭāṁ ścaipakṣeṣu ।

viśeṣadṛśāṁ nātābhaṁ abhaṁ abhaṁ cardiitaṁ ॥ २४ ॥

evaś caśa ruciḥo ‘nayo bhārthitaṁ caśa ruciḥobhiṣeṇ pārthāṇि
śravasāyāyam daṇc śaśvamānembāra āsteyamānām pratījase
dvāv śravasāyāyaḥ प्रक्षार्धिनां भावाभावान् । नन्विकते ।
प्रतिमेव कण्ठूः शास्त्रभोजौ द्वारानामां निवर्तते ॥ २४ ॥

tatāmaḥ prayati caṁ bhavatīkṣaḥ ।

tadā viśeṣaṁ karvan kāśīpaṁgaṁbhāraḥ ।* chītata ॥ २५ ॥

* pratiṣṭhitē pratiṣṭhitē ca sa kṣapaḥ ।
† caśa ruciḥo ‘nayo bhārthitaṁ ca sa kṣapaḥ ।
† caśa ruciḥo ‘nayo bhārthitaṁ ca sa kṣapaḥ ।
पारे २७ कस्मः


dरसालशास्त्रिनुसार विद्वत्त्व विश्लेषपरमोऽगुणसं विनमाशीतिदी-दानीं ‘विदेकर्तिकः’ विदेकमात्मग्नामस्युः, ‘कैव्यभार्तर्स कैव्य-पलं, कैव्यारद्वं वा वनयुतं द्रवत्य || २ ४ ||

स्रोतां विदेकवाशिन सि सुखे श्रवकरीयं ग्रादृश्यभव सत्यं प्रतिपादनाद्वारे श्रणोपायायामः

tस्थित्र श्रवण प्रत्ययान्तराशी संस्कारेभं || २६ ||

स्रोतां स्मार्थी श्लोकसं, ‘कैद्रयु’ ग्रादृश्यभव, धार्म ‘प्रत्ययान्त-राशी’ युक्तान्तरपाशी श्रणानी, तानी प्राणवेषः। युक्तान्तराधिकार्यः कैव्यारद्वं बले मेवेषः: ‘संस्कारेभं’, तवं ममोपेवर्त्यापाशी चिन्माणोपेषोऽपि प्रभवणि।

श्रम: करणोपस्थितिद्वारे तेषा दार्ण कर्मविभिन्निमुलं भवति || २ ६ ||

दार्णायय तृत्येश्वेवां यत्वः

dहानेयं ज्ञोषवदुर्सः || २७ ||

वधा ‘कृपासामविलक्षादीनाः, दार्ण पूर्वपुरुः, तथा संस्कारणा-मध्य कर्मवं । वधा ते श्रणानी वुष्टाद्वर्धीकस्यन न पुन-स्विनाभमूः प्रेक्षकार्यम्बरे लम्बन, तथा संस्कारा विकृतम् || २ ७ ||

पवं प्रत्ययान्तराशुरुः त्वरितां स्मार्थी द्विश्रुः न्योगिनः: श्रमाधी: प्रत्ययान्तरिभिञ्जन:- तथा वित्तुष्पायायामः॥

* विदेकविश्लेषप्रभा भिं मुखधाराः ||
† तांत्रिकक्ष भिं मुखधाराः ||
‡ भ्रातान्शर्य विनति H मुखधाराः ||
§ विस्तिरित विनति H मुखधाराः ||

एततः सथेश्वरसि, पदश्च उपाधिभिः त सामस्यें यादर्शस्य योगिन विनति प्रस्ते तथा वित्तुष्पायामः॥
प्रसंस्कारः पुष्युत्तमवर्षस्य सर्वेषा विबेकायतेद्धर्म्मेश्यः
समाधिः॥२८॥

‘प्रसंस्कारः’ धार्मिक तत्त्वान् वधार्मिक यथविनियमः परस्रविषयः
चणिपुपिनिवावनं, तत्त्वान् वति ‘श्रापः’, ‘श्रावुद्विशः’ फलमालिकोऽसः
प्रत्याल्प्रसंस्कारंद्वुद्वो ‘सर्वमेकावृत्तेश्यानि’’ परिषेषात् ‘धर्मेश्यः
समाधिः’ भवति, प्रकटमाध्यक्षस्य ध्वनि प्रासंगिकाध्यायां भेदिति
विमीतचिन्द्रनीति ‘धर्मेश्यः’. \(\text{अभिनेत्र प्रकटमाध्यक्षसैव श्रावुद्वित्व मितिवपरा-}
\text{निर्मिति भवति} \(\text{॥२८॥}

तद्भाषा धर्मेश्यात् किं भवतीवः\(\text{॥}}

ततः ज्ञेयकम्बिनिष्टः॥२५॥

‘ज्ञेयकम्बिविद्यादीनामनिविद्याश्राणारः’, ‘कर्षणस्वरुपविनिविद्याश्राणा’
द्वेन विविधानानं, श्रावुद्वित्व पूर्वपूर्वकारणविनिष्टा ‘निविष्टः’,
भवतीवः॥२५॥

निःस्वेदु तेपु किं भवतीवः।

तद्भवावर्षस्य श्रावुद्वित्व श्रावुद्वित्व श्रावुद्वित्व \(\text{मलयं} \(\text{॥२०॥}

श्रावुद्वित्व भित्रसंविनिष्टि ‘श्रावुद्वित्व क्रिया:’, त एव ‘मलयः’,
तेषां ‘अपेत्त्र’ तद्विद्द्रविश्वतः, ‘श्रावुद्वित्व’ गतचन्दनावलिनिष्ट्य, ‘श्रावु-
याद्यं चन्द्रकेदार, ‘फें’, ‘हां’ गणनाशकं भवति, चन्द्रोऽनैव वर्णं फें जानातीयं। || २० ||
तत: किमित्याह।
तत: ज्याद्यां परिश्रामक्रमसमातिनिरुपानं। || २१ ||
‘ज्याः’ निम्पादितः, भोगार्जुनकल्पः पुरवायः प्रयोजनं दैवी ‘ज्याद्या’, ‘गुणः’ वचन-रणस्मांसि, तेवा ‘परिश्रामः’ च पुर्वायं-वामातिरातुः बोधेऽविन माणिक्षिक्षिण माणिक्षिन्तिविविषिणः, तस्य चोःच्छैं ‘कमः’ वर्णमाणः, तस्य परिश्रामसि’ निधा, न पुर्ववर्त दृश्योः। || २२ ||
क्रमसहोकशः लक्षसमाधि।
क्रमप्रतियोगी परिश्रामार्जनान्तरविण्यायः कम:। || २३ ||
‘चलः’ चन्द्रीचालः काष्ठः, तस्य चोःच्छैं ‘प्रतियोगी’ एकचालक-प्रकाष्ठः। ‘परिश्रामार्जनान्तरविण्यायः’ च चन्द्रवतेः चन्द्रेऽप्पः पुरावः चक्रश-निन्यान्न चो चन्द्रवतेः च चापाणि ‘कमः’ उच्यते। न च चन्द्रवतेः चन्द्रेऽचन्द्रे निन्यान्न कमः परिश्रामां ब्रह्मः। || २४ ||
द्रान्तः चन्द्रवतेः सैवाक्ष्णायाधारां चक्रसमाधि।
पुरवाय्यमाणाः गुणाणां प्रतिप्रसव: कैवल्यं स्वरूप-प्रतिष्ठा वा चित्रितक्षितितिः। || २५ ||
चन्द्राचन्द्रोऽनैव चन्द्रश्वायानां ‘गुणाणां’, य: ‘प्रतिप्रसवः’
प्रसन्नानेषुशुकीदृष्टिः सर्वथा विवेकायतेद्विमेवः
समाधिः || २८ ||

‘प्रसन्नान’ यावतां तथानां यथाकथं यवविन्यायं परस्यस्विषुपश्चिमपविभावं, तविन् यति ‘श्रवणं’, ‘श्रुतिकीदृष्टिः’ फलमार्गायोः। प्रत्येकान्तराणामनुढे शर्म्प्रकारविवेकायाः’ परिवेष्टत् ‘ध्यामेहः
समाधिः’ भवति, प्रक्षमेऽ्रक्षमेऽ धस्यं परस्यप्रत्ययाभाबं मैत्रेयि विश्वनीयति ‘ध्यामेहः’। जनेन प्रक्षमेऽञ्जेव श्रावपेतुलिङ्गुपपादिन्तं भवति || २८ ||

तक्षाद्विमेवेऽवादत्र किं भवतीयासः

ततः श्रेष्ठाकर्मनिद्रा: || २८ ||

‘श्रेष्ठाकर्मनिद्रादीगर्भाभिनवेशाश्वासः’, ‘कर्ष्यात्यश धुक्कादिभेदेव जिथिवारः’, श्रावपेतु पूर्ब्बपर्ययकारणनिद्रा: निद्रा:’, भवतीयि: || २८ ||

नित्यस्तेव तेषु किं भवतीयासः

तदा सन्तोषार्धमशेषापेतस्य श्रावानन्त्यास्थे:—
मायं || ३० ||

श्राविचे विचमेभिर्वति ‘श्रावरणामि’ केभा:, त एव ‘भन्ता’,
तेभाः ‘यघेत्या’ तद्विद्विक्षिता, ‘श्रावखा’ गतपणगननिभिष्य, ‘श्राव—

* भवतीयि: चाहेति ३ पुक्षकालः
न्यात्र चन्द्रवङ्गद्रात्, 'श्रेयं', 'वर्त्यं' गणान्यां भवति, कक्षाशेनैव वर्यं श्रेयं जानातीयः॥ २० ॥

तत: किमित्यादि ।

तत: ज्ञातायानां परिशामक्रमसमातिरिजुग्नानां॥ ३१ ॥

'क्षण:' निम्पादितः, भोगापवर्गलक्षणः पुरुषार्थः प्रयोजनं वैसे
'क्षणायः', 'गुणाः' वचन-रजस्मांसि, तेऽवं 'परिशामः' ज्ञ पुरुषार्थ-
क्रमांतरातुसक्तौर्भेत्र प्रातित्येक्षेत्र चक्राभिभावविश्वातिक्षणः, तथा
चोऽसैं 'क्रमः' वचनमाणः, तस्म परिशामति' निर्ह न पुनःब्रह्म
द्वयः॥ ३१ ॥

क्रमायोऽहु वचनमाहः

क्षणप्रतियोगी परिशामापरान्तनिर्ग्रीधः क्रमः॥३२॥

'चणाः' चण्यस्य कालः, तथा चोऽसैं 'प्रतियोगी' एकचावपिक्रमः
लक्षणः। 'परिशामापरान्तनिर्ग्रीधः' ज्ञानुभतेशु मेशेशु पश्चात्
चन्द्रचन्द्र चो गम्यते च चप्पानं 'क्रमः' उच्चते। न ज्ञानुभतेशु मेशेशु
क्रमः परिशामाय शक्यः॥ ३२ ॥

द्वाराया ज्ञानवत् सैव ज्ञानायाधारां स्वरूपमाह ।

पुरुषार्थश्रुण्यानां गुणानां प्रतिप्रसवः सैव यस्य स्वरूप-
प्रतिष्ठा वा चिन्तामन्विरिति॥ ३३ ॥

क्रमायोऽभोगापवर्गलक्षणपुरुषार्थायानं 'गुणां', य: 'प्रतिप्रसवः'
প্রতিষ্ঠানপরিষায় গবেষণার জন্য, যদি বা সংখ্যাগণনায় নিষেধাত্মক হয় তবে 'কীভাবে' প্রতিফলিত হয়।

ন নিয়ম-মানসের চেয়ে বেশি: কেবল খবরের কথা জানানোর জন্য ব্যবহার করতে পারেন।

ধর্মীয় বন্দ্যর্যায় বরদান ভূমিকায় সম্প্রতি প্রাপ্ত বিভিন্ন প্রকার পত্রিকার প্রতিনিধিত্ব হিসেবে যে পত্রিকার কর্মকান্ড নির্দেশ করিয়ে দিতেন।

ব্যবহার এবং ব্যবহারের ক্ষেত্রে পত্রিকার প্রতিনিধিত্ব বিভিন্ন প্রকারের পত্রিকার কর্তৃত্ব প্রদান করিয়ে দিতেন।

আবার একই কথার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকার প্রতিনিধিত্ব বিভিন্ন প্রকারের পত্রিকার কর্তৃত্ব প্রদান করিয়ে দিতেন।

চিত্রকারাচ্ছাদিত পর্যবেক্ষণের জন্য প্রতিনিধিত্ব বিভিন্ন প্রকারের পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকার কর্তৃত্ব প্রদান করিয়ে দিতেন।

চিত্রকারায় নিজস্ব প্রকাশনায় গুণগত প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকার কর্তৃত্ব প্রদান করিয়ে দিতেন।

* ব্যবহারের জন্য প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ 

† বিভিন্ন প্রকারের পত্রিকার প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ 

‡ পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ 

§ পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ 

∥ পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ 

** পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ 

†† পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ 

‡‡ পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ 

§§ পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ 

∥∥ পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য পত্রিকায় প্রকাশ 

 관련자리에 대한 블록을 추가하였습니다.
चिंताच एवाांवावतितं द्वीयें चुनूँ। संवारदशाधानु एवंभूतस्य कर्तवं मोक्षमनुष्ठावलिम्बं वर्त्तुपपथेतो। तथायथ षोधस्य महाना: प्रत्यया शशानार्धिपेन्यालोकोऽकोभावलिम्बं। सम्भवा: अविवेकाविन्दुः, तत्स्थान दलि पुनःपार्यम् संविनात्तिश्रुमिनिद्रपञ्चयमाणे व दशाद्विभावेन परिष्ठातिसङ्कृसंवो संवो दलि पदार्थानुभिर्भवार्यां चिन्तायाः समपण्याभावीं। बुधियाृतिः च वाश्वनिवेश्चायाप्रक्षयाभावीं, चिन्तावंदधानां दुःक्षेत्रीयां कर्तवंभूतावधानाशयनं एव सूक्ष्मायूणस्य भागपूर्वकः अवस्थास्य निष्पटोः। निष्प्रत्येकः प्राणायामस्य निष्प्रत्येकः।

चति पुरोक्षामनुभाेबावतिते परमार्थिक्षामयम्। कर्मवाद्वग्नि-कियस्थेत्, तदार्थो परिष्थातित्र्यूऽ, परिष्ठातित्वाभावाद्वावस्य तत्स्थान-भिक्षु। न द्वायविशेष न मन्त्रे एकधेय द्वयें परमार्थिक्षां-वश्चालयववविविधत्वाद्वावस्य। चति दस्मवर्गस्यां व्यास्ताष्ट्रायेत् दस्मवर्गस्य श्रवणयोगायां दशाद्वितिस्य। ततो वस्मे- खानावलालातसर्चित्तिवावशिष्टास्याति नागायाः, शास्त्रां तत्परिष्ठातित्वाभावाः गापि सहितम्। न एव मानसां सादिर्भिः। राज्यत्तमाः। यदौ संवारदशाः अथावाय चेष्टाभयूपपमक्षीत्वात्।

वेदोऽथ संवारदशावं वेदाविविधानसर्ववन्द्यर्हामानान्यार्थो नैतच मन्यने, तथां न पुष्कर: पृष्ठ। तथाकर्षण्याः चूर्य्यवक्षेत् चूर्य्यू: एव संवेद-मानान्त्येव प्रतिमाकार्तु वेदान्तमण्यां वेदेन्तचार्यात्रेववन्द्यर्हामानान्यार्थो नैतच: पृष्ठ। चूर्य्यात्तक्षेत्रवेदोऽथ संवेद्वेदख्यायाम्यार्थो नैतच:। तत् विद्वद्धधार्मिकायाधारस्य वेदेन्तमण्यां। न चूर्य्यूऽ संवेद्वेदवेदख्यात्यात्तक्षेत्रवेदोऽथ संवेद्वेदवेदख्यात्यात्तक्षेत्रवेदोऽथ संवेद्वेदवेदख्यात्यात्तक्षेत्रवेदोऽथ।
यात्राचे येतमार्गे

उत्तरात्। तत्र चेमेव कपेश सुख-दुःखचेस्थलोप्युक्तं कर्भारावः तेनेव कपेश धार्मिक परमातमः खासरा कर्भारावत्यपरमातमः परिशालित-भविष्याभावलखा खात्। प्रथम न दाचार्थङ्गोत्तरं, किन्तु तदुपस्तकठिक-तत्स्थार्थोत्तरांत्यात्यित्तरलेख स्वाक्षरोति, तदार्थाद्वैतानुप्रक्ष्येत्। धार-नदृपता च पूर्व्यंसेव निराञ्जता। किस्मातिविद्याखाभावं निःशान्तव-लानु कर्भारानां कः शाक्ताधिकारी। न तावशस्त्रित्यालूत परमात्मा, धार्मिकाभावलानु कर्भारान। तत्तथ कस्मात्वायर्थविषयो-प्रकृतः। अविद्यायले च जगतांलक्ष्मीयवादाने कस्मात्विषयाति विषय-क्षेत्रं। न तावशस्त्रित्यालूते जित्यिसिधिनुक्लात् विचाराधाराच। कर्भारानोद्यौति निःशान्ताभाववता श्रवणिप्रक्ष्यविधाने कस्मात्वायर्थविषयेन। अध्यायं अद्वेदविचारया श्रवणियं रालोत्तरान्येलं नाम। कैव चि विचारेष्य विग्रहकर्तरसूरानोद्धकविशिष्टाविद्यान्, कैवाविषेधुु-न्याधे। सैवं। यदस्य किंस्मात्विशक्तो नरोत्तरं तदवस्यं कुतस्मित्थिपार्श्विभवं वा वचनं, श्रवणियाच्छ संसारसंस्कारमन्युज्याकार्यमन्युज्याकार्यमन्युज्याकर्णं, तत्तचिन्त्यकार्यां तथापि विद्याविषयां सूक्तसुक्तमन्युज्यते, तदा कक्षाधिपत्याच्छ वधारं न खात् श्रवणोप्यवाच्चत्रायमन्युज्य। तत्तादिधिविद्यादृष्टिविषयेष्मार्थविषयानो रुपस्वपष्यते। श्रवणियाच्छ चारूपविषयस्य तत्ततितित्वस्य अध्यात्म दृष्टिधिविद्याधिकारस्य अध्यात्म कल्यानित्वमप्रमाणानुपपत्ते।

शैवं शैवाविष्याच्छ शैवाविष्याच्छ शैवाविष्याकर्नमत्येष्टत दृष्टेयते, शैव-नापि तथा मनाध्योगन। तथाच उद्धा-श्रास्त्र-महानर्द्वयो गुणावशयः

* पहचान इति ६ पश्चापादः।
वधारेद्वारे श्राद्धमः शंयोगादुपणावे। तैरेव च गुणः खर्चं श्राता कर्षं भोगेति अपरिधिरः। मेघेद्रशावासु भिक्षाशानन्तिकृतसौ तत्वांशाः दोषाणां किष्टः सेवाः, विशेषुद्वायं गामयानां भिक्षणां च। तेषां न पुंकः पदः। धर्मसारा दद्यां किमाध्यन श्राद्धं। दान्वलाद्वयो गुर्गा श्रामाणावार्तम बन्निः। धर्मसारानाशुकाद्वयः जातिः जातिः। न जातिः जातिः जातिः। तत्ते जातिः जातिः जातिः। भूयां खैर विं जातियोऽवस्थ: सभ्यति। चते जातियो वैवैवाहिकान्तिकृतं च। तथाविधार्थेः चूनुप्यतेहैव घर्ते नायक्या।

धैर्यगी मीमांकः कर्म-कर्मधृप श्रामाणावात्रिकिते। तेषापि न चुकः पदः। तथाच विधमधुपप्रयास्यां श्रामाणावात्रिकिते तेषां प्रतिभा चर्म-प्रायये च कर्मलोकान्तिकृतं च। न चैतिसर्वेशुलादुपपघते कर्मलोकः प्रायये च। चैतिसर्वेशुभज्ञातिस्थायोऽचुन्न-देवसः घर्तेः, यज्ञिरुद्वाराः न तस्थं। यथा भावाभवे। विभूषण च कर्म-कर्मधृपः। प्रायोऽवरः। न कर्मधृप-कर्मधृपोऽवरः। चैतिसर्वेशु विभूषणायसः चुन्नलाः। तत्त्वाद्रप्रयास्यां परिशालानागिरिष्ठात्मेवपपत्तिः, तत्त चेत-विन्यः।

धैर्यगी वृक्षपद्याधमेवेनाद्वयं श्राद्धम् श्रिरपरिमाणां परिशालानागिरिष्ठात चूनुप्यतेहैव दद्यां किमाध्यन श्राद्धं। तत्त्वाद्रप्रयास्य श्रामाणावात्रिकृतं च। चूनुप्यतेहैव दद्यां किमाध्यन श्राद्धं।
वरिष्ठ के एक स्थान से वधित कारणों के लिए हम दर्शाते हैं। तथापि विवरणावधि के लिए हम स्थान में निर्देशित करते हैं। तथापि निर्देशित करते हैं।

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चरणों नामावलीमाणकारारेखा 

तस्थापनां। वल्लभानां संविदावां कोकलोत्त्याणां विषयमिति। 

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તાંત્રિકન: વિજ્ઞાનાધયાયાધારાના બુધ્ધજ્ઞાન ને ચિંતા ચાલુ નથી. મુદ્રાનિઃિશિલન ચિત્રે મહાનારાયણજ્ઞાન પ્રગટીક્રમના ગુણપ્રગટી સમજાયમાં પ્રથમ પ્રતિપાદિતા, ન પ્રકાશાધયાય: પરશક પુષ્કલ સાહિત્યશાસ્ત્ર તત્વસ્થાપનકાલી.

એવાં વૈશ્યુકી દૃષ્ટિનેય વિશ્લેષણ નાંખાડાની રૂપકલાપ

ભાજી શોભી ચિત્રુભાઈ. તમારા પ્રાચીન કબુલ મેલ. ચિંતાપતા વયદ્રોષિત તદેવ ભોગલાં કાયમ. યાં વચનાધીન તદેવ શિક્ષણવસ્ત્રોખ્યાત ભવિત. એવા વયને કરાયલાટે પ્રધાને

ચાલી ફાલી અણુદ્ધાળને સાહિત્યશાસ્ત્રક્ષેત્ર દર્શાયામાં: ક્રમના આવકાર્યક્રમશાસ્ત્ર તારાનું દૃષ્ટિસાધિત ધ્યાનમાં નાંખા ગતિરીઝા તાલાદિદ્ધ પુષ્કલ દૃષ્ટિકોણ ક્રિયારૂપિના સાહિત્યક્ષેત્રના સાહિત્યક્ષેત્રના કેવી બાબીને: કેવી બાબીને

તદેવે વિદાઃનારેભની વિસ્તારણ વૈવિધ્યહ્રિદ્ધેભની બધાઃદ્ધિમુદ્ધવતા દેખાદ્ધિમુદ્ધવતા વધારાદ્ધિમુદ્ધવતા પ્રકાપ પ્રકાપ પ્રકાપ 

ચાલી ફાલી અણુદ્ધાળને નાંખા ગતિરીઝા તાલાદિદ્ધ પુષ્કલ દૃષ્ટિસાધિત 

* ભાગ્યાંતરેનેત્ર ૦ પુષ્કલ 

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पाववृत्ति वाच्यमः

शास्त्रवादः निरालम्ब धाकारवादः प्रतिहार्य पुरस्क शालमदुञ्जा विस्तारेण यज्ञवद्यरनिश्चितिमिकुपपाध्य पुरस्कित्वात् प्रमाणसुप- 

dः कैव्याविन्देयाध्य दु:भिः। घचेः। कबूमेकोपयोगिनः। धाराविन्धाय शाखान्नारेन्तेतेव कैव्याविन्देयाध्य प्रकृतिमिकुपपाध्य कैव्याविन्देयाध्य निर्णयतात्। कैव्याविनः।

सचें वचा घचा। मानमानयते: पादास्तिकानसित- 

प्रभुजूकातो नूर्हूर्हू रूपाजातान्त भरविनेषत:।

घचा धर्मशास्त्राय गर्भधर्मम वामदेवतापि भिता

व श्रीमोहनसङ्गीतः। पारिपाठः। सचें दूसरं वघातः।

दृस्तः श्रीमध्याराजाधिराजश्रीमोहदेवविशिष्टान्तर्भाष्याय पातस्थायोगवाच्यमेतस्य। कैव्याविन्देयाध्यः।

समासः सचें पातस्थायोगवाच्यमेतस्य।।।

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