| Bibliotheca me late | Cer: २, ८1 luad. I, 7° Digitized by Google BIBLIOTHECA INDICA ; New SERIES. Nos, 462, 478, 482 and 491.492. न > THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI WITH THE COMMENTARY OF BHOJA RAJA AND AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY RAJENDRALALA MITRA, LL. D., C.I.E. PUBLISHED BY THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL. CALCUTTA : PRINTED BY J. W. THOMAS, BAPTIST MISSION 1 BESS. 1883, Digitized by Google CONTENTS. —@— Preface, an ss Index, ६ se Addenda et Corrigenda, ey Bhoja’s Introduction, ००५ Translation of text and commentary, Chapter I, Ditto, Chapter IT, ००७ ee Addendum to ditto, ais Translation of text and commentary, Chapter III, Ditto, Chapter IV, ५ sey Appendix. A descriptive list of works extant on the Yoga system of Philosophy,... Sanskrit text of Yoga-sitra and its commentary, . ry e¢@ PREFACE. ~क The doctrine of Pessimism as evolved by Schopen- hauer and developed by Hartmann created quite a sensation in Europe. The novelty, the bold genera- lizations, the closeness and vigour of ratiocination with which it was set forth, endowed it with qualities which could not but attract attention and claim consideration. But, carefully analysed, it does not appear to have any pretension to novelty or origi- nality to which its admirers lay claim. The doctrine of evil as inseparable from the world is nearly as old as humanity. It was the dread of evil that drove the primitive man to seek the shelter of superhuman power, and laid the foundation of religion. There would have been no religion if there had been no dread of evil, here or hereafter. Nor would philosophy have had its birth had not the neces- sity arisen to discriminate between good and evil. Morality, too, presupposes a differentiation between that which is proper and that which is improper—of @ consciousness, however vague and undefined, of future reward and punishment. Doubtless the doctrine assumes constant and unalloyed evil, and not a mix- ture of good and evil; but in so doing it only places the evil in the present condition, and transfers the iv PREFACE. good to a hereafter, in a hazy, cloudy, dubious, undefined way, but does not absolutely deny it. The preéminence of the unconscious Will is the most important element of the doctrine; and it, too, under the names of Freewill, Maya, Buddhi, and the like, has occupied men’s mind and played its part in philosophy from a pretty remote period of anti- quity. Then comes the repugnance to worldly attractions, love, affection and joy ; and under the form of asceti- cism it is almost as old as civilized man. The denial of the existence of God is an assump- tion of no modern date; it unquestionably preceded the formation of human ideas about Divine Provi- dence ; and the assumption about the objectification of Will forms the corner-stone of the doctrine of Patanjali. It might be said that, if thus the leading tenets of the Pessimist doctrine be old, their association into a compact and complete system is not so, and that in this respect it may well claim the full meed of praise for its originality. This, however, cannot be con- ceded. Even as are its tenets, so is it in its entirety as a system. What Schopenhauer enunciated in his ‘ World as Will and Idea’ (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung) in 1819, and Hartmann worked out in his ‘Philosophy of the Unconscious’ (Philo- sophie der Unbewussten) in 1869, is no other than the nihilist philosophy of Buddha put forth in a modern European garb, or, as an able writer puts it, a system “little more than Buddhism vul- PREFACE. ष garised.”’ It is the farthest from my wish to assert that the two German philosophers have surreptitiously, or deliberately, borrowed their system from the Indians: it is almost certain that Schopenhauer at the beginning of this century had no knowledge of any Buddhist Philosophy, and Hartmann, working on the model of his predecessor, had, probably, no occasion to consult the texts of the Sunyavada system of the Buddhists as accessible to him in meagre abstracts in European languages. The similitude may be—nay, most probably is—purely accidental, the result of human mind set to thinking in a particular line of ideas arriving at the same conclusion; but it exists, and is as clear as possible, and that is all that is here intended to be emphasized. The system of S‘akya Buddha 18 a modification of a more ancient and more fully developed doctrine— that of Kapila, as known under the name of Sankhya. Thoroughly logical in its scheme of ratiocination, the Sankhya enunciates that there is no proof of the existence of a Supreme Divinity, and therefore leaves it entirely out of consideration in its scheme of primal causation. Its words, as summarised in the text book of the school, but which is obviously of a much later date than Kapila, are, Is vardsiddheh: ‘‘It is not proved that there is a God.” (Sankhya, Aph. I, 92.) The idea is more fully developed and argued in a subsequent part of the work (Vide infra, pp. 31f). S’akya Buddha, less logical but more bold, adopted this idea in a positive form, instead of keep- ing the question open by admitting only the want of v1 PREFACE. dialectic demonstration. Schopenhauer does the same without any reserve, describing theism as “a tradi- tion of the nursery.” The next subject is Soul or the vitalizing and conscious principle of life. Kapila’s theory recognises its existence, assuming a separate soul for each living being. Buddha did the same. These souls are un- create and eternal, never coming to an end. Buddha acknowledged and, indeed, made them the basis of his system, but practically, though not in 80 many words, he denied them absolute eternity, for his theory of Nirvdna assigned them an ultimate and final goal after many transmigrations in sunyatd, vacuity or nihility. It may be that his Nirvana did not extend to absolute nihility, for there is nothing authentic and unquestionable in his sayings ; but his immediate followers, who developed the Mahayana school, announce it in unmistakable terms, and for the pur- poses of the present comparison this is enough. The German philosopher goes a step further, and insists on the absolute negation of Soul. His words put in English are, “ there is no psyche;” but unable to dispense with it altogether, he supplies its place by an ‘unconscious will’? which plays the part of Soul. Practically this amounts to admitting Soul, but divesting it of its consciousness and eternity. In the Sankhya system, the category next after Soul is Pradhdna, or Nature, having inherent in it the threefold qualities of goodness, foulness, and darkness, or as the Sankhya-pravachana-bhdshya defines it, ^ {716 equilibrium of the three qualities,” PREFACE. Vil (° triguna-sdmyam’). The terminology is archaic, but it implies the sum-total of the laws and forces of nature, which regulate the course of the phenomenal world. Buddha availed himself of this category to the full, and Schopenhauer does the same, using only modern terms in conformity with the physical science of the day. The next is Intellect. It iscommon to all the three systems under notice, and alike unconscious in all. The Sankhyas call it Mahat, the Buddhists Buddhi, and Schopenhauer Will, “the Reality, the absolute Existence, the Ultimate Fact, the universal and fun- damental essence of all activities, both of the organic and the inorganic world, the primordial thing whence we and everything proceed.” Inthe Yoga system, the term used is chittva, which, in the following pages, has been rendered into ‘thinking principle ;’ but would have been as well—nay more pointedly—expressed by will. Kapila assigned real substantiality to matter. What the primitive Yogis thought about it we know not. Patanjali is silent on the subject in his Yoga apho- risms; but in his Mahdbhdshya he admits an absolute reality of it. He raises the question by saying, yadi tdvad gunasamudayo dravyam, “if you hold matter to be the aggregate of qualities,’ (IV, 1.) and then refutes the theory, Buddha’s idea of Sunyata neces- sitated the same theory in a more prominent manner. He could not admit absolute reality to any thing, and as the inevitable nihilistic consequence of his creed, matter had to assume the character of a phantasmal play of mental phenomenality— ४111 PREFACE. ‘‘___. A fleeting show For man’s illusion given.” The Vedanta took it up after him, Berkeley worked it out in England in the early part of the last century, and Schopenhauer has done the same in our own days. As already stated the theory of evil—constant, ever-present evil in everything mundane,—is common to all the three schools. Kapila designed his system with the express object of removing “ the threefold pain” which is inherent in existence (Aph. I). Bud- dha’s dread of the ever-recurring pain of birth, existence, decay, and death, drove him to the shelter of nihility, and the Pessimists of our day look upon pain as constant and inherent in worldly existence. The Yogis, who represent a section of the Sankhyas, sum up the fruit of worldly existence by the significant remark, “to the discriminating all are verily painful.” (Yoga, II, 15.) According to Hartmann “ the world is so bad that it had better not exist, and that it is steadily becoming worse.” Nor are the means devised for the removal of this evil different. Perfect knowledge, attainable by hard, unremitting study amidst the most rigorous asceticism and self-mortification, and total renunciation of the pleasures of the world, is the only remedy accessible to man. Neither Kapila nor Buddha would have any other, and Schopenhauer, after dwelling on the miseries of existence, and showing that even suicide was not enough to put a stop to them, asks, ^ Whence then is deliverance to come?” and the answer given is “In knowing that the world is radically and essen- tially bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for PREFACE. 1x that old affirmation of the Will to live; it leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of Will, that true Nirvdna in which there is no more Will, therefore no longer an ideal presentation, or a real world.” In so far the correspondence is as close as possible in works set apart by an interval of considerably over four and twenty centuries—between Bud- dhism of the 6th century before Christ and the Pessimism of our own times. A learned writer describes Pessimism as the “ goal of modern thought” in Europe. If so, that “ goal’ was reached in India over four and twenty centuries ago. Nor should the limit be set there. It is im- possible to believe that Sankhyaism, like Minerva, issued forth in all its perfection at once. It is but natural to suppose that many ontological and 11010. gical questions, such as God, soul, mind, primary causa- tion, &c., must have formed the theme of speculation and enquiry from a long anterior period, to prepare the Indian mind for the conception and reception of so recondite a system as the Sankhya. Kapila could not have conceived and brought it forth, had not his predecessors discussed and made themselves familiar with such philosophical ideas. There must have existed many doctrines, many dogmas, many theories to afford him the necessary materials to work out his scheme. Even as Bacon’s Novum Organum was not the spontaneous generation of a novel thought, but the crystallization or solidification of ideas which x PREFACE. were extant at the time in a more or less undefined, nebulous way, so was Kapila’s Sankhya. Various phases of philosophic thought were well known and current in his time, and his was the master mind which put them together to create a complete system. The bricks existed, and Kapila was the architect who used them in constructing a novel edifice. How long before the time of Kapila metaphysical dogmas had currency among the Hindus we know not for certain; but the remarkable hymn in the Rig Veda which discusses whether entity or non- entity existed before creation (X, 129) carries us to a remote period of antiquity beyond which we cannot speculate. The reference in the Sma Veda to a Yati who condemned sacrifices, and whose wealth was transferred to Bhrigu, is equally germane to the point. According to the Aitareya Brahmana some such Yatis were punished by being thrown before jackals. In the A’ranyaka period of Vedic history, these rationalistic speculations and metaphysi- cal controversies were of frequent occurrence, and the Upanishads have preserved for us the substance of some of the orthodox speculations on the subject. They afford us traces also of the heterodox dogmas which they were intended tocombat. Kautsa was the leader of one of the rationalistic schools, and he is named by Yaska. Jabala was an atheist, and his name occurs in the Upanishads. Panini alludes to atheists, sceptics, fatalists, and revilers of the Vedas. It may be taken for granted without any offence to reason that these heterodox people did entertain many dog- PREFACE. xi mas in opposition to the received exposition of primal causation and other recondite doctrines of the Hindu faith. They could not have been heterodox if they had not adverse theories to propound ; and they must have been met by counter theories to keep up the antagonism. One may go further and assume that these disputes led to the development of adverse schools of thought which have since been overthrown by later developments. The earliest Vedic cultus was purely ritualistic. It embraced prayers and peace-offerings—prayers in set forms, and peace- offerings in the form of sacrifices accompanied by libations of spirituous liquors. Those who reviled the Vedic religion opposed it principally on the ground of the futility, cruelty and unmeaning cha- racter of the offerings. The atheists, pure and simple, denounced the whole system as false. This, however, was a purely destructive course, and not calculated to win the multitude in its favour. Mere negation suggests the idea of the doctrine of Metrodorics, the Epicurean, which had for its main object the stomach. Society needed some check to vice by holding up a threat of future retribution, and absolute negation of divine providence and future life did not provide it. Besides, a future state being admitted, a preparation for it in the present state was felt a necessity, and a large majority of the opponents, therefore, appealed to self-torture and meditation for aid. Meditation as a means of communion with the Divinity was known long before the date of the Sankhya. Indeed, in all ancient forms of religion, 11 PREFACE. meditation occupies a prominent place as a religious exercise. In the Rig Veda the Gayatri enjoins the meditation of the divine light which vivifies the solar luminary as the most sacred act of devotion, and that meditation occurs in endless forms in the rituals of all subsequent sects and systems. This medita- tion is called Dhydna, the word used in the Gayatri being the verb dhimahi “ may we meditate.” Now, this Dhyana cannot be performed without fixing the mind on one particular object after abstracting it from worldly cares and enjoyments, and this fixation is called Dhdrand, or steadfastness. The abstraction necessarily implies some amount of asceticism and austerity, and this is called in the Vedas Tapas. A man must foreswear all worldly enjoyments before he can fix his mind on one unworldly object, and the fixation must take place before he can begin a medita- tion. Austerity, therefore, forms the first step in the process; fixation or steadfastness the second; and meditation the third; and all these exercises have enjoyed a halo of sanctity from a remote period of antiquity. No Rishi could live without his her- mitage ; none without performing Tapas; none with- out steadfast devotion; none without his meditation. These are the essential attributes of a Rishi. It would be a contradiction in terms to suppose a Rishi could be so, without them. They suggest the idea of communion with something superhuman, and create a feeling of mysterious awe and veneration in the mind of the common herd. At first the object of meditation was of course the Divinity in some form PREFACE, 111 or other; but atheistic philosophers soon found it practicable to dispense with that object, and they converted the objective thought to a subjective one, and thus produced the highest meditation of the Sankhyas, a meditation in which the mind meditates on itself, or, as the philosophers of this class express it, on nothing. The next step was to dispense with the eternity of matter, to reduce it toa phantasmal charac- ter. The mind was all in all, and there was no necessity for an eternal co-ordinate, and this is the dogma of the Buddhists and the Vedantists. None of these, however, dispensed with individual soul. That formed an integer in all the leading systems of early Indian philosophy. Nay, more, in order to provide for a future state of retribution, it was necessary to develop or retain the system of metempsychosis. It was seen that neither virtue nor vice always brought on its deserts in this life, and the necessity for a next life became unavoidable ; and if the soul was to have a next corporeality of some kind to bear the deserts, there was nothing to hinder the transmigration many times. It may shock European ideas of the present day to be told of metempsychosis ; but between worldly life, purgatory, and eternal hell- fire, or heaven on the one hand and metempsychosis on the other, dispassionate and unsophisticated logic will readily yield the palm to the latter. An English lady was once shocked at the sight of a Hindu lady with her nose bored for a nose-ring. She said, ^^ how barba- rous is this custom of yours, dear sister, of boring the nose P”? “TJ fail,” replied the Hindu, ^ to perceive the difference, Madam, between boring the two ears and XIV PREFACE. boring the nose.” The Hindu controversialist may adopt this line of argument and ask, the matter not being susceptible of positive proof without the aid of revealed religion, “logically what is the difference between three corporealities and a dozen or more?” But, however that be, all the ancient leading schools of India accepted metempsychosis, and the grand object they had in view was to devise the means for putting a stop to the ever-lengthening and never- ending chain of transmigration. And so long that was kept prominently before the masses, most of whom keenly felt, as they do now, and will always do, what Schelling calls ‘‘ that sadness which cleaves +o all finite life,” the system propounded, however otherwise dis- cordant in doctrinal points, had a fair chance of success, as a proselytising system, particularly if it were favour- able to peace and welfare in this present existence. Buddhism was peculiarly well-adapted for this purpose. It was the most attractive in its moral and social phases. No system of human religion has propounded a more perfect course of morality, humanity, mercy, and sympathy. The universal benevolence it preached could not but exert a potent influence on the mind of the people. At a time when sacrifices of animals by hundreds were every- day practices, and those sacrifices were often effected by driving wooden spikes into the heart of writhing victims, the dogma of total abstinence from all sacrifices and uniform mercy to all creatures could not but produce a marked revulsion of feeling against the current religion, and to draw large numbers of PREFACE. xv men to the standard of the new faith. The doctrines of equality of man and of non-recognition of caste also contributed very largely to recommend it to the favour of those who had been for a long time ground down by caste rules. The result was wholesale con- versions of the lower and the middle classes of the people 70 all parts of India—so much so as to make Buddhism the leading religion of the country. The intellectual classes, the men of leading and light, also appreciated these moral and social advantages, and were willing to accept them. They perceived, how- ever, the worm in the flower, and were shocked by the sight. The-atheism which forms the basis of Buddhist philosophy never obtruded itself on the perception of the multitude. It was unknown to them, and they cared not at all to understand its true purport. But the intelligent few felt it, and wished to avoid it. Even professed Buddhists could not always tolerate it, and many were the attempts made to gloss over it, or to supplant it in an insidious way so as to divest the system of its atheism without injur-. ing it in its constitution, The Ais’varika system of the Buddhists was the outcome of one of these attempts, and the Vedanta and the Yoga systems with their various Gita, Tantric and Puranic modi- fications represent the results of Hindu attempts at reconciling the higher philosophy of Kapila and Buddha with a theistic religion. It is not my object here to enter into the vexed question of the chronology of these different systems. It would take more time and space than what are Xxvl PREFACE. at my disposal now. It is necessary, however, to state that in appealing to the Sankhya, I appeal to the doctrine, and not to its text-books. There is abundant evidence, both in Hindu and Buddhist works of unquestionable antiquity and authenticity, of the Sankhya and the Yoga systems having been current before the time of Buddha. The most prominent part of the exercise of those systems involved the most rigorous self-mortification, and that mortification was currently practised with the utmost rigour before the time of Buddha. Buddha himself notices this. According to the Lalita-Vistara :— “While at Uruvilvé, Sékya called to mind all the different forms of penances which people at his time were in the habit of submit- ting to, and which they thought raised the mind above all carnality. ‘Here,’ he thought, ‘am I born in the Jambudvipa, among people who have no prospect of intellectual redemption (adhimukts), crowd- ed by Tirthikas with diverse wishes, and at a time when their faculties are wriggling in the grasp of the crocodile of their earnal wants. Stupid men, who seek to purify their persons by divers modes of austerity and penance, and inculcate the same! Some of them cannot make out their mantras. Some lick their hands. Some are uncleanly. Some have no mantras. Some wander after different sources. Some abstain from fish and flesh-meat. Some mind not the annual duties. Some abstain from spirit and the water of chaff. Some beg alms from one, three, five, or seven tribes. Some indulge in tubers, fruits, mosses, kuga grass, leaves, cow’s dejecta, frumenty, curds, clarified butter, molasses, and unbaked cakes. Some wash the body of charioteers, parrot-flyers, and news-purveyors. Some dwell in villages, or in woods for their livelihood. Some adore cows, deer, horses, hogs, monkeys, or elephants. Seated at one place in silence, with their legs bent under them, some attempt greatness. Some speak to only one person, others to seven. Some eat once in a day and night, some once on alternate days, and some PREFACE. XVli at intervals of four, five, or six days; some once in a fortnight, performing a chdndrdyana. Some put on themselves the feathers of vultures or owls, Some, seated on aboard or a munjaé mat, wear bark, kuga grass, valvaja grass (Eleusine Indica), or blankets of camels’ hair, or of goat’s wool, or of hair, or hides. Some sleep more or less in wet clothes Some sleep on ashes, gravel, stones, boards, thorny grass, or pestles, with the face downwards, in a hut or the bare ground. Some wear one, two, three, four, five, six, or seven pieces of cloth ; others go naked, making no distinction between fit and unfit places. Some have long hair, nails, beard, and matted hair, and wear bark. Some live upon a single meal of a mixture of sesamum and rice. Some smear themselves with ashes, cinders from altars, dust, or clay. Some carry on their persons and in their hands down, munja grass, hair, nails, raga, mud, or a cocoanut-shell alms-bowl. Some drink hot water, or rice-water, or fountain water, or water preserved in earthen jars. Some carry on them cinders, metals, astringent things, three sticks, skulls, alins- bowls, bones or swords, and by these means they hope to attain to immortality, and pride themselves on their holiness. By inhaling smoke or fire, by gazing at the sun, by performing the five fires, resting on one foot, or with an arm perpetually uplifted, or moving about 07 the knees, some attempt to accomplish their penance. Some seek salvation by killing themselves by entering into a mass of lighted chaff or charcoal, or by suppressing their breath, or by roasting one’s self on (hot) stones, or by entering any fire or water, or ascending in the air. The syllables “om,” “ vashat,” ^ svadhé,” svahd,’” as also, blessings, hymns, lighting of the sacred fire, invocations, repetitions of mystic mantras teaching of the Vedas (lit. mantras), or fancying the image of adivinity in one’s mind, afford means of purification to many. Some pride themselves on their saluting Brahma, Indra, Rudra, Visbyu, Devi, Kumara, Matri, KatyAyani,Chandra, Aditya, Vaigravana, Varuga, Vasava, & 8४108, Naga, Yaksha, Gandharva, Asura, Garuda, Kinnara, Mahoraga, Rakshasa, Preta, Bhita, Kushmanda, Parshada, Ganapati, Devarshi, Brahmarshi, or Rajarshi. Some select some of them, others resort to the earth, the water, heat, the air or the ether. Mountains, rivers, fountains, tanks, lakes, long narrow sheets of water (tadagas), oceans, vats, ponds, wells, trees, lotuses, herbs, creepers, XVill PREFACE. grasses, stumps, pastures, cremation grounds, courtyards, and bowers afford asylums to others. Houses, columns, stones, pestles, swords, bows, axes, arrows, spears, and tridents, are the objects of salutation to some. In curd, butter, mustard, barley, garlands, darbha grass, jewels, gold and silver, some seek their welfare. Thus do these Tirthikas, dreading the horrors of mundane life, seek their shelter. Some seek heaven and salvation in their offspring, and resolutely apply to them. They all follow the wrong road; they fancy that to be the true support which is untrue; they hold evil to be good, and the impure-to be pure. I shall then commence that kind of vow and penance by which all hostile sects shall be overpowered. To persons deluded by works and sacrifices, I shall show the destruc- tion of all works and sacrifices. To Devas, perceivable by meditation, as also to those who become manifest in divers forms, 1 shall exhibit a meditation by which they may be overpowered.’”’—My Buddha- Gayd, pp. 24, ९८ seq. | The meditations he practised were all in ac- cord with the rules of the Yoga system, and even their technical names were the same. These facts demonstrate the antiquity of the Sankhya and the Yoga doctrines; but this cannot be said of the text-books of those systems as we have them before us now. They are obviously of a later date than Buddha, and this may safely be predicated of all the six leading texts of Hindu Philosophy. The Sankhya Sutra quotes the Vais’eshika by name in two places (A. 1., 25 and VI, 35), and refutes the doctrine of the Vedanta Satra. The Yoga Satra takes for granted the twenty-five categories of the Sankhya as the basis of its doctrine, and copies some of its aphorisms almost verbatim. The Vais’eshika Sutra recognises the Nyaya as well as the Sankhya. The Nydya Sutra refutes the doctrines of the Vedanta, and of the ~ 9 Sankhya. The Mimajis’a either directly or practically PREFACE. xix by the mode of its refutation of adverse doctrines recognises the pre-existence of all the others, not excepting Buddhism. It also quotes Badari, a teacher, and B4darayana, probably a grandson of Badari, and author of the Vedanta Sutras or later 21108788, as also of a commentary on the Yoga Satra. The Vedanta in its turn refutes adverse doctrines of all the five, and thereby admits their pre-existence. This state of facts can be reconciled only by the supposition that the different dogmas and the schools which cherished them existed for a long time before the dogmas were written down in the aphoristic form in which we have them now. Oral transmission must have been the principal means of their preservation for a long time. There might have been also text-books before, but they were set aside by the very complete systems which the new texts produced, and in the new systems the refutation of adverse opinions very naturally included all the theories which were prevalent at the time when the books were compiled, and not the theories only of the time when the original dogmas were first promulgated. This is also obvious in other ways. In the case of the Sankhya Satra, though it is usually attributed to Kapila, one of the mind-born sons of Brahma, we find it refers to an “ancient teacher” (4’charya, A. V, 31), and to “vener- able preceptors” (A. VI, 69). Sanandana and Pancha- s‘ikha are cited by name (V, 32, and VI, 69). Kapila is then said to have taught his doctrine to A’suri, who is described both as a brother and a pupil of the teacher, A’suri imparts it to Panchas‘ikha, who is, according xx PREFACE. to the Puranics, again a brother. This Panchas‘ikha, again, according to the Mah4bharata, lived in the time of Janaka, and taught the Sankhya doctrine to that king of Mithila. Had Kapila written the Satra he would never have described in it his younger brother and pupil as an A’charya. In the Vedanta Stitra, Badarfyana, the author, is several times named in the third person (I, 3, 26; I, 3, 83; III, 2, 41; ITI, 4,1, 8, 19; IV, 3, 15, IV, 4, 7, 12). This is usually explained by the state- ment that a pupil wrote down the teachings of the saint. Colebrooke, arguing on these facts, came to the conclusion that the text-books are much later than the saints whose names they bear. Referring to the Sankhya he says “the text of the Sankhya philosophy, from which the sect of Buddha seems to have borrowed its doctrines, is not the work of Kapila himself, though vulgarly ascribed to him ; but it purports to be composed by I’s'varakrishna,—and he is stated to have received the doctrine mediately from Kapila, through successive teachers, after its publication by Panchas‘ikha who had been himself instructed by A’suri, the pupil of Kapila.” (Essays, I, p. 93). Professor Cowell accepts this opinion in its entirety ; he says “ The Sitras, as we have them, cannot be the original form of the doctrines of the several schools. They are rather a recapitulation, at a certain period, of a series of preceding developments, which had gone on in the works of successive teachers. The Sutras mutually refer to each other; thus, those of the Sankhya school, which in itself I should consider PREFACE. र] one of the earliest, distinctly refer to Vedanta tenets. They expressly mention the Vais eshika in 1. 25, V. 85; for the Nyaya cf. V, 27, 86, and for the Yoga I, 93.” (Colebrooke’s Essays, I, 354.) This is also the opinion at which I have arrived after a careful consideration of the bearings of the question; in short, my conviction is that the Sutras were written, like the Institutes of Manu and many other Hindu works, long after the date of their putative authors. As regards the Yoga, the doctrine is described to be as old as Brahma, and the text-book to be the work of Patanjali, who, says the commentator, ‘“‘compiled the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them” (p. 4). That such is really the case, is obvi- ous from the fact of the Yoga which Patanjali inculcates being identically the same which the Sankhya accepted as the only means of salvation. It might be argued that the Sankhya adopted the theory of the 25 principles, from the Yoga of Patanjali, and did not lend it to him. But the argu- ments against this theory are overwhelming. In the first place had Patanjali initiated the theory of the Tattvas he would have for certain defined them,and not left them to be inferred. He is very careful in his definitions, and he would never have left so vital an element of his system to be inferred. But following the Sankhya no necessity was felt by him for any definition. It cannot be said that his Tattvas were different from those of the Sankhyas, for that would make the necessity for a definition even more Xxil PREFACE. imperative. Secondly, the author of the Maha- bhashya cannot possibly be proved to have lived before Kapila, or his doctrine. The learned Professor M. M. Kunte, in his “ Vicissitudes of Aryan Civili- zation,’ has combated, with great tact and ability, the arguments usually put forth to fix the date of Patanjali; and it may be admitted that indivi- dually each argument as put forth by Goldstiicker and others admits of refutation, and I may add that a long chain of weak arguments is not stronger than any of its links. Still the coincidence of a number of names of a given period is one which in Indian history cannot be easily set aside as purely accidental. Confining, however, one’s attention to the text-book only, no one who has read them carefully can fail to perceive that Patanjali has contented himself by tacking a theistic appendage of no direct utility to a positively atheistic model, without in any way blend- ing the two ideas into any homogeneity or consistency. Hence it is that the Hindus call it Ses'vara Sankhya, or Saxkhya cum deo, as opposed to the former which is Niris'vara Sankhya, or Sankhya sine deo. The cardinal difference between the two rests on their theistic and atheistic belief, but as already stated, it makes no difference in their systems. Isolation of soul from thinking principle is the end sought in either case, and meditation in Samadhi is the only means available. The believer in the existence of the God- head assumes that divine grace facilitates the end sought, but he does not dispense with Samadhi, and his belief, therefore, is of no material importance. PREFACE. XXlll **In less momentous matters,’’ as noticed by Cole- brooke, “they differ, not upon points of doctrine, but in the degree in which the extcrior exercises, or abstruse reasoning and study, are weighed upon, as requisite preparations of absorbed contemplation. Patanjali’s Yoga-s‘dstra is occupied with devotional exercise and mental abstraction, subduing body and mind: Kapila is more engaged with investigation of principles and reasoning upon them. One is more mystic and fanatical. The other makes a nearer approach to philosophical disquisition, however mis- taken in its conclusions.” (Essays I, p. 265.) And we have enough in these facts and reasons to infer that the Yoga text-book is posterior to the San- khya text-book, and that both the text-books are later than Buddha; but that the doctrines of the two schools are very old. Any how these are the imme- diate ancient Hindu archetypes of the nihilist theory of Buddha, and indirectly of the Pessimism of Scho- penhauer and Hartmann. The Yoga, moreover, is the archetype of another modern doctrine, that of spiritualism with its occult appendage. In this case the relation is direct and more intimate. The eternity of soul is recognised by both ; both look to a course of gradual progress which has perfection for its goal; both admit the existence of soul in higher and higher stages; both recognise the possibility of man’s commanding departed souls to come down, to become visible, and to hold converse with him ; both pretend by regulation of breath and other exercises to attain occult powers of the most XXIV PREFACE. transcendental kind. The details and the rationale of exercise may be different in minor points, and a few of the dogmas such as the “ material reality” of soul - according to the spiritualists, and its pure spirituality according to the Yogis, may be apparently contradic- tory; but substantially the two are as closely related as two systems separated by a gap of five and twenty centuries can well be. The cardinal theory, that “the body is the prison of the soul for ordinary mortals” but it is not so in the case of the adept, is evidently the same in both. ‘ We can see only what comes before the windows of our body, we can take cognizance of what is brought within its bars. The adept has found the key of his prison, and can emerge from it at pleasure. In other words, the adept can pro- ject his soul out of his body to any place he pleases.”’ The whole system in either case is based on this doctrine, and even a cursory study of the 3rd chapter of the work now presented to the public in an English dress will, I believe, fully bear out this statement. The name of the Yoga system as we now have it is Yoganus'dsana, or ‘ the Institutes of the Yoga.’ This name, however, is rarely used, the work being better known as the Yoga-s'astra or ‘the science of Yoga,’ or Yoga-sutra, the ‘ Aphorisms of the Yoga.’ According to the commentary, commonly assigned to Vyasa, one name of the work would appear to be Sdnkhya prava- chana, or ‘an exposition of the Sankhya.’ The words of the colophon are Pdétanjala-yoga-s'a'stre sdnkhya- pravachane, which may be translated into, in Patan. 12118 science of the Yoga, the Sa’nkhhya pravachana. PREFACE. xxv Vyasa, however, if he be the author of the exegesis, which I do not believe to be the case, must have used the term simply to imply that it is a text-book on the Sankhya system, and not to indicate the specific name of the work, for in his remarks on the first aphorism he distinctly says, ‘the name of the work is Yogénus‘a- sana,” ( Yoganus'asanam nama s‘astram). Following this exegesis Colebrooke says: “ the title of Sankhya- pravachana seems a borrowed one; at least it is common to several compositions. It appertains to Patanjali’s Yoga-s‘dastra.”” (Essays I, p. 244). In short, Yogdnus'dsana is the specific, and Sdnkhya- pravachana the descriptive, name of the work. Any- how it is obvious that the Yoga is recognised from an early period as a work on Sankhya. The Yoga text as we now have it comprises a total of 194 short, succinct aphorisms, divided into four chapters or quarters (pa‘das). The first contains 51 aphorisms, devoted to an exposition of the nature and character of meditation, and is entitled Samddhi-pada. The second is called Sedhuna-pdda, or the quarter on the exercise of meditation and its requirements, and contains 55 aphorisms. The third is called Vibhuti- pada, and treats of the various occult powers which may be derived by the exercises enjoined in it. It is of the same extent as the second. The name of the fourth chapter is Kaivalya-pada, and it gives an exposition of the nature and character of the isolation or detachment of soul from worldly ties, which is the object and aim of the exercises and meditations recommended. It is limited to 33 aphorisms. XXvl PREFACE. The work opens with a definition of the term Yoga. It is derived from the root yuj, which means both “ to join” and “ to meditate.’’ Some accept the first meaning, explaining it in the technical sense to imply the joining of the mind to the object of thought. Others prefer the second, but that makes no material difference in the purport. The technical meaning of the word as used in the text is a deri- vative one. Instead of giving prominence to the join- ing, it implies the detachment which that joining occasions. The definition is, ‘‘the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle.”” This suppres- sion, however, need not be absolute in order to make the word applicable. It is used to imply all stages of abstraction of the thinking principle from worldly cares with a view to centre it in the peculiar medita- tion which serves to effect that abstraction. The word is of very ancient date. It occurs several times in the Rig Veda, but not in the technical sense. In the time of Buddha, six centuries before the era of Christ, it had acquired its technical meaning to perfec- tion, and as Buddha, according to the view of the case set forth above, borrowed it from the followers of the Sankhya school, it may safely be assumed that it dates from long before the age of Buddha. In fact, the Tapas of the Vedic Rishis got the more expressive name of Yoga at a later period, and Kapila and his followers gave it prominence in their system by making it the sole means of salvation. Many other works have since used it to indicate communion with the divinity in some way or other, and the Bhagavad- PREFACE. XXVli gita takes thirteen out of its eighteen chapters to be each a treatise on a separate kind of Yoga. The names are: 2, Sankhya Yoga; 3, Karma Yoga; 4, Jnana-karma Yoga; 5, Karma-sannyasa Yoga; 6, Dhyana Yoga; 8, Tarakabrahma Yoga; 9, Raja- guhya Yoga; 10, Vibhuti Yoga; 12, Bhakti Yoga; 13, Kshetra-kshetrajna Yoga; 14, Gunatraya Yoga; 15, Purushottama Yoga; 18, Sannyasa Yoga. In fact, every phase of devotion is described as a form of Yoga. The Tantras have a great number of others, and many variations of those named above, but they need not be noticed here. The definition of the text suggests immediately the question, what are the functions that have to be suppressed ? These must first be known before they can be overcome. The author, therefore, proceeds to describe them. They are said to be fivefold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory. These, directly or indirectly, comprise all the functions to which the thinking principle can possibly be directed. The means of suppressing these functions are next described. They include, (a) exercise, or ‘effort constantly made to keep the thinking principle in its functionless state,” (x11,) and (6), dispassion, or “the consciousness of being their subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects,” (xv). The details of these are reserved for consideration in the next chapter. The exercises and dispassion result in Yoga, of which there are two kinds, a conscious and an un- conscious one. The former is that which is attended XXVill PREFACE. by argumentation, deliberation, joy, and egoism or self-consciousness ; the latter is devoid of such attendants. As long as the thinking principle argues what is good and what is bad; as long as there is deliberation as to the nature of the object of thought ; as long as a person engaged in meditation feels a sense of joy; or as long as he retains a sense of his own individuality, (self-consciousness), he is said to be in a conscious state of meditation. This is, in the technical language of the school, Savija- samadhi or “seeded meditation,’’ because there is in it some nucleus on which the mind is centered. When, by arduous and long-continued exercise, this seed is lost, and the mind remains divested of all thought, a mere state of consciousness without an object, it becomes seedless, 2207404, or perfect, and this is the summum bonum which the Yogi exerts to attain. When this is attained, the bondage of the world, of transmigration, is entirely severed, and the soul is declared to be isolated or free. The expedients aforesaid are always and impera- tively necessary—nothing can be attained without them; but their action can be expedited by another means, and that 18 ^“ Devotion to God.” This devo- tion is absolute resignation of one’s* self to the Divinity. Inthe language of the commentator, “ it is thorough worship of God. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one’s actions to him, the preéminent guide.” This devotion is the means by which the theism of the current Hinduism is reconciled with the philosophy of PREFACE. XXIX the school. Kapila did not care for this reconciliation, and his system, therefore, did not stand in need of a Divine Providence; but his atheism being repulsive to the thinking portion of mankind, Patanjali avails himself of it to give a theistic character to his system. It will be noticed, however, that he makes his Divi- nity one of several means to an end, and not the end sought. The God he invokes is defined to be “a parti- cular soul which is untouched by affliction, works, deserts, and desires,’’? one who is existent, but not the avowed Creator and -preserver of the universe. His name is I’s vara or “ the ruler,” and that may imply providence, but nothing is said on this subject. In two successive aphorisms, He is described as one “in whom the seed of the omniscient attains in- finity,’’ (xxv,) and “ who is the instructor of even all early ones, for, He is not defined by time (xxvr).” The indicator of this Divinity is the syllable OM, called Pranava, and it is by repeating it and reflecting on its meaning that the different states of meditation can be easily attained. The author could have scarcely put God and his name to a more subordi- nate position. Turning now to the obstacles which stand in the way of the Yogi in the satisfactory accomplishment of his meditation, the author enumerates what they are, and suggests the means of overcoming them. The obstacles, or causes of distraction, are disease, langour, doubt, carelessness, idleness, worldly-mindedness, mis- taken notions, unattainment of any stage of abstrac- tion, and instability in the stage obtained (A. xxx) ; xxx PREFACE. and these are attended by pain, distress, trembling, and oppressive inspiration and expiration (xxxI). These tend to make the thinking principle unsteady, or unfit for meditation, and have, therefore, to be sedulously overcome. The means for overcoming them are various. The habit of concentrating the mind on one particular principle is the most efficacious, (XXXII,) and it is to be supplemented by cheerfulness, benevolence, compassion, complacency, and indifference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue, and vice (xxxi1). It may be effected also by a system of regulation of breath, called Pranayama, which is supposed to exert a powerful influence in steadying the thinking principle, and warding off disease and other obstacles (¢f. p. 41). Although this regulation of breath is a necessary element in all the earlier or lower forms of the Yoga, one is specially called the Yoga of breathing, and technically called Hatha-yoga, from the letters ha and tha, meaning the sun and the moon, which are the mystic names of inspiration and expiration. This form is particularly esteemed for its efficacy in pro- curing occult powers. When the habit of meditation has considerably advanced, and the Yogi is able to realize sensuous objects in his meditation, or when the mind is thereby so illumined, it is of itself sufficient to ward off tribulations. Meditation in the passionlessness of accomplished Yogis might also effect this (xxxviI). Reliance on dreams, or on the object of one’s fancy, is, likewise, an eflicacious remedy. The author then enters into a more elaborate classi- fication of the Yoga. The twofold division first PREFACE. अश्र] pointed out does not suffice fully to indicate the various shades of difference which the seeded form assumes under different circumstances, and to each of these shades he assigns a different name, and defines its nature. In course of this, he points out the theory of the mind becoming the object it thinks upon (xLI), in other words that intense thought creates objects, or becomes objective. This is the basis on which the occult powers described in a subsequent chapter are founded. The seedless form is one and simple, and it is the ultimatum sought by the Yoga. The second chapter is devoted to the details of the exercises necessary for the performance of the Yoga, and is therefore called Kriyd-yoga or “ practical Yoga.’’ In its earliest and simplest state practical Yoga is accomplished by a strict observance of asceti- cism, by the muttering of a mantra a great number of times at stated periods every day, and by devotion to God. The object of these observances 18 to weaken afflictions and give firmness to meditation. Afflictions arise from attachment to worldly affairs, and asceticism is the best antidote for them, and the practice of repeating a mantra for a long time serves to steady the mind. The reference to afflictions suggests the question, what are they ? They are ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life, or ‘the Will to live’ as Hartmann designates it. Someof these are subtile, others gross, (111). The former are to be counteracted by acting against their natural bent, (x) and the latter by meditation, (x1). XXxii PREFACE. The afflictions are described to be the root of all evil. They give rise to works, and works leave be- hind their stock of residua to be worked out ina subsequent birth, and in that subsequent birth other works are performed, and they leave their residua, and so on, the chain is never brought to an end. For instance, ignorance leads to the commission of a sin ; the retribution for that sin comes in the next existence; while that desert is being borne in that existence another sin is committed through ignorance; that necessitates another birth for its retribution, and the series never breaks. And what 18 true of ignorance is equally so of the other afflictions. Nor does the rule apply only to sins; it applies equally to virtuous deeds. For instance, if instead of a sin a virtuous work be performed, its deserts have to be enjoyed in another existence, and the course proceeds exactly as in the case of sin. In fact, every work, whether right or wrong, has its apportioned desert, and it must be borne in a corporeal existence, and the succession of birth, decay, and death must, in the ordinary course of things, recur over and over again without a limit. The fruits may be joy or suffering according as the cause is virtue or vice, but to the discrimi- nating they are invariably painful, (xv). They are, also inevitable, and must be borne. An act once performed must bear its fruit, and in so far there is no remedy. One may, however, avoid doing those works which bear fruit, and thereby break the spell, and the maxim is therefore laid down that only those pains are avoidable which are not yet come, (XVI). PREFACE. XXXili The question then arises, what should one do to abstain from works, and avoid their consequences ? and the object of the Yoga is to devise the means through which the abstinence may be effected. In order to explain the rationale of the course by which the evil is to be brought to an end, the author next enters into an explanation of the mutual relation of Intellect and Soul. Intellect is called a spectacle, and it is said “to be of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs; it is for the purpose of experience and emancipation,” (xvi). It exists solely for the purpose of Soul, (xxi). Soul is called the spectator ; “it is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas,” (xx). When these two are in conjunction through ignorance (and itis ignorance which brings them into conjunc- tion) they produce life and its consequences, (XVII,) or as the text puts it ^ the apprehension of the nature of the contact, power, and the lordship of power,” (उशा) 4. e., Soul thinks it is the experiencer and Intellect thinks it 18 the experiencer. Now, when the light of knowledge dispels the false impression the conjunction is dissolved. Intellect ceases to think that it is the experiencer, and Soul gives up the idea of its experience, and the ignorance is removed. In other words, the conjunction being removed Soul is isolated, and there is a period put to further birth and suffering. Now, igno- rance being the sole cause of the conjunction, the great object is to remove that ignorance, and XXXIV PREFACE. this is to be effected by discriminative knowledge, or that which will rightly appreciate the true cha- racter of the relation which exists between Soul and Intellect, This knowledge then is what is to be sought, and the means are now provided by which it may be attained. The knowledge in question passes through seven stages before it becomes perfect (xxvi1). The first stage is that in which a person feels that ^ the know- able has been known by me.” (2) He next feels that “there is nothing remaining to be known.”’ (3) The conviction then arises that ‘ my afflictions are over- come, and there is nothing for me to overcome,” (4) This is followed by the belief that ^^ discriminative knowledge has been attained by me.’”’ These four suffice to effect what is technically called ‘liberation from work,” (Karya-vimukti), for when these have been acquired there is no more impulse or wish left to perform works. These are followed, in course of progress, by three more successive convictions. These are,—Ist “my intellect has accomplished its pur- pose ;” 2nd, ‘the three qualities have finished their dominion over me, and can no longer affect me;” 3rd, “my meditation has been identified with my soul,” that is the Intellect has merged into the Soul. These three are called “intellectual liberation” (Chitta-vimukti). The last is called isolation (Kav- valya), on the attainment of which the Soul is believed to be perfectly liberated. In order to bring on this consummation the Yogi should apply himself to improve his understanding so PREFACE. अदर्प as to make it completely devoid of impurities. To effect this improvement eight means are recommended, and these are technically called 1, Restraint; 2, Obligation; 3, Posture; 4, Regulation of birth; 5, Abstraction ; 6, Steadfastness ; 7, Contemplation ; and, 8, Meditation (xx1x). Of these the first in- cludes five negative acts, viz., abstention from (1) slaughter, (2) falsehood, (3) theft, (4) incontinence, and (5) avarice; and the second five positive acts, namely, (1) purification, (2) contentment, (3) pe- nance, (4) study, and (5) devotion tothe Lord. These two classes of acts are called mahkdvratas, or acts of primary asceticism. They are obligatory on all classes of the community, whether householders or ascetics, and none should neglect them. Slaughter is in se sinful, and none should commit it, whether he be a householder ora hermit. Falsehood and theft are sins of the same gravity, and should therefore be shunned by all. Incontinence &c., are likewise reprehensible, and none should be guilty of them. Nor can a virtuous and peaceful life be secured simply by these restraints ; it is necessary that one should keep himself free from filth, both material and moral; that he should be contented with his lot and not rapine; that he should submit to penance for his sins and for curbing his passions; that he should study the Vedas, and be devoted to the service of God. No one can be a good citizen who does not practice these restraints and obligations, and therefore they are recommended to all classes of the community. And if they are good and necessary for ordinary XXXvl PREFACE. people, they must ipso facto be so for the Yogi, who aspires to rise above the common herd. Nay, to him they are most imperative, for none can prepare himself for the Yoga who does not especially attend to them, as the first step in his career. The advan- tages of observing these restraints and obligations are described at some length; but they call for no remark here. Restraint and obligation being thus common to both householders and Yogis the third of the eight means becomes the first special act of exercise to which a Yogi has to apply himself; this is the assumption of particular postures, which are con- ducive to the fixation of the thinking principle to any object to which it may be directed. No one can settle himself down for meditation while walking, or running, or doing something unconnected with his main object, and some particular postures are, therefore, deemed essential. The text contents itself by saying that it should be firm and pleasant (उ.रा), and entail the least effort (xLvm); but it does not describe any particular posture as the most bene- ficial. Commentators, however, have supplied the omission, and described a great number of them, some of them most painful and difficult of assump- tion, (ef. pp. 102/,). When the Yogi has assumed one of the prescribed postures, he should begin the fourth exercise, the regulation of his breath. This consists in drawing the breath through one nostril; retaining the air for some time in the chest; and then throwing it out PREFACE. XXXVli through another nostril. The details of this process will be found on pp. 427. This process of breathing should be followed by the fifth exercise, the abstraction of the organs from their ordinary natural functions. As long as they are engaged in their own works, they do not allow the thinking principle to settle down for the act of meditation, and consequently prove obstruc- tive. To overcome them, or to draw them away from works, is an essential preliminary. When they are abstracted, they merge into their primary cause, the thinking principle, and cease to disturb it. All these five acts of Restraint, Obligation, Posture, Regulation of breath, and Abstraction are accessories or necessary adjuncts to Yoga, for without them no Yoga can be performed; but they form no essential part of the Yoga itself. Even all the five existing together would not constitute Yoga, though without them as preliminaries no Yoga can be effectual. These are, therefore, called ‘ practical Yoga,” or ० accessories to the Yoga,” but not Yoga. The last three, on the other hand, are essential constituents of the Yoga, and are therefore called «^ intimates” or anta- rangas. These three include Steadfastness (Dhdrana), Contemplation (Diydna), and Meditation (Samadhi) ; and the third chapter opens with a description of these. ‘‘Steadfastness is the confinement of the thinking principle to one place,”’ (L). Asan exercise, it is of little moment to what object the thinking principle is applied: so long the thinking principle remains unswervingly attached to it, without for a ॐ १४111 PREFACE. moment thinking of} anything else, it is Steadfast- ness. When the understanding is brought to bear upon this fixation and the two act in unison the result is Contemplation (11), 2. e., when the thinking principle thinks intelligently and steadfastly on an object it is Contemplation. Again when this con- templation is so intense that it loses all idea of its own identity, and enlightens solely one object, it is Meditation or Samédhi. The definition given points to something much more intense than what the English word meditation ordinarily conveys ; it implies a state of extacy or cataleptic trance when both the body and the mind are dead to all external impres- sions, and the thinking principle is completely drowned in the special object of its thought, or in itself, but as the degree of intensity is not fixed and is admitted to vary considerably under different circumstances, I have used the word meditation as the most convenient and conveying the nearest idea of the mental act indicated by the Sanskrit term. When these three follow successively or are united, they have the common name of Sayama. How this union is to be effected, or how this Saiiyama is to be performed, is nowhere described at length; but it may be directed to diverse objects, internal and external, and, when duly and thoroughly performed, results in the most extraordinary occult powers. A subject is the correlative of the three qualities of tranquillity, enlivening and latency, and as each quality becomes ascendant the subject varies; and these variations may be produced by the power of PREFACE. XXxI1x Saiiyama, apart from ordinary mundane causes. Hence the efficacy of the Safiyama in producing occult powers. Safiyama, however, should not be applied indiscriminately to all purposes. The proper rule is to follow the stages of perfection successively attained by a Yogi, ६. e., it should not be applied to a subtile object, until it has been practised and per- fected with regard to gross objects. In other words, it should be practised step by step according to the different stages into which the career of a Yogi is divided. Unless this is done no fruition follows (v1). The occult powers, called Siddhis, derivable by the practice of the Saiiyama are the most astounding possible. By it one may know the past and the future, the circumstances connected with his former existences, as well as the day and hour of his death. He may know what is in the mind of another person, or the meaning of the cries of animals. He may make himself or others invisible to bystanders, contract friendship with whomsoever he likes, or attain other superhuman powers. He may acquire a knowledge of things that are ordinarily too subtile, or too remote, for human observation, or so intercepted as not to be visible. He can observe the details of regions situ- ated far away from the earth ; of the stars and planets, their dispositions and their motions. He can have occular knowledge of spiritual phenomena. He may know what is going on inside his body; subdue his hunger and thirst ; or make his body so firm as none can shake it. Itis possible for him, too, to make departed spirits visible, and to converse with them. xl PREFACE. He can attain superhuman intuition, audition, taction, Vision, gustation and olfaction. He may project his own soul into another’s body, and then bring it back into his own. He can travel with the quickness of the mind through air or through water, and go wheresoever he lists. When most of these powers have been attained and a Yogi is in a forward state for absolute perfection, the gods envy his success, and try to divert him from his onward course. They place temptations in his way in the forms of handsome women, great wealth, and other worldly objects of value, and thereby lead him astray (LI). In this they play the part of Mara in the Buddhist legends, and of Satan in the Bible. Great care and determination are necessary to rise above such temptations. According to the Tantras when temp- tations fail, resort is had to frightful forms, tigers, lions, serpents, ogres and the like, which threaten instant destruction to the Yogi. But if they are met by firm resolve, they are always ultimately overcome. Great as are these and such like powers, of which a great many are described in the text, they are not the objects which a Yogi should seek. They are the results of his meditations, and they indicate the success he is gradually attaining, and the progress he is making towards his goal ; but they are not that goal. The highest power is, even like the lowest, a part of the ‘seeded’ or discriminative meditation. These powers are, nevertheless, of value, as they enhance the power of the understanding, and in their perfec- tion result in the all-saving knowledge, tdérakjndna, PREFACE. xli which makes manifest the relation between the think- ing principle and Soul, and brings on the “seedless meditation.”” They are thus of use in consummating the isolation of Soul—the summum bonum which the Yoga promises to its votaries. The fourth chapter is devoted to a consideration of such metaphysical topics as bear on the nature and character of Isolation. It opens by saying that spe- cial faculties may result from five different causes, (I). Some of them are described to be due to birth; such as the power of flying, or living in water, or with suspended animation for protracted periods. These are specific peculiarities of particular genera of animals which may be acquired by being born in such genera, and are not common to all living beings. Others are due to herbs, such as the effect of drugs in arresting sleep, hunger, or the like, or making the flesh proof against heat, or poison, or cold. Others, again, are due to certain incantations or mantras which are universally believed by the Hindus to have very extraordinary powers. Austerity or asceticism in the game way is credited with the power of enabling people to acquire special faculties. Of course, the tangible faculties in this case are not faculties strictly so called, but the effect of habit. And lastly, Samadhi is believed to produce the same results, and these are what have been described in the preceding chapter. The first four causes do not concern the author, and, therefore, no further notice is taken of them. The last is intimately connected with the question at issue, and great pains are taken to meet such objec- 111 PREFACE. tions as might be started against the theory of Samadhi being the cause of special faculties. The objections are assumed to proceed from opponents, and the 888 supply the replies. In the second and the third aphorisms, an opponent is made to deny caus- ality to Samadhi, inasmuch as it has no influence on the body, and bodily changes are known to have been produced in this life. The explanation given is that the materials of the body undergo change of their own accord, and merit resulting from Samadhi subserves only to remove all obstructions from their way. This is illustrated by the example of the husbandman, who removes the inequalities on the surface of a field in order to lead water to where it is wanted, and the water then flows of its own accord, or in obedience to the laws of gravitation. This satisfies the opponent, who thereupon, shifts his ground, and, admitting the possibility of the materials changing by themselves, raises the question as to how thinking principles, which — are immaterial, can be so produced. Yogis pretend that they can, each of them, animate a number of bodies at the same time, and it is necessary that, for such a purpose, each body should have a separate thinking principle, and the questions raised are how is it provided ? aad how is the unity of the creating one preserved? The theory of spontaneous change in materials cannot explain this, and the reply given is that such thinking principles are emanations or scintillations from the creating one, and are there- fore subordinate to it, acting in accord with the will of the creator, even as the different organs of the PREFACE. xiii body act in accordance with the will of the mind, (11m1—Vv). _ The possibility of Samadhi producing occult powers being thus settled, the question next comes as to the nature of those powers—are they of the same charac- ter as those produced by other causes? or are they different ? The reply is that they are different, (णा). The faculties produced by the other causes are intimately connected with former births; the resi- dua of former births are the active principles which animate them; whereas the faculties produced by Samadhi have no such background. They are spontaneous, and do not produce those after-conse- quences which the others do. . This leads to the classification of works leading to residua into four groups. Some are described to be white or meritorious ; some are black or vicious; some are partly black and partly white; while others are neither black nor white. The first three groups belong to ordinary life, and leave behind residua ; the last pertains to Yogis, and are not calculated to leave any remnant behind, (ण्या). The after-consequences of ordinary works are two-fold, instinct, and kind, age and experience. The theory is that every work, every sensation, every form of experience leaves on the thinking prin.« ciple an impress of its own, and such impressions, accumulating in course of a lifetime, become the stock of residua which, though for the time being latent, are susceptible of revival by proper stimulants in subsequent existences. (4. p. 26—174). This xliv PREFACE. révival is Instinct, ४. e., instead of believing Instinct to be spontaneous, self-evolved, intuitive reason, as Euro- pean philosophers describe it, (ef. p. 175,) Yogis take it to be the fruit of the remembrance of former experi- ence, revived by particular circumstances. These resi- dua are also the causes of rewards and punishments in subsequent lives, and the rewards and punishments are represented by kind, age and experience ; kind imply- ing birth into higher or lower grades according to merit or demerit; age the span of life in such existences, which is prolonged or reduced according to one’s deserts ; and experience sensations of pleasure or pain. Confining his attention here to Instinct, the author describes that the residua producing Instinct do not revive invariably but according to circumstances, even after breaks caused by dissimilar births, (vm). Nor do such breaks, produced by dissimilar births, localities, or times lead to any breach in the relation of cause and effect existing between residua and instinc- tive manifestations, (Ix), inasmuch as the result mani- fests itself invariably at the first favourable moment, The theory of residua as above propounded is open to the grave objection that it does not provide for the manifestation of instinctive action at the first birth when no residua can be predicated; but the author obviates it by assuming eternity of desires and consequently of the universe. That which is eternal can have no beginning, and consequently there is no room left for a first birth, (x). This involves a regressus in infinitum, but, assuming matter and the universe to be eternal, .it is not objectionable, or illogical. More- PREFACE. श्न over, the necessity of keeping God apart from creation, renders the theory of eternity of the universe unavoidable. Admit God to be the creator, the necessity arises of making Him engage in work and derive its fruit ; deny it, the universe must be accepted as self-evolved, and the theory of nothing comes from nothing not allowing of such an assumption, the author is driven to the only alternative left, that of eternity. The opponent who raised the first objection now turns round and argues that if eternity be predicated of desires, how can they be removed? and if they are not removed the chain of transmigration will ever lengthen and never come to anend, and no redemption is possible, so that the performance of the Yoga for the sake of liberation from the fetters of repeated existence would be futile. To this the au- thor replies by saying that the cause of desire is ignorance of the true nature of things; its effect is the body and its longings and their consequences ; its asylum is the thinking principle; and its object is worldly enjoyment, and if these can be made inert or functionless, they would cease to produce their fruits; and if they ceased there would be no root left im re the individual in which they are made functionless to produce new residua, and consequently he would be free, (XI). But, says the opponent, the thinking principle is ever changing under diverse influences, it cannot be in one existence what it was before, and consequently there is no unity, and therefore the theory of oneness, of omne ens est unwm, is lost. This argument is met अणा PREFACE. by the theory of archetypes. Every category is eternal, all things are eternal, nothing is really created, or absolutely destroyed, and what we call. creation or destruction is simply change of attributes, and in the case of the thinking principle it is nothing more. When it changes its present condition, it reverts to its former condition, or asumes a new one, but its unity is never lost, (x11). This is the theory of the moder- ate nominalists or conceptionalists, with their univer- salia ad rem, universalia in re, and universalia post rem. Change having been admitted above, the author proceeds to account for it. 1६18 produced by the three qualities acting either on the subject, or on the object, or on both, (उवा). The action, however, is not simul- taneous, only one of the qualities is predominant at a time, and therefore there is no diversity in the two, (xiv). This leads to the question are sensibles the causes of sensation ? or sensations the causes of sensi- bles? The first idea is in accord with every-day experience. Sensation usually takes place when there is a sensible present to produce it. The rela- tion of the two as cause and effect is, however, not constant, and under different circumstances the same sensible produces simultaneously very different sen- sations, and the simultaneous production of different effects by one cause is illogical and impossible. The commentator illustrates this by appealing to the different effects produced by a single handsome Woman on amorous males, her rivals, and ascetics. He might have gone further, and adverted to repre- sentative sensations as. distinct from presentative eee PREFACE. xlvii ones. In fact, as Professor Miiller, in his ‘ Elements of Physiology’ (Baly’s Translation, p. 1059), has observed, ^ external agencies can give rise to no kind of sensation which cannot also be produced by inter- nal causes, exciting changes in the condition of our nerves.” Sensations, too, remain on the sensorium after the sensibles producing them have been removed. Nor can sensation be the cause of sensible, or, in the language of the commentator, “if a thing were an effect of the thinking principle, then there would be nothing besides, when that thinking principle -would be occupied with one particular thing.” It cannot be said that the ideal presentation of things would be created and maintained by other thinking principles while one thinking principle is occupied with a particular thing, for in that case many diverse causes would be made to produce one effect. Applied to the world the inference would be that one world is the effect of many diverse causes, and, that not being possible, the alternative would be that the world is causeless. The solution afforded is that there is no relation of cause and effect between the two; they are eternal and move in different paths (xv) ; and their action upon each other is regulated by the triad of qualities, one or other of which predomi- nates for the time and produce its effects. Patanjali is exceedingly brief and enigmatical, but his object is the refutation of the theory of ideal presentation as opposed to real substantiality of matter, 2. e., of the Vivartavdda doctrine of the Vedanta. - .The preception above produced is still incomplete. xI viii PREFACE. The thinking principle may undergo modification and assume the shape of the object presented to it, but it cannot, being unconscious, intelligently perceive ‘what it sees, (xvi). The intelligent principle has still to be infused into it, and this is done by Soul. The reflection of the Soul acting on it makes it per- ceive directly what 18 presented to it. It is accord- ingly said that a thing is known or unknown accord- ing as there is a reflection of the Soul, or the absence of it, in the thinking principle, (xvz). An objection is now raised to the effect that under the circumstances above stated, there being no stabi- lity in the thinking principle, knowledge derived by perception could not be constant. The reply given is that since the real perceiver, the Soul, is immutable, knowledge which depends on it must necessarily be constant. Inasmuch, however, as the thinking principle can undergo only one modification at atime, and the Soul perceives only that modifica- tion, and not the outside world, there can be only one perception at a time: two diverse ideas cannot arise simultaneously, (XIX). The objector is still unsatisfied. To obviate the necessity of calling in the agency of Soul, he sug- gests a multiplicity of thinking principles, saying let one perception or thinking principle be perceived by another. This, however, says the author, cannot be, for the second perception would require a third, aud so on, and that would lead to a regressus in infinitum. There would, moreover, be no certainty, for in calling one idea to mind a host would arise, and there would ___ _ च्न्तण्०्र | PREFACE. xlix be nothing to show which is the particular idea that has been invoked, or is necessary to the elucidation of the perception at hand. There is yet another objection to urge. Accepting that perception cannot be helped by one cognition cognizing another, the opponent suggests that in life persons always express the opinion of their knowing things, and how can this take place unless the thinking principle possessed self-illuminative powers? This is met by saying that the thinking principle, assuming the form of the immutable soul, attains the light of intelligence, and is then able to understand its own cognitions, (ङा) ; and the conclusion arrived at is that when the thinking principle is modified on the one hand by soul and on the other by objects of cognition, it is sufficient for all purposes of understanding, (उक्या). The commentator here anticipates a number of other objections, and disposes of them according to the theory of the Yoga. (Cf. p. 197). These explanations, however, are not enough. There is yet a lingering suspicion that the thinking principle has a will of its own, and this suspicion is developed in the form of a question as to what motive the thinking principle can have in engaging itself in its various functions? Naturally inert, it can have no object of its own, and in performing its functions it must be acting without a motive, and as nothing is done without a motive, the inference would be that it has a will of its own, and it gratifies that will by acting as it does. This suspicion is set at rest by the remark that since it acts in conjunction with others, 1 PREFACE. its object must be to subserve another’s purpose, and that another is soul, (सत्वा). The commentator explains that such conjunct action for another’s purpose without any consciousness on the part of the actors is possible, as we sec it in the organs of sense, which act for the purposes of the mind without knowing that they are doing so. The Sankhya-karika adduces the example of milk, an unintelligent sub- stance, secreting for the nourishment of the calf. (Cf. v.’8s LvII to LX). The example of the cart carrying ` saffron for the use of man is also generally appealed to. Soul is described as the witness, spectator and experiencer of the actions of nature. Conscious and always present in the body, it cannot but witness what takes place in it. This is the idea which Fichte assigns to mind, when he says, it is, “as it were an intelligent eye, placed in the central point of our inward consciousness, surveying all that takes place there,” (Morell, II, p. 95). But since soul has no action or desire of any kind, and as it is, moreover, eternal and immutable, how can it be said to have 8 purpose of its own, which the thinking principle has to subserve? This is a crucial question, and the answer given is practically an evasion. The premises are admitted, but it is said that, inasmuch as it isa shadow of the soul that sensitizes the thinking princi- ple, and that shadow feels and observes, by indiscri- minate use of language we call the soul to be the experiencer and witness, (cf. p. 194). The service done is, in the same way, service done to the shadow PREFACE. li and not to the reality, and the benefit derived gocs to nature or Prakriti, which is entertained and ulti- mately relieved of all sense of pain, and not to soul, which is painless and ever free. Patanjali now turns to the effect of the theory and practice propounded. Whena person has duly gone through the course of practice enjoined and ac- quired the knowledge promised, all false notions that he before had on the subject of life subside, (xxiv), and his thinking principle is bowed down by the weight of knowledge and commencing isolation, (xxv). Worldly thoughts, however, still break out occasion- ally, (xxv1), and these should be carefully repressed in the same way in which afflictions and obstructions were originally overcome, (¢f. II, xxvii). When this repression is effected, perfect knowledge rises in the thinking principle, and entirely sweeps away all remnants of afflictions and residua of former works, (xxvii—xxx). All obscurations are removed; the triad of qualities in regard to the individual concerned ceases from undergoing further change, (xxxI); and the moment at last arrives when the qualities, having retired to rest, become defunct, and the soul abides solely in its own essence. This is isolation or salvation which is the aim and object of the Yoga doctrine, (xxx). This isolation is absolute and eternal, and the soul in regard to which it has been attained remains free for evermore Following the order of the text, the above sum- mary does not afford a consecutive statement of the leading points of the Yoga system of theology and lti PREFACE. metaphysics, and inasmuch as the dissertations on the Yoga now available in the English language are brief, obscure, and not unoften misleading and in- correct, it would not be amiss to attempt here a categorical resumé. The cardinal dogmas are, as already above stated, taken from the Sankhya system, but there are differences, and the importance attached to some of them, in their mutual coéporation is markedly distinctive. The leading tenets of the Yogis 876 : Ist. That there is a Supreme Godhead who is purely spiritual, or all soul, perfectly free from afflic- tions, works, deserts, and desires. His symbol is Om, and He rewards those who are ardently devoted to Him by facilitating their attainment of liberation ; but He does not directly grant it, Nor is He the futher, creator, or protector of the universe, with which He is absolutely unconnected. 2nd. That there are countless individual souls which animate living beings, and are eternal. They are pure and immutable; but by their association with the universe they become indirectly the experi- encers of joys and sorrows, and assume innumerable embodied forms in course of ever recurring metemp- sy choses. 3rd. That the universe is uncreate and eternal. It undergoes phenomenal changes, but, as a noumenon, it is always the same. In its noumenal state it is called Prakriti or nature ; it is always associated with the three qualities or active forces called goodness, foulness, and darkness. Matter as an integral part of PREFACE, lin the universe is, likewise, eternal, though subject to modifications like the world. Strictly speaking the modifications of matter produce the phenomenal world which is composed of it. 4th. That next to soul there is a noumenon called Chitta, or the thinking principle, or mind in its most comprehensive sense. It is subject to the three qualities aforesaid, and undergoes various modifications accord- ing to the prevalence of one or other of those quali- ties. It is essentially unconscious or unintelligent, but it becomes conscious or intelligent by the reflec- tion of, or association with, soul, which abides close by it. It also receives through the organs of sense shadows of external objects, and thereupon modifies itself into the shapes of those objects. The conscious- ness reflected on it makes it think that it is the experiencer of all worldly joys and sorrows. In reality, however, it is merely the spectacle of which soul is by proxy (its shadow) the spectator. It is closely allied to Buddhi or intellect of the Sankhya system, but it plays a much more important part in the system, than what Buddhi does, partaking as it does the parts of both Prakriti and Buddhi in a prominent degree, and also of self-consciousness. It occupies the position of Will of the modern Pessimist system. 5th. That the functions of the thinking principle are five-fold, including right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory, and that these functions are produced by the prevalence of one or other of the three qualities. 6th. That, like the universe, all sensible objects liv PREFACE. have their eternal archetypes or noumena, which undergo phenomenal changes, but are never absolutely destroyed. When one object changes into another, it is merely a modification of its form, and the form assumed, when destroyed, passes on to some other form, but it ultimately reverts to its noumenal or primary state. ith. That phenomena, as results of modifications of noumena, are real and not phantasmal. 8th. That sensibles are not the direct causes of sensations, nor sensations the causes of sensibles ; but that the thinking principle receives impressions of sensibles under the influence of one or other of the three qualities, and the result is regulated by that influence. The influence extends both to sensations and to sensibles. 9th. That the thinking principle being changeable, constancy of knowledge is due to the immutability of the soul, and that no perception can take place until the thinking principle is made conscious by the soul. 10th. That impressions produced on the thinking principle leave on it certain residua (avayyyors of Aris- totle) which are causes of intuitions, desires, new births, and further experiences. 117. That desires are the origin of pain in this world. 12th. That the universe being eternal, desires are likewise eternal, and it is needless therefore to en- quire when residua first arose to create desires. 13th. That mundane existence is thus associated with pain, and it is the duty of every one to rise above that pain. PREFACE. lv 14th. That the pain may be finally overcome or removed only by withdrawing the thinking principle from its natural functions. 15th. That the withdrawal in question can be effected by constant and sedulous observance of cer- tain prescribed restraints, obligations and steadfast meditation. 16th. That in the course of the exercises above referred to, the adept attains extraordinary occult powers. 17th. That when that withdrawal is complete and absolute, the soul is completely isolated from the world, and that when that isolation is attained, it is liberated from all liability to future transmigration. And this is the isolation, liberation, emancipation, or final beatitude which should be the great object and aim of human existence. The general impression regarding the nature of the Yoga doctrine, has been hitherto exceedingly unfavourable among Anglo-oriental scholars. It is mystical, itis fanatical, it is dreadfully absurd, are among the mildest charges brought against it. Mr. Fitz-Edward Hall is so disgusted with its tenets that in a fit of virtuous indignation he says, ^ As few of the . twenty-eight Yoga works which have fallen under my inspection are at present read, so, one may hope, few will ever again be read, either in this country or by curious enquirers in Europe. If weexclude the im- mundities of the Tantras and of the Kama-s‘dstra, Hindu thought was never more unworthily engaged than in digesting into an economy the fanatical vagaries lvi PREFACE. of theocracy. Not less, it is observable, have the Yogins of India transcended than they have anticipated the quietistic delirations of Bonaventura, de Sales, Saint Theresa, and Molinos,” (Contributions, p. XI). Other writers, if not equally denunciative, are still very severe in the tone of their criticisms. I believe this is due principally to the subject not having been carefully studied. The subject is dry—exceed- ingly so—and the enigmatical form in which it 1s presented in the text-books is not conducive to any interest being created in its favour. Generally speaking Indian scholars do not study it, and the few ascetics and hermits who do seldom associate with the world. Pandits, when called upon to ex- plain, frequently, if not invariably, mix up the tenets of Patanjali’s Yoga with those of the Tantras, the Puranas, the Tantric 87111188, the Pancharatras, and the Bhagavadgité—works which have very dissimilar and discordant tenets to inculcate. Some of the later avowedly Yoga works are, moreover, exceedingly allegorical and mystical in their descriptions, and in them the purport of the instruction is buried in a mass of absurdity. Practices, too, have been inculcated in them which are certainly repulsive. (Cf. pp. 108, 117). In judging, however, of the nature of Patanjali’s doctrine it is unfair to associate it with the vagaries of fanatical, deluded mendicants, or with the modifications and adaptations which it has undergone in the hands of the Tantrics and the Puranics. The tencts of Patanjali are all that concern the PREFACE. रा critic, and the summary of them given above will show to the unbiassed enquirer that they are closely similar to those enunciated by some of the greatest metaphysicians of ancient Greece. The similitude is in some cases so close that I would not be surprised to see some enterprising dialectician, intent upon proving everything good in India to be of European origin, demonstrate that the whole system has been nefariously copied from Greek philosophers. The tenets may not be the best of their kind—some of them are unquestionably futile,—but they are cer- tainly, not such philosophic desperadoes as to com- mit outrages on the chastity of our thoughts, or so vile as to make us join in the hope so fervently expressed by Mr. Hall that the works which treat of them may not again be read by the curious en- quirer. Ifthe history of the human mind be a fit subject for study, if it be desirable to compare the progress of metaphysical knowledge among different nationalities at different times in different places, if the civilization of the Hindus be an object of enquiry, we should rather earnestly desire that the works should be thoroughly examined, and not neglected, and that without in any way pledging ourselves as their defenders. There is no reason to doubt that such enquiry will not only be useful to history, but reflect credit on the grasp of the intellect of the ancient Indian sages who matured the doctrine. It would take more space than what I have at my disposal to go through all the tenets seriatim, and show their relation to European theories, but it may [णा PREFACE. be generally observed that even the most faulty dogmas do not, on sufficient examination, appear to be so bad as they are represented to be by hasty and adverse critics. The theory of isolation is certainly very startling, but it was the logical outcome of the conception of the absolute perfection of the Godhead reacting on the Upanishad doctrine of resolution into the Divine essence.* The Bhagavadgita thus sums up the Upanishad idea : ‘He who all paths stops up, and in the heart ‘Confines the mind, shuts up the breath within ‘The head, adopts a firm devotion, utters ‘The single syllable “ Om”—the Soul Supreme, ‘And thinks of me, and goes, abandoning ‘The body thus, reaches the goal supreme.’ (Zelang's Translation, p. 52.) This idea, however, involves the necessity of addi- tions to, and abstractions from, Divine perfection. The theory is that the human soul is specifically dis- tinct from, though generically the same with, the Divine one, and as the two dissimilars cannot melt into one, they must always remain separate, and as joy, felicity, bliss and the like imply activity and enjoyment,—a concrete heaven inconsistent with the theory of final rest,—the Yogis obviate all philosophic and logical difficulties by contenting themselves with isolation, without predicating it with joy or bliss. The threefold division of the intellectual man into purusha, chitta and ahankara is the counter part of vous, yx and copa Of Plato and other ancient * Dr. Weber probably refers to this Upanishad theory, and not to the Puranas as stated on page 208. PREFACE. ltx European authors. (Plato, Fimeus, Aristotle, Poli- tics.) The theory of Prakriti, a noumenal absolute of the phenomenal wor.d, or nature in the abstract, has been a stumbling-block to many Europeans, and the allego- rical way in which it is frequently described, is cer- tainly often misleading. Even among Hindus it has given rise to many frivolous and absurd stories. In the main, hawever, it seems to accord very closely with some of the latest European speculations on the sub- ject. It is no other than the gues or plastic nature of Cudworth, which has been designed to avoid fortuitous- ness on the one hand and God’s constant interposition on the other. Morell, in his ‘ History of modern Philosophy’ (I, p. 208) commenting on one of the latest German systems, that of Herbarts, says :. ‘The process by which the necessity of philosophy comes to be felt is the following :— When we look round us upon the world in which we live; our knowledge commences by a perception of the various objects that present themselves on every hand to our view. What we tmmediately perceive, however, is not actual essence, but phenomena ; and after a short time, we discover that many of those phenomena are unreal; that they do not pourtray. to us the actual truth of things as they are; and that if we followed them implicitly, we should soon be landed in the midst of error and contradiction. For example, what we are immediately conscious of in coming into contact with the external world, are such appearances as green, blue, bitter, sour, extension, resistance, &c. These phenomena, upon re- flection, we discover not to to be so many real independent exis- tences, but properties inhering in certain substances, which we term things. Again, when we examine further into these substances, we discover that they are not real ultimate essences, but that they con- sist of certain elements, by the combination of which they are produced. What we term. the reality, therefore, is not the thing ae. lx PREFACE. a whole, but the elements of which it is composed. Thus, the further we analyze, the further does the idea of reality recede back- wards; but still it must always be somewhere, otherwise we should be perceiving a nonentity. The last result of the analysis is the conception of an absolutely simple element, which lies at the basis of all phenomena in the material world, and which we view as the essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation.’ Dr. Kay, in his remarks on this passage, observes— ‘This “ essence that assumes the different properties which come before us in sensation” —this which the European analyst arrives at as “the last result of the analysis’—is what the Saikhya expositor, proceeding, “more Indico,” synthetically, lays down as his first posi- tion. This is Kapila’s mulaprakriti—the “root of all’’—‘ the radical producer’’—that which, variously modified, constitutes all that the ‘ soul’ takes cognizance of. This primordial essence—among the synonymes for which, given in our text-book, are the ‘ undiscrete’ avyakta, the ‘indestructible’ akshara, that ‘in which all generated effect 18 comprehended’ pradhdaaka, &c., is the ‘ absolute’ of German speculation. The development of this principle, according to one of Shelling’s views (noticed by Mr. Morell at p. 147, Vol. II) is ‘ not the free and designed operation of intelligence, but rather a blind impulse working, first unconsciously in the mind.”’ So, according to Kapila, “ From Nature issues Mind, and thence self-consciousness.”’’ (Benares Magazine, Vol. III, pp. 284) This Prakriti is believed to be unintelligent, and yet it is described to be acting for another’s purpose, and this has often been stigmatized as a specimen of Indian absurdity. This theory, however, is exactly what Cudworth entertains in regard to his plastic nature, which, he says ‘doth never consult nor deliberate ;’ ‘it goes on in one constant unrepeating tenor from generation to generation; it acts artifi- cially and for sake of ends, but itself understands PREFACE. lxi not the ends which it acts for.’ ‘It acts neither by knowledge nor by animal fancy, neither electively nor blindly, but must be concluded to act FATALLY, magically, and sympathetically.’ (‘True Intellectual System of the Universe,’ ए. I., Cap. ITI, 37.) Again, Prakriti and necessarily matter are eternal, says the Yogi, and in the sense in which he predicates eternity, ४, e., to noumena as distinct from pheno- mena, we have nothing more preposterous than the “eternal verities’” of the European philosophers of even our own times—verities which even the Godhead cannot undo, such as the conception of a triangle invariably including two right angles. To such archetypical eternities few can object from a pure philosophic standpoint, apart from revealed systems of religion. The two most repellent dogmas of the system are its faith in metempsychosis and its theory about occult powers, and even these have found defenders in quarters where they were least expected ; and, care- fully considered, they do not seem to be so absurd as one would at first glance suppose. Extravagant as are the ideas regarding the occult powers, and purely imaginary as, at least, some of them doubtless are, it is worthy of note that belief in such powers was almost universal in the ancient world, and well-authenticated reports are not wanting to show that some of them were attainable. Mental prescience has manifested itself on many occasions. Mesmeric and other electric conditions of the body are now objects of scientific research ; and they are well-known lxii PREFACE. to produce extraordinary phenomena. Many facts have been brought to light which show that physical causes may be, particularly in unsophisticated states of society, easily mistaken for occult powers. Sir David Brewster’s theory of the objective projection upon visual organs of a subjectively concieved image may account for a good many occurrences which strike the mind of the masses with wonder, and appear as the result of superhuman agency. Many psychological conditions, which are known to arise and produce start- ling results, but the true nature of which has not yet been fully and scientifically examined and ascertained, would account for some so-called occult occurrences. But in the present state of our knowledge it is impos- sible to separate the wheat from the tares—to discri- minate between what powers were really attained or attainable by Yogis and what they fancied they would attain by persevering in their practices. Doubt- less the pretensions of the European psychics of the day are to a considerable extent false and fraudulent ; still there are among them some good men and true, and their researches carried on oncatholic, honest and scien- tific principles will hereafter bear some good fruit, and the time will then come to enquire how far the Yogis had anticipated them. Inthe meanwhile all that need be said is that the extravagance of some of their pre- tensions should not make us spurn the Yogis as all knaves and charlatans, and their psychical system wholly falseand fatuous. Such a principle of action, however necessary and prudent in shifting the merits of a lawsuit, and even then under certain PREFACE. 1ड111 restrictions, would be intolerable in history. If some obviously false, or improbable, or unprovable, statements in any author would justify our rejecting the whole of his testimony there would be no ancient author left whose testimony could be accepted, and ब know not how few of our modern authors would escape the condemnation. No Yogi myself, norany- wise interested in the doctrine, all I feel in the cause of truth is, that there should, for the present, be a suspension of judgment, and the materials afforded by the Yogis should be subjected to examination and analysis. As regards metempsychosis something has already been said, (८८९, p. xiii.) It is a doctrine which even Plato thought fit to adopt, and much might be said in favour of it which cannot be readily disproved; but I shall content myself here with a quotation. Perhaps the ablest metaphysician who ever came to India from England was the late Rev. Dr. Kay, principal of the late Bishop’s College. His strong Christian convictions did not by any means make him an indulgent critic of adverse faiths, but in commen- ting on the doctrine of metempsychosis as affording a solution of the question of the origin of evil, he says: ‘The doctrine of the Metempsychosis is, in fact, the Hindu theory on the great question of the “ ori- gin of evil.” The theory may be thus stated. Evil exists, and it is not to be supposed that evil befals any one undeservedly. When, therefore, for exam- ple, a new-born child, who has had no opportunity of acting either rightly or wrongly, is found suffer- lxiv PREFACE. ing evil, it is inferred that the evil is the fruit of evil deeds done in a former state of existence. If you ask how the person became disposed to do evil in that former state of existence, the answer is ready—it was the consequence of evil deeds done in a state of existence still anterior, and so on. You have only now to apply the Newtonian principle—that what is true at every assignable point short of the limit, must be true at the limit—and then there is no assignable point in the existence of evil in past time at which point its existence cannot be accounted for by the hypothesis of antecedent evil-doing; it follows (argue the Hindus) that the existence of evil is accounted for on this hypothesis; and further, they contend, it is accountable on no other. ‘If one will take the pains thoroughly to grasp the conception, and to view the matter, as a German would say, from the same stand-punki as the Hindu, who, holding the past eternity of soul, denies that the regressus in infinitum here involves any absur- dity, he will probably acknowledge that the doctrine of the metempsychosis, however false, is not to be treated as a fiction of the poets, when we are arguing with a Hindu. We try to make the Hindu give up the tenet—and we do well :—but we shall also do well to bear in mind that we are calling upon him to give up, without an equivalent, what he has been accustomed to regard as a complete solution of the greatest mystery in the universe—short of the primal mystery of “ Being” itself. The Hindu’s explanation we regard as a delusion, and we must tell him so— PREFACE. lxv but we must beware how we allow it to appear as if we were provided with a substitute. The “ origin of evil” has not been revealed. The requirement that we shall maintain our entire reliance on the good- ness of God, in the absence of such revelation, is one of the trials—rather it furnishes the substance of all the trials—of our faith. This we have to teach— but we have no equivalent solution of the mystery to offer. On this point the words of Whately should be treasured by every Missionary among the Hindus. We quote from the Preface (p. 12) of his ‘ Essays on some of the peculiarities of the Christian religion.’ ‘The origin of evil, again, not a few are apt to speak of, as explained and accounted for, at least in great part, by the Scripture- accounts of ‘sin entering the world, and death by sin ;' whereas the Scriptures leave us, with respect to the difficulty in question, just where they find us, and are manifestly not designed to remove it. He who professes to account for the existence of evil, by merely tracing it up to the fret evil recorded as occurring, would have no reason to deride the absurdity of an atheist, who should profess to account for the origin of the human race, without having recourse to a creator, by tracing them up to the erst pair.’’” (Benares Maga- gine, III, pp. 286} Elsewhere the same writer, speaking generally, observes, ‘ it may somewhat tend to check the mischiev- ous consequences attendant on bluntly regarding any current and influential Hindu doctrine, that happens not to accord with our accustomed notions, as being self-evidently frivolous and effete, if it can be shown that the conceptions involved in the doctrine are still influential in directing the current of speculation in Europe, in quarters where that current runs (or is supposed to run) deepest.’ (Opus cit., pp. 2852) Ixvi PREFA CE, To turn now to the life of Patanjali. The brief notices to be met with of him in Sanskrit works are so legendary and contradictory that little can be made of them to subserve the cause of history. He was a great scholar and unrivalled philologist of his time, and the life of every great man was, in ancient times, so encrusted with the supernatural that it is difficult to remove the covering, and come to the truthful core. Rev. J. Ward, citing the Rudra- yamala Tantra, the Vrihannandikes vara Purana, and the Padma Purana, describes him to ‘ have been born in the Ilavrata Varsha, where his father Angira and his mother Sati resided, and that, immediately on his birth, he made known things past, present, and future. He married Lolupa, whom he found on the north of Sumeru, in the hollow of a “ Vata” tree, and is said to have lived as a mendicant to a great age. Being insulted by the inhabitants of Bhota-bhandara, while engaged in religious austerities, he reduced them to ashes by fire from his mouth.’ (Hindus, II.) There occurs in the Sankshepa-s'ankara-jaya of Madhava A’charya a story, according to which the Devas, on one occasion, repaired to Mahadeva, and be- sought his aid in saving the world from the baneful doctrines which Bauddhas and other heretics had widely disseminated among men. The god vouchsafed to them a kind reply, and it was arranged that certain chief divi- nities would from time to time appear on earth as Jai- - mini, Vydsa, Patanjali, and S’ankara, and, uprooting all heresies, preserve the true religion from pollution. It fell to the lot of Vishnu and S‘ankarshana alias Ananta PREFACE. xvi to depute a portion of themselves to be born as Patan- jali,* and Mahadeva himself appeared as S’ankara.t The only value of this story for historical purposes is the admission that Patanjali appeared on the earth long after it had been overrun by the Buddhists. Madhava A’charya of the 14th century is no autho- rity for what happened sixteen hundred years before him, but the tradition in his time was that Patanjali was born long after Buddha in order to inculcate theism, and this supports the opinion ex- pressed on page xxiii to the effect that the Yoga doc- trine as we have it in Patanjali’s work is of post Buddhist origin. It is in favour, too, of the deduc- tions made by Goldstiicker and others regarding the age of Patanjali from casual historical allusions in his great work, the Mahdbhashya, entirely under- mining, as it does, the arguments.of Professor Kunte as given in his ‘ Vicissitudes of Aryan civilization.’ It is true that the Yoga-sutra does not anywhere refer to Buddhism, and it is not easy to accept the theory of Professor Cowell that the relegation of benevolence (maitri), which occupies a prominent place in the Buddhist system, to an ancillary or subordinate position in the Yoga is a direct allusion to Buddhism, (Sarvadars ana-sangraha, p. 273,) for benevolence as an element of religious observance is * मध्यमं काडसमडतुमनन्ञाताः Fas AT | अवनोयांशतेः भमो सङ्कषे णपतद्चरो ॥ PiU मनौभत्वा were araareaal feat ॥ अप्रिमं भ्ानकाखम्तडरिष्य्रामौति देवताः। URE † aan शङ्करानाश्ना भविष्यामि मरदोतले | wane भवन्तोऽपि मानुषीं तनुमाश्रिताः॥ ४३ Ixvill PREFACE. common to all systems of religion, and reference to it cannot be taken as an unmistakable test; but apart from them, I believe, I have produced suffi- cient evidence to show that Patanjali cannot reason- ably be believed to have lived before Buddha. Ananta is represented in the form of a many-hooded serpent, and, as an emanation of that serpent, Patanjali is fre- quently indicated by the homonym phaeni or ‘serpent,’ (cf. p. 1). _ The references given of Patanjali in his Maha- bhashya entirely upsets the statements made in Mr. Ward’s notice. Thesage describes himself as the son of one Gonika, not Sati, and his place of birth was the eastern country, whereas Ilavrata is said in the Puranas to lie to the north of the Himdlaya. These facts are thus given by Goldstiicker in his essay on Panini: ‘Of the lineage of Patanjali all the knowledge I possess is, that the name of his mother was Gonitkd. It occurs in the last words of Patanjali on a K4rik& to Panini. Of more importance, how- ever, is the information he gives us of having resided temporarily in Kédshmtr, for this circumstance throws some light on the inter- est which certain kings of this country took in the preservation of the great commentary. ‘His birthplace must have been situated in the east of India, for he calls himself Gonardiya ; and this word is given by the Kasiké in order to exemplify names of places in the East. Patanjali’s birth- place had therefore the name of Gonarda. But that he is one of the eastern grammarians is borne out also by other evidence, Kaiyyata calls him on several occasions A’chdryadesiya. If we interpreted this word according to PAyini’s rules V, 3, 67 and 68, it would mean “an unaccomplished teacher ;’’ but as there is not the slightest reason for assuming that Kaiyyata intended any irony or blame when he applied this epithet to Patagjali, it is necessary to PREFACE. lxix render the word by the teacher “ who belongs to the country of the Acharya.”’ Now, since Kaiyyata also distinctly contrasts dcharya as the author of the Varttikas, with Achdryadesiya, the latter epithet can only imply that Patanjali was a countryman of Katya. yana. Katyayana, however, as Professor Weber has shown by very good arguments, is one of the eastern school; Kaiyyata, therefore, must have looked upon Patanjali also as belonging to it. ‘ Another proof is afforded by a passage in the comment of Bhatto- ji Dikshita on the Phit-sitras which I have quoted above. For when this grammarian tells us that the eastern grammarians attri- bute the accent in question of saka to Panini’s rule VI, 3, 78, we find that it is Patanjali himself who gives us this information, and without any intimation of his having obtained it from other author- ities.’ (Goldstiicker’s Padnins, p. 237.) Meagre as these notes on the life of Patanjali are, they are of unquestionable authority, and we must rest content with them. In the ‘Indian Antiquary’ (IX, p. 308), Professor Max Miiller has a note on the travels of I-tsing, a Chinese pilgrim, who visited India at the close of the 7th century, and therein mention is made of a Sanskrit grammatical work under the name of Juni or Chuni. The learned pro- fessor shows on very good arguments that the work could be no other than the Mahabhashya, and then very pertinently asks, “Is this (Juni) possibly a name connected with Gonika, the mother of Patanjali, who calls himself Gonik4putra, or with Gonarda, his sup- posed birthplace, from which he takes the name of Gonardiya ?” Few who have studied the subject would hesitate to respond in the affirmative to the first question. In a note on a Pali inscription from Bharhat, pub- lished in the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal for March 1880, I have quoted a lxx PREFACE. great number of instances to show that in India metronymics were used to indicate ilegitimacy, or the forsaking of a child by its father. If this theory of mine be tenable, the use of Gonikaputra in the case of Patanjali would suggest a bar sinister in his scutcheon. Under that supposition it would be futile to enquire about his genealogy. If Napoleon said, ‘my genealogy begins with the battle of Austerlitz,’ Patanjali might well appeal to his Maha- 1014812 as the root of his family tree.* Professor Weber, however, has been at some pains to find a genealogical tree for him. In his ‘ History of Indian Literature’ he has several remarks with reference to Patanjali in ‘connection with the Vedic Kapya Pata- mchala. He says, on page 137, ‘ Again, though only in the Yajnavalkiya-kanda, we have mention of a Kapya Patamchala of the country of the Madras as particularly distinguished by his exertions in the cause of Brdhmanical theology ; and in his name we cannot but see a reference to Kapila and Patanjali, the traditional founders of the Sankhya, and Yoga systems.’ This is modified in a subsequent remark, (p. 228,) in which it is said, ‘The name of Patan- jali (we should expect Pat.t) is certainly somehow * Professor Weber refers to a tradition which, he says, ‘ identi- fies Pingala with Patanjali, the author of Mahdbhashya and the Yoga-sitra,’ but he justly adds, it ‘ should answer for itself; for us there exists no cogent reason for accepting it.’ (‘ Hist. Indian Literature,’ p. 231.) ¶ This grammatical correction has been suggested apparently with a view to make Patanjali a derivative of Patamchala to prop the theory of relationship. PREFACE. lxxi connected with that of the Patamchala Kapya of the land of the Madras, who appears in the Yajnavalkiya- kanda of the Satap. Br. It occurs again (see below p. 737) as the name of the author of the Yoga-siitras.’ On page 236, we are told that, ‘ Kapila, again, can hardly be unconnected with the Kapya Patamchala whom we find mentioned in the Yajnavalkya-kanda of the Vrnhad A'ranyaka asa zealous representative of the Brahmanical learning.’ This is repeated on page 284,—‘ Kapya Patamchala, with whom Kapila ought probably to be connected.’ It is difficult to make out from these extracts a consistent account of what the real or actual theory is. In the first extract a single individual, Kapya Patamchala, is split into two persons, Kapila and Patanjali, and that as certainly as the phrase ‘ we cannot but see’ can imply. In the second extract the Vedic personage is said to be ‘certainly’ connected with Patanjali only, and in the third we are told that the same individual can ‘ hardly be unconnected’ with Kapila. In the fourth the phrase ‘can hardly be unconnected’ is replaced by ‘ought probably to be connected.’ No reason is assigned for the first two conjectures, but for the 3rd and the 4th the reason assigned is that Kapya Patam- chala was ‘a zealous representative of the Brahmanical learning.’ It happens, however, that Kapila was an atheist, who repudiated the existence of the Godhead, saying ‘there is no proof that such a being existed,’ and it is difficult to conceive how the relationship should be established on the ground of Kapya having been ‘a zealous representative of the Hindu learn- lxxil PREFACE. ing,’ unless we admit that Hindu learning consisted in atheism. It is obvious that the learned professor has been led away entirely by phonetic resemblance, un- less he should urge, which is not at all likely, that it is an ex cathedra opinion, without any reason to back it. Kapya has the letters & and p and so has Kapila, and Patamchala sounds very like Patanjali, and therefore he evidently concludes they are the same. This is a line of argument, however, which I cannot help thinking, is, to use the language of the learned Professor, ‘ of a very curious kind.’ It reminds me, I must frankly confess, the ratiocination of Fluellen by which that jovial Welsh Captain proved the iden- tity of Macedon and Monmouth. Had that flighty logician been reminded in the present case of the absence in Kapya of the letter ए of Kapila, and of 7 of Patanjaliin Patamchala, I can easily conceive how he would have completely dumb-foundered his antagonist with the pithy remark : ‘ Why, I pray you, is not pig great? the pig, or the great, or the mighty, or the huge, or the magnanimous, are all one reckonings, save the phrase is a little variations.’ 1 have nothing to show that Patanjali was not connected with Kapya by the father’s or the mother’s or some other side, in family or race, but I firmly hold that we have at present no proof worth the name in support of the conjecture. The son of a Brahman priest, and devoted to literary studies and ascetic practices from early life, Patanjali had little to do which could afford incidents fit for historical record, and it is not remarkable, therefore, that we have no account left of his career. He was PREFACE. bxxill doubtless married and probably the father of a family, but we know nothing about those points. The only memorials of his life are his literary works,—his great eommentary on the grammar of Panini and the Yoga 8018. It is impossible to speak in too high terms of the first. Itis the noblest monument of profound erudition, of keen critical acumen, of unrivalled philo- logical perception, which has been left to us by any ancient scholar in any part of the world, and well may ` the Hindus be proud of the heritage that has been bequeathed to them by their renowned ancestor. The second forms the theme of this essay. There is an A'ryyd-panchasdti on the Vaishnava theory of the relation between soul and nature which is also ascribed to him. The work has been published in the Benares ‘Pandit,’ No. 50. He wrote also a work on medicine, but it is no longer extant. It would seem that he was, likewise, the author of a treatise on grammatical desiderata under the title of Zshtis, and also certain supplementary notes on the rules of Sanskrit gram- mar (Vartikas), but these exist now only in the form of quotations in the Mahdbhishya. The manner in which they are cited 1u the ‘ great commentary’ sug- gests the idea that at one time they had separate existences, but they are not met with now as a separate work. To turn now to the Bibliography of the Yoga doctrine. The leading text is, as already stated, the Yogdnusdsana, but its different topics have been elaborated and expounded in a great number of sub- sequent treatises, and its literature is now represented lxxiv PREFACE. by a large mass of writings. In 1859, Mr. Hall, in his ‘Contributions towards an Index to the Biblio- graphy of the Indian Philosophical Systems,’ collected the names of 28 separate works. But recent re- searches carried on under the auspices of the Govern- ment of India enable me now to put in the Appendix ॐ list including no less than 150 names. It is pro- bable that further researches will bring to light the texts of several other works. It must be admitted, however, that while Mr. Hall’s list was compiled by a single individual after himself examining all the Mss. named, thereby obviating all risks of error, mine is a compilation from meagre reports, and it is likely, therefore, that there will be found in it. mistakes of diverse kinds. Sanskrit works have many aliases, and it is possible that in some cases—probably very few—of works unknown to, and unseen by, me I have recorded the same work under two or three names. Ihave included, too, afew works which treat of varieties of the Yoga, the Tantric and Puranic forms of it, and not confined myself solely to the doctrine of Patanjali. The differences in some cases are so slight, that it was not possible for me, without carefully reading the works, to mark the distinctions. On the whole, however, I believe the new list will be found useful. In preparing my list I have followed an alphabe- tical arrangement, a chronological one with anything like accuracy not being practicable in the present state of our information on the subject. Ifthe Yoga-s'dstra- sutra-patha, attributed to Yajnavalkya, be really his, it PREFACE. xxv is the oldest treatise known on the Yoga doctrine. Yajnavalkya lived long before Patanjali, and the Bhashya especially cites his name to prove that the Yoga doctrine was current from a much anterior period than the Yoga-sttra, which was compiled fer the benefit of novices; but as I have not yet seen it, I can say nothing on the subject. Adverting to the work, Mr. Hall says, ‘It is alleged that they (the aphorisms of Yajnavalkya) were noted down by Baudhayana, as they were orally delivered by S‘ukra to Yajnavalkya. Hence they are ascribed to S‘ukra, who here has the epithet of Mahakavi. This work possibly deserves a closer examination than I can at present give it: but, it is, I suspect, of compara- tively recent origin, and of little worth in any point of view.’ (Contributions, p. 18.) Passing it over for the present I come to the work of Patanjali, the Yoga-sutra alias the Yoganus'ésana or the Sdnkhya-pravachana. It has the benefit of a host of commentaries, explaining its tenets from different standpoints. The most ancient of these commentaries is generally believed to be the one which is known under the different names of Yoga- bhdshya, Pétanjala-bhashya, and Sdnkhya-prava- chana-bhdshya. It is held in high estimation by the Pandits of this country. It has the advantage, too, of two exegeses by eminent scholiasts, one by V&achaspati Mis‘ra, and the other by Vijndna Bhikshu. It labours, however, under the disadvan- tage of being of doubtful authenticity as regards the name of its author. It has been twice printed, once lxxvl PREFACE. at Benares, edited by Bhairavadatta Dvived{, and once at Calcutta, along with the gloss of Vachaspati M.s'ra, edited by Pandit Jivananda Vidyasagara, in 1874 (Samvat 1929.) I have also seen upwards of a dozen Mss. of it of different dates; but in the colophon of none of these have I met with the author’s name. This is a remarkable omission, inasmuch as it is rarely that the author’s name, where known, is dropped out from the colophon of a Sanskrit MS. The tradition is pretty common and old that Vyasa, the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahabharata, is the author of it. This tradition has been gener- ally accepted by European writers, and it has the support of the two well-known and respectable exegesists named above. V&chaspati Mis’ra in his gloss (८) on the commentary (bhdshya) says, “Saluting the saint Patanjali, I attempt a short, clear exposition (voydékhyé), pregnant with meaning, on the commentary expounded by Veda-vydsa.’’* The authority, however, of this writer is not, in matters connected with historical facts of olden times, of much weight. There were two writers of this name. One of them was a legist, and, according to the colophon of his S’udrdchdra-chintamani, court Pandit of Maharaja Harinérayana, of Mithila, and Harin&rdyana lived in the middle of the 16th century. The other lived between the 10th and the 12th centuries, and com- mented both on the Yoga and the S‘ankhya texts, as well as on the Vedanta-stitras. Adverting to him * wen पतञ्चरिब्धषिं केदब्यासेन wifes | सङूचिग्स्यटवङथे भाष्ये aren fruTea ॥ PREFACE. Ixxvli Mr. Hall says, ‘ Vachaspati’s exact age has not yet been discovered. But he is mentioned, as are Udayana and Prasastapada, in the Nydyasdra-vichdra of Bhatta Raghava, which was written in the S‘aka year 1174 or A. D. 1252; and he quotes from Bhoja, who was igning in A. D. 1042.’* (Sdnkhya-sdra, p. 40.) Vijnana Bhikshu dates from a much later time, According to Mr. Hall, ‘in all probability, Vijnana lived in the sixteenth or seventeenth century. There is some slight ground, however, for carrying him back still further. His nationality is unknown; and so is his civil appellation even; for Vijnana Bhikshu is, without question, the style of a devotee.’ (Sén- khya-séra, pp. 37/.) He continues, ‘In the Prayogaratna, a work on the sixteen sacraments, by Narfyana Bhatta, son of Ra- mes’vara Bhatta, its author says, that he was assisted, * This date is incorrect. It refers to the last Bhoja, where- as the Bhoja quoted must be the elder one, and elsewhere construc- tively admitted to be so by Mr. Hall himself. In the Preface to his ‘ Contributions towards an Index to the Bibliography of the Indian Philosophical Systems,’ he observes, ‘that two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, whatever was the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court; and the astrological compilation known as the Rdjamdértanda, and thus called in honour of him, may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work, so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate he came long after the date of the Sarasvatikanthdbharana ; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet of Ranaraiga- malla.’ (Contributions, p. viii.) lxxvill PREFACE. in preparing it, by Ananta Dfkshita, son of Vis’va- natha Dikshita. The father of one of Vijnana’s dis- ciples, Bhava-ganes’a Dikshita, was Bhava-vis’vanatha Dikshita; and, if the latter was one with Vis vandtha Dikshita, and if Bhava-ganes’a Dfkshita was brother of Ananta Dikshita, we are enabled to form a pretty correct estimate as to the time of Vijnana Bhikshu. For Narayana Bhatta’s youngest brother’s second son, Raghunatha Bhatta, dates his Kdla-tattva-vivechana in Samvat 1677 or A. D. 1620: Vijnana may be placed fifty or sixty years earlier.’ But whatever the times of Vijnana Bhikshu and Vachaspati Mis’ra, it is futile to expect from such authors any precision as to the identity of a person who lived many cen- turies before them. The name Vyasa may be right enough, but there is nothing whatever to show that this Vyasa was the same with the digester of the Vedas and the author of the Mahabharata. In the Mahabharata every epigraph gives the name of Vyasa, and there is no reason why it should be omittedin the commentary. Then Vyasa lived at a remote period of antiquity, in the begin- ning of the Kali Yuga according to Indian belief, and his classification and division of the Vedas existed long before the time of Patanjali, for we have un- mistakable proofs of the existence of the classification in Panini, Yaska, the Pratis‘4khyas, and other works of a much earlier date than that of the Yoga aphorisms, and it is impossible to reconcile the idea that he should be the author of an exegesis which could not have had a raison d’étre before the Yoga-sutra was PREFACE. Ixxix composed in the 2nd or 3rd century before the Chris- tianera. That exegesis quotes, too, authorities which are of a more recent date than that of Vyasa. The evidence of style is often a suspicious one, but no one who has any knowledge of the Sanskrit language will for a moment think it possible that he who wrote the Mahabharata could be the author of the Bhashya under notice. Compared with the works of leading scholiasts, the Bhashya appears to be the production of a third class writer. It certainly cannot be compared with the ‘great commentary’ of Patanjali, or with the equally renowned exegesis of S’ankara on the Vedanta aphorisms, or with the commentary of Sabara Svamf on the Mimaiisa ; and, whatever his age, Vyasa was by the unanimous testimony of the Hindus a far superior author and scholar to Patanjali, or Sabara, or S‘ankara. Fairly good though it be, there is a looseness, an inde- cision, a want of logical precision,in the Bhashya which are incompatible with the universal estimate of Vyasa’s learning and scholarship. Bhojadeva treats it with withering sarcasam. Without naming it, but obviously aiming at it, he says, ‘ all commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by say- ing that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number,’ (p. 2). It may be that Bhoja had to justify his attempt at a new commentary by throwing dis- credit on his predecessors, but his remarks are not al- lxxx PREFACE. together unauthorised. The invocation at the begin- ning of the Bhashya is also against its authenticity. No work of the leading Rishis which has come down to us contains any such invocation, and Vydsa would be the last to pray to Mahadeva in the way in which that divinity has been invoked in the Bhashya. The tone of the Bhashya is that ofa third class medieval scholium, and I am clearly of opinion, therefore, that it is not the work of the digester of the Vedas. Its author may have borne the name of Vy4sa, a common family name even to this day, but he was not the digester of the Vedas nor older than the latest ancient times, or, more probably, the early middle ages. The next commentary I have to notice is the Raja- martanda, of which a complete English translation is now offered to the public. It is not so ambitious as the last. It styles itself a vritti or gloss, whereas the other is a Bhdashya or commentary. It is mainly explanatory, when the other is discursive. It is modest in tone, when the other is dictatorial. Its author sets forth his object in writing the work by saying, ‘ Avoid- ing voluminousness, keeping clear of all mystifying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patanjali for the edification of intelligent per- sons,’ (p. 2). And he has faithfully carried out his resolution. He has interpreted all the leading words of his text, and given a very fair explanation of the meaning of his author, and the purport and bearing of his doctrine. It is, perhaps, not always quite so full in philosophical matter as its predecessor, but it PREFACE. lxxxi certainly omits nothing of importance for a correct understanding of the text. It is generally taken for granted by Indian writers that Bhoja, king of Dh4ra, who flourished in the middle of the 11th century, was the author of the exegesis ; but the opinion is not tenable. Doubtless the colophon of the exegesis names Maharajadhiraja Bhojadeva as its author, but there have been many Bhojas in India, (द. my ^ Indo-Aryans,’ IT, pp. 385/, ) and it does not show which is the sovereign meant: it certainly does not announce that this Bhoja was the hero of the Bhojaprabandha and a sovereign of Dh4ra in the century named. The title assigned him in the introduction to the work is Ranarangamalla, and this, as far as we know, was not borne by the Bhoja of the 11th century. The former is, moreover, described in the introduction to have written three works, a grammatical treatise on the government of words, a medical memoir under the titleof Rajamrigan- ka, and the gloss under notice, and none of these is attributed by the Bhojaprabandha to its hero. Onthe other hand, that hero is known to have written or pub- lished in his name a work on judicial astrology as bear- ing on Smriti rites, under the name of Rdjamdartanda, and it is impossible to imagine that he assigned the same name to his exegesis on the Yoga aphorisms. Two such dissimilar works could not have been published under one common name. And even if one believed such a nomenclature to be possible or probable, the question would arise, how is it that in the introduc- tion to the Yoga, the astrological work is altogether Ixxxi PREFACE. left out of record? The astrological work is several times the size of the Yoga exegesis, and otherwise of considerable importance; it has been very largely quoted by subsequent writers, and it is not at all probable that an author, or his encomiast, who was particular in noticing the meagre and poor medical treatise should overlook it. It might be said that it was composed after the composition of, and therefore could not be included in, the Yoga gloss, but that would be a simple assumption without any proof, a mere begging of the question. That the Rajamartanda | is not a generic, but a specific, name is evident from the fact of an exegesis on the S’ankhya bearing the name of Rajavartika, which is believed to have been dedicated to Ranarangamalla. It is probable, therefore, that our author is the Bhoja of the 10th century, who was also a king of Dhara. Adverting to him, Mr. Hall says, “That two Bhojas have ruled over part of Central India, and that the earlier, what- ever were the case with the later, was interested in literature, I have elsewhere shown conclusively. The Bhoja who reigned in the middle of the eleventh century very likely entertained learned men at his court, and the astrological compilation known as the Rdjamértanda and thus called in honour of him may have been indebted, for its name, to the suggestion of the Yoga work so entitled, written in the time of his homonymous antecessor. At any rate, he came long after the date of the Sarasvatt-kanthdbharana ; and we are nowhere told that the Bhoja to whom it is attributed bore the epithet, Ranarangamalla.’ (Con- tributions, p. Vill.) PREFACE. [गड Of the other commentaries on the Yoga-Sitra, the works of Bhavadeva, Nagoji Bhatta, Bhava-ganes‘a, Udayankara, Nages’a Bhatta, Narayana Bhikshu, Sada- siva, Ram4nanda Tirtha, Mahadeva, Ananta, S’an- kara, Umapati Tripathi, and Ksheménanda, may be cited as samples. They are all inferior in importance to the work of Bhoja, and call for no special remark here. The same may be said of the other works named in my list. Some of them treat of the various practices which Yogis resort to to acquire occult powers; while others describe modified forms of the doctrine of Patanjali, suited to Vaishnava, 88158, and Sakta forms of worship, so as to lead the individual soul, in its longing for salvation, to subsidiance in, or union with, the Divinity. Among the works of the first group the most popular and noted is the Hatha-pradipika or Hatha- dipika. It comprises 395 stanzas, divided into 4 chapters or lessons, (Upades’a), the first treating of postures, the second of regulation of breath, the third of gesticulation or mudras, and the fourth of Sama- dhi. Its author is one Chintamani, son of Sahaja- nanda, but this name of his was what he got when living as ahouseholder. On his becoming a hermit he took the name of S’vA4tmarama, and received the title of Yogindra, and is now generally known by the name of S’vatmarama Yogindra. He makes a great mystery of the theme of his work. He says, “ By Yogis wishing for perfection, this science should be carefully kept in secret, for it is most efficient when lxxxiv PREFACE. kept secret, and worthless when disclosed.” * Like the alchemists of old, he indicates simple things by round- about metaphorical names, and enjoins that none but adepts should know anything of his subject. This book is named Hatha vidya, or the science of the letters ha and tha, ha meaning the sun and tha the moon. This sun again stands for the breath inspired, and the moon for the breath expired, and the ultimate mean- ing of Hatha-vidy4 is thus the science of inspiration and expiration. Although by profession and habit a recluse who had thoroughly abandoned the world and its attractions, Svatmarama, indulges at times in language of agrossly carnal type. Thus in one place he says, “let beef be eaten and the immortal arrack (odrunt) be drunk every day. I reckon him who does so, to be a kulina (a noble householder) ; the rest are des- troyers of their nobility.”+ Here beef gomdisa stands for the tongue, which should be reverted and made to touch the palate, and varwni means the breath which passes over this reverted tongue. Again: “Let the youthful chaste widow be ravished on the land be- tween the rivers Ganges and Yamuna; it is the high- est glory of Vishnu.”’{ Here the two rivers are the two nostrils, and the widow is the breath which is to be forcibly suppressed for a time. This style of खठदविद्या पर गाप्या यागिना सिडिभिच्छता। सवेदोय्यवमो ag निर्वोथ्यो त प्रकारिता ॥ † गोमांसं भ्येच्धित्यं पिवेदमरवादणीं | SUT तमे मन्ये इतरे कुरुषातकाः ॥ } मङ्गायमनयेमष्ये बाररण्डातर्पखिनीं | WSS ग्दह्कियाशद्िष्णाः परमं पद्‌ ॥ PREFACE. ixxxv allegory and mystery is adopted by a great many medieval writers on the Yoga. At the beginning of the work, the author has given a list of thirty re- nowned ए 088 who had practised the science in question. At the head of these appear A’dinatha, who is generally identified with 8158, who is believed to be the first and most renowned of Yogfs. The work has been made the subject of comment by several writers, among whom Brahmananda, the author of the Jyotsnd, is reckoned to be the ablest. It would seem that the Yoga doctrine was, at a very early period, translated to Persia, and disseminated in some form or other among different sects. The Sa- p4siyans obtained it in its entirety. They believed on efficacy of discipline and austerity; they assiduously practised the regulation of breath enjoined in the Yoga; they divided the stages of their progress in meditation in the same way as the Yogis did; they held the highest meditation to be a state of trance identically the same as the Samadhi; they claimed occult powers* of the same nature and character as * ‘QF these illustrious personages they have many miraculous and mysterious deeds: such as, in the upper world, hiding the sun’s disk ; causing him to appear at night ; making the stars visible in the day-time: and in this lower world, walking on the surface of water ; making trees productive out of season ; restoring verdure to dried up wood; causing trees to bow down their heads; also showing themselves between heaven and earth in the form of lightning; and such like: and, in the animated world metamorphosing animals ; rendering themselves invisible to men; appearing under various shapes and forms: some of which wonders have been recorded in the Barmgahei-durveshi-khushi, They relate that these great per- Ixxxvl PREFACE. did the Yogis; they were familiar with the idea of the possibility of the soul at will passing from one body into another; they believed in metempsy- chosis ; and, if they looked upon union with the Su- preme Divinity as the swmmum bonum of their faith, they but accepted one of the several forms of the Yoga, different doubtless from the Isolation of Patan- jali, but not independent of it. (Qf Dabistan I, pp. 5f.) It is, however, not known whether the system of Sapasiyéns was founded upon any transla- tion of a Sanskrit Yoga work, or on oral communica- tion. Some of the Sapdsiyans admitted their obliga- tion to Hindustan, but their text-books, the few and imperfect ones that are still accessible, have not yet been sufficiently examined to throw light on the question. The close relationship existing between the two systems, even in the use of technical terms, preclude the idea of spontaneous growth, and the avowed posteriority of the Persian doctrine leaves no doubt of its Indian origin ; but as at present advised, we are not in a position to spot the exact text from which it was derived. Of interpretations of the Yoga system in foreign languages the earliest appears to be an Arabic version of the text of Patanjali. The work is no longer sonages were to such a degree enabled to divest themselves of cor- poreal elements that they quitted the body at pleasure; also that they had acquired from the court of heaven the knowledge of all 86160668, whether known or occult, and consequently had the power of exhibiting such wonderful works ; having rendered, by the efficacy of their austerities, elementary matters subject to themselves.” (Troyer and Shea's Dabistén i Muzahib, 11, pp. 101) PREFACE. Ixxxvii extant, but the testimony in favour of its having once existed is unquestionable. Abu Réhan al Nirani, in his Tarikh-ul Hind, which formed a part of his famous Kantin-i-Masudi (A. D. 1025-36), says, ‘I have translated into Arabic two Indian works, one dis- cusses the origin and quality of things which exist and is entitled Sankhya, the other is known under the title of Patanjali, which treats of the deliverance of the soul from the trammels of the body. These two works contain the chief principles of the Indian creed.’ (Elliot’s Historians, I, p. 99; Journal Anéntarya, uninterruptibility, ००० eee Anéaégaya, without any residua, ०* Anashta, active in operation, not destroyed, Anavachchhinna, irrespective, Anavasthitatva, instability in any stage, ००० Afgamejayatva, trembling, a distraction, eee eee Animé4, molicularity, an occult power, ००० 1, 121, Antara, internal, a form of purification, ose 01४97808, intimate, or essential part, ध Antardhauti, washing of the intestines, re Ann, directly, without an intervention, AnumAna, inference, a form of proof, ie Anumodita, abetted he sae Anuéasana, an exposition, an institute ००९ Anusrava, Veda, scriptures, ४४ Anuéravika, scriptural, ... wise Anvaya, conjunction, co-operation, ... ०९७ Anvayatva, concomitance ० ee Anyatakhyati, distinctive knowledge, Avyatva, diversity sas INDEX. Apana, the air which descends from the naval down to the great toe ००० eee tee A paranta, final end, death ve es aie A parigraha, non-avarice, a Yoga duty, i ००५ A pavarga, emancipation, ove A prati-saikram4, nontransational, eternally the same, aes Aptavachana, reliable testimony, Apupya, vice, opposed to virtue, _.., vas eee Apérana, making up, - Argumentative, a form of meditation ००. ०० Arhats, refuted ‘i Arishta, portent, cee Aristotle, 9 eae 9 Artha, purpose, aim, or object ioe sis §1, 61, Arthapattf, presumption, or inference from context, a form of proof, =... see 4 a ses Arthavatva, fruition, ... be 157, Asamprajnata, meditation in which consciousness is lost, 17, 20 Asampramosha, the not letting go, not forgetting, Asana, posture defined, ... : Aganadhyaya, bes avs sea ००० Asanna, proximate, a et .- 26, 102, Asafisarga, non-intercourse, ‘es sae es Aéaya, desire, will sus nt 29, Asceticism, a duty of practical Yoga, see Ashtaénga-hridaya, se ००७ ‘a Ashtaiga-yoga क ae Asiatic Society of Bengal, Proceedings of the, ... 4518108, intense desire, ee ६९८ sea = 4870168, egoism, ee abs see 65, Aégraya, substratum, _... - Asteya, nontheft ००४ ०१९ ००९ Aguddhikshaya, decay of impurity, ... is 48६९६09, guastation, =... Sale sisi Atitadhvan, postcedent condition, ... ae bes Atmé, soul, ae ses 5 30, 81, XCV Page. 158 14 92 78 192 17 73 170 51 215 142 180 187 10 159 21 18 102 218 105 99 70 59 218 218 36 178 159 179 92 91 150 129 82 xevi INDEX. Page Atmadarsana-yogyatva, fitness for beholding soul, ses 1 Atmérama, ... oes ww. 219 Atyantika, final, a character of isolation, 38७ .,, 208 Austerity, fruit of a fee =a ... 10} Avarana, covering, $ 14, 204 Avarice, abstinence from 92, fruit of abstinence from, ‘aie 98 AvasthAparinama, change of relation, ee we 133 Aversion, an affliction 61, defined, ... ५३५ 1 66 Avidya, ignorance, a ००५ ove 62, 64, 86 Aviplav4, undisturbed, ... es as aa 88 Avirati, worldly-mindedness, ४६ oe iat 38 Aviéesha, unspecific, a character of quality, ee ५ 80 Avigishta-liiga, undefined or uspecific character,... ०० 53 Avyapadisya, latent, .0- ६ ee 134, 161 Ayus, age, a fruit of residua, sis ... 71 B. Bain, Dr. Mental and Moral Science, sé ००, 175 Bala Sastri, oe 228 Ballantyne, Dr. J. R., 8, 6, 7, 15 17, 22, 24, 30, 31, 71, 72, 77, 81, 88, 85, 86, __... oe 87 Bandha, gesticulation, or pustures of particular kinds, 121, 109 Bhadra, a kind of posture, 3४8 see ,,, 10: Bhadrdsana, a kind of posture, 9 Se ,.„ 103 Bhagavadgita the, quoted ००७ ses 174, 208 Bb&sdparichcheda, the, quoted See ve 21, 22 Bhavadeva Miéra, 221, 224, Se ies .., 226 010६१ ६2911668 Dikshita, ... wide a 6-224 Bhavana, thinking, Mee aay ... 17, 21, 37 61 Bhavdnisahaya, ००० 224 Bhavaprataya, caused by the world 25, 209, 210, 217 Bhoja, 2,7, 21 23, 58, 71, 78, 79, 116, 129, 144, 145, 147 148, 167 Bhimi, stages of Yoga, ०० owe 126 Bhutandtha, lord of creation, a name of Siva, ,,, श Bhitas, elements, ve ee ee as 78 INDEX. Bible, the, ३5४ sus see see Brahma, _... ७६ नः oe (४ Brahma, ध Ses es 31, 35, Brahmachaitanya Yati, ... ५५६ se Brahmacharya, continence, Pe Brahmananda, commentator of Hatha-pradfpik& 102, Brahmarandhra, an aperture on the crown of the head, 146, Brahmayamala, a Tantra, Breathing, regulation of, Buddhi, intellect aes 6, Buddhi-tattva, the principle of understanding, ... si Buddhists, the, भ sie ... 92,154, Byron, quoted, sate ००० sae ००५ C. Carelessness, an obstacle to Yoga, ... ssi Chakra, wheel, a part of the human body, oe Chandrayana, a form of penance, ... ... 59, 60, 100, Charvakas, a sect of atheists, as dae Cheerfulness, an exercise, 4 ee sa Chetana, perception, ... ies oat Ss Chhaéndogya Upanishad, on Om, __... sie ee Chhay4purushavabodha,.., ००* ose ‘ee Chintamani, site ae See Chit, see Chiti, Chiti, soul, eke Chitta, thinking principle, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 46, 114, 192, 108, Chittavah4, nerves through which the thinking principle travels, $ ४ ose Cicero, on eternal exemplars, Cloud of Virtue, a result of meditation, ; Cognition, how produced, 185, 192, not self-illuminative, 190 not able to perceive another cognition, Colebrooke, Mr., ee ue 7, 16, 71, 81, 87, Conception, anubhava, a cause of residua, ai ve Contemplation, an accessory of Yoga, 91, defined, se 11 Page 163 211 67 222 92 218 219 192 201 152 130 203 188 207 179 128 xevill INDEX. Contentment, an obligation 93, fruit of, ar is Contents of Yoga-sttra, Chap. J, 57; C. I, 116; ©. Il, 167; C.1V Continence, an obligation, 98, fruit of oes ००५ Cousin, M., opinion on nihilism, = ०० see ०० Cowell and Gough’s Sarvadarsana-sangraha,_... 211, Cowell’s Kusumépijali, quoted, ... jae ae D. Danda, staff-like, a posture, a ae Dandadhauti, purification with the stalk of a plant ei Dandasana, staff-like posture, ३ 6 102, Dantadhauti, washing of the teeth,... Danu, mother of a class of evil beings, Daphne, becoming a creeper, re os ‘ Darsana-Sakti, the power of seeing, ... ००५ ग Dattatreya, wie ००० 218, 0०४४६४९४ 8901168 ००७ Daurmansya, distress of mind, a cause of distraction, Davies, Mr., eee ‘ee §1, 83, 207, Davis, Harbinger of Health, ६ 9 ies Deliberative and nondeliberative meditations, = „+, Ss Deda, locality, situation, ४६ 93, 112, 121, Desire, an affliction, 61, defined, _... ००, 65, eternal, Devisinha Deva, tat ea jee seis Devotion, an obligation, is : Dhanuh, a kind of posture, ik । Dhanurdsana, bow posture, és ००, ००० 10478118, steadfastness, .. = 114, 121, 122, 123, Dharma, property, virtue, ve 134, Dharmamegha, Cloud of Virtue, a meditation, Dharmaparinama, modification of property, Dharmaeéastra, law-books, Dharmi, substratum of quality, Dhauti, washing, a mode of purification, INDEX. Dhruva, Polar star see ४ abs Dhyana, contemplation, .. 123, 124, Dirgha, protracted, a kind of breathing, sen Discernment, precedes samadhi, =... ००७ eas Discriminative knowledge, how manifested, =... Disease, an obstacle to Yoga, 9 ee Dispassion, defined, ,.. ०७२ 14, its effect Distractions, companions of, ae or 38, Diti, mother of Daityas, or ००९ Divyaérotra, superperfect organ of hearing, __... Dosha, residua of work,... व bee see Doubt, an obstacle to Yoga, an ee Drashté, the spectator, soul, Soe 8, 14, 15, 16, 77, Drik-éakti, the power that sees, _... ४ ०९५ Drisimatra, absolute sentience, ane sac Drigya, spectacle, ५ a ds 77, Duhkha, pain, a cause of distraction, ve 39, 66, Durga ६ sé a ३६ Dvaipayana, Krishna, ... oe bee sae Dvesha, aversion, an affliction, defined, ve ०७० 1, Egoism, an affliction, 61, defined, =... ०७० “ae Ekagraté, concentration of the mind, see 49, 50, Energy, an antecedent to meditation, ५ awe Enlightenment, its varieties, ००७ Exercise, defined, ‘ee ai ase Experience, cause of, ... ni Expiration of the breath, ६ oes ०० F, Falsehood, abstinence from, a restraint, ००७ oe Fancy, defined, ve eee iy Functions, defined, 5, their number and names, 9, their sup- pression how effected, sis ०० wwe 11 13 © INDEX. G. ७210688, prayer to, ; ॐ ६ 0871006, excessive pondrosity, an occult power 121, Gati, flow of the breath in breathing, ‘as 111, Gaudapada, quoted, Gheranda, Pe ve sh $ Gheranda 82711४8, the, ... eee 105, 177 God, devotion to, 28, defined, 28, attributes of, 34, 35, His symbol, 36, effect of devotion to,... 5 36, Godavara Misra, ve eas a's Gomukha, cow’s mouth, a posture, ... ; 102, Gorakshandtha, numeration of postures by, 102, a Yogi, 219 220, 222, 224 S65 ३८६ re Goraksha-sataka, ae a vee pee Grahana, perception, : Grahana-sam&patti, acceptance form, a result of meditation Grabay4mala, a Tantra, १४; ००* sds Gréhya-samapatti, tangible form, a result of meditation, ... Grihitri-samdpatti, the form of the taker, a result of medita- tion, 9७७ sae see Gunadkara Mis’ra, ८५ ede Gupta, a kind of posture, ००० H. Hall, Bishop, quoted, ०० ००७ ००७ Hamilton, Sir William, quoted, _... sei sue Hana, avoidancy, gue wes + 7, Harichara, ४४ wha ६ oe Harigaikara Mis’ra, ,,, aie ses 222, Harris, quoted, ००९ “es ‘as ००५ Hartmann’s Philosophie der Unbewussten sed 75, Hasti-nishidana, seated elephant, a posture Hatha-dipik ४ or pradipika, a work on Yoga breathing, 45, 44 60, 105, 102, 109, 219, tika 219, Tippana, Hatha-yoga, the Yoga of breathing, Hatha-ratnavali, ग INDEX. Hatha-sanketa-chandrika, es oe Hatha-yoga, a Sa eee =" dhirdja, saiigraha, ... a a's we tika, eee viveka, Gs ine see Hermes, quoted २५ se ee ie Heya, avoidable, ve san 68, Hinsa, slaughter, should be avoided, 92, fruit of abstinence from, Hiranyagarbha awe es Hada, joy, a fruit of work ies Hriddbauti, washing of the stomach, a mode of purification,.. I. Idleness, an obstacle to Yoga, Sie : Ignorance, an affliction, 61, field of other afflictions, 62, defined Inclination, sraddhd in favor of Yoga, ge se Incontinence, abstinence from ४५ is Indissoluble state, alitga the final condition, fruit of, 88 Indriya, organs, of three kinds, =, Indriyajaya, subjugation of the organs, Inspiration, a Yoga practice, y Instability in any stage, an obstacle, 18812, Siva, a prayer to, ‘ee 751४8, supremacy, an occult power, ... Fsitva, supremacy, an occult power, ... ००* Isolation, 161, 166, its progress, 206, its definition, 206, Févara, Godhead, 18, 28, 29, 30, _... Yévarakrishna, Févara-pranidhdna, resignation to God, a Yoga duty, J Jainas, the 31, 92, their doctrine refuted se Jalandhara or Jélandharabandha, a form of gesticulation 105, Jalavasti, washing of the fundament with water, a form of purification, ००५ 168 121 168 208 36 84 39 215 107 119 cll INDEX. Japa, repetition of a select mantra,... eee J&ti, kind, produced by residua,__... seis 71, 93, Jivana, vital air, soe oat ५५ ल Jivanmukti-viveka, ‘Jnana, understanding, cognition, 6, 51, 184, 185 Jnénamrita, eee ae Jnanadipti, illumination of the understanding, 91, Tippana, ... J ndnananda, ‘se १०६ see ५ Jnéna-yoga-k4nda, (६ Jneya, cognizable, er aes sae 185, Joy, cause of । ag ove Jugupsé, loathing, a result of purity, see ses Jyotih, light, its seat in the crown of the head,... eee Jyotismati, extremely luminous disposition, == ९, ०७५ Jyotsnaé, ... 4४६ 1. Kaivalya, isolation of the soul from Natare, 1, 3, 87, 162, 206, KAlabheda, distinction of time, vas 5% re Kaliké Purana, ¢ sa Kaémévas4yité, fulfilment of desires, an occult power, cae Kamévaséyitva, fulfilment of desires sins Kanthakipa, throat-well, a seat of Yoga, sis Kapdlabhati, purification of the head by particular modes of breathing, sis 117 Kapila, 6-9, 14, 28, 80, 81, 88, 35, 76, 81, 84, 102, 201, 209 Kapila-gita, ००९ ‘ag sng Karméaégaya, residua of works, vas was 69, Ka4rtikeya, son of Siva, ४5६ eis ०९० Karuné, compassion, a Yoga virtue,... ००७ ००० Kaya, body, its control,... ses ies 140, Kéyasampat, excellence of body, a Yoga excellence, Kayavytha-yoga, multiplication of bodies, es Jus Kedarakalpa, oes (४५ Khechari, a form of gesticulation, ... as 106, Khecharievidy4, ०७४ ७०० coe eve INDEX. Kbyati, manifestation of knowledge, Kind, cause of, 70, how produced, i Kles&h, afflictions which disturb Yoga, 29, 61,... Knowables, minimised Krama, succession or course, 163, 205 Kramanyatva, diversity of succession, ००* Krauncha-nisidana, the posture of the seated heron, Krichchhra, a form of penance, __... Kriparama, ०० ee Krishna, black, a class of work or Krishnanatha, - > es Kriy4, action, र és Kriyé-yoga, Yoga discipline, Krodha, anger, an obstacle to Yoga, Kshaya, decay of ignorace, aes Kshemendra Dikshita, ... ००५ Kshinavritti, of overpowered faculties, Kshipta, unquietness, effect of foulness, Kukkuta, fowl, a posture, mr 7 Kukkutdsana, fowl seat a Yoga posture, une Kulamani Sukla, Se Kumbhaka, the function of stopping the breath inside, 112 Karma, tortoise, a posture, Kiurmasana, tortoise posture, L. Laertius, Diogenes, __... ००७ ध Laghima, extreme lightness, an occult power, 121, Lakshanaparindma, modification of time, Langour, an obstacle to Yoga, ००७ Laukiki, a mode of purification, = ०, Laya-yoga, Leibnitz, opinion quoted Lifigamatra, solely mergent, Lobha, longing, an obstacle to Yoga, 102, C1V INDEX. M. Madhupratika, honey drops, a result of Samadhi, Madhya, moderate intensity of meditation, Madhyama, moderate intensity of meditation, ... Mahdabandha, a kind of posture, _... sie 105, Mahabharata, ae ai ००० or Mahadeva, .. ee i bas 219, Mahamudra, a form of gesticulation, vais 105, MahAdpdsupatas, a sect of Saivas, ... ५१० Maharamayana, ००७ 4४४ ००७ द Mahasiddhis, great perfections, sie dive Ses Mahat, defined ei as ०४४ ae Mahdavedha, a kind of gesticulation, 135, Mahavideba, great incorporeal, a result of meditation, ine Mahavratas, great austerities, what are they, ... 4 01211688, = ,,, i ६६४ ze ००० Mahedga-sanhita, re eee ar ८ 218166१ 878 इ ५१ र 35 43, Mahima, illimitability, unlimited reach of organs, an occult power ९ tee Maitri, friendliness or benevolence, a Yoga virtue, ५०५ Manas, mind ae .,, 6, 45, 46, Manda, mild intensity of meditation, 1 Manojavitva, quickness as of mind, an occult power, bat Mara, sin personified, ... sits ००५ re Markandeya, {9 श्रा, cell for Yogi’s dwelling, ... sae 33 Mathuranatha Sukla, ... sea 219, 220, 224, Mati, intellect, Matra, absolute, Matr&épramana, fixed quantity, as ius ध Matsyanatha, a great Yogi, ००७ ५७६ 102, Matsyanathasana, a posture, ००७ ove Mayira, peacock, a kind of posture, May trasana, peacock posture, sae is ae INDEX. CV Page Meditation, conscious form, 17, unconscious form, 20, modi- fications, 24, 25, 26, 27, special means, 28, 101, accessories of, defined, 124, stages, a 126, 127 Memory, defined, 12, attendant on conscious meditation, ... 25 Meru, mountain, the, ... vee ive ००, 148 Milton, quoted eee we. 175 Miméiisakas, Ritualists 10, 81, their opinion refuted .. 214 Minandtha, igs ६ 220 Misconception, a function of the thinking principle, defined 11 Mistaken 00061008, an obstacle to Yoga, ००७ 38 Mitra, Sanskrit Buddhist Literature of Nepal, Dr. R ००» 164 Modification, defined, 7, suppressive, 127, meditative, 180, con- centrative, 131, of property, &c., 182 its diversity, 185, ite termination, - ies Sa ses ,०, 205 Moksha, defined, es “as Sas .०„ 218 Moments, their succession, a ००० ०० 206 Morell, Dr., quoted, =. see an ss 22 Mridu, mild, a measure of energy, ... see by 27 Mridu-madhya, mildly moderate, a measure of energy, ००७ 96 Mridu-myidu, mildly mild, a measure of energy, sas 96 Mridu-tivra, mildly ardent, a measure of energy, ses 96 Mugdha, bewildered, an effect of darkness, i dei 5 Mudita, complacency, a Yoga virtue, ies sie 40 Mudré, gesticulation, ... si , 105,106, 109 Mudré-prakas’a, ‘ge ane ‘ise ०० 220 Mukta, a kind of posture, avs ५९६ ..* 102 Mula-bandha, a kind of posture, ,, sae 105, 107 Mulagodhana, purification of the rectum, es 117, 119 Muttering, of mantra 59, fruit of, ... vas .. 1५ N. Na&bhi, navel, a point of Yoga, meditation, sis ००, 145 Nadi-jnéna-dipiké, _... bes ‘es ,., 220 NégArjana, vei ४ au ,,, 225 Nagoji Bhatta, ५६४ sa .,, 221 Nahusa, a pious hermit coo ०५१ 69, 70 cvi INDEX. Naiydyikas, followers of the Nydya doctrine, 10, their opinion refuted, Nandiégvara, a pious person, sae 69, 70, 169, 170, Néréyana, a as ध a Nérdyana Bhikshu, aus ses Narayana Tirtha, ee sis ००० Nashta, destroyed, Navaratnakara, ive des Ses eas Nayandnanda Siddha, ... aes vee vee Neti, thread, used for purification, ... see 117, Nidré, sleep, one of the functions of the thinking princi- ple, re re 12, Nimitta, merit, cause of residua, ... ee ६4 Nirodhaparindma, suppressive modification, ive es Nirupakrama, nonedeliberate, on ०७५ ०० Niruttara, a Tantra, ... sae eee Vis Nirvichar4, non-deliberative meditation, ‘as 53, Nirvija, seedless meditation, ose ०७९ see Nirvitarka, non-argumentative meditation, ts ००५ Niyama, obligation, a Yoga duty, ... ४६ न Non-argumentative meditation, ss. ०७५ eee Nydsa, contemplation, ... ००७ ००० ite Nydya,.a system of Philosophy, _... sas 6, 21, 0. Objects, their unity, 182, their relation to thinking principle, . Obligation, an accessory of Yoga, 91, defined, ... on Obstacles to meditation,... ०७७ ध Occult powers, eight kinds, 121, 158, specific, knowledge of time, 136, of cry of animals, 187, of former existences, 133 of another’s mind, 189, of the art to make oneself invisible, 140, of final end, 14], of art of gaining superhuman powers, 142, of powers of elephants &. 143, of subtle objects, 143, of regions and stars, 144, of their motions, 144, of internal structures, 145, of the art of subjugating hunger, 145, of firmness, 146, of vision of spirits, 146, of everything, 147, of 143 182 INDEX. the thinking principle, 148, of soul, 148, of attaining perfec- tion of organic powers, 150, of the means by which a thinking principle enters a different body, 151, of rising superior to obstacles, 153, of the means of attaining effulgence, 168, of perfection of hearing, 154, of travelling in ether, 155, of the destruction of covering of light, 155, of the conquest of elements, 156, of attenuation and indestructibility of its qualities, 157, of excellence of body, 158, of the conquest of organs, 159, of the conquest of nature, 150, of omniscience, 160, of Isolation, 161, of discrimination, 168, of innate distinction, 164, its character, _... vs sie rE: Padma, lotus, a kind of posture, :.. sn ses Padmasana, a kind of posture, sei saa 102, Pain, defined, 39, its causes, 73, how avoided, ... 76, Pal, N. ©.) treatise on the Yoga, ... see ००७ Paley, Mr., definition of instinct Panchagikha, one of the expounders of the Séikhya system Panchatayi, fivefold, explained ae ies ०५ Panini, a grammarian, ... sss ध 9 or Paradise Lost, quoted, ... ies igs ००* Par4rtha, another’s object, jus ase Parasara, a renowned Yogi, ४६; ae sie Parinama, change, see modification, ... is 7, 75, Parinaéma-dubkhatva, pain of sequence, ६४४ Paritapa, suffering, proceeds from residua, es oe Paschatya, future, ह PAtanjala-bhdshya, 4, 7, 15, 16, 21, 23, 38, 35, 39, 42, 46, 50 51, 52, 57, 61, 64, 67, 68, 72, 96, 102, 128, 124, 128, 131, 132, 144, 147, 176, 207, 208, ————— abhinava-bbashya, eee ०५ — rahasya, ००८ sai 89, 16, 50, 51, 61 Satra-bhashya, ००७ a oe —— प्रि, eee eee eee eee vyakhyé, vi ००९ cvlll INDEX. Patanjala-vartika, ४ is a) 3 vritti, ei sae soe ace Patanjali, 1, 2, 8, 4, 6, 11, 28, 28, 30, 101, 109, 116, 121, 147, 167, 201, 209, 290, Pavanaevijaya, 6 Penance, an obligation, ... vs ies aes Perfections, how produced, wes vee ae Pida, disease, an obstacle to Yoga, ... a ee Pisdchas, ghosts, ous ००७ ius aes Plato, opinion noticed, ... ec er 16, 129, Posture, 91, defined, 102, various kinds of, 103, how suc- cessful, 110, fruit of ६ ५६ ००५ Prachchhardana, expulsion of breath wee 41, Practical Yoga, defined, 59, object of es छ 1900818, nature, Sis sae ...82, 83, 160, Pradhdnajaya, conquest of nature, ... ०७७ ००० Prddurbhava, prevalence, ४ ssi a Prajaépatya, a penance, .., sas sis gs Prajna, knowledge, we 61, 26, 55, 89, Prékamya, irresistible will, १ ae 121, Prakasa, illumination, 78, Prakriti, nature, 1, 7, 25, 29, 84, 58, 54, 65, 79, 80, 81, 88 84, 85, 170, 201, 205 ie Prakyitilaya, resolution into nature, ... sve 91, Pramada, carelessness, an obstacle, ... Praména, right notion, a proof, sis 1278108, breath 2 wae sia’ 153, Pranava, symbol of the divinity, ... : 36, 37 Prandyd4ma, regulation of breath, a Yoga practice, 41, 42, 43 44, 46, 111, 112, 118 des ००७ Pranidhdna, devotion to God १ sae 28, Préotabhimi, utmost stage, ६ on ५२६ Praépti, accessibility, unlimited reach of organs, also called mahima Pragdntavahité, tranquil flow of thought Prasupta, dormant ६५६ oes eee e06@ = 221 INDEX. PraSvdsa, expiration of breath, _... ies ००७ Pratibha,. comprehension, ५ ens .. 10, 147, Pratiprasava, adverse course, regression, ०४ 68, Pratishedha, prevention, Pr eae sae Pratiyogi, counterpart, ... sas se + Pratydbéra, abstraction, क sec aes Pratyakchetan&, reverted perception, ००५ Pratyaksha, perception, os 9 ies Pratyaya, thought, understanding, ... 20, 128, 182, 187, 189, Pravibhaga, distinction,... eee ००५ ००५ Pravritti, cognition, _... ‘ee see wee Pravritti-bheda, diverse tendency, ... sis ee Punya, virtue, ४६ ai nee एश, filling in, of breath sis se ००७ Puranas, their definition of God, 81, seven regions, Purification, an obligation, 98, fruit of, 99, various modes of Pdrnaénanda, ६८४ re wee Purusha, soul, sue 1, 12, 29, 80, 84, 57 Purusha-visesha, particular soul, =, Sei ies Purushottoma, God, __... aes sas 80, Pyrrho, his moral imperturbability,... ५०१ ००० Q. Qualified, its conditions, ite sei oe Qualities, their character, 80, their division, ... sis Questionables, their exclusion, 94, what are they, 94, their fruit, coe ००७ ००० aoe R. Ra&ga, desire, ६८ ei ‘ei sus Raghavananda, i - Sake ००७ ००७ sa Rajam4rtanda, name of a commentary on the Yoga-sttra, 58, 116, 167, 217, =. ( ०० Rajamrigéika, a treatise on medicine, ais ou Rajas, foulness, one of the three modes of nature, ०९ Réja-yoga, a form of Yoga practice, aa 60, cx INDEX. 1९41 8118888, demons, $ ses dee is Rama, ove Se 959 Ramachandra Parémahaiisa, ats Qi ००७ Ramachandra Siddha, ... as vas ००० 1२410६72 Sarasvati, ... ie ८६ Réménanda Tirtha, ,, was 219, 221, 228, 226 Raméasahkara, eh ese ses see Rémastavaraja, tes 9९ rr is Raméyana, an epic poem, se ००७ ave Rameégvara Bhatta, ses sae aa (६ ४9098113, a title of Bhoja, ... Rechaka, expulsion of breath ae Regulation of breath, 91, enjoined, 111, described, 112, its varities, 113, fruit of ००५ sae 8 Reichenbach, notices electric flames, ... 54 ae Reid, Mr., definition of perception, 10, works quoted, sae Residua defined, stock of, 69, fruit of, 70, 78, how mani- fested, 174, its continuity, 176, eternal, 178, how destructi- ble, 179, formed during commencing isolation, Resignation to God, a Yoga duty, ... ses 59, Resolved into nature, a result of 89708111, == - ००, re Restraint, an accessory, 91, defined, 92, its importance, ४ Riddhi, supernatural powers, ies ais 59, Right notions, defined, ... ००५ Rita, truth se ss sd Ritambhar4, truth-supporting, Bag bee wey Roer, Dr. E., quoted, =... ००५ ००९ Rudrayamala, a Tantra,... ००९ ००५ coe Rapa, shape, see ५४ ००९ Ruta, cry of animals, ... ००७ ध 8. 82009, word, " "अ ses (9४ 10, 51, 10६08, knowledge dependant on words, ... ५०९ 800808118079; the rudiment of sound, sie Sadachéra-prakarana, 99 eee eee 117 137 137 222 INDEX. Sadaénanda, nas “es vy ‘ie Sadasiva, 1१ + ae iad Sadhydya, muttering, .. ‘ee ००७ 59, 61, Saivas, the follower of Siva, sa ses sae S’aktichAlana, a form of gesticulation, ,,, 105, 108, ॐ ४ ए Buddha, flames issuing from his body, ... jee S4lambana, along with its object, ... ae se Samadhi meditation, 17, 25, 86, 41, 54, 57, 61, 89, 101, 128, 124, 125, 167, 168, 169, ag श one parinama, meditative modification, prakarana, ०, sive ses Samana, air which surrounds the stomach nes 158, SamApatti, condition, .., + Was ह Me Samaraséra-Svarodaya, ... coe Samasansthana, evenly poised, “ae ae ee Sambhava, proportion, ... - ee se १ Sambodha, conscience, ०० ius aie site Samprajnata, conscious,... see ००७ sige Samprajndta-samadhi, conscious meditation, ... 17, 19, Samprayoga, application, ००* cet ००५ 88781108, joyous, ०० ००७ ००५ ००९ Saugatas, Buddhists, ... ००९ Sajijama, exercise of steadfastness, contemplation and medita- tion, @ ® eee eee eee Sankara, it sks ae 226, ——— A’charya, = ०० eee .. 218, 219, Séikhya, a system of philosophy, ... 6, 7, 10, 85, 112, 207, kaériké, ६ ,,, 10, 15, 16, 39, 83, 207, pravachana,.... 2 ००७ ००७ —— —— bh­a, oes oa क —— stitra, aus ae se $3, 42, —— tattva-kaumudi, a commentary on the Yoga-sitra, 79, yoga-dipiké, =... ००७ see re Séikirna, affected, ... mr ००७ ५८ Saumanasya, complacency, es aie Saiigaya, doubt, defined,... diet agi 11, ८11 INDEX. 84081 848, residuum, ... = 21, 22, 23, 56, 67, Sanskdradubkha, pain of residua, Sas ae 8४०४७, tranquil, ei se ... 182, 184, Santapana, a penance, ... eee ve Santosha, contentment, a Yoga obligation, ei eee Saiivega, impetuous, a measure of energy, eee ००० Saiivit, cognition, nts ०* Safiyama, 121, defined, 125, fruit of, 125, how to be employed 126, 128, producing various occult powers, 186, 137, 188 139, 140, 141, 142, 148, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 163, 154, 165, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 168, 164, 165, 167, 169, Safiyoga, conjunction, ... see ies 78, 85 Saptabhumiké-vichara, ... ९०७ wa seis Séragita, aes ६ saa Sdérasamuchchaya, ००७ ‘bs ‘ae ge §’arirabandha, corporeal bondage, ... ee ee Sarvabhdvadhishthdétritva, supremacy over all conditions, Sarvajnatritva, omniscience, as see sae Sarvarthaté, multifunctionality, .., ००७ sae SarvAthdvishayatva, superobjectivity, eee eee Sarvavishaya, omniobjective, ००७ >. अ Ses Sdsmita, egoistic, ats te isis 18, Satan, his representative, eae or sas Sattva, quality of goodness, ००० ... 5, 99, 148, Satya, veracity, a Yoga obligation, ... ०९, 92, S’aucha, acts of washing, or purification, sue 94, Sava, corpse, a kind of posture, = =, ००७ isa Savicharé, deliberative meditation, ... » - he 18, Savija, with & 8660, ... ००७ क aoe Savija-samédhi, seeded meditation, ... ध ००० Savitarka, argumentative, $ oa 17, Savitarka-sam4dhi, argumentative meditation, ... aa Sayambhu, 8188) =. ००० oes ०० ००० Schopenhauer, quoted, ... wee ave ००१ Seeded meditation, .. ,,* aa: aes ; wee | ००५ 86641688 medit ation, see oes 99७ 57, INDEX. Seneca, quoted, Shatchakra, $ ae: dag dhydna-paddhati, wet os Shatkarma, sixfold work 38६ us ‘ee Siddha, perfect, jae bs ००५ one Siddhékhanda, ‘ ane Siddhdénta-paddhati, Siddhdgana, a posture, ... ve eee ००७ Siddha-siddhanta-paddhati, és ००७ 8100018, perfection, ०० 100, 121, 142, 151, 158, 81718, lion, a Yoga posture, see ies 81188808, a Yogs posture, ; 103, Sitkrama, throwing out water through the nostrils, Siva, the God so named, 1, 30, 81, 102, 219, 220, 221, 222, 228 8198, wife of Siva, ate bes Sivananda Sarasvati, ... Are aoe det S‘iva-saibitd, ‘ee ००७ भ 117, tika ०९५ ध ००५ eee Skanda Purana, - eve os Slaughter, abstinence from 92, fruit of abstinence from, on Sleep, defined ००७ ses ००७ Sie Smriti, law-books, ०७७ ove ,,, 18, 25, 60, Socrates, opinion quoted one va ००७ Sopakrama, anticipatory, or designed ०० Sop4éraya, self-reliant ०९ * Spectacle, its nature, 78, its object, 82, its action, 84, its cause, Spectator, defined, 81, its conjunction with spectacle, 85, how prevented ० dee ००* ००९ Sphota, bursting of sound ००० ००७ 87900108, inclination, an antecedent of Yoga, sisi Sravana, audition, an occult power, wie ७०७ 81141087878702 १8४7) ०, see sis abi S‘rikrishna S’ukla, ae ४34 क ५ Srotra, organ of hearing, ०० ‘vi es S‘ruta, testimony, _ Steadfastness, an accessory of the Yoga, 91, defined 150 221 225 154 56 121 CXxiV INDEX. Steadiness, how acquired, 45, 46, 47, 48, advantage thereof, ... Stewart, Dugald, quoted क ००० ध Sthalavasti, purification of the fundament by seating firmly on dry land : £ ००७ ae Sthamnab, celestial gods ठ re ००७ Sthira, firm, ६ coe ee a Sthiti, abidance, rule, ... 2 we ... 14, 78, 79, Sthitistbapaka, elasticity, 3 Sis ००५ Sthula, gross a . Sy 3 sé ००० St. Jerome, ss vai wars Study, a Yoga obligation, ०७ Styana, langour, an obstacle to Yoga, ०९ Subject, a correlative of qualities, ... ove Suddhi, purification, ... sos ००७ ve Suffering, cause of, cas , , ०० Sag Sukha, pleasant ‘ 4६ , oon S‘ukbdnuégayi, dwelling on pleasure, ५. ate foie S’ukla, white, a class of works, | S’ukla-krishna, white black, a class of works, S’ukra, ts eee 225, Sakshma, subtile, a form of breathing, 67, 143, 157, Sakshmavisaya, subtile objects, °. ००९ Summary of the Yoga-sitra, eae 57, 116, 167 Sundaradeva, भ ‘ve 4५ Sunya, vacuity, Svs sae ses Suppressive modification, see modification, see ene 8९६1689, eelf-illuminative, 188, 189, implies self-conscious- : ness, . és Svddhydya, inaudibly repeating a great many times any se- lected mantra, .__... ‘ea ius Svdmiéakti, lordship. of power, _... “at ०० Svapna, dream, defined as 18, Svarasav4hi, that which carries the residua of one’s former _ life, ha aes sa wes ६६ Svarodaya, Lm ve eae 9 8१४1108, nature, ००५ as ... 82,167 Page 49 176 169. INDEX. S’vasa, inspiration, . ... ee ove Svasakti, inherent power, ve ke sss Svastika,a mystic diagram, = - ... ००७ ws Svastik isana, a posture, ... ००७ sea 102, Svatmardma, sis Kes ४६ Tadajnanatva, consubstantiation, _... coe 49, Taddtmana, to consist of, त ee ००० Tamas, darkness, one of the three qualities, sae Tanmatra, matter, noumenal Tanmayatva, being of that substance, Tantras, the, oe ee 44, 117, 120, 147, Tantric rituals, sac ६ aes sas Tanu, weak iis 5, we aise ००७ T&paduhkhata, pain of वडाला, ... ue ove Taraka, emancipator, ... ae 147, Tarka-sangraha, a treatise on Saakhya philosophy, Tatsthatva, concentration init, ... 98 49, Tattvarnava-tika, ५ a $ Tattva-panchasika, Yoga-chinta, ... ध ०० Tattvas, principles, ae ८६ ses 18, 40, Tattvavabodbaka, __... a see ध Tattva-vindu-yoga, ae Taylor’s Elements of Thought, oa Temptations, to be avoided, Tenacity of life, defined Theft, abstinence from, 92, fruit of abstinence from Thinking principle, 4, its modification, 127, its tranquility, 180 how multiplied, 171, its unity of purpose, how preserved, 172, meditation-born, its character, 173, its modification, 180, its functions, how known, 186, cannot direct itself to two objects at once, 189, not self, 201, its refluence, a5 Tibergbien’s Essai des Connoissance humane, ... see Tirthasiva, $ ove Titans, their moral peculiarity, im a ee exvi INDEX. Tivra, ardent, a measure of energy,... ‘ale Tr&taka, a form of purification, ... ००७ 117, Trembling, an obstacle to १०६४) ==, sa se U. Udana, vital air which ascends to the heads, __... Udara, simple, Wes Udaya, enlivenment, of a feeling, Udayana A’chérya, ०० ००७ we ००७ Udayankara, ००० sos ००* + Uddiyana, a kind of posture, ais a Uddiyanabandha, a kind of posture, Udghata, striking of the vital air against a plexus of nerves, 112 Udita, enlivened, ae wee we 132, 184, Umépati Tripathi, piste see 219, Unattainment of a stage, Unembodied, a condition produced by Yoga practice, Upadesht, instructor, ... Upaméana, comparison, ... = see Upanishads, the, noticed ००० 30, Upardga, modification, change of form, Upasargas, obstacles, ... oe ४ si Urvasi, a celestial courtesan, as ५४६ 67, Wsbtranishidana, seated camel, a posture, re 102, Uttana-kurmaka, upset tortoise, a posture, Uttana-karmakdsana, upset tortoise posture, ... Vv. Vachaka, indicator, ५ sie Vachaspati Misra, a 4,7, 15, 28, 24, 35, 47, 48 Vahiranga, stranger, accessory, not essential Vabishkarana, a form of purification, Vabya, external ate vishaya, the outer sphere, _... Vaisdradya, purity from dirt: Page INDEX. Vairagya, dispassion, ... + प 18, Vairatydéga, abandonment of enmity, ove Vaiseshikas, their opinion refuted Vaishyavas, the followers of Vishnu, Vajrasana, a posture, ... sss ove Vajrasaiihananatva, adamantine hardness, as Vajroni, a kind of gesticulation, _... see 105, Vamadeva, eee भ Vamanadhauti, drinking a large quantity of water and then vomitting it out ००७ ses ०५९ Varana, covering, ; ००५ ००७ Variséra, a mode of purification, ... se Varnaprabodha, as see Varta, olfaction, an occult-power, ... See “ine Vartamdnddhvan, present condition, ... ०५ Vasadhauti, washing with a piece of cloth, a kind of purifica- tion, “6 ००७ Pe Vasand, desires produced by residua, a 70, Vasikara, controul aon see ise 49, Vasikdra-sanjnd, consciousness of being able to subjugate, ... Vaéishtha, a saint, ay ies ‘at 102, Vasishtha-séra, Sea es eee ०० Vasishthiya-gudartha, ... wee ६8 vss Vasité, subjugation, ... Vasitva, subjection, _... soe Vasti, a kind of purification, ; Vastigodhana, purification of the fundament Vasudevendra, wee ००७ Vatakrama, a kind of purification, ... 9 Vataséra, a kind of purification, ० Vedana, taction, an occult power, ... ae Vedanta-sara, a treatise on the Vedénta, see Vedanta-sitra, aphorisms of Vyasa, Vedantists, the followers of the Vedanta-sitra, 10, their doc- trine refuted a ss 212 Vedas, the, ves 11, 30, 86, 97, 101, 178 174 CXVill INDEX. Vega, velocity, Ss 55 oes Veracity, defined, 92, its fruit or 2 as Vibhishiké, frights, _... 4 a3 ००७ Vibbiatis, occult powers,... ses ar ०७७ Vichchheda, interruption, Vichchhinna, intercepted, Videha, unembodied, Videha-mukti, oe ae ~ „2 sie 11081909, retention, ... ५ eer 41, Vidy4, knowledge, ies ^ eal Si ०७७ Vidydéranya Svami, we " 9 श ce Vija, seed 7 4४ ae abs Vijndna, perception, knowledge, ~ bhikshu, a commentator on the Yoga-sitra, 47, 87 1238, 221, 225 es ie 9५ Vikalpa, fancy, defined, 11, its effect : see Vikaranabhava, uninstrumental perception, =, ००९ Vikramorvasi, a 07507119, ... wa ४ Vimarsa, opinion refuted, “ ˆ “> rr Vipaka, deserts, of works, ie ee 29, Viparita-karani, a kind of gesticulation, tes 105, Viparyaya, misconception, a function of the thinking principle, Viprakyishta, remote =e ०७५ ००० Vira, heroic, a kind of posture, Virama, cause of rejcction, ae “ ००९ Virdsana, heroic posture, Vireévarananda, ध (> ae aa Virtue, cloud of, ` ० ह [ए 208, Virya, energy, one 4: 25, Visayavaitagya, dispassion for worldly objects, asceticism, ... Visesha, specific, = ` ` .., Vishaya, sensuous objects es Vishayavati, that in ‘which worldly objects reside, Vishnu, born as Kapila,. dee Visishta-liiga, defined character, ` Vigoka, sorrowless perfection, _... wo ee 46, 16L INDEX. Visokasiddhi, sorrowless perfection, ... ; Viévakarman, celestial artificer, a name of God, ... Visvamitra, ae ae Visvesvaradatta, se’ ५ Vitaraga, the passionless, «tee Vitarka, questionable, ... Sine श Viveka, discriminative knowledge, ... martanda, Viveki, discriminating, ... ००९ ove Viyoga, disunion, _... oe Vrajabhushana, । aids Vrihannandikesvara Purana, ae व Vrindavana S’ukla, sie + Vritti, functions, = vs a Vy&dhi, sickness, _—_... ००९ Vyankata A’charya, ,,, Vy&na, a vital air that pervades the whole body, Vyasa, ies ४ ४६३ Vyavahita, intercepted, ... ue Vyuha, disposition, ०० Vyutkrama, a form of purification, ... we Vyutthana, state of waking, ms 128, | प. Weber, Dr. A., his idea of isolation,... ४ Westminster, Review, quoted, = ,, os a Wilson, Dr. H. H., quoted, 7, 16, 89, 81, 87, 144, 207, Wordsworth, quoted, = ,,, | ane Work, its varieties, ees | aes os Worldly-mindedness, an obstacle to Yoga, =... ००५ Y. | Yajoavalkya, 2, | ,,, 102, 223, gité | Yama, restraints, or discipline, Yoga, 1, 8, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17, 24, 25, 29, 44, 46, 55, 57, 58, 59 60, 61, 63, 91, 92, 94, 102, 104, 109, 110, 111, 115, 121 128, 125, 128, 127, 142, 147, 154, 162, 163, 167, 168, 179, 205, 208 Cxx INDEX. Yoga-bhashya-krama, ... Yoga-bhydsalakshana, ... ies Yoga-chandra-tiké, १ — 01810118, wee ‘oe —— chintémani, eee -——— tippana, ose ose —— darpana-tika, —— drishti-svadhyéya, —— grantha, 9, ——tiké, ... aes —— kalpadruma, ध —— kalpalata, 3 Yogé-khyana, ०० ००* Yoga-mahima, ००९ mani-prabhé, __... ००७ —— mapjari, ies Yog&fga, the accessories of the Yoga, $ 0 81 08488113; Sc ae vritti, ५८३ sia Ygga-nydsa, as ese —— pradipa, ००५ oe —— prakaéa-tiké, —— pravega-vidhi, ... ०९ ratndkara, “as ३४ — ratna-samuchchaya, ee ratnévall, aes nee Yogasana-lakshana, == ००, ००* ए ०९४-820 78118 ba coe —tiké, ... seis === 8878) क ae -—— séracsafigraha, ee. —— sastra, ave — sdstra-sitrapatha, ... ००७ —— édstré-vachuri, ... sat —- siddhanta-paddbati, —— sikhopanishad,... a Yoga-sikshé, -——— stitra, ies —— sttrartha-dipiké, ... ——— sitra-tika, tippana, न> Vitti, ००७ tippana, —— taraiiga, ००९ —— ४4785911, fei =——_ tattva, sae —— varnana, a vartika, bas —— vasishtha, “ik —— tiké, ,,. vichéra, wae vija, ——— vindu-tippana, ... —— vishaya, —— vivarana, as —— viveka, ~ tiké, —— vritti-sangraha, .., Yoges&rnava, vee Yogini-hyidaya, Yogopadeéa, BO LOR PR LO LO ON ON OB LO BT I Ll IO IO INDEX. ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA. —@— Page vii line 15 for chittva read chitta » 27 ,, some theory ina more read the theory of unreality in a xiv , 8 ,, alternative » resource 20 and its object is worldly enjoyment, read its object is worldly injoyment ; ” xxxv ;; 4 ,,_ birth » breath ५ » 24 9106 » 7९0०6 xlvii , 26 + produce »» produces [सा , 29 , Sucha- » if it did, the Ixxx ,, 6 after Bhashya, add Vydsa himself is the author of a different system of Philosophy, and one cannot reasonably suppose that he would condescend to expound the text-book of an adverse school. 11 after this day; add, asa footnote, Brahmanya Tirtha had a pupil named Vy4sa, who wrote the Tatparya-chandrikd on the Vedanta Sutra. 17 +; 1 for cive read conducive 19 + 18 ,, saméaptti +» samapatti 43 , 25 4, thum » thumb 61 ,, 80 + word » phrase 77 ,, 24 ), वमव » arashtd. 78 +, 15 + ‘thepurposeof for + forthe purpose of 88 , 9 , Oo » ID 91 , 28 = 4, devotion 9 steadfastness 96 , 80 + and naturally hostile individuals having acquireditlive read and even natur- ally hostile beings live beside those who have acquired it ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA. 20-21 ,, 8 27 1 after 25-27 for 16 22 28 7 9 99 99 steadiness », steadfastness (anyatva) #% anyatve out | » out of, attainment of add or unlimited reach greatness of organs such as country read situation the perfections ,, Perfections boy » body eteology +» etiology — he » the author ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA. CCKXV (Sanskrit.) पटिः Woe use १ मन्युद्धिभिः मित्यक्किनिः 1 परिशामाय परिशटामायां R विश्या विषया १९४ सावना भावना R quits डानि % मरत zee ९ नामस नाम ४ निरथं निरोध 1 "अन्याः" 'चाक्याः' ९.९९ स्यान स्याम xe Card रकाप्र to यदाधात्‌ यद्वाधात्‌ ९४ छौ यमाः वोयमानः ४.४.९१. सम्बित्‌ संवित्‌ ९९ Caran: UCaT Sm: ४ खं । Sw तत्‌ अलिङ्पर्यवसानं | % सालिकः साश्िकाः ५ चुखसंवित्‌ सुखसंवित्‌ ९४ निरिं निरिं 2 WAT, BX, 2 ‘sraetfa’ ‘arareita:’ ९ | wereraeay TT MET ea १३ संष्यविषय्येसशपं संद्रयविपय्धासरूषं १ ‘awa’, wey’ १९ खदपं खरूपं © भ्रशायामानभिधाय प्राशायामाममिभाय १८ प्रशायामात्‌ भ्राशायामात्‌ ९ प्रशायामेः TATA: CCcxxvli ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA. we ९ ष्रानवतिरेकेन श्रागग्यतिरोकेष ९९ १ we wa १८ ® सव्य hice bf ea rerwe te 0 च्धने नाभिप्रायेने तेन ववने नाभिप्रायेरेवेग ee a wefeerreg: अषिषठातरूपः ee 80 t SU GL | मोक्घरूपलयात्‌ १०४ ९९ विवेकाप्रबद्धोद्करपि विवेकापलशादभोक्करपि a THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. INTRODUCTION. Salutation to Ganeéa. May that semi-corporeal union* of S’iva and his spouse (S/ivé) by the recollection of which man enjoys isolation,t hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings ! 2. We praise that eternal S’iva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold paint which besets mankind. 8. That unprecedented work § of the sage Patanjali where- in he describes the severance of the soul (Puruska) from nature (Prakritz\ to be Yogal| (true union) reigns supreme. 4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes,f| which are * A fit of jealousy, according to the Kaéliké Purana, had caused a temporary separation between S‘iva and his spouse Durgé. On their reconciliation, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodies so asto make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union. + Separation of the human soul from all association with nature. Vide p. 207. { Viz., lst, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes ; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. Vide Wilson’s Saikhya-karika, p. 2. § Lit., saying. : || A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment of, lit. disunion from (viyoga), the world is a conditio sine gua non to the Yogi, which is the end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is separation from sensuous objects is the union or dissolution of the thinking principle in its original source. शु Patanjali is believed to have been an incarnation of Ananta, and the title indicates that idea. Vide Introduction, p. lxvii. 1 9 INTRODUCTION. even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting bappiness—may they prosper ! 5. The glorious words of the king Ranarafigamalla,* who, like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work on the government of words, who has commented on Patanjali, and written on medicine a treatise called the Riéjamrigdfkat— may they prosper. 6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning of their authors ; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious ; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where the meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number. 7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all mysti- fying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting the inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patanjali for the edification of intelligent persons. * A title of Bhoja. + All these wake of Bhoja are still extant. ¢ ‘Commentators each dark passage shun— And hold a farthing rush-light to the san.” 8४. Jerome “ not versions but inversions.” Italian, Traduttori traditori “ Translators traitors.” ०५ Surrender rather than render ; Not turning, but overturning.” 1 oe THE YOGA APHORISMS OF PATANJALI.<:Wo7p, OD oa eae ae INTRODUCTION. ऽ Salutation to 0810688. May that semi-corporeal union* of Siva and his spouse (81९६) by the recollection of which man enjoys emancipation,f hard as it is to attain, shower on you all blessings ! 2. We praise that eternal Siva the thought of whom forthwith dissolves the threefold paint (which besets mankind.) 3. That unprecedented$ work of the sage Patanjali where- in he describes the severance of the soul (Purusha) from nature (Prakrit:) to be Yoga|| (true union) reigns supreme. 4. May the sayings of the lord of snakes,{| which are * A fit of jealousy, according to the Kaliké Purdna, had caused a ‘@mporary separation between Siva and his spouse Durgé. On their roconci:i:ntion, the lady besought her master to devise some means by which the possibility of all future separation could be obviated, and the expedient was hit of uniting their bodics so as to make of the two an androgynous figure, half male and half female. Other causes have been assigned for this union. † Escaping from transmigration in one of four different ways, all implying equality with the Divinity in some way or other. These are: Ist, Sdrshfi, or the enjoyment of equal supremacy with the T)ivine Soul; 2nd, Sd/okya, or getting abode in the samo region with the Divinity; 3rd, Sdyujya, or the merging of the human into the divine, from intimate union; and 4th, Sdriupya, or obtaining of the form of the Divinity. Tho 3rd is also indicated by the term Kaivalya, the word used in the text. It means abstraction or separation from nature and the products thereof. ‡ Viz., 18४, those proceeding from internal causes; 2nd, those from natural and extrinsic causes ; 3rd, those that proceed from superhuman causes. Jide Wilson’s Sankya-kariké, p. 2. § Lit., saying. | A play upon the word Yoga. The purport is that a total abandonment lit. disunion (viyoga) from the world is a conditio sine qua non to the Yoga which is tho end sought by the Yoga system of Philosophy. In other words what is abstraction from sensuous objects is concentration in the Divinity. श॒ Various causes have been assigned for this title of Puatanjali. Vide In- troduction. 1 2 INTRODUCTION. even as the light of the moon to the mass of expanding darkness of the human mind, and the appreciation of which always fills the mind of good people with lasting happiness—may they prosper ! 5. The glorious words of the king Ranarafigamalla,* who, like the lord of snakes, has cast off all impurity from his speech, mind and body, who has (like unto him) compiled a work on the government of words, who has commented on Patanjali, and written a treatise on medicine called the Rajamrigéfikat— may they prosper. 6. All commentators are perverters of the meaning fo their authors ; they avoid those parts which are most difficult to understand, by saying that the meaning there is obvious; they dilate upon those parts with useless compound terms where thie meaning is plain; they confound their hearers by misplaced and inappropriate dissertations without number. 7. Avoiding voluminousness, keeping clear of all misti- fying and obviously worthless network of words, and abstracting its inmost meaning, I publish this exposition of the sage Patan- jali for the edification of intelligent persons. * A title of Bhoja. † All these works of Bhoja are still extant. t ‘Commentators cach dark passage shun— And hold a farthing rush-light to the sun,” St. Jerome “not versions but inversions.” Italian, Zraduttori traditort “Translators traitors.” “ Surrender rather than rendcr ; Not turning, but overturning.” CHAPTER FIRST. 3 CHAPTER FIRST. Now, an exposition of the Yoga (is to be made). This aphorism explains the subject of the work, the object with which it is written, and the relation (it bears to the subject). (The word) “ Now’* (atha) suggests (that) a (distinct) topic (here commences), and it serves also as a benediction. (The word) Yoga means ‘union,’ or the application of the mind to abstract contemplation, from the root yug “to meditate.” An “exposition” (anus‘asana) is that whereby something is expounded or described through its characteristic marks, its real nature, its distinctive divisions, its causes and effects. (The two words Yoga and anus'asana form the com- pound) Yoganus’asana, (which means) “an exposition of the Yoga.” This is to be understood to be the topic even to the end of this work (of Patanjali). Yoga, with the means of performing it and its fruit, constitutes the subject, that being treated of in this Institute. The object of the work is the explanation of the subject, and the fruit thereof is the emancipation obtainable by the Yoga. The relation of the work is the connection which exists between that which treats, and the subject treated of, (or the Institute and its subjects). The connection between Yoga, the subject, and its effect, which is emancipation (Kaivalya), or the means and the end, is also its relation. The substance of this is—that in the work are described the instruments of performing the Yoga which is its subject— that Yoga the accomplishment of which leads to the consumma- tion of emancipation called Kaivalya. [Dr. Ballantyne has rendered the word Yoga into “ concentra- tion.” That English word, however, in itsordinary signification, does # Dr. Ballantyne’s text has athdtah “now then.” 4 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. not convey anything like a fair idea of what Yoga means. The word meditation would have been more appropriate, but even that ` does not convey all the ideas which the Sanskrit term has been made to comprehend. A perfect English equivalent is not to be had, and I prefer, therefore, to use the original term to coining a new one. The commentator so explains the word Anus‘dsana as to convey the idea that it is a verbal noun intended to explain the purport of the work. The commentary named Pdtanzala- bhashya takes it along with the word Yoga to be the specific name of the work. (Yogdns’dsanam nama sdstram). If this be accepted, and it appears to be the most appropriate, the aphorism should be rendered into, ‘“‘ Now, the (work called) Yoganusfsana, (will be expounded).”” Vd&chaspati Misra, the annotator on the last named work, and Vijnéna-bhikshu in his Vartzka, take notice of this subject. They also raise the question about the origin of the doctrine. They hold that Patanjali was not the originator of the doctrine, for it has existed from creation, and Hiranya- garbha was the first performer of the Yoga; but that he was merely the compiler of the rules in the form of an institute for the use of intelligent people anxious to study them. Nanu hiranyagarbao yogasya karté nanyah purdtana iti yogiydjna- valkyasmyiteh, katham patanjaler yoga-sastritvamityds'aflkya sutrakdrena anus dsanamityuktam, 8 ishtashyanusasanam.) | Now what is this Yoga? To this the author replies :-— II. Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the think- ing principle. «Thinking principle” (ckitia) is of the form of goodness without a taint. “ Functions” (vrittz) are modifications of the relation between each other of them. “ Yoga” or meditation 18 described to be the “ suppression” (xzrodha), or dissolution in their primary causes, through the direction inward on the suppression of CHAPTER FIRST, 5 the tendency outward, of the functions in question, This sup- pression is @ cross-grained ascent of the “ functions” of the thinking principle. Being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle, it is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in gome one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—restless activity, mischievous ignorance, volup- tuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of activity (15420८0) is induced by an access of the quality of foulness (rajas). Propelled by that quality it tends out- wards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasur- able or painful objects, It is common to demons, sons of Diti, Titans, sons of Danu, &c. Addiction to evil actions without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (muda) proceeds from an excess of darkness (८4048). It is common to demons (Rakshasas), ghosts (1154९088), &c. Voluptuousness (vikshipta) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and en- gaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds. from an excess of the quality of goodness (sativa), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes restlessly active; by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injur- ing others ; and by goodness full of happiness. These three con- ditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression, having an excess of the quality of goodness and following the others, are reckoned fit for that purpose, The object of arranging the qualities of goodness &c, in a dise orderly way is this : notwithstanding the two qualities of foulness and darkness being very detestable, the quality of foulness is first described, because unless activity is made intelligible, no supprese sion of it can possibly ke grasped. Hence the reversed order. The object of placing the quality of goodness last 18 this: that by its ex- cess, the two (subsequent) conditions become fit for Yoga. Of thosg two conditions, viz., concentration and suppression, that in which 6 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. the thinking principle is in a state of (exclusive) application to one point is called Yoga. What is the resultof this? (It 18 this): by Yoga or concentration to one point the external func- tions cease, and on that cessation there is a complete dissolution of all functions with their residua. In both these conditions, Yoga meditation is practicable. {The most important word in the aphorism 18 ८7८4 which has been rendered into “ thinking principle” by Dr. Ballantyne. In ordinary Sanskrit it is a synonym of the word manas “ mind,” and Dr. Ballantyne has used that word as a synonym in different places, and in the sense in which that word is used in philosophy --2, ¢., “that which perceives, feels, thinks and wills,” (Taylor, Elements of Thought,) “ or that which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned,” (Harris, Hermes, p. 227)—he is right. In the Séfikhya aphorisms of Kapila, its counterpart manas has been used in the same sense (Mahaddkhyamddyam kdryam tanmanah,I,71). But inasmuch as the philosophical writers of this country make a marked distine- tion between mind as above described, and as an internal organ of knowledge, the sensorium, it is desirable that the distinction should be marked by the use of a different word. In the Safikhya aphorisms the word ८2८८4 does not occur, nor is it to be met with in the Nyd4ya. The Vedantists use it sparingly, taking it to be a modification or another name of Buddhi (Veddnta-sdéra). Its equivalent in the Safikhya is Adhyavasdya, which is synonymous with Buddhi. (Adhyavasdyo buddhih, 11, 13). Itis called Mahat “the great one,” because “it is the first and most important of the products of nature, presiding over and pervading the whole.” (Mahattvam svetara-sakalakérya-vydpakatvan-mahaisvarydchcha.) It is mati “ understanding,” because every thing is understood by it, (manyati anayd) ; ६९/८४ “ familiar knowledge ;” jndna, and 27404. That Patanjali implies the object of these words by chitta is evident from the fact of his making it the first product of nature and anterior to egotism, as the Sinkhya does, and by say- son CHAPTER FIRST. ) the tendency outward, of the functions in question. The form is a cross-grained ascent of the “functions” of the thinking principle. Tlat suppression being common to all the condi- tions of the thinking principle is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—unquietness, mischievous ignorance, voluptuous- ness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of unquietness (tshipta) is induced by the access of the quality of foulness (rajas). Propelled by that quality it tends out- wards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasur- able or painful objects. It 18 common to demons, sons of Diti, and Titans, sons of Danu &c. Addiction to evil action without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (५५) proceeds from an excess of darkness (famas). It is common to demons (Rékshasas) and ghosts, (18६९1195) &९, Voluptuousness (vikshipta) 18 the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and en- gaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness, (3८४८2), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes active (or desirous) ; by darkness mischievous, or desirous of inju- ring others ; and by goodness full of happiness. These three con- ditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression having an excess of the quality of the goodness and foulness, successively placed, are reckoned fit for that. The object of arranging the qualities of goodness &c. in a dis- orderly way is this: notwithstanding the two qualities of foulness and darkness being very detestable, the quality of foulness is first described, because unless activity 18 made intelligibleno suppression of it can possibly be grasped. Hence the reversed order. The object of placing the quality of goodness last is this: that by its excess, the two (subsequent) conditions become fit for Yoga. Of those two conditions, ८८६.) concentration and suppression, that in which 6 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. the thinking principle is in a state of (exclusive) application to one point is called Yoga. What is the result of this? (It is this): by Yoga or concentration to one point the external func- tions cease, and on that cessation there is a complete dissolution of all functions with their impressions. In both these conditions, Yoga meditation is practicable. [The most important word in the aphorism is chzéta which has been rendered into “ thinking principle” by Dr. Ballantyne. In ordinary Sanskrit it is a synonym of the word manas “ mind,” and Dr. Ballantyne has used that word as a synonym in different places, and in the sense in which that word is used in philosophy —1. e., “that which perceives, feels, thinks and wills,” (Taylor, Elements of Thought,) ^^ or that which, when it acts, knows what it 18 going to do ; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned,” (Harris, Hermes, p. 227)—he is right. Inthe Safikhya aphorisms of Kapila, its counterpart manas has been used in the same sense (Mahadikhyamadyam karyam tanmanah, 1,71). But inasmuch as the philosophical writers of this country make a marked distinc- tion between mind as above described, and as an internal organ of knowledge, it is desirable that the distinction should be marked by the use of a different word. In the SafAkhya aphorisms the word chiéta does not occur, nor is itto be met with in the Ny4ya. The Veddntis use it sparingly, taking it to be a modification or another name of Buddhi (Vedanta-sa'ra), Its equivalent in the Safkhya is Adhyavasaya which is synonymous with Buddhi. (Adhyavasayo buddhih, II, 13). It is called Mahat “the great one,” because “ it is the first and most important of the products of nature, presiding over and pervading the whole.” (Aahat- tvam svetara-sakalakarya-vydapakatvan-mahaisgvaryachcha.) It 18 mati ^^ understanding,” because every thing is understood by it, (manyatt anaya) ; Khydati “familiar knowledge ;” jnana, and prajnd. That Patanjali implies the object of these words by chitta is evident from the fact of his making it the first product of nature and anterior to egotism, as the Sankhya does, and by say- CHAPTER FIRST. 7 ing that the suppression of its functions results in the completion of Yoga. (Vritti-nirodhat tatsiddhih, III, 31). Thus Vaéchas- pati Misra—chitta-s'abdenantahkaranam buddhimupalakshayati. According to the order of creation prakritri comes first, thence ehitta, thence egotism, thence mind, and thence the subtile organs &c., and this both according to the SéAkhya and the Yoga systems. The thinking principle is thus the same with intellect, and mind in the highest sense. The next word is vritti, I follow Colebrooke and Wilson by rendering it into “functions.” The functions are produced by modifications of the original principle produced by unequal exertions of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness. In so far they are allotropic conditions of the same principle, and so, as Vijnfna Bhikshu expresses it, the world is merely a modification of form, of which prakritz is the materiality. (Pa- rindmaripam jagadupaddnakatvantu-prakrititvam,) Parindma or change is the term usually employed as its equivalent, and Bhoja explains it by saying “they are modifications of the relation between each other of the functions.””? Vijnana Bhikshu calls it transformation of Prakriti, (prakritiviripam). Under these circumstances Dr. Ballantyne’s use of the term “ modification” affords the closest rendering; but Dr. Wilson prefers functions as more idiomatic and expressive. The last word 18 1270464, which means stoppage, or hindering, and suppression implies the same. The definition of Yoga as given in the text and the commentary suggests the idea that the suppression of thought must be complete before Yoga can be accomplished, but such is not the object, for in the lower stages of meditation such is not the case, and yet it is Yoga. The Pdtanjala-bhdshya points this out by saying that since the word sarva “all’’ has not been used before vyitte € functions,” the form of Yoga in which there 18 a distinct recog- nition is also Yoga. (Sarvasabdagrahanat samprajndtopi Yogah). It is remarkable that Bhoja should have overlooked so important a qualification. } 8 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. Now the author of the Stitras, wishing to describe the words chitta-vyitti-nirodhak, describes first [in two aphorisms] the word chitta. ITI. Then (४, ८. at the time of meditation) there is abi- dance of the spectator in its own form. ‘‘Then,” at that time, the soul, as “ the spectator,” (drashta) “abides” remains in its own form, which is simple intelligence (and nothing more). The meaning is this: that on knowledge being fully developed, there being no shadow of any sensuous object cast on the thinking principle, and the egotism of one’s self, which is the actor, being gone, and intellect being fit for liberation, the soul abides or obtains location in Buddhi which is its own form. [The spectator is the soul which, abiding in the body, and influ- enced by the thinking principle, beholds what is done by the organs, but does not partake of the pleasures and pains resulting from their action, and in the state of Yoga the functions being- stopped there is the spectator without any spectacle to behold. This spectator is the soul. ] What then is the form (of the soul) when waking (or active, 4. €. other than in a state of meditation)? To this he replies: IV. At other times it is in the same form as its func. tions. “At other times”—4d. ¢., at times other than that of medita- tion. Its “functions” are those the characteristics of which will hereafter be described (A. V.) ‘‘In the same form” means to consist of it. The purport is this. Even as the functions, in- volving pleasure, pain and bewilderment, manifest themselves, so does the soul z. e., it appears so to itself. Ifso, it follows that that object, in which, in the state of modification produced by concentra- tion, the power of understanding finds its own form, and which CHAPTER FIRST. 9 being influenced by the functions of the senses resolves itself into worldly objects, and the soul appears manifest in the forms thereof, as the moon reflected in the moving ripples on the water, appears as if it were (itself) moving, is the thinking principle chitta. [It is a dogma of the Hindu metaphysicians that the thinking principle or intellect assumes the form of the object perceived. And the aphorism explains that when that principle is immersed in complete Yoga it perceives itself and nothing more, but when it is active and influenced by external objects it assumes the forms of its excitants]. To explain the term function, (the third word in A. II,) the author says :— V. The functions are fivefold, (and they are either) painful or not: painful. The “ functions” (vrz¢éz) are certain modifications of the think. ing principle. The word panchatayi (five-fold) is formed by the addition of the affix ¢ayap (Panini v. ii. 42), and implies that the totality of the forms of the functions constitutes the form-bearer, and the functions severally are the forms thereof. The five functions are what are meant. How are they? They are painful or not painful. ^ Those that are involved in sufferings of the kind about to be described are painful; those that are the reverse of these are not painful.” [This aphorism is a verbatim copy of Kapila’s aphorism 38, Book II. It only propounds what are to be explained in subse- quent aphorisms]. The five functions are to be described after being named. VI. (The functions of the thinking principle are) right notion, misconception, fancy, sleep and memory. Of these the author gives the definitions successively. 2 10 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. VII. Right notions are perception, inference, and testi- mony. Here the author of the Institute has not given a separate definition of what right notion is, that being very well known, and it being made evident by the description of its different forms. In fact the real definition of right notion is that whereby is produced unquestionable knowledge. “Perception” (pratyaksha) is that function of the thinking principle by which it acquires, through the medium of the senses brought in connexion with external objects having common and peculiar characteristics, a knowledge of the most important peculiar characteristic. “Inference” (anumana) is the conviction produced by a previous knowledge of the necessary relation between a characteristic and that which bears it. A trustworthy word is “ testimony,” (agama). [Pramana means right notion, as also the means of acquiring that right notion, 2. ¢., evidence, and hence the two meanings are often confounded. As a function of the thinking principle it is right notion, and not evidence. The Yoga system follows the Séfikhya in admitting only three means of right notion, and in the Séfikhya-kariké they are said to comprise every mode of demonstration. The Naiy4yikas, however, reckon four kinds, viz., preception (pratyaksha), inference (anumdna), comparison (upamana), and testimony (sadda). The Veddntis follow this latter, and the Miméfskas recognise six, vzz., perception (pratyaksha), presumption (arthapatt:), proportion (sambhara), privation (०९4८), comprehension (pratibha), and oral com- munication (aztihya). The word used for perception is pratyaksha, which means “ that which is seen,” but it implies knowledge acquired through any one of the five organs of sense, or, as Reid defines perception, CHAPTER FIRST. 11 “ evidence which we have of external objects by our senses.” For testimony Patanjali gives dgama, which means the Vedas, but the commentator has generalised it by giving for its synonym dptavachana “ reliable words” ; it is the declaration of one who knows the truth of that which he affirms, and whose authority may be relied upon. The scriptures, as revealed knowledge, naturally come at the head of testimony]. | Having thus described the function of nght notion the author speaks of Misconception. VIII. Misconception is incorrect notion, (or a notion) which abides in a form which is not that of its object. “‘ Misconception” (viparyaya) is a notion of something in re- spect of which it really is not ; as the notion of silver in mother- o’pearl. ‘ Which abides in a form which is not that of its object” is to say a notion which does not abide in that form which is its (real) form (in respect of which the notion is entertained). It amounts to this, that the notion does not reveal the real form of the thing. Doubt (safsaya) founded on the notion whether a thing abides in its proper form or not, such as whether a parti- cular object seen is a man or the stump of a tree, is also a Misconception. To describe the function of Fancy, he says : IX. Fancy is a notion founded on a knowledge con- veyed by words, but of which (there is) no object (corresponding in reality). Knowledge dependant on words is abda-jndna. That which follows it, is sadda-jndnanupati (the epithet used to define Fancy, which in the text has been translated by the word “notion founded on a knowledge conveyed hy words”). Such a notion without reference to the real character of an object 12 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. is “Fancy.” Thus the words, “the intelligence of the soul (purusha) is its own form.” Here a notion is assumed by ad- mitting a distinction as in the notion produced by the possessive case in the phrase “the blanket of Devadatta,” though it does not really exist, for in fact the soul is intelligence itself (and there is no distinction between it and its intelligence, or of possessor and the possessed). [‘ In the soul Are many lesser faculties, that serve Reason as chief ; among these fancy next Her office holds ; of all eternal things Which the five watchful senses represents She forms imagination’s airy shapes,” Paradise Lost, B. V.] In order to declare what Sleep is, he says: X. Sleep is that function (of the thinking principle) which has for its object the conception of nothing. Of that function which is based on the conception of nothing the name is as aforesaid (abhdvapratyayd.) Hence it follows that “Sleep” (१४14) is that function (of the thinking principle) which takes place on the quitting of all objects, in consequence of the quality of darkness always preceding it. That this is a function (of the thinking principle and not a mere blank) is proved by our seeing that one recollects (on arising from a sound sleep) that “I slept pleasantly,” which could not have happened without a consciousness of it, (and no memory can exist of that which is not). Hence it is a function. In order to describe Memory, he says : XI. Memory is the not letting go of an object that has been recognised. CHAPTER FIRST. 18 “The not letting go” (asampramosha) or not allowing to escape from our intellect an object which has once been recognised through (proper) evidence 18 “ Memory” (smrztz). Of the five functions Evidence, Misconception, and Fan- cy belong to the waking state. When any of these, from vividness of impression, becomes perceptible (in sleep), it isa Dream (svapna.) But Sleep of itself has no cognisable object. Memory again is dependent on Evidence, Misconception, Fancy or Sleep. [Bishop Hall says, ‘“ Memory is the great keeper or Master of the Rolls of the soul, a power that can make amends for the speed of time, in causing him to leave behind him those things which else he would so carry away as if they had not been.” It is said to be dependant on Evidence, Misconception, &c., because the impressions it preserves are the productions of those causes. ] Having thus described the functions (of the thinking principle), in order to explain the suppression (the fourth word in A. II,) of these with the means thereof, he says: XII. The suppression of these (functions is effected) by Exercise and Dispassion. ५ Exercise” (adhydsa) and Dispassion” (vairdgya) will be defined in the aphorisms about to be given. The repression by these (Exercise and Dispassion) of the functions of the thinking principle which have the form of revealing, energizing and regulating, is *‘ suppression” (nirodha). What is meant is the placing of the func- tions, which from their turning inwards have ceased to dwell on ex- ternal objects, in the thinking principle, which is their original cause, and of which they are but potential attributes. Aversion from sensuous objects is produced by “ Dispassion”’ resulting from a knowledge of the evil influence of those objects (on the thinking principle) , and confirmed steadfastness is acquired by “ Exercise,” which makes it a source of happiness and quiet ; and by the (conjoined effect of the) two the functions of the thinking principle are suppressed. 14 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. (The purport of this aphorism has been given by Kapila in six aphorisms, 31 to 36 of Book ITI.] With a view to describe Exercise, he says : XIII. Exercise is the (repeated) effort that it (the think- ing principle) shall remain in its functionless state. Sthiti or “ functionless state” is that condition of the think- ing principle in which it abides in its own (original) form, free from all functions ; and the effort or endeavour (repeated) again and again to bring it to that condition is ‘ Exercise” or abhyasa. He next mentions a special character of that (Exercise). XIV. It is again a firm ground attained by proper devo- tion for a long time unintermittingly. It (Exercise) is a firm ground, z. ८.१ it becomes steadfast, or acquires firmness, by being assiduously attended to for a long time unremittingly with an excess of regard. The meaning is that it tends to firmness. He now mentions the definition of Dispassion (A. XII.) XV. The consciousness of being the subjugator on the part of one who thirsts after neither perceptible nor scriptural objects is Dispassion. Objects are of two kinds, ‘“Perceptible” (drishta) and ८८ Scriptural” (dnus‘ravika). The Perceptible is that which may be apprehended here (on earth), such as sound and other objects (perceptible through the organs of sense). The Scriptural is that which exists in the regions of the Devas or elsewhere (where it cannot be grasped by carnal organs). . CHAPTER FIRST. 15 That which is heard (anus’rityate) from the mouth of a preceptor is anus‘rava or the Veda. What comes to our knowledge there- from (i. ¢., from the Veda) is what is meant by “ one heard of” dnus'ravika. Giving up all eagerness for these two classes of objects, on account of their becoming distasteful at the end, the reflection which ensues (in the thinking principle) to the effect that these are my subjects, but I am not their slave, is called Dispassion (Vairagya.) _ [The word Vairdgya (dispassion) is formed of the privative prefix vi, and rdga, ‘affection,’ ‘ prepossession,’ ‘love,’ ‘desire,’ the meaning being, in the technical sense in which it is used here, absence of desire for enjoyable objects. The absence, however, should not be accidental, as in the case of a child or of a stolid person where, owing to want of development of certain organs, it © results without effort, but the fruit of due deliberation, and a conviction that the objects are not worth having, and that the desire for them should be suppressed. The word vas’ikdra-sanjnd literally means ‘consciousness of being able to subjugate,” in this instance the passions; but the commentators take it to be a mere indifference or apathy, neither affection nor hatred. Thus the Patanjala Bhashya: “devoid of hatred and desirability” (Aeyopddeya-sunyd) ; and Vachaspati Misra explains the phrase by the words “a sense of indifference having neither attachment nor hatred” (dasaflgadvesharahité upekshabuddhth). The word rendered into ‘ perceptible’ is drishta ‘seen ;’ but, as illustrated by commentators, it means all worldly objects of sense ; they may not be perceptible owing to excessive distance, extreme nearness, defect of the organs, inattention, minuteness, inter- position of objects, &c., (Sadkhya-kartka. V. VII.), still they are perceptible on this earth under some circumstance or other, and therefore included in the term. The Patanjala Bhdshya illustrates the term by naming women, food, drink, and power, (striyonnapanamaisvaryimit:). Dr. Ballantyne renders it into **seen,”’ which is its lexicographical meaning, but which is quite 16 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. inadmissible here. Wilson, following Colebrooke, renders it into “temporal” which conveys the right technical meaning, but it becomes inappropriate under certain circumstances, as when we have to deal with adrishta, the antonym of drishta, in which case non-temporal would be unmeaning, for the word implies fate or what has not yet happened but may happen; 2८ unseen is in that case the best. The Sanskrit term for Scriptural is dausravika, which means “that which has been heard from another,” but it has not been used in that sense here. As the commentators show, the secondary meaning of 20४57202 is the Veda, which is also called Sruti, or “that which has been heard,” and the object is to im- ply those rewards which the Veda promises to the performer of sacrifices &c. Colebrooke uses the synonym ‘revealed.’ The Patanjala Bhdshya takes the rewards to mean heaven, rudi- mental body, and dissolution into nature (svargavaidehyapra- kritilayah). Thus the dispassion implies not only indifference to worldly enjoyments and objects, but the same feeling also in regard to celestial and other forms of pleasure derivable by the performance of the rites enjoined in the Veda. The pleasures, both of this world and of the next, are equally temporary, and therefore should not be desired by one who longs for emancipation. Thus in the Sattkhya-karika: ‘The revealed mode is, like the temporal one, ineffectual, for it is impure; it is defective in some respects, as well as excessive in others.” (Wilson’s Saéfikhya-karik4, p. 13). In fact it amounts to the moral imperturbability of Pyrrho.] A peculiarity in it is to be described. XVI. Carried to the extent of indifference to the qualities it is the highest, as it is (then) conducive to a know- ledge of God. “It? ४, ८., ^^ Dispassion.” “ Highest” (para) the most estimable. The first degree of ^ Dispassion” (A. XV) has regard to (ordinary) objects; the second, has regard to the (three) qualities, and it is CHAPTER FIRST. 17 cive toaknowledge of the distinction between the product qualities and the (nonproduced) soul, from its extreme conduciveness to the perfect suppressive meditation. [The object of this aphorism is to divide Dispassion into two kinds; one referring to enjoyable objects and called vzsaya- vatrdgya, and the other to qualities, ४. ९. to the knowledge of the relation between the discrete and the indiscrete, (vyaktavyaktadhar- makebhyoviraktah). The latter is described to be the highest, or most estimable, because it is more valuable than the former, in the attainment of the final object. The word para is the lead- ing term in the Aphorism, and stands by itself, being predicated by what follow. But Dr. Ballantyne has subordinated it, by re- ducing it intoa predicate. He says “ This carried to the utmost is indifference regarding the qualities.” This is obviously not the night meaning. | Having thus stated the nature of Yoga, the author (next) mentions the differences existing between the nature of that kind of it in which there is consciousness (samprajnata) and that in which consciousness is lost (asamprajnata). XVII. Conscious, because it is attended with argumenta- tion, deliberation, joy and egoism. The word “ meditation” (samddhz) is understood to be present after the word conscious to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism. That which makes manifest without any doubt or error, ४. ¢., makes thoroughly manifest, the exact nature of the object pon- dered is “Conscious meditation,” (samprajnata samadhi). Samadhi or meditation isa kind of pondering(44évana.) The suppression or exclusion of every function (of the thinking principle) except that which relates to the subject pondered 1s Consciousor Discriminative meditation ; it is thesame with “ Seeded meditation” —savija-sama- dht. And from there being distinctions of argumentation, &c.,it is of four kinds, (namely} lst, the Argumentative” (savitarka) + 2nd, 3 18 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. the ‘ Deliberative” (savichdra); 8rd, the “ Joyous” (sinanda) ; and 4th, the “ Egoistic” (sdsmita). Pondering” is the taking again and again into the thinking principle of any particular object to the exclusion of all other objects. The object to be pondered is of two kinds ; the Godhead (¢s’vara), and the categories or prin- ciples (४८८८८८५३). The last again are of two kinds according as they are “irrational” or “ rational.”’ The irrational are the twen- ty-four; the rational is the soul. Among these (the four kinds of meditation), when accepting the gross elements and the organs as the objects, pondering is carried on with reference to which is antecedent and which is conse- quent, and the relation of the words to their meanings, it is called ¢ Argumentative meditation’ (savitarka-samadhi). Should this pondering, however, be independent of the idea of their antecedence and their sequence and the relation between their names and meaning, 16 would be called ^ Non-argumentative” (nirvitarka). When pondering is engaged in with reference to something subtile, as the subtile elements and the internal organ, and to their qualities in relation to space, time, &c., it is ‘ Deliberative” (savichdra). But should this pondering be in regard to those subjects themselves, without reference to their relation to time and space, and simply as substrata of qualities, it is said to be *“Non-deliberative” (nzrvichara). What have been described up to this time are called Tangible Forms. (Grahya-samdpatti.) When the quality of goodness of the Internal Organ tinctured with a little of the qualities of foulness and darkness is pondered, then consciousness being under the influence of qualities and the quality of goodness, which is full of the manifestation of happiness, becomes enlivened, the meditation becomes “ Joyous” (sazanda). In this (kind of) meditation those of confined intellect who do not perceive the other (7. e¢., last of the twenty-five principles, or the chief soul) are indicated by the word ‘“‘bodiless’” (videha), because they have risen above their body and egotism. This 15 the Acceptance Form. (Gra- hana-samdpatts.) CHAPTER FIRST. 19 Next, the pondering which has the pure quality of goodness untainted by foulness and darkness for its object, is called Egoistic or ontric meditation, (sasmzta), because in it, from the enlivening of the intellectual power, the quality of goodness, which is the object of the pondering, is disregarded and its existence alone is perceived. It should not be supposed that there is no difference between this Ontric meditation and egotism, because where the Internal Organ knows objects with the use of (the word) 7 (४, ¢., with a knowledge of the distinction between itself and the object before it) it isegotism. But when mere existence is alone manifest in the thinking principle merged in nature from its reverse action resulting from its tendency inwards, it isegoism. In this (last kind of) meditation when contented (beings) do not perceive the Supreme Soul, and their mind is merged in its true cause, they are described to be Prakritilaya ‘ resolved into nature.’ Of the persons, who enter into pondering, knowing the Supreme Soul, the manifestation of intelligence is called the Form of the taker, Grihitri-samaptts. Even in the argumentative meditation all the four kinds exist potentially, and successively as each is abandoned the others remain, and all these four kinds are Conscious meditation, or that which has a distinct recognition, samprajnata-samddhi. {Meditation is described to be of two kinds, Ist, that which is carried on with a clear understanding of the object reflected ed upon as distinct from the meditator; and 2nd, that in which no such distinction obtains and the intellect is merged in the soul. In the former, the subject of the aphorism, there are argumenta- tion, deliberation, joy, and eguvism, when the objects meditated upon are irrational objects, such as the first twenty-four of the twenty-five categoriesof the Sankhya system which the Yoga school adopts ; and they may not exist when the rational soul is the object. The first or Argumentative form applies to gross matter; and the second or the Deliberative appliesto subtile matter. In both these the quality of goodness plays a subordinate part. When that quali- ty attains ascendancy the meditation becomes “ Joyous ;” and it 20 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. ceases to have connection with the body, or technically becomes dis- embodied. When it prevails without any taint of the foul and the dark qualities, the thinking principle is then believed to have merged into primeval nature. This is, however, not the highest reward, for it does not put an end to transmigration: on the evolu- tion of creation from nature, the merging ceases, and there is again a separation. It will be noticed that the first two forms, the Argumentative and the Deliberative, have their negatives the Non- argumentative and the Non-deliberative; and these four form a class called the tangible forms. The next is the “ Joyous” kind in which the sense of the existence of the body is lost, and this is called the ^ acceptance form.” In this there is no negative form, nor is there any such distinction in the next kind, the ^ Egoistic,” in which every thing is identified with the self. This is called the “acceptor” form. In all these six kinds of pondering, there is, it will be perceived, a distinct recognition or consciousness of individuality, and hence they all come under the term Conscious. When this consciousness is lost, we come to the next class which forms the theme of the next aphorism. ] ~ The author now describes that form of meditation 10 which consciousness is lost, asamprajnata. XVIII. The other is that in which the residua are ended, preceded by the exercise of thought as regards the cause of rejection. By virama is meant that whereby rejection takes place, 2. e., the abandonment of all anxiety about argumentation &c., (A. XVII). Pratyaya, “ thought,” added to virdma, “ cause of rejec- tion,” produces the compound expression virdma-pratyaya. Exer- cise (abhydsa) is reiteration of the idea in the thinking principle. In this condition of exercise, constantly rejecting with a nega- CHAPTER FIRST, 21 tive, “not this, not this,” whatever ideas spring up, the result is the other or Unconscious meditation, or that in which there is no distinct consciousness, which has nothing left, and in which the residua are ended. It is the opposite of the former kind, and it 15 asamprajnata-samadhi. In this condition there is nothing to be known, and therefore it is called Unconscious, undiscrimi- native, or seedless meditation (zrvija). Now, there are four modifications of the thinking principle, waking,commencing meditation, concentration, and suppression of . thought. Thereof (A. II) the waking state belongs to the two conditions of the thinking principle described as restlessness and mischievous ignorance. The quality of goodness being on the ascendant in the condition described as voluptuousness, it is that of commencing meditation. Concentration and absolute suppres- sion are the final conditions. Each condition has its residua. Thereof, those residua which are present in the waking state are destroyed by those that are produced by the condition of com- mencing meditation, and those that are brought forth by the condition of commencing meditation, are destroyed by those due to the condition of concentration. The residua of the condition of concentration are destroyed by those of suppression. Even as lead melted with gold destroys the dross of gold as well as itself, so do the residua of the condition of suppression consume both themselves as well as the residua of the condition of concen- tration. (The most important word in the aphorism is Safskdra, and it is just the one which has unfortunately not been ex- plained either in the commentary of Bhoja, or in the Pdfanjala Bhashya. In ordinary Sanskrit it has many meanings. In the Nyaya it occurs frequently in three different senses, viz., velocity (vega), thinking (dhavand), and elasticity (sthitisthipaka). (Tarka-saflgraha). Adverting to the second meaning the Bhdsd- parichchheda, says: ‘ 6205} 818, called thinking, (९4८८१) / resides in sentient beings ; and is imperceptible to the senses. Certainty 22 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. which has no inattention in its constituent, is its cause. It is also described to be the cause of memory and recognition.” (Bhavanakhyastu sanskdro jivavrittiratindryah. Unekshanatmakastasya nischayah kdranam bhavet. Smarane pratyabhijndyamapyasau heturuchyate.) Thus it is not memory as rendered by Dr. Roer in his transla- tion of the Bhasha-parichchheda, for there it is described to be the causeof memory, and not memory itself. It is not sensation, nor impression, for it is not transient, but lasting. It is not perception, because that applies to the acceptance by the senso- rium of something existing without, and does not serve as the cause of memory. It is not idea, for it is the result of former experience, and not spontaneous as an idea may be, nor eternal as the ancient Greek philosophers supposed ideas to be. Dr. Ballan- tyne renders it into “ self-reproduction of thought ;”’ but there is nothing like “ self-reproduction” in it; for it is said to be re- vived by external stimuli, and not by its own effort. It is some- thing then—a trace, a mark, acelule, a psychograph—which perception, whether conscious or unconscious, leaves behind in the intellect, to be revived afterwards under particular circum- stances, and it is more or less connected with all intellectual acts as cause or effect. In the language of Dr. Morell (‘ Mental Philosophy,’ p. 95) “ When a given mental impression is produced upon us, it remains for a time before the consciousness, and then gives way to others. We know, however, that it is not absolute- ly lost ; for,if proper conditions occur, the impression 15 renewed. The conclusion is, that there must be something deposited within us which subsists permanently, and which is equally there, whether it be at any moment the immediate object of our con- sciousness or not. This something, then, we term a residuum, using the expression, it will be observed, without implying any theory on the subject whatever.” The Sanskrit counterpart of this residuum is Safiskéra. Every sensation, every impression, every perception, every idea, nay, every dream, leaves its trace behind, and the traces or residua so obtained constitute the sum total of CHAPTER FIRST, 93 our experience, and these are Saiiskaras. According to Indian philosophers these remain not only all life through, but even in subsequent states of existence, and they are, therefore, believed to be the cause of our instincts. The new-born infant takes to its mother’s breast from the sanskara it has in its mind from its experience in a former existence. The next word is ‘esha, and it, too, has not been fully defined by the commentators. It means ‘remainder’ ‘ balance,’ or ‘end.’ Compounded with safskdra the meaning is that in which the remainders are the saiiskaras, or that in which the 8०781 4198 are ended, or brought toaclose. Bhoja accepts the second meaning, and he illustrates it by saying that in the state of Unconscious meditation in its perfection all previous saiskaras or residua of former conditions, as well as those of the perfect state, are de- stroyed, even as in the process of cupellation, lead melted with gold not only destroys the dross existing in impure gold, but also itself, leaving nothing behind. Thus the Unconscious medita- tion is seedless or has no object whatever for contemplation. The Patanjala Bhashya takes a different view. According to it, in the Unconscious stage all functions are set at rest and the resi- dua alone remain behind. (Sarva-vrittipratyastamaya-saiiskara- Seshah nirodhah.) And Vachaspati Misra emphasizes this by ad- ding the word “alone’—saiisk4ras alone remain—(sanskara-matra Seshah.) This contradiction may be explained by supposing that the Patanjala-bhashya has in view a meditation from which there is awaking, while Bhoja describes the final meditation from which there is no further waking; for he admits that in the earlier stages of the Unconscious meditation there are residua peculiar to it. Yogis admit that people do wake from the Un- conscious meditation, and that that meditation 18 often practiced, and in such cases the safiskéras must remain in a latent state to be revived by proper stimuli on waking. It is difficult satisfactorily to decide to what condition Patanjali himself referred to. The way in which he has used the word seska would suggest the idea that he has been correctly interpreted in the Pdtanjala Bhashya. See A. 1५, at the end of the chapter. 24 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. The state of Unconscious meditation above described is subject to the condition precedent, that there should be repeated acts of contemplation or exercise of thought amounting to a habit, as regards the necessity of rejecting all causes of disturbance. Without it the final stage cannot he acquired. This exercise of thought, however, forms a part of the Unconsious stage, and is totally unconnected with the Conscious form. Vachaspati Misra says— the first word in the aphorism (which I have rendered into ^ preceded by the exercise of thought regarding the cause of rejec- tion,’ and for the sake of idiom put at the end of the sentence) de- scribes the means, and the other two define the nature of the medi- tation in question” (purvapaderupayakathanamuttardbhyam cha svarupa-kathanam). Dr. Ballantyne has mistaken the purport of the word, and made it the conditio precedent. His version is ^ व 116 one [kind of meditation just described] is preceded by the exercise of thought in the shape of repose ;—the other [—in- dependent of any fresh antedecent—] is in the shape of the self- reproduction [of thought, after the departure of all objects.]” After what has been stated above, it is obvious that this version is not tenable. It may be added that itis not at all usual with authors of Sitras to repeat in a subsequent stitra what has been already explained in a previous one. | Having thus stated the distinctions and the nature of Yoga, and having briefly mentioned the method of performing it, the author proceeds to speak of those methods more fully. XIX. Of (the meditative states attained to by the two classes of aspirants technically called) the Unem- bodied and the Resolved into nature, the world is the cause. The ^^ unembodied” (videha) and the “resolved into nature” (prakritilaya) have been described in the aphorism on the argu- mentative and other forms of meditations (A XVII, pp. 18 f.) CHAPTER FIRST. 95 Of their meditation the world is the cause. The word dbhara- prataya 18 formed of bhava ‘ world’ and pratyaya ‘ cause.’ The meaning is this: that such persons, from their entrance into the world (on account of their deserts), become participa- tors of similar (inadequate) meditation. Not being conscient of ultimate reality, for them this is a mere exercise of the Yoga: Hence, exertion should be made for the knowledge of the ultimate reality and in the contemplation thereof, witha view to the attainment of deliverance. This is the object for which this has been said. (In the commentary on aphorism XVII, among the conditions of Conscious meditation disembodiedness and resolution into primeval nature have been pointed out as high. Here the object is to show that those results are secondary, and of the earth earthy. They do not secure the ultimate end of Yoga. They are accordingly meditations, of which the world or Prakriti is the cause. They are, nevertheless, desirable exercises as pre- paratory to the state in which the ultimate reality is revealed. | Of others :— XX. (In the case) of others this (meditation) is preceded by Inclination, Energy, Memory, Meditation, and Discernment. “Of others” ४. ९., of Yogis, other than (those who have been described as) “the disembodied” and “ the resolved in nature.” “ Preceded by inclination” &c.; that meditation which has Sraddha &c. as the first means, is called sraddhadipurvaka. These, inclination and the rest, act successively as the means and the end, 2. ९. they serve as the means or instruments for the Con- scious meditation. Thereof ^ Inclination” (sraddha) is approbation in favour of the Yoga. ‘ Energy” (virya) is strenuous exertion. “ Memory” (smritz) is not letting out what is once cognised. (A. XI, p. 12.) “ Meditation” (samadfi) is intentness on a single point. 4 26 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. Discernment” (prajna) is thorough understanding of that which is to beknown. Now, he who has “ Inclination” gets “ Energy,” or becomes persevering in favour of Yoga. In the condition of “Energy” comes “Memory” of former states, in which the thinking principle meditates; and the thinking principle which has meditated knows thoroughly what it has thought upon. All these are the expedients of the Conscious form of meditation. From the (frequent) exercise of that meditation and from extreme dispassion Unconscious meditation ensues. [This aphorism explains the practices which should be adopted by the neophyte in the first stage of his career asa Yogi. He must have Inclination for the exercise he cannot then undertake. The Inclination then, must be followed by Energy, or active exertion. Then there should be Memory of what he has learnt. Next, there should be frequent exercise of Meditation of some being or other to bring on the habit for it. And, lastly, there should be clear Discernment of what should be done and what should be avoided. } Of the Yogis possessing the above mentioned expedients he next describes the sub-divisions according to the different ex- pedients they adopt (for the attainment of their object). XXI. Proximate for the ardently impetuous. (To complete the aphorism the words:) “The attainment of the state of meditation” are required to be supplied. ‘ Impetu- ous” (safivega), energetic exertion for the execution of a work. « Ardent” (¢ivra), excessively, in a high degree. On the part of those who are thus ardently impetuous, the attainment of Medi- tation is ^^ proximate” (asanna). The fruition of Meditation is also proximate, 7. ९.) quickly accomplished. [Having in the preceding aphorism pointed out the practices to be adopted by Yogis, the author in this lays special stress on the necessity for ardent application. A lukewarm feeling is not enough for immediate or early fruition. The application should be “ ardently impetuous” to ensure quick reward.] Who are then ardently impetuous? To this he replies. CHAPTER FIRST. 27 XXII. There is a further distinction, from there being the mild, the moderate, and the excessive. There are specific distinctions among those who adopt these ex- pedients, from the mild and other expedients being different. The divisions of the expedients are ^^ mild” (mrzdu), ‘ moderate” (madhya), and “excessive” (adhimdtra). These are severally threefold, from their being severally subdivided into “ the mildly impetuous,” “the moderately impetuous” and “the excessively impetuous.” And in accordance with this division there are nine classes of Yogis. The mild expedients are (severally) ‘ mildly impetuous,” ‘ moderately impetuous,” and “ ardently impetuous.” The moderate expedients are (also) ^ mildly impetuous,” ‘ mo- derately impetuous,” and “ardently impetuous.” The excessive expedients are (likewise), “mildly impetuous,” ‘ moderately impetuous,’ and “ardently impetuous.” And great endeavours should be made for the attainment of the “ardently impetuous” form of the excessive method. So much for the declaration of the distinctions of Yogis. (The object of this aphorism is to classify Yogis into different orders according to their respective arduousness. Some are mildly, ` others moderately, and others ardently disposed, and so each group forms an order. Again in their mildness and the rest there may be degrees varying from mildness to moderateness and ardency, and soeach of the three orders has three sub-divisions, mak- ing a total of nine groups. The injunction is that Yogis should exert to pass through the several orders as quickly as possible, so that the attainment of the final stage may not be delayed. | Now he mentions an easy expedient, distinct from the preced- ing expedients. 28 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. XXITI. Or by devotion to God. “God” (Fsrara) will be described presently (A. XXIV). “Devotion” ( pranidhdna) isa form of resignation to Him. Itis thorough worship of Him, and the consignment of all one’s actions to Him. Without wishing for the fruition of worldly enjoyments, the making over all one’s actions to Him, the preémi- nent guide, is “devotion,” pranidhana. This is an important means of meditation and of its fruition. (In this aphorism the author departs from the Safikhya system, by introducing devotion to God as a facile and ready means of attaining the end. God, however, is not made the end, but the means to an end of which He forms no integral portion. The theory of resignation or dedication of the fruits of all actions to Him, 18 evidently borrowed from the Bhakti system in which it plays the most important part. In entire reliance on the providence of the Godhead, the Bhakta wishes for no fruition whatever. Whatever he does is for the service of the Divinity, and He in His mercy is to grant whatever He thinks proper. In the Bhagavad Gita this is made the cardinal point of faith, (IX, 27,) and there 1४ appears quite consistent; but in the Yoga system Kapila found no necessity for it, and Patanjali adopts it asa sort of compromise to give atheistic character to his system ; but it plays only a very subordinate part. | It has been just stated that meditation may be achieved through devotion to God. With reference to this he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature (XXIV), the proofs (XXV), the glory (XXVI), the name (XXVII), and the order of worship of God (XXIII), as also the fruit thereof (X XIX). AALV., God is a particular soul which is untouched by afflictions, works, deserts and desires. CHAPTER FIRST, 29 Those things which afflict are “ afflictions” (0८६८6), They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. ‘ Works” (karma), are what are enjoined or prohibited (in the S’astras), as also what are mixed, z.e¢., partly one and partly the other. What ripen out of those works are “ deserts” (vipaka). They are kind, ace and experience. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (dsaya). =^ Untouched,” (apardmrishta,) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). ^" Parti- cular soul” (Purusha-visesha), is that which is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. ‘‘ God” (4४८7८) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of afflictions does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the afflictions abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the afflictions in any of the three tenses ; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to sempeternal excess of the quality of goodness, This excess is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependent, His wisdom aud almightiness are not mutually dependent, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that goodness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of Prakritz and Purusha cannot happen except by the will of that Isvara. The thinking principle in ordinary beings, undergoing modifications into pleasure, pain and delusion, becomes, on being touched in the body of the Yogi, by the reflection of the soul, known ; but such is not the case with Isvara. His superexcellent modification of goodness abides eternally without a beginning as the sole object of enjoyment. Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily is Iévara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by SAstric means (such as the Yoga, &c.). In His case, however, being always in that condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor 30 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated ; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almighti- ness attains its highest limit. [The most important word in the aphorism is J’svara. Derived from the root $) it means ^ ruler’ or ‘ governor,’ but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler. The next word is purusha, which means a man, or the soul of a man—that which abides (skete) in the body (pure); but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent ; but as the dualism indicated by European philoso- phers between soul or animal life (फणी) and spirit, or rational life (IIvevua) is not recognised by Hindu writers, I have accepted soul to imply the two collectively. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedantic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and, to avoid trouble, uses a neuter noun. To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the accidents of humanity. For the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Achérya’s summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus: ८८ Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the (four well-known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit, or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahapasupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidie or secular violations,—the Saivas as S’/iva,—the Vaishnavas as Puru- ८ ०.^~ cok CHAPTER FIRST. 99 Those things which afflict are “ afflictions” (k/esah). They are ignorance and the rest about to be described. ^ Works” (karma), such as are enjoined or prohibited (inthe SAstras), as also such as are mixed, 2. e., partly one and partly the other. What ripens out of those works are “deserts” (vipaka). They are the results of actions, such as caste, existence, and enjoyment. What abide on the field of the thinking principle until fruition is affected are the residua called desires (asaya). ^ Untouched,” (aparamrishta, ) free from the contact in all the three times (past, present and future). ^^ Particular soul” (purusha-vigesha), who is distinct from all other souls, and that is the distinction. ^ God” (Fsrara) Almighty, or one who is able to grant salvation to creation by the fiat of His will. It is true that the contact of troubles does not obtain in regard to any soul, still the troubles abide in the thinking principle of all souls, even as conquest and defeat effected by soldiers abide in their master. In the case of this Soul there is no such contact of the troubles in any of the three tenses; hence He is especially the Almighty Lord. Such almightiness of His is due to His sempeternal greatness in the quality of goodness. This greatness is due for certain to the fulness of His wisdom. Being separately self-dependant, His wisdom and greatness are not mutually dependant, for they two are eternally abiding in the substance of the Almighty. His relation to that greatness is sempeternal, because the union and separation of Prakrit: and Purusha cannot happen except by the will of that Isvara. In ordinary beings, the thinking principle is modified into pleasure, pain and delusion, but in the body of the Yogi, being touched by the reflection of the thinking principle (in its purity) it becomes known as reflected. Such is not the case with Isvara. He is, by reason of His eternity, always solely of the quality of goodness and super-excellence; he exists as the object (of our meditation). Hence, being distinct from other souls, He verily 15 [gvara. Again, in the case of the liberated soul, liability to pain and the like is removed by 84816 means (such as the Yoga &c.). In His case, however, being always in that 30 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. condition, there is no correspondence with liberated souls. Nor is there a multiplicity of Gods, for if we admit their equality there must be diversity of object, and the object (of the enquiry into the cause of creation) is defeated ; and if we admit relative greatness, he who is the greatest, is God, because in Him almighti- ness attains its highest limit. [The most important word in the aphorism is Fsrara. Derived from the root Fs, it means ‘ruler’ or ‘ governor,’ but as that is not very definite, I have preferred the precise and unmistakable term God, which, though supposed to be derived from good, is generally accepted in the sense of a ruler. The next word is purusha, which means aman, or the soul of a man—that which abides (shefe) in the body (pure) ; but it also means a male simply. Dr. Ballantyne uses spirit as its equivalent ; but in philosophical works it is always used for soul, and to preserve the spirit of the text I have accepted that word. The use of the term shows that Patanjali did not much care for the Vedantic theory which denounces the idea of attaching sexuality to the Divinity, and to avoid trouble uses a neuter noun, To prevent misconception he thinks it quite enough to say that the soul was of a particular kind, quite distinct from all other kinds, and characterised by being devoid of all the incidents of humanity. Tor the sake of comparison with his definition it may not be amiss to quote here Udayana Achdrya’s summary of the different definitions of the Godhead given in leading Hindu works. It runs thus : ^ Now although with regard to that Being whom all men alike worship, whichever of the [four well-known] ends of man they may desire,—(thus the followers of the Upanishads as the very Knower,—the disciples of Kapila as the perfect first Wise,—those of Patanjali as Him who, untouched by pain, action, fruit or deserts, having assumed a body in order to create, revealed the tradition of the Veda and is gracious to all living beings,—the Mahapasupatas as the Independent one, undefiled by Vaidic or secular violations,—the Saivas as Siva,—the Vaishnavas as Puru- CHAPTER FIRST. 3l shottoma,—the followers of the Purfnas as the great Father (Brahmé) ,—the Ceremonialists as the Soul of the sacrifice,—the Saugatas as the Omniscient,—the Jainas as the Unobstructed,— the Mimaiisakas as Him who is pointed out as to be worship- ped,—the Charvakas as Him who is established by the conven- tion of the world,—the followers of the Nydyaas Him who is all that is said worthy of Him,—-why farther detail ? whom even the artizans themselves worship as the great artizan, Visvakar- man,)—although, I say, with regard to that Being, the adorable Siva, whom all recognise throughout the world as universally acknowledged like castes, families, family invocations of Agni, schools, social customs, &c., how can there arise any doubt? and what then 15 there to be ascertained ?”—(Cowell’s Kusumanjali, 1. 2.) For a theist, intent on proving the existence of the Deity, this summary is good enough ; but it is not absolutely correct. The Charvikas do not admit the existence of the Godhead as the supreme ruler. They are atheists, and do not acknowledge any Divine supremacy. The Kapilas, though not so outspoken, still hold that the existence of the Godhead cannot be proved. Kapila, in the Safikhya aphorisms says, “ It is not proved that there is a God.” (Es'vardsiddheh I. 92.) This idea he works out elaborately in his Fifth Book, and, for ready reference, I quote Dr. Ballan- tyne’s translations of the aphorisms on the subject. Aph, 2.—Not from its [—the world’s—] being governed by the Lord, is there the effectuation of fruit, for it is by works [—z. e., by merit and demerit—] that this is accomplished,— [‘‘ by works alone, which are indispensable,” —and if we do make the additional and cumbrous supposition of a Lord, He cannot reward a man otherwise than according to his works]. Aph, 3.—[If a Lord were governor, then] having intended his own benefit, His government [would be selfish], as is the case {with ordinary governors] in the world. Aph, 4.—[He must then be} just like a worldly lord, [and] otherwise (than you desire that we should conceive of Him ; for 32 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. “if we agree that the Lord also is benefited, He also must be something mundane,—just like a worldly lord ;—because, since his desires are (on that supposition) not (previously) satisfied, he must be hable to grief, &c.’’]. Aph. 5.—Or [if whilst there exists also a world, there be a Lord, then, let yours, like ours, be merely”] a technical term [“ for that soul which emerged at the commencement of the creation,—since there cannot be an eternal Lordship, because of the contradiction between mundaneness and the having an un- obstructed will’’]. Aph. 6.—This [that there is a Lord] cannot be established without [assuming that He is affected by] Passion, because that is the indispensable cause [of all energizing]. Aph. 7.—Moreover were that [Passion] conjoined with Him, he could not be eternally free, [^ भात्‌ thus the tenet (of His eternal freedom) must be surrendered.’’—“ Pray (let us ask)—does Lordship arise from the immediate union, with Soul, of the wishes, &c., which we hold to be powers of Nature—(not pro- perties of Soul—)or from an influence through proximity simply, —as in the case of the magnet? Of these he condemns the former alternative” |. Aph. 8.—If it were from the conjunction of the properties of Nature, it would turn out that there is association, [which sel denies of Soul. ‘In regard to the latter alternative he says” | , Aph, 9.—If it were from the mere existence [of Nature, not in association, but simply in proximity], then Lordship would belong to every one; [‘‘ that is to say,—if Thought obtains Lordship merely from proximity, as in the case of the magnet (which becomes affected by the simple proximity of iron), then it is settled, as we quite intend it should be, that all men indiffer- ently, experiencers in this or that (cycle of) creation, (may) have Lordship, because it 1s just by conjunction with all experiencers that Nature produces Mind, &c. ;—therefore your tenet, of there being only one Lord, is overthrown”). CHAPTER FIRST. 33 Aph. 10.—It is not established [that there is an eternal Lord] because there is no real evidence of it, [—in the first place, there is not sexse-evidence, so that only the evidence of inference and of testimony can be offered ; and these are inapplicable ;”’ as he proceeds to show]. Aph.11.—There is no inferential proof [of there being a Lord], because there is here no case of [invariable] association [between a sign and that which it might betoken ;— and so there is no inferential proof of there being a Lord ; because, in such argu- ments as ‘ Mind, or the like, hasa maker, because it is a product,’ the fact of invariable concomitancy is not established, since there is no compulsion” that every product should have had an intel- ligent maker]. Aph. 12.—Moreover, there is scripture for this [world’s] being the product of Nature [—not of a Lord].” (७५404 Aphorisms, pp. 1147) 1 should add here that some K4pilas do not wish openly to admit their atheism, and appeal for support from the aphorism in which Kapila says «^ The existence of such a Lord is a settled point,” (III, 5 and 7), meaning by “such” an emergent Lord who has been absorbed into nature, and who is inno sense the governor of creation. The greater part of chapter III of the first book of the Vedanta Satra treats of this subject ; but it is too long to be quoted here. The Pdtanjala Bhashya points out the distinction between the emancipated soul and the Godhead thus: “ If isolation be it, then would there not be many isolated ones? (Notso.) For the isolated ones attain their isolation by rending asunder the three bonds, whereas in regard to God there never was and never can be such bonds. The emancipated implies previous bondage, but this cannot be predicated of God. Again, in the case of the resolved into nature there is possibility of future bondage, but it is not the case with God—He is sempeternally emancipated and sem- peternally the Lord.” Kaivalyam praptahstarhi santi cha baha- vah kevalinah, Te hi trini bandhanam chhitvad kaivalyam 5 34 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. praptdh ; tgvarasya cha tat sambando na bhutona bhavi. Yatha muktasya pirvabandhakotih prajndyate naivamisvarasya. Yatha vi prakritilinasyottaré bandhakotih sambhavyate naivamisvara- sya; 8a tu sadeva muktah sadevesvarah. | Having described the identity of God, the author next produces a proof that such a being exists. XXV. In Him the seed of the omniscient attains infinity. In that God the seed of omniscience, as also of parvitude and magnitude and of knowledge of the knowers of the past, the future &c., attains its “infinity,” (niratisaya)* or highest perfection. Being the source like a seed 1४ is called seed (vija). It is well known that of the qualities of parvitude and magnitude, which have degrees, there is an absolute perfection. Thus, the perfection of parvitude 18 scen in atoms, and that of magnitude in the sky. In a similar manner knowledge and other manifest attributes of the thinking principle compared with each other must somewhere attain the highest perfection, and wherever they are in the highest perfection, that is God. Although from the general character of this inference no precise being is proved, yet in the 8481728 His omniscience and other qualities may be precisely learnt. But how does He, without any impulse of Hisown,cause the union and separation of Prakriti and Purusha? Such a doubt should not be entertained. Being merciful, He finds in His mercy to creation the impulse. His impulse isthe wish “I shall rescue all creation (from pain) at the periodical minor and great pralayas.” What ever is desirable to one, is his impulse. [The logical force of this aphorism is not apparent. Itis a mere assertion, and can scarcely be taken as a proof, as the Com- mentator puts it foryvard to be. He himself felt the difficulty, and escaped out of it by appealing to the authority of the Sstra. * Niratisaya, limitness, greatness, or infinity. CHAPTER FIRST. 35 The SAstra here referred to is the Séfkhya, and the P. Bhéshya quotes a passage from the work of Panchagikha which shows that “the first knower, lord, and great sage, with a view to creation, in his mercy taught this science to the enquirer Suri.” Mdividvannirmanachittamadhishthaya kdrunyat bha- gavan paramarshi résuraye jijndsumdndya tantram pravacheti. The first knower is Kapila, who, being an incarnation of Vishnu, obtained the science from Sayambhu or Maheévara.] Having thus described the identity and proof of the existence of God, the author refers to His greatness. XXVI. He is the instructor of even all early ones, for He is not defined by time. Even of the primary creators such as Brahmé and others, he 18 the “instructor,” or preceptor, because “ He is not defined by time,” for He has no beginning, while the others are so defined, having a beginning. [The word guru has been translated “ instructor” in accordance with the text, and after the commentator who supplies the equi- valent upadeshtd. It may be more appropriately rendered into noblest” or “ greatest,” as it would make the reason assigned, पण defined by time, more consistent, for want of beginning, or being not circumscribed by time, does not imply tuition. The object of the explanation, however, is to refer to the first tutor Mahesvara to whom reference has been made in the last note. Inthe P. Bhashya no equivalent is given of the word, but the sense is explained by the word yathdsya sargasyadau prakarsha-gatydsiddhah, tathda- tikranta-sargadisvapi pratyetavyah. V&chaspati Migra explains the term by prakarska “ superior :” na vartate prakarshasya 4८24 praptih pratyetavya agamat tadanena prabandhena bhagavanisvaro darsitah, In giving the purport of the aphorism he uses the words: Samprati bhavatah brahmadibhyah viseshamaha.] 36 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. Having thus described the greatness of God, the author now supplies His indicator, with a view to help people in their devotion. XXVII. His indicator is the Pranava. Of the Isvara thus described, the “‘ indicator,” name, expressive word, whereby one is thoroughly (pra=prakarshena) lauded (nu) or praised, glorified, or hymned is—pranava, which 18 the same with the syllable Om. (The sentence indirectly gives the deriva- tion which is pra = “ excessive” and xu = “ to laud,” whence Pranava). Between the two (the name and the being denomi- nated) the relation of the indicator and the indicated is eternal. This is conventionally expressed, but not produced by any one ; (it is the same) as in the case of a father and his son, when one points out the existing relation (by saying) “this is the father, and this is the son,” (though the relationship exists from before, and is not produced by the saying.) [Pranava is the technical name of Om, and the injunction is that that syllable should be frequently muttered. Care is taken to show that the relation between the indicator Om and the indicated God is eternal and not produced by man, and the example of the father and son explains what is intended. The Vedas, the Upanishads and all Hindu works recommend the same process, accepting the term as the most sacred name of the Divinity. See Chhindogya Upanishad, ChapterI. In two short notes, pub- lished in the ‘Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal’ for 1865, pp. 46—208, I take the word to be the Indianized form of the Hebrew Aman and the English Amen. | His adoration is next enjoined. XXVIII. Its repetition and the reflection on its meaning (should be made). CHAPTER FIRST. 37 Tts,” 2, ¢e., of the Pranava, consisting of three and a half instants, “ Repetition” (gapa), pronouncing it in due order, and the “ Reflection” (dhdvana), the perception repeatedly of the God indicated by it, are the means of concentration of the thought in it. Hence, for the accomplishment of meditation (samadhi) the Pranava should be repeated, and its meaning reflected upon by a Yogi. This is declared. (Om is ordinarily declared to be a compound of the letters q (a) ड (प) and म (70), which supply the three instants, and the con- version of the m into the nasal mark ~ supplies the half instant. In prosody the word is a long syllable, but in modulated reading or recitation its prosodial quantity 18 a protracted circumflex sound. | The fruit of such adoration is next described. XXIX. Thence the right knowledge of the reverted percep- tion, and the removal of obstacles. From that repetition and that reflection the nght knowledge of the “reverted perception” (pratyakchetand) is effected in the case of Yogis. That “ perception” (chetand) or power of seeing, which turns towards its own internal organ, withdrawing itself from (orin opposition to worldly) objects, is called “ reverted perception” (pratyak “turning back,” chetana = ^^ perception’’) - anda “right knowledge” (adhigama) of it is thereby acquired. The “ removal” (adidva),z.e., the counteraction of the power of the obstacles about to be described is also effected. [The natural function of the senses is to extend outwards, in order to receive the impressions of external objects and carry them to the sensorium, but that being suppressed by the Yogf, the senses turn inwards and find their object within, and therefore the function is called reversed, or reflex. The object of this round- about way of description is to say that the senses hold communion exclusively with the soul.] 38 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. Now, 9 doubt arising as to what are the obstacles? he says :— XXX. Disease, Langour, Doubt, Carelessness, Idleness, Worldly-mindedness, Mistaken notions, Unattainment of any stage of abstraction, and Instability therein ; these, causing distractions, are the obstacles. These nine, impelled by the force of foulness and darkness, become the causes of “ distractions,” 7. ९, by these enemies to concentration the thinking principle is disturbed. Of the nine :— (1) “Sickness” (vydédhi) is fever and the like, resulting from disordered humours. (2) “Langour” (stydua) is an indisposition of the thinking principle to work. (3) Doubt” (saftgaya) is the disposition of the thinking principle which relies on both sides of a question, as whether Yoga is practicable or not. (4) ^ Carelessness”’ (pramada) is a disposition not to exert, or indifference in performing meditation. (5) ^ Idleness” (d/asya) is a heaviness of the body and of the thinking principle, which is the cause of want of interest in matters relating to Yoga. (6) ^ Worldly-mindedness” (avirati) is the inclination of the thinking principle to enjoy the pleasures of the world. (7) “Mistaken notion” (b47dntidarsana) is wrong percep- tion, such as taking a bit of mother-o’pearl to be silver. (8) ^ Unattainment of any stage” (alabdha-bhiimikatva) is not attaining, for some cause or other, a particular stage of abstraction. (9) “Instability” (anavasthitatva) is the condition in which the thinking principle having attained a stage cannot abide in it. These being opposed to the practice of concentration of medita- tion, are called ‘ obstacles,” (antardydh). To shew that there are other causes which produce distraction of the mind, he says :— CHAPTER FIRST. 39 XXXI. Pain, Distress, Trembling, Inspiration and Expira- tion are the companions of distractions. Whenever from any cause distractions are produced then pain &९., come on. Thereof— (1) ‘ Pain” (dukkha) isa modification of the foulness of the thinking principle; it is characterised by pain, which living beings exert to remove. (2) “Distress” (daurmansya) is the agitation of the mind proceeding from external or internal causes. (3) “Trembling” (afgamejaytva) is the shaking of the body which causes unsteadiness in the posture (of a Yogi). (4) “Inspiration” (svdsa) is a drawing in of the external air. The expulsion of the air from the lungs is “ expiration” (prasvdsa). These existing along with the (other) distractions, should be removed by the exercise and dispassion already described; (A. XII) and therefore they are noticed here [Pain here referred to is described in the Pétanjala Bhashya as of three kinds: mental, physical and supernatural. That which affects the mind without touching the body is mental, that which proceeds from disorders in the body is physical, and that which proceeds from evil spirits &c., is supernatural. The Safkhya Karika notices all the three. (Wilson’s Séfkhya Kariké, p. 2.) The Pdtanjala Rahasya gives pidd ‘ disease’ as the equivalent of Duhkha.] Another expedient for overcoming the obstacles with their accompaniments is now being pointed out. XXXII. For their prevention let there be exercise on one principle. 4.0 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. For the “ prevention” (pratishedha )or obstruction of those distractions, let there be “ exercise” (abAydsa) or repeated applica- tion of the thinking principle to some one selected “ principle,” (¢attva), from the force resulting from which arise the condition of concentration, and thereby the distractions subside. [In former aphorisms meditation has been declared to be of two kinds: conscious and unconscious, or seeded and seedless. The object’ here is to inculcate the necessity of constant exercise of the first, or the seeded form, to steady the mind, and prepare it for the more arduous and difficult phase in which there should be no object upon which to meditate, or the state in which, in the language of Wordsworth, “ thought is not.” The highest form of conscious meditation is intelligent communion with the soul, but this too is not at once practicable, and the instruction is that any one of the twenty-five categories may be taken up for medita- tion, so that the mind may be trained to the habit of concentra- ting itself at any one point at pleasure, and of remaining in that state of concentration without fatigue. |] Now he describes another expedient with advertence to certain works which help to purify the thinking principle. XXXITI. The cheerfulness of the thinking principle, through friendliness, compassion, complacency and_indif- ference in regard to happiness, grief, virtue and vice. < Friendliness” (maztri) disposition to be friendly. ^^ Compas- sion,” (karund) mercy. ‘ Complacency” (muditd) to be pleased. ^ Indifference” (wpekshd) to feel neither pleasure nor pain. These feelings should be felt, in due order, for the happy, the grieved, the virtuous, and the sinful. Thus, to the happy one should be friendly, (saying) “ blessed is their happiness ;”’ and not be envious tothem. For personsin grief he should show mercy, and desire how to relieve them from their grief, and not remain indifferent to their suffering. To the virtuous, with a view to encourage virtue, he should express satisfaction, and not be envious of them (say- CUAPTER FIRST. 41 ing) ^ Forsooth, are these virtuous”? For the vicious a feeling of indifference should be practised, neither encouraging nor hating them. In the aphorism, the word “ happiness” &c. are intended to stand for persons possessing those qualities, These feelings of friendliness &c.,producing cheerfulness in the thinking principle, easily bring on the condition of Samadhi. These acts are external (and not intrinsic parts of the Samadhi). Even as in arithmetic, addition and the like are useful in the calculation of alligation, &c., (but are not in themselves integral parts of the main object), so the feelings of friendship, &., antagonistic to envy, passion &c., pro- ducing cheerfulness, prepare the thinking principle for the con- scious form of Samfdhi. Passion and envy are the chief causes of distractions. When these are thoroughly eradicated, the cheerful- ness induced, effects the concentration of the mind (to one object). [The Aphorism suggests a second expedient that of cheerfulness. Unless the mind is cheerful it cannot be steady, and this cheer- fulness is to be brought on by friendliness towards the happy, com- passion for those who are in distress, complacency in regard to virtue, and indifference in respect to vice. Indifference in respect to vice might at first sight appear a very mild feeling, but hatred, detestation or other strong manifestation of feeling towards vice would mar cheerfulness, and itself be a cause of pain and unsteadiness ; hence it is avoided. } He points out another expedient. XXXIV. Or by expulsion and retention of the breath. “Expulsion,” (prachchhardana) means the throwing out of the air from the lungs ina fixed quantity through a special effort. ^“ Retention” (vidhdrana) is the restraint, or stoppage of the motion of breath for a certain limited time. That stoppage is effected by two acts—by filling the lungs with external air, and by retaining therein the inhaled air. Thus the threefold prand- yama, including the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention of breath, fixes the thinking principle to one point of 6 42 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. concentration. All the functions of the organs being preceded by that of the breath—there being always a correlation of breath and mind in their respective functions,—the breath when overcome by stopping all the functions of the organs, effects the concentration of the thinking principle to one object. The Agama proclaims its power of destroying all defects thus: *‘ All obstructive functions are caused by faults.” Hence, by its destroying faults, it becomes effectual in producing concentra- tion of the mind. [The definition of “retention” (vzdhdrana) by the terms ^ stoppage of motion” (gatevichchheda) 18 obviously faulty, but as the aphorism refers to “retention” immediately after the “expulsion” (prachchhardana) and the attempt to retain the breath after it has been fully expired would be futile, it is necessary to inspire before the breath can be retained, and the com- mentator is obliged to include that act along with the retention. The Patanjala Bhashya calls the retention to be Prandyama (vidharana prindayamah), and in the Séfkhya Stra this meaning is accepted. It is, however, not the generally accepted mean- ing. Allother Yogic and Tantric works regard the three acts of expiration, inspiration and retention performed in specific order, to constitute the Pranayama. The order is not always the same. Some have expiration first, inspiration next, and retention last, Others place inspiration first, retention next, and expiration last. The word matrapramana in the commentary, which I have rendered into “ fixed quantity,” has been rendered into sva/pa or “little” or “ slowly” in the Patanjala Bhashya ; but it does not ex- press the true technical meaning. The object of the matra is to imply a fixed period of time. According to the Skanda Purdna a matra is equal to the time required in one breathing, (Eka érdsa- mapt mitra prinaydme nigadyate), and to imply that this breathing must be natural, the Yoga-chintdmani adds that this breathing should be during sleep (when there is no violent effort). Nidrdvasangatasya puiiso yavatkalenaikasvdso gachchhatyagach- chhats cha tavathdlaprindydmasya mdtretyuchyate.) And this CHAPTER FIRST. 4.3 period is equal to two anda half palas. (Sirddha svasa palad- vayatmakah kdalah, pranayama kdla siddhah.) The pala here means the period occupied by a twinkling of theeye. The matré is obviously taken as a unit, and of these from 1 to 24 are devoted to a prandy4ma according as it is inferior, middling, or superior. The mode of reckoning the time to be devoted to each act is regu- lated in one of two ways; Ist, by so many repetitions of the syllable Om, or the mystic mantra of the performer, or the specific mystic syllables (४८) of that mantra; 2nd, by turning the thumb and the index finger of the left hand round the left knee a given number of times. The time devoted to inspiration is the shortest, and to retention the longest. A Vaishnava in his ordinary daily prayer repeats the Vija mantra once while expiring, 7 times while inspir- ing, and 20 times while retaining. A Sakta repeats the mantra 16 times when inspiring, 64 times while retaining, and 32 times while expiring. These periods are frequently modified. The details vary according to each particular form of meditation, and the capacity of the performer. As a general rule it may be said that longer is the retention the more proficient becomes the Yogi. The usual mode of performing the 78१६ $ 8102, 18, after as- suming the posture prescribed, to place the ring-finger of the right hand on the left nostril, pressing it so as to close it, and to expire with the right, then to press the right nostril with the thumb, and to inspire through the left nostril, and then to close the two nostrils with the ring-finger and the thum, and to stop all breathing. The order is reversed in the next operation, and in the third act the first form is required. This constitutes the Prandydma, and it may be repeated after short intervals according to choice for hours. The object avowed of this performance is the steadying of the mind. The Hatha-dipikd philosophises on this by saying, ^^ by the motion of the breath, the thinking principle moves; when that motion is stopped, it becomes motionless, andthe Yogi becomes firm as the trunk of a tree ; therefore the wind should be stopped. As long as the breath remains in the body so long it is called living. Death is the exit of that breath, therefore it should be stopped.” 44 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. (“ Chale vate chalam chittam nischale nischalam bhavet, Yogt sthanutvamdpnoti tato vdyumni rodhayet. Yavad vdyuh sthito dehe tabajjivanamuchyate, Maranam tasya nishkrantistato vayum nirodhayet.”) Elsewhere the text asserts that this Prépdy4ma is conducive both to health and longevity, and all minor works on Yoga and the Tantras generally expatiate at great length on the sani- tary and the therapeutic advantages of practising it regularly at stated times. The Hatha-dipika, in one place, says, “ all diseases disappear in him who devotes himself to the ९18 0६४8728 ; without it in the state of practising Yoga every kind of disease arises.” (Prandydmadiyuktena sarvaroga kshayo bhavet, ayuktébhyasa- yogena sarvaroga samudbhavah. The ideaseems to have travelled to the far West, and the spiritualists in America have accepted it as a recognised maxim of their system. Many spiritualists practice this Prandydma under the name of “ deep breathing,” and A. J. Davis, one of their apostles, in his “ Harbinger of Health” (pp. 52-53), gives the following directions for curing diseases through its means. First, if your weakness be general, and the blood is loaded with cold matter, lay flat down on your back, and, while breath- ing deep, and slow, and uniformly, WILL YOURSELF TO BECOME HEALTHY—in your feet and hands, in your knees and elbows, in your hips and shoulders, in your bowels and liver, in your lungs and brain! The heart will take care of itself. In cases where the weakness is generally distributed, all you are required to practice (while so prostrated and respiring) is the art of concentrating your Will and desires simultaneously on the extremeties first ; then work upward and zaward progressively ; and when, in the lapse of ten minutes of steady, deep breathing, you have reached the brain, repeat the process in the ascending scale, as indicated in the manner aforementioned. “ By this Pneumogastric treatment of yourself, you will receive spiritual strength from the air—nothing is more certain! When, by practice, you can breathe deeply and heroically, and at the CHAPTER FIRST. 45 same time put your Will upon the restoration of the general system, the art of fixing your mind upon some particularly diseased part will become less and less difficult. Consumptive persons, by simply breathing profoundly, and willing systemati- cally, may enlarge their chests and lungs beyond the possibilities of disease. Persons of cold temperature, with irregular habits and bad practices, may “right about face” and become har- monially healthy. Learn to depend upon yourself—use the infallible remedies of Nature—and, in spite of priest or doctor, you will ‘ pass from death unto life.’ “Time or Exercises.—In acquiring this psychological power over the destinies of your bodily state, and in becoming a Self- healing Institution, whether home or abroad—it may be neces- sary to practice (either while on your back, or standing, or walking, or riding,) perhaps three times in each twenty-four hours. Never just before meals, nor soon subsequent to them ; but the true time is when chilification is going on; about 90 or 120 minutes after eating. The spirit world will aid you, by forming a secret conjunction with the pxeumogastric conductor. It is certain, gentle sufferer; do not permit yourself to doubt. Nothing is too good in Nature, in matter, in spirit, or in truth.”’] In pointing out another expedient, he foreshadows the con- scious form of meditation. XXXV. Or cognition resulting from sensuous objects may be the cause of steadiness. ^ Of the mind” (manasah is understood to) complete the sentence. “Sensuous objects” (viskaya) are odour, taste, colour, touch and’ sound, and that in which these reside as objects is vishayavati, the cognition whereof causes the steadiness of the mind. Thus, by directing the thinking principle to the tip of the nose, the cogni- tion of spiritual odour is effected. In the same way the cognition of taste may be effected at the tip of the tongue, the cognition of colour at the forepart of the palate, the cognition of touch at the 46 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. middle of the tongue, and the cognition of sound at the root of the tongue. Thus the cognition of spiritual sense-objects result- ing through one or other of those organs becomes the cause of the concentration of the mind. This is to encourage Yogis in the belief that the Yoga has a fruit. . [By this commentary the meaning of the text remains perfectly unintellegible to the uninitiated. The reason is, the commen- tator takes for granted that the rudimentary principles of Yoga are known to his readers. The purport is that in the act of Pranfy4ma (as explained in A. XXXIV) when the Yogi directs his mind to the tip of his nose &c., he derives in the places mentioned a sense of those objects which is ordinarily acquired by their natural organs, and having done so, he feels no inclination to exercise those natural organs, and his mind settles down into undisturbed contemplation of the object to which he directs his mind. The commentator uses the word divya for which I use “ spiritual” as the equivalent. The P. Rakasga uses alaukika or “ supernatural” as the equivalent. The word prarritti in the text has been taken by the P. Bhasya to be equal to saivit or cognition. In the commentary above and elsewhere the word 22748 mind has been sometimes used for chzéta, thinking principle}. He describes another expedient of the same kind. XXXVI. Or a sorrowless extremely luminous (disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle). (The sense of the aphorism must be completed) by the terms, ^ disposition being produced causes the steadiness of the thinking principle.” The word “lumen” (/yotis) means the manifestation (of the quality) of goodness. When it exists in its fulness, in any disposi- tion it is called “extremely luminous” disposition (jyotismati). “ Sorrowless” (visoka) is that disposition in which the power resul- ting from the exercise of the delightfully pure element (goodness) CHAPTER FIRST. 47 has removed the grief which is produced by the quality of foulness. It steadies the thinking principle. The purport of this is this :— when the thinking principle is in the quality of goodness located in the cup of the lotus heart as on the waveless milky ocean, and the sensuous functions are all destroyed by the light of know- ledge, the steadiness of the thinking principle results as a matter of course. [Briefly, the purport is that when the thinking principle is totally griefless, and manifest in the extreme refulgence of the quality of goodness, it is steady, and has no cause for vacillation. ] In course of pointing out another expedient, he describes the object of the conscious form of meditation—or discriminate meditation. XXXVII. Or. the thinking principle taking a passionless object (becomes the cause of the mind’s steadiness). The phrase “becomes the cause of the mind’s steadiness” is understood to complete the sentence. “The Passionless” (vifaraga) are those who have abandoned all longings for sensuous objects, and their thinking principle, which has destroyed all pain, by being made the object of thought, becomes the cause of steadiness. [The next expedient is the making the thinking principle of those who have overcome all passions the object of contemplation. Vachaspati Misra explains this by saying “ the passionless are Krishna Dvaipfyana and others. To make their thinking principle the object of thought is to rely thereon. Vétardgdh Krishnadvaipayana prabhritayah. Tesham chittam tadevavalam- banam, tenoparaktamits. || He describes another expedient of this kind. XXXVITI. Or reliance on knowledge resulting from dream or sleep. 48 APTIORISMS OF PATANSJALI. “ Dream” (svapna) is the perception by the thinking principle alone of the soul’s agency when the functions of the external organs are dormant. ‘‘ Sleep” (nzdrd) has heen already defined (A. X). The knowledge which results from ^^ reliance” thereon, ४, é., reliance on dream or reliance on sleep, produces steadiness of the thinking principle. [ Although sleep has been defined to be absence of consciousness, the Yogis believe absence of consciousness to be a kind of know- ledge. (See. A. X,) Vachaspati Misra gives an illustration to show how the beatific vision of an image of Mahesvara may, on wak- ing, tend to steady the thinking principle in the contemplation of any particular object. Perfectly sound sleep of which on waking we know only that we have slept well and nothing more, is also favorable to steadiness in the same way, perfect calmness of the mind being thereby produced. | ¡ Different men having different tastes, Yogis may affect each a different expedient according to choice, and by meditating there- on attain his object (sci/. steadiness of mind). To stablish this he says— XXXIX. Or by meditating according to one’s fancy. By thinking on anything according to choice, whether external, as the moon, or internal, asa plexus of arteries, the thinking principle becomes steadied. (The object of this aphorism is to show that by constantly reflecting on any object of choice, the habit is acquired of keep- ing the thinking principle confined to one object. The choice of course does not extend to carnal objects, for they would tend to excite, instead of allaying, the passions. The moon, or the sun, or other similar object has no such tendency, and certain plexuses within the chest and the abdomen which are believed to be the seats of the thinking principle, are held particularly bene- ficial in producing steadiness. | Having thus described the different methods, he proceeds to point out what the fruit thereof is. CHAPTER FIRST. 49 XL. His mastery extends from the minutest atom to the limit of infinite magnitude. Having by these means acquired steadiness of the thinking prin- ciple, the Yogi, by thinking on minute objects, acquires unfailing “‘ mastery” (vasikara) over the minutest atoms, ४, ¢., his thinking principle is not baffled even by the reflection of the most minute objects, such as the minutest atoms. In the same way, the reflec- tion of big objects, like the sky &c., to infinite magnitude, never causes any disturbance of the thinking principle, ४ ¢., it becomes independent everywhere. Such is the meaning. [The purport is obvious. When steadiness is once fully acquired, the thinking principle acquires mastery over every thing, and nothing can baffle it. The result of this perfect nature is transcendantal power over all material and spiritual objects: of this full illustrations will follow in Chapter III. The P. Bhashya adds that when the thinking principle of the Yogi is perfect in this respect, 1६ does not any longer care for the appli- ances of exercise elsewhere enjoined. Tadvasikarat paripurnam yoginaschittam na punarabhyasakritam parikarmapekshate iti.] What becomes of the condition of the thinking principle purified by these methods, he now proceeds to describe. XLI. To him of overpowered faculties, there area con- centration and a consubstantiation in (matters relating to) the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, as in a transparent gem. He, whose faculties have been overpowered, is “ of overpowered faculties” (kshinavrittz). With reference to him there is, in regard to the objects of his faculties, no distinction about the per- ceiver, the means of perception, and the perceivable, and there result a “concentration” and a “ consubstantion.” Tatsthatva is concentration in it, (ekdgratd). ^ Consubstantiation” (¢adania- 7 50 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. natva) is becoming of it, for when the thinking principle 18 lowered, (or reduced in its carnal functions in the way described,) the object of meditation attains superiority. The meaning 1s, that such a condition (samdpatt:), or modification to that form, results, Of this an example is given. In the case of “a transparent gem” or clear rock-crystal jewel, whatever colour it dwells upon, the same it obtains. In the same way in the transparent, clear thinking principle the form of the object thought of is imposed. Although the text gives the perceiver, the means of perception, and the perceptible, but, according to the order of precedence, the terms should be understood to stand as if written “ perceptible, means of perception, and perceiver,” for first the meditation 18 directed to the perceivable ; then it is devoted to the perception ; and then it is confined to the perceiver, which is mere egoism ; for in the case of the soul alone there can be no thinking. Even so, the thinking principle tinged by a substantial or a subtile object of perception assumes its character. In this sense the condition is implied also to the perceived. [The word kshina in the text means weakened, but this weak- ness is not general ; according to the P. Rahasya it is confined to those subjects which are not thought of, the power remaining in full force in connexion with the special object of thought: kshina-critteh dlambanavishaydtirikta = vishayanirupita = vritti- sunyasya. Tatsthatva is literally being in a thing, ta? ‘ there,’ and stha “ to be reposited ;” but the commentator gives the equivalent concentration, ekagrata. Tadanjanatva is literally being tinged thereby, and the stock illustration of the crystal being coloured red by the shoe-flower placed in it is adduced; but the com- mentator prefers the equivalent tanmayatva “ being of that sub- stance.” He is, however, not singular in these interpretations. The P. Bhashya amplifies the explanation by adding that when the soul, as agent or perceiver, is made the object of thought, the thinking principle becomes manifest in the special form of that soul, and when the emancipated soul is thought upon the think- CHAPTER FIRST. 5] ing principle becomes of its special form. Grihitripurushdlam- banoparaktam grihitripurushasamapannam grihitripurusha-svari= pakdrena nirbhasate. Tathi muktapurushalambanoparaktam muktapurushasamadpannam muktapurushasvaripdkdrena nirbha- sale. | Having explained the conditions, he now points out its four- fold differences (in three aphorisms.) XLIT. The argumentative is that which is influenced by the fancy of word, meaning, and understanding. That which is perceivable by the organ of hearing, or is an explosion or bursting of sound (sphofa), is (technically sound or) “word” (§abda). ‘‘ Meaning” (artha) is (the sense conveyed by the word indicating) a genus (such as the cow or the horse). ^^ Understanding” (jndaza) is a function of the intellect in which the quality of truth prevails (in preference to the other two qualities). = ^ Fancy” (८८2) has been already defined (A. IX) “ Affected” (sadkirna) influenced by them, ए. ९.) by the three, words &९. That modification, in which the three (words &c.) are apparent in an undefined fanciful shape, (४. ९.) their relations are doubtful in the mind), as the word gau “a cow,” meaning a cow, and conveying the notion of a cow, is called ^“ argumentative,” (savitarka.) (The conditions adverted to in the preceding aphorism are four- fold, and thereof the first is called argumentative, inasmuch as in that condition the thinking principle fancies or doubtfully accepts a thing without positive discrimination of the relations between a word or its meaning and the idea conveyed by it. The P. Bhashya explains it by saying, ^ Gaw is the word, a cow is its meaning» and the idea is that of a cow, and accepting these distinct posi- tions in an undivided form.” Gauriti 8abdo Gaurityartho Gaurits jndnamilyavibhagena vibhaktanamapi grahanam drishtam. The P. Rahasya puts it more clearly by saying “ when on hearing the word there is a doubt as to whether the gau is a word, or it 18 52 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. ४ meaning, or it is an understanding. Gauriti s‘abde s‘rute sate gauriti s'abdo ४८ gaurityartho va gauriti jnanam va evamvikalpahk. (See p. 18.) This is an inferior condition. The word sphota, which I have rendered into “ bursting,” is the technical name of the sound which is eternal, and of which spoken words are but manifestations. The theory of some grammarians is that words are eternal, and they become manifest whenspoken. Dr. Ballantyne, in his essay on Hindu Philosophy, has given a full account of this dogma. ] The opposite of it or the non-argumentative is next de- scribed. XLII. That is non-argumentative in which, on the disso- lution of memory, the meaning alone without any definite identity is apparent. When the memory of words and of their meaning has subsided, and the shape rises manifest and distinctly graspable, excluding the sense of understanding, and appearing as if devoid of a definite identity, it is ^ non-argumentative.” (The P. Bhashya explains the purport thus: when the intellect, intent upon the form of the object of acceptance, forsakes the accepting understanding which is like itself, and becomes solely of the form of the object, z. ¢., it becomes of the form of the object accepted, it is non-argumentative. Grdhyasvaripoparaktéd 27070 svamiva prajndripam grahandimakam tyakté padartha- matrasvarupa grahyasvaripapanneva bhavatt sa nirvitarkéd samapatti.] To indicate varieties of it, he says : XLIV. By this the deliberative and the non-deliberative as pertaining to subtile objects are also described. “ By this,” 2. ¢., by the explanation about the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions, the deliberative (savickdrd) CHAPTER FIRST. 53 and the non-deliberative (nzrvichdéra) conditions have been descri- bed. How are the latter? =“ Subtile objects,” (sukshmavisaya)— ‘‘subtile” rudimentary matter and the organs are so called. By this the former two propositions are made to refer to gross objects. They are dependant on gross matter, whether connected with the ideas of words, meaning, and understanding (as in the case of the argumentative form,) or without them (as in the non-argumenta- tive form.) “The deliberative” (savichdrd) is that which is an abstract notion defined by place, time, quality,&c. ‘The non- deleberative” (xzrvichard) is that in which the abstract notion is . manifest as a mere substratum of quality, perfectly independent of all ideas of place, time, quality, &c. These refer to subtile objects. [The object aimed at is to assign the argumentative and the non-argumentative conditions to gross matter, and the delibera- tive and the non-deliberative to subtile objects. The distinction seems to be purely technical, implying only slight differences. ] To explain how far this subtile object extends, he says: XLV. This subtile objectivity terminates in the indisso- luble. What has been described about the object of the deliberative and the non-deliberative conditions being subtile objectivity extends to the indissoluble. That which does not merge into anything, nor indicates or implies anything is the ^ Indissoluble” (adiffga) or First Principle (nature, Prakriti), and subtile objectivity extends to that limit. Now in the resolution of qualities, there are four stages, viz., 1, defined character, (vzszsht{a liftga) ; 2, undefined character (aviszsh{alifiga) ; 3, mere character (liftgamdtra) ; 4, devoid of character, or indissoluble, (aliftga). The objects of defined character are the (gross) elements. Those of undefined character are the subtile elements and the organs. Mere character is indicative of the Intellect; and devoid of character, the First Principle. Hereby it is said that there is nothing more subtile than the First Principle. | 54 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. [The word /:fga has been defined to be that which indicates or characterises, a mark or sign which is inseperable from it, and, I believe, the word character is its nearest equivalent. The First Principle or Prakriti is called a/fga or that which is with- out anindicator, because by itself it does not specifically indicate anything, and is the subtlest of the categories, and there is nothing more subtile. “It may be urged,” argues the P. Bhashya, “ that the soul is more subtile than the first principle, but, though it is true that the characterless (a/iflga or Prakriti) 18 more subtile than the characterised, still the same cannot be the case with the soul, since thesoul is not the material but the in- strumental cause of character, and therefore the utmost limit of subtility must rest with the First Principle.” Nanvasti purushah sukshma itt. Satyam yatha liflgat param aliigasya saukshmyam, nachdivam-purushasya, kintu littgasya anvayt-karanam purusho na bhavatt hetustu bhavatiti, atah pradhane saukshmyam niratisay- am vyakhyatam.] He now points out the necessity for these mental conditions. XLVI. These verily constitute meditation with a seed. “These verily,” 7%. ¢., the conditions above described, exist with a seed or object. =^ With a seed,” (savija} means conscious meditation, (or Samadhi having a distinct recognition,) because such meditations have always something to rest upon. [These four conditions have been already described in the commentary on Aphorism XVII, and call for no further re- marks here. } Now, these (conscious conditions) maturate into the non-deli- berative condition, and therefore he describes the fruit thereof. XLVII. In the purity of the non-deliberative (condition) there is intellectual contentment. * CHAPTER FIRST. 55 ८८ Non deliberativeness” has been already defined. (Aph. XLIV). ^ Purity” (vaisdradya) means freedom from dirt. The non-argumentative condition is superior to the argumentative. To that the deliberative which has a subtile object in view, (is su- perior). Again, the non-deliberative, which has no object in view, is superior to the preceding. When by rigorous practice “ purity,” as the condition of freedom from dirt, is attained “ intellectual contentment” results, 7. ¢., the thinking principle, being free from pain and longing, becomes fit to flow in an even course. This is the purity of the thinking principle, abidence in which is steadfastness (Aph. XXXII). (The four conditions are graded in due order, and the last is declared to be the best of them, because in the highest purity of that condition there is perfect intellectual contentment, in which one can behold all knowledge like one seated in the palace of wisdom can look, as from the top of a mountain, upon groaning mortals below on earth, without being in any way disturbed. Prajnaprasadamaruhya asochyah s'ochatojanan, Bhimishthaniva sailasthah sarvdn prajnonupasyati. | He next explains what happens when this condition is attained. XLVIITI. In that condition knowledge becomes truth-support- ing. That “ knowledge” (prajnd) which supports the “ truth” (rita) or reality, and never permits it to be covered by misconception (A. VIII) is “truth-supporting” (rétambhara), and in the condition (aforesaid) this is acquired. With the light of that knowledge the Yogi perceives everything in its true character, and acquires the highest Yoga. [In the next aphorism it will be shown that this perfect know- ledge 18 the same with the transcendental power of knowing things, independently of the ordinary means of ascertaining truth. | Its distinction from other forms of knowledge is now to be explained. 56 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. XLIX. The knowledge which results from testimony and inference is general, (and differs from this) which has a specific object (in view). “Testimony” (७१४८४) is knowledge founded on sacred texts. “Inference” (anumdna) has been already defined (Aph. VII). The knowledge which results from these two has generals for its object, since neither words nor characteristic signs are able, like the organs of sense, to convey -a knowledge of particularities. While this knowledge (the one under notice), resulting from the purity (fulness) of the non-deliberative condition, is distinct from them, inasmuch as it has a speciality for its object. When one is in the condition of this knowledge, the truth of all subtile, intercepted, and remote objects becomes manifest in a clear form. The advice is, that for this reason it is proper that every exertion should be made by Yog‘s for the attainment of this knowledge. [The transcendental powers referred to above are here de- scribed to be the power of observing things which are so subtile, or so intercepted, or so remote that they cannot be observed by the ordinary appliances of perception. ] He now describes the fruit of this knowledge. L. The residuum of this is opposed to all other residua. “The residuum” (sat#skdra Aph. XVIII) which is produced by that knowledge, obstructs all other residua, whether arising during worldly condition or during meditation, 2, ९.) it renders them incapable of achieving their respective works. Since the residua produced by knowledge being absolute, are more power- ful, they are able to preclude all residua resulting from non- absolute knowledge. The purport is that for this reason that absolute knowledge should be exercised. @ = ———— ——s ऋ ~ ~ CHAPTER FIRST. 57 [The purport of this and of the next aphorism has already been explained in the comments on aphorisms XVII and XVIII.] Having thus described conscious meditation, he now explains the un-conscious form of meditation, (Aph. XVIII). LI. On the removal of this also, everything being removed, there is meditation without a seed. ८८ Of this,” 2. e., of conscious meditation. “Removal” (niro- dha) is dissolution. On its dissolution all functions of thought melting into their causes, and the mere residua which arise in this state being also rejected by the conviction “this is not, this is not,” meditation without a seed becomes manifest. On this being accomplished the soul (puruska) becomes pure, and abides svlely in its own nature. [The P. Bhdshya explains the aphorism thus: “That medi- tation 18 not only antagonistic to the impressions of the Samé- . dhi state, but also to the residua left by those impressions. But how do the residua of the suppressed (nirodha) state remove the residua of the meditative state? By the influence of the duration of the suppressed state the existence alone of the impressions produced by the suppressed thinking principle is perceptible. As the thinking principle then merges into its own natural form along with all the impressions of the waking, the meditative, the suppressed and the isolated states, their residua can no longer be antagonistic to the natural state of the thinking principle, nor the causes of its (separate) existence. And since the thinking principle, divested of its functions, along with the residua of the isolated state, is suppressed, and in that suppression the soul resides in its own form, it is called pure and liberated.’’] Now in this (chapter) have been described Yoga, the subject of the work (A.1I), its definition by the words the cessation of the thinking principle (A. II), exercise (XIII), dispassion (XV), the 8 * 58 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. nature of the two means and their varieties (XVI, the conscious and the un-conscious forms of Yoga, the inferior and superior Yoga (XVII—XVIII), the various means of exercising Yoga, easy means of accomplishing it (XIX—XXIII), definition of God (XXIV), his proof (XXVIII), greatness (XXVI), indicator (XX VII), mode of worship (XXV), and its results (XXIX), the perturbations of the thinking principle (XXX), and the pains thereon consequent (XXXI), the means of obviating them by study and benevolence (XXXII-XXXIII), regulation of breath (XXXIV), condition preceding the conscious and un-conscious meditations (XXXV), meditation with a seed, mental afflictions (XLI), their definitions (XLII-XLIV—XLV), their fruits (XLVI—XLVIII), their object (XLIX), and meditation without a seed (LI). Thus is the Yoga chapter explained. [The above summary has not been translated literally. The original is interrupted by a number of participles and explanatory words which have been omitted as they would have served only to make an uncommonly long sentence very much involved. ]} This is the end of the first quarter or Yoga chapter of the commentary entitled Rajamartanda on Patanjali’s Institutes of the Yoga by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva. CHAPTER SECOND. 59 CHAPTER SECOND. May the three-eyed Lord of the universe, by whom has beer disclosed the several means of obtaining the occult powers of the difficultly-achievable Yoga, be favourable to the attainment of the desired object ! Having in the first chapter explained the Yoga for those whose thoughts are collected, together with the means thereof, the author now, anticipating the question what should be the practice of the means for the achievement of the Yoga for those whose thoughts are in a waking (worldly) state, describes the Kriyda-yoga (practical Yoga), with a view to establish the mode of accomplishing it. (This chapter is designed for persons who have not obtained contro] over their passions, but who are nevertheless desirous of practising those works which are calculated to train them for the performance of the highest branches of the Yoga, and to enable them to acquire supernatural powers (riddiss). Inas- much as this training can be attained only through active exercise of certain duties, and those duties form the topics of this chapter, the chapter is called Kriy&-yoga or “ Practical Yoga.”’] I. Asceticism, muttering, and resignation to God con- stitute the Practical Yoga. ८ Asceticism” (¢apas) is the observance of the fasts called Krichchhra, Ch&ndréyana and the like enjoined in another S astra (Dharma-édstra). “ Muttering” (sddhydya) is the inaudible repetition of particular mantras preceded by the Pranava, (२, ¢., thesyllableOm). ^ Resignation to God” (J’svara-pranidhana) is the dedication to the Supremely Venerable all one’s works, without 60 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. any concern for their fruits. These, it is said, are the Practical Yoga. [This aphorism defines what Practical Yoga is. It includes the three acts of Asceticism, Muttering, and Resignation to God. The first includes all those acts of fasting and the like which the Smriti ordains for the mortification of the flesh. In this sense tapas would be best rendered by religious austerity or self-denial, but the examples given are included under the head of penance. The Yogis do not exclude any of them, nor, except in the form of seats &c., add any new form of penance. The Krichchhra named in the commentary is by some believed to be the same with the Pr&japatya, and by others with the Santapana. The first is effected by eating once a day for three days in the morning, then once in the night for three days, then subsisting for three days on food given, unasked, as alms, and lastly fasting for three days. The fast is absolute, and not evena mouthful of water is allowed to be drunk. The second is effected by living for six days on the five products of the cow and water in which kwéa grass has been steeped, and absolutely fasting on the 7th day. The Chéndrdyana has several varieties, but all of them are regulated by the moon’s age, the food being daily reduced by one mouthful from the first day, till on the newmoon no food is taken, and then on the next day beginning with one mouthful the full allowance is got on the day of the fullmoon. These penances are ordained for particular heinous sins. In citing their names it is not the object of the commentator to enjoin that these particular penances shonld be regularly practised, but simply to cite examples. The Hathadipiké enjoins some forms of asceticism suited to the Raéja-yoga. The object is, there should be constant mortifying of the flesh so as to subdue its longings. Muttering, like the last, 18 a part of the Smriti ritual, largely dwelt upon in the Tantras. Every householder has a particular mantra which he is required to repeat for a certain number of times every day, the number varying from twelve to many thousands according to choice. The muttering is so done as not to be audible to a bystander, but in a manner so that cach repe- CHAPTER SECOND. 61 tition may be clear and distinct, and fit to be counted by the mutterer. The P. Bhdshya and the P. Rakasya add that sadhydya implies either the muttering of a mantra, or the study of that s’4stra which: relates to emancipation. Pranavadi-pavitra- nam japo mokshas'astradhyayanam via. Resignation to God (pranidhdna) has been already explained on p. 28. These are essentially necessary as preliminary practices, but they do not constitute the Yoga itself.] (To the question) of what use are these, he replies: II. It is for the purpose of the contemplation of Sama- dhi and for weakening afflictions. ८८ Afflictions” (1८८54) will be presently described (II, 111.) To “ weaken them” is to make them unfit for their respective works. ८८ Samfdhi’’ (meditation) has been already explained (I, xx.) Its “contemplation” (०५४८१४८) 15 repeated cogitation of it in thought. That Yoga which has these contemplation and weakening for its purpose (arthka), object, is so called (kriyd-yoga). What is said is this : These mortifications, &c. when practised, weakening the afflictions of the ignorance residing in the thought, become acces- sories toSamfdhi. Therefore the advice is that the Yogi should first turn his attention to this Practical Yoga. [The purport of this aphorism has been already anticipated -in the remarks on the last preceding Aphorism. | It has been said (above that the Practical Yoga is wanted) for the purpose of weakening the afflictions, and what those _afflictions are he now describes. III. Ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and ardent attachment to life are the five afflictions. 62 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. “ Afflictions” (९८३4) are the five, ignorance, &c., which will be (presently) described. These, being of an obstructive cha- racter, 2. ¢., producing distress, become the object of the term affliction. These, abiding in the thinking principle, strengthen the modifications of the (three) qualities whieh constitute mun- dane existence. (Here the names of the afflictions are given, but their defini- tions are reserved for subsequent discussions. The reason why they are called “ afflictions,” is explained to be that they tend to promote those modifications of the thinking principle which the three qualities of poodness, foulness, and darkness tend to for worldly purposes. In other words, those functions which attach the mind to the world are afftictions, because they stand in the way of emancipation. ] Although all these are equally afflicting, nevertheless ignorance, being the source (of all of them), is the chief, and to establish this he says: IV. Ignorance is the field of those which follow, whether they be dormant, weak, intercepted or simple. “Tgnorance” (avidyd) is delusion ; it is in fact the assumption of that being the soul which is not soul. Itis the “ field” (kshetra), or ground of production, of those which follow, 2. e., egoism and the rest, and each of them may be in one of the four condi- tions of dormancy, &c. Wherever the reverse-idea-producing ignorance becomes weak, there egoism and the other afflictions are not seen to arise, for it is seen that where the mistaken notion exists there they arise, it follows, therefore, that ignorance is their source. The “dormant, weak, intercepted or simple.” Of these afflictions those which, existing in the thinking principle, do not, owing to the absence of an exciting cause, produce their CHAPTER SECOND. 63 effect, are called “dormant” (prasupta), asleep. Thus in child- hood. Though residing in a child in the form of instincts those afflictions do not, from want of co-operation of an exciting cause, flare up. Those afflictions are said to be “ weak” (tanz) which, be- coming overpowered in their effort to perform their respective functions by their mutually contradictory inclinations, reside in the thinking principle in the form of instincts, but are not able to carry on their work without the aid of numerous auxiliaries. This is the case in the practising Yogi (who being engaged in one particular contemplation does not allow the afflictions to disturb his thoughts, They are in him, but in a condition of weakness produced by their non-indulgence). Those afflictions are said to be “intercepted” (vickchhinna) which remain with their powers overcome by a particularly potent passion, as desire when the prevailing passion is aversion, or aversion when the prevailing passion is desire: being mu- tually opposed to each other, they cannot dominate at the same time, (one must for the time intercept the other). Afflictions are said to be “simple” (udara) when, having their auxiliaries beside them, they carry on their respective functions. This is the case of the waking condition of those who follow not the ways of the Yoga. Each of these four (afflictions) has ignorance for its root, and is also attended by it, for nowhere are the afflictions found existing by themselves as opposed to, or independent of, the attendant. When that ignorance, a mere falsehood, is removed by thorough knowledge, these afflictions, like roasted seeds, never sproutagain. It follows that these are both rooted in, and attended by, ignorance; hence they are all implied by ignorance. The conclusion is that as all these afflictions are calculated to produce distractions of the thinking principle, it is the foremost duty of the Yogi to exert for their removal. [In A. 111 the afflictions have been described to be five in number. In this the author shows that four of them owe their 04 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. origin, and are subject, to ignorance. He also shows that they are always present, though not always active. The causes of their want of activity are described to be dormancy, weakness and interception | He now defines ignorance. V. Ignorance is the assumption of that which is non- eternal, impure, painful and non-soul, to be eternal, pure, joyous and soul. The assumption of a thing being what it is not, is “ igno- rance” (avidya). That this is its general definition follows from its distinctions as pointed out (in the aphorism). Thus the assumption of eternity in the non-eternal water jar and the like is ignorance. In the same way, the assumption of purity in impure objects, like the body and so forth, that of joy in pain, and that of the soul in the body (which is not soul, are results of ignorance). By these is explained the mistake of con- founding vice with virtue and the useless with the useful. [The P. Bhashya argues that although the word avidya is formed of the privative particle a with vidyd “knowledge,” it does not mean simple absence of knowledge, but a conception distinct and the opposite of it, and illustrates it by the examples of amitra and agoshpada, the former of which, though formed of ८ (absence) and mitra “a friend,” does not mean the absence of a friend, but an enemy, and the latter, formed of @ and goshpada “the footprint of a cow,” does not mean the absence of the footprint of a cow, but a country. Tasyds chamitragoshpada- vadavastu sa tattvam vijneyam, yatha namitro mitrabhdvo na mitramatram, kintu tadvirudhah sapatnah, yatha vdgoshpadam na goshpadabhavo na goshpadamatram, kintu des’a eva, tdbhyamanyat vastvantaram, evamavilyd na pramdnam na pramdndbhavah, kintu vidyaviparitam jnanantaramavidyeti. | With a view to explain egoism, he says : LIST OF BOOKS FOR SALE AT THE LIBRARY OF THE SIATIC pociETy OF PENGAL, No. 57, PARK STREET, CALCUTTA, AND OBTAINABLE FROM 57 anp 59, Lupeare Hint, Lonpon, E. C. BIBLIOTHECA INDICA, Sanskrit Series. ae. गय Translation, 1 fasci. ७५१४११५ PHO कक कै ७७७११५१ wees 9 ५४०५७७४५ ५१०१५ ३५००१ । 7171808, 24 fasci. CORE ७५१४७४०१ ००११ EEE EEE १११००१४ Bee ee Brahmana, 19 fasci. १११११ eee eens १११. COG ७५७५५ chee ७५१०७५०५ ०५०१००५१ : fasci. 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COCR ११ ५७५० १५०५०७०७ ४१५१००१ eee eee नुन + नल PRR Re REE HOE ३5०००५७० Hee ee ee १०७४५११ व ए थ, 6 fasci. 1१33111. eee ६५७०४४४४ ५ 113127711111. Kamandaktiya 0108878 fasci (Fasci 1 out of stock.) Cee eee eee eee wees Aphorisms of Séndalya, न 155 < avaveu sccaesae speeds edgvadhe'as Kashé Banit Ségare, Hnalish Translation, 7 Fasol..cs,acscoc evsovses seevosee THE SOCIETY’S LONDON AGENTS, MESSRS. TRUBNER & eee Anas nevis Nataka, 3 fasci... Cees COOTER ४१५४४१४ ४४११ ००००००५» RS Brabmana, Upanishads, 5 fasci. ७२१११११ ११०११०११ १११०३१७४ ००५१ ५१५१०१५५ EO Hee CO, *- NIOCawQrtwor ry Ger on (2 च ~ च oe < ८ = <= > € €= © + #> ६० + © © @ € & Digitized by (400g ges CHAPTER SECOND. 65 VI. Egoism is the identifying of the power that sees with the power of seeing. ‘“‘The power that sees” (drik-sakti,) is the soul (Purusha). “‘The power of seeing” (darsana-sakti) is the internal organ produced by the quality of goodness unaffected by the qualities of foulness and darkness. What is said is, that the assumption of the two extremely different things,—the one being the enjoyer and the other the enjoyed—the active and the inert,— being the same is egoism (asmita). Thus, when nature (prakritz), though really devoid of the power of enjoying and of intelli- gence, fancies “I am the enjoyer,” “I am the intelligent,” the blunder is the affliction called egoism. [The internal organ is a modification of the quality of goodness, which marks the distinction between itself and the things around it. In this state it is egotism; but when that internal organ ceases to perform this function, and only a sense of mere existence is felt in the thinking principle without any distinction of the self and the things around it is egoism. This definition was anticipated by the commentator in his remarks on A. xvii chapter I, (p. 19) and the author gives it here. ] He defines desire. VII. Desire is dwelling on pleasure. “ Dwelling on pleasure” (sukhdnusayt) is lying on pleasure. The longing or thirst for pleasure on the part of him who had experienced it before, and is impelled by its remembrance, is the affliction called desire (raga). [The root $£ is “to sleep” or “lie down,” and literally the translation of anus‘ayi should be the sleeper, or that which lies on something, but idiomatically I prefer dwelling, as it conveys more clearly the idea intended by the author. Obviously he means the 9 66 APHORISMS OF PATANJALTI. dwelling on, or keeping alive in the mind, the idea of some object or other. Anusaya means “ to follow” or ^ to pursue,” and that would afford a very appropriate rendering of the term here, but in the next aphorism it has been used with reference to pain, and as no one pursues pain knowing it to be pain, that rendering cannot be adopted. It is true the word also means “repentance,” and it may be assumed that the author has used the word in two different senses in the two aphorisms, but such an assumption would be unjustifiable in dealing with definitions. The author, in his aphorisms, has nowhere evinced any leaning for rhetoric or verbal ornament, and it is very unlikely that he should use the same word in two consecutive aphorisms in two contradictory senses, when his object is to make things clear, and not to confound. | He next defines aversion. VII. Aversion is dwelling on pain. “ Pain” (duhkha) has been already defined, (€. I, xxx1). That which one, having experienced it, and remembering it, is averse to its means as undesirable, is the affliction called ^ aversion” (dvesha). [Three of my MSS. has pratikiula-lakshnam for ukta-laksh- nam. If that reading be adopted, the meaning would be ^ Pain is of an opposite nature,” ४. €.) 17 the case of pleasure there is a longing or thirst to get the object, while in that of pain, the feeling is the reverse, or avoiding to get it.] He now defines tenacity of life. IX. Tenacity of life is an attachment to the body which relates to the residua of one’s former life, even on the part of the wise. CHAPTER SECOND. 67 The fear arising from the memory of pain from death endured ina former life prompts the constant wish, ‘ May I not be separated from the body and its objects,” and the attachment to the body resulting therefrom, an attachment which exists without an inducing cause, in all beings from Brahma to an earthworm, is the affliction called ‘ Tenacity of life.” (AdAznz- vesha.) Thus, it is afflicting in the waking or mundane state. These afflictions should at the outset be destroyed by the Yogi by the exercise of concentration of the mind to one point. (The only doubtful word in the aphorism is the first. It 1 formed of the three words, sva “one’s own,’ rasa literally “wish,” and rahi, “ that which carries :’—* that which carries or keeps in current one’s wish.” The commentators have, however, not rendered it so. Without giving a synonym of rasa, the P. Bhashya uses the word vdsand in its place (marana- duhkhanubhavadiyam vasaneti), and that word is the equivalent of saiskara, which I have rendered into residua. In this way the term svarasavaht means ‘that which carries the residua of one’s former life.’ It proceeds from the memory of former experi- ence, and since no one has in this life experienced the pain of death, it must follow that the fear of death must be the result of the unconscious memory of the experience of a former state of life—and this fear is the cause of attachment to life. | Since it is not practicable to remove these afflictions without first knowing what they are, the author, having described their names (II, 111) fields, (I, tv) divisions, (II, 1v) and characteristics, (II, v to rx,) now explains the division of the means of destroying them, according as they are gross or subtile. X. These, the subtile ones, should be avoided by an adverse course, Those are “subtile”’ (sikshma) afflictions which exist in the form of residua, but have not assumed a modification in the 68 APIIORISMS OF PATANJALTI. form of active work. They are to be avoided (heya), eluded, by an adverse course (pratiprasava) or reflex modification. When the thinking principle, with its residua, has accomplished its course and entered into egoism, which is its source, how can these, (afflictions,) being rootless, exist ? (The five afflictions aforesaid are described under two heads, subtile and gross. They are subtile when they exist in the form of residua, ४, e., they exist potentially, but are latent. They become gross when they break out into active operation. Now, the latent ones are to be overcome by an adverse course. The natural course is to allow them to manifest themselves through the stimuli of external objects; but if the thinking principle be directed inwards towards egoism, the course of action is adverse to the natural tendency of the residua; and, in the absence of stimuh, they cannot manifest themselves. They cannot sprout, and are, therefore, compared in the P. Bhashya to roasted seeds. | He next describes the means for the destruction of the gross (afflictions). XI. Their functions should be avoided by meditation. The functions of these afflictions in active operation, which manifest themselves in the form of pleasure, pain, and delusion, should be “ avoided,” destroyed, by meditation characterised by the concentration of the thinking principle ona single point. These, being gross, are suppressed by the mere exercise for the purifica- tion of the thinking principle, even as dense thick dirt on cloth and the like is removed by mere washing, while that which is subtile in it requires heating and other (arduous) means. [The means of suppressing the gross afflictions, or those afflictions which are in active operation, is meditation, or con- fining the thinking principle to one action, and focussing it there to the exclusion of all other objects. The difference lies in this—that in the case of latent afflictions the thinking principle CHAPTER SECOND. 69 is directed inward, and no opportunity is given to the latent ones to become active ; and in the case of gross ones or those which are in active action, the thinking principle is confined to one object, and thereby all others are excluded. In the one case a desire is repressed by turning away from it, and keeping the thinking principle occupied with another, and in the other no opportunity 18 given for external stimuli to excite the latent wishes. The illustration given shows that the subtile ones are more difficult to repress than the gross ones. ] Having thus defined the true character of the afflictions he, with a view to explain the residua of works, says: XII. The residua of works have affliction for their root, and are felt (either) in this manifest birth, (or) in the unmanifest one. By the term ^ residua of works” (karmds‘aya) the nature of the residua is explained, for all works are of the form of residua. By (the phrase) “ Have affliction for their root” (kles'amiu/ah) their cause 15 indicated, for of good or evil works the afflictions are the cause. By (the phrase) “ felt in this manifest birth, or in the un- manifest one,” the fruition is described. What is felt in the present existence is called “felt in this manifest birth” (drishtajanma- vedaniyah) ; that which 18 to be felt in another existence is called “felt in an unmanifest one,” (adrishtajanma-vedaniyah). Thus, some virtuous actions, such as the worship of the gods and the like performed with excessive ardour, produce fruits even in this life in the form of kind, age, or experience. Thus, to Nandis’vara, through the influence of his worshipping the lord Mahesvara, change of kind was secured even in this life. Similarly to Vigvamitra and others kind and age accrued through the force of penance. In the case of some kind alone is changed. Thus in the case of Nahusa and others performing vicious acts with excessive ardour kind alone was changed. So Urvas’i was 70 ड APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. metamorphosed into a creeper in the garden of Kartikeya. Thus is the rule to be explained distributively or collectively. [The leading word in this aphorism is sarmadsaya. Formed of karma “works” and asaya “ virtue and vice,” it implies the results which follow from the performances of works. The word agaya has been accepted in aphorism 24, chapter I, to be the equivalent of vdsand and saiiskara, and for the sake of concord- ance, and in accordance with the commentators, I render 1४ here in that sense, inasmuch as the results do not manifest imme- diately, but remain latent to even a second or subsequent life in the form of residua. The works are described to have afflictions for their root, because all works proceed from ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity for life, technically called the five afHic- tions, (II, 111). No work can be performed unless impelled by one or other of these five, and so they are the roots of the residua that are left behind. The fruits of these residua are borne either collectively or singly, and at different times, either in this life or in a subsequent one, and the commentator cites instances to prove this. The story of Nandisvara becoming a demigod occurs in the Vrihannandikesvara Purana. The Ramayana and some of the Puranas give the story of Vis’vamitra, a Kshatriya by birth, becoming a Brahmana. The Mahabhérata relates the story of Nahusa being changed into a snake by a curse. The story of Urvasi’s becoming, like another Daphne, a creeper, occurs in the drama of Vikramorvasi. ] Now he describes the varieties and distinctions of the residua of works with their fruits. १९११९ The root existing, the deserts are kind, age, and experience. The ^ root’’ (mila) is the afflictions aforesaid. As long as the afflictions are not removed, the deserts (४९७६८), fruition of works, CHAPTER SECOND. 71 good and evil, follow in the form of kind, age, and experience. ८८ Kind” (ja¢z) means being a man or some other being. “ Age” (५5) is always remaining in the same body. ^ Experience” (640ga) means sense objects, the senses, and consciousness of pleasure and pain, according as it 15 accepted in the passive, instrumental, or abstract sense. The purport of this is this: That as the residua of works reposited in the thinking principle from time without a begin- ning, attain maturity, so they, according to their measure, lead to fruition in the form of kind, age, and experience. The afflictions existing with their roots uncut, the residua of works become the originators of deserts. Even as unhusked 8811 paddy, like unroasted seeds, are able to germinate, but husked grains, like roasted seeds, cannot, so the residua of works, un- parted from the afflictions, become the germinators of deserts ; though such is not the case when the afflictions are removed, or the residua are reduced to the condition of roasted secds. (The first difficult word in the aphorism is 4८2. Its meaning is obvious enough, but I call it difficult because I can find no satisfactory equivalent for it in the English language. It is formed of the root jan ‘to be born,’ and means that which is born; but in philosophy it 15 used to imply species in a very comprehensive sense. It means caste, 2, ९., distinction of family ; or species, that is one distinct from another, as several species in a genus or order; or broader distinctions than what is implied by species; as also the broadest distinctions which naturalists indicate by the term kingdom. The examples given show that the word 74८ equally applies to the change of caste, as in a Kshatriya becoming a Brahman; or to that of species; as in a man becoming a demigod ; or to that of a kingdom asin a woman becoming a creeper: I know of no such comprehensive term in the English language. Dr. Ballantyne uses 7294, but I doubt if the change of a woman into a creeper or a stone, the change could be idiomatically described as one of ^ rank.” Colebrooke uses 72 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. “birth,” but the change may take place without a regular birth. For the sake of English idiom the best course would be to use different equivalents under different circumstances, but that would upset the line of argument of the author. Genesis appears to bear close approximation to ja¢i, and kind is its Anglo-Saxon counter- part. In using “kind” as the equivalent, I use what appears less liable to objection than others, but it is by no means a good one. The second word dyus has been so explained by the commenta- tor as to imply longevity, but the word means simply “ age” or “duration of life,” which may be long or short according to circumstances :—a meritorious work leading to prolongation of existence in a particular body, whereas a vicious one tending to shorten the span of life. The third word is d4oga, which Dr. Ballantyne renders into “enjoyment ;” but inasmuch as here it means the endurance of pain as well as the delectation of pleasure, I prefer ^ experience,” which covers both. The purport of the aphorism is that the fruition of works leads according to circumstances to change of body into a higher or lower grade, to the prolongation or reduction in the span of life, and to the experience of pleasure or pain. The P. Bhashya thus explains the time of fruition: “The deserts are of three sorts, kind, age and experience. In regard to them the questions are discussed, 1st, Is one work the cause of one birth, or is it the cause of many births? 2nd, Are many works the causes of many births or of one birth ? One work is not the cause of one birth. Why so? Because there would be no regularity in the fruition of the remainder of innumerable works accumulated from time without a beginning along with a recent work. The objection would also be there would be no inducement for people (to perform many works). Therefore it 18 wrong. Nor is one work the cause of many births. Why? Because if out of many works each work was to be the cause of many births, CHAPTER SECOND. 73 there would be want of time for the fruition of all the remainmg deserts. Therefore it, too, is wrong. Nor can many works be the cause of many births. Why? Because it is not possible for many births to happen simultaneously, and consequently it must be said to happen successively, and then the objection before urged (about want of time) would apply. It follows then that the diverse stock of residua of virtuous and vicious actions performed from birth to death remains in a dominant or a dominated form, and on a death taking place it becomes the cause of a birth, being iteelf liable to destruction on another stock becoming dominant.”] The above described kind, &c. being the fruits of works, the author, in order to show that they produce fruition according to the works which are their cause, says: XIV. _ They have joy or suffering for their fruit, accord- ing as their cause is virtue or vice. “Joy” (4८422) is pleasure, and “suffering” (paritdpa) is pain. Those which have joy and suffering for their fruits are 80 called, (४. ¢., by the term Aldda-paritapa-phalah). “Virtue” (pxnya) is fortunate action, and the reverse of it is “vice” (apunya). Those which have virtue or vice for their cause are so called (by the compound term punydpunya-hetutva). What is said 18 this :—those works which proceed from virtuous actions yield joyful fruition in kind, age, and experience. Those which result from vice have painful fruitions. (The meaning is obvious, and calls for no remark. | To all ordinary beings the fruition is thus of two kinds; but to the Yogi all are painful ; to show this, he says: XV. To the discriminating all are verily painful, be- cause of the adversity of the actions of (the three) 10 74 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. qualitics, and of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua. | The meaning is, that to the “ discriminating” (vzveki) who has had experience of the afflictions, &c., all manifest sense- objects are painful, like tasteful food infused with poison, and therefore should be known as adverse to him, since the thoroughly experienced Yogi feels oppressed by even the slightest pain. Even as the eyeball feels the acutest pain from the mere touch of a fibre of wool which the other organs do not, so the discriminating Yogi is distressed by even very slight pain. 0 explain why it should be so, he says, “ because of the pains of sequence, anxiety and residua.” Inasmuch as the longing for objects of enjoyment increases in the same ratio in which they are enjoyed, and the pain proceeding from their non-attainment is unavoidable, therefore pain always follows pleasure, and there is nothing but pain. This is the pain of sequence (parindma- duhkkhatva). Again, since even in the enjoyment of pleasing objects there is always a feeling of aversion against that which is antagonistic to them, anxiety cannot be eluded even while in the enjoyment of pleasures. This is the “ pain of anxiety,” (tdpaduhkhata). ८८ Pain of residua” (sanskdradukkha). The sensation of plea- gure, or of pain, arises in the presence of a desirable or an undesirable. object, and a corresponding residuum is left on the field (of the thinking principle), and since from such a residuum a corresponding sensation is produced, and since from a great number of such residua the mundane condition is never cut short, therefore all residua are painful. “From adversity of the action of the qualities” (gunavyitti- virodhdt). The effects of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, manifesting in the forms of pleasure, pain, and delusion, being mutually overpowering or overpowered, are hostile to each other. They are everywhere connected with pain, hence they are painful. CHAPTER SECOND. 75 What is said is this :—To the discriminating who ts anxious to obviate pain to the utmost and absolutely, all the four causes above described, appear in the form of pain, and hence all deserts are said to be of the form of pain. [The object of this aphorism is to establish that everything connected with worldly life is painful, and Yogis should, there- fore, shun them all. To prove this, itis first shown that all joyous actions are followed by pain. (The word parindma in the text here is used for sequence or result, and not modification as in most other places.) There must be a change after the enjoy- ment of pleasure, and as there is an increase of desire from enjoyment there must be frequent disappointments, and they inflict pain. Even in the act of enjoyment there is always a dread of something that may disturb it, and so it is not unal- loyed. Then all actions and all impressions leave behind residua in the field of the thinking principle, and they revive sensations of pleasure and pain. And lastly, the three qualities are adverse to each other, and therefore they create disturbances - and cause pain. The conclusion is a state of pessimism, from which the only relief is to be had by totally cutting oneself off from all worldly affairs. This pessimism forms the basis of all the leading systems of Indian philosophy, and is not unknown in Europe. According to Hartmann, “if we balance our pleasures and pains, the latter greatly exceed the former.” Schopenhauer goes further, and assigns a negative nature to pleasure, which is very much the same as the doctrine of Leibnitz who assigns a privative character to pain. He holds that “all pleasure causes an exhaustion of the nervous processes, and are in themselves indirect, resulting from the cessation or intermission of pain, and seldom emerges into consciousness, whereas pain ¢o ipso generates consciousness.” He asks, “what, for instance, are all the pleasures of health, of youth, of freedom, of sufficient means? Are they anything but the absence of sickness, of old age, of slavery, of poverty? and is not work itself an evil? How great misery does it cntail upon. the toiling magses of 76 APIIORISMS OF PATANYJALI. our fellow countrymen? Does any one work of his own free will?” He adds, “no amount of pleasure can compensate for any degree. of pain.” Again, ^ human life oscillates between pain and ennui, which states are indeed the ultimate elements of life.” Hartmann holds pleasure and pain to be “ qualitatively similar, and only different in quantity.” (Philosophie des Unbe- wussten). Socrates aptly describes pleasure and pain to be “fastened together from one crown.” (Plato, Phedo.) Poets generally revel in the pleasures of this world, but Byron, one of the greatest among them, says— “ Count o’er the joys thine hours have seen, Count o’er thy days from anguish free ; And know, whatever thou hast been, *Tis something better—not to be.” The question then arises whence is the deliverance to come ? and an able writer thus summarises the answer of the pessimists. In knowing that the world is radically and necessarily bad. Such knowledge leaves no ground for that old affirmation of the Will to live. It leads to a negation of Will, to a renunciation of desire, which, completed by means of asceticism and mortification, must attain that perfect freedom of the Will, that true nirvana, in which there is no more Will, and therefore no longer an ideal presentation or a real world.” (Westminster Review, XLIX, 128.) This is almost the very language of Kapila}. Since pain, residua, works, and the fund of deserts, as aforesaid, are produced by Ignorance, and since Ignorance is of the form of false knowledge, and should be destroyed by perfect know- ledge, and since perfect knowledge is that which decides what should be rejected and the cause thereof, and what should be approved and its cause, he says this by way of explanation: XVI. Avoidable is the pain not yet come. ~ ॐ CHAPTER SECUND. 77 Inasmuch as the past is gone (and cannot be recalled), and that which is being experienced cannot be avoided, that worldly pain which has not yet come (but may come) is what should be avoided. This is what is said here. (The word heya is derived from the root 4d ‘ to quit,’ and means both that which should be shunned and that which can be avoided. The English equivalent has not this double sense, but it affords the nearest approach to the Sanskrit term. The injunction is, since the past and the present are beyond control, exertion should be made to preclude the possibility of future pain. Dr. Ballantyne is quite right in rendering the aphorism into “what is to be shunned is pain not yet come,” but when 4eya is used as an adjective, this phrase “ that which 18 to be shunned,” is too lumbering to be used with convenience, Avoidance-worthy conveys the exact meaning, and is more easy of manipulation, but it too is lumbering. A single term is wanted, and, not knowing any English word of the kind, I use what appears to me to approach the nearest to the -original, without being its exact equivalent.] He now describes the cause of the avoidable. XVII. The conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle is the cause of the avoidable. The “spectator” (drishta) is the soul of the form of intelli- gence. The “spectacle” (drigya) is the principle of under- standing (intellect). The conjunction,” safiyoga, 3. e., coming into the relation of the enjoyer and that which is to be enjoyed, of these two, without due discrimination, is the “cause,” (Aetzu) producing agent, of the “avoidable,” (4eya) which is pain result- ing from the modifications of the qualities, and that is the world. The meaning is that on the cessation of that conjunction worldliness subsides. (In this aphorism “the avoidable” is used to imply the affairs of the world. Those affairs result from the conjunction or 78 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. interaction of the soul and the intellect, and inasmuch 93 world- liness is invariably associated with pain, and that pain cannot be suppressed as long as that worldliness lasts, and for the sake of emancipation worldliness should be avoided, that which is to be avoided is here called the avoidable, or the avoidance-worthy. The word satyoga means conjunction, but here a mere reflection of the soul is what is meant. The reflection results from propin- quity. There is never an actual contact. | Having described the conjunction of the spectator and the spectacle, he now explains the nature, the function, and the motive of the spectacle. XVIII. The spectacle is of the nature of illumination, action, and rule; it is of the form of the elements and the organs ; it 18 the purpose of for experience and emanci- pation. “Tllumination” (0141662) is the nature of the quality of goodness, “ Action” (Kriya) inthe form of exertion, is that of foulness. ^^ Rule” (s¢Az¢z), in the form of regulation, is that of darkness. That which has illumination, action and the rest for its essential nature is so called, (%. ¢., by the term prakdsa-harya- sthiti-silam). By this the nature of the spectacle is defined. ‘‘It 18 of the form of the elements and the organs” (dhuten- driyalmakam). The “elements” (06४८5) are, according as they are gross 07 subtile, the earth, &c. and the rudiments of odour, &e. The “ organs’’ (¢ndriya) are threefold, according as they are the organs of sense, the organs of action, and the internal organ. That of which these two (the elements and the organs), in the forms of the preceptor and the precept, are the natural modifications, not different from its own form, is called “of the form of the elements and the organs.” By this its action is also described. “Experience” (d40ga) has been already defined, (II, शा). “Emancipation” (apavarga) is the cessation of worldliness yesult- CHAPTER SECOND. ` 79 ing from discriminative knowledge. That which has these two, (804८ and apavarga) for its “ object” (artka) or requirement, 18 the spectacle. This is the meaning. [There would be no spectacle if there was not in it a power of manifestation, 2. ९.) of illumination, or light. Without some action, too, it could not be manifest ; and to be manifest it must have some rule or order. Hence the three are described to be the three essentials of its existence, or in other words its nature. The esoteric interpretation of this is that the spectacle is essen- tially the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness, which must be in action to produce spectacle. It is of the form of the elements and the organs. The organs could not alone produce spectacles, nor would the elements produce spectacles if there were no organs to perceive them and communicate them to the intellect. The independent existence of the two, unconnected with each other, would also fail to produce a spectacle. They must be brought together to do so, and therefore it is that the spectacle is described to be of the nature of illumination, and of the form of the elements and the organs. The purport of this round- about expression is that the intellect is the spectacle when it is acted upon by the elements and the organs, or the elements and the organs are modified in the form of the intellect. The word used in the text is dima, and it is explained to be a modification not different from its natural form or identity (svarupabhinnah pari- १417144. What this natural form is is not apparent. Obviously the natural form of the intellect, or Buddhi, would be the mean- ing, but from what follows, Prakriti would seem to be what is meant. I shall notice this lower down, (A. इड, xx1) The motive or object of the spectacle is twofold,—it ministers to our enjoyment, and it may be made to help us in our endea- vours to attain emancipation from the bondage of the earth. The word 5८420 means fixity or abidance, but the Sdfkhya- tattva-kaumud? explains it to mean rule, regulation, or order. Had there been no order or rule, illumination and action would be continuous, and there would be no cessation or break. It is the 80 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. intervention of darkness that causes the break or order of the manifestation of light and action ; this is implied by ०८४4०८४. It implies the quality of darkness. | To describe the phases of this spectacle in its various conditions, in the forms of modifications which should be known as fit to be avoided, he says: XIX. The specific, the unspecific, the solely mergent, and the immergent are the divisions of the qualities. ‘The divisions of the qualities,” 2. ९.) their specific conditions, should be known to be four—this is enjoined. Thereof the specific” (vigesha) are the grosselements and the organs. The * unspecific” (aviseska) are the subtile elements and the internal organ. The “solely mergent” (ifgamdtra) is intellect. The ‘immergent” (aliflga) is the unmanifest or undiscrete, 4. ¢., Prakriti. This is what is said. Since the relation everywhere of this undiscrete of the form of the three qualities is necessary to be known at the time of commencing knowledge, the four divisions are defined. [The object of this aphorism is to explain that the spectacle assumes different forms under different circumstances. It is ^ specific” or well-defined when it refers to the elements and the organs. It.is “unspecific” or undefined when related to the subtile elements and the internal organ or the mind. It is “solely mergent” or mere thought when it refers to the intellect or the thinking: principle. And it is “ immergent” or unmanifest or undiscrete when referring to Prakriti. Here Prakriti is included as one of the forms or phases of the spectacle, though in the commentary on the seventeenth aphorism the spectacle has been defined to be the intellect or the principle of understanding (buddhitattva). This inconsistency is explained away by saying that the intellect is but a modification of Prakriti, and, inas- much as its primary form is Prakriti, the spectacle must include OHAPTER SECOND. 81 Prakriti. The words used in explaining the term d/md in the commentary on the last aphorism—“ a modification not different from its primary form,” (svaripdbhinnah parindmahk)—supports this inference. This is, apparently, different from the doctrine of Kapila who assigns 23 out of the 25 categories to the spectacle, leaving out the soul and Prakriti; but in reality there is no difference, except in the phraseology, as will be shown in the twenty-first aphorism. The four terms have been differently rendered by different translators. The terms used above have been taken from Cole- brooke and Wilson’s ‘Safkhya Karké.’ Mr. Davies, in his ‘Hindu Philosophy,’ adopts the first two, but for ‘ mergent” uses “attributive,’ and for “immergent” its negative. Dr. Ballantyne uses “diverse,” ^ non-diverse,” ^^ merely resolvable” and ‘“‘irresolvable.” In translating apherism 45 of Book I, I have rendered these words collectively with the subject, ९494, into ‘‘ defined character,” ‘ undefined character,” ‘‘ mere character” and “devoid of character.”’] Since the detestableness of spectacle must be first known, and it having been described along with its conditions, to show what should be accepted, the spectator, the author now says: XX. The spectator is absolute sentience, and, though pure, still directly beholds intellected ideas. “The spectator” (drasktd) is soul. He is “absolute senti- ence” (drisimaira), sensation only. The object of using the term “absolute” (mdéra) is to preclude the idea of the quality and the qualified, (3. e. he is himself sensation and not possessed of sensation). Some explain sensation to be an attribute of soul. He, the spectator, ‘though pure,’ (Suddhopi), i. e. although existing by himself in his own essence, being above all liability to modification and the like, “directly beholds intellected ideas.” “ Intellected ideas” (pratyayas) are knowledge tinctured by 11 82 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. worldly objects. ^ Directly” (८१५४), without any intervention, or without any medium, he beholds (pagyati). What is said is this. Soul attains his spectatorship by his proximity to intellect, which alone is tinctured or influenced by passing objects. {The soul is sentience only, ४ ९.) it consists of sentience and nothing more. In this condition it is absolutely pure, being unalloyed by any other object. It, nevertheless, directly beholds intellected ideas, or is the percipient, of all ideas without any intervention. This is effected by its proximity to the intellect, which receives the impressions of the outer world. The act of modification or change which perception implies is effected in the intellect, and does not extend to the soul. This distinction is necessary for the purpose of maintaining the immutability and perfect purity of the soul, for the admission of change would destroy its immutability and absolute purity. ] To show that soul alone is the experiencer, he says : +. Only for his purpose is the soul of the spectacle. *‘ Spectacle” (drisya) has been defined above (II, उणा). © Its soul’ (दद) is its true nature. It, “ the soul of the spectacle,” is required for ^^ his purpose,” for the purpose of consummating the experiencership of soul to the exclusion of all selfish ends. Pradhana in activity does not work with a view to attain any aim of its own, but to accomplish the experiencership of soul. (The meaning is that the true nature of the spectacle acts solely to accomplish the purpose of soul, and not for any purpose of its own, for it has none such. It will be noticed that the text says it is the soul of the spectacle, and not the spectacle itself, that subserves the purpose of soul, and the question arises what is its soul? The word used in the text is démd, which means soul, 7. ९; the soul of the spectacle subserves the purpose of the soul of a living being. The commentator explains démd by svardpa “ it own natural form,” CHAPTER SECOND. 83 or true nature. In the commentary on A, xrx, he uses the words svaripabhinnah parindmah, or “a modification not dif- ferent from its primary form,” neither of which carries us directly to what is meant. It is obvious, however, from the use of the word Pradh4na—Prakriti in the commentary on the aphorism under notice, which in activity, is said, “ not to work with a view to attain any aim of its own,” that the “soul of the spectacle” is but another form of expression for Prakriti. That Prakriti n activity is the spectacle is abundantly evident in the leading works of the Safikhya system. Thus, in the Safkhya-kérika : ‘¢ For the sake of soul’s wish, that subtile person exhibits (before it) like a dramatic actor, through relation of means and consequence, with the aid of nature’s influence.” (Verse xxi). Again, “as a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to soul.” (Verse ux). Again: ‘Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit (to herself), the wish of the ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities.” (Verse Lx). Again “ he desists because he has seen her; she does so, because she has been seen. In their (mere) union there is no motive for creation.” (Verse Lxv1). Similarly the Séfikhya Stitra: ^ Nature’s creating is for the sake of another, though it be spontaneous,—for she is not the experi- encer,—just like a cart carrying saffron (for the sake of its master).” (Ballantyne, III, ष्या). Again, “ just like a dancer, does she, though she had been energising, desist, because of the end having been attained (in the shape of soul’s aim).” (Ibid. III, पड). Nor is there any inconsistency in this, for intellect does not differ from Prakriti except in being in activity ; and “soul,” “true nature,” “original shape of the intellect,” and other similar expressions must imply Prakriti or nature, and nothing else. This will explain the remarks made in the note on Aphorisms xvii and इड, Commenting on the passages quoted from the Safkhya-kéri- k&, Mr. Davies observes, ^ Beautiful as poetry, but not very 84 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. philosophic, nor in direct harmony with other parts of the Séfkhya philosophy. Kapila, or I’svara Krishna, forgets that nature (Prakriti) has no personality, no powers, no volition, and no consciousness,” (p. 95.) This is not fair towards I’svara Krishna, who provides for such criticism by saying, “as the production of milk, which is unintelligent (unknowing), causes the growth of the calf, so the developement of nature causes the liberation of soul;” (Verse L1x;) and Kapila cites the unintelligent cart carrying saffron for its owner. | If the accomplishment of the experience of soul be thus the only aim, then, on the accomplishment of that object, Prakriti, having no other object in view, should cease to be active, and the cessation of all modification in it, itself being pure, (४, ¢., having the three qualities in equipose) all spectators should be free, and it would follow that the world would be cut short, Suspecting such a consequence, he says: XXII. Destroyed in the case of him whose purpose has been attained, she is still active, for she is common to others besides him. Although she (Prakriti—nature) becomes “destroyed” (nash fa), devoid of action, in the case of some one soul which has attained its purpose, (kritdrtha), by experiencing the world till the manifestation of discriminative knowledge, yet she, being com- mon to all souls, remains active (anashk{a) in other cases. It follows that Prakriti, being common to all experiencers, can never be totally destroyed, nor can the emancipation of one imply the emancipation ०५211. This is what is meant. (The conclusion arrived at in the next preceding aphorism, to the effect that on knowledge being attained, Prakriti ceases to act, and becomes functionless, is calculated to suggest the idea that her cessation from her action would apply to all souls, so that on one soul attaining emancipation all souls would be free, there being no active ministering Prakriti to keep them supplied with CHAPTER SECOND. 85 external impressions. This, however, is not the case. The destruction, or cessation, of action, is confined to the particular soul concerned. When a soul has, through discriminative know- ledge, attained his aim he ceases to be influenced by Prakriti, and guod that soul Prakriti is destroyed ; but as regards other souls which have not attained their aims she remains fully active ; and this is indicated by the paradox ^^ though dead, still she is alive :” nashtopyanashtam. This 18 the natural consequence of nature being one, and soulsmany. The P. Bhashya explains the reason by saying that the contact of the quality to the qualified is without a beginning ; dharmindm anddisatiyogat dharmamdtra- ndmapyanddisanyogah. | Having described spectacle and spectator he proceeds to describe their conjunction. XXITI. Conjunction is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the inherent power and the lordship of power. He defines it through its function. “Inherent power” (svagakii) is the nature of the spectacle. “ Lordship of power’ (svdmi- $aktz) is the identity of the spectator. That “conjunction” (safyoga) which is the cause of the apprehension of the natures of the two, existing correlated as the knowable and the knower, is the natural condition of the relation of the experience and the experiencer, and no other. Nor is their conjunction of a different character from their respective natures, which are eternal and all pervading. The character of the experience as the experience and of the experiencer as the experiencer is established from time without a beginning, and that is the conjunction. (The purport of this is that there is an inherent relation between the experience as experienceable, and the experiencer as experiencer from time without a beginning; that is, this relation is not casual or adventitious, produced at particular times by particular causes, 86 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. but natural and always existing. This relation of the two is indicated by the term saziyoga or conjunction, and this conjunc- tion or the natural relation of the two is the cause of worldliness. As will be explained afterwards, the conjunction is not actual or material, but a mere reflection of the one on the other.] He now describes its cause XXIV. Its cause is ignorance. That which has been described before (II, rv) as ^८ ignorance” (avidya), having the nature of doubt and delusion, is the cause of the conjunction which has the form of indiscriminateness. (The object of the text is to say that ignorance is the cause of the conjunction of soul with intellect, and that conjunction produces indiscriminateness, or the waut of power on the part of soul to distinguish between itself and intellect, and the failure to do so leads to the feeling of the pleasures and afflictions of the world being borne by it. When the differences of the two are distinguished, the conjunction dissolves, and soul is free. Dr. Ballantyne has been misled by the presence of the word Aeya in the preamble of the following aphorism into the supposition that that word is a part of the aphorism under notice, and having incorporated it he has interpreted it as such. The word, however, has been cited with reference to its use in a preceding aphorism. | The avoidable (heya) is the objective of the verb to avoid (4d), and to explain what that avoidance is, he says: XXV. From its absence there is absence of conjunction, and that is, avoidance. Thereupon results the isola- tion of the spectator. “Its,” z.e.,of ignorance. On its “absence” (abhava), ४. ९.) on its being irradicated by perfect knowledge which is its essential CHAPTER SECOND. 87 opposite, the effect of the conjunction ceases, or is absent, and this absence 18 called “ avoidance” (४). The meaning is this: it is not, practicable to separate ignorance like an embodied object, but, on discriminative knowledge being produced, this conjunc- tion, which has indiscriminitativeness for its cause, it of itself ceases, and this is its avoidance (१८१८४). That which is an avoidance of the conjunction, is assumed to be an “ isolation” (kaivalya) of the eternally isolated soul. In this way the nature, cause, and effect of the conjunction is explained. (The meaning is that when ignorance is irradicated by a right apprehension of its relation to soul, its relation with soul ceases, and this surcease makes the solitary eternal soul isolated from ignorance and its consequences, and the soul remains isolated, as is its nature. All my MSS. give the reading ५ of eternally isolated” (nityakaivalyasya,) but Dr. Ballantyne, has found a different version; his text has nztyam kevalasya, which would give the meaning “there is eternal isolation of the solitary or isolated”—hkevalasya nityam kaivalyam, The isola- tion is in either case assumed to be everlasting, and hence this isolation is believed to be final deliverance from bondage. The word]kasvalya is derived from kevala, “ alone,” and “ isola- tion” appears to be its most appropriate rendering ; but, inasmuch as this isolation takes place by withdrawing or detaching the soul from the phenomeral world, Colebrooke and Wilson use abstraction.” The Sattkyatattva-kaumudi defines it to be ‘absolute suppression of the three kinds of pain, as a property of sacred writ, holy sages, and inspired teachers or prophets. It must, therefore, be something different from intellect and the rest which are the same thing as pain, and cannot effect a spera- tion form their own essence.” (S‘astranam makarshindm divya- lochanandm cha kaivalyam chatyantikaduhkha.trayaprasama- lakshanam na buddhyddindm sambhavati, te hi dukkhatmakah katham svabhdvddibhih mochayitum sakyanti.) Vijnina Bhikshu defines it in the same way, and calls it absolute extirpation of pain (duhkhatyantikochchhedah). Any way, it is the final reward 88 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. of the knowledge advocated and the practice of meditation enjoined in this system of philosophy. ] Now, by way of describing the means of avoidance he points out the cause of the acceptable. XXVI. The means of avoidance is the manifestation of undisturbed discriminative knowledge. ^ Discriminative knowledge” (viveka) is the name of the knowledge (which shows) that qualities are distinct from soul. Its ^^ manifestation” (kAyd¢z) is the means (updya) or cause of the “avoidance” (Adma) or rejection of the visible. How should this be? It should be “undisturbed,” (aviplava). That which has no interruptions, or breaks or repeated intervals of waking from meditation, is called undisturbed. The purport of it is this: on the disolution of ignorance, from the contemplation of that which is adverse to it, the cessation of all ideas of relationship, agency, &c., the vanishing of the dirt of foulness and darkness, and the refluent modification of the intellect, the reflection of soul on intellect is called dis- criminative knowledge. And by the constant or uninterrupted prevalance of it the function of the spectacle ceases, and this is isolation. [The object of the aphorism is twofold; Ist, to point out the means of avoiding the avoidable, 2nd, to indicate, by implication what should be accepted. The means of avoiding the avoidable, that is ignorance, is the cultivation of discriminative knowledge without any break or interruption. Light and darkness cannot exist conjointly, light must always destroy darkness, and as dis- criminative knowledge is light, and ignorance darkness, the one disappears on the other becoming manifest. Were, however, the light to be fitful, or interrupted, there would be certain periods of light and others of darkness, and to preclude this the injunction is added that the light “should be undisturbed” or uninterrupted. CHAPTER SECOND. 89 The second object is implied, but not pointed out. If continuous light is necessary it follows as a matter of course that that is what should be accepted. | Having described the enlightenment which takes place in the soul on the taking place of discriminative knowledge, he defines the nature of the discriminative knowledge. XXVITI. Of that there are, up to its utmost stage, seven kinds of enlightenment. “Of that,” ६. ¢., of the produced discriminative knowledge, the “enlightenment” (prajnda), with the understanding of what should be known is, to its “ utmost stage,” (prantabhim:) 2. ९.9 to the stage of Samadhi, along with all its accessories, of seven kinds. Thereof four are liberation from work, viz., (1) The knowable has been known by me. (2) There is nothing remaining to be known. (8) My afflictions are overcome, and there is nothing for me to overcome. (4) Knowledge has been acquired by me, discriminative knowledge has been attained by me. Thus, in these states, by rejecting all other conceptions, these kinds of un- derstanding are produced. This understanding, which is pure knowledge regarding work, is called liberation from work. Intellectual liberation is of three kinds, vzz., (1) my intellect has accomplished its purpose. (2) The qualities have finished their domination over me; like stones fallen from the crest of & mountain they cannot go back to their place; for, tending to dissolution in their own cause, and there being a want of the original cause which is ignorance, and in the absence of a motive, how can there be springing up of the evilones? (3) And my meditation has been identified with my soul. Such being the case I am existing in my real nature. These three kinds are intellectual liberation. Thus, on the springing up of this sevenfold knowledge to the utmost stage (of meditation) the soul is said to be isolated. 12 90 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. [The knowledge which is the aim and object of this system of philosophy is, according to its different states of perfection, classed under two heads; one relating to works, and the other to intellect. The first of these two heads is then divided into four, and the second into three sub-heads, making altogether seven stages. The lowest stage is that in which the Yogi feels that he has known all that has to be known. ‘The next is that in which he, in addition to the first, feels that he has nothing more to learn. In the third there is, in addition to the first two, the conviction, that all impediments to knowledge have been destroyed, and there is nothing more to destroy. These three lead to the conviction that the full amount of discriminative knowledge has been acquired, and this constitutes the fourth. All these refer to external nature, and since they are connected with the active creation or works, they are called liberation from work, The second group refers exclusively to the intellect or the thinking principle. The convictions, Ist, that the intellect has done its office by pointing out the distinction between soul and nature ; 2nd, that the qualities which govern the functions of the intellect have lost their influence ; and 3rd, that the intellect has merged in the soul, refer to the relation of the intellect to the soul, and as the conviction is that the intellect has lost its power on the soul, therefore, it is called intellectual liberation. All these, it will be perceived, are dependant upon judgment, or conscious- ness of the effects of certain actions, and therefore relate to con- scious or seeded meditation. (Cf. 8. 1, A.17.) The function of deliberation or Judgment resulting from ratiocianation is in every instance present, and the ideas of, I, me, and mine, govern the whole. But when the judgment is brought to this final stage there is nothing more to do, and then follows the uncon- scious condition which is absolute isolation. ] Having described that the cause of discriminative knowledge is the cessation of conjunction, he now explains what are the means of its origin, CHAPTER SECOND. 91 XXVIII. On the decay of impurity through the practice of the accessories of the Yoga, there is an illumination of the understanding till discriminative knowledge (results). “The accessories of the Yoga” (Yogaflga) are what will be presently described, (xx1x.) =^ The practice” (anusht{hana) there- of is the intelligent exercise of the same till discriminative knowledge results. ‘On the decay of impurity,” (asuddhi- kshaya), ४, e., onthe decline of the impurity which is of the form of afflictions of the character of an envelope to the manifestation of the thinking principle, whatever “ Illumination of the under- standing” (jndnadipli) takes place, greater or less, by the modi- fication of the principle of goodness till the time of the manifes- tation of the discriminative knowledge, the same becomes the cause of that manifestation: this is the meaning. [The commentary explains the aphorism in a roundabout way. The purport is that by the practice of certain exercises the impurities which surround the thinking principle are gradu- ally destroyed, and as they are destroyed so there results a gradual enlightenment which culminates, on perfect maturity, in diserimi- native knowledge. | The decay of impurity by the practice of the accessories of the Yoga having been thus described, the question arises what are those accessories ? (To this question) he replies. XXIX. Restraint, obligation, posture, regulation of the breath, abstraction, devotion, contemplation, and medi- tation are the eight accessories. Some of these being directly beneficial to profound meditation are intimate accessories, such as devotion, &c. Others sub- serve profound meditation by eradicating hesitation and adverse 92 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. feelings of slaughter, &c., such as restraint, obligation, &. Among them posture and the rest are successively subservient (to sam&dhi). Thus on the acquisition of posture there is steadiness in the regulation of breath. The successive ones are to be explained in the same way. [These eight are classed under two heads, Ist, ~eneral or extrinsic, and, 2nd, special or intrinsic. The first two are general, because they are obligatory at all times ; the other six are intrinsic, because they subserve the purpose of the Yoga, but are not otherwise necessary. What these eight are will be explained in the follow- ing aphorisms. | He now successively explains their nature. XXX. Restraint includes abstinence from slaughter, false- hood, theft, incontinence, and avarice. ^ Slaughter” (A77is’d) is work which requires the destruction of life; it is the root of all evils, and its absence is ^^ non-slaughter,” (ahifisd). As slaughter should be avoided at all times, its absence implied by non-slaughter is first mentioned. ८८ Veracity” (satya) is confirmity in mind and speech with fact. “Theft” (steya) is forcibly taking another’s property; and its absence 18 “ non-theft” (asteya). ^ Continence” (46rakmacharya) is subjugation of carnality. ८ Non-avarice” (aparigraka) is the non-acceptance of objects for the promotion of enjoyment. These five, non-slaughter, &c., are indicated by the term yama, restraints, and reckoned as accessories to Yoga. [These restraints figure prominently in all Hindu systems, and are by no means peculiar to the Yoga. They obtain equal prominence among the Jains and the Buddhists; the latter call them Piaramités. Using the term restraint, for Yama, I have found it necessary for the sake of English idiom and uniformity of expression to use the roundabout form of abstinence from false- CHAPTER SECOND. 93 hood, &c., instead of the direct positive terms veracity (satya), &c., which the text employs. They form the ground-work without which no religious superstructure is possible. ] He points out a peculiarity of these. XXXI. These are the great austerities of all stages, irrespec- tive of kind, locality, time, and compact. “ Kind” (742), such as Braéhmanhood (conf. ante, p. 71). ५८ Locality” (desa), such as particular sacred pools, &c. ‘‘ Time” (kala), such as the fourteenth lunation and the like. ‘ Compact” (samaya), the requirement of a Brahmana, &c. These are called the great austerities (makdvratas). They are imperative in all conditions or stages of the thinking principle, “ irrespective” (anavachchhinna) of these four conditions of kind, &c., 2. ९., it does not mean that “I shall not kill a Bréhmana,” “T shall not kill any one in a sacred pool,” “TI shall commit no slaughter on the 14th lunation,” ^ [ shall not kill except for gods, Bréhmanas, &c.,”’ implying four specific conditions, but that “I shall not for any purpose whatsoever, kill any one at any place, at any time.” The others should be explained in the same way. Thus, when these practices are universal, without any qualification, they are called “ great austerities.” Their interrupted observance is not so. {The purport is that these restraints should be observed with reference to all kinds of being, at every place, at all times, and under every circumstance, without any qualification whatsoever. The object of adverting to ^^ compact” is to leave no room for religious sacrifices, such as the Vedas enjoin. They are, in the estimation of the Yogi, as objectionable as unauthorised slaughter. ] He next describes obligation. XXXII. The obligations are purification, contentment, penance, study, and devotion to the Lord. {)-} APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. “ Purification” ($aucha) is of two kinds, external and internal. External (vd4ya) means the washing of the body with earth, water, &c. The internal (aztara) is the washing, by means of friendliness and the like, of all dirt from the thinking principle. “Contentment” (santoska) contentedness. The others have already been explained. These, purification and the rest, are indicated by the term niyama, “ obligation.” [These obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise. They must be attended to very carefully as much to prepare oneself for the performance of the Yoga, as for the well- being of ordinary worldly life. ] How these are accessories to the Yoga, he next explains, XXXITI. By the exclusion of the questionable the thought of its opposite (18 acquired ). (Those things which) cause doubts or questioning are ^“ ques- tionables” (Vitarka), and these, including slaughter and the like, are inimical to the follower of Yoga. When they are obstructed or excluded by the thought of their opposites, then Yoga becomes easily achievable, and the restraints and obligations consequently become accessories to Yoga. [The restraints keep one from the performance of certain ques- tionable acts, and the obligations train one habitually to avoid the questionables, and thereby the thinking principle is prepared for undisturbed concentration in the performance of the Yoga. The restraints and the obligations necessarily become accessories to the Yoga, and are therefore so called.] Now he successively describes the natures, the distinctions, the varieties, the causes, and the fruits of the questionables. XXXIV. The questionables are slaughter and the rest. (Whether) they are done, caused to be done, or abet- ted; (whether) preceded by longing, anger or delu- CHAPTER SECOND. 95 sion; (whether) slight, moderate or excessive; they have pain and ignorance for their endless fruits. Hence (the necessity) of the thought of opposites. The aforesaid slaughter and the rest are first divided into three kinds, ४८८.) done, caused to be done, and abetted. Thereof those which are accomplished by oneself are “done” (krita). Those which follow from orders to the effect ^ १० them,” “ they should be done,” are caused to be done kirita). Those which, on being accomplished by others, are encouraged by (the saying) “ well done, well done,” are “abetted” (anumodita). These three forms are described to prevent mistakes respecting them ; other- wise a dull-witted person might fancy, “ the slaughter has not been completed by me, so no fault rests on me.” To indicate their causes he says, ^^ proceeded by longing, anger, or delusion.” Although longing and anger are first noticed, yet since delusion, which is characterised by its accepting that to be soul which is not soul, the source of all pains, and since longing and anger arise from distinctions about differences of relation as to one’s own or another, delusion should be known to be the root, ४. €. all faults proceed from antecedent delusion. ‘ Longing” (lobha)) is thirst. ^^ Anger” (krodfa) is an inflammatory func- tion of the thinking principle, which sets aside all sense of dis- crimination about what is proper and what isimproper. Each of these is threefold, according as it is distinguished by being done, caused to be done, &c., and slaughter and the rest are divisible into these according as they are caused by delusion, &c. They are again divided into three kinds according as they are “ mild, moderate, and excessive.” ^“ Mild,” (manda) are slow, 2. e., neither excessive nor moderate. The “ moderate” (madhya- ma) are neither mild nor excessive. The ^ excessive” (adhi- mitra) are ardent, neither mild nor moderate. Thus there are nine kinds, and these being three-fold the total becomes twenty-seven. Again, of the mild &c., each being divisible according as it 18 mild, moderate and excessive, becomes 96 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. threefold. The combination to be made as it becomes appro- priate; thus mildly mild (mridu-mridu) “ mildly moderate” (mridu-madhya), ^^ mildly ardent,” (mridu-tivra). Their fruits he describes (by the words) “having pain and ignorance for endless fruits.” Pain (21602) is a function of the quality of foulness, manifesting itself in the form of repugnance. ५८ Tenorance” (ajndna) is false knowledge in the form of doubt or error, Their fruits are indicated by (the compound term) duhkhajndnananta-phaléh. From such pain and ignorance pro- ceed “ endless” (ananta) unintermitting fruit. What is enjoined is that these should be overcome by the Yogi, who has known their nature, cause, &c. by thinking on their opposites. [The works condemned by the restraints and the obligations have been lumped together under the name of questionable (Vitar- ka) for easy treatment, and then their natures, distinctions, varieties and fruits are generally described. They call for no explanatory remark. | In order to explain how perfections arise successively by ardent exercise of these (duties) he says: XXXV. When non-slaughter is confirmed (there is) near him abandonment of enmity. In the neighbourhood of him who is confirmed in non- slaughter there is “abandonment of enmity” (vairatydya), or harmless abidance even on the part of the naturally cruel, such as of serpents and mungooses. The meaning is, those that are addicted to injury, give up their injurious nature. [The purport is obvious. When the restraint from slaughter has been acquired there cannot exist any feeling of enmity, and, naturally hostile individuals, having acquired it, live in peace and harmony, like serpents and mungooses, which are naturally hostile to each other, and yet under the influence of the virtue may dwell together without injuring each other.] CHAPTER SECOND. 97 He next describes what becomes of him who practices veracity. XXXVI. In the confirmed in veracity (there is) asylum of the fruit of works. “Works” (kriydh) are the sacrifices, which, when performed, yield the fruits heaven, &c. The Yogi who practices veracity rises to such greatness that he attains the fruits without per- forming those works, and at his bidding they may be attained by any one soever, without performing those works. Such is the meaning. [Veracity or abstinence from falsehood is here described ४० be as meritorious as the sacrificial rites enjoined in the Vedas; 2, e., by practising veracity with unswerving faith one acquires the same merit which the sacrifices yield, and that without its being tainted by the cruelty which attends sacrifices. The P. Bhashya explains that he becomes virtuous, and as a virtuous person attains heaven (which is the reward of virtuous works), and his speech becomes fruitful. (Dharmika bhiiyd iti bhavati. Dhar- mikah svargam prapnuhiti svargam prapnoti, amoghdsya vidg- ९6८०4४2.) ] He now describes the reward of him who abstains from theft. XXXVIT. Jewels from all sides approach him who is confirmed in abstinence from theft. When a Yogi practices abstinence from theft, and that absti- nence rises to a high pitch, jewels from all sides come to him without his wishing them. [The object here is to show that what may be acquired with great trouble by theft, may be had unsought by scrupulous abstinence from theft. ] The fruit of continence he next describes. 13 98 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. XXXVIIL. Attainment of vigour in confirmed continence. Whoever steadfastly practices continence obtains, on its attain- ing its highest pitch, “‘ vigour” (virya), or manly power comes in him. Conservation of manly vigour is continence, and on its attaining a high degree, vigour comes in plenty in the body, the organs and the mind. (The meaning is that there is always a 1088 of vigour by in- continence, and therefore the Yogi should abstain from it in order to conserve his vigour. | He next points out the fruit of non-covetousness. XXXIX. On non-covetousness being confirmed there 18 conscience of all about births. The word sathantd is the abstract form of katham ‘ what,’ or ‘what all about,’ and janma-kathantd means all about births, and the full knowledge thereof is its ‘conscience’ (sambodha). The meaning is that he knows all about the questions, ‘ What was I in a former birth? Who was 1? What did I do?” Covetousness is not confined to objects of enjoyment ; it extends to the soul’s desire to have a body, for that too is covetousness, since the body is needed for enjoyment. And such being the case, the knowledge of principles cannot prevail, while the inclinations are disposed outwards from the excess of the quality of foulness, Now, when on giving up all desire for the body and the rest, an indifference is attained, then to the indifferent being, devoid of foulness, an acquaintance with all past and future existences becomes a cause of thorough knowledge. (The reward here spoken of is transcendental ; it enables the observer of abstinence from all covetousness to see by his mental eye all that has happened to him in former births, and what will happen hereafter. ] Having thus described the perfections of the restraints, he now describes the obligations, CHAPTER SECOND. 99 XL. From purity (proceed) loathing for one’s own members, and non-intercourse with others. For him who practises purity there is a “ loathing” (jugupsd) or detestation produced for even the members of his own body from discrimination of their nature and cause. (The idea then 18) ^“ This body is impure, no fondness for it should be cherished.” And for the same reason there results a ^^ non-intercourse,”? (asansarga) absence of relationship, or avoidance of mixing with “others,” (paraih), ४. e., with other embodied persons. This is the meaning. How can he who loaths his own body from per- ceiving its this or that fault, wish to have intercourse with other bodies of the same description ? [The purity as defined in the commentary on A, XXXII. (p. 94) is obviously confined to contact with dirt and conscious- ness of the body being naturally impure. Here the latter phase is magnified to the extent of making the embodied loath his own body, and @ fortiorari all bodies. ] He describes other fruits of purity. XLI. Moreover, purification of goodness, complacency, concentration, subjugation of the organs, and fitness for beholding soul. (The words) “are produced” are required to complete the sentence. ^ Goodness” (sattva) consists of light, joy, &c. Its purification, is its not being oppressed (or overcome) by the qualities of foulness and darkness. ‘ Complacency” (sawmanasya) is mental satisfaction from non-perception of distress. ^ Con- centration” (ekdgratd) is fixedness of the thinking principle on any sensuous object to which it may be directed. ^ Subjuga- tion of the organs” (indriyajaya) is the abidance in themselves of the organs diverted from their objects. ‘Fitness of behold- 100 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. ing soul” (d¢madarsanayogyatva) is the adaptation of the thinking principle to do so on the manifestation of knowledge. To one who is practised in purity these, purification of goodness and the rest, successively manifest themselves. Thus, from purity comes purification of goodness; from purification of goodness, complacency ; from complacency, concentration ; from concentration, subjugation of the organs; from subjugation of the organs, fitness to behold soul. {This aphorism is the sequel of the preceding one; it enu- merates advantages in addition to those previously described. The advantages noted are of obvious import. ] The fruit of exercising contentment. XLII. From contentment, (proceeds) superlative felicity. From contentment becoming excessive such internal felicity arises for the Yogi, as cannot be equalled by the pleasures of external objects, even to the extent of a hundredth part of it. (The meaning is obvious. } The fruit of austerity. +. Through austerity results the perfection of the body and the organs, from decay of impurity. Through the decay of impurity of the form of distress and the like by the exercise of austerity there arises in the mind a ८ perfection” (szddhz) or superiority of the body and the organs. The meaning 13 this, the afflictions of the thinking principle decay by the performance of Chandrfyana and other fasts. From that decay the organs acquire the power of perceiving the minute, the hidden, and the remote, and the body (the power of assuming) at pleasure the form of a molecular, or great mag- nitude. CHAPTER SECOND. 101 [Briefly the purport of the aphorism is that by attaining perfection in austerity, a Yogi acquires transcendental powers ; his organs are then able to grasp all kinds of objects, whether they be so minute as not to be ordinarily perceivable by the senses, or so hidden as not to be accessible to the senses, or so remote as to be beyond their range. The reference to the Chandrayana is a mere illustration, the object is to imply austerity generally, and not to such only as are enjoined as penances. The object is not penance or expia- tion for sins committed, but the general mortification of the flesh. | The fruit of muttering. XLIV. Through muttering results the cognition of the desiderated deity. . On the perfection of “ muttering” (sddhydya) characterised by the repetition or the like of a selected mantra, there results a cognition on the part of the Yogi of the deity desiderated : the meaning is that that deity becomes visible to him. [The word svddhydaya means the study of the Vedas, but here it is used in the technical sense of muttering or inaudibly re- peating a great many timesany selected mantra. This is closely analogous to the counting of the rosary. | The fruit of contemplating on the Lord. XLV. Meditation is completed through the contemplation of the Lord. Whoever is thus devoted tv the Lord, in bim “ meditation’’ (samadhi) of the kind described (C1 AL.) becomes manifest, because that Divine Lord, being pleased, excites meditation by removing all obstructive afflictions (from the way). (The theistical character of Patanjali’s doctrine is here estab- lished by the admission that the divinity may, when contem- 102 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. plated, help to promote the object of the Yoga. Kapila repndiates the idea. ] Having described the restrictions and the obligations, he now proceeds to describe posture. XLVI. Posture (is that which is) firm and pleasant. “ Posture” (dsana) is that whereby one sits, such as Padmasana, 1081) १६४8०12, Svastikasana, &c. When that seat becomes “ firm” (sthira) or devoid of agitation, and ^^ pleasant” (suka) or not uncomfortable, then it is reckoned as an accessory of the Yoga. (The word dsana ordinarily implies the material adapted for sitting upon, such as a rug, a mat, a board, a chair, or the like, but here it has been used for particular modes or attitudes of sitting, and therefore I have translated it into posture and not seat. The aphorism re- commends such postures as ensure steadiness and comfort; but the postures as described in other works do not convey to a worldly under- standing any such idea. Brahmdnanda, in his commentary on the Hathapradipika, says that Vasishtha, Yajnavalkya and other ancient sages had described 84 postures as appropriate for Yogis, and that Siva, the greatest of Yogis, was their author. He adds that Gorak- shanatha, a Yogi of a later date, but of great renown, reckoned the total number of appropriate postures at 84,00,000. (Chaturass- tilakshdni cha taduktam Gorakshandthena.) Of the 84 some are common, some are more important. Svatmardma, in the Hathapra- dipiké, describes ten as ^^ more important” for the performance of the Hathayoga. These are called, 1, Svastika ; 2, Gomukka ; 3, Vira; 4, Kurma; 5, Kukkuta; 6, Utténa-kirmaka ; 7, Dhanuh; 8, Hat- syandtha ; 9, Maytira; 10, Sava. The most important ones are: 1, Siddha alias Muktia alias Gupta; 2, Padma; 3, Sitha; 4, Bhadra alias Goraksha. The P. Bhdshya does not enter into any detail, but names the following as examples, viz., 1, Padma or lotus; 2, Vira or heroic; 3, Bhadra or decent; 4, Svastika or the mystic diagram so called ; 5, Danda or staff-like ; 6, Sopdsraya or self-reliant ; 7, Pary- afka or bedstead-like ; 8, Krauicha-nisidana or like the posture of the seated heron; 9, Hastz-nishidana or seated elephant; 10, Ushtra- CHAPTER SECOND. 103 nishidana or seated camel ; 11, Samasansthdna or evenly poised. The following are brief accounts of the ways in which the postures are assumed. 1. Padmdsana. The right foot should be placed on the left thigh, and the left foot on the right thigh; the hands should be crossed, and the two great toes should be firmly held thereby ; the chin should be bent down on the chest; and in this posture the eyes should be directed to the tip of the nose. It is called Padmdsana, and 18 highly beneficial in overcoming all diseases,* 2. Vérdsana. Place each foot under the thigh of its side, and it will produce the heroic posture Virdsana.t 3. Bhadrdsana. Place the hands in the form of a tortoise in front of the scrotum, and under the feet and this is Bhadrdsana.f[ = 4, Svastikdsana. Sitting straight with the feet placed under the (opposite) thighs is called Svastikasana.§ 5. Dandisana. Seated with the fingers grasping the ankles brought together and with feet placed extended on the legs. || 6. Sinhdsana. Let the ankles be placed under the testes, the left ankle on the right side of the suture (the mesian line) and the right on the left side of the suture; let the hands placed on the knees, and the fingers extended; let the mouth be wide open, and the sight be directed to the tip of the nose while one is in deep contem- * वामेरूपरि cfawy चरपा dary aa aur दच्तारूपरि afgaa विधिना wat कराभ्यां दढ | ङे हदये निधाय चिवकं नासाप्रसालाकये- देतद्वयाश्विनाश्कारि यमिनां पद्मासनं TET ॥ † एकपाद्‌ तचेकसिम्‌ विम्बसेदुरणि faa | wafegigar St वीरा सनभिती रितं ॥ { awer च टषशस्याधः सीवन्याः Wea चिपेत्‌। सव्यमरूफं तथा सये Tam दशि पाञ्चपादा च पाणिभ्यां ढं वद्धा मुनिं | भद्रासनं भवेदेतत्‌ सव्वयाभिविनाश्रनं ॥ § खानृव्वारनरे सम्यक्‌ रत्वा पाद तले उभे । waar समासीनः afaa तन्‌ प्रचखते ॥ || suf faersfeat चिषगदफा भूमिशिषटजङ्धोड्पाद्‌ा sera दण्डासनमन्यसेत्‌। 104 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. plation ; and it will produce the lion posture Sithdsana, the adored of all Yogis.* 7. Put the right ankle on the left side of the chest, and similarly the left ankle on the right side, and the posture will be Gomukha, or of the shape of a cow’s mouth.t 8. Closing the anus with the two ankles crossed while the mind is under control, produces, say the knowers of Yoga, the tortoise pos- ture, Kurmasana.{ 9. Having established the lotus posture, if the hands be passed between the thigh and the knees and placed on the earth so as to lift the body aloft, it will produce the Fowl seat, Kukkufdsana.§ | 10. Having assumed the fowl posture, should the two hands be placed on the sides of the neck it would make the posture like that of the tortoise upset; itis called upset tortoise posture, Uttdnakurmaka- sana. || 11. Hold the great toes with the hands, and draw them to the ears as in drawing a bowstring, and this is called the bow posture, Dhanurdsana.§ 12. Place the right foot on the roof of the left thigh, surround the right knee with the left, foot, and sit with the body twisted, and it will result in the Matsyandthdsana or posture Matsyandatha.** TVET च दषष्पस्याधः Vtaanr: पाश्चैयाः feta । दिशे Gare द्खगब्फन GIA ॥ खले तु जान्वोः संस्था awe: सं्रसाय्ये a | arTwag faced मासाप्रं सुखमाड्ितः fewer भवेदेतत्‌ पजितं यो गिपङ्गवेः ॥ † स्ये द्िरगरुफन छप ख नियोजयेत्‌ । दखिणऽपि तथा ga drag गेमखाश्ति॥ { गदं निदध्य गख्फाभ्यां युतक्रमश समाडहितः। gated भवेदेतदिति यमव विदुः ॥ § पष्मासनक Gang लानृष्वारक्रे करा | निवेश्च भूमा संख्याय Waa कुष्टासनं ॥ ॥ कष्षटाषमबन्भख्े। Way सम्बध्य कन्धरां | UA ङूश्मवदुलमेाभवेदुसागङ्कम्मकं ॥ ¶ पादाङ््टो तु पाशिभ्यां zeta अवशावधि। WAU कुय्यादनरासममश्यते॥ »#*% जामाद्मललापितदच्पादं जानेवेद्डिवदहिलवामपाङं | aww तिष्ठेत्‌ परिग्तिताङः ओौमक्छ्माये।दिलमासमं तत्‌ ॥ CHAPTER SECOND. 105 18. Mayurdsana. Hold the earth with both hands placing the elbows on the sides of the navel, and keep the body erect like a staff: this is called the Maytrdsana or peacock posture.* 14. Siddhdsana. Place the left ankle onthe membrum virile, and thereupon put the right ankle, and it completes the Siddhdsana.t Besides these A’sanas, Yogis have a great many postures or ges- tures which they reckon under the name of Mudrd, to which, how- ever, no mention is made here in the text. In Tantric rituals the technical difference between an A’sana and a Mudré depends upon the organs employed. An A’sana or seat is by its very nature connected with the disposition of the lower limbs, whereas the Mudrd depends upon the motion of the upper limbs; and in the Tantras all symbols produced by twining the fingers or placing the hands in particular positions are recognised as Mudrds. The Yogis have also some Mudras of the same kind; but in their more important Mudras the distinction is entirely lost sight of, and hands and feet alike come into play to produce the A’sanas as well as the Mudrds. The great and most remarkable distinctive character of the Mudra appears, however, to be its connection with the regulation of breath. The Gheranda 6८244८4 describes in all twenty-five Mudras, and the Hathadipiké recognises ten of these as the most important ‘in warding off decay and death,” (jardmaranandsanam.) These are — 1 Mabdmudra; 2, Mahabandha; 3, Mahadvedha; 4, Khechari; 5, Uddiyana; 6, Mila- bandha; 7, Jalandhara; 8, Viparita-karani ; 9, Vajroni; 10, S‘akti- chdlana.{ The following are brief descriptions of these gesticulations and of the advantages to be derived from them: 1. Mahdmudrd. Pressing the perineum by the heel of the left foot, the right foot should be extended, and then held fast by the two # अरामवद्टभ्य aceaa waacenitararirara: | ख्वासमादण्डबदुत्वितः स्यात्‌ मरमेतत्‌ भवद्नति पीदं ॥ † मेढादुपरि विन्यस्य oa aaa तथाररि। मरफ मारश्च farfgu सिदधासनमिद्‌ं भवेत्‌ ॥ ‡ महामुद्रा म्ाबन्धामरावेधश्च खेचरी | खङ्खीयानं मूलबन्धा भन्ने जाङन्भराभिधः ॥ करशी विपरीता व्ोशौ क्ियालनं। US डि मद्रादश्कं जरासरकनाष्नं। 14 106 APHQRISMS OF PATANJALI. hands. Then closing the throat the wind should be held above. Even as a snake struck by a staff stretches like a staff, so the coiled S‘akti (breath) saddenly becomes straight, for then she is in a state of dying in the two nostrils. Then the wind should be discharged steadily, but not forcibly. The wisest of the wise call this Mahdmudra.* 2. Mahdbandha. Let the heel of the left foot be put under the perineum, and the right foot on the left thigh, and, having drawn io breath, let the chin be pressed hard on the chest, and the wind be held fast in the heart. After holding the wind as long as one is able, let it be slowly expired. When the expiration is complete, let the operation be repeated on the right side. (This shows that the breath in the first instance should be drawn by the left nostril.) 8. Mahdvedha. While performing the Mahdbandha should the Yogi effect the suppression of the breath in the Khechari style by closing the passage of the wind by the throat Mudr&, and then, putting the hands evenly on the ground, drive the wind slowly to- wards the buttocks, it is Mahdvedha.t * महाद्रा | पद्मूरेन वामेन at संपीय दिकं | प्रसारितं पदं शला acral चारवेदुढं ४ ष्ठे बन्धं CHT चारयेदायमूदधतः। यथा दष्डतः खप।दष्डाकारः प्रायवे ॥ wate तथा जकः कुष्ठी ससा भवेत्‌ । लदा खा मरुरावख्या जायते दिपडाश्नया॥ तनः WH: WHE रेचयेतच्ेव वमतः | मडामुब्राखतेगेव वदनि विषुचोात्तमाः॥ † मडाबन्धः। पाग्डि are पादस यआनिखाने नियाजवयेत्‌ | वामेोखू्यरि संख्याप दथिशं चरणं तथा ॥ पूरथिल्वा तनोबार' Wea चिवकं इडं । निष्पीय बायमाङुभ्वा attaw निाजयेत्‌ ५ जारयिला यथा्द्ि Tea hay wa: | UNF तु समभ्यस्य Ta पनरभ्धसेत्‌ ॥ {† awee | मराबन्धख्ितायोगी war परकमेकधीः | grant मतिमाष्टत्य ferzad कष्डमद्रया ॥ खमस्यम । भूमा Fars सन्ताङुयब्डमेः | पड्दवमतिक्रम्ब ae echt मध्यमः CHAPTER SECOND. T07 4. Khecharé. When the tongue is reversed and pressed into the thollow of the head and the sight is fixed at a spot in the middle of the two eyebrows, the posture is called Khechari.* 5. Uddiydnabandha is that posture in which the wind flies upwards by the susamné vessel frum the right side of the belly above the navel.t 6. Mulabandha. When the heel is pressed against the perineum, the anus is contracted, and the Apéna wind is by force directed up- wards, it is Mulabandha.t 7. Jdlandharabandha. When the throat is contracted and the chin is pressed hard on the chest it is Jélandhara posture, the de- atroyer of decay and death.§ सामद्धय्याग्रिसम्बन्भाजायते चादताय ® | तावद्या sang ततावाय' विरेष्वयेत्‌ | म्ावेधऽयमम्धाखाग्मासिद्धिप्रदायकः * wed । sarge खिदा प्रविष्टा विषरीतम। भवो रकागताहहिमं द्रा भवति Get ॥ RATT: कणां ऋमेकावदेवे्ावत्‌ | खा यावत्‌ मध्यं ष्यति तदा खेचरीख्दिः aaiquindt we gareafquruafaad | t sytarraa: | षन्धोयेन चुषन्नायाः sree glad यतः | ABS SIA TeN SS मेजिनिः THEE A: ॥ wylt कुरते यद्याद विषानौ aurea: | Sytarat aga gray बग्ोऽभिषीयते॥ wet पिमं तानं qe GY कारयेत्‌ । ङी यानोद्धसो बन्धोदत्युमासङ्गकशरी ४ ‡ पाग्डिंभानेन gate यानिमाङच्येदुगदं। पानमद्ध माछष्य मरुबन्भोऽभिषी यते ॥ अथेमतिमप।नं बे wage कुरते वलात्‌ | च्धाकुच्चनेन तं sage fy भागिनः § जाखन्धरबन्धः। कष्डमाङुच्चा इदये सापयेशिवकं इ GATING waa aaa ॥ 108 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. 8. Viparitakarant. Place the sun (expiratory air) above, just below the hard palate, and the moon (inspiratory air) below, just above the navel, and the Viparitakarani is completed. It promotes hunger, &c., &c.* 9. Vajront. The exercise by which the several secretions are drawn upwards is so called.f 10. WSaktichdlana. Seated in the Vajrasana posture, let the feet be held firm by the hands and the anus be pressed by the heels, then putting the air in motion by the bellows of the chest, let it be suddenly stopped, and, contracting the forehead, let the wind be * we मामेरधसाराङद्धं भानुरधः wat | करशौ विपरीताष्टया Tena रभ्यते ॥ नित्यमभ्धासमन्नस्य nzufgfaafeat | QUCUISYAGY सम्पाद्यः Viuag F ii अर्या र।यदि wiafgeufa तत्‌खशात्‌। अधःभिरासखद्धंपादः चरं स्पात्‌ प्रथमे दिने॥ aay किञ्िदधिकमम्यसेख fra far afed carga Wart ema | मासमाजनत Uta स्त कारुजित्‌ a + weet) खेच्छया ब्तमानेाऽपि BAR नियनैवना। awaret या विखामाति स याभी सिखिभाञनः॥ लय वङ्इयं वच्छे cud यस्य कस्यचित्‌। wices दितीयनक मारी च anafiat ॥ मेखनेम गनः सम्यम्‌ दाङकुचंनमम्बषेत्‌। परचाऽप्यथवा मारी वद्लोशीणिदडिमान्नयात॥ पतः शस्तनाल्तेव फत्कार yas | नः णनः THALA वायस्चछारकारशात्‌॥ Mihi पत दिन्द मभ्यासेनद्धं AV | afeay निजं विन्दमदमाषष्य रखयत्‌ ॥ ewaifeqratifeagrar मेद waa: | was मदय fafeu cama ॥ वख्मोीमथयनायु खं Sa: खाङ्गरेपनं | QIAN: CAAT सक्रव्यापारयाः wera ॥ CHAPTER SECOND. 109 directed that way for two muhirtas and when it comes to the susumn& yessel, stop it and this is S’aktichdlana. (Loosely translated.)* According to some the Bandhas, on distinct form the Mudras, (Cf. N.C. Pal’s treatise on the Yoga.) Treating of a system of philosophy Patanjali bas not thought proper to enter into details, regarding age, sex, caste, food, dwelling, — &c. as bearing upon Yoga, but other works supply information about them to a considerable extent. A few notes derived therefrom may not be unfitly added here. The first question that would arise would be—who are fit to perform the Yoga ? On this subject the Hatha- pradiptkd fixes no limit. It says, “by the practice of Yoga, every one may attain perfection, whether he be youthful, or old, or very old, or diseased, or decrepit.”t The next point is the selection of a proper place, “ A small monastery, a dwelling not larger than a cube of six feet, situated in an out-of-the-way place where there is no danger within a circuit of a bow, of hail, fire and water, in a country abounding in food and free from danger of wars and the like, where religion prevails, ina thriving kingdom,” is the most appropriate. The cell or mathikeé should have a small door and no window; it should be free from holes, cavities, inequalities, high steps and low descents; it should be smeared with cow-dung, devoid of dirt, not infested by ver- min, with a terrace in front, a good well, and the whole surrounded by a wall. Dwelling in such a place, avoiding all anxieties, the Yogi should follow the path pointed out by his teachers in the exercise of * gf reared पादो कराभ्यां धारयेष्ढं । मु््फरेऽमीपे च कन्दं तज Saga ui aqreafaaraat चालयिना च कुण्डलीं | कुय्यादमनन्रं wei कुष्ठी माश बे धयेत्‌॥ भानाराकुशनं कुय्ये त्‌ कुण्डलो चालयेशतः | व्त्युवक्कनतस्यापि तस्य QUAY कुतः ॥ सुकरं इयपय्येकं faded चालनादसो | द्धं माष्टष्यते fated चुष्कायां सरुद्गता।॥ वेन gafeat wan पुषन्ाया सुखं भवं । HAVA AAT TTY एषनां व्रजि खतः | { यवा बृदधोतिषुदधोवा बाधितोदुवेलाऽपि वा। & = a अभ्यासात्‌ सिदिमाननाति सब्वेयोगेष तन्तं ॥ 110 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. the Yoga.* He should avoid all excess of food, violent exertions, and vain disputations. His food should consist of wheat, sali rice, barley, Shashti rice (or that which matures in six days), the syama and the 0015818 grains, milk, clarified butter, coarse or candied sugar, butter, honey, ginger, palval, fruits, five kinds of greens, mung pulse, and water,’’ and all soothing sweet things in a moderate quantity, avoid- ing flesh-meat and too much salt, acids, and all stale, putrid, decomposed or acrid substances. The quantity of food taken should be such ae to leave one-fourth of his appetite unappeased.f He describes the means of making the seat firm and pleasant. XLVII. Through slightness of effort and attainment of the infinite. The construction of the sentence is that through slightness of effort and through attainment of the infinite the seat becomes firm and pleasant. When the wish is formed, ‘I shall adopt this posture,’ and that posture is accomplished even with “ slightness of effort,” 4. ¢., without difficulty, and when the thinking principle is reposited in the infinity of space or the like, and by understanding it becomes of it, then from absenoe of the body and of egotism the posture does not become painful. When this controul over posture is accomplished agitations of the body and such other obstructives to meditation do not arise. * qo urfae en gira निरूपद्रवे | wasarecare firenfirereafera ॥ CATH Afsatawy qtaa खटयामिन | अर्पहारमर भमत विवरं नात्यु्नीचं च यत्‌ ua मामयसाशिप्नमररूं fread मितं | वाद्ये मंडपवेदिङ्कपदच्िरं प्राकारसंवेहितं Ie योाममरस्य रशरुभिदः सिदे खेठाम्यासिभिः t मेथमधाण्डियववाहिकन्यभनानं खीराग्यश्ंडनवनीतखितामचनि | शऋएंटिपडालकफशादिकपचध्ाकं भद्रदिदिबमटकं च यमीन्धरपर््यं॥ सुखिर्धमधराडहारखतु थां गविवजिंतः। भण्यते farsi मिताहारः स उश्यते ॥ कश्च तीच्ण र वराग्याङरीत शाकं सेवीरतेरतिलघषेपमखमतश्वाम्‌ | अजदिमांसद्पितनङुरत्य कार पिष्ाकडिगर षएएनाद्मयथ्यमाङः ॥ CHAPTER SECOND. 111 {The object here is to point out that when by practice one becomes able to assume any position at will, without any diffi- culty, and, adverting to the dogma that the thinking princi- ple assumes the form of the object it thinks of, when by thinking on any infinite object, such as the sky, it becomes itself infinite, it feels no pain or uneasiness in assuming any posture, however painful it may otherwise be. The means of attaining firmness of seat thus are practice and the contemplation of bound- less objects. ] A fruit thereof when accomplished. XLVIITI. Thereupon non-embarrasment by the pairs. The meaning is that on the controul of posture being accom- plished, the Yogi is no longer oppressed or embarrased by the pairs, 3. ¢., cold and heat, hunger and thirst, and the like. (This is the ultimate fruit of attaining perfection in assuming the different postures above adverted to. | Having thus described how to controul the postures he describes regulation of breath. XLIX. On its being accomplished the regulation of breath (which is) interruption in the flow of inspiration and expiration. On posture becoming firm that auxiliary of the Yoga which is regulation of breath and of which firmness of posture is the cause, should be practised. How is it characterised by the interruption in the flow of. inspiration and expiration? Inspiration and expiration have been already defined (B. I. A. xxxiv.) The “ interruption” (vichchheda) or stoppage of the twofold “ flow” (gatz) or current in places outside and inside produced by means of expelling or filling of the breath is called Pranaydma or regulation of breath. 112 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. {Here the true Praynéy4ma is accepted to be the interruption or break in the flow of the breath. The inspiration and the expiration are the functions of which the stoppage is the most effectual act for the attainment of perfect meditation. It is called Aumbhaka, or quiescence, and the longer it is sustained the more proficient becomes the Yogi. When perfect controul has been attained in this respect, the Yogi can live buried under earth for months and years without peforming any organic function whatever. | For its better understanding, he describes its nature after showing its distinctions. L. That, again, is an external, an internal, and a stationary function; it is divided by place, time, and number; it is protracted or subtile. The “external function” of breath is expiration, or expulsion of the breath outward (१८८१८९४). The “ internal function” is in- spiration or filling in (४7212), The function of stoppage inside is kumbhaka. Because the vital air at that time remains quiescent or motionless, as water in a jar, (17060) therefore that condition is called kumbiaka. This regulation of breath is of three kinds, according as it is specialised by space (des’a), “time” (kala), and “ number” (52106). It is also “ protracted”’ (dirgha), or “subtile” (sukh- ma). It is especialised by place, as (when we say) “ twelve distant from the nose,” meaning as far as twelve fingers from the nose. It is specialised by time, as (when we say) “ of the duration of thirty-six instants.” It is specialised by ^ number,” when (we say) “many times done.” By these inspirations and expirations the first udghata is produced, and to know this a numeral figure has to be used. Udghdta is the striking of the head by the wind propelled upward from the navel. CHAPTER SECOND. 113 (The object of this aphorism is to describe the Préndy&ma. It is an operation which includes the three functions of inspira- tion, quiescence, and expiration. The breath must be drawn in ` first before it can be retained within; the retention cannot last long, and so after a time there must be an expiration. The first and the third, however, are regulated by the capacity of the lungs, and by the time necessary for the expulsion of a given quantity of air, and cannot be much modified, and the second alone, there- fore, concerns the Yogi most, for he can controul it to a consider- able extent, and hence it is held to be the most important element of the Pranfyama; not unoften, as in the last preceding apho- rism, it alone is described as the Pranayéma. The threefold operation is specialized by the time devoted to each operation, by the extent of space from which the breath is drawn, by the number of times it is repeated, by the period for which it has been practised, and by the subtility or grossness of the operation. The operation of udghdéa is mysterious. I cannot find out from any work or person how the internal air is made to strike parti- cular internal organs. | Having described the three members of the regulation of breath, he, with a view to enunciate a fourth, says :— LI. The fourth is dependant on the recognition of the outer and the inner spheres. _ ©The outer sphere” (véhya-vishaya) of the breath extends far as twelve (fingers) from the nose. The “inner sphere” (dbhyantara- vishaya) is represented by the heart, the navel and the like. That quiescence or stoppage of motion, (which ensues) on recog- nising or taking into consideration these two is the “ fourth” regulation of breath (prandydma). Its difference from the third form, called kumbhaka, is this : The latter without taking any note of the outer and the inner spheres suddenly assumes quiescence, 15 114 APHORISMS OF PATANJALTI. like a lotus falling on a hot stone, while this is a stoppage which results from a recognition of the two spheres. This, like the preceding, should be known to be divisible according to place, time and number. (This is purely intellectual, and involves no change in the order of the operation. It is the same operation, but performed intelligently. ] He now describes the fruit of the fourth kind. LIT. Thereby is removed the covering of light. “Thereby,” ४. ९.) by that fourth form of regulation of breath, . the “covering” (dvarana) of the form of afflictions which envelope the “light” (prakds’a} which is the thinking principle abiding in the quality of goodness, is destroyed. This is the meaning. [The purport is that this fourth form of Pranay4ma is specially useful in removing all those ideas of pain and suffering which are ordinarily associated with the thinking principle. } Another fruit. LIII. The mind’s fitness for steadiness. ५ Steadiness” (dhdrand) will be defined presently (B. पा, A. 1.) The mind (mamas), divested of its defects through the instru- mentality of these forms of regulation of breath, remains fixed to whatever it is applied, and does not suffer from distractions. (Here the word manas has been used as a synonym of chzéia, thinking principle). He gives the definition of abstraction. LIV. Abstraction is the assumption by the senses of the original nature of the thinking principle, from want of application to their respective objects. CHAPTER SECOND. 115 That by which the senses are abstracted, or from a feeling of opposition, withdrawn from their respective objects, is Abstrac- tion (pratydhara). How that may be effected is thus explained. Of vision and the other senses the respective objects are form and the rest. “Application” (samprayoga) to them is advancing towardsthem. The want of such advance is the forsaking of them and abiding in their original nature. When that forsaking is effected the senses become the imitators of the original nature of the thinking principle. Since the senses follow the thinking principle as do bees their king, they all become of ite nature. Thus when the thinking principle is subdued these become abstracted. [The natural tendency of the senses is outwards, towards the objects which are designed for their entertainment, and the great object of the Yoga is to divert them from those objects, in order to bring them to a focus in the thinking principle. When this is effected they cease to act, and are restored to the natural state of the thinking principle of which they are emanations. That natural state, again, is quiescence, and con- sequently the senses become quiescent, and this is their abstracted state. ] Having described abstraction, which is the imitation of the nature of the thinking principle by the senses, he now describes the fruit of the act. LV. Thence the complete subjugation of the senses. The meaning is—that by the practice of abstraction the senses come so completely under controul that do not proceed, according to their natures, outwards to their respective objects even when excited thereto. [The chapter opened by enquiring, what the exercise of the Yoga was, and having described in detail that exercise with all its concomitants, it now closes by describing the fruit of that exer- cise. The fruit is complete subjugation of the senses. | 116 APHORISMS OF PATANJALI. Thus then has been described the practical exercise of the Yoga which forms the theme of the first chapter. The practical Yoga 18 first defined (1), then follow its use (11),in the weakening of the afflictions (111), its origin from ignorance (1v), the definition of ignorance (ए), do. of afflictions (vi to 1x), means of obviating them (x and x1), works, their sources and fruit (x11 to xiv), afflictions, their character and why and how they are to be got rid of (xv to xxvi!), discriminative knowledge (उणा to अका); postures, &c., (उपशा to ना), and the advantages thereof (L111 to Lv). [Not literally translated, but only the substance of the commentary is given here for reasons elsewhere assigned, p. 58. ] Now this Yoga, through restraints and obligations, assumes the form of a seed, which sprouts through postures and regulation of breath, flowers through abstraction, and bears fruit through contemplation, retention and meditation, and these are explain- ed in this chapter on exercise. This is the end of the second quarter, or the quarter on practice, of the commentary entitled Rdjamdrtanga on Patanjali’s institutes of the Yoga, by the great king, the superior king, the illustrious Bhojadeva. CHAPTER SECOND. 117 ADDENDUM. The note on Aphorism xxxrrI on page 94 is calculated to mislead unwary readers. The remark that purification and other obligations are common to all persons, whether Yogis or otherwise, is quite correct with reference to the text. The obligations are as imperative on Yogis as they are on householders, and none should neglect them ; but purification is here taken in its ordinary acceptation, and does not refer to certain peculiar acts of washing or Saucka which some Yogis, particularly the followers of the Hathayoga, recommend. They hold that ordinary washings &c., are not enough. They have accord- ingly devised complicated, and in some respects very repulsive, forms of purification, which they regard as absolutely necessary as prepara- tory steps towards the attainment of fixity of seats. These they de- cribe under the collective name of Shkatkarma or “sixfold work,” as they are reckoned under six different names. These names are—lL., Dhauti ; II, Vasti; III, Nets; IV, Laukiké ; V, Trdétaka, and VI, Kapdlabhdti.* These are variously subdivided by the Gheranda Saf- hitd, the Niruttara Tantra, the A’diydmala the Brahmaydmla, the Grahaydmala, the Rudraydmala, the Sivasanthitd, and other Tantras. I shall follow the first in the following notes : I. Dhauti means washing, and it is known under four different names according to the parts of the body to which it is applied. These are, lst,