This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world’s books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that’s often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book’s long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

+ **Make non-commercial use of the files** We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.

+ **Refrain from automated querying** Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google’s system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.

+ **Maintain attribution** The Google “watermark” you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.

+ **Keep it legal** Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can’t offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book’s appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google’s mission is to organize the world’s information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world’s books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at [http://books.google.com/](http://books.google.com/)
A HISTORY OF ROME.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
Vol. I.

London:
PRINTED FOR LONGMAN, REES, ORME, BROWN, GREEN & LONGMAN, PATERNOSTER
AND JOHN TAYLOR, UPPER GOWER STREET.
1833.
THE
CABINET OF HISTORY.

CONDUCTED BY THE

REV. DIONYSIUS LARDNER, LL.D. F.R.S. L.&E

ASSISTED BY

EMINENT LITERARY MEN.

THE
HISTORY OF ROME.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR
LONGMAN, REES, ORME, BROWN, GREEN, & LONGMAN,
PATERNOSTER-ROW;
AND JOHN TAYLOR,
UPPER GOWER STREET.
1834.
London:
Printed by A. Sportiswoode,
New-Street-Square.
THE CABINET CYCLOPAEDIA.

CONDUCTED BY THE
REV. DIONYSIUS LARDNER, LL.D. F.R.S. L. & E

ASSISTED BY
EMINENT LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC MEN.

History.

ROME.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
PRINTED FOR
LONGMAN, REES, ORME, BROWN, GREEN, & LONGMAN
Paternoster-Row;
AND JOHN TAYLOR,
Upper Gower Street.
1834.
"E' SI CONOSCE FACILMENTE PER CHI CONSIDERA LE COSE
PRESENTI E L'ANTICHE, COME IN TUTTE LE CITTÀ, E IN
TUTTI I POPOLI Sono QUELLI MEDESIMI DESIDERI, E QUELLI
MEDESIMI UMORI, E COME VI FURONO SEMPRE; IN MODO CHE
EGLI E FACIL COSA, A CHI ESamina CON DILIGENZA LE COSE
PASSATE, PREVEDERE IN OGNI REPUBBLICA LE FUTURE, E
PARVI QUELLI RIMEDI CHE DAGLI ANTICHI SONO STATI USATI,
O, NON NE TROVANDO DEGLI USATI, PENSARNE DE' NUOVI, PER
LA SIMILITUDINE DEGLI ACCIDENTI. MA PERCHÉ QUESTE
CONSIDERAZIONI SONO NEGLIETTE, O NON INTESE DA CHI LEGGE,
O SE LE SONO INTESE, NON SONO CONOSCIUTE DA CHI GO-
VERNA, NE SEGUITA CHE SEMPRE SONO I MEDESIMI SCANDALI
IN OGNI TEMPO."

MACHIAVELLI, DISCORS. L. I. C. XXXIX.
In a field where the labours of eminent foreign historians have rendered originality a difficult feat and a doubtful merit, it behoves a writer not affecting novelty to name his principal sources and authorities. This has been done, in case of occasional reference, at the foot of the pages. The authors from whom more important points have been abstracted are, in the First Book, Niebuhr, in his third (untranslated) volume; Wachsmuth*; and Heeren, in his chapters on Carthage.† But the largest contributions have been drawn, throughout the volume, from the great work of Professor Schlosser of Heidelberg‡; and the views of manners and literature will be recognised by the German student as (it is hoped useful) selections from that author. A neglected book, the *Scienza Nuova* of Vico§, has deserved acknowledgment long before the date of this notice, as throwing a strong original light on the early portions of Roman history, and the primitive relation between patricians and plebeians.

† Ideen, &c.
§ An abridged translation of this work has been published in Paris by M. Michelet, with an excellent prefatory "Discours sur le Système et la Vie de Vico."
CONTENTS.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

ETRUSCAN, LATIN, AND SAMNITE LEAGUES, BEFORE THE ROMAN ERA.


CHAP. II.

ROME UNDER THE KINGS.


A 4
CONTENTS.

CHAP. III.

FIRST YEARS OF THE REPUBLIC.


Page 29

CHAP. IV.

POLITICAL POWERS ACQUIRED BY THE PLEBEIANS.


39

CHAP. V.

ADVANCE OF ROME TO SUPREME POWER OVER ITALY.


49

CHAP. VI.

WARS WITH LATINS AND SAMNITES.

Ravages of the Gauls between the Apennines and the Tiber. — Condition of the Italian States at this Period. — Roman Expedition to aid the Samnites of Campania. — Self-devotion of Decius. — Victories over the Samnites. — Conspiracy and Revolt in the Army. — Peace made with the Samnites. — Alliance of Romans and Samnites against Latins and Campanians. — Manlius sentences his Son. — Self-sacrifice of Decius. — Annihilation of the Latin League. — Treatment of its several Members

64
CONTENTS.

CHAP. VII.
SAMNITE WARS.


Page 75

CHAP. VIII.
WAR WITH PYRRHUS.


86

CHAP. IX.
FIRST PUNIC WAR.

Situation, Institutions, and Dominions of Carthage. — Her colonial Dependencies. — Naval and military System and Policy. — Carthaginian Intervention in the Affairs of Sicily, leading to the First Punic War. — Romans aid the Mamertines against Carthage — besiege and capture Agrigentum — create a Fleet to contend with Carthage. — Duillius invents boarding Machines. — Romans carry the War into Africa. — Regulus makes insulting Proposals of Peace to the Carthaginian Army — puts a finishing Stroke to the War in Africa. — Fate of Regulus. — Maritime Disasters of Rome. — Exhaustion of both Sides. — Hamilcar Barcas. — Roman Aristocracy contribute to fit out a new Fleet. — Complete Naval Victory over Carthage. — Termination of the First Punic War.

97

CHAP. X.

INSTITUTIONS, MANNERS, AND MENTAL CULTIVATION, UP TO THE END OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.

Early military Organisation a Cause of Roman Greatness. — Roman Legion moulded on the national Character. — Modes of arming adapted to
CONTENTS.


BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

FIRST TRANSACTIONS OF ROME WITH GREECE. — SECOND PUNIC WAR.

CONTENTS

—Claudius marches to reinforce his Colleague. — Hasdrubal’s Descent upon Italy. — Conduct, Defeat, and Death. — End put to the War in Spain by Scipio. — Massinissa and Syphax gained by Scipio. — Scipio permitted to invade Africa on his own Account. — Massinissa deserts Carthage.
— Scipio burns the Carthaginian Camp. — Route Hasdrubal and Syphax.

Page 159

CHAP. II.

SUBJUGATION OF GREECE.


204

CHAP. III.

DESTRUCTION OF CARThAge. — ROMAN MANNERS AND POLITICS.

Roman, especially provincial, Character. — Accomplishments hereditary in certain Families. — Influence of P. Scipio permanently retained by his Family. — Appropriations of Land by powerful Personages. — Flower of the Italian Race destroyed by Latifundia and Slave-cultivation. — Increase and Abuse of Tribunitian Power. — Oligarchic Dread of Cato’s Reforms. — Different social Position of Women in Greece and Rome. — Extravagance in Dress, &c. described by Livy. — Censorship of Cato. — Factual Opposition to him. — He erects the Basilica Porcia — promotes the Increase of Slaves. — Middle and lower Classes impoverished by the Wars which enrich the great Men. — Profits made by Usury: frequent Allusions thereto in Plautus’s Comedies. — Partiality shown to the metropolitan Rabbles at the Expense of the Provinces. — Revenue-farmers: their profligate Conduct — screened by senatorial Interest. — Maintenance and political Use of superstitious Practices. — Scrupulous Attention to traditional Rites. — Supposititious Disinterment of Numa’s Writings — ordered by the Senate to be burnt. — Roman moral Feeling and national Sentiment — contrasted with Athenian Meanness, as described by Polybius. — Adulation of the Athenian Ambassador to Flamininus.

Page 224

CHAP. IV.

LITERATURE AND MENTAL CULTIVATION UP TO THIS PERIOD.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

SPANISH WARS. — SIEGE OF NUMANTIA. — REVOLT OF SLAVES
IN SICILY.

Division of Spain into two Roman Provinces. — Predatory Incursions of the
Lusitanians. — Treachery of a Roman Praetor. — Successes of Viriathus
— who concludes a Treaty with Rome — which is infringed by the
Senate. — Renewed Hostilities. — Scipio suborns Assassination of Viriathus.
— Siege of Numantia. — Fresh Instances of Roman Perfidy. — Fate
of Numantia. — Revolt of Slaves in Sicily. — Their Overthrow and cruel
Punishment

Page 263

CHAP. II.

AGITATIONS OF THE GRACCHI.

Treatment of the Italian Allies. — Degradation of the rural Population
into city Rabble. — Increase of Slaves. — Conversion of Arable into Pas-
turage. — Tiberius Gracchus. — Commencement of Tumults. — Placards.
— Italian Conspiracy. — Obstinance of the Senate. — Unconstitutional
Step of Tiberius. — Both Sides meditate Violence. — Consul refuses to act
for the Senate. — Nasica volunteers his Service. — Defeat of the popular
Party. — Death of Gracchus. — Caius Gracchus warned by his Mother
Cornelia — obtains the Tribuneship. — Contrast of his Purposes and Cha-
acter with those of Tiberius. — His revolutionary Proceedings. — Second
Tribuneship. — Senate outbids him, and procures the Election of Optimus
to the Consulship. — Gracchus loses his Third Election as Tribune.
— Betrays Defect of Energy. — Decisive Conflict. — His Death. — Triumph
and Conduct of the ruling Order. — Adherence of the Romans to old
Usage in Matters of no moment

269

CHAP. III.

JUGURTHINE WAR.

Jugurtha's Character. — Murders Hiempsal. — His War with Adherbal.
Intervention of Rome. — Jugurtha murders Adherbal, and seizes his
Territory. — Corrupts Calpurnius and Scaurus. — Summoned to Rome.
His Conduct. — Forced to fly the City. — Aulus's disgraceful Peace. —
Metellus retrieves the Roman Arms. — Superseded by Marius. — Policy
of Jugurtha. — Outdone by Sylla. — Surrendered by Bocchus. — End of
the War

286

CHAP. IV.

CIMBRI AND TEUTONES. — SOCIAL WAR. — DISORDERS IN THE
CITY.

Marius. — His Character. — Breaks with Metellus. — commences De-
magogue. — Cimbri and Teutones — ally themselves with Celtic Tribes,
CONTENTS.


Page 291

CHAP. V.

WAR WITH MITHRIDATES. — SYLLA’S DICTATORSHIP.

Character of Mithridates. — Foundation of the Bosporan Kingdom. — Aims to reduce Asia Minor under his Dependence — takes Possession of Cappadocia, and comes in Collision with the Romans, whom he defeats, and occupies Asia Minor. — Athens taken and sacked by Sylla. — Negotiations with Mithridates at Delfium. — A Roman Army, led by Valerius Flaccus, appears in Asia Minor. — Fimbria usurps Command of it — presses Mithridates hard — deserted by his Soldiers. — His Death. — Treatment of Greece and Asia Minor by Sylla. — Cinna and Marius enter Rome in a hostile Manner. — Marius orders a general Massacre. — Dias. — Sylla makes his Appearance near Tarentum. — Pompey, afterwards called the Great, makes himself conspicuous. — Action at the Gates of Rome. — Sylla massacres his Prisoners. — Elected to the Dictatorship in an unusual Manner. — Regulations for an organic Change in the Government. — General Direction of his Policy — pays Court to the young Pompey as a Favourite of Fortune. — Misunderstandings between the Latter and Sylla. — On Sylla’s Resignation and Death, Pompey becomes the Leader of the aristocratical Party. — Lepidus proposes Laws equivalent to a new Revolution. — Pompey puts a speedy Termination to his Movements

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 304

CHAP. VI.

SERTORIUS. — SERVILE WAR. — PIRATE WAR.

Far-sighted Policy of Caesar. — Pompey, Crassus, Lucullus, and Metellus at the Head of Affairs. — Sertorius, his early Career — collects an Anti.
CONTENTS.

Senate — attacked by Metellus — protracted Warfare — forms a regular Government. — Pompey sent to Spain with a 'Second Army. — Year elapses without decisive Action. — Fall of Sertorius effected by the Ambition of Perenna. — Condign Fate of the Latter. — Exclusive Popularity of Pompey. — Origin of Servile War in Italy. — Spartacus annihilates a Roman Army — meditates Retreat across the Alps — Inflicts repeated Defeats on the Romans. — Crassus expressly despatched against him. — Spartacus eludes his Manoeuvres. — Slave Army splits into separate Parties. — Defeat and Death of Spartacus. — Mean Conduct of Pompey — elected Consul with Crassus — plays the Part of a Man of the People — enjoys a tacit Autocracy in Rome. — Origin and Growth of the Pirate League — connived at for awhile by the Romans — who are forced at last upon serious Measures. — M. Antonius sent against the Pirates. — His Character. — Disasters and Death. — Vengeance of the Romans on Crete. — Increased Power and Audacity of the Pirates. — Unlimited Powers conferred on Pompey by the Motion of Gabinius. — Successful Termination of the War. — Page 316

CHAP. VII.

ASIATIC CONQUESTS OF POMPEY.

Alliance between Tigranes and Mithridates. — The Latter compelled by Lucullus to raise the Siege of Chalcedon. — Siege of Cysicus. — Mithridates left without a Fleet or Army — takes Refuge with Tigranes. — Roman Embassy to the latter Monarch. — Capture of his Metropolis. — Insubordination of Lucullus's Soldiers. — Accusations against him in Rome. — Revival of Mithridates's Fortunes. — Lucullus's Troops refuse Obedience. — Manilian Law. — Exorbitant Powers conferred by it on Pompey. — Mithridates makes a last Effort — defeated, and flees to his Bosporan Kingdom. — Pompey receives the Submission of Tigranes — treats with the Parthian King — marches towards Syria — subjugates the Country. — Aristobulus resists the Will of Pompey. — Mithridates slain by his Son Pharnaces, — who prostrates himself before Pompey. — Sensation produced in Rome by Pompey's Successes against the Arabs and Jews. — His overweening Vanity on the Subject. — Page 329

CHAP. VIII.

EVENTS IN ROME. — CONSULSHIP OF CICERO.

CONTENTS.

CHAP. IX.
STATE OF THE TIMES. — SOURCES OF WEALTH. — OPPRESSION AND CORRUPTION.


CHAP. X.
INTELLECTUAL AND LITERARY CHARACTER OF THE TIMES.

HISTORY OF ROME.

BOOK I.

FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE END OF THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.

CHAPTER I.

ETRUSCAN, LATIN, AND SAMNITE LEAGUES BEFORE THE ROMAN ERA.

An opening dissertation on each of the native tribes and foreign settlements which, in ages without authentic record, formed the population of Italy, would be perhaps an introduction too ambitious for the limited design of the present history. It may suffice to make introductory mention of three extensive national leagues, not only as forming the most powerful, and, before the Roman era, the most flourishing and civilised states, but as affording traces of those features by which the Roman character was principally distinguished in the days of its unexhausted vigour.*

Of these three federal unions in Italy previous to the empire of Rome, and whose several constituent parts became at length embodied with it, the Etruscan league has the first claim to attention. This again was divided into three several branches; the

* The Tuscans are alluded to by Persius (Sat. iii. 28.) as forming a parent stock of the Roman people; which Dionysius confirms, so far as regards the formation of their language. Florus, besides, expressly says, that the combination of the best institutions and bravest hearts from amongst the Etruscans, Latins, and Sabines, composed the strength of the Roman body politic. "Quippe quum populus Romanus, Etruscos, Latinos, Sabinosque miscuerit, et unum ex omnibus sanguinem ducat, corpus fecit ex membris, et ex omnibus unus est." - Flor. lib. iii. cap. 18.
northern and most ancient extending between the Alps
and the Apennines, over the regions afterwards known
as Cisalpine Gaul, the second being situate in Etruria
Proper, the third in Campania.

It may safely be inferred from the Etruscan relics
extant, that a civilised people, with a language, religion,
and government of its own, elevated Etruria Proper at
least to a state more flourishing than it ever enjoyed
afterwards under the Roman domination. Niebuhr,
indeed, has shown, that the social system of this people
was not of the most happy description. It formed an
aristocratic hierarchy, in which a patrician caste, who
alone had access to the will of the gods, (manifested by
signs of which they monopolised the interpretation,)
ruled over a multitude of serfs, like the Penestae of
Thessaly*, or of peasants as submissive as serfs in obe-
dience to the divine will. But Niebuhr sometimes
seems to forget that our sources of intelligence do not
reach back to the brightest days of Etrurian prosperity,
but embrace only a period when the bonds of union had
been slackened, morals depraved, and religion shorn of
its influence. At the time when Rome begins by de-
grees to make a figure in history, the whole Etruscan
league had lost its energies. Luxury had followed in
the train of wealth and commerce, and piracy itself had
become a regular branch of trade. Intercourse with
Greece had induced a change in the modes of thinking
and living, while the old established hierarchy did not
admit of modifications corresponding with the state of
the times. Owing to these circumstances, the way may
be said to have been clear for the extension of the Ro-
man power in Etruria, even before Rome herself had
become sufficiently powerful to aim at reducing the
towns of the Latin and Tuscan leagues under her
empire.

The Etruscan institutions seem to have stood in close
connection with the number of their twelve principal
deities, to whom, in earlier times, human sacrifices were

* ο ΕΤΕΡΟΘΑΣ ΤΗΝ ΕΤΡΟΣ ΠΕΝΕΣΤΑΙ. Dionysius, ix. 5.
offered. We find the number twelve recurring everywhere. Twelve towns always composed a federal state; twelve nobles constituted the priesthood of the Anthesterias; and even many Roman regulations again present the mystical number twelve. Of the northern and southern Etruscan leagues, we have few trustworthy memorials; but with regard to that in Proper or Royal Etruria*, we know with certainty that it consisted of twelve towns, each constituting a state of itself; that general assemblies were held in the neighbourhood of Volsini, in the temple of the goddess Voltumna; and that, in critical emergencies, a king, or rather a regent, spiritual and temporal, was elected for a certain time as head of the whole confederation. This regent, like the Roman kings, presided at all sacrifices and other public offices of religion; watched over the maintenance of ancient manners and usages; had cognisance of all minor judicial transactions, and the right to call assemblies of the patricians, and regulate public affairs with their concurrence. On him devolved also the executive part of the ordinances made by the patrician senate, as well as the command of the army in war-time. It was from these kings, or lucumos, or whatever other title belonged to them, that the Romans derived† the purple robe, the golden crown, the curule chair, the eagle sceptre, the fasces and the axe of the lictors—all

* The Etruscan league is described as follows in Beaufort's République Romaine, vol. ii. p. 67. —
"On sait que ces peuples, réunis par une confédération générale, étaient presque toujours divisés par des intérêts particuliers, et que l'esprit de faction mettait la désunion au point d'en venir à des actes d'hostilité les uns contre les autres.
"C'était une ligue ou alliance défensive, dont tous les membres étaient indépendants et pouvaient faire des alliances particulières, pourvu qu'elles ne fussent pas contraires aux conditions de la confédération générale. Chaque ville ou canton envoyait ses députés aux États de la nation, et c'était là qu'on délibérait sur les intérêts des corps de la nation, et que se prenaient les résolutions. Quelque la pluralité des suffrages y fut suivie, il paraît que lorsque le corps de la nation s'engageait dans une guerre que quelque canton particulier n'approvait pas, ce canton pouvait rester dans la neutralité sans être obligé de fournir de contingent malgré lui."

† Livy says (lib. i. c. 8.) that Romulus adopted the lictors from the Etruscans: — "unde sella curulis, unde toga praetexta sumpta est, numerum quoque ipsum ductum placet, et ita habuisse Etruscos, quod ex duodecim populis cunctis ruris creato rege, singulos singuli populi lictores dederint."
which insignia were transmitted from the royal to the republican authorities.

The second people which flourished before the Roman era in Italy, and whose ancient vigour went to establish that of the ascendant state, were the Latins. As all that is recorded of the Arcadian immigration of Hercules and Cacus, of Æneas and the Trojans, belongs to the province of mythology and poetry, not of regular history, it may be sufficient to notice generally the flourishing state of the Latin region before the Roman era. Latium would seem to have at no time been more populous, at no time to have offered an aspect of opulence more widely diffused, than at the period which precedes authentic history. Thirty Latin municipalities existed in a country which is now in the most deplorable condition; three and twenty populous places are said to have been situated where the atmosphere is now poisoned many a league by the Pontine marshes.* Under the Roman empire, the prosperity of Latium exhibited only the vast and unwieldy wealth of a few families, side by side with the squalor of a corrupt and dissolute populace, and the wretchedness of innumerable slaves.

A confederation of small states existed in Latium, similar to that which has been already described in Etruria. The larger towns, so far as their supposed traces may be relied on, were always placed on heights, crowned by a citadel, and gradually extended their domains around the central eminence. The mode of building, the massive and gigantic scale of the walls, exhibit the same architecture already remarked among

---

* The Pontine marshes, during the dominion of the Latins, are thus contrasted, by Micali, with their state at the present day:—“Per opera d’una diligente industria la maremmona Pontina, soggetto di curioso esame per naturalisti, ed i politici osservatori delle rivoluzioni umani, vedeva si ridotta nello stato di un florido ed ubertoso territorio, cui si alzavano ventitre grosse terre mentre di nostri giorni dopo tanti secoli et tanti sforzi, non ha potuto mutare finora lo squalido aspetto d’una malsana palude.” — Micali, vol. i. p. 161.

Against this account must be cited the authority of Niebuhr, who states (vol. iii. p. 388,) that it is physically impossible the Pontine marshes ever can have gone through any other transition than merely from a reservoir of water to a morass. The legends of towns having there existed and perished, he treats as purely fabulous.
the Etruscans. Ruins like these also unequivocally indicate similar, if not so powerful, hierarchical establishments. Under the sway of such establishments only could enormous works of this kind have been practicable. It will be seen, in the course of our history, that the Latin constitution bore considerable resemblance to the Tuscan. The bond of union between the several states was equally loose, and the deficiency of concert in their measures equally ruinous. Many monuments extant seem to indicate the celebration of certain sacrificial and festal rites in common, by the Latins, Tuscans, and Samnites.*

A national league extended over the whole range of the Apennines, probably consisting chiefly of tribes having a common origin. Of this league the Samnites formed the vital core and centre. Even after its dissolution, the primitive Samnite character was preserved throughout the whole Roman history, in the habits of the Vestini, Marsi, Peligni, Marrucini, and Frentani. The Sabines, also, sprang from the same race, and continued to maintain the good old usages in the highest vigour, even after kindred tribes had split into bands of robbers.

The national religion, like that of the Latins, was closely connected with the labours of agricultural and pastoral life. Of the national and religious festivals, those held in Cures were renowned above all the others. The Samnite, like the Etruscan, institutions were based on aristocracy and religious ceremonial. But aristocracy among the Samnites was not begirt with slaves and vassals: worship was ruled by written prescriptions, not by the caprice of patrician colleges †, veiling in oral tra-

* The worship of the Dea Feronia, described by Dionysius (l. iii. c. 39.) confirms the existence of rites in common between these primitive nations. "There is a mode of worship (ἱερὸν) common to the Sabines and Latins, which is held in high veneration. The deity which they worship in common is called Dea Feronia. This is translated by those who attempt to render it into Greek θεά 'Ανθρώπη, by others θεά Φιλοστήριον, by others again Ἐγγίκτηρον."

† "Ibi ex vetere libro linteo lecto sacrificatum, sacerdote Ovii Pactio quodam homine magno natus, qui se id sacrum petere affirmabat ex vetustate Samnitiurn religione." — Liv. Ann. 1. x. c. 33.
dition their mysterious art and science. Inhabiting a hilly country, they scattered themselves through numerous villages, instead of being crowded together in towns. The few towns which existed lay in the most inaccessible fastnesses of a region every where rugged in its character. The whole mountainous tract of the Mateese, situate in the highest range of the Apennines, and covered with snow during part of the year, was then turned into arable or pasture by the labours of a hardy and contented race, and peopled to an extent almost incredible.

The Samnite aristocracy was unlike that of the Tuscan and Latins, as the Samnite population knew no luxury. Domestic slavery either was wholly unknown, or at least rare; every one performed his own labour, and all were closely united by reciprocal necessities. Political and religious institutions, in many points, coincided with those of the Latins and Etruscans, and perfectly served the purposes to which they were afterwards turned by the Romans; who readily adopted, in their civil and religious arrangements, the best parts of those of the three primitive nations of Italy.

According to Strabo and Stobæus, marriages among the Samnites were contracted under the eye of the authorities. The youths were assembled at certain epochs for that purpose, and subjected to examination by public censors. The most deserving were privileged to make a selection amongst the virgins, and others were provided with wives under suitable regulations. The highest and lowest cultivated the soil with their own hands, and the institution of an agricultural priesthood (fratres arvales) was borrowed by the Romans from the Samnites. This fraternity was not wholly engrossed with formal rites, but engaged in the scientific practice of agriculture.* Virgil, in a well-known verse, derives vine-cultivation in Italy from the service performed to the deity of the Sabines.†

* The forms observed by the fratres arvales were discovered engraved on marble tablets, in 1778, in clearing out the foundations of the sacristy of St. Peter's, in Rome.
† paterque Sabinus
Vitisator, curvamque ferens sub imagine falcem.
The Samnite league, in this respect, resembled that of the Latins and Tuscans, that the several tribes might each contract separate alliances. But the bond which held them together was never so feeble as in the other leagues, and the members of their confederation, even singly, were capable of formidable resistance to an external enemy. The Sabines at an early period severed themselves from the league, and entered into close union with Rome. Their uncorrupted morals, firmness, piety, and rectitude, gained power and reputation for the infant state amongst those around it; and the Sabine virtue furnished the Roman poets with the richest theme for eulogy of their forefathers.
CHAP. II.

ROME UNDER THE KINGS.

The origin of the city of Rome and its earliest institutions must entirely be assigned to the province of legend. The succeeding era of kingly government is also wholly legendary, and even among the oldest monuments extant of the Latin language, it is difficult to regard any as referable to this period. But if we would trace chronologically, and view connectedly, the growth of the original institutions, and of the power of Rome, from the primitive times, we must accept, notwithstanding their apocryphal character, the recorded names, the leading events and dates of successive dynasties.

The new town, whoever may have founded it, appears, from the legend of Romulus and Remus, as belonging neither to the Samnite, nor the Latin, nor the Etrurian league, while it not only lies contiguous to the three confederations, but also stands in connection with all three. In Alba Longa, 'one of the capital cities of the ancient Latium, Romulus and Remus were born, and on one of the seven hills by the Tiber, they preluded with Etruscan auguries * the building of a new town †, which, a few years after its foundation, acquired increased importance, or rather rose to independent existence, by the rape of the Sabine virgins ‡; and soon

* The number of twelve vultures seen by Romulus is Etruscan, as also is the yoking of a cow and an ox together, the circuit of the city with a plough, the lifting of the plough (porta), the pomarium, and, finally, the mundus. (See Appendix.)
† The Building of Rome, according to Dionysius, Varro, and Plutarch, took place on the 24th or 25th year after the first Olympiad, which again is assumed as the year 776 B.C. The foundation of the city, on this calculation, falls on the 754th or 755 year B.C.; which last era is that assigned by Varro, and commonly received by the authorities followed in this history.
‡ Niebuhr finds the origin of the poetic tale of the rape of the Sabines in the absence of the connubium, or right of intermarriage, between the Rhamnes, or genuine Romans, and their Sabine neighbours, whom he accommodates with a settlement on the Quirinal and Capitoline hills.
afterwards, by the reception of a considerable number of Sabines, as comrades and co-burghers. This tradition tallies exactly with the geographical situation. In those times the Sabines and Samnites were pressing down upon Latium and the Campanian plains. North of the Tiber was Tuscan land. Thus, without ascribing to legends more historical weight than they deserve, a glance at the map renders it easily conceivable how a mixed town population should form itself in this corner of Latium.

The Latin and Tuscan regulations, described in a former chapter, recur to view in the first annals of Rome. A patrician senate, a priesthood held exclusively by the nobles, guided and governed all public affairs. An elective chief stood at their head, the lucumo or dictator of the former nations, designated as king by the Roman legend. These forms, indeed, even if tradition had not avouched them, conjecture might have ascribed with high probability to the earliest ages, as in the primitive nations, already referred to, a sacred aristocracy existed, combining the priestly functions with those of secular sovereignty.

As the foundation of the new town, according to the legend, was executed by two Latins, Romulus and Remus; and as its scanty population was swelled by Sabine reinforcements, the first monarch could turn his arms against none but the Etruscans. The wars with Veii, which did not end till several centuries afterwards, by the destruction of that town, began under Romulus. Yet no important additions to his own city appear to have been made, either by him, or by his immediate successor. Rome is, however, described as having gathered strength internally under Romulus, as well as under Numa,—under the first by wars, and by the reception of the vigorous Sabines,—under the latter by laws and institutions borrowed from that people, and in particular by the establishment of a worship well adapted to the agricultural life of the patricians and their clients.

The tradition of Romulus having opened a sanctuary
for fugitives of every description, and of Numa having established guilds or companies of tradingburghers, may have been founded on the circumstance that, besides the patricians and their clients, a class of simple citizens, in the modern sense of the word, began to show itself at a very early period, but remained during a long time without obtaining any share whatever in the public administration. Such are the first traces of the free plebeian order in Rome.

After a senatorial interregnum, the patrician assembly chose Tullus Hostilius, whose grandfather had migrated from a Latin town to Rome, where he had married a Sabine lady of the highest rank. Though in this manner Tullus was closely connected with the Sabines, it is precisely with the Sabines that we find him in perpetual warfare. Yet, notwithstanding the eternal feuds of the Romans with the Sabines, Rome had all the characteristics of an Etrusco-Sabine stronghold, reinforced by Latin immigrants, and by these raised to importance.

The current narrative of the wars of Tullus Hostilius with Alba Longa, by tradition the parent state of Rome, is, in all its details, a mythical epos. Yet we must take as an historical fact (in order to understand what follows), the incorporation of one of the thirty Latin towns with Rome, and the removal of its inhabitants to the Cælian hill. From this moment, the Romans, without properly belonging to the Latin league, advanced claims to priority of rank amongst the neighbouring towns,—claims which gave occasion to the wars which are recorded to have occupied the succeeding monarch during the whole course of his reign.

The reign of Ancus Martius was distinguished by the conquest of Fidenæ, an Etruscan town, although supported in its struggle with Rome, first by Alba Longa, which had severed itself from the Latin league, and afterwards by Veii. A truce was closed with Veii and the Volscians; for it was contrary to Etruscan usage to make a regular peace, though they would willingly agree to a truce of a hundred years. Under this
government it is further recorded that a footing was gained on the right bank of the Tiber. The Janiculum was built upon, and a harbour made at Ostia.* Works for preparing sea-salt were also placed on the coast. Fortresses were built on Etruscan ground. Rome received an increase of her plebeian population from Latium, and Ancus assigned the Latins, whom he brought to Rome, as captives of war, a site for their habitations in the wood which covered the Aventine; and admitted them to the rights of Roman citizens. The Aventine continued to be the plebeian quarter of the city, and was not included in the Pomerium, the circuit consecrated by patrician auspices. A temple at the fount of the Ferentina had hitherto been the point of union for all the Latins. A temple on the Aventine was thenceforth destined to be so. It is here that solemn rites were held for the object of investing Rome with the character of capital and centre of the Latin league; though to what deity they were held is not easy to say, since the Roman religious services were excessively indefinite, and altogether dependent on political expediency.

The Etruscan character appears in all the undertakings of the next king, Tarquinius Priscus; his father, according to the legend, having migrated from Corinth into Etruria.† The existence of a dominant patrician order, like those already described amongst the Etruscans, Latins, and Sabines, must be continually kept in

* The state of this harbour in later times, and the navigation of the Tiber, are described with great particularity, though with some apparent exaggerations, by Dionysius, i. liii. c. 44.
† The importance of the genealogy of the Tarquins to the version commonly received of the expulsion of the kings, claims insertion for it here, as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lucumo, (afterwards L. Tarquinius.)</th>
<th>Aruna.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tarquinia</td>
<td>Tarquinius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Superbus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mind throughout the first ages of Rome. It cannot, indeed, be affirmed that these patricians, who, however, stood at the head of all religious rites and ordinances, had a character exactly sacerdotal. The two principal Roman historians differ essentially from each other, with regard to other particulars in the life of this monarch, but all they relate of his architectural works bears the Etruscan stamp of grandeur and solidity. The sewers, which in later times were viewed with astonishment, as a work of giants *, for draining the forum † and other parts of the town; the walls which he constructed of squared stones, the substructions of the Capitol, and the levelling of a site for the erection of an immense temple on the summit of the Capitoline rock ‡, (then called the Tarpeian), recall the massive Etruscan piles to remembrance. The games, too, which were held in the circus, are styled Etruscan by Niebuhr, who also shows how totally the popular diversions of the drama, racing, and wrestling differed in Rome and Greece in their nature and tendency, and how this difference naturally resulted from the whole organisation of society.

The murder of the elder Tarquinius, and the narrative of the early life of his successor, Servius Tullius, who appears to have belonged neither to the royal nor

---

* Dionysius (l. iii. p. 67.) adduces Caius Aquilius as his authority, for stating a circumstance, from which may be inferred the enormous outlay made by Tarquinius on his various architectural works. Caius Aquilius reports, that when on one occasion the necessary repairs of the cloaca had been for some time neglected, the censors entered into contracts for cleansing and repairing them, for 1000 talents. Thence, Dionysius concludes, may be inferred the expense of their first construction. He adds, that Roman greatness may be specially traced in three things—in the highways built of solid stone, the aqueducts, and the cloaca.

† The Forum Romanum, so long the site of markets, public assemblies, as well as public spectacles and solemnities, was originally a marshy plot of ground, between the Capitoline and Palatine hills. Tarquinius Priscus, according to Dionysius and Livy, first apportioned lots of building ground about the forum to private persons, erected covered passages, and set up booths for artisans and tradespeople.

‡ Livy relates (l. 38.), that during war with the Sabines, king Tarquinius had vowed a temple to Jupiter, and that, on the conclusion of that war, he proceeded to clear a foundation for it on the Capitol, by levelling a space, of which the extent was enough to give an idea of the grandeur of the contemplated work. This site retained the name of rupe Tarpeia to a late period, and is now known by that of la Rocca.
CHAP. II. SERVIIUS TULLIUS.

to a patrician family*, cannot in any degree be relied upon as history. Thus much, however, seems established, that he was raised to the throne by his merit, and by the will of his predecessor; that he maintained himself at first by force, and afterwards by the love of the people, and promoted during his reign Latin and Grecian customs, in the same way as Tarquinius had Etruscan. From this epoch we find Grecian principles of religion and of policy more and more prevalent, even though every particular fact of this and the succeeding times continue veiled in legendary obscurity. Most of the acts exclusively ascribed by later tradition to Servius are so important to the knowledge of the Roman constitution, that we cannot avoid treating of them in this place, though it seems next to impossible to separate what belongs to these early times from what is manifestly of later date. In order to the better understanding of the organic changes introduced by Servius, we must take a rapid review of the original constitution, such as early traditions, adopted by the commonly received authorities, describe it to have existed up to the era of those changes.

The earliest constitution of Rome is set down as the work of Romulus, by those records of antiquity which constitute our sole authorities. Yet rarely does a constitution spring from the brain of an individual, independently of already existing regulations. It is true that we should overlook the most rapid strides of the human mind, if we denied the noble prerogative of a spirit superior to the crowd; which anticipates the slow movement of multitudes, and forms a new creation out of such elements as the age affords. Thus, features of the earliest constitution of Rome are to be found in several of the primitive states of Italy. But the new spirit which shows itself from the very outset in Roman story, gives warrant enough that the infant city did not

* Livy (I. i. c. 39.) relates that Ocrisia, wife of the first citizen of Corniculum, was, after the conquest of that town, brought to Rome, where, ab rege Romam prohibitam servitio, she bore Servius.
continue swaddled in the old forms of traditional observance.

According to Niebuhr, Rome's earliest citizens solely consisted of patricians and their clients.

The patrician houses in later times were fond of tracing their origin to the fabulous age of Trojan and Greek heroism. Even the rude tradition does not affirm that Rome was founded by a mere undistinguished multitude. And though her earliest citizens may not be deemed to have constituted a regular colony, formed according to ancient Etruscan or Latin usage, yet it may safely be assumed, that such nobles as were found amongst them, ranked in the new commonwealth as such, without requiring elevation to that dignity by the founder of Rome. The patrician creations attributed to the kings, and the additions which they are said to have made in the numbers of the senate, wear the aspect of measures adopted to curb the domineering spirit of an order which they found already existing. While, then, the first establishment of the order of patricians must be disputed to the legendary founder of Rome, it is, nevertheless, as clear as any fact of that obscure period, that the following kings from time to time made additions to their numbers, whether individually or by batches; that consequently a close oligarchical system had no existence, and that the patricians could not pretend to preserve the purity of their blood. Hence it happened, that in later times not all the patrician families pretended to trace their pedigree to Æneas or Ulysses. Royal creation sufficed to confer the privileges of birth. That even plain plebeians were raised to patrician rank, is evidenced by the patres minorum gentium, so designated by the old nobles, while that designation did not import the non-possession of any privilege.* The patricians, as they could not bar plebeian entrance into their order, apparently refused them

* The patres minorum gentium are thus described by Livy: — "Plurique oriundi ex Albanis et Sabiniis non genere et sanguine, sed per cooptationem patres," &c. liv. 4.
admission at least into their families. It is, however, doubtful, whether the connubia were rigidly refused by them during the period of the monarchy; and plebeian disqualification in that point up to the time of the Twelve Tables, appears on the whole rather to have been customary, than matter of express regulation or positive institution.

The relation of clientship formed between the patricians and their dependants appears to have been less of a political than of a private nature. One of its most ordinary incidents was the allotment of land by the patron to the client. It seems, however, that clientship could subsist independent of such allotment, as free plebeians, possessing land of their own, would sometimes enter that state, and property in land might be acquired by clients from other sources. Instances of the first kind may be easily accounted for by the advantages of powerful protection offered in the condition of clientship, which might well outweigh the blessing of precarious independence. Thus, freemen in the middle ages consigned their persons to servitude, and their possessions to dependance, by the fiction of a feudum oblatum.

As Niebuhr describes the Roman population to have at first only consisted of patricians and their clients, he supposes that a free plebs was only formed by degrees, and that its first organisation was owing to the elder Tarquin and Servius Tullius. There are not, however, wanting grounds for inferring the earlier existence of a commonalty not included under the condition of clientship. It appears extremely probable that immigrants from the neighbouring towns, who had emancipated themselves from the bonds of hereditary clientship, were not called upon to bind themselves anew on coming to Rome. It may even be supposed that clients coming in with their patrons changed their condition, and became at once free citizens along with their lords, in like manner as the negro slave acquires immediate freedom by setting his foot on European soil.
According to Dionysius *, Romulus first divided the whole people into three tribes†, each tribe into ten curiae, each cury into ten decuries. At the head of each of the three divisions stood tribunes, curions, and decurions. Out of each cury he chose ten knights, altogether three hundred in number, entitled celeres. Livy relates, that after the war with Tatius, thirty curies were established, and at the same time three knightly centuries, entitled Ramnenses, Titienses, and Luceres. According to Plutarch, the able-bodied were first classed in military divisions, of which each contained 3000 foot and 30 horse, and was called a legion. All the rest came under the denomination of people (δῆμος).

The names above given, in all probability, indicate three original divisions of race in Rome. The first were the Ramnenses, the Latin comrades of Romulus, to whom were afterwards joined the Titienses (Sabines), and Luceres (Etruscans).

Different arrangements of the same body of citizens are requisite for different purposes. The purpose of the curiae was religious—they formed centres of union and of common sacrificial rites. The tribes came into action in time of warfare, independently of the curiae, and were founded on national distinctions. Dionysius, for the sake of connecting the several divisions, has mixed things up together which have no proper affinity. The division by curies has nothing to do with war. Dionysius takes the curiones for military commanders, and therefore thinks that Romulus selected the bravest for that function. But there is no authority for believing them any thing else than priests, or for supposing that the tribes had curies for subdivisions in the armies.

* iii. 7.
† Varro calls the tribes the primary division of the domain of Rome.
* Ager Romanus primum divisus in partes tres, unde tribus appellatur. Varro's etymologies are amusing, like most which are found in the writers of antiquity: e. g. ** Turma terra est, E in U abit, quod terdeni equites ex tribus tribubus fiebant. . . . . . Milites, quod trium millium prima legio fiebat, ac singulis tribus millia singula mittebant."
On the other hand, Dionysius’s decurions belong not to the curies, but to the army. The tribunes, like the tribes, have war for their only destination. It is easy to see why the tribes, elsewhere subordinate to the curies, in war appear as an independent portion of the people. In all antiquity, armies, in which various nations or races served, were originally arrayed in divisions corresponding with those varieties. Thus, in Ro. e, the Latin, Etruscan, and Sabine races fought in separate bands, till Servius introduced common arms and array for all three, and thus remodelled the military as well as civil organisation.

The patrician order, which alone had a recognised share in the powers of government, according to immemorial custom, constituted the senate. The original number of members is unanimously given by the ancients at 100. The several accounts of the augmentations of the senate diverge very widely from each other. Dionysius states the second hundred, or, according to other accounts, fifty, as elected through the curies, after Tatius’s accession. Livy only mentions 100 after the death of Romulus; yet he speaks of the participation of the Sabine senators in the government, and his hasty style of writing seems to explain the contradiction. Tullus Hostilius took only a small number of the Albans into the senate; and this, it would seem, rather as a complement than an augmentation.

The stated powers of the senate, or the patricians, in so far as they only gave members to that body during the times of the monarchy, cannot be laid down with precision. What is told of the last Tarquinius, that he never asked advice of the senate, may be equally true, if true at all, of Romulus and Tullus Hostilius. Neither Romulus, nor any of the succeeding kings, appear to have been controlled by the patrician caste in their course of policy, or devoted to its interests so completely, as that executive generally must, which a stable aristocracy sets at its head, as its mere organ. The power of the senate, however, could not fail to be felt on all occasions, when that
of the monarchical branch suffered interruption. After the death of Romulus, therefore, it showed no disposition to allow the new accession of a troublesome supremacy. The *interregnum* was an attempt to vest the lapsed executive functions in the members of the body of patri- cians. But, however willing might be the aristocrats to lose their head, the people cherished other inclinations. Accordingly, the former did not succeed in making their monarch one of their own body, and keeping him in allegiance to themselves. The royal dignity at Rome was doubly remote from this consummation. Hereditary right began to show itself in the sons of Ancus; while the elective right which the people seems to have exercised in the case of Servius, and, according to Livy *, so early as the elder Tarquin, was almost equally dangerous to the senate.

The king stands at the head of the earliest magistrates of Rome. We have seen that his power was not merely executive, nor confined within the limits conjured round it by Dionysius, who figured to himself the royal power as resembling that of the consuls. He was commander-in-chief, superintendent of worship, and supreme judge. The right of taxation seems to deserve mention as especially belonging to the sovereign. Even after the kingly era, the people laid no claim to it, but it continued in the uncontested possession of the senate.

The *interreges* were very subordinate instruments of the senate. When it is said that the interreges chose the king, this can only be understood to refer to the conduct of the election by them, according to Livy’s usual mode of speaking of the presiding magistrate.

Next to the king’s, the highest rank was held by the tribune of the celeres, the prototype of the subsequent *magister equitum*. This office is mentioned only twice during the royal era, under Romulus and the younger Tarquin. Under the latter, Brutus is recorded to have possessed the power of assembling the people.†

* i. 35.  
† Liv. i. 59.
The patricians were, at first, possessed exclusively of the public *sacra*. However, they can neither be supposed to have been a priestly caste, in the Oriental sense of the word, nor to have first been invested with priestly functions by Romulus. These functions were an ancestral right of the nobles, who, in the primitive times of Italy, were at once priests and warriors. The king, however, retained the choice of the officiating persons. We are here speaking, not of family forms of worship, which do not belong to a survey of the constitution, but of public rites. These were performed in the curia, under the superintendence of thirty curions.

A state religion was soon found to be necessary, and could emanate alone from the king, the first among the priests. Numa became the creator of a worship common to all citizens, and of a more exalted nature than the service of each individual cury. One common cury would not alone suffice him: he endowed the temple of Vesta with the character of a sanctuary—a temple consecrated by himself to an ancient Latin worship. Moreover, he built a significantly formed temple to the Etruscan Janus, and dedicated the Salians to the service of the Sabine Quirinus; who, as afterwards the vestals, was considered as the guardian of a mysterious palladium, the Ancilia. Thus each of the three national races was honoured by the establishment of its own peculiar worship, and the temple of Fides Publica was reared as a basis of mutual confidence.

The most momentous influence on the state was exerted by augurs and fecials. The former sprang from the primitive times of the Latins and Etruscans. The latter were first introduced in Rome by Numa, to proclaim war and conclude peace and alliances,—a kind of antique prototype of the *treuga Dei*. In a peace closed by the fecial right no hostages were given.*

The office of haruspices in Rome was, at all times, exercised by Etruscans, more peculiarly than by Romans.

* Liv. ix. 5.
Notwithstanding the instructions which the Roman youth received in their mysteries, they never became properly acquainted with them; and, on important occasions, Etruscans were brought to Rome, or ambassadors despatched to Etruria. At the time of the siege of Veii, Rome had no haruspices of her own. The emperor Claudius, an amateur of Etruscan art, restored their college, which, in his times, had gone to decay. The grand Etruscan mystery was the interpretation of lightnings, which, like every other branch of aruspicial science, could only be attained to in the schools of the priests. So late as the siege of Rome by the Goths, A.D. 408, Etruscan art was put in requisition to conjure thunderbolts down upon the enemy.*

The first reception of foreign worship in Rome drew after it the principle which was long afterwards acted upon, of uniting with neighbouring states in common ceremonial rites, with the Latins, for example, in the service of Diana and of Jupiter Latialis, with the Sabines in that of Feronia. The religious forms of foreign nations were also imported into Rome; for example, the service of the Veian Juno, and the Mater Matuta of Satricum. They were anxious to avoid omitting any deity. Accordingly, as the Athenians built an altar to the unknown Godhead, all the divine powers, who it was apprehended might have been missed, were named Novilenses, "hereafter to be recognised." We shall presently find mention made of these in the self-devoting formula of Decius. Thence it appears, that though the patrician worship suffered no direct invasion, it could not but subside into insignificance amidst the accessions from all quarters, especially from Greece. Tarquin the elder assumed to be the founder of the highest national godhead for Rome and Latium, by beginning the temple of Jupiter on the capitol. Thenceforward every state-transaction was linked with the service of Jupiter. Jupiter's temple became the holy of

* Zosim. v. 41.
holies, the point of union for all parts of the state. Many a rite which had formerly been recognised as public sunk before it into the obscure and private service of a particular gens.

Livy and Dionysius disagree about the commencement of the reign of Servius Tullius. According to the former, he commenced his reign under the auspices of the senate, without election by the people: according to the latter, through the people, against the will of the senate. In the sequel, the patricians alone are exhibited by Livy as the enemies of the people; while the rich, as a body, together with the patricians, are presented in that light by Dionysius. In both points Dionysius appears to be right. That Servius was a friend of the people, and that the patricians hated and plotted against him, appears from a passage of Festus.* Indeed it might be indirectly gathered, from the statement of Livy † that he chose his habitation on the Esquiline, for that was the plebeian quarter.‡ The government of Servius Tullius was, from beginning to end, a sort of revolution. The organic changes ascribed to him can hardly be conceived of, as projected under any but republican institutions. At all events, they seem to have paved the way for the republic.

Servius prepared his constitutional innovations by a division of lands and of building-ground for habitations to the poor. His constitution, however, had no resemblance to a pure democracy. Property was adopted as the standard for apportioning the public contributions and franchises. To facilitate the intended general census, it was necessary to divide the mass of the people for a convenient survey, as the curies by that time only included the smaller part of the population. For this purpose, the city was divided into four tribes; the whole domain belonging to it into six-and-twenty.

* Patricius vicus Rome dictus eò quod ibi patricii habitaverunt jubente Servio Tullio, ut si quid molirentur adversus ipsum, ex locis superioribus opprimorentur.
† Liv. i. i. c. 44.
‡ Dion. l. iv. c. 13.
Next was performed a general valuation of property. The whole number of able-bodied citizens was then divided into six classes. On the valuation of the property of the class depended the tribute, the military accoutrements, and the place assigned in order of battle. The highest description of citizens were embodied into the cavalry.

Each class was divided into centuries, which again were subdivided as seniores and juniores. The division by centuries, probably, was calculated, so that an equal amount of property should be possessed by the members of each collectively. In voting in the comitia, not the number of heads, but of centuries counted. On the other hand, the position of the military forces seems entirely to have been fixed by the numbers in each class, told by the head. The knights, or citizens entitled by birth or wealth to serve on horseback, gave their votes apart in eighteen centuries. Of these the six first were reserved exclusively to patricians, while the remaining twelve were open to the wealthiest men of plebeian birth. In the enrolment of plebeian knights, as in all the rest of his institutions, it may be affirmed that Servius regarded wealth as of primary importance.

When it is considered that out of a hundred and eighty-nine [or ninety-three] centuries, the first class alone contained eighty, to which must be added the eighteen centuries of knights, and that the last class had either only one voice or none at all, it is easy to see that Servius, if in effect he made this arrangement, substituted an aristocracy of wealth for the former patrician preponderance in the curiae.* As, in these times, the property of land was, for the most part, in the hands of the patricians, they, of course, retained preponderance in the new aristocracy likewise. But this was accidental, and soon ceased to be the case. For the rest, the curiae, even in the time of the republic, retained all the rights which stood in connection with religion,

* Glarcanus (Liv. Drakenborch, p. 172.) gives the following tabular view of the arrangement of Servius: —
and with the performance of particular formalities. The authorities which were elected in the assemblies of the centuries received the military command through the sanction of the curiae, or, in other words, the curiae had in appearance the right of confirming the previous elections. Adoptions, testaments, priestly functions, and sacrifices remained, even in later times, under their superintendence. The *comitia centuriata*, instituted by Servius, continued in possession of supreme power, till the people, or rather its tribunes, systematically began to undermine the aristocracy and patrician order; and, therefore, set the mode of voting according to tribes, and by the head, in the place of that of voting according to centuries.

The warlike undertakings of Servius were principally directed against the Etruscans. He is said to have carried on war for twenty years with the citizens of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Centuries</th>
<th>Knights</th>
<th>Arms, Offensive and Defensive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Asses of brass. 100,000</td>
<td>80, divided, as in all the classes, into seniores and juniores.</td>
<td>18 centuries. Livy adds the two centuries fabrorum to the first, Dionysius to the second class.</td>
<td>Offensive; <em>Hasta</em> et <em>Gladius</em>. Defensive; <em>Galea</em>, <em>Clpeus</em>, <em>Ocrea</em>, <em>Lorica</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Offensive; <em>Hasta</em> et <em>Gladius</em>. Defensive; <em>Galea</em>, <em>Scutum</em>, <em>Ocrea</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>Offensive; <em>Hasta</em> et <em>Gladius</em>. Defensive; <em>Galea</em>, <em>Scutum</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Tibicinum duo centuriae, according to Livy tres.</td>
<td>Offensive; <em>Funda</em> et <em>lagides manus</em>. Defensive; <em>None</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Capite cenorum.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Veii, Cœre, Tarquinii, and, lastly, with the collective force of the Etruscans; till all allowed the pre-eminence of Rome and her king. By the erection of a temple on the Aventine hill, he had drawn to Rome the sacrificial meetings of the Latins, which had formerly only been held in the grove of Ferentina, in the territory of Alba Longa.

The horrible tale of the last Tarquin's accession to the throne might be regarded as incredible, were it not that Italian history in the middle ages affords us many similar examples. The narrative in question is as follows: — The two daughters of Servius were married to the two sons of the elder Tarquin. The one murdered her husband, Aruns, and her sister, with the aid of the other son of Tarquin, Lucius, and paved the way to the throne for herself and her new husband by the murder of her father. If this history be true, Tarquin the Proud arrived at the head of the government by similar means to those employed by the petty tyrants of Italy for possessing themselves of sovereignty in their native town. We cannot, therefore, be surprised if he maintained himself on the throne by similar means, that is to say, by terror and by brute force. Servius Tullius had given up many royal prerogatives; and later writers even suppose that he cherished the intention of introducing the consular government. Tarquinius proceeded in an opposite direction. He aimed at over-reaching the allies of Rome, at employing the people in forced labours, and despoiling the senate of all consideration in the state, by letting its numbers dwindle away gradually. This was the more easy, as the senators were nominated by the kings, as at a later period by the censors. (Still later, indeed, certain public offices gave claims to a perpetual place in the senate, yet, even then, the censors retained the right of naming the other members.) Tarquin, moreover, formed for himself a body guard and privy council; neither sought the concurrence of senate nor people; consulted only his friends and cabinet councillors; made himself difficult of access, and en-
couraged informers and eaves-droppers. Turnus Herdonius, the most influential man in Aricia, who had offered successful resistance to Tarquinius, when he attempted to transform into a species of supremacy the influence which Rome had long exercised over the Latin states, was put out of the way by violence, and an alliance formed with Octavius Manutius, who ruled in a similar manner at Tusculum as Tarquin did at Rome. The practice now commenced, which was continued till a later period, for the king, as afterwards for the consul, to proclaim, by a yearly solemnity on the Alban hill, that Rome laid claim to the first rank amongst the Latin towns, not as a privilege acquired by force, but as hereditary, and consecrated by divine awe and worship.

From this time forth the king appears as a conqueror, and quite in the approved manner of conquering kings, as a builder of enormous piles, and a founder of new cities. Suessa Pomætia, and the rich country of the Volscians, were first occupied; vast spoils were made, numerous captives, and an immense mass of treasure, fell to the share of the monarch. The next attack was made against the Latin town of Gabii, which refused to acknowledge the title by which Rome affected the eminence of capital of the whole Latin league. Tarquin vainly attempted to reduce the town by force; and his son Sextus acted the part of a double betrayer, in order to procure success for his father. Among the colonies which Tarquin is said to have founded are Signia, Circeii, Cora. It is related by the Roman annalists, Fabius Pictor and Piso, that the king collected enormous spoils in his wars, and on some occasions brought an army together, of which the number was reckoned at 70,000 men. All these incidents cannot have been of literal occurrence. Yet, combined with other circumstances, they indicate a power which was much more extensive and considerable than the Romans, who wrote the history of the first times of the republic, knew or chose to acknowledge as having preceded them. The building of those enormous temples, of which the first foundations
had been laid under Tarquinius Priscus, was doubtless carried on under Servius Tullius; but their completion is ascribed to the last Tarquin, who is said to have kept the people at forced labours, and to have spent the amount of his military spoils upon these objects. It is certain that the buildings of the elder, as well as the younger Tarquin, were entirely in the Etruscan style; that workmen out of Etruria were employed upon them; that the Capitoline temple was a triple one, and consecrated to the Etruscan worship, which at this time had spread itself over all Italy.*

It is evident that the military despotism which Tarquin had endeavoured to erect was not only obnoxious to the senate, whom he deprived of their influence, and to the people, of whose compulsory service he made use in his wars and his works, but even to a large part of the royal family itself; and this, for the obvious reason, that in a military despotism, with the exception of a single man, and of those whom he happens to choose for his instruments, all others are and must be utterly insignificant. That the expulsion of the king and his sons was the work of an aristocratical party is manifest from the early constitution of the Roman republic. It is equally certain, however, that the Roman patricians, like the English barons, were obliged to enlist the people in their interests, and concede to it rights, which must, sooner or later, lead to a new description of government. Livy, moreover, expressly states†, that the change of

* The story goes that Tarquin, on the capture of Suessa Pometia, appropriated a treasure, of 400 talents of silver and gold, from the booty, with which money he set about the building of a magnificent temple. Liv. i. 53.

† The building was, however, laid out on so grand a scale, that the spoil from Pometia, which should have defrayed the expense of the entire work, proved hardly sufficient even to lay the foundation. (Liv. i. 55.) The king, eager to see his temple completed, caused architects and surveyors to be brought out of Etruria; and put in requisition for that purpose, not the public treasures only, but the labours of the people, who, on their part, did not grudge their assistance to raise the gods a temple with their own hands. Liv. i. 56.
the constitution at the outset was nothing else than the transformation of monarchical into patrician administration—of hereditary into elective government. Those members of the royal family, by whom the king was expelled, would seem to have gained the patricians and the plebeians for their new regulations, much as the men who overset the old regime in France attached the mass of the people to the revolution, by dividing amongst them, namely, the possessions of the exiled party.

The legend represents the collateral branches as principal actors in the expulsion of the main branch of the royal family. Brutus was the nephew of the despotic Tarquin, and at the same time the first officer of the realm, having the command of the cavalry, and the right to assemble the people. Collatinus, who in concert with Brutus conducted the conspiracy against the king, and excited the people to revolt, was a descendant of the younger branch of the royal house, and Spurius Lucretius, like Valerius, who was distinguished by the title of Publicola, belonged to Collatinus's family, and to that of his wife. That Brutus, to avoid suspicion, counterfeited idiocy; that he brought an oracle from Delphi, and applied it to the furtherance of his project for the liberation of Rome, does not interweave so well with the main texture of the story as does the brutality of Sextus Tarquin towards the chaste Lucretia, the wife of Collatinus Tarquinius. No one who is acquainted with the history of the petty lords of Italy in the middle ages, and who knows the force of passion and the excess of wanton arrogance exhibited by an Ezzelin and a Caesar Borgia, will consider it incredible that Tarquin should have hurried from his father's camp at Ardea, expressly to dishonour the nuptial couch of a near relative. The Roman historians lavish an abundance of rhetorical ornament on the voluntary death of Lucretia, her last moments, and the scenes immediately subsequent in Rome.

In later times, the 24th of February was celebrated
by the Romans as the anniversary of the expulsion of kings. The history of Rome as a kingdom closes with the reign of the Tarquins. The place of the monarchical form was taken by a strict aristocracy, modified only by the existence of assemblies voting by centuries. According to the ordinary reckoning, the kingdom had existed 244 years.
BRUTUS and Collatinus, according to the received tradition*, were chosen consuls for the first year of the new republic, in a popular assembly held by centuries, which continued to be the custom from that epoch. They retained the royal insignia with the royal power, which, being divided between two, who were only invested with it for one year, could no longer endanger the state, while it gave greater vigour to the executive department than it possessed in any other republic of those times. Brutus, who in fact had been the head of the conspiracy against the royal government, found, according to the tradition, a part of the most respectableburgers, and even his own colleague, Collatinus, more inclined towards the monarchical constitution than towards republican forms. He detected a conspiracy, in which the sons of the first families, including his own, were implicated, and of which the object was to recall the royal family from exile. He sacrificed his sons to his country, and pronounced sentence of death on them in person. Moreover, according to Livy’s account, Brutus compelled his colleague, Collatinus, to resign the consulate, in a manner which looks very like a manœuvre for the promotion of Valerius, who procured the concession of new rights to the people through the senate, which was now restored to the number of 300.

* The treaty of peace which the Romans are said to have closed with the Carthaginians in the first years of freedom,—which Polybius affirms himself to have seen, and the very words of which he has handed down to us,—stands in utter contradiction with the whole history of the first consuls, and every thing connected with it. The only alternative, therefore, is to derive an altogether new history from the treaty, or to follow the hitherto received tradition. We have preferred the latter course; since, though the early annals of the republic are as little adapted as those of the kings to afford a firm historical footing, they may very, well aid in explaining the first steps of Roman aggrandisement.
The stories of the flight of Tarquin’s party to Tarquinii; of the aid which they received from thence and from Veii; of the battle and single combat* at the wood Arsia; of the panic terror by which the troops were dispersed after the battle; of the expelled monarch’s arrival at Clusium, and reception at the court of Porsenna; of the latter’s expedition to Rome; of Mucius Scaevola, Clelia, Horatius Cocles, &c. &c. are hardly more admissible into the page of sober history than the narrative of the Messenian war, or that of the deeds of Codrus.

The story goes, that the city of Rome was invested by Porsenna, and compelled to accept the conditions which he thought fit to impose. He, however, was magnanimous enough not to force back on the Romans the expelled king, in whose cause he is said to have undertaken the whole expedition! This looks very consistent with the natural course of human action. But we are now in a field where strict historical method is inapplicable. According to Dionysius, an unfortunate war with Aricia deprived Porsenna of all the advantages previously gained by him over Rome, while the city received an important reinforcement of able-bodied men, by the settlement on Roman soil of Attus Clausus, a Sabine patrician, with 5000 fighting men of his clients. He was afterwards, as a Roman patrician, called Appius Claudius, and his whole family always continued notable, or notorious for aristocratic pride.

The Latins are recorded to have next marched upon Rome, in the cause of the exiled family, under Mamilius, the ruler of Tusculum. Their object appears less to have been to restore the Roman king, whose flight was now directed towards Tusculum, than to contest with Rome the foremost rank and influence in the Latin

* The single combat is described very theatrically. Brutus and Aruns Tarquiniius, each a worthy antagonist of the other, must of course be brought together; and that the desa ab machiav may not be wanting, the voice of the wood-god scatters hosts which, the day before, had fought courageously. Dion. l. v. c. 15, 16.
league. The battle which was fought at Regillus*, u. c. between the Romans and Latins, decided the contest. 258. Tarquin is said, after this period, to have been last of all abandoned by the Latins, and to have died at Cumæ.

In the Latin towns, a dictator was a functionary of nearly the same description as an esynmete among the Greeks.† We find this dignity also established in Rome soon after the expulsion of the kings. Even if the dictator was not appointed, according to the commonly received account, on occasion of the disputes between the plebeians and the patricians, his commanding position, at all events, was employed to drive to the field such plebeians as refused to serve in the army.‡ The main grievances of the people did not directly point to the constitution, but to the laws and their administration, especially in cases of debt. By the existing law, the person of the poorer citizen, who in war-time was compelled to neglect his business, and maintain himself besides at his own cost, was abandoned to the mercy of his creditor; who, having first by usurious interest exhausted the poor debtor's means, laid claim at last to his person§ as security for the principal. The chance-spectacle of a former captain set to work like a slave in chains occasioned a revolt at so early a period as that which preceded the battle at the lake Regillus. The plebeians refused to be enrolled, and the first conciliatory expedient was the extension of the term for calling in debts. The people now expected some mitigation of the existing laws; but the persecution of debtors was recommenced with all its former rigour, immediately on the close of the Latin war: and, when the popular dis-

* Il lago Regillo, situato secondo Livio nell'agro Toscolano dee essere lo stesso che oggi chiamasi laghetto alle radici di monte Falcone presso la colonna.—Micali, Italia, &c. iii. 70.
‡ The choice of a dictator at first rested with the senate. The consul, afterwards one consul, nominated him in the dead of night, and the consular lictors were instantly transferred to him. It was necessary, at first, that he should be a man of consular rank: in later times this limitation ceased, as well as that of election by the senate.
§ Wachsmuth, p. 276, 277.
content broke forth, endeavours were made, by incessant wars, to occupy and divert the minds of the multitude. During these wars, and after the close of each campaign with the Volscians, with the Sabines, and Auruncans, the disturbances became more and more serious. The government, the lictors, knights, and patricians, met with resistance; and it was necessary twice to name a dictator to restore order. The first of these officers, Appius Claudius, embittered the people by proud defiance; the second, Manius Valerius, sought to appease them by fair promises, which he found himself unable to keep, as the rich would concede nothing. A formal schism ensued between the orders of the state. The dictator resigned his office; the consuls took the command of the army; the plebeians left the patricians to return to Rome by themselves, and encamped under the guidance of their leader, Sicinius, three miles from the town, on a hill, which since that time was known by the new name of Mons Sacer. Here they seemed prepared to found a city for themselves, with laws and regulations of its own.

In the position which they occupied, it is not at all improbable that they really began to organise some sort of constitution, though it were only of a tumultuary or military description, like the peasantry in the Bauernkriegen of Germany in the sixteenth century, or the ana-baptists in Munster and Thuringia; excepting that they were not utterly rude like the former, nor fanatical and abandoned like the latter. In their ranks were men of the greatest wealth, even nobles, though not Roman ones, nor did they lack the presence of landed proprietors. The seceders, as the story goes, were induced to cool reflection by the rational addresses of the moderate patricians, and by the celebrated fable of "The belly and limbs" of Menenius Agrippa, who was sent as their delegate to the plebeians. A formal pacification was at length concluded. It is not known what was settled with regard to the debts,—the main point;—but it is certain that the people obtained a much more im-
portant share in the administration of public affairs than
had hitherto been allowed them.

This was achieved through the agency of the tribu-
nate,—an authority entirely new in its form as in its
essence,—a representation of the people, invested with
its majesty, armed with its collective force against any
individual magistrate, and striking with a sentence of
outlawry whoever dared to violate it. At first, two tri-
bunes were appointed, Junius Paterculus (Brutus), and
Sicinius, the chiefs of the secession. Soon afterwards,
three others were added, and the people thought they
had gained an advantage in proportion to the increased
number, while the patricians profited in effect, by the
splitting of the authority.

The tribunate, looking only to the spirit of its
institution, was established to protect the people from
patrician attacks generally, and from magisterial tyranny
especially in cases of debt. It was established as a last
resort for every individual against threatened ill treat-
ment, and, the patricians alleged, was limited to im-
mediate personal protection. The intercession of the
tribunes, therefore, had nothing of free spontaneous
agency, but was primarily a check upon the agency of
others. They could prohibit, but they could not enjoin
without special occasion. Strictly speaking, therefore,
they had no administrative function, though, in so far as
they had charge of the safety of every individual, and, by
consequence, of the people in the aggregate, they as-
suredly deserved the name of a magistracy; and even
the patricians soon found their account in extending
this protective authority over their own body, and thus
converting the tribunate into a general or national,
though still called a plebeian, office, in regard to the
birth of those who held it.

But the principle of the institution could not long
confine its range, which inevitably extended itself with
the growing power and claims of the people. It was
soon perceived that when one side strikes, while the other
is only allowed to parry, the struggle is waged on very
unequal terms. This suggested the idea of anticipating patrician attacks, by crippling the power of the order which was capable of them. Thus, patrician prerogatives, even when unaccompanied by actual encroachments on the plebeians, soon came to be regarded as entrenching on their political rights. Out of these pretensions sprang the principle that the plebs composed the people, properly so called, and of right possessed supreme judicial and legislative authority. So soon as this idea was once recognised, the tribunes might bring forward what they pleased in the name of the people, and the patricians appeared merely in the light of possessors of public property, from whom successive portions of that property might and should be recovered. The plebs put forward their claim of property; the patricians rested on that of possession: the former party felt themselves strong in the justice of their cause, and acquired additional strength with every right which they recovered; the latter defended themselves by the arts of chicanery and religious delusion. The issue of the struggle could not be doubtful.

According to the Roman maxim of government, that the prevention of good measures should be preferred to the admission of evil, and that those who held coordinate authority had the right of opposing a veto to each other's proceedings, a tribune, by his single intercession, could, at once, check the activity of the rest. The decision of a majority of the tribunes could only be admitted as valid, when a previous understanding had existed that it should be so, a precaution which was taken against the right of intercession, by which any one of their body might have reduced the rest to inaction.

Along with the tribunes, plebeian sédiles were instituted, inferior in rank, but who do not appear to have been subservient, though subsidiary to the former in function. Their duties, which had, probably, no very definite limits, soon became manifold. As the tribunes on a large scale acquired and secured to the people
justice, liberty, and the powers of legislation; so the ædiles afforded them succour in necessity, aid against all injuries of a minor description, tranquillity and security, by means of police regulations. In after times, the regulation of the price of grain, the surveyorship of public works, the care of the temples, aqueducts, baths, and other similar duties, which had formerly been in the province of the consuls, devolved on the ædiles.

The whole subsequent history of Rome turns upon this grand innovation in her government. Ever since the expulsion of the kings, the legislative power, the supreme legal jurisdiction, and the election of public officers, had vested ostensibly in the people; but the exercise of these their rights was extremely cramped and limited, as the people gave their votes only by curiae and by centuries. In the first, patrician influence preponderated. In the second, wealth appears to have had the majority, and in general all the centuries blindly followed the vote given by the prærogativa, or century called by lot to vote first. Neither of these assemblies could be held without the senate. A magistrate of senatorial rank presided in both. Both were under the authority of the augurs, who interpreted or invented signs at discretion. Things were altered after the secession: the popular assemblies had been held without auspices on the Mons Sacer; and without auspices those assemblies continued to be held, which were especially called to debate the affairs of the plebeians. These assemblies voted by the head, and the tribunes were invested with the formidable attribute of convoking them, as well as taking cognisance of the rights of the plebeians in the meetings of the senate.* The number of the first tribunes was limited to two; but a few years after there seem to have been five of them, and the number was raised to ten at a later period.† The first step had now been made towards the annihilation of the strict aristocratical privileges. The senate, however, still retained

† According to Livy, a formal treaty was made, "in has conditiones, ut plebis aulis magistratus essent sacrosancti, quibus auxilli latii adversus con-
the prerogative of war and peace, decreed levies of troops, determined as to the necessity of naming a dictator, imposed taxes, allotted and administered the public domain, gave or withheld the spoils of war from the army. It retained, even in later times the superintendence of religion and religious ceremonial, the distribution of offices in the provinces and commands in the army, the care and appropriation of the public treasures, the administration of justice over all Italy, the conduct of all foreign affairs, the reception and appointment of ambassadors, the investment of allies with royal dignity. Moreover, it fixed the times for holding popular assemblies, and pre-arranged the matters there to be treated of. Lastly, the senate held itself licensed to confer unlimited powers on consuls, praetors, and tribunes, by virtue of the tremendous formula, which consigned to their charge the safety of the republic on occasions of particular emergency.

The whole subsequent history, it has already been said, turns on the strife between the privileged orders and the plebeians, who, since the nomination of the tribunes, had started up at once into a formidable political power, and, three years after that nomination, seized the highest judicial functions. This took place when a young patrician, Caius Marcius, surnamed Coriolanus, for his bravery at Corioli, endeavoured to take advantage of the necessities of the people to tear from them their hardly extorted franchises.

Dionysius*, Livy†, and Plutarch‡, unite in narrating that the interruption of agriculture during the secession was very soon succeeded by a dreadful famine. Ambassadors were sent to purchase corn of the Volscians, as well as into Etruria, Cumæ, and Sicily. The Volscians, and Aristodemus, the tyrant of Cumæ, gave the Roman envoys an unfriendly reception; corn

* V. V. 1.  
† II. 34.  
‡ Coriol. 12.
was not to be had in sufficient quantities from Etruria. At length arrived the supplies bespoken from Sicily, with an equal quantity as a present from one of the Sicilian tyrants. It would seem that the ædiles, had not, as yet, the superintendence of stores and prices, for the senate regarded the distribution of the newly acquired stock as coming entirely within its proper financial province. A certain party, of whom Coriolanus was at the head, proposed that the corn should be portioned out to the people on no other condition than the abdication on their part of the rights so lately conceded to them. The tribunes, who were present at the debate, took note of the words of the young patrician champion, and as he went out of the curie, called him publicly to account for them. Tumult ensued, Coriolanus struck the ædiles, who would have laid hands on him; and the young patricians rallying round him, prepared to repel force by force. The tribunes interfered to restrain the summary justice of the multitude, and cited Coriolanus before the tribunal of the people. At this tribunal they themselves were to preside, the votes to be taken by head, independently of all influence or guidance of the patricians. This was probably more than the latter intended to concede, when they recognised the judicial authority of the assembled people. They must now have given up all hope of saving Coriolanus, as they could not even assist at the trial without incurring deeper loss than even that of Coriolanus himself. Any individual sacrifice seemed of less destructive consequence than collective abasement of the order beneath the authority of the tribunes. Accordingly, though with their clients they made their appearance on the day of trial, it was only to work upon the people by threats or supplications, without taking any part in the proceedings. The tribunes charged Coriolanus with having uttered traitorous words, with having outraged the persons of the ædiles, and with having proposed to rob the people of their consecrated authorities. The
penalty annexed by them to these offences was ban-
ishment. Coriolanus quitted Rome without appear-
ing before the tribunal, and took refuge at Antium with
the Volscians. According to the legend, he reappears
at the head of a Volscian army, in the character of an
enemy to his country, marches on Rome, and forbears
the vengeance already in his grasp, at the prayer of his
mother, wife, and children, after he had spurned from
his feet the suppliant priests and magistrates of his
country. He draws off the Volscians from their prey,
and the fates devote him to death, by their hands, with
strict poetical justice.

The history of Coriolanus, whether it be true or not,
must be acknowledged of the highest importance in esti-
mating the Roman character. This narrative of a struggle
between two parties, equally firm, vigorous, and pa-
triotic each in its way, demanding or defending what
they each deemed their rights, was delivered from mouth
to mouth, from generation to generation, and became a
lesson of fathers to their children and grandchildren.
The patricians might already perceive what were their
future prospects from the issue of this struggle, in which
they vainly opposed force to force.
CHAP. IV.

Political powers acquired by the plebeians.

While war with the Volscians, Hernici, and Veientes, supplied the Romans with military exercise, new disputes arose in the interior; first, on the right of the people to a share in conquered lands; and secondly, on the right of legislation which the plebeians, assembled by tribes, began on certain points to claim exclusively. The Agrarian law, the object of the first of these demands, has been investigated so thoroughly by Niebuhr, that the following simple statement can add little of value or novelty to the view which he has given of the subject.

The division of a demesne into three parts, one for the gods, one for the state, and a third for the citizens, was, in ancient times, no uncommon measure. In Rome it was of immemorial usage, and is ascribed, like other things of the kind, to Romulus. In the earliest divisions of land, one portion appears to have been obtained in absolute property by the patricians, nor does there seem to have been any prohibition against the enlargement of this portion by purchase. The usufruct of another part of the public domain was held by the king and patricians, jointly or severally, and usufructuary became, in fact, permanent possession, on the payment of a trifling quit-rent, or, rather, tithe. This tenure was greatly more advantageous than the ordinary modes of farming land, and it was matter of complaint that these prescriptive occupants dispensed themselves even from paying the dues annexed to their tenure. The occasion of every extension of Roman territory was seized by the patrician gentes to swell their acquisitions, while allotments of conquered lands to plebeians, in full property, were rarely and were grudgingly made. On the expulsion of Tarquin, indeed, his domain was divided
among the people; but the subsequent losses of territory under the republic dispossessed many of their allotments. Fresh conquests were not speedily made, but the patricians first attempted to meet the public distress by establishing colonies. This was, however, not so much an allocation of territories conquered and secured as of strips of frontier, thrown for defence on the colonists to whom they were allotted, and consequently was viewed as no relief by the plebeians, who, while they were mocked with these illusory advantages, saw in the hands of patricians the more secure and inland public domains. The people were thus tricked out of the profits of their toilsome campaigns. The tribunes, however, were not the first to signalise the abuse. A patrician and a consul took the lead in bringing it under discussion.

Spurius Cassius had been thrice consul. He had already, at an earlier period, proposed to return to the people the purchase money of the grain which had been imported from Sicily during a scarcity. He now proposed to divide a part of the public landed estates.* It would be difficult to form any decision with regard to the character of Cassius from the records of this transaction which have come down to us. What is certain, however, is, that his motion occasioned dangerous disorders, not only during his consulship, but to the end of the republic, during the whole of which period these disturbances form one of the main features of Roman history. The senate, embittered against a consul who seemed to betray so scandalously the interests of his order, exerted itself to ruin him with the people, succeeded in throwing suspicion on the motives of the proposal, and even affected willingness, and absolutely passed a decree, to give the people a share in the conquered territory. The people distrusted the consul, whose ambition was notorious, and abandoned him to the vengeance of his order.

* Wachsmuth, 394.
After the fate of Cassius*, no one dreamed of putting the senate's decree, with regard to the public lands, into execution, until the tribunes at length began to take up the matter in good earnest. They did not, however, it seems, immediately bring the patrician authorities who were to blame for this neglect, before the popular tribunals. It was not till the termination of the war with Veii and the Sabines, that the tribune Genucius advanced the proposition that all the consuls since Sp. Cassius must be made answerable to the people for the subsequent oblivion of the promised division of lands. However, he did not persist in going so far back, but contented himself with bringing to trial Furius and Manlius, the consuls of the foregoing year (280 B.C.), who had terminated the war with the Veians, and closed a forty years' truce. The patricians took all possible pains to save their most esteemed and deserving colleagues from the slur of a public trial. They even had recourse to the most humiliating supplications; unless, indeed, Livy, as usual, has transferred to the earliest times what was wont to occur in his own days† on similar occasions. Nothing would do! The people were assembled, the trial came on, when, at this critical moment, the death of the defender of popular rights was announced‡, and the comitia rose again as a matter of course.

This incident, however, only made matters worse, as the affair must inevitably, sooner or later, again come under discussion. Publius Volero, a plebeian captain (qui ordines duxerat), on being shortly after summoned to serve in the ranks as a common soldier, refused, and, when compulsion was attempted, appealed to the people, and was instantly taken under their protection. The

* Sp. Cassius is said to have been sentenced by his own father, according to the ancient family law, cognosce domi casae. On the other hand, Livy states, "Invenio spud quosdam, idque propius idem est, a quaeoribus K. Fabio et L. Valerio diem dictam perduellionis, damnumque populii judicio, dirutas publice aedes."

† Furius et Manlius sordidati circumvent non plebe magis quam juniores patrum — hi non publica, sed in privato seducta a plurium conscientia consilia habuere, nec auctor quamvis audaci facinori deearat.

‡ Igitur die judicis cum plebs in foro erecta expectatione staret, mirari primo, quid non descendenter tribunus, tandem qui obversati vestibulo tribuni fuerant, nuntiant domi mortuum esse.
senate was induced to yield by the more prudent of the patricians, and Volero was chosen by the people for their tribune of the following year. During his tribune-
ship he made the proposal to withdraw the election of tribunes of the people from the influence of wealth, and from that of the nobles, with their pretended science of sacred rites and usages. The tribunes, like the regular authorities, had been formerly elected in the assemblies of the centuries, which could only be convoked in pursuance of a decree of the senate, and in which rank and riches had the preponderance. These assemblies were presided over by some person in authority, and stood in need of the auspices and auguries, which entirely depended on the senate. They must, moreover, be confirmed by the assemblies of the curiae, which were wholly patrician, or, at least, stood wholly under patrician influence.

Publilius Volero proposed that the defenders of the people should be chosen in the assemblies of tribes, where votes were decided by numbers; where no auspices and no confirmation by the curiae were required; where, lastly, a tribune presided.* The question was momentous: it was the first step to all the subsequent changes introduced in the aristocratic parts of the constitution. In the first year Volero could not carry through his project. He was, however, again elected for the following year; which would not have happened, had not the rich plebeians of the first class for once felt an identity of interests with the multitude. The consuls of the following year were of different dispositions. Appius, at the head of the haughty nobility, would have used force; but Quinctius led his colleague away, and conceded what could not be refused much longer. Four generations passed, however, before the consul Publilius procured the delegation to assemblies of the tribes, and, by consequence, to votes by the head, of the power of making valid laws on all subjects proposed to them. Meanwhile the confirm-

* Beaufort.
ation of the decrees of the centurial assemblies by the curiae became a mere form, as did the curial meetings themselves, the thirty lictors only being brought together to represent the curia. It was rare for aught of early institution to sink into entire disuse in Rome. If the substance vanished, the shadow was retained, and the curiae kept the privilege of confirming long after the right of electing the consuls had shifted to the centuries. All political changes made by the Romans were directed to some proximate and definite object, and nothing was wholly done away with, unless inconsistent with that object.

The plebeians having in this manner possessed themselves of some of the most important political privileges, next sought to remove the last restrictions on their rights, which had existed from the earliest times, and had hitherto retarded the development of that Roman state, to which was reserved the empire of the world.

In order to obliterate in Rome the last traces of the Etruscan system of castes and priestly government, the plebeians must be made to participate in the knowledge of those legal mysteries, which had hitherto been communicated only to the patrician families by means of oral tradition and of ceremonial archives, while they were purposely kept inaccessible to the body of the people. The exorbitant power of the consuls as supreme judges must disappear*: the prohibition of marriage between patricians and plebeians must be taken off. To this end a new legislation was requisite, and the tribune, Terentillus Arsa, made the first advances to it, taking u. c. 292. advantage of the absence of both consuls. The affair was, however, delayed by the city prefect, through intervention of the other tribunes, till the return of the consuls, whose presence put a stop to it for the moment. In the following year, however, the whole u. c. 293.

* According to Livy, Terentillus Arsa particularly directed his attacks against the consuls: — * Quippe duos pro uno acceptos immoderatâ infinitâ potestate; qui soluti atque effrenati ipse omnes metus legum omniamque supplicia verterent in plebem. Quae ne aeterna illis licentia sit, legem se promulgaturum, ut quinque viri creentur legibus de imperio consulari scribendis*.
college of tribunes renewed the rogation, which was strenuously resisted by the noble Cincinnatus, the very model of a Roman of the old stock, as well as by his son Cæsio Quinctius. Legal and illegal means were resorted to; recourse was had to the Sibylline books; warnings against disturbance were promulgated on divine authority; a war was begun against the Æqui and Volsci. All in vain. Quinctius was brought to trial; the entreaties of his father, those of the patricians and his own were unavailing, and he thought it more advisable to forfeit his recognisances, and save himself by flight, than to await his sentence. Cincinnatus was impoverished, being obliged to indemnify those who had stood as sureties for his son; yet the nobility still resisted the repeatedly re-elected tribunes. The latter, however, carried the augmentation of their number to ten; and at length the nomination of a commission, with extraordinary legislative powers.* Every other power, even that of the tribunes, thereupon ceased, and unlimited authority, till the establishment of new laws, was delegated to ten men, to be elected, according to the proposal of the tribunes, as well as from among plebeians as patricians; but who were chosen, after some discussion, exclusively from the latter class.

It is evident, that an union of the several classes of Romans, which had hitherto stood apart from each other, in some measure, as castes, was the real scope and end of the new legislation. The remains of that legislation are, however, so insignificant, and their interpretation so difficult, that even Niebuhr confesses they would give us little instruction in civil or criminal jurisprudence. It may be enough, therefore, to mention, that the distinction between clients, as vassals, or birelings of the patricians, and the rest of the plebeians, thenceforth vanished, that patronage became a mere protection and defence

* Livy, who in this is followed by Niebuhr, says, that each decemvir held the presidency for twelve days, had twelve lictors for his suite, and exercised judicial supremacy: — Placet creari decemviro sine provocacione, et ne quis eam anno alius magistratus esset. Adiscerenturn plebei controversias aliquandiu sult, postremo concessum patribus modo, ne lex Icilia de Aventino aliqua sacras leques abrogarentur.
of humble dependents by the rich and the powerful; and that the centuries, not as yet the tribes, recognised as alone having penal jurisdiction overburghers.

In the first year of their office, these decemvirs behaved so admirably, that their administration gave general satisfaction; and they brought their legislative duties nearly to a close; but declared that a sixth of the requisite laws was still wanting (or two of the twelve tables on which the laws were afterwards engraved*); and by consequence, that a further prolongation of this extraordinary regimen was necessary. The patrician, Appius Claudius, who took the leading part in the whole affair, was nominated president at the election of the new decemvirs. He acted in concert with the plebeians, by receiving votes for plebeian candidates, and for himself, likewise, though it had been declared contrary to law that any functionary should be re-elected immediately after holding office. By dint of intrigue, Appius was, however, re-elected, and along with him nine others, half of whom were patricians, half plebeians.

This new commission soon showed itself very different from the first. Each of the decemvirs had twelve lictors; and the latter bore in their bundle of staves the formidable axe, the sign of judgment on life and death, which the consuls, since the time of Valerius Publicola, had been obliged to lay down during residence in the city. It was now in vain to think of appeal from one ruler to another, though that appeal alone had rendered tolerable the want of tribunes during the first year of the new government. Even in this year the sway of the decemvirs had already become tyrannical; and in the beginning of the next, not a word more was said of the resignation of their office. The second year's decemviral government was entirely without legal foundation; yet the senate, which they

* Duo adhuc decem tabulas, is the singular phrase of Livy, as if the requisite number of tables could have been settled so precisely beforehand. Had the mystical Etruscan number any weight in the calculation?
found themselves obliged to convoke on occasion of an
inroad of the Æqui and Sabines, acknowledged their
authority. The circumstances under which that body
was convoked were the following. The decemvirs had
received an application for aid from Tusculum; and, as
they durst not presume so far on their own authority as
to levy an army, they were obliged to call the senate
together. On its meeting, the first question raised was
the right by which it had been convoked: for in
strictness the decemvirs were but private persons, and
as such could have no right to convoke the senate or
to collect its votes. However, only two of its number
insisted on the point of form, and the decemvirs kept
possession of their dignity. Accordingly, they sent out
an army, which was every where defeated, and procured
the murder of Siccius, the only man who had vindicated
the honour of the Roman arms by deeds of personal
valour, which the chronicles have strained to the verge
of the fabulous.

Hardly was this murder accomplished, when Appius
Claudius perpetrated a still more scandalous deed in the
town than that which had been committed by his col-
leagues at the head of the army. The daughter of Virgi-
nius, a brave officer, the betrothed of Icilius, who had
before acquired high esteem as tribune of the people, was
claimed by a dependant of Appius, as daughter of his
female slave; and Appius himself sat in the judgment-
seat to decide upon the question raised with regard to
the birth of an innocent virgin, whom he had marked
out for the victim of his lust. He refused to await
longer than a single day the arrival of her father from
the army, pronounced sentence against him on his un-
expected appearance, and the father stabbed his daughter
in the sight of the assembled people, rather than be
witness of her dishonour. Father and bridegroom then
invoked the vengeance of the people. Within the city
the senate took the part of the decemvirs; but Virginius
and Icilius found an audience in the army, which
left its encampment, marched upon Rome, and Virginius
first occupied the Aventine with one division of troops, where he was speedily joined by Icilius with another. The people would hear none but the two men who in the senate had opposed the illegal power of the decemvirs. Every other embassy from the town was received with scorn, and each division of troops, that of Virginius and Icilius, elected ten tribunes, who formed a deliberative council. The first rank and the conduct of affairs was entrusted to two of these tribunes, and the whole multitude marched, under the leading of their new chiefs, from their position on the Aventine to the Mons Sacer.

At first the patricians, in spite of threats, persevered in their previous disposition, and the decemvirs did not abdicate their office. But Valerius and Horatius refused to mediate between senate and people, so long as that iniquitous power should continue to exist. It was not till the people prepared for a formal secession from the town, that the patricians did at last give way. The decemvirs were obliged to retire; and the people, under the auspices of the pontifex maximus, chose ten tribunes, who were recognised by the senate as rightful defenders of the people. On the motion of these tribunes, the old constitution was restored, with the express provision, which Horatius and Valerius, the two friends of the people, who were afterwards chosen for consuls, caused to be passed into a law, that not only should an appeal lie to the senate from all decrees of the consuls, but that the decision of the people should have more weight than that of both the senate and the consuls.* Appius, who had caused Virginia’s murder, died by his own hand; the plebeian Appius, who, with the aid of the senate, had screened Appius, was capitally convicted; the other decemvirs were forced to quit the town. Whether the laws of the second and third year of the decemviral government had by that

---

* "L. Valerius et Horatius, (says Livy) omnium primum, cum velut in controverso jure esset, tenerenturque patres plebis citatis, legem centuriae comitias tulere, ut quod tributim plebs jusisset, populum teneret." The antithesis of plebs and populus here must not be overlooked.
time been promulgated, cannot be ascertained with certainty, since it is no where stated at what time were set up the two last tables of the twelve which contained the old legislation of Rome. However, the impassable distinctions of rank were overthrown. A law of Canuleius, in the 309th year of the city, removed the prohibition of marriage between plebeians and patricians; and, after a long struggle, all the regular seats of authority were at length rendered accessible to the plebeians. The provisional function of interrex alone continued till the latest times a prerogative of the patricians.
CHAP. V.

ADVANCE OF ROME TO SUPREME POWER OVER ITALY.

The rapid aggrandisement of Rome, and immense increase of her internal strength, resulted from the foregoing innovations. Nothing but war could procure for the families which occupied the places of honour any respite from the tribunes and from the multitude, kept by the tribunes in a state of constant excitement. Nothing but moderation, valour, fortitude, justice, and prudence could now secure persons in their station who had formerly owed every thing to birth alone. It was this which gave such dignity to the characters of those times, such activity and vigilance to the military leaders. The plebeians were excited in no less degree by the change. They were constrained to double exertions in the public service, in order to supplant the present possessors of public offices; they were constrained to practise industry and frugality, in order to become their rivals in wealth; they were constrained to exhibit promptitude in supporting public burdens, in order not to stand behind them in patriotism. Perfect union prevailed amongst all classes against the foreign enemy; and to the latter the vigour awakened by intestine strife was always dangerous. But so soon as war with external enemies ceased, intestine commotions were sure to recommence, which kept all the burghers awake at least, and allowed none to sink down on the pillow of effeminacy or luxury.

About this time a system of strict moral superintendence was introduced into the Roman state, according to Sabine usage, and in connection with military discipline, taxation, and administration. A review of the civic force, of the most eminent as of the poorest burghers; inscription in the roll of citizens, and in the
lists of contributions; and the letting of the demesne lands, were annually conducted by two censors, who, moreover, made strict inquisition into the outward manner of life and reputation of every individual citizen. These censors must themselves be men of tried and blameless character, and for a long period they watched over the maintenance of the ancient discipline, with no less success than was found during three centuries in Geneva; only that in the latter town, the duties of religion and morality, as well as those of domestic life, were drawn within the competence of a spiritual tribunal; while in Rome the censors exercised a merely civil jurisdiction. The election of censors took place every five years. Three men were elected who had held the consular dignity, who remained in office eighteen months, and performed its functions usefully, so long as superintendence of that description was compatible with the multiplied relations of the state. When this ceased to be the case, the people began to regard the superintendence of morals as a secondary part of the office, and the censors themselves only employed it to gratify animosities, and to wreak their personal spite upon individuals.

We must content ourselves with indicating the steps by which Rome attained to the highest point of external domination, in the same manner, that is to say, only in its leading features, as we have already described the internal formation of her civil constitution — a constitution which, like the English, was bought at the price of blood and of earnest struggles, not got up extempore complete in all its parts, but developed by degrees, like every thing great which nature herself produces.

The Sabines, a parent stem of Rome, had been, since the three hundred and sixth year of the city, wholly incorporated into the Roman state — their hills and vales became Roman possessions. The Volsci and Æquii were in part received into the alliance which was granted to the Latins, and their land was in part granted to Roman or Latin colonists. In this manner Fidenæ
became Roman property; while Lavici, Bolsæ, and Anxur were divided between Romans and Latins. In these arrangements the advantage was always on the side of the Romans, who, though citizens of a single town, maintained an equal footing to the whole league at the head of which they stood. Their domain extended as far as the sea and the lake Fucinus, and all the Latins appeared content with these unequal terms of alliance. Southwards and westwards their territory was rounded off by the sea; northwards, in Etruria Proper, their farther progress was hindered by the Capenates, Falisci, and Veientes. At an earlier period, Rome had maintained a respectable rank even among the Etruscan towns. This rank, however, was afterwards lost by the town — the remembrance of their Tuscan origin had vanished, and Veii, with its enormous walls, behind which its inhabitants were perfectly safe against every attack which could be made without machinery for a siege, and without paid and standing armies, lay like a barrier in the neighbourhood of Rome, and resisted the extension of her domains north of the Tiber. Perpetual wars between Veii, a declining primitive state, and the growing Roman commonwealth, were inevitable. Unfortunately for Veii, the total overthrow of the two other principal parts of the Etruscan league took place just at the time when Rome, by degrees, partly modelled herself, and was partly modelled by circumstances, completely into a military aristocracy; and at the moment when the Romans threatened the Veians with destruction, even the towns of Etruria Proper refused to aid them against the common enemy. With regard to the two other members of the great Etruscan union, the Campanian branch had sunk under the Sammites, who also began to press on the Greek population of Campania. The Lombard branch had long been crushed by the Gallic expeditions. While the Romans at length threatened the destruction of Veii, the same barbarians also invaded Tuscany Proper, or at least threatened it every day with invasion.
Shortly before the last war with Veii, Rome had taken a measure which necessarily rendered her military force the most imposing in the whole west. The regulation must, however, have existed in the time of the kings, as the royal troops, or at least their guards, were undoubtedly paid from the public treasury. After this model, the civic force, which had formerly marched at its own expense, was, thenceforward, taken into the pay of the state. * This, however, regarded only the infantry: the cavalry, which was not very strong in numbers, and which was levied from that class which was the first in point of property, did not begin to receive regular pay till long afterwards.

The occasion of the last war with Veii was not so much the aggression of its citizens on the Roman soil, as the insulting manner in which they had dismissed the Roman delegates who were sent to demand satisfaction. "*Veiens bellum," says Livy †, "motum ob superbum responsum Veientis senatus, qui legatis repetentibus res, ni facessent propere urbe finibusque daturos, quod Lars Tolumnius dedisset, responderi jussit."" The explanation of this insolent allusion is, that the Fidenates, on the suggestion of Tolumnius, had slain the Roman ambassadors. In retaliation for this outrage, Cornelius Cossus slew Tolumnius, and brought to Rome the second *spolia opima.* Unequal to a conflict in the open field with the Romans, the men of Veii ensconced themselves behind their gigantic walls, and there withstood a siege for years. The siege of Veii has been handled in the Roman chronicles just as the Messenian wars in those of the Greeks. Its duration during ten successive winters and summers; the part which Camillus plays in it as dictator; the turning off the waters of the Alban lake by

* Livy relates (l. iv. c. 52) that after the siege of Anxur (Terracina), the plebeian soldiers were gratified with regular pay by the senate. "Oppidum veterum opulentum tres exercitus diripuere, eaque primum benignitas imperatorum plebe patribus conciliavit. Additum deinde omnium maxime tempestivo principum in multitudinem munere, ut ante mentionem ullam plebs tribunorumve decerneretur senatus, ut stipendium miles de publico accipere, quum ante id tempus de suo quisque functus e muneré esset."

† L. iv. c. 58.
the enormous work of a canal (emissarium), hewn in solid stone*; the sudden apparition of the Romans from a subterranean passage in the temple of Juno at Veii, belong to the embellishments of this narrative, which it were vain to attempt to reduce to any historical form and consistency. These incidents have all been received as true historical details, and filled the later Romans with enthusiasm for their national history. While on the one hand, therefore, we dare not represent them as authentic, on the other we shall as little presume to subject them to the method of historical criticism applicable on other occasions.

The conquest of Veii not only increased the population of Rome, as its inhabitants were compelled to leave their abodes and migrate thither,—it not only enriched the Romans with the spoils of an ancient and wealthy town, but it also extended the Roman dominion over one of the most fertile districts of Italy. The lands of the burghers of Veii were partly divided, partly farmed out. Etruria was now rendered accessible; the bulwark which had arrested the march of the Romans was removed; and sooner or later Latium, like Etruria, was marked out for conquest.

Even the Gauls were involuntary accessories to this subjection of all Italy under Roman domination, though they menaced, in the outset, Rome itself with destruction. We have already related how the Gauls forced their way into Italy; how, by degrees, and constantly reinforced by new immigrations, they approached the Apennines, and at last extended their ravages even into Etruria, on the other side of these mountains. Four expeditions are said to have been made by the Gauls at an earlier period, the fifth had been conducted into Etruria by the guardian of the regent (Lucumo) of Clusium, whom the latter had robbed of his wife. According to another account, the Gauls made their appearance somewhat later in Italy, and directed their

* Ricci, Memorie Storiche della Città di Alba Longa.
attack at once on the Etrurians within the Apennines.

Whatever occasion, however, may have led them over the Apennines, they besieged Clusium (Chiusi) at a time when Roman ambassadors were resident there, either accidentally, or on account of the Gauls. These ambassadors, of the powerful and numerous Fabian gens, were sent to make representations to the Gauls in the name of the Romans; and when they could not obtain a hearing, joined the ranks of the combatants. One of them had slain a Gaulish leader, whereupon the Gauls demanded the surrender of an ambassador, who had been guilty of so gross an offence against the laws of nations. Not only did the Romans refuse to comply with this demand, but likewise, when the Gallic army set out from Clusium towards Rome, elected three Fabii as military tribunes of the year. As the conqueror of Veii was at that time living in Ardea, the military tribunes led the army into the field.

The motive of Camillus's retirement from Rome, at this juncture, is said to have been his resentment of the treatment which he had met with from the people and their tribunes. Before the conquest of Veii, he had promised the people the whole of the spoils, but afterwards had skilfully contrived to diminish their share by a tenth. He had also applied a great part of the Veian spoil to his own use,—a practice to which the people were not yet accustomed. The tribunes took advantage of this circumstance to get him condemned by the people to a considerable fine. Indignant at this, he would not allow his clients and men of his tribe to pay it, though they offered to do so. According to Livy, he left the town "precatus a diis immortalibus, si innoxio sibi ea injuria ficeret, primo quoque tempore desiderium sive civitati ingrata facerent."

The Romans took position, with 25,000 or 30,000 men, on the river Allia, against 70,000 Gauls, and suffered such a defeat, that the remainder of the army did not even find its way back to Rome. It would
appear, from the rapid and easy conquest of Rome which ensued on this disaster, that the citizens, deprived of their effective force, betook themselves in part to the neighbouring places, in part to the Capitol. Many Romans and Etruscans had collected themselves together within the massive and deserted walls of Veii, with the Roman Cædicius at their head. Another band, under Camillus, defended itself in Ardea, in conjunction with theburghers of that town. Eighty old men, who had filled the highest offices, sacred and civil, devoted themselves as victims to the subterranean powers, and awaited, in their robes and on their curule chairs in the forum, the sword of the unsparing invader. In Rome the Gauls burned the houses, but mainly besieged the Capitol, which they therefore kept blockaded, and spread their ravages over all Latium. Cædicius from Veii, and Camillus at the head of the men of Ardea, obtained important advantages over isolated Gallic detachments; and the Veneti pressed hard on the Gallic settlements across the Apennines. In the mean time the besiegers of the Capitol endeavoured to come to an understanding with the Romans with regard to the sum of money which they demanded for their departure; while the small and scattered bands of Romans in Latium or at Veii addressed themselves for aid to Camillus.

Hitherto the narrative has been probable in all its parts; but from henceforward it rather resembles an epic poem, framed for the glorification of its hero, than a true or even probable story. According to the tradition, the Romans elected Cædicius for their leader; but when he declared that he, a man of inferior rank, could never be their rightful leader, they applied to Camillus, who, however, refused to exercise the functions of dictator without the sanction of a decree from the senate. Pontius Cominius undertook the dangerous duty of ascending the besieged Tarpeian rock, and bringing back a decree from such of the senators as were within the Capitol. He swam across the Tiber, climbed the rock
at its steepest side, and returned in safety to the army. The senate decreed it lawful to elect a dictator in an assembly of the curiae, and to delegate the military command on this occasion, not to a person nominated by a consul, but to one who should be elected by the people. Camillus was accordingly elected; but before he had time to proceed to the liberation of his native town, the Gauls had tried a surprisal of the citadel from the same side on which they had discovered that Cominius had climbed the rock. On this occasion the vigilance and firmness of M. Manlius saved the Romans from surprisal, just as the enemy had scaled their walls. If Roman heroism and destiny did indeed conspire so singularly to rescue a town destined to be mistress of the world, the last scene in this drama is not so incredible as it has sometimes been said to be. Polybius, indeed, contradicts the ordinary narrative; but his testimony has not the same weight with regard to a dark period which we grant him with regard to times nearer to his own. According to the narrative of Livy, the gold which the Gauls exacted as the price of their departure was being actually weighed out. A dispute took place, occasioned by the Gauls employing false weights — their leader wantonly threw his heavy sword and shoulder-belt into the balance. In the nick of time appears Camillus, drives out the Gauls, and cuts off their retreat.

Whatever the real facts may have been with regard to this liberation of Rome, she now advanced with giant steps to sovereign power over Italy. It was first debated whether the town should be rebuilt on its old site. Many would have preferred taking possession of the deserted Veii; but the patricians, and especially Camillus, withstood this, and their patriotic views were backed by the popular superstition. The town having been hastily and irregularly rebuilt, petty wars were renewed with the Etruscan states, the Volsci and Hernici. The termination of all such contests was in favour of the Romans, who maintained superiority in the field. Under Camillus, Cincinnatus, and others, a number of
skilful officers were formed, and improvements were made in arms and martial discipline, though intestine broils broke out with renewed violence.

The attempt of M. Manlius, who had previously saved the Capitol, to make himself master of Rome, is a very remarkable episode in her history. Whether the charge were true or false is hard now to determine; but it is certain, that he who was its object was thrown from the Tarpeian rock, and thus met a more rigorous doom from the Roman aristocracy than Miltiades from the democracy of Athens.*

It were superfluous to investigate the motive which may have induced Licinius Stolo to broach anew the long-decided themes of dispute betwixt the nobility and plebeians. He was a highly distinguished person, connected by marriage with a patrician family †; possessed all the requisite qualifications for the consulship; and, moreover, as his tribuneship proved, stood so firm in popular favour, that he certainly would have succeeded as a candidate for the higher office. Such a man must have felt with unusual bitterness the exclusion of the plebeians from the highest political functions. Elected tribune with Lucius Sextius, he immortalised his name by a nine years' struggle for the rights of his order, in which he won at last the most brilliant victory.

The currently received tale ascribes the introduction of the Licinian rogations to a petty caprice of female vanity. M. Fabius Ambustus, who was consular tribune, u. c. 374, had two daughters, one of whom married Servius Sulpicius, consular tribune in 378, the other a plebeian, C. Licinius Stolo. The story goes, that this younger bride of the Fabian house, being once upon a visit to her sister, showed alarm at the noise made by the lictors announcing, by striking their rods on the threshold, the arrival of their master from the forum, and was ridiculed by her sister for an instance

* Vid. Niebuhr.
† One of the daughters of Fabius Ambustus was married to C. Licinius Stolo, the other to Servius Sulpicius, one of the military tribunes, who were then from time to time appointed instead of consuls.
of plebeian ignorance, which betrayed the humble station into which she had lowered herself by marriage. The plebeian lady, stung by the affront, extorted a vow from her husband, and even from her father, that they would never rest till her house also were graced with similar ceremonies. The silence of Dionysius on this absurd legend, and the absence of the smallest trace of it even in Plutarch, who seldom resists the temptation of preserving relics of that sort, might well be deemed sufficient to discredit the whole story. Its absurdity, moreover, appears from the simple consideration that the ambitious lady in question could not well have been surprised at formalities with which she must have been perfectly well acquainted in the house of her father, who had himself been consular tribune four years previously. Besides, since the capture of the city, the consular office had been in abeyance, and its restoration could hardly have been dreamed of by a thoughtless woman, although it was now once more about to become the object of manly ambition.

The first Lictorian rogation provided that military tribunes should again be superseded by consuls, equally appointed from among the patricians and plebeians, and of whom one must invariably be chosen from the latter order. It will be found, from the subsequent course of Roman history, that infinite good, unalloyed by evil, resulted from this law. The Decii, who gave themselves up as sacrifices for the weal of the Roman people, were plebeians. Plebeian leaders first repulsed, and finally conquered Pyrrhus. A plebeian reduced the Gauls of Italy, stemmed the conquests of Hannibal. A plebeian from the peasant huts of Arpinum extirpated the Cimbri and Teutones. A plebeian consul saved Rome from the highborn comrades of Catiline. The Catos, the Gracchi, and Brutus, were plebeians.

The second rogation consisted of the Lictorian agrarian law. The following is the substance of its most important provisions.

"The common land, the ager publicus of the Roman
people, shall be strictly ascertained and defined in its boundaries. Such portions of it shall be reclaimed by
the state as may have been usurped by private persons. Those of which the property is uncertain shall be sold,
that the law may decide between private claimants.

"No one shall possess for ploughing or planting more than 500 jugera of common land, nor turn out to graze
on the common pasture more than 100 head of large, or 500 of small cattle. All who act in contravention of
this law shall be sued on a fine, by the seiles, before the people; so, also, all who extend their pasture lands
illegally.

"The occupiers of portions of the ager publicus, shall pay to the state the tenth bushel of agricultural produce,
the fifth of the produce of plantations and vineyards, and a certain yearly sum per head for the grazing both
of the large and small cattle kept on the common pasture.

"The censors shall, once in every lustrum, let on lease to the highest bidder, the annual dues reserved to the
Roman people from the ager publicus. The revenue farmers shall give security for the performance of their
contracts. In case of unforeseen losses, the senate may remit the sums due from them. The proceeds shall be
applied to the pay of the troops.

"The revenue farmers shall agree with the occupiers as to what part of the produce of their possessions they
are entitled to demand in behalf of the state. Cattle are not to be turned out on the common land without
being previously marked, and paying grazing money. Cattle withdrawn from the legal dues are forfeited to
the state.

"The occupiers of public land are bound to employ free labourers in a certain fixed proportion to the ex-
tent of their occupation."

Thus far the provisions of the proposed enactment were general and permanent in their nature. The fol-
lowing clause had more immediate reference to existing circumstances.
"Such portions of the public land, over and above 500 jugers, as are in the present possession of individuals, shall be divided amongst all the plebeians, in lots of seven jugers, as property. Triumvirs shall be appointed for the execution of this law, which shall be sworn to by both orders as an eternal covenant."*

Happy the state, says Niebuhr, where by force of a Licinian law the restoration of a race of free agriculturists, were it only for a century, was possible!

III. The third Licinian rotation enacted, that the amount of interests hitherto paid on all outstanding debts, should be deducted from the principal, the residue to be paid by equal annual instalments, within a term of three years.

In order rightly to estimate the character of this last enactment, we must dismiss from our minds the modern ways of thinking on these subjects. We must remember, that the transactions of the money-market were hardly less odious to the nations of antiquity than to the early Christian church, or the religion of Islam.

* The following is a note of Niebuhr, which, in this instance, we choose to extract from No. XXII. of the Foreign Quarterly Review, rather than take it, as usual, from the original text of that author, for the sake of one or two useful additions made to it by the critic.

"Five hundred jugers, says Mr. Niebuhr, are equivalent to about 490 Magdeburg morgen, or to 70 Roman rubbi; that is about 280 English acres, the rubbio being about four of our acres. Now, as Mr. Niebuhr ascertained during his residence in Italy, a farm of 70 is considered a very handsome tillage farm in the Agro Romano at the present day, which generally brings in about 20 scudi a rubbio to the mercante di campagna, as the persons who take them are called, and gives them a large return for their capital. The farms of the present day are in general immensely large; but there are smaller ones in the more fertile situations, such as the vale of Aricia, which pay from 60 to 70 scudi the rubbio; and in this way Mr. Niebuhr thinks the patricians of ancient Rome may have let to their clients small portions of the part of the domain which was in their possession. That the 500 jugers, which, be it remembered, were all arable and plantation land, formed no paltry farm, is plain, when we re-collect the right attached to it of feeding cattle on the common pasture, the extreme fertility of the soil in the south, and the frugal habits of the people. To this we must add, that the law set no limits whatsoever to the acquisition of property of any kind, but only regulated the possession of the domain, the public property. Two hundred jugers would just, at this very time, be considered a very large estate in Attica, where the paternal estate of Alcibiades was not quite 300 plethra, or 120 jugers, that is, about 67 acres. Yet Alcibiades was immensely rich; and the very same might be the case with a Roman citizen, who, exclusive of the property which he might purchase within the limits of the Roman territory, might hold large estates in Latium, Etruria, or any where else that the public relations of the state would allow him to purchase."
Every interference of a modern state between debtor and creditor robs not only those who can stand the loss, but many more who cannot, and perhaps despoils the widow and orphan to ease the great proprietor. This did not take place at Rome, where the debts contracted had no resemblance to the intricate and extensive transactions known by that name in later times. Rome was not a mercantile town, and consequently there was no borrowing on bottomry or at respondentia for mercantile speculations. Borrowing on mortgage for the completion of purchases, or for the payment of legacies on landed estates, was equally unknown; such estates, when the inheritance was divided, being left in joint tenancy, or partitioned amongst the several heirs. Thus the debts which came within the operation of the Licinian law formed a very small proportion of those which now make up the mass of obligations of that nature. They were such as arose wholly from the pressure of necessity in times when extravagance and commerce were equally in a manner unknown. The deduction of interests already paid had no such effect as would inevitably result from the adoption of a similar measure in our times; namely, that many a debt would be cancelled, principal and interest. There were no debts of sufficiently long standing to be wholly wiped away by this process, how high soever might then be the rate of interest.* It is a singular fact, that the tribunes who introduced this daring measure neither mitigated the rigour of the existing law of debtor and creditor, nor restored the ancient laws against usury.

For ten successive years the popular tribunes were re-elected, during which time they were obstinately resisted by eight of their colleagues, who appear to have been gained by the patricians. Both parties exhausted every expedient permitted by the Roman constitution in case of disputes between the tribunes and the ordinary authorities. Licinius and his colleagues stopped the elections of public officers; and the senate, on the other

* See Appendix.
hand, resorted to their old resource in civil feuds, the appointment of a dictator, and endeavoured to seize the first occasion of war, in order, if possible, to elude the necessity of yielding. Camillus was appointed dictator, and began to levy troops on the day fixed for taking the votes of the people. The old man might imagine himself as powerful as Cincinnatus had been, surrounded with the terrors of a time long passed. But the tribunes opposed a passive resistance to all his commands and menaces; and as neither troops nor taxes could be levied, the senate was at length forced to yield. In the year u. c. 387, the three renowned Licinian rogations passed into law. In the following year, a plebeian consul was elected for the first time. But the patricians, in their assembly of the curie, refused their assent to the appointment—se auctores futuros negabant. This senseless act rekindled the yet smouldering flame more fiercely than ever. According to Livy, furious threats were exchanged, and a new secession of the plebs appeared imminent. But even Camillus had now become tired of this inglorious squabble. He stood forth as the mediator of peace between the contending orders, and dedicated a temple to Concord, in memory of his success as a pacificator. The throwing open of the consulate to the plebeians was directly advantageous of course only to the élite of that order—the men of wealth, abilities, and influence. Meanwhile the patricians endeavoured to save whatever was not yet lost, and succeeded in effecting the separation of the supreme judicial functions from the consulship. Thus arose the new office of prætors. The high police was also set aside for the patricians. When, therefore, the plebeian sêdiles refused to hold the games which the senate had appointed for two extraordinary festival days, patrician sêdiles were chosen with the distinctions which exclusively belonged to the first rank. The office of curule sêdiles, like the censorship, was thus created at first for the patricians, who also regarded the priesthood as their hereditary property. This, however, could last but a
short time: the first step drew all the others after it. After the lapse of only eleven years, admission to the censorship was extorted for the plebeians. Fourteen years later a plebeian became prætor; and fourteen years after the first prætor had been elected from amongst the plebeians, they likewise obtained admission to the priesthood. From this epoch, a new nobility supplanted the patricians, whose pride, however, long survived their importance.
CHAP. VI.

WARS WITH THE GAULS, THE SAMNITES, AND THE LATINS.

It is evident from the military annals of this period, that the passing of the Licinian laws disembarrassed the republic from the oppression of those fetters by which it had been previously retained in a state of wretched impotence. Hitherto the internal struggles for freedom from this crushing constraint have been exclusively deserving of attention: but henceforward the mission of Rome to rule the nations declares itself. All at once, the complaints of public burdens, and the resistance to levies, cease, and are succeeded by murmurs whenever soldiers are disbanded against their inclination. So rapid was the rise of martial spirit in the nation; so rich her treasure of warlike force and virtue, from the moment that every one could aspire to attain his fitting place and recompense.

At two successive epochs, during this period, Rome was alarmed by the near approach of the Gauls, and, according to Livy, victoriously repelled their inroads on both occasions. Livy has, moreover, preserved the legend of a single combat, in which the youthful hero, C. Manlius, vanquished and slew a giant who had stepped forward, insultingy, from the Gallic ranks, and challenged a Roman knight to the trial of single combat. The legend recites, that the Roman warrior adroitly shunned the sword-stroke of his bulky antagonist, and thrusting upwards the lower rim of his monstrous shield with his own, transfixed his bowels, as he towered above him like a rock, and falling, like the Homeric Mars, took up an extended space with his carcase.*

* Livy's version of the Roman legend at once reminds the English reader of the fall of the old dragon in the Faery Queen:

"So downe he fell, and forth his life did breath,
    That vanisht into smooke and clowdes swift;
So downe he fell, that Earth him underneath
    Did groane, as feeble so great loades to lift;"
victor won the golden chain which had decorated the neck of the vanquished, and along with it the surname of Torquatus. Two victories, hardly won by Pætelius and C. Sulpicius, and authenticated by the memorials of them preserved in the triumphal Fasti, freed the republic, for this time, from the alarms of Gallic invasion.

Nine years had elapsed, when Rome and Latium were visited anew by the Gauls. Terror, as before, preceded their march, and poetic fiction, as before, described their struggle with Roman valour. A gallant youth, M. Valerius Corvus, again meets an insulting foe in single combat; a raven sent from the gods alights on the helm of the Roman warrior, and at every onset flies in the face of his adversary, and attacks with beak and wings its selected prey. However apocryphal Livy's oft-repeated tale of victory, certain it is that Latium never again was reached by the Gauls, and Rome had, from this period, a long respite from their inroads. In the Gallic wars, as Polybius remarks on a later occasion, they became inured to being cut to pieces, and they issued from these wars accomplished candidates for the empire of Italy.

As, in Rome, little distinction was to be gained by civil services, and none at all by mental exertions, as the whole system was calculated for warfare and contention, we cannot be surprised that the Roman annals of this period are little else than an uninterrupted string of bulletins. The middle age of the Romans, as we would designate the period extending from the expulsion of the kings to the second Punic war, is, like that of the modern European nations, an age of chivalry. The single combats of heroes with Gallic giants, described in the Roman annals, bear out this compa-

So downe he fell, as an huge rockie clift,  
Whose false foundation waves have washt away,  
With dreadfull poyse is from the maine land rift,  
And rolling downe, great Neptune doth dismay;  
So downe he fell, and like an heaped mountain lay."  
Book I. Cant. ii.
rison. In reading of a Valerius Corvus and Manlius Torquatus, every one involuntarily thinks of Arthur and Roland, as of Godfrey of Bouillon in reading of Pyrrhus, who cuts through the Mamertine giant, so that half his body falls off at each side of the saddle. Central Italy alone maintained its ancient splendour and glory, for which it was indebted to the fruitfulness of Campania, to the remains of the declining Latin industry and Tuscan commerce, and, above all, to the progressive growth of Rome as a state of soldiers, and of vigorous and industrious agriculturists. Between the years 405 and 408 since the building of the city, the Romans alone, without reckoning the Latins, could, according to Livy, bring into the field ten legions, each consisting of 4200 infantry and 300 cavalry; a force which seems quite enormous, and doubly important from the consideration that it was wholly composed of men who took the field of their own accord, for their own cause. The common soldier might start into a general at any moment; all the centurions, up to the pricipilus, that is to say, every man, from the corporal to the major, took rank according to merit and length of service. We follow Livy's narrative in these statements (l. viii. c. 8.).

Upper Italy lay already desolate. In Magna Græcia, sometimes Greeks contended against Greeks—sometimes with the Lucanians and other rude mountain tribes—sometimes with Dionysius or the Carthaginians. On the other hand, the hardy Samnites cultivated, or turned into pasture, the rugged range of the Apennines, till the Romans entered Campania. Then came desolation over these regions also. The whole interior of the country, partly rugged and mountainous, had enjoyed the happy Samnite constitution and simple modes of life, while the bands of robbers and mercenaries which issued from their fastnesses gained disgraceful notoriety by their rudeness and rapacity. From the moment of the Roman expedition into Campania, hostilities with this people were incessant. This expedition
was occasioned by the Samnites, who had formerly found themselves too much cramped in their mountains, and, in consequence, had migrated into Campania. They had possessed themselves of the land — had become enervated by the influence of the climate and the mode of life — and had fallen into contention with the primitive Samnite tribes.

The occasion of the war with the Samnites was similar to that which afterwards led the Romans into Sicily — namely, that their assistance was solicited by the Campanian Samnites, who had seized upon a district town and goods belonging to others, against their own countrymen, as afterwards against the Carthaginians. It was eighty years since those Samnites, as we have already above remarked, had despoiled the Osci and Etruscans of Capua and great part of Campania. Since that time, they served among the Greeks and Carthaginians as mercenary troops, degenerated, and ceased to be connected with their mountain brethren, either by political or moral ties of any kind. In the constant wars of the latter with the Samnites in Campania, the Sidicini, whose capital was Teanum, were particularly hard pressed. They addressed themselves to Capua, and Capua to Rome. The Romans, who, since the year B.C. 401, were at peace, and, indeed, in formal alliance with the Samnites, scrupled to form a new league with a people engaged in actual warfare with their allies. Hence they refused to take the Campanians into their alliance, unless the latter, *pro forma* at least, would declare themselves clients of Rome, and thereby render overtures in their favour a right, or rather a duty, of the Romans. The Campanians, without, probably, considering the consequences of such a self-surrender, submitted to the necessity of pronouncing, through their ambassador, the formula which the Romans demanded; whereupon the latter summoned, for the first time, the Samnites to exercise no further hostilities against a state which had given itself up to
them.* Naturally, the Samnites did not attend to these representations, but rather felt affronted by them; and both the Roman consuls entered Campania, each at the head of an army. One of them, Valerius Corvus, took an exposed position in the neighbourhood of the Lucrine lake, where the Samnites thought they could attack him to advantage. They had deceived themselves, however, and were defeated by him. The other consul, Cornelius Cossus, allowed himself to be lured into the mountain passes, and found himself surrounded all at once in a deep valley, by the hostile army which occupied the heights. Retreat alone appeared to remain open—but even this would be difficult or impossible, if the whole Samnite army, which was posted on the heights, should pursue him. In this emergency, Decius resolved to offer himself as a sacrifice. He proposed to take position on an eminence, with a small band, in order that, while the whole force of the army was directed against him, the consul might have time to draw back his forces. This was done accordingly. Decius made a stand against the far superior forces of the enemy till nightfall, cut his way during the night through the whole hostile army, joined the consul, and induced him to hazard an instant attack on the enemy.† In this action, also, the Samnites were beaten; but the consul, as it should seem, refrained from pursuing them, and penetrating again into the mountain regions, where matters had gone so ill with him shortly before. Decius received public honours in the shape of praises and gifts, and his name shone forth in popular songs and legends, side by side with those of Scævola, Cincinnatus, Manlius, Camillus, and other ancient heroes.

* The solemn formula of subjection ran, according to Livy, as follows:—

   "Itaque populum Campanum, urbeque Capuam, Agros, delubra dedum, divina humanaque omnia in vestram, P. C. populique Romani ditionem de-dimua."

† "Decius, dum occasio in manibus esset, perpulit consulem, ut hostes et nocturno pavore attonitos, et circa collem castellatim dissipatos, aggrede-runtur; credere etiam aliquos, ad se sequendum emissos, per saltum vagari."
Meanwhile the Samnites speedily rallied their forces, which were far from having been crushed by the foregoing actions. Both the consuls, too, combined their armies, and endeavoured to make themselves for once sure of the enemy. The Samnites mistook their caution and cunning for terror, and imprudently strayed to a distance from the camp, which they had fixed near Suessula. The Romans took the camp by a sudden assault, and immediately afterwards gave such a decided defeat to the Samnite army, before it had time to form in order of battle, that the Carthaginians sent the Romans a golden crown of honour, as a token of their pleasure on the overthrow of their ancient antagonists, with whom they came in constant collision in Italy and Sicily. Valerius, already distinguished by birth among the Romans, attained still higher distinction by this victory. The patricians were rejoiced to have men amongst them, whom the people were constrained to love and reverence; the people, on the other hand, is never disposed to refuse its homage to high birth, when accompanied by merit and condescension. In republics which are not founded on trade and commerce, and in which, therefore, wealth is not the only title of honour, gratitude to deserving men is more rarely lost sight of than in states where rank is solely conferred by riches.

However honourable their two recent victories to the Romans and their consul Valerius, the Samnites were still far from being wholly subdued; for in the very next year we find them in as great force as ever. Meanwhile the Romans, contrary to their custom, had left a part of their army behind in Campania; and this division consisted of persons deeply involved in debt, who anticipated feeling the full rigours of the merciless law of debtors on their return. The project, therefore, occurred to them, of appropriating Campania, or, at all events, a part of it. The plan was prematurely detected; but such numbers were already concerned in it, that it was deemed more prudent to stifle than to scrutinise the matter. An attempt was, therefore, made to
remove the malecontents to a distance; but they pene-
trated its object, united their forces, and unexpectedly
marched, 20,000 strong, against Rome, in order to ex-
tort the enactment of some decree against usury, and
pardon for themselves and their friends. It was in-
tended that Valerius, at the head of a civic force, should
march against them, and he was accordingly named
dictator; but, as he dreaded a new struggle between
patricians and plebeians, he preferred to smooth the
contest in an amicable manner. The immediate result
of this dispute was a reconciliation with the Samnites,
which an impending war with the Latins probably aided
in bringing about.

It seems disparaging to the Romans, that, while they
imposed a contribution in money and in grain on the
Samnites, they, on the other hand, abandoned the Sidicini
to their destiny, whose cause had been the pretext of
the whole war. The latter circumstance indirectly oc-
casioned a war with the Latins. For the latter took
part with the Sidicini just as the Romans had given
them up, and leagued themselves in their favour with
the Campanians against the Samnites. This was at
about the same time that they declared, by a solemn
embassy to the Romans, that the hitherto existing re-
lations must cease between Rome and Latium, which
must together form a free federal state. Latins must
have seats in the senate — the authorities at Rome must
in part be Latin — Rome must become in future merely
the capital of the Latin league — and not, as hitherto,
domineer exclusively over that league. This idea was
unbearable to the Roman pride — the arbitrament was
therefore left to arms. A Roman army marched upon
Campania, where the allied Campanians and Latins
stood in arms against the Samnites. And here was
displayed an alternation of friendship and hostilities,
connections and disoverments, which astonishes us, and
the causes of which we cannot satisfactorily explain.
First of all, the Romans aid the Campanians, on account
of the danger with which the Sidicini threatened the
Chap. VI. War with the Latins.

Samnites. Then the Romans desert the Campanians — the Latins take their part — and, last of all, a combined force of Latins and Campanians take the field against the Romans and Samnites, who march upon Capua. The Latin force might probably be a match for that of the Romans — but that of the Campanians was certainly not, and would be of little use if the Samnites, as it appears, advanced, combined with the Romans, into Campania. The Latins and Campanians lay encamped at the foot of Vesuvius*, resolved to await the decision of a battle.

The action which ensued, contributed more than any other event to establish the Roman greatness, and diffuse the dread of their name over Italy. They have therefore, extolled the two consuls who then stood at their head, as patterns of Roman fortitude and discipline, and as unsurpassed examples of devoted love of country.

While the hostile army stood in each other's presence, the consuls issued orders that, on pain of death, no man should engage in single combat in front of the ranks; provocations to which might arise all the more probably, as individuals in the Roman and Latin ranks were personally acquainted, from the campaigns which they had formerly served together. This order could be no secret to the enemy. Accordingly, a Tusculan officer confronted the son of the consul Manlius, who commanded a body of cavalry, and scoffed at the prudent precautions of the generals, and the no less prudent forbearance of the soldiers. The youth yielded to passion, fought the aggressor, who fell by his lance. The intoxication of victory in the youth, the consternation of the father, the inevitable sacrifice to military discipline, the sentence and execution, are incomparably described by Livy.†

From the tenth chapter, and especially from the be-

* Niebuhr here remarks, that, according to Livy, the battle took place on the road ad Vesperim, and that the Romans, therefore, named it the battle ad Vesperim; but that we do not know whether this was the name of a place or a river.
† viii. 7.
ginning of the eleventh, in the eighth book of Livy's history, it appears with the fullest evidence, as it also may be proved from other sources, that in ancient Italy the Celtic and Phœnician custom of offering human sacrifices was not unusual, however it might yield to the Grecian influence. Livy recites the following particulars of this usage*: — "It was lawful for the consul, the dictator, or the prætor, when he contemplated devoting the hostile legions to the powers of destruction, not only to offer himself up to the gods of death, but also any others whom he chose of the Roman legion. If the man who was after this fashion devoted to the infernal gods died, well and good — probe factum videri; if he died not, then a wooden image, seven feet high or more, was to be buried in the earth, and a beast slain as an expiatory offering. No Roman public personage was allowed to go where the image was buried. If a person in authority devoted himself to the infernal gods, and died not, he never again could offer a pure sacrifice for himself or the state." From this horrible custom, springing from the idea which prevailed in various countries with regard to expiatory offerings—the sacrifice of the most distinguished, best, and purest objects,—the practice of self-devotion would appear to have arisen amongst the Romans and Etruscans.

In the instance before us, both consuls received in a dream the announcement, from the spectral form of a superhuman being, that the leader on the one side, and the whole army on the other, were doomed to mother earth and the infernal gods. Both agreed, that he whose wing might waver should devote himself, and thereby the hostile army, to destruction. Even before the battle, the victims presaged evil to Decius. "It matters not," he replied to the aurspect, "if my colleague has had fortunate omens."

The wing commanded by Decius giving way in the first onset, he exclaimed, "The aid of the gods is now

* Lib. x. c. 5.
necessary, Valerius! Up, high priest of the Roman people; prescribe to me the formula in which I may devote myself to death for the Roman legions.” The high priest enjoined him to dress in his senatorial robes, to veil his head, to raise his hand under the toga up to his chin, to place himself on a sword which was laid beneath his feet, and, these preliminaries having been fulfilled, he pronounced the formula to be repeated by the voluntary victim:—“Janus, Jupiter, father Mars, Quirinus, Bellona, Lares, Dii Novensiles, gods of our fathers, gods who rule alike over us and over our enemies, gods of the dead, to you I pray; you I beseech to bless with power and victory the Roman people, to send on their enemies dread, horror, and death. In behalf of the Roman people and Quirites, the army, legions, allies of the Roman people and Quirites, thus I devote the legions and allies of the enemy, with myself, to the gods of the dead and to mother earth.”

From that moment, mounted on his horse, he seemed to both armies the spirit of destruction rushing down on the Latin legions. Terror went before him; and when he sank, transfixed with arrows, the Latins recoiled. The battle was won by the Romans, and, like all actions in which Romans were engaged, was extremely bloody, as it was chiefly fought with the sword and other weapons for close fighting. The Latins lost more than three fourths of their army, but reinforced themselves immediately afterwards, and ventured a new battle. This battle, near Trifanum, between Sinuessa and Minturnæ, completed the results of the former overthrow; and the force of the Latin league, like that of the Campanians, was annihilated. The Romans, therefore, next turned to particular towns and states, which they treated in a variety of ways, according to circumstances. The war with the several states of Latium lasted two years longer; amongst these, Tibur, Prænestæ, Velitriæ, Antium, distinguished themselves by the most persevering resistance: yet even these at length acquiesced in the new order of things.
By virtue of this new order, the old league of Latium was entirely torn asunder; the interests of the towns were divided by means of the various privileges which they obtained in relation to the Romans; general assemblies were prohibited, every citizen restricted to the landed estates within the jurisdiction of his town; a great part of the land was partly converted into Roman national property, partly assigned to Roman colonies, which were settled every here and there. Such was the course taken in the district of Antium; most rigorously, however, in that of Velitri: the inhabitants of that town were forced to surrender their lands entirely; in Ætium, on the other hand, they were admitted amongst the colonists. Lanuvium, Aricia, Nomentum, and Pedum received the rights of citizenship and suffrage, which Tusculum already possessed and was able to retain. In Campania the same course was taken; Capua, Cumæ, Suessula, Fundi, and Formiae became Roman towns,—that is to say, their burghers acquired the right of Roman citizenship; a part of the land was partitioned amongst Romans,—in other words, became the leasehold estate of Roman magnates. On the other hand, the nobility of the country, because it had exhibited Roman, not Campanian, patriotism, was indemnified for its losses in land at the cost of its fellow citizens. From this time forward the force of Latium came to be called Roman, though the Latins no longer served in the body of the legions, but were annexed to them in cohorts of their own.

Thus, as Niebuhr remarks, the *jus Latinum* became a system of regulations established by the will of the Roman people over all the internal and external relations of the then vanquished Latin towns and states. The *jus Italicum* continued to be a wholly different compact, according to the circumstances under which it was made, with the towns which became subject by treaty, or, as it was termed, allied towns.
CHAP. VII.

SAMNITE WARS.

From this moment the struggle was waged for empire over Italy. The Gauls, the Greeks, above all, the Samnites, might easily have prevented the Romans from becoming lords of the whole land, if they had but been united; but they were either in a state of discord, or, at all events, of isolation. The Greeks were an easy prey to the most powerful among the states which they had improvidently called upon for assistance; the Etruscans, who repeatedly revolted from the Romans, weakened as they had been by the Gauls, and enervated by luxury, were reduced to complete subjection with facility. The Grecian states of Italy regarded the Romans as their natural friends, and the Samnites and Lucanians as their hereditary enemies, but sought by preference the aid of their own countrymen, who at that time made a trade of war, and had conquered the whole East.

As both nations, Samnites and Romans, were alike warlike and alike ambitious, it was a point which the next few years must inevitably decide, which of the two should in future rule over Lower Italy. The Samnites were deficient in unity; their councils were without plan or consistency. On the other hand, the Roman senate firmly pursued the same track, and remained ever equal to itself. Even if Samnium had allies, they were such as could not be trusted; while those of Rome were obliged to follow her dictates, and to serve in the Roman ranks under Roman officers. It cannot, therefore, be wondered at, that the event was in favour of the Romans. The first impulse to a new war with the Romans was given by the colony of Fregellæ, established by the Romans on a site which had formerly belonged to the Sidicini, but had afterwards been ravaged by the
Samnites. This colony formed a sort of outwork of the Roman state, an advanced post, the purpose of which in general was served by the Roman military colonies. The Samnites had not impeded the formation of this colony; but when the Romans declared war upon the burghers of Palæopolis, a Greek town *, they seized the occasion of making a return in kind.

Palæopolis, a Cumæan colony, distant a few leagues from Naples, was, as the name indicates, founded at an earlier date than the latter town, which, however, gave its name to the co-burghers of both, who appear to have been united into one Neapolitan state. The ostensible cause of war between Rome and Naples was so insignificant, as to show that it was rather undertaken because the Romans aimed at exclusive rule over Campania and the western coast, and at wresting from the Samnites the alliance of a rich commercial town, than because they really felt themselves offended by the Neapolitans.† The latter themselves did not repose much confidence in the Samnites; but the Romans, while the one consul marched against Palæopolis, and before the formal outbreaking of the Samnite war (v. c. 428), sent the other consul to the Samnite frontier, in order to observe their motions. The Palæopolitans could not defend themselves single-handed against the Romans: 4000 Samnites, and 2000 burghers of Nola who lay in their town, appeared to them more dangerous than the Romans encamped around it; and the Tarentines, who had promised them aid, delayed too long in affording it. Hence the Roman party in the town, especially the two most eminent burghers, Charilaus and Nymphius, decided rather to capitulate

† Appian puts the following announcement to the Romans into the mouth of the great Samnite general Pontius: — "We Samnites have ever kept inviolate peace with you Romans; but, ye have disturbed this amicable intercourse, inasmuch as ye have become allies of our enemies the Sidicini. Scarce, however, had we again become friends, when you made an attack on our neighbours the Neapolitans. We know well that this attack upon Naples is planned merely as a first step (praemuniri) to the subjugation of all Italy."
with the Romans, than to endure the brutal oppression of the Samnite garrison any longer. The Romans were received into the town, and Neapolis was the first Grecian state admitted into the Roman league with extraordinary privileges. *

The Samnites were such formidable enemies to Rome, that her most experienced general, Papirius Cursor, was opposed to them in the capacity of dictator; and even he considered it more prudent to extort from them a recognition of Roman superiority in the field, than to drive them to extremities. † A truce was agreed on only for a year; and early in the following the war was renewed, which, with few intermissions, lasted forty years.

The important town of Luceria, in the interior of u. c. Apulia, with some further part of that district, was at 428. first allied with Rome, while the greater part of the population ranged itself against the Romans in alliance with the Samnites. A rumour, artfully spread by the Samnites themselves, that Luceria was besieged by their whole force, brought precipitately into the field two Roman armies, united under the consuls T. Veturius and Sp. Posthumius. The march of these consular armies through Campania was directed with the thoughtlessness of men blinded by destiny. In a region where almost unarmed peasants might have checked their march or cut off their communications, they marched in a column, of which the front lost sight of the rear at every turn of the route, with as little precaution as though they were far from any enemy. They had had now descended through a hollow way into a narrow valley, closed in by a second ridge, across which the only issue was a pass of the same narrow and difficult character as that through which they had just made their descent, and both which obtained fatal renown

---

* Such is Livy's narrative. Niebuhr maintains, with show of reason, that Paleoopolis suffered the usual fate of cities surprised by treachery; and that Neapolis, on the other hand, opened her gates to the Romans pursuant, not previously, to a treaty of alliance.
by the name of the Caudine passes. When the further pass was reached by the head of the column, they found it barricaded with fragments of rock and trunks of trees, and at the same moment discovered the ridges around swarming with armed enemies. The army, thus unexpectedly entrapped, consisting of two consuls, and between 40,000 and 50,000 Romans, could neither attack the enemy, nor move backwards nor forwards.* They had, therefore, no choice but to capitulate, though, probably, not, as Livy would have it, without an effort to force their passage. The Samnites themselves appear to have been embarrassed how to employ their advantage; and of all possible lines of conduct, which could have been selected by their general, C. Pontius chose the worst. He dismissed the Roman legions and their officers on the faith of a treaty †, concluded, indeed, by the two consuls, Posthumius and Veturius Calvinus, but at which no fecialis or public functionary, commissioned by the Roman people for those religious ceremonies required in every treaty, could be present. The circumstance of passing under the yoke, which has been described as an impolitic humiliation inflicted on the vanquished army, was nothing more than matter of usage in all similar cases. A space was made in the palisades encompassing the Roman army, admitting one to pass through at a time, and this passage was framed into a door by a transverse bar of wood.

At Rome, on the first intelligence of the defeat and captivity of the army, a levy en masse was ordered to effect their release if possible—at all events to defend the walls against an expected siege by the victors. The shops were shut, for even the tradesmen and artisans were compelled to enlist, the courts of justice closed, and the terms in all transactions extended, as every one was forced to abandon his business. Such a cessation of all intercourse could not outlast the immediate crisis; but the general mourning continued, which had been

* Liv. i. ix. c. 3. † Ibid. c. 4.
chap. vii. affair of the force caudine. 

voluntarily assumed. the senate had laid down their purple robes, the nobles their golden rings, the women their jewels and ornaments. no sacrifice was performed, no marriage solemnised, while rome awaited the close of the year of mourning, or its abridgment through some fortunate change in the posture of affairs.

the pretext of informality was now put forth by the senate, in refusing its recognition to the treaty. it declared that treaty to be binding only on those persons who had pledged themselves thereto, and not on the state.* it decreed that all who had sworn to the observance of the terms of that treaty should be delivered up to the samnites, as having practised a deception on them. the annals followed by livy must clearly have been those of a senatorial family; for he ascribes to the unfortunate consul posthumius the honour of voluntarily proposing the surrender of all those by whom the treaty had been closed and guaranteed, and amongst whom he himself was the first; while he imputes opposition to this surrender to the tribunes of the people, and makes them appeal to the inviolability of their persons.† even the tribunes are finally impelled by magnanimity to offer themselves a sacrifice for their country; even they lay down their offices, and are all delivered up to the samnites. all the roman writers admit that the whole affair was nothing but a theatrical representation, intended in part to inspire the roman people with new courage, in part to procure admiration for the consuls and the senate. this is confirmed by the speech put into the mouth of the samnite leader, when he refused the proffered surrender of the contracting parties.‡ the romans had, however, gained their end by this disgraceful subterfuge. the courage of the

* "nec sunt consules, injus populi fœdus fieri posse, nec sine facialis, ceremoniaque solenni."

† livy puts the following peroration into the mouth of posthumius, after a long speech: — "quod ad tribunos attinet, consulti utrum presens detitio earum fieri possit, an in diem differatur. nos interim, t. veturi, vosque ceteri, vult haec capita luende sponsonis feramus, et nostro supplicio liberemus romana arma." — l. ix. c. 8.

‡ liv. l. ix. c. 11.
army was doubly inflamed by the sting of the shame which they had suffered. But the idea of perjury still shocked the popular superstition. Posthumius met this scruple by a childish expedient. He was delivered up to the Samnites by the Roman priest of peace, fecialis; declared himself to have thereby become a Samnite slave, and in that capacity offered some affront to the Roman fecialis. All that was wanted was a form to nullify another form; and so much, at least, was gained by this expedient.

In the mean time Luceria had been taken by the Samnites: the Roman knights, who had previously been given as vassals, were guarded there. The consuls divided their forces;—one marched against Luceria; the other gave the Samnites battle in the neighbourhood of the Caudine passes, and beat them. The advantages which the other consul gained before Luceria were far more important than the victory of his colleague. He not only routed the Samnites, but forced Luceria to capitulate, retook the spoils which had been taken from the Romans, revisited on the Samnites the disgrace which had been suffered by the Romans in the former year; and, if we may believe the accounts to which Livy lends a distrustful ear, Pontius himself underwent the dishonour which he had inflicted a year before on the Roman consuls. It is certain that Luceria was taken, and lost again at a later period. After its second capture, all the burgthers were cut to pieces, and 2500 colonists sent thither. The war went on for twelve years, yet we do not find the Samnites overwhelmed by the successive defeats which are said to have been inflicted upon them. The Romans (v. c. 437) obtained a firm footing in Apulia, placed a garrison in Forentum, and advanced on the Lucanian territory, so that they limited the Samnites almost entirely to their own resources. We shall presently see that the Romans secured themselves in the possession of the passes, roads, posts, and best military positions on the whole line of the Apennines. But if actions had so fre-
Quently taken place as those which the Roman annalists enumerate during each year, and in each of which twenty, often thirty, thousand men were slain, the senate, which always knew how to employ its advantages admirably, would hardly have granted the Samnites a peace which did not take a foot of land from them.

This peace secured for the Romans, whose senate pur- sued a single end with unvarying firmness and tranquility, leisure to finish all that had been begun during the war. The Romans soon became masters of the whole of Central Italy, of Etruria, Umbria, and the territory which we now call the Marches. The transmutation of Italians into Romans begins with the extirpation of the remains of the Ausonian people. Then the Umbrians on the high and cold ridges, whence the Tiber descends, were, more by chance than of set purpose, brought under the Roman dominion. For the Romans, as they had known how to fix themselves more and more firmly southwards, and had planted out colonies in Suessa and Pontia, in like manner pressed forwards further and further up the Tiber, and sent a military colony of 4000 men to Interamna and Casinum.

This seems to have aroused the Etruscan spirit anew. It was some time before the different towns could be brought to unite in any common undertaking against Rome. And even when their combined forces at length laid siege to Sutrium, the Arretini kept out of the general alliance. Besides, what could loose associations effect against a state which drilled its allies, like its subjects and dependents, into military unity and firmness. Fabius, who took the field against the allies, did not allow himself to be terrified by the number of assembled Etruscans; hastened over the mountains, which were then so thickly wooded, that Livy compares the Ciminian with the Hercynian forest*;

*“Silva erat Ciminia magistum invia atque horrenda, quam nuper fuerat Germanici saltus, nulli ad eam diem ne mercatorum quidem adita. Eam intrare haud, sive quia quassar præter ductem ipsum, audebat, allis omnibus cladis Caudilianae nondum memoria aboleverat.”

VOL. I.
and reached, by ways which no one had hitherto thought of, the territory of the Camentinian Umbrians. At first the Umbrians, or at least a part of them, aided the Romans in their descents from the heights, on the admirably cultivated Etruscan lands. They soon, however, bethought themselves better, and combined with the latter against Rome. If it be true, that in an engagement which was fought, either on the other side of the wooded Ciminian ridges in the neighbourhood of Perusia, or immediately at the foot of it, above 60,000 men were taken or slain, this can only be explained by the Umbrians and Etrurians having been mad enough to oppose their altogether unpractised militia to the flower of the Roman army, and its most skilled and experienced officers. The consequence might have been foreseen. The Umbrians were compelled to give themselves up before the close of the year, entirely into the hands of the Romans, or to accept a share in the jus Latinum on the most disadvantageous conditions—namely, by becoming dedititii. The Etruscans, as usual, separated; Cortona, Perusia, and Arretium, obtained a thirty years' truce; and the other towns kept up the war without keeping together, or appearing simultaneously in the field. The case was the same with the other hill populations; and here again the Roman policy shows itself in the most brilliant light. They offered the right of citizenship to the three Hernician nations,—the Alatunates, Verulani, and Ferentini,—but on their refusal to accept it, left them their own laws, in order to secure their friendship. They conferred the full rights of citizenship on theburghers of Anagnia, as well as on the Arpinates in the Samnité territory; though, with regard to the former, without the right of suffrage in the popular assemblies. The Řæqui suffered severely. Fifty inhabited places of the little territory were annihilated, and Carseoli was turned into a Roman fort or colony. The Marsi lost three places*, and were forced to submit to the establishment of Sora to the southward, and of

* Milonia, Piestina, Fresilia.
Alba to the northward, in their own territory, as military colonies.

The intestine discords of the Etruscans rendered their conquest easy to Rome. The Licianian family, which, to judge by inscriptions, was extremely powerful and numerous in Etruria, bore heavily on the Etruscans with their oligarchical rule; and as the Romans took their part, new disputes were occasioned at once with the Umbrians and Etruscans. The Romans routed the Etruscans near Rusellæ, and disunited them by an armistice of two years from the Umbrians, whose passes now became of double importance, as the Gauls began to set themselves in motion anew. About this time they pressed upwards towards Spoleto into the mountains, established a new colony on the river Nar, which they called Narnia, and commanded all the passes which led from the Samnite territory to the tribes connected with them in the mountains. At length the Samnites, Etruscans, and Gauls, united, rose against Rome. At an earlier period the Etruscans had employed Gallic mercenary troops, of which new swarms had come into Italy. Now the Gauls appear to have risen, *ex proprio motu*, against the Romans, who were pressing on them constantly more and more closely, and, by occupying the passes of the Apennines, were in a condition to put an end to their excursions for ever.

From this moment the most formidable war arose in the mountains, which had ever hitherto threatened the conquering city, and was waged in an inhuman and exterminating manner.* The Romans began and ended with devastation — the inhabitants of whole towns were swept from the face of the earth. So early as the second year of this war, or, as Livy relates with greater probability, in the third, Roman bands under the command of Decius and Fabius, like those infernal columns sent by the French against their countrymen in La Vendée, scoured the Samnite territory. When, in the following year, the hope which the Samnite leaders had

* Dion. Halicar. l. xvi. c. 11, 12, 13.
reposed in a connection with the Gauls and Etruscans was frustrated, the devastations recommenced on a still more horrible scale. The Apulians had in vain sought to connect themselves with the Samnites; they were routed at Maloentum, afterwards called Beneventum. Gellius Egnatius sought thereupon to effect a junction with the Umbrians and Etruscans, to strike one decisive blow: the Romans were interested in employing every means to prevent this junction, and the consuls of the following year found opportunity to immortalise their name. In the first year, Decius and Fabius frustrated the plans of the enemy by rapid and judicious movements, and completed the internal regulation of their armies and the fortification of their camp.* The consuls who after them assumed the direction of the army, Lucius Volumnius and Appius Claudius, won a decisive victory, while the proconsuls laid waste Samnium systematically. Egnatius, who had drawn round him the Umbrians and Etrurians, had already once been beaten at a distance from his country, by the junction of both consuls; but he did not despair. His countrymen devastated Campania, and the presence of a consul was necessary in order to expel the Samnites from thence. Egnatius, therefore, joined in the mountains the Etruscans reinforced by the Gauls.† The year approached a close. Old Fabius, with Decius for his colleague, were elected to face this formidable enemy, which threatened Rome from the north. The two consuls marched together against the Samnites, Gauls, Etruscans, and Umbrians, who had encamped on the other side of the Apennines, in the neighbourhood of Sentinum. The wing of the Roman army led by Decius became so hard pressed, that Decius held it necessary to make a desperate effort to restore their sunken courage, as his father had done in the battle

* Liv. i. x. c. 15.
† According to Livy, the consul Appius wrote to Rome. — "quatuor gentes conferre arma, Etruscus, Samnites, Umbros, Gallos. Jam castra bi. fariam facta esse, quis unus locus capere tantum multitudinem non posset."
near Veseris. Fabius in the mean time had defeated the right wing of the Samnites; the reserve came up at the proper moment, and Fabius detached aid from his wing: the superstitious feeling aroused by the self devotion had also its influence. The Gauls were at length surrounded, and the war with the Samnites in Etruria decided, since Gellius Egnatius fell in this action, surrounded by his valiant Samnite bands. The war in Etruria, indeed, like that in Samnium, was still protracted several years longer; but the most powerful towns, Volciini, Perusia, Arretium, purchased peace for themselves as they had done once before: each paid a considerable sum as smart-money, and left the other towns and lands to their destiny. The Etruscans, indeed, at a later period, often rose against Rome; but this happened in general only in the case of particular small towns, and only rendered easier to the Romans the establishment of colonies and oppression of the country. The Samnites, on the other hand, were marked out for extermination. A people, warlike, free from time immemorial, distinguished by the simplicity of its manners and constitutions, was not to be reduced to submission. A battle near Aquilona, in which Papirius Cursor led the Romans, was won by the latter, but still the Samnites remained a match for their enemies. After a new victory, Curius Dentatus was obliged to exercise the most shocking cruelties, to annihilate canton after canton, one place, one plantation or vineyard after another.* If it be true, as the Romans themselves relate, that the Samnite general Pontius was despatched in a shocking manner, it may well be conceived how remote was the Roman temper from that chivalrous spirit which alone can engage the sympathies for a people whose prime occupation is warfare.

* "Quando jam nullus esset hostium exercitus, qui signis collatio dimicaturus videretur, unum super esse belli genus, urbium oppugnationes; quarum per excidia militem locupletare praeda et hostem pro aris et socia dimitcandem conficere possent."—Liv. l. x. c. 38.
CHAP. VIII.

WAR WITH FYREHUS.

When the Romans had so far succeeded in extirpating the Samnites, and devastating the lands which had been cultivated by them, that their dominion over Italy seemed established on a firm foundation, they began to push northwards into the Gaulish territories, southwards into those of the Bruttians; and to offer or to force their protection on the petty Grecian states of Lower Italy. This alarmed the citizens of the Greek town of Tarentum, who sought, by scattering gold, and their own jealousies, to diffuse a hostile spirit against the Romans.

Ten Roman vessels, under command of a certain Cornelius, circumnavigated the coast of Magna Grecia. This conduct was, of course, highly suspicious to the Tarentines, as they had introduced the wildest form of democracy in their state, and well knew that the nobility of the three other Greek towns in their neighbourhood had invited Roman garrisons, as well to overawe the citizens as to guard against the Lucanians and Bruttians. Thurii, which had received a Roman garrison within its walls, had no means of land communication with Rome; while the terms of a treaty, which Appian states as subsisting between the Romans and Tarentines, precluded the passage of Roman ships of war through the Sicilian straits. The faith of treaties, however, was forced to yield to the expediency of supporting the Roman interest in Thurii. The commander of the Roman squadron above mentioned, either by way of bravado, or anticipating no unfriendly construction of the act, proceeded to cast anchor in the very bay of Taren-

* The words of Appian are as follows: "Ἐγινείσταται διὰ τῆς ἐμήν ἑσθεν τῆς μεγάλης Ἑλλάδος."
tum. The theatre in that, as in the other Grecian towns, commanded a view of the sea; and the people there assembled, enraged at the near approach of a foreign armament, were easily moved by a miserable demagogue of the name of Philocaris, on whom his dissolute conduct had affixed the nickname of Thais, to sink four of the Roman ships and capture a fifth, while the rest escaped to sea. The Roman commander, with many of his company, was drowned; such of the officers and men as were made prisoners, murdered; and the rowers sold for slaves. The popular party at Tarentum now fraternised with their friends at Thurii, and aided them in the work of expelling their nobles. The people of Thurii proceeded to divide among themselves the possessions of the exiled aristocracy, but dismissed the Roman garrison without doing them any injury. The Romans were, as usual, glad of a pretext to reduce Tarentum, the only town in those regions still retaining considerable power and vast riches. Posthumius was accordingly sent to the Tarentines, as the bearer of excessively severe conditions. The government would not, at first, introduce the Roman envoy into the public assembly, foreseeing the event. The people raged and clamoured—a wretched buffoon committed a piece of gross indecency towards Posthumius, which was greeted with loud laughter by the sovereign mob of Tarentum. The Romans, mortally outraged, gave instructions to Æmilius Barbula, who was engaged in the Samnite territory, to break off that war for the present, and march, without delay, against the Tarentines.

The Tarentines now stood in need of a general and a regular army, since their civic force was not inured to the hardships of actual warfare. The existing constitution of the Tarentines resembled that of Athens, at the time of a Cleon or Stratocles; and the state of manners was even more corrupt, because the middle class, which every where forms the main strength of a people, was beyond comparison smaller than in Athens;
while, on the other hand, the members of that class of men, who are now called Lazzaroni, was even greater than it is at present in Naples. All the representations of rational persons, who conjured the people not to dream of averting one peril by bringing on themselves a greater, in the shape of a foreign protector, were useless. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, a prince who carried on war as a trade, was invited over to Italy with his army, which he could only support by making warfare support itself. He was not one who needed much encourage-ment; yet, if Plutarch is to be credited, the Tarentines did not hesitate to allure him by the most shameless exaggerations, and therefore richly deserved to be deceived by him in return.

Pyrrhus was born about seven years after the death of Alexander the Great (Olymp. 115, 3.) of Æacides and Pthia, daughter of Menon of Pharsalus, who distinguished himself amongst the Grecian leaders in the Lamian war. We know not how long his power continued limited to his native kingdom, and whether he remained without undertaking foreign conquests until the year u. c. 465, when he received the invitation of the Tarentine embassy.

At the date of his passage into Italy, Pyrrhus was thirty-seven years old,—the most favourable age for great undertakings, while the fire of youth remains yet unextinguished, and a stirring life has ripened the fruits of experience and deliberation, the lack of which endangers earlier youth. These were times of general instability, in which one revolution followed another. Sovereign princes and nations were alike robbed of their eminence, and usurpers themselves in turn were the sport of fortune. Pyrrhus combined the advantages of education in times like these with those which are annexed to princely birth. He was alone royal amidst the upstart princes of those times, and remained, in consequence, unstained by the crimes which seem the all but unavoidable cortége of usurpation. The upstart princes of those times were environed with intriguers and flat-
terers. Pyrrhus had friends, and cultivated the friendship of the worthiest. The princes his contemporaries had mortal foes in their own families, betrayers in their courts and their armies. Pyrrhus's household circle was happy, and the fidelity of his Epirots stainless. He was grateful to his people, and acknowledged, unreservedly, that through them he was what he was. It was only as a general he exacted blind obedience: as a king, he forgave even unseemly freedoms.

The troops and transport ships from Tarentum all being in readiness, the king hastened his embarkation, though the stormy season was not yet over. Scarce had the fleet put out to sea, when a tempest rose from the north, by which the bulk of the fleet were scattered, driven ashore, or sunk. Pyrrhus himself saved his life with difficulty from the wreck, and arrived with an insignificant handful of soldiers at Tarentum. While such vessels as had been spared by the storm were collecting at Tarentum, the king let the Tarentines alone; but no sooner had his troops been brought together, than he proceeded to exert dictatorial powers, without which, indeed, the objects aimed at by those Greeks could as little be obtained, as he himself could hope to save his honour, and his army. Not the Tarentines only, but all the Grecian townsmen of those times, had long abandoned military service to mercenary troops. In the Macedonian phalanx, however, the rawest recruit might be made of use, provided he had mere strength of limb. If the Tarentine population were to be useful to Pyrrhus in any shape, he must have powers to enlist and drill them in his infantry; and, moreover, he must fill the gaps which shipwreck had made in his forces. But all this was unlooked for by the Tarentines. A free and wealthy people loves to carry on war by subsidies: so long as this can be done, and its own territory remains inviolate, the excitement of warfare seems no dearer bought than any other spectacle. When the Epirot officers made their levies without regard to any consideration but that of bodily strength, the unwarlike youth
endeavoured to escape out of the city, but found the
gates guarded by Pyrrhus's troops. The lawless and
undisciplined acts of the soldiery quartered on the citi-
zens, gave rise to well-grounded discontents; and
wherever the burghers met, they unburdened their
hearts with complaints and murmurs. The Tarent-
tines, as a Lacedæmonian colony, had at least retained
the form of the Syssitia as an ancestral observance;
these were now prohibited, with all other assemblies.
The theatre was closed; and of course the popular
meetings, which had usually been held there, discon-
tinued. On the other hand, the youth were charged
to practise martial exercises in the gymnasia, instead of
idle athletic games. And Pyrrhus, by way of addi-
tional precautions against the outbreaking of any con-
spiracy during his campaign, took every method short
of open violence for sending the leading citizens to
Epirus.

It was not the numerical force of Pyrrhus, it was
Pyrrhus himself, his tactics and character, which ren-
dered his hostility more formidable to Rome than that
of any former enemy. In the times of which we are
treating, the Macedonian and Roman tactics had each
attained their highest point of perfection, and were now
for the first time about to be brought in hostile collision.

A point of form appeared a serious difficulty at Rome,
in the midst of more substantial embarrassments. It
was thought sinful to commence hostilities without ful-
filling the previous formalities of a declaration of war,
amongst which, one of the most important was that of
throwing a javelin on the enemy's ground. The means
by which this scruple was got over, are characteristic of
the Roman attachment to literal observances. An Epirot
deserter was caused to buy a piece of land, which was
to represent, pro hóc vīce, the kingdom of Epirus:
hereupon Lævinus led the army into Lucania, in order
not to await on the defensive the first attack of Pyrrhus
and his allies. As the king had not yet taken the field,
the Romans seized on a strong position: one division
remained here as an army of observation, and to prevent
the junction of the Lucanians with Pyrrhus, while the
Samnites in the mean time were kept in check by the
late consul, Barbula. Lævinus also found himself suf-
ficiently strong to detach the eighth Campanian legion,
under Decius Jubellius, to Rhegium, which alone, at that
time, of all the Italian towns, adhered to the cause of
Rome. It must also have seemed an object of import-
ance to prevent or impede the junction of the Sicilians
with Pyrrhus.

Pyrrhus seems to have looked upon the Romans at
the outset as a people wholly ignorant of the art of war,
and was not a little astonished to find no vestige of
barbarism in their mode of encampment, arms, and
evolutions. The armies met a little above Heraclea on
the Siris, and the Romans threw the blame of defeat in
the action on the elephants. Pyrrhus made an excellent
use of his victory; gained to his side the Samnites and
Lucanians, crossed over the hills, and unexpectedly
appeared in Campania. He seems, however, not to
have been gifted with one prime qualification of a great
leader; he was incapable of entering into the character
and nature of the countries, nations, and generals who
were opposed to him; and in this respect, we shall
presently see, he was infinitely inferior to Hannibal, who
was never outwitted, precisely because he never failed
immediately and intuitively to know with whom he was
dealing. How little could Pyrrhus have known with
whom he was dealing, when he attempted to recruit his
army with Roman and Latin prisoners, as if he had
been tampering with Greek mercenaries. What could
be more certain than the total loss of his time and
labour? Without fortified places, without a single ally
on whom he could count, the impatient spirit of Pyrrhus
soon indisposed him for carrying on a tedious war with
the Romans, whom he learned at last to appreciate;
and as, besides, he must soon be in want of money, he
endeavoured, through the agency of Cineas, to bring
them to terms of peace. He tempted them first with
the promise of the unpurchased liberation of the numerous Roman prisoners in his hands: he demanded nothing but what the Romans could grant without prejudice to themselves; — independence of the states in the hill country and southern corners of Italy. Cineas, too, whose eloquence Plutarch compares with that of Demosthenes, contrived to make his offers so acceptable, that the senate was shaken, and seemed disposed to peace.

This was contrary to the ruling maxim, — a maxim which rules in Rome to this day — the pride of Roman policy — vestigia nulla retrorsum. For the maintenance of this policy none could be fitter than an Appius. His family, which had hitherto stood up with iron stubbornness for every point of patrician privilege, now made itself popular for the first, perhaps for the only, time. The blind and aged Appius Claudius had himself carried into the council, and in a speech attuned exactly to the temper of his countrymen, moved the senate to reject the terms of Pyrrhus.* The liberation of the prisoners, however, interested the Romans so much, that they despatched three men of consequence to Pyrrhus, the best fitted to give that monarch a high notion of the character, talents, and military experience of Roman officers. These ambassadors were, C. Fabricius, his colleague Quintus Æmilius, and the conqueror of the Senonian Gauls, Publius Cornelius. It was on this occasion that Pyrrhus tried on Fabricius an experiment rarely tried in vain on the Grecian military leaders, and even on the monarchs of those times; namely, that of enlisting his private interests against those of his country. But matters had not as yet, nor, indeed, ever proceeded so far in Rome, as to give a gross temptation like this the slightest chance of success. Plutarch's account, that Pyrrhus made use of his elephants to frighten Fabricius, appears to us so unworthy of the king and of the Roman consul, that we leave the scene exclusively to those orators and painters who have

* Cicero de Senectute, cap. vi.
thought the subject worth delineation. What is related of the astonishment of Cinesas at the dignified appearance of the Roman senate, and the willingness with which the people presented itself to the levies, wears an aspect of much less improbability. When we remember the manner in which Cato, as cited by Cicero, expresses himself with regard to an Appius Claudius; how he represents him as the dignified father of a family, as prince among a numerous clientage; we may well believe that the Roman magnates seemed an assembly of kings to a Thessalian orator hackneyed in the base usage of Greece.

War having recommenced on the conclusion of the armistice, an obstinate and protracted conflict took place near Asculum in Apulia, in which the most probable accounts award victory to Pyrrhus. Having, however, lost 15,000 men in the action, and amongst them his best officers, and his allies appearing not greatly inclined to give him active assistance,—having no hope, under the circumstances, of drawing reinforcements from Greece, while the Romans filled all vacancies in their army with the utmost ease,—he sought to give them the slip, and took opportunity of circumstances which called him into Sicily; leaving behind, with a strong garrison, at Tarentum, his officer Milo, who, from the first hour of his league with that city, had occupied its citadel. It was not surprising that a military adventurer like Pyrrhus, at the moment when embarrassed by his losses at Asculum, accepted with alacrity the proposal to seek new adventures in Sicily. Vainly did two states, at other times engrossed by mutual enmity,—the pirate state of the Mamertines in Messina, and the Carthaginians,—combine for once their efforts to prevent his passage. Having embarked his troops at Catana, by aid of the tyrant of Tauromenium, he made good his landing at Syracuse, and was received in triumph there as throughout the island. The Carthaginians instantly raised the siege. Pyrrhus reconciled the various parties; and most of the

* Cicero de Senectute, cap. xi.
tyrants hastened to Syracuse to tender him their allegiance. Pyrrhus now declared war upon Carthage, gathered about him a force more numerous and not less effective than that which he had brought with him from Epirus, and made himself master of all Carthaginian Sicily. The town and fort of Lilybaeum alone held out against him, and the Carthaginians made the most extensive preparations for the rescue of a place which they regarded as their principal strong hold, and which they had made the depot of their stores. Pyrrhus's inconstancy, and the strange unsteadiness of his conduct, appear on this occasion in the most striking possible light. First, he storms the place with all the force at his disposal, meets with obstacles, and pursues his object only the more eagerly; but, after the lapse of two months, he abandons at once his whole plan, resolves on building a fleet and driving the Carthaginians from the seas, and on collecting a great army with which he meant to cross over to Africa. But he knew not how to unite energetic measures with prudent deliberation, and to win to his cause the generals and soldiers of the mercenary troops of Carthage in Sicily. He soon fell out with the petty chiefs who had given in their adhesion to him, and who now deserted, some to Carthage, others to the Mamertines. In short, he soon perceived that, aided only by his Epirots, he should never be able to keep his ground against the Carthaginians, the Mamertines — who alone could bring 10,000 men into the field — not to mention a multitude of adventurers who had formed themselves armies, and occupied towns in various parts of the island. He re-embarked, for Italy, on the summons of his old confederates, and once more tried his fortune against the Romans, after carrying on the war in Sicily two years and four months.

During his absence the Greek towns had succumbed beneath the Roman arms. Heraclea had capitulated; Caulonia was plundered without mercy by Roman troops; Croton was taken; Locri expelled or massacred Pyrrhus's garrison. To retaliate, on his return from Sicily,
Pyrrhus sacked the town, and plundered the temple of the subterranean goddess, one of the richest in Magna Graecia. Dionysius gives the following account of this transaction:

"The wicked and godless friends of Pyrrhus made him seek all possible resources in his pecuniary embarrassments. Evagoras, the son of Theodorus, Balacrus, the son of Nicander, Dinarchus, the son of Nicias,—people who belonged to the accursed and godless sect of Epicurus,—suggested to him an impious source of riches. They advised him to possess himself of the sacred treasures of Proserpine: for there was in this town a venerable temple, in which from of old time there lay heaped up much gold, which had never been touched, and masses of pure metal, unseen and buried under the earth. Pyrrhus, misled by the arts of the above-named flatterers into believing that necessity was valid above law, made use of the men who had prompted the plan to conduct its execution; plundered, through their agency, the sacred treasures, loaded his vessels with the spoils of the temple, and sent them, with the rest of his acquisitions, to Tarentum. He was now, indeed, full of exultation; but a righteous providence here showed its power (γε δι δικαια προνοια την αυτης δυναμιν απεδιξατο). On the other hand, Appian says that he scoffed at the goddess into the bargain; and said, that piety out of season was ridiculous superstition, and that getting money, where it was to be had without trouble, was true wisdom (την ακαιρον ευσεβειαν ειναι δειστημονιαν, το δε συλλεξαι πλουτον απον ευθυλιαν).

In the year after his re-appearance, the Romans appointed Curius Dentatus and Lentulus consuls, the former of whom introduced the practice of confiscating the goods of citizens failing to present themselves when enrolled for military service. He defeated the Epirot army in the neighbourhood of Beneventum, nearly at the same time as his colleague vanquished the Lucanians. Pyrrhus could not remain in Italy after the loss of a single battle: accordingly, he hastened back to Greece.
in quest of new adventures, abandoning Tarentum to her destiny. Two years after his departure, Milo, who had continued to hold the citadel of Tarentum, also capitulated. He was allowed to draw off his troops without disturbance; but the Tarentines lost their fleet, fortifications, part of their works of art, and were subjected to the payment of an annual tribute. The destiny of the other Grecian towns has already been noticed. All Italy bowed beneath the Roman yoke. Most of the cities and states retained, indeed, their laws and constitutions, but in return were forced without reserve to supply their youth to the wars of Rome, and assist in making conquests without sharing either their honour or profit.

How considerable at that time was the Italian population, may be gathered from a statement in Pliny. He relates that when, five years after the capture of Tarentum, the Picinians were in like manner compelled to submit to the Romans, above 360,000 men took the oath of allegiance. The Messapians and Sallentines, too, were bent beneath the Roman yoke; and Brundusium, the point of communication with Greece, was reduced likewise.
CHAP. IX.

FIRST PUNIC WAR.

Carthage was originally one of the Phœnician colonies, founded by Tyre, on the northern coast of Africa. These settlements were mostly formed for the purposes of commerce; but many of them soon made use of their favourable situation, to vindicate their own independence, and snatch to themselves the trade which they were destined to secure to the mother-country. This was an every-day incident in the nations of antiquity, amongst whom, except in the instance of the Romans, the tie which bound the colonies to the parent state was extremely feeble. There was, besides, another circumstance in the origin of Carthage, as of many other colonies of antiquity, which completely accounts for its early independence of the mother-country. It appears to have been one of those settlements formed by the emigration or expulsion of a discontented party in the state. On such occasions, exiles from Greece commonly directed their course to the coasts of Asia Minor, or of Lower Italy; while the Phœnicians sought new habitations in Africa.

Carthage was built in the bosom of a spacious bay (the Gulf of Tunis), enclosed on the eastward by the ancient Promontorium Hermaëum, or Cape Bon, on the west by the Promontorium Apollinis, or Zibib. It stood on a peninsula, connected with the main land by an isthmus, about half a league in breadth. The only defence seawards was a single wall; but toward the isthmus the town was fortified from all assaults on the land side by the citadel of Byrsa, and by a triple wall ninety feet high.

Carthage, as Herder has well observed, was a city, not a nation. An isolated commercial town, on the edge of a
vast and peopled continent, of necessity followed, at first, the policy suitable to its infant feebleness. The Tyrian colonists did not come as conquerors, but purchased and paid tribute for every inch of land occupied by them, and studied to preserve a good understanding with the surrounding natives. This policy was, however, pursued only while it was necessary; that is to say, only till Carthage had strength sufficient to do without it. Hostilities with the native powers followed in due course. In these contests the new comers always kept the upper hand, but, after all, only succeeded in reducing subjects under their empire who eagerly seized every opportunity to throw off the yoke.

At the time when Herodotus wrote, during the better days of Carthage, agriculture was practised by no native population of northern Africa beyond the bounds of the Carthaginian empire. All the native tribes extending from Egypt to the lesser Syrtis were, according to that historian’s express testimony, nomadic. They appear to have preserved their original habits with least mixture in the southern and western parts of the Carthaginian dominions. They did not even understand the language of their masters, and would also seem to have spoken various languages among themselves. Eastwards, along the coast, the native tribes had amalgamated more with the Carthaginians; and a mixed race had sprung up under the name of Libyphœnicians, by whom the most fertile tracts of land were occupied and cultivated.

To keep in subjection this motley population, Carthage adopted much the same expediens as those which we shall presently see were taken by Rome with the nations of Italy. Colonies of her citizens were transplanted to her subject domains, and the twofold end was thus attained, of securing the sovereignty of the land, and of encouraging connection and intermixture with the indigenous races. The foreign colonies of Carthage were wholly designed for commercial purposes. This is indicated, indeed, by their situation, which was invariably fixed on the sea coast. On the other hand, the
colonies within their own dominions were mostly agricultural and inland. These colonial establishments were employed by Carthaginian policy as the surest means of conciliating the favour of the people by drafting off the surplus population of the capital, and bettering, by apportionments of land, the situation of the poorer class of citizens. "In this manner," says Aristotle*, "the government of Carthage secures to itself the attachment of the people, by continually sending from amongst the citizens colonists to the surrounding districts, and raising them to the rank of wealthy land-owners. Such," he adds, "is the character of a mild and enlightened government, which extends its arm to the indigent, while at the same time it inures them to labour."

Notwithstanding this profound and correct policy of Carthage, or rather, perhaps, in consequence of gradual deviation from it, her empire in Africa never formed so perfect and compacted a whole, that the capital kept its dependencies in equal and entire subjection. The agricultural population only, whom the Carthaginians themselves had trained and accustomed to that mode of life, could be treated as subjects, properly so called, for the nomadic tribes were subject to Carthage only so far that they paid her tribute. The rooted hatred of these tribes for the interloping rulers, who disturbed their aboriginal and vagabond mode of life, was fomented by the oppressions of the Carthaginian government, and broke out in revolt whenever the approach of an enemy gave the signal.

The Carthaginian institutions were a work of time and of circumstances. There is nowhere mention of any express legislative basis for the rights and relative functions of the constituted powers of the state. In all probability, therefore, the constitution formed itself by degrees. Its growth was hastened by those internal disturbances, obscure traces of which are to be found in its early history, and its legitimacy rested on the title of prescription. However this may have been, all author-

* Polit. vi. 5.
ities unite in stating, that an aristocracy formed itself in Carthage, which soon acquired all the stability peculiar to that form of government. The Carthaginian aristocracy seems, however, to have consisted not so much in a hereditary nobility, strictly so called, as in the customary pre-eminence of a certain number of leading families. Sometimes a single family held so leading a rank, for a length of time, that generals and supreme magistrates were chosen by preference from its members. But however great the influence and the power of such particular houses, it is, nevertheless, certain that the constitution was at no period purely aristocratic, but always contained some tincture, however moderate, of democracy. Polybius and Aristotle coincide in classifying the Carthaginian among mixed constitutions, although in its general character aristocratic. They both mention the Spartan constitution as having had, in many points, the greatest resemblance to that of Carthage.

The fatal vice of the Carthaginian constitution was the influence of wealth on the appointments to high dignities, and the abuse, which stood in close connection with that influence, of heaping official pluralities on individual personages. In a commercial state, however, where the powers of government are centered in a single town, it was naturally to be expected that the houses possessing most wealth should engross the public administration. Such were the predominating elements of an aristocracy of which the centre and focus was in the Carthaginian senate; which extended its authority through the splendour of its wealth and conquest, and found its support in the popular religion, and in a strict superintendence of its own members.

Carthage was at once a land and maritime power, so far as the latter title can belong to any state of antiquity. Her sovereignty of the seas only extended to the Mediterranean, or, properly speaking, only to the western half of that sea, and, perhaps, to a small part of the ocean just beyond the Pillars of Hercules. Here were
situate the islands which she had wholly or partially conquered, and the coasts which were studded with her colonies. The main object of her policy was to guard these her dependencies, and to keep, for this purpose, the route to them continually open for the transport of troops and defence from hostile incursions. This object required sustained exertion in keeping up the naval power of Carthage, as powerful rivals to that power were not wanting. In Italy they had to struggle, from the earliest times, with the Etruscans, in Syracuse and Massilia with the Greeks, and when at last they might flatter themselves with having surmounted these, Rome, the most formidable of enemies, took the field, and soon discovered that the sovereignty of the sea was the first necessary step to the humiliation of Carthage. The ordinary number of ships, or galleys of war, possessed by Carthage, at the period immediately preceding the Punic wars, appears to have been from 150 to 200. It was increased in the first Punic war, when their naval power appears to have attained its highest pitch. Their war vessels were manned partly with fighting men, partly with rowers; the war complement of a quinquereme, or first-rate, being 120 of the former, and 300 of the latter class. The great number of rowers conduced to that rapidity of manœuvre, for which the Carthaginians were distinguished beyond other nations. These rowers were slaves, bought by the state expressly for that service, and who, as they stood in need of long training, must, doubtless, have formed a standing corps, maintained, at least, partly, in time of peace. The quickness with which their fleets were manned would otherwise be inexplicable.

The whole organic structure and position of the republic led them naturally to place their main reliance on their naval power; and to that power, as Polybius expressly remarks, their land force stood in no sort of adequate proportion. The numerous wars, however, carried on by the republic, and the maintenance of their

* Diod. 11. Polyb. 1

II 3
vast dependencies, forced them almost constantly to keep on foot large armies. In this point, too, the Carthaginian policy and arrangements were altogether peculiar to themselves, and strongly characteristic of a trading state, which preferred hiring others to fight for her money, to carrying on her wars herself, and knew how to make even war subservient to communication and intercourse with the most remote nations. A Carthaginian army presented an interesting spectacle to the eye of the observer of human nature, as well as to that of the soldier by profession. It was an assemblage of the most dissimilar tribes from the most distant regions: hordes of half naked Gauls stood side by side with bands of white-robed Iberians; wild Ligurians were arrayed with far-travelled Nazamones and Lotophagi; Carthaginians and Phœnician Africans formed the centre or main army; countless troops of Numidian cavalry, levied from all the tribes of the desert, swarmed and skirmished on unsaddled steeds on the wings; Balearic slingers formed the advanced guard, and lines of colossal elephants, with their Ethiopian drivers, preceded their march, like a front of movable fortresses. The armies were purposely drawn from the most various populations, in order, as Polybius remarks, that combination and mutiny among the soldiers might be impeded by diversity of language.

The main strength of their army for the most part consisted in light cavalry, which was provided in abundance by the nomadic tribes, which flanked their dominions. From time immemorial, as at the present day, these tribes had been renowned for the practice of horsemanship, and inured from youth to scour the field of battle on their swift horses. All these tribes, from the neighbourling Massyles to the remote Maurusii, who inhabited the present Fez and Morocco on the Western Ocean, were accustomed to serve in the Carthaginian armies and receive the Carthaginian pay, and their levies extended eastward to the territory of Cyrene. The troops of this Numidian cavalry served on small un-
saddled horses: their onset was tremendous through the speed of their horses, and flight had no disgrace in their eyes, as they only fled to renew the attack: they were, in short, to the Carthaginians what the Cossacks are to the Russian armies. The heavy cavalry (equi frænati) were formed from Carthaginian, Libyan, Spanish, and, in later times, Gallic levies. All these are continually mentioned by Polybius.

On the whole, it appears, from the destiny of Carthage as of other states, that mercenaries can never entirely supply the place of native troops, on account of the defect of moral impulses. The genius of a great man, assisted by long exercise, as in the instance of the second war with Rome, may give to an army so composed a short superiority. But a leader of this character is not always to be met with. War with Rome was war with Romans, and Carthage must in the end succumb.

It is evident from the nature of the colonial dependencies possessed by the Carthaginians beyond the limits of Africa, that, in acquiring and retaining them, they acted on a principle which must naturally suggest itself to every trading and seafaring people; namely, that they cannot have any safer and better possessions than islands. Accordingly, the foreign territorial possessions of Carthage, even in her most flourishing times, were almost entirely insular. The western half of the Mediterranean, studded with islands large and small, opened out to them a field exactly suited to their power and position. The first and most important province of Carthage was Sardinia, the largest of all the islands of which they acquired the entire mastery. The whole population of the island, with the exception of such scattered tribes as lurked amidst the fastnesses of the mountains, were reduced to subjection, and the Carthaginians built the town of Calaris (Cagliari), which is still the capital of the island, and Sulchi, both on the south coast. The high value which the Carthaginians placed on this possession is explained by the geographical position of the island. For a people whose tenure of
national existence might be said to depend on the so-
vereignty of the western Mediterranean, and who never
obtained the entire possession of Sicily, Sardinia could
not be otherwise regarded than as the principal pro-
vince. It was doubtless, too, their commercial dépôt for
southern Europe, with which they were in constant
communication. The possession of Sardinia was, be-
sides, of hardly less importance for its own sake. As
a corn magazine it ranked second alone to their domain
in Africa. Of the native tribes inhabiting the island
even the rudest were not wholly unversed in agriculture.
The prime importance to Carthage of a corn country in
this situation may be conceived from the large numbers
of the armies which she kept on foot, and from the ge-
nerally low condition of agriculture in Africa, and in
the western parts of Europe.

Sicily was the point at which Carthaginian and
Grecian interests first came in actual collision. The
Carthaginians and Greeks had planted colonies in this
island, of which the latter soon eclipses the former.
The colonies of Greece were free states, which soon
rose through the enjoyment of independence, the as-
tonishing fertility of the soil, and the unrestricted vent
of its produce, to a high degree of power and of opu-
ulence. The colonies of Carthage, on the other hand,
were planned with the close economy, and watched
with the jealous vigilance, characteristic of suspicious
and frugal traffickers: even her principal settlements
could stand in no comparison with Agrigentum, far less
with Syracuse. The entire possession of the island
would have enriched her with the oil and wine trade,
would have given her armies a never-failing storehouse,
and her fleets the naval command of the Mediterranean.
This, however, Carthage never attained, though it was
long the first and almost only object of her policy, pur-
sued with that unvarying perseverance of which a strong
aristocracy seems alone capable.

The embroiled transactions of Carthage with the Gre-
cian states in Sicily proved the occasion of her first rup-
ture with Rome. The town of Messina, the seat of the pirate republic of the Mamertines, stood in close alliance with Rhegium, on the Italian side of the strait, where an equally lawless military commonwealth had sprung up in the confusion of the Roman war with Pyrrhus. During that war the inhabitants of Rhegium had solicited the detachment of a Roman garrison for their protection. Accordingly, a body of Campanians was sent them from Rome, under the orders of the military tribune, Decius Jubellius. These troops, apparently with the assistance of their neighbours across the strait in Messina, expelled or massacred the citizens for whose protection they had been sent, and established their tumultuary government in Rhegium. So long as the Romans continued at war with Pyrrhus, and were occupied in the reduction of Tarentum, they overlooked this outrage of their soldiery; but no sooner was the war with Tarentum concluded, than they seized at once so good an opportunity to possess themselves of a town which would facilitate their passage to Sicily. A Roman army, under the consul Genucius, marched upon Rhegium; but the 4000 men who constituted the garrison defended the place with the courage of desperation. It was taken by storm, and the greater part of the garrison were cut to pieces in the assault on the walls, or in the streets of the town. Three hundred only fell into the hands of the Romans alive, and were executed in due form as murderers. The town was then restored to its surviving emigrant citizens, who remained, of course, in absolute dependence on the Romans; and thus Rhegium, which lay exactly opposite Messina, was thenceforth in effect subject to Rome.

The fall of Rhegium had robbed the Mamertine commonwealth of Messina of the only ally which these pirates could count upon. The latter had encouraged and reinforced the predatory excursions of these military bandits on the rest of Sicily, regardless alike of the Carthaginian province as of the Greek towns; and the vengeance of the two states which divided Sicily (Car-
thage and Syracuse) impended with combined weight on their heads.

Their nearest, most inveterate, and most dreaded foe was Hiero of Syracuse. This celebrated personage had risen from the station of a young soldier of fortune under Pyrrhus to the royal power in Syracuse, through the regular forms of popular election, though under the pressure of military necessity. During fifty years' reign no single act of despotism was laid to his charge; and under his unostentatious regimen the Syracusans enjoyed all the advantages of freedom, which, under a republican constitution, they had lost speedily. Hiero armed the citizens, got rid of the mercenary soldiery, and organised a new army devoted to himself and the state. With this force he soon expelled the Mamertines from the towns which they had reduced to subjection, and won a decisive victory over them not far from Messina. These disasters so completely exhausted their resources, that, expecting nothing short of immediate capture, and the doom of their companions at Rhegium, they had already made up their minds to sue for mercy from the victor, when the faithless intervention of a Punic naval commander, who was cruising on the coast, snatched the fruits of conquest from Syracuse, and laid the train for a war in which a province was finally lost to Carthage which had been ruled by her for a century and a half.

For centuries back the Carthaginian government had aimed at the absolute possession of all Sicily; and as the Grecian towns, in the last degree enfeebled and depopulated, were for the most part reduced to their subjection, while their own republic had arrived at the full height of its power, they believed themselves nearer than ever to the attainment of the desired object, if they could only succeed in capturing Messina.

But the Mamertines were divided in their sentiments; and the aid of Carthage, although it offered a welcome relief in the present emergency, was to many a source of suspicion and anxiety. Both parties had recourse to
negotiations. The partisans of Carthage found a willing ear with the ruling body; those who sought the protection of Rome met more serious obstacles.

The policy hitherto followed by Rome, if not wholly immaculate, may yet be recorded as conscientious and honourable, when compared with that which we shall find pursued in the latter part of her history. The lust of conquest and of empire are innate in the human heart, and virtue cannot manifest its purity unmodified in the mutual transactions and collisions of powerful communities. Rome had already many acts to repent, but none as yet exactly to be ashamed of. Now, however, that state had abundant matter for shame, which had delivered its own subjects to the axe of the executioner for a deed of which it now stepped forward to rescue the accomplices from the just reward of their crime, and to receive them into its own alliance. This resolution, which was adopted against the decision of the senate, and by the vote of the assembly of the people, was no less an indelible disgrace on the Roman name, than an evidence that the constitution leaned already too much to the side of democracy, though that leaning did not occasion internal mischiefs till long afterwards.

In the mean time the Carthaginian party in Messina had taken advantage of the alarm of imminent danger, to prevail upon the Mamertines to receive a Punic garrison into the citadel. The Romans, on the other hand, though they sought a pretext for war with Carthage, could assume no other colour for their proceedings than that of affording protection against the hostility of king Hiero. The Carthaginians, however, by negotiating peace between the latter and the Mamertines, completely spoiled the pretext which had hitherto been advanced to justify Roman intervention. Still, however, both states avoided an open rupture. At length, after protracted delays, a lieutenant of the consul, Appius Claudius, made his appearance with a division of the army and a fleet of triremes at Rhegium.

The passage across into Sicily was barred by the
Carthaginian fleet, which lay in the strait. The unskilful seamen of Rome were unacquainted with the currents; a violent wind which arose scattered the fleet, and, without one hostile manœuvre on the part of the Carthaginians, many ships fell into their hands, and the rest retreated back to the Bruttian coast. The ships which had been taken were restored uninjured with their crews. At the same time Hanno, the Carthaginian commander at Messina, called on the Roman leader to abstain from breaking the peace, and to abandon his chimerical project. But Romans were not to be discouraged by one frustrated effort. The legate explored the strait, and the wind and current landed him on the island without hinderance on a second attempt, and probably under cloud of night. He found a friendly reception in the harbour of Messina, and soon obtained possession of the citadel by taking advantage of Hanno's vacillating and super-subtle policy. The Carthaginian commander was invited to be present in the assembly of the Mamertines, in order to treat with them and with the Romans. He showed some hesitation in complying with this summons, but at length decided to do so, that he might leave nothing untried. After long speeches on both sides, with no symptom of concession on either, a Roman soldier seized the deluded Hanno and dragged him off; while the Mamertines witnessed with acclamations this breach of all international law. Hanno had the weakness to command the evacuation of the citadel as the ransom for his person; and his cowardice and imprudence were requited at Carthage with crucifixion.

The appearance of a Roman force in Messina, and the consequence thereby given to the Mamertines in Sicily, seemed so dangerous to Hiero, that he forgot the causes of discontent which had been given him by the recent demonstrations of Hanno, and, without delay, concluded an alliance with Carthage. The combined forces of Carthage and Syracuse marched up to the town; Hiero took position on the Chalcidean heights, and the
CHAP. IX. FIRST PUNIC WAR. 109

Carthaginians on a level plain called Eunai: their fleet was moored in the bay of Cape Pelorias. The Roman consul, Appius, had crossed over with comparatively small forces; but he instantly saw the danger of allowing time for the enemy to invest the town by land as well as by sea, as at sea the Romans durst not risk an engagement with the fleets of Carthage. He made overtures to treat with the Carthaginians, which were rejected; attacked king Hiero, and drove him back to his camp from all his positions. Hereupon the Syracusan, either, as Polybius thinks *, foreboding adverse results to the whole enterprise; or, according to Diodorus †, suspecting his Punic allies of treachery, drew suddenly off, and fell back to Syracuse. Appius now attacked and routed the Carthaginians singly, and spread devastation over the whole island. The two consular armies were now concentrated in Sicily, the whole inland domain of Syracuse over-run and occupied, and preparations made for the siege of Syracuse itself, when Hiero offered terms of peace, which, according to Polybius, the Romans were the more inclined to grant him, as the Carthaginians were masters of the sea, and were thus in condition to prevent the provisioning of the Roman armies. Hiero agreed to pay a hundred talents, and to liberate all his prisoners without ransom; and in return was guaranteed possession of Syracuse, and a considerable territory.

Successes so brilliant had never before been crowded into one campaign; but resistance so feeble had hitherto never been met by a Roman army. For in Italy every people had contended for its freedom; while the Sicilian towns, with the single exception of Syracuse, had long lost the very idea of freedom or independence. Nor did they dream of attaining these objects by means of alliance with Rome; but they courted that alliance as affording hopes of a new and less intolerable form of domination, instead of that under which the flower of

* οτειναμενος ει πει τω δλων πε δαματων.
† χαμίων περιδιναι την διεκδειν υπον Καρχερδονων.
their culture had been destroyed by wars, and the last extremities visited on them by the mercenaries of Carthage and Syracuse.

After this campaign, the fate of Sicily seemed to be decided, and peace to be at no great distance. The Carthaginian troops had nowhere shown themselves in the field; no check had so much as retarded the course of Roman conquest, and the senate had not yet proposed to itself the entire reduction of Sicily as the object of those conquests. That object was, indeed, irreconcilable with all hope of peace; and the attainment of it seems to have been first suggested to Roman ambition by the capture of Agrigentum in the third campaign of the war.

The condition of that town, once so magnificent, had long been wretched, no less through the internal pressure of tyranny than the destructive wars for the empire of the island. Hanno was compelled, by repeated signals of distress from the city, to give the Romans battle under its walls. On their part, the increasing dearth of provisions in a hostile country rendered an action no less urgent to them than to the enemy. Hanno's army had a retreat open to them. The Romans could hope to save themselves only by conquering, and they conquered accordingly. The next morning the Romans stormed the town, which was abandoned by the Carthaginian garrison. The famishedburghers could not defend the wide extent of their walls, but in vain they offered to surrender, and supplicated for mercy. The Roman soldier, after seven months' hardships, claimed a richer spoil than that which he had found in the Punic camp. The gates were forced, and the town abandoned to all the horrors of plunder and massacre. Twenty five thousand persons were sold as slaves, and this calculation probably includes the free population only. Those who were already slaves merely changed their masters.

Under the domination of Rome, Agrigentum again rose from its ruins, and, in spite of repeated devastation, exists to the present day. Two thousand years of ruin-
ous oppression have not exhausted the resources of nature under the sky of Sicily.

Every year Rome sent new generals into the field; for in this age of democracy a second consulship was a rare occurrence, even after a longer term than the legal one of ten years. In this multitude of leaders, few showed themselves unworthy of the highest trust, or incapable of the greatest achievements. On the other hand, the number of the Punic leaders was limited, and their talents, before the appearance of Hamilcar Barca, in no instance rose above mediocrity. During the first and more momentous half of the present war, either no distinguished leaders formed themselves, or the government little knew how to discover them. The same unskilfulness showed itself in the whole conduct of the war. The wealthiest republic of those times was in constant financial embarrassment, and saw its troops revolt for lack of their ordinary pay. Rome, whose material resources bore no comparison with those of Carthage, while her citizens felt the pressure of taxes far more than the Carthaginians, whose treasury was chiefly filled by their subjects, nevertheless contrived to raise the requisite amount; or, in default of pay, her soldiers bore deprivations without murmuring, supported as they were at the cost of the miserable Sicilians. On one occasion the Gauls in the service of Carthage threatened desertion, unless their arrears of pay were discharged. The Punic general had recourse to a horrible expedient. He promised them the plunder of Entella, pretending that the Roman garrison which occupied that town had made him an offer to betray it. At the same time he gave the Romans notice of the meditated onset of the Gauls, who were thus enticed into the town and cut off to a man, not, however, without selling their lives dearly in a desperate conflict: so that the issue of the Punic ruse de guerre was regarded as doubly prosperous.

The successes of Carthage at sea were of a less inglorious nature. With a fleet of sixty ships they spread
devastation along the coasts of Italy, and terrified many Sicilian seaports again to acknowledge their empire. In the interior of the island, on the other hand, where no Carthaginian force was at hand to relieve those who preserved their fidelity, all the towns yielded in succession to the Roman armies.

This turn of affairs blighted the premature hope of obtaining a peace which would include, in its terms, the entire cession of Sicily. The accessibleness of Italy to the Punic fleets rendered necessary a new line of defence. It had, by this time, become obvious that Carthage only wanted a leader, such as she found afterwards in Hannibal, to shake the Roman empire to its centre at home, and that nothing but conquests in Africa could put an end to the war. The senate, therefore, resolved to build a fleet, and to attack the Carthaginians on their own element. A Carthaginian pentera, which had been stranded on the Bruttian coast, and fell into the hands of the Romans, served as a model, after which, 130 ships were built within sixty days from the date at which the wood was felled with which they were constructed. The fleet, thus hastily built, was manned with no less expedition; the rowers having been exercised as well as they could ashore, on temporary scaffoldings raised for that purpose. The consul, C. Cornelius Scipio, sailed with part of the fleet to Messina; the remainder followed, as soon as it was fit for service, along the coast. At Messina, the consul, whose imbecile credulity procured for him the surname of Asina, was greeted by false messengers from Lipara, a Greek town of the Cnidians, subjects of Carthage, inviting him to take possession of their islands. Off these islands the Punic commander, Bogud, awaited the success of this stratagem with twenty galleys, and showed himself to the Romans so soon as their fleet had entered the harbour. At this unexpected apparition the crews were seized with a panic fright, and fled ashore, where at least they might hope to escape from the pursuit of the
victor. The consul, with all who remained on board with him, were made prisoners of war, and their capture included that of the whole squadron.

The officers of that part of the fleet which had not come into action, so soon as they learned the destiny of their consul, invited his colleague, C. Duilius, to undertake the command. The consul did not conceal from himself that the ridicule cast by the enemy on the clumsiness of the Roman galleys was well founded, and set about inventing the means of conquest with these unwieldy masses. This could only be effected by depriving the enemy of the advantage which they derived from superior swiftness.

To effect this, every ship in the Roman fleet was provided with a boarding or grappling machine (corvus), which appears to have been a species of drawbridge, of thirty-six feet in length, and four in breadth, with transverse planks, forming an easy stair, and armed at one end with a strong iron spike. This boarding bridge was raised against a mast in the fore part of the vessel, so that, on letting go the rope which secured it, it fell on the deck of an enemy's vessel approaching near enough to engage in the only manner then practised, grappled it fast by means of the spike, and afforded easy access from the Roman deck to that of their antagonist. This achieved, the event could not be doubtful. The ordinary crew of an African galley, which consisted in all likelihood of just such rascals as have been found on the decks of Barbaresque rovers, could never pretend to cope with Roman soldiers.

Thus prepared, Duilius sailed, without hesitation, to meet the enemy, on learning that their fleet was laying waste the coast of Myla. The Carthaginians came to action, as to a certain triumph, with 130 ships, and without even forming in line of battle. Thirty ships, which were first attacked by the Romans, were grappled and taken by means of the boarding machines. The rest, by evolutions and manoeuvres, endeavoured to find a favourable position for attack; but
either could not gain a sufficiently near approach, or, if they did so, were grappled by these dreaded machines, and taken or sunk. One and thirty ships, amongst which was that of the admiral, a heptera, which the Carthaginians had made prize of in a naval action with Pyrrhus, were taken, fourteen destroyed, 7,000 prisoners made, 3,000 slain. The Romans appear not to have lost a single ship. The cause of their success is pretty obvious. The Carthaginians were not prepared for the new invented manœuvre of grappling; their tactics were confined to the shock with prows of their vessels, which had hitherto been the only mode of commencing a naval action. They were consequently taken by surprise. Accordingly, in subsequent naval engagements, we find less notice taken of the grappling bridge, and finally lose sight of it entirely.

The triumph of a first naval victory exceeded its immediate results. The successful leader was allowed, as a lasting token of honour, to be lighted home from banquets with a torch, attended by a flute player. A monument, of which an ancient drawing is still extant, delivered down in marble the remembrance of the Dullian triumph, and the inventory of the spoil with which he enriched the Roman treasury.

Notwithstanding this naval reverse of Carthage, nothing decisive took place in Sicily. The Romans laid siege to Myidostratus seven months without success, sustained severe losses before this town, and Hamilcar, who had assumed the command in place of the unfortunate Hanno, soon afterwards gained a brilliant advantage over them near Thermæ. Meanwhile the Romans felt what Pyrrhus had felt before them, that even successes had been bought at a price which must end in ruin. Accordingly, they resolved to attack the Carthaginians on their own ground, where the matter must be speedily brought to an issue.

How certainly that issue might be foreseen, may be learned from the whole history of the African war under Regulus, up to Xanthippus's arrival. Both consuls,
Lucius Manlius, and M. Attilius Regulus, were commissioned to conduct the army over, and for that purpose collected a vast number of vessels, fastened and arranged to keep together on an attack of the Carthaginians, so that the skill of the latter in naval tactics should be of no service to them, constrained as they were to fight as if upon shore.* A similar scheme was tried by the French and Spaniards at the siege of Gibraltar.

The Roman manœuvre did not fail of success. The crews of the Roman ships, with the army which was to be transported, amounted to 140,000 men,—those of the Carthaginian fleet to 150,000. The spectacle of a sea fight between 300,000 men, divided in an immense number of vessels, must have been imposing; but the action itself had no decisive result, as, after sustaining some loss, the Carthaginians broke off the engagement, in order afterwards to assail the Roman fleet and army separately. But the Romans had no sooner landed on the promontory of Hermæum, than they frustrated the enemy's scheme by drawing their ships ashore, surrounding them with a wall and trench, and laying such vigorous siege to the fortified town of Aspis or Clupea, that they forced it to capitulate before the Carthaginians had recovered from their surprise and consternation. By taking Clupea, they put themselves in possession of the whole neck of land opposite to Carthage, and, having secured their rear, could scour the country before them.

How little the bold enterprise of the Romans had been anticipated, or else how little trust the Carthaginians placed in their own troops, is evident from the fact, that they had neither fleet nor army in Africa, to blockade the Romans at least in their posts, if not to

* Polybius says, "The number of ships was so great, that any one must have been astonished; I do not say who saw, but even who heard of the greatness of the danger, and of the power of the two rival states, which may be inferred from the number of ships and men. The Romans clearly saw they must struggle for empire on the high seas, where the enemy were more than their match in the working of their ships (αὐτοκρατοῦν); they endeavoured, therefore, on all occasions, so to arrange their ships, that they should hold fast together, and that the line should not be easily broken (τὰξις αὐτοκρατὴς καὶ ἀνακάμπτων)."
attack them there. The consuls waited for instructions from Rome, and receiving orders to send back all the ships but forty, all the troops but 15,000 men and 500 cavalry, with whom Regulus was to remain in Africa, they not only embarked the troops without molestation, but 20,000 men whom they made slaves; and no Carthaginian squadron so much as dared to attack Manlius on his passage. However, when it was perceived that Regulus had remained behind, and that, therefore, permanent conquest must be meditated, Hasdrubal and Bostar were appointed to the chief command, with whom Hamilcar, summoned from Sicily, was associated as a third.

u. c. 491. Regulus led his army out of the short repose of winter quarters, and opened the campaign with the capture of a town of the name of Adis, of which the situation is involved in the uncertainty of most African geography before the Roman era. The enemy, meanwhile, had levied an army around Carthage, and drawn over a part of their force from Sicily. The command was given to three generals, Hamilcar, Hasdrubal, and Bostar, who, to all the disadvantages of divided power, added that of inability, in the tenth campaign of the war, to apprehend the peculiarities of the Roman mode of fighting any more than the strength or weakness of their own armies. They avoided the plains, in which the Romans might fear the shock of their cavalry and elephants, and took position in the hills, where the nature of the ground rendered both horse and elephants useless, and harmless to the enemy. Thus they encamped on the hilly grounds near Adis, in order to relieve that town from its state of siege, and their foreign troops, unsupported by the cavalry and elephants, were routed and dispersed, after an obstinate resistance. Eighteen thousand men of the Carthaginian army fell in the battle, 5000, and eighteen elephants captured. After this action the Carthaginians retired within the walls of their capital. Regulus conquered Tunis, sixty-four other towns surrendered to him, the Numidians threw off the yoke
of Carthage, and completed the devastation of the country.

Regulus wrote to the senate that the terror of his arms had sealed the gates of Carthage, and increased its population by innumerable hosts of fugitive peasants, who were cooped to endure famine within its gates. An embassy sued for peace in the Roman camp, and Regulus might then have obtained all that was at last extorted by thirteen years' continuance of warfare, and at the sacrifice of the lives of hundreds of thousands of allies and citizens. But the proconsul dreamed that he held the fate of Carthage in his hands, and was resolved that none but himself should be the arbiter of its destiny. He demanded the cession of Sicily and Sardinia; the return, without ransom, of all the Roman prisoners; the payment of ransom for all on the side of Carthage; annual tribute; recognition of Roman supremacy; renunciation of the right of making war without the consent of Rome; surrender of all but a single ship of war; and the outfit of fifty ships at any time when Rome should require it. No sooner were these terms announced to the Carthaginian embassy, than they took their departure without returning an answer, as conditions like these seemed nothing short of absolute destruction.

Destruction indeed appeared all but inevitable, when it was for the present averted by the arrival of a volunteer from Greece (where life had become intolerable to every man of active talents), in the person of the Lacedemonian Xanthippus. Sparta was by this time in the lowest stage of degenerate impotence, but the laws of Lycurgus still subsisted, and nobler spirits were still found there. Xanthippus is known to us only by his services in this war, but his military talents and reputation must have been acquired in the Macedonian wars of those times, for he cannot have come to Carthage as a mere military adventurer, whose counsels could have carried no authority. Xanthippus declared, with Spar-
tan freedom of speech, that the late unbroken series of reverses, by which Carthage had been brought to the verge of destruction, had been imputable neither to her weakness nor to the force of Rome, but solely to the unskillfulness of the Carthaginian generals, who knew not how to make use of troops, in themselves extremely serviceable. The Punic leaders would, probably, rather have gone to wreck with their country than have owned themselves indebted for their salvation to a foreigner. But the people forced the government to give ear to that very foreigner, and the general voice assigned to Xanthippus the conduct of the war. So soon as the army was placed under his orders, and remodelled, and exercised by him near the city, every one felt that a higher spirit now directed their energies, and despair gave place to the full assurance of victory.

Xanthippus inveigled the Romans into a position whence all chance of escape was out of the question. Regulus's whole army was cut to pieces, with the exception of a few cohorts who escaped as by a miracle. Regulus, and with him a number of Roman knights, were taken prisoners. Xanthippus acquired the more unmingled honour by terminating thus at a single blow the war in Africa, as a foreigner could not be employed in command of the armies of Carthage abroad. He thus returned to his country with the whole renown and recompence which he had earned of the Carthaginians by one decisive action.

An embassy was despatched from Carthage to Rome with proposals for peace, or at least for an exchange of prisoners. The Carthaginian ambassadors were accompanied by M. Regulus, who had now been for five years a captive. There are few more favourite themes for poets and orators in Roman history, than the heroism and martyrdom of Regulus. He is said to have refused to enter the city, regarding himself as a Carthaginian slave; to have sought the leave of his new masters before he could be prevailed upon to attend the deliberations of the senate, and there to have opposed the ex-
change of prisoners with not less vehemence than the propositions for peace. It is recorded of him that his counsels determined the wavering resolutions of the senate; that no persuasions to remain prevailed with him in comparison with his honour and his oath; and that, in order to escape farther temptations, he gave out that a slow poison had been administered to him by Punic treachery, which would soon end his days, even though the senate, consulting less the general good than that of one individual, should attempt to retain him by means of exchange, or by interposing direct authority. It has farther been described, in prose and verse, how he withdrew himself as dishonoured from the embraces of his family, and was put to death, on returning to Carthage, with all the refinements of African cruelty. Dio Cassius, however, treats the martyrdom of Regulus as a piece of pure fictitious martyrology; and the calumnies against Carthage, in which the Romans constantly indulged, render it probable that the received story had exceedingly slight foundations in fact. At all events, the rationale of this heroism seems not very easy to discover, considering that, three years later, the same exchange of prisoners, to have prevented which is reckoned proof of such high merit in Regulus, was actually acceded to by the Romans, with greatly more disadvantage to their affairs.

The Roman government now gave up the idea of carrying on the war in the interior of Africa. Meanwhile they renewed their attacks on the African coast, and on Sicily. This war was especially ruinous to the Greek towns on the coast of Italy; next to these to the Latin seaports, and to those in which, since that time, colonies were planted with the obligation of furnishing hands for the sea service, in return for which the citizens were guaranteed entire exemption — sacrosanctam vacationem—from the land service. These marine colonies, as they were afterwards called, were multiplied amazingly after the second Punic war. Meanwhile, besides the bloody sea and land fights, one enormous
Roman fleet after another was buried in the waves through the want of skill and experience of the Roman seamen and officers.

The Romans never made a brilliant figure at sea; and, altogether, the naval actions of antiquity are childish, compared with those of modern times, notwithstanding the enormous loss of human life which characterised them. However, we must not imbibe too contemptuous an opinion of the ancient navigation, from the frequent wreck of whole fleets. In the ports of Greece and Barbary, well constructed and fast sailing vessels are built without the aid of science in shipbuilding, from mere tradition, of which the origin clearly belongs to classical antiquity. But ships of war, which are now the finest vessels, were then precisely the reverse, as they were not built for sailing, but so as to be wholly in the power of the rowers. Accordingly, they could not weather a storm at open sea; and though they drew so little water, that when stranded their crews could commonly save themselves, their frail structure was shattered by the shock.

As citizens, the Claudian family generally merited the curses of the Roman people; as generals, they were rarely deserving of much consideration. Such honour as they had, however, P. Claudius wholly forfeited, at the same time throwing away the lives of thousands, which, indeed, he viewed with more than indifference. The Roman fleet being again manned, he thought it would be a brilliant feat to surprise that of Carthage in the harbour of Drepana. Auguries were vain to dissuade him; he gave orders to throw overboard the cages of the presaging fowls, that they might drink, as he said, if they would not eat.

The Punic leader, Adherbal, was indeed surprised by the Roman attack, but was found not unprepared for such surprisal. His ships were without delay manned and put in fighting order. Adherbal did not think fit to remain and receive the attack in harbour; but, while the Roman ships were making for the port at its west-
ern entrance, he took his ships out to sea in the opposite direction. P. Claudius saw that he had missed his mark, and gave orders for retreat, which were imperfectly understood. The vessels which had reached the inner part of the harbour met, in returning, those in the rear which were still advancing, and were with difficulty formed into line of battle along the coast. Adherbal, in the mean time, had already drawn out his whole fleet, enclosed that of the Romans, and cut off their retreat. The Carthaginians must have invented some machine or manœuvre to counteract the effect of the Roman grappling engines, as it is evident that they no longer dreaded them. Their crews had superior skill in evolutions: they were favoured besides by the open sea, while the Romans, pinned to the coast, had no space to move or manœuvre, which would, indeed, have been impossible with their clumsy and scarce seaworthy vessels. Only the left wing escaped, consisting of thirty ships, amongst which was that of the consul himself. Ninety-three ships were taken or sunk. The Romans acknowledged a loss of 8000 slain, and 20,000 taken prisoners. The victory was, doubtless, easy; but a circumstance which seems incredible is, that the Carthaginians had not one man slain, and very few wounded.  

The shame and distress ensuing on this defeat, which at once gave a decided preponderance to the power of Carthage in Sicily, broke out at Rome in the shape of the most violent feeling against the consul. He was enjoined, in the name of the republic, to nominate a dictator, and then forthwith to lay down his office and answer for his conduct. P. Claudius, who made a jest alike of the weal or woe of his country, being satisfied that the republic could survive many defeats, and, by consequence, that the honours of his house were not in danger, appointed in derision to the dictatorship M. Claudius Glycias, the son of a freedman, one of his servants, and a client of his house. This wanton piece

* Diodorus.
of insolence was, however, not endured; and the privilege possessed by the senate, of exercising their own choice, and prescribing to the consul an appointment in accordance with it, was employed by them in favour of M. Atilius Calatinus. It is told of this dictator, that his appointment was announced to him while he was sowing with his own hand the field which he occupied as a plebeian, from whence he derived the surname of Seranus.

At this epoch the issue of the war must have seemed desperate, and the perseverance of the senate ruinous to the state. However, the pusillanimous recommendation of peace by a single senator, was punished in the Curiae by the infliction of immediate death. Had similar constancy been shown on the part of the Carthaginians; had they, like the Romans, struggled for the victory at the price of their blood, it does not seem improbable that success would have been on their side, notwithstanding the waste which had hitherto been made of their resources.

Rome's reverses exceeded the restorative powers of the state. The hope of forming a new fleet was abandoned, and Carthalo was tamely suffered to appear on the coasts of Italy, and revenge the devastation of Africa. But the Carthaginians again took to their ships when they found the praetor had taken the field against them. A dangerous mutiny of the soldiers, who clamoured for their arrears of pay, seems about this time to have endangered Carthage, and to have disappointed her brilliant hopes.

It was in these arduous circumstances, that the command of the Carthaginian forces was confided to Hamilcar, who is known under the surname of Barcas, and, more widely, as the father of Hannibal. He was a young man in the modern as well as in the ancient meaning, according to which the bounds of youth were extended into advanced years, at the period when the chief command of the army was conferred on him by the government of his country. His first measure, on
aking the command of the army, was to curb the mutineers of which it consisted by an iron discipline, before he would lead them out against any enemy. He then sailed for Italy, plundered the coasts of Brut-tium and Locris, and, returning from thence, landed at Panormus, and took post on the hill Hercyle (Monte Pellegrino), of which the steep and rocky height commands the plain whereon is built the present capital of Sicily. From the harbour at the foot of this rock the Carthaginian vessels swept the coasts up to the borders of Cumna: and in this situation, separated less than a mile from each other, the armies of both nations re-

The Romans had for some years been driven from the seas; their public hoards were exhausted; the Italian towns and states on the coast suffered incessant annoyance from Carthage. Rome durst not propose new sacrifices to the subjects and allied states. In this crisis the citizens voluntarily taxed their own resources. Poly-bius justly awards the whole honour of the new fleet, which, under Lutatius, terminated the war, to the self-devoting patriotism of the Roman aristocracy, as knights and senators advanced the requisite sums from their own fortunes.* They recovered, indeed, afterwards, their advances out of the sums which Carthage was forced to pay. Never again had the Carthaginians looked to see such a fleet opposed to them. They fitted out theirs hastily under Hanno, in order to transport to Eryx fresh troops and stores; and then, under command of Hamilcar Barcas, to attack the Roman fleet when they had taken troops and seamen on board.

* Polyb. I. c. 59.
But the consul did not let things go so far. He went to look for the Carthaginians, forced them to come to an action in the neighbourhood of the islands which lie over against the Lilybæan promontory, or, rather, the western extremity of Sicily, and won a complete victory. Fifty ships were sunk, and seventy carried off to Lilybæum, with crews amounting to 10,000 men in number. Even now, indeed, the Carthaginians did not despair; but, seeing no means of carrying on the war, empowered the leader who had hitherto conducted it with such ardour, to continue or to terminate it, as he should deem expedient. Hamilcar made good use of the circumstances. He saw that, after winning a splendid victory, Lutatius was disposed to be more cautious than Regulus had been, and moreover wished to enjoy the triumph of terminating the war. In effect, Lutatius closed a peace on such equitable terms, that the Romans at first did not think proper to ratify it. The condition of that peace, which, as we proceed, will appear of greatest moment, was, that the Romans from henceforward should have joint possession of Sicily with the Syracusans. Soon afterwards they took advantage of the unfortunate situation of Carthage to extort, in addition, the cession of Sardinia. This single condition, which stretched the domain of the Roman people beyond the bounds of Italy, occasioned such alterations in their internal and external relations, that from this moment all was changed in Rome. Here, therefore, concludes the purely Italian period of Roman history. The first Punic war remained without a parallel in the later history of Rome, whether we contemplate the grandeur of the efforts, or the sacrifices offered by the firmness of the republic.

There is a common cant, says Niebuhr, which usurps the name of philosophy, that the value of a conquest never can compensate the expense of it, and the accompanying loss of human life. The first clause of the sentence can only be true with respect to the private possessions of individual subjects of the conquering state,
when the burden of imposts and corresponding diminution of property is felt to any considerable degree. The latter part of the maxim is false, if the nation remains flourishing. And a flourishing condition, not of commerce only, but of national power, vigour, and importance, acquired by conquest, gives life and energy to a state, which soon replaces any loss it may have sustained in population and resources.
The early organisation of a standing army in Rome contributed, in no small degree, to the rapid extension of her dominion. The character of the Roman republic was altogether military. Agriculture and war were the only honourable occupations. It may be proper here to notice a few of the leading features which characterised the military system of Rome up to the period now reached by us. According to the well-known and repeatedly quoted statements of Livy, the legion, at the commencement of the fifth century from the building of the city, consisted of five cohorts or divisions, or, if we may use a more familiar designation, battalions. These were severally named Hastati, Principes, Triarii, Rorarii, and Accensi. The two first had the joint appellation of Antesignani, or Antepilani, because they were disposed in front of the standards and the triarii, who were also called Pilani. Each of them contained 15 manipules, or 30 centuries; and a century consisted of thirty men besides the centurion. The complement of each cohort consisting of thirty centuries of thirty men, each must consequently have been 900 men; and the numerical strength of all five being probably the same, the legion mustered 4500. Of these, 400 hastati, 900 principes, and 900 triarii, 2200 men in all, ranked as heavy-armed and troops of the line; 200 hastati and 900 rorarii, 1100 in all, as light troops. These proportions are the same as those which obtained among the Greeks, between the light-armed soldiers and the hoplites.

With regard to the three cohorts of heavy-armed troops, we learn from Varro that the hastati carried spears, the principes swords, the triarii pilae or javelins,
from the use of which they received the name of *pilani*. The meaning, however, of these names became obscure in the lapse of time, and in consequence of the changes introduced in military arrangements. The legion, its division, the mode of arming its several main component parts, the moveableness, and easy applicability to every peculiarity in the nature of the ground, of the order of the three main bodies into which it was divided, the *principes*, *triarii*, and *hastati*, are peculiar to the Romans. Like the division of the Spartan and the Macedonian phalanx, it was grounded upon national characteristics, but here, too, did that character display itself, which wholly and solely fixes the pre-eminence of the Romans above the other nations of antiquity. That character consists in this; that their senate, whom Cineas names, with justice, an assembly of kings, and who, in early times, were the only persons who could aspire to places of authority, so admirably understood not only how to receive a foreign regulation, when it was preferable to a native one, but how to knit it so closely with the earlier domestic arrangements, that Rome, until the period of the second Punic war, remained always the same, yet always admitted alterations. This is evidenced in every part of the military system.

Military service, however burdensome in early times, was in those times, at least, a service of honour. The mode of recruiting was such, that only the flower of the population was levied. Lists of all the young people who had reached their sixteenth year were kept in the temple of the goddess *Juventus*; and these, with the register of deaths, which in like manner was kept in the temple of Venus Libitina, and, with the lists of the censors, which contained a complete registry of births, gave the numbers of those liable to serve.

The whole army of earlier times was an image of Samnite equality in combination with liberty. The consul or general only, and the tribunes, were officers in or out — all the centurions held their ra
only. The consul chose, and the senate confirmed, the legates; the tribunes, since the year 443, were in part elected by the people, and in part named by the consul in the field, but a difference existed in the rank of the two. Amongst the tribunes the number of those was often very great who had held the rank of consul, praetor, ædile, and tribune of the people; centurions and praefects, on the other hand, were named with consent of the consul by the tribune of the legion, and it was not till the legions had become standing regiments, that a regular promotion in rank was introduced. All the tribunes were either already senators, or, at all events, were sure to be taken up by the censors into the senate, in case they fixed their residence in Rome. Even the number of legionaries was altered according to circumstances, without the national forces being thereby in the least disturbed; and the mode of arming, also, was adapted to each new enemy.

Acquaintance with the troops of Greece, especially since the war with Pyrrhus, induced the Romans to modify their military arrangements, and to approximate, so far as it was practicable, their arms and order of battle to that of the phalangites. The arms of the Greco-Macedonian troops were at that time little round shields and sarissæ. The Romans had long shields, and therefore more complete protection to the body than the Grecian shield can give, and possessed the pilum, a formidable weapon for thrusting and throwing. The soldier of the Grecian phalanx, as well as the Roman legionary, fought at close quarters, and in rank and file, but the phalanx was immovable, and all its soldiers similar in accoutrements and weapons. The Roman order of battle admitted of contraction and extension, as every cohort and every manipulus formed an order of its own, and could be used singly, so that the whole could be easily divided, and, when necessary, easily united again.

The same advances, the same adaptation to the time and to the circumstances, combined with a judicious ad-
herence to old customs, as far as possible, is to be found in the civil constitution, in the ordination of authorities, and the functions committed to them; in the treatment of the vanquished, and the manner in which Roman laws and regulations were never intruded, but skilfully engrafted upon foreign.

At a time when the Romans were obliged to oppose unity and consistency to the intestine discord of the Etruscans and the Latins, and when internal concord was often disturbed, even amongst themselves; at a time, besides, of simple social relations; all executive power was in the hands of the kings, then of the consuls, or, when needful, of occasionally nominated dictators. The censors, how important soever their office, had only definite functions, which always recurred in the same routine; though the regulation of this magistrature, as well as of the rest, shows what care was taken to adapt the whole political constitution to the circumstances.

During the disputes which, since the establishment of the tribunate, had engrossed the whole attention of the consuls, the official enumeration and assessment of the Roman people often was omitted. Hence these functions, originally connected with the consulship, were altogether severed from it, and delegated to some one of those senators who had already held that office. As their principal duty demanded longer time for its performance, and was, therefore, to be repeated only once in five years, the censors remained full five years in office, during the first nine years which succeeded the erection of the new dignity. This, however, could not be endured by the republican jealousy; a law shortly followed, that in future they should always lay their office down on the expiration of eighteen months. Immediately on entrance to their office, they held a public session on the forum; and one tribe after the other, in succession, were made to parade past them, stated their property, and were registered anew in the scale of taxation, according to an estimate of their whole posses-
sions, as these had been increased or diminished. In later times, the burghers, who resided in the provinces, transmitted their estimates in writing. These, engraved on copper plates, formed the register of population and taxes. We have remarked, in another place, how far the supervision of the censors over morality extended. The farming of the public lands, the superintendence of public buildings, high-roads, and aqueducts, the nomination of senators, and the right to exclude an unworthy person altogether from the senate for the space of five years, gave a dignity to those who were invested with this office, which was so much greater, the less they seemed connected with the executive power, or to stand in need, like the prætor and consul, of military command.

The first nomination of a prætor was, properly speaking, not the result of the increase of population, but of the contest of the patricians and the plebeians about the consulship. But the new dignity could not have been established at a more opportune time, had the direct intention been to add to the number of appointments in accordance with the necessities of the time. By the establishment of a prætorship, the functions of the judicature were separated from those of the executive, and committed to a man who stood almost equal to the consul. The first prætor was son of the great Camillus. Gradually, the number of the prætors was increased to four, to six, and, lastly, to ten. The last alterations do not fall within the times of which we are treating. The constitution of the tribunals, and the maxims according to which decisions were to be given in certain disputed cases, underwent alterations in like manner according to circumstances: the former according to the necessities of the times: the latter according to the views of the jurists who guided the prætor, or his own. That a wide field was opened to caprice and cabals in later times, by the edicts of the prætors, is undeniable. On the other hand, the delays, the mechanical spirit to
which a fixed unvarying constitution is so liable, were avoided, and the rapid transaction of business was promoted, which distinguishes the conduct of affairs at Rome, in every department.

The remarks which have been made respecting the praetors, apply in a great measure to the aediles. It is true that some obscurity involves the occasion of the earliest establishment of the dignity of curule aediles. It may, however, be maintained, without hesitation, that at a time when, with the increase of population, the want of police came to be sensibly felt, the establishment of this office created a superior police authority, in the same way as, in England, it has been necessary to place the police of the metropolis in the hands of the home secretary.

The same may be said of the office of questors, so far as we understand thereby, not criminal judges, but officers of the treasury. They arose as business multiplied, were doubled when continual wars demanded standing armies, and again increased when the four regions of Italy afforded domains and contributions which required as much attention as formerly the Roman had done.

The progressiveness, the prudent and deliberate improvement which we perceive in the erection of new offices, we also find in the laws and regulations. We have shown with what tranquillity, on the part of the plebeians and their tribunes, the new popular rights were won from the ruling aristocracy, without effusion of blood, and without violence, properly so called; how they were, step by step, augmented, till — at once retaining the old division of the people, retaining the laws and essential rights of the several classes — an altogether new form was called into existence. A new nobility arose, which, if it did not consist exclusively of families whose founders had distinguished themselves by extraordinary services to their countrymen, yet at least had the voice of the people unequivocally in its favour. The people, indeed, did not elect the senators, except inas-
much as those who had been invested with the first dignities thenceforward had a seat in the senate. It was, however, enjoined as a duty on the censors, in filling up the numbers of the senate, only to accept the most distinguished of the citizens. We shall content ourselves with indicating thus much, and hasten to the arrangements made by the senate with regard to the Italian states, when we shall first have thrown a glance upon the several classes of the people at Rome.

Rome's earliest history shows us a state possessing a nobility, a sort of vassals, vanquished slaves like all the other primary states, as well of other countries as of Italy in particular. Rome, however, soon acquires a mixed description of burghers, which does not, as in Athens, merely exercise mechanical trades, but the most important part of which employs itself in agriculture, as well as the patricians and their clients. Regulations are even attributed to so early a reign as the second king's, calculated for this entirely new class, of Etruscan, Latin, or Samnite origin. The last king but one gave it, according to the legend, an importance in the state which proved the occasion of the total subversion of the regimen of castes in Italy. We will not investigate what relation the earlier knights bore to the later, having already declared the history of Romulus mythical and poetical; but that, after the classification of Servius Tullius, and the organisation, founded thereon, of the Roman army, and of the military service of the several classes of the people, the knights were inserted betwixt the nobles and burghers as a new order, is so completely made out as to need no demonstration. The equestrian order sprung up as an intermediate rank between the class of nobles and of plain citizens. These knights owed their rank in the state entirely to their property. To their property, also, consisting, of course, in earlier times, of land, and, in later times, in ready cash or other disposable capital, they owed their constant employment as contractors of tolls and farmers of revenue. The body of knights, without regard to age or to patrician origin, was wholly constituted by reference to the valuation of
property: and even in the most flourishing times of
the republic, no greater sum was required to qualify for
equestrian rank than 400,000 sesterces, or about 3200l.
of English money.

We are also led back to Romulus in the matter of
the colonies, as an institution by means of which the
Romans contrived to annex to themselves the force of
the whole Italian population, properly so called, and to
render Italy but the domain of the single town of Rome.
The Greeks severed their colonies from the mother coun-
try, and pushed them into far remote regions; the Romans
regarded theirs as a part of themselves; and it was not
till late, reluctantly, and against the will of the senate,
that they made up their minds to plant colonies out of
Italy. So long as the republic lasted, the number of
foreign colonies always remained very inconsiderable.
The system, and its first applications, originated with
Romulus, according to the ordinary accounts. The fol-
lowing kings are said to have founded six or seven
colonies, in the number of which was Ostia, the splendid
seaport of Rome, which numbered, at a later period,
80,000 inhabitants. Up to the period of the second
Punic war, their number had increased to thirty, as
Livy thinks, or to fifty-three, if the statement by name
of the individual colonies in Asconius Pedianus is to
be trusted to. These colonies lay at the two southern
extremities of Italy, as well as in the northern part,
in the Gallic lands on the Po. Since the Latins, and
the Italians in general, participated in their victories,
they allowed them also to share the rewards, and founded
Latin and Italian, as well as Roman colonies, only
endowed with the various rights of the mother countries.
It must here be remarked, that the colonists shared in the
burdensome obligations, as well as in the honorary
rights, of Roman citizens, but were much more nar-
rowly limited in their own internal administration than
the allied towns of which we shall presently make
mention. The principal advantage of the Roman citizen,
that of giving his vote in the public assembly of his
native city, was not enjoyed as a matter of course by the colonies, unless when it was specially secured to them. These colonies formed, where they existed, a little Rome; had their senate (the decurions), their consuls (duumviri), and their censors (duumviri quinquennales); and in the Roman senate there was always one or other of the great men who took charge of their interests.

While thus, by means of colonies, Rome multiplied herself in Italy, and these colonies were knitted to the metropolis by honorary rights, and by the provision that the colonist who took up his abode again in Rome again enjoyed the rights of Roman citizenship, the vanquished states were partitioned in the most diversified manner. Even those towns comprised under the name of Municipia, in which we include those which had the right of Roman citizenship, with or without that of suffrage in the metropolis, were various in their modes of administration; and the senate took the most favourable occasions which offered to get such towns effectually under, without wounding the mass of their inhabitants by withdrawing from them rights of which the loss would have pained them for the moment. The subjection of the formerly free states, whenever occasion offered, was effected by converting them into prefectures. We cannot better elucidate this than by translating the words of Festus:—"Those Italian towns were called prefectures, where courts of justice, markets, and fairs were held; where the administration was local, though not composed of self-elected authorities, the government being by prefects who were annually sent from Rome. Of these states there were two species:—the one to which prefects were sent elected by the people: to these belonged Capua, Cumæ, Casilinum, Liternum, Vulturnum, Puteoli, Acerra, Suessula, Atella, Calatia. The prefect of the others was appointed by the town prætor, as in Fundi, Formiæ, Cære, Venafrum, Allīfa, Rivernum, Anagnia, Frusino, Reate, Saturnia, Nursia, Arpinum, &c.

We must speak with somewhat more particularity of
the municipal towns, the rights of the Latins and Italians, as well as of the Greek states, which received from the Romans peculiar privileges. First, as to what regards the so called municipia, or Italian towns, to which the right of Roman citizenship was secured; these towns either themselves elected their authorities, or received prefects from Rome. The latter regulation was inflicted as a punishment, when the state had been guilty of some gross offence, of treason or of revolt; but those also to whom no offence could be imputed, had great varieties of right and constitution. Not all received the Roman citizenship in the full sense of the word: some had it only as the colonies; others, on the other hand, could, when they had time and taste for it, go to Rome, and there give their votes, and compete for public offices. Further, they had either their own laws, or had adopted the Roman ones wholly or else partially; not to mention other diversities. Most of these municipal towns framed their constitution entirely on the model of the Roman. We find the ranks divided, as in Rome, into senatorial or old noble families, knightly, and, in a stricter sense, civic ones. They had their consuls, censors, ediles, questors, and tribunes of the people. For the rest, there was only a very limited number of such towns in Italy; and even these, for the most part, did not arrive at the full rights of Roman citizenship till a late period.

The senate well understood how to diminish and annihilate imperceptibly the privileges conceded to the Latin states at the time when the Roman armies chiefly consisted of Latin troops. Just as they had contrived to oppress Praeneste, once an enormous town, afterwards insignificant in comparison to Rome, and which had been honoured by a league with the new state on terms of perfect equality, so they also oppressed the Latin populations. We here speak, not of the extirpation of whole races, such as the Volsci and the Æqui, to the remnants of which the privileges of Latium were afterwards conceded,—they were treated according to
the laws of war,—we speak of those who offered no such obstinate resistance, or, like the Asci and Ausonians or Aurunci, were, after their defeat, associated voluntarily by the Romans to the old Latins. We refrain from investigation with regard to the several towns and nations during the domination of the Romans: the Latin right was proclaimed equal for all states of Latin origin; yet in point of fact a very great diversity existed; so that, even among the Latins, union for one end was extremely difficult.

In early times, hardly any distinction existed between Roman and Latin citizens. On his arrival in Rome, the Latin guest was enrolled, if he thought proper, in the civic lists, as a matter of course, by the censor. This was more difficult at a later period, when the city mob became proud of those rights which gave them at least collective importance. For the rest, all the advantages which were conceded to the Latins, and which placed them on a footing of all but equality to Roman citizens, were more than outweighed by the military burdens, which pressed them more heavily than the Romans. First of all, they were forced to submit to the levies prescribed by the Romans, without having the shadow of a share in the deliberation whether war should be waged or not, and this in a state hardly ever at peace. The service imposed was so much the harder, that they did not even share that honour which alone can console the soldier for an infinity of toil and peril, equally with the Romans, with whom they had equally shared exertions and hazards. It was always Roman legions, known by name and number, which won victories, though the Latins were armed exactly like them, equally divided into legions, and equally brave. For the Latin troops were always used and designated only in the second rank, as auxiliaries. Their legions, besides, were always stronger in numbers than the Roman; their cavalry always double as strong: indeed, the Romans often demanded a double even from the infantry, and from the cavalry a triple contingent.
If we consider the enormous number of men who fell in the battles of antiquity, where the struggle was man to man, the loss of life in the first and second Punic wars, and the concourse from the country to Rome, the depopulation of Latium and all Italy is conceivable. The other Italian nations had been incorporated with the Roman empire on altogether different conditions, and were, as we have already remarked, in manifold ways distinct from each other, as well by rights and laws, as by derivation and language or dialect. Of the Italian nations, some, indeed, had voluntarily submitted themselves, but all at a later period attempted to throw off the yoke: all were, therefore, reduced to regard their rights as a present or a privilege of the Romans. Meanwhile, the latter were artful enough to concede all possible privileges, so soon as these vigorous races would submit to martial organisation.

All the populations which enjoyed the *Jus Italicum*, had their own laws and local administrations, and were not, like the conquered land (provinces), ruled by Roman authorities. On the other hand, however, the senate gave them severe orders, which the local authorities were obliged to put in execution as rigidly as a Roman could have done. Roman grandees arriving in the capital towns, or travelling through the country, allowed themselves all possible licence, and no state dared to make the slightest remonstrance; partly because every Roman senator was a formidable person on his own account, partly because these states, in those contests in their interior, and with their nearest neighbours, of which there could be no lack, considering the Italian popular character, were obliged to appeal, as the sole tribunal open to them, to the Roman senate, or arbitrators named by it. However, as the Romans never failed to confiscate a part of the land of the vanquished, and either to farm it as public domains, or assign it for a yearly rent to colonies, they could easily concede freedom from taxes; having levied them, once for all, at the out-
set, by confiscation of the property in the soil. Yet this freedom from taxes was in later times an advantage in comparison with which the right of citizenship was often despised. In the posting of soldiers, many had a preference over the Latins; others, again, were dealt with no less hardly than the Latins; and, finally, others were put on quite ignominious services in the army.

In civil rights, certain advantages seem to have been common to all Italians with the Romans. The Grecian towns in Italy were allowed to enjoy a free constitution, retain their old authorities, and preserve complete independence. But they soon found that an independence which hangs on the good-will of the stronger party is worse than a distinct and definite servitude. When they discovered this, they endeavoured to release themselves from patronage, but were again reduced by force to submission, and were indebted from that moment to the clemency of the victor for all that they retained of their rights. The struggle took place at different times and under various circumstances. Hence, too, the conditions of the new subjection were utterly different. Yet all, when they were called upon, were bound to furnish troops to the Roman army, and pay tribute; and those which lay on the sea-side, at the time of the Punic wars, were ruined by the quota of ships and sailors they were forced to supply.

The first Greek town, which in this manner came under Roman denomination, was Neapolis or Palaiopolis, or the city of Parthenope, one of the Sirens, whose grave was shown in the neighbourhood, and this town even in Strabo's time had preserved its Greek regulations. Strabo records no Roman titles of functionaries, although he tells us that Campanian names and offices had been introduced. For the rest, every thing else remained entirely Greek as before,—wrestling schools and other Grecian seminaries existed there—every five years, gymnastic and musical festivals were held; and the Romans settled there even gave Greek names to their children. The old renowned Posidonia, afterwards
Pæstum, became a Roman colony; while Thurium, which of all the towns in Lower Italy had first invoked the Roman protection, became a Roman colony under the name of Copia.

In all the towns of the Greeks which received Roman colonies, the Greek prosperity sank along with the Greek constitution: the stamp of their coinage more and more betrayed that art was encouraged no longer; and, instead of the former symbols of the prosperity of the town and its territory, cultivation and commerce, came the two Roman, consequently foreign, names, which mark the highest magistracy (duumviri). Others of these towns adhered to the Greek constitution in their interior, as the Romans never invaded constitutions, especially those of particular towns, except in case of extreme necessity. If the little state in the aggregate did their pleasure, it might administer itself as long as it pleased.

The history of Rome under the kings, with reference to the mode of life, industry, arts, and similar objects, belongs wholly to the primitive times and primitive states of Italy. What Plutarch relates of Romulus’s stone gate of the ancient Rome, does not harmonise with the history of Remus’s leap over his trench. The former circumstance leads us back to Etruscan arts and manners; the latter to a primitive state, such as we might see in the interior of Africa. The buildings of a Tarquinius Priscus, and of a Porsenna, ill agree with the narratives of the ancient poverty and ignorance, with the straw huts of Romulus, and the want of all the arts of life. We therefore set out from the supposition that Rome, as a republic, retrograded the further from the old civilisation, the more it formed itself into an entirely new state; and that the more it took a direction wholly military, the more the Etruscan and Latin manners yielded to the Samnite. Were, therefore, an accurate history possible of the earlier times, we should have to speak of a retrogradation to simpler manners and modes of life, of the immigration of families and tribes
from the mountain and rural districts, of the gradual transformation of domestic habits and intercourse into military rudeness and simplicity. As, however, we lack materials to elucidate this retrograde movement, we take up the thread in the times when we can agree with the common Roman histories.

These times may be dated from the destruction of the town by the Gauls, to the end of the Samnite wars; for, at that period the state had acquired vigour in continual wars, but had also become impoverished, and had gone back in civilisation. The ordinary public expenses of these times were paid from the contributions of the burghers, from the limited proceeds of the tolls, from the above-mentioned imposts on public lands of which grants had been made to private persons, and from the rents of those districts which remained public property, and were farmed out as pasture or as arable. As in the time of the kings, spoils were employed in public works and buildings.

Even in early times, exceeding liberality was exercised in the outfit and indemnification of functionaries. The allowances made to commissaries named for special employments, the outfit bestowed on individual functionaries on active service, are frequently referred to by historians. The public expenses became considerable on the duration of a war, and the extension of a dominion, which at first brought little in through the entertaining of numerous subordinate functionaries, all paid by the state, for the most part changed annually, and chosen by the individual magistrates at discretion. Considerable profits also accrued from the spoils in war to the magistrates and the old and new nobility in general. This is evident from the fact, that the first strife between the old patricians and burghers arose entirely and exclusively from the circumstance that the patricians became richer and richer by war, and the administration of public posts of dignity, while the people became poorer and poorer by military service.

We shall presently see, from the narrative of the
Gracchic disturbances, that the new nobility trod in the very footsteps of the old. We cannot conceal that the accounts of the want of a regular coinage, of the late coining of silver, and the use of cattle as an instrument of exchange, would stand in direct contradiction with those of the usurious transactions of ancient Rome, if it might not be assumed with confidence, that Etruscan, Latin, and Greek coins were in use before the Roman state saw fit to coin for its own use.

We will somewhat more minutely explain what we have said of the subordinate class of functionaries, and the provision made for them, since it stands in close connection with the whole public administration, and we shall be under the unfortunate necessity in the following sections of speaking only too often, of the profits drawn by the Roman grandees from those who were their protégés and subjects. First, we have to remark that the inferior authorities, which did not depend on the censors, consuls, praetors, ædiles, and quaestors, but were appointed independently by the people or the senate, drew considerable emoluments, either from fees or appointments, and outfit money. These subordinate officers are commonly included under the general name of apparitors, or those secondary functionaries who were named at the discretion of the higher ones, without the concurrence of the senate. We know that they chose them from their clients, in order to lay the latter under obligations to them, or attach to themselves that numerous class which subsisted on such petty employments. Of these, it is proper first to name the so called scribes, who formed an important class in Rome, and to whom were intrusted the drawing up of law papers, the whole routine of finance, and the most important despatches. They purchased in part their offices, and formed so large a body of men in Rome, that it was found necessary to distribute them, like the other inferior functionaries, in regular societies, according to rank and order. They received a small salary from the state; but occasionally participated in the perquisites of
the higher officers, and laid their accounts in such a manner before them that it was difficult to detect any embezzlement. As they formed a regular class, they may be looked upon in the same light as that of lawyers, —a class to which at one and the same time the most distinguished, rich, and respected men, and the most despised, may belong. The character of a Roman official personage may therefore be judged of by that of those with whom he filled his offices. It is true, this was a later state of things; but that, at an earlier period, the military contempt of intellectual cultivation rendered accountants, penmen, and persons acquainted with the forms of law, still more necessary to the persons in power, is proved by the renowned example of Cn. Flavius, the son or grandson of a freedman, who, in the year 440 of the town, even reached the curule ædile-ship, and immortalised himself by drawing forth from priestly patrician obscurity the calendar or catalogue of the days on which courts of justice might or might not be held, which was before a mystery.

The servants, properly so called, of the first official persons (accensi), were, indeed, but little elevated above the rank of slaves, and were chiefly selected from the freedmen. The occupations of these people, as of the precons, were so manifold, and so lucrative, that a trade was sometimes driven with their posts; and that a praeco was often numbered amongst the most important personages in Rome, as may be learnt by the example of Sextus Nævius in Cicero's oration for Quinctius. In every case, the treasury had considerable payments to make for the subordinate officers in service. The number of lictors was very considerable; for the lower police authority of the triumviri capitales alone had eight of these in their service. But the most numerous were the officers and commis of the censors, ædiles, and questors. As the censors were elected for a short time only, they were obliged to leave the mechanical execution of their functions to subordinate officers, whose labours were thereafter to be guided and examined by
the censors of the next lustrum. The ædiles, distracted by the care for police and public amusements, could not possibly give adequate attention to the many other important departments intrusted to them, as they entered quite new upon their office, of which the duties indispensably demanded experience. The quaestors had the public treasury under their superintendence, the administration of which was extremely complex under the Roman republic, and required the care of officers who should not be shifted annually. Quaestors, ædiles, censors, had, therefore, under their superintendence a great number of officers of all kinds; accountants, architects, scribes, surveyors, people of all trades.

As to the censors, it must be remarked, that, although the Romans undertook no buildings on account of the state, but had them performed by contract with private speculators, in the same way as they farmed out the collection, or rather the proceeds of the public revenues, they yet were obliged to cause the building contracts to be drawn up in writing (of which Cato has preserved to us a specimen in his book on agriculture), as well as the innumerable multitude of other contracts, which they could not possibly look after themselves. Even the inspection of the building and execution was intrusted to hired functionaries, who were bound to account to the censors.

Works of public utility had already begun to be projected. We more particularly allude to sewers, aqueducts, and highways, the crowning monuments of Roman grandeur, which excite in us more astonishment than all the Egyptian edifices, and Indian rock temples. We pass over the sewers, as they belong to the Etruscan period. The roads also, aqueducts, theatres, baths, and the like, we must not overlook, as it was in this period that the model was given according to which public works of the two former descriptions continued to be conducted, until the latest times of the emperors. The
pride of a princely patrician, Appius Claudius, whom we
know, from the history of Pyrrhus, as a man of lofty
spirit; who looked, indeed, on his family as his country,
but also looked on his country as his family; a man who
may be called the express image of the ancient patri-
ciate — of the sternness, vigour, simplicity, and con-
stancy of the old Roman nobility — for the first time
since the kingly era, employed the revenues of the state,
greatly augmented as these were by the possession of
Campania and the plunder of Samnium, in a gigantic
undertaking,— in the building of an enormous aqueduct,
and the planning of the most remarkable highway of
the Roman empire. At that time, the Romans as well
as the Latins continued to pay war-taxes, land-taxes,
property-taxes: the tithe of the demesne lands brought
large sums in: and the tolls had become more pro-
ductive since the domain had received aggrandise-
ments: the number of slaves had, owing to the wars,
greatly increased. Appius, therefore, could not better
oblige the mass of the citizens than by undertaking an
enormous public work, which should occupy them,
and give them an opportunity to enrich themselves
through the labour of their slaves. At the same time,
he announced by these means the greatness of Rome to
the whole world, and secured immortal glory to himself.

The construction of the Appian way from Rome to
Capua remained for ever unsurpassed, became the mo-
del of all highways, and evidenced Roman grandeur
best of all those of which we shall have afterwards to
make mention.

What remains of this Appian way, exhibits up to
the present times a structure which may almost be
said to surpass the Etruscan walls, as it extends over
so large a tract of ground. It is a broad highway, not
of broken stones, but solid masonry. The stones them-
selves are squared by line and rule, smoothed and fitted
with such nicety, that the joinings are scarcely per-
ceptible. Each stone measures four or five feet. These
freestone causeways were strewed with gravel, and furnish-
ished with stones for mounting and descending from
horseback, with milestones, and with houses to put up
at. Soon also gravestones and other monuments rose
on every side in their neighbourhood, whereby the uni-
formity of our turnpike roads was avoided, the traveller
received instruction, and was filled with admiration and
awe of the world-ruling people.

Aqueducts increased in a proportion fully equal to
that of these superb and splendid highways. If due
weight be given to the reflection, that projects like
those of Tarquin and of Appius presuppose the out-
lay of enormous sums, and an extraordinary number
of skilled artificers, the more importance will be attached
to the recorded circumstance, that in Pyrrhus's time
private houses were either wholly constructed, or at least
covered in with wood; and that Rome did not begin to
coin silver till after the conquest of Tarentum, or gold
till after the second Punic war. Consequently, every
thing in Rome was done with a reference to the grandeur
of the state, its works and undertakings; nothing was
done for intercourse, trade, and show in private life; all
ready money was turned to public purposes of definite
and obvious utility; and the Etruscans, Latins, Cam-
panians, Greeks, were willingly allowed the honour of
setting their stamp upon coins of which Rome was to
make use.

The Roman family life was entirely Samnite; in other
words, rural, simple, moral, and moderate. The resi-
dence of a Roman, that of the senators excepted, was
in earlier times in the country: he only resorted to the
town on business, and returned as soon as his business
was finished. Round about him lived his children,
grand-children, and clients, who stood upon a similar
footing; he was at once father and judge, and the state
did not concern itself about what passed in the interior
of the family. Such a constitution seems to involve hor-
rible tyranny, as the husband was lord over the life and
death of his wife, the father of his son, whom he
could even sell as a slave three times successively. It is well known, however, that the feelings of nature, when cherished, are superior to all ordinances. Examples of the abuse of the paternal power are rare, though it cannot be denied that such examples do here and there occur. The government of families rendered it possible to dispense with courts of justice and with law books in the earlier times. When, however, the inhabitants of the town increased in number, and were more mixed, other regulations became necessary.

The Roman housewife was not severed, like the Grecian, from political life and social intercourse, confined to her own chamber, and excluded from the circles of the masculine sex, which amongst the Greeks could only be visited by a hetaira. The Roman matron was educated, honoured, and admitted into male society, and a divorce, easy as it was, continued, in the times of which we treat, a thing unheard of.

Even the slaves, up to the beginning of the first Punic war, stood in a totally different relation to their masters than after the termination of that war. Italians and Romans regarded themselves as one people; their mode of life was not essentially different; many prisoners of war were voluntarily released; others, as their friends and relations were near, were ransomed; domestic slavery, and subjection to degrading services did not take place. The patrician shared with his clients and his slaves the toils of agriculture, since hunting could only be enjoyed from time to time in the thickly peopled and cultivated parts of the Roman empire, and seldom, as in the north, became a passion. Military service was to the Romans what hunting was to the people of the middle ages. Every Roman was stimulated by love of country and love of fame, when an army was disbanded, when an expedition was terminated, to renew his enrolment immediately, engage in a second enterprise, and to continue to serve with willingness and alacrity even over his twenty years of liability. That love of fame and country alone excited
these old Roman soldiers, may best be learned from the
well known example of the primipilus Ligustinus, quoted
by Livy. Ligustinus’s speech is too well known to re-
quire insertion in this place; besides that, it belongs to
a much later epoch; but precisely for that reason affords
evidence that the elder Samnite Roman life maintained
itself in the country long after its extinction in the
town, and that, even after the second Punic war, an
officer who had served as major in one year, to use a
modern expression, might be employed as an ensign
in the next; or, in other words, that no centurion could
hold himself entitled to make a permanent claim on his
grade in the service.

As no consideration was to be gained by trade or in-
dustry, but only by valour in war and by good use of
patrimonial property, it is easy to conceive how the
provisioning of an increasing metropolis was found in
the fourth century of the town a work of such dif-
ficulty, that the sale of grain was given in charge to
certain state-commissioners, who had a regularly elected
president (praefectus annonae), at their head. This
functionary is noticed on an occasion in which we per-
ceive distinctly, that there were in Rome private indi-
viduals even in those times, whose property so greatly
exceeded that of their fellow citizens as to place them
in condition to maintain a princely expenditure. For
example, Spurius Maelius was accused of having courted
popular favour by gratuitous distribution of grain, in
order to gain possession of the sovereign power. As he
bought up the grain which he purposed to distribute in
Etruria, he must certainly have had silver money, since
the Etruscans had coined from time immemorial, and
shared the Mediterranean trade with Carthage.

The Romans also carried on a maritime trade in
earlier times, not, indeed, through the native race of
inhabitants, but through strangers who had settled
amongst them; Latins who had submitted to them, and
Etruscans who found more protection from them than
from their own effeminate countrymen, addicte. as they

L 2
were to piracy. This may easily be inferred from the founding of Ostia, which is attributed to a very early period. Rome, had her usages been different, might, by means of the harbour of Ostia, have become a naval power, as the greater number of the Etruscan states, which were situate almost all in the interior of the country, had become by similar establishments.

The maritime trade actually carried on by the Romans may be inferred in particular from the circumstance, that from the time of the foundation of the republic, until two years after the landing of Pyrrhus in Italy, they concluded three or even four treaties with the Carthaginians, and, according to the common accounts, one with the Tarentines concerning the number of ships with which they were licensed to circumnavigate the promontory of Lacinium.

Many individual traits from domestic life give indications of a greater degree of luxury and industry in the city than we can infer from the accounts concerning the military class who play the first part in the Roman history. The Roman dames wore purple robes with a gold trimming (the so called stola); they employed dentists to fasten the teeth in their mouths with gold, in the modern fashion; and in the twelve tables a law is to be found against the luxury of burning golden ornaments with the dead, and an allusion to the use of gold in the teeth. The Romans commenced at a much earlier era than the Greeks—who, however, from their vicinity to the East, and from themselves possessing gold mines, were much richer in gold—the practice of bestowing crowns of gold on their conquerors; and so early as eleven years after the first Punic war, they made the vain attempt to stem by laws the influx of luxury, an attempt renewed in all times among all nations, but which never yet was found to succeed.

The liveliness and relish of life which we find among the Greeks we cannot expect to find among the serious, sturdy Romans, intent as they were upon the useful. On the other hand, they are also far from the
levity and wantonness which constantly display themselves in the Greeks, and which, even in Sparta, appeared in the abandonment of the women, and in the laxity of the bonds of wedlock. When we come to speak of the Roman games and diversions, both these points will admit of further explication; we shall in this place only indicate a few particular circumstances. Horse-racing and martial games appear to have been naturalised amongst the Romans from earlier times: whatever required art or adroitness was foreign to them. Mimes and dancers, who entertained the Etruscans with indecent postures, were borrowed from that people — no Roman made a show of himself — and since the introduction, at the beginning of the first Punic war, of the gladiatorial games, which so admirably suited the rough character of the Roman people, sanguinary combats and wild-beast baiting became the favourite pastimes of the people. The music was of a loud or ludicrous kind: the flute-playing and drinking-songs, of which we shall speak presently, were never brought to perfection like the Greek music; and the solemn sacrificial rites at which music was used, were carried on amidst boisterous screams, springs, and stamping dances. In the comic history told by Livy of the contests of the censors and flute-players, the latter appear quite as village musicians, and worthy servants of Etruscan entrail inspectors.

It agrees extremely well with this, that we find from the regulations which were made not long after these times, that the lowest description of luxury, the pleasures and expenses of the table, threatened to gain early predominance, and attracted the attention of the censors and the senate. This regarded estables as well as wine. It was soon found necessary to prohibit the importation of foreign wine, as Italian wine was disdained by Roman palates, until wine-growing and wine-making in Italy were brought to the pitch which they reached in the times of Augustus. For the vine required a very peculiar management, in order to afford a good wine,
under the then and actual method of training practised by the Italians. This was felt by Cineas; for, if the bon-mot which Pliny puts in his mouth be genuine, he could not at all conceive, accustomed as he was to the low training of Greek vineyards, how wines trained upon stately elms, and here and there forming high avenues, could possibly afford good wine. When Italian wine was set before him (and assuredly the worst was not put upon the table), he said that “it did not surprise him at all that the parent of such wine should be hanged so high.”

The Romans had been involved in continual warfare; every Roman was a soldier; the senate consisted of distinguished officers. Fashion, therefore, and the all-powerful example of the higher orders dictated simplicity, and the manners of the monarchy were forced to yield to those of the camp. The female sex alone knew and exercised some degree of luxury in dress, carriages, cushions, and golden ornaments; the male sex became rougher and sterner during the Samnite wars, and in the wars with the Gauls, as these wars lasted through a whole generation, so that the growing race served under the same standards under which their fathers had served. The Etruscans, Latins, and Campanians were either converted entirely to Romans, and taken into their armies, or left to themselves and their own government. In the one case, they adopted the martial and rural manners of the Romans under whom they served; in the other, they were utterly innocuous to them. From the moment when the Romans vanquished Lower Italy, and came into collision with the transmarine Greek states, all these circumstances were changed. A richer booty, a number of slaves who had learned in the East and in Greece Proper the art to make themselves agreeable as ministers of lust, a multitude of vagabonds, who attached themselves to the few families of Rome, which, in point of fact, ruled Italy, could not fail to be perilous to a virtue which did not rest on principles but on habit. How speedy, too, was this alteration!
In the course of a few years the inhabitants of the wealthy towns of both Calabrias were not merely vanquished and subjected, like the nations within the Apennines, or extirpated, like the Samnites, but plundered, taxed, and carried away as slaves, on the pretext of repeated attempts at revolt. The Greeks amongst them brought their talent in all the arts of life amongst men who had just enriched themselves by violence, and, therefore, were impatient for immediate enjoyment. On the other hand, the Lucanians, Bruttians, and other rough populations furnished slaves on whom severity was necessarily and willingly practised.

In the last years of the first Punic war, all the circumstances altered still more strikingly. The Romans acquired a fleet, without being a trading or even a seafaring people: they plundered the richest region of the then world, the coast of Africa; and from the spoil of a people indebted for its prosperity to trade, that is to say, to their skill in taking advantage of the artificial wants of foreigners, they brought numberless things over to Italy, with the use of which they had previously been unacquainted. The single campaign of Regulus brought a body of slaves to Rome, equal in number to a fifth part of the then body of citizens. How must this have altered manners and customs! How differently in all respects from the Italians, whom the chance of war had thrown into the hands of their enemies, must people have been treated whose speech was not understood, who had been forcibly brought together from the most distant lands, and who were accustomed to a merciless government.

Neither art nor science flourished among the Romans in this first period; and when art or science was wanted in their great undertakings in peace and war, they were forced to betake themselves, first to the Etruscans, then to the Greeks. The whole of the early culture of Italy seems to have been a religious culture, and the arts and all the branches of industry stood in connection with this culture. We have already called
attention to the manner in which the brotherhood of the *fratres arvalis* stood connected with the agriculture of the Samnites, the priesthood of the patricians among the Etruscans with astrology; and we refer those who may wish for more precise information to Niebuhr's disquisition on the Etruscan cycles. We must, therefore, altogether exclude the royal era, which is known to us only from obscure legends, adorned by later rhetoricians; since it is clear that a completely different sort of cultivation became prevalent in the republican times from that which existed previously. Men in years, who had grown grey in the practical details of war or peace, conducted the government of the state; distinct regulations excluded before a certain age from the magistracy; the people were perpetually engaged in the disputes about debt, about patrician prerogatives, about *meum* and *tuum*; were called out anew to warfare almost annually, and had only the brief interval between the campaigns for re-establishing their private economy, disordered during the absence of the father of the family. In such a state of things, where could be room for scientific efforts? The whole of Roman culture, therefore, had retrograded, especially since the erection of the republic, and we shall see in the next period intellectual cultivation introduced as a foreign luxury, to which the genuine old Romans are inimical. Cicero, who never forgets the rhetorician when he aims at commending philosophy to his hearers, does not fail to make this clear to us through his praise of the olden time, for he very skilfully exhibits the predominance in the mind of the Romans of the practical and real over all the purely mental pursuits.

We find the same thing over again in the regulation of sacred worship; and Machiavel, who had thoroughly the spirit of the old Romans, has admirably elucidated this in his Discourses on Livy. We are too little acquainted with the sacred poetry of the Romans to undertake to show, by a comparison of them with Grecian hymns and the oldest lyrical poetry, that religion had
been from the earliest times a political machine, for the skilful use of which the few families to whom the care of the state was committed had formed a firm union. We shall therefore only briefly remark, that the whole affairs of religion stood under the direction of the practical understanding; and that, though it is true that entrance was thus effectually barred against priestcraft, yet, on the other hand, science and imagination could not, as amongst the Greeks, employ the popular persuasion, in order to raise even common souls above daily life and its occupations. An aristocratical college, which filled up its own numbers, and consisted of four members and a president (pontifex maximus), all of them men who occupied, and had long occupied public offices, presided over all ceremonies. At a later period, indeed, four plebeians were added; but these were all chosen from amongst men who, as senators, had already entered the body of nobility. It was not till a very late period (v. c. 649) that the people acquired a share in their election. All the other priesthoods were subordinate to this college, which depended on the senate and the people. Every ceremony, even the fearful devotion, depended on formulas, of which, like those of the English courts of justice, the observance was enforced with minute accuracy. Thus, a state order regulated every banquet and sacrifice; music and dancing were prescribed with equal precision as the formulas of prayer. Here it may well be imagined that no room was left for poetry, still less for devotional songs or sacred dramas. This college of the superior priests was flanked by that of the augurs, who were neither priests nor jugglers, but statesmen, whose age and consideration in the state maintained the old superstition, and made use of it for the advantage of the government. No mysteries, no rites for the excitement of the fancy, not even for the subterranean powers — for the solemnities of the Bona Dea were merely a female festival. Even the business of the vestals did not rest on secret tradition, or on legendary tales, which had been solemnised by
popular songs. The priests of particular deities were, indeed, fettered by certain rules; but even the three of the fifteen priests held in highest respect, those of Jupiter, Mars, and Romulus, were in public offices, and their influence was more properly secular than spiritual. We could easily demonstrate in a similar manner of the so-called Salii, of the Epulons and Curions, that they were restricted to definite, merely outward forms, and subordinate to the senate and the people; by consequence, that they were civil officers, destined to reinforce the popular morals through superstition, feasts, and offerings, or to guide them by these means in the direction desired by the civil authorities. No new ceremony, no temple, no altar, festival, or solemnity, could be introduced without sanction of the senate and consent of the tribunes.

We speak not here of rural feasts, and rustic music and poetry: these could not be wanting in the old religion and mode of life. Cicero mentions several species of ancient popular poetry in a well known passage, in which, however, he expressly says at the same time, that no one of these species of national poetry had any thing in common with the literature of his own time. He mentions, first, the songs at sacrificial nuptials and public banquets, with the musical accompaniments to them; but it is easy to see that he is speaking of something that was antiquated, and had vanished without leaving a trace behind. We must, indeed, lament that Atticus's labours on the subject of this elder Roman literature are no longer extant, as Cicero himself confesses, that all which he promulgated about it has merely been abstracted from that source. (Tusc. Disp. l. v.)

We should expect to find a second species of literature in Italy, where there always has been, and still is, a great taste for the burlesque, even if Cicero, Horace, and St. Augustin had not expressly spoken of it, and if the laws of the twelve tables had not denounced the punishment of death against satirical songs, which,
flying from mouth to mouth, and sung at festivals, wounded those who were hit by them more deeply than the sharpest weapon. These satirical songs, however, even had they been preserved, would upon us have been entirely ineffective, as they were aimed at individuals, and only referred to particular objects. The same holds good of the dramatic entertainments, of the Atellan and Oscan drolleries, and the humours of the vintage.

More attention than is merited by these rude jests would (if the writings of an Atticus and Varro had been still preserved) have been due to those early literary efforts which contain serious doctrines or historical matter, or which delivered down to memory a peculiar description of rigid moral precepts of the Samnite people. In this respect, much similarity existed between the Samnite stock and that of the Dorians, or the towns ruled according to the principles of Pythagoras. Cicero cites in particular a poem, of the didactic sort, of Appius Claudius Cæcus, who obtained distinction as an orator, even at a period as yet unacquainted with Grecian models.

With regard to historical poetry, it has not indeed been preserved in its original shape, but the whole of the earlier Roman history, as Livy has handled it, and as it everywhere presents itself in the Roman poets and orators, flowed out of old songs, and these must have been preserved to the time of Cicero, though he complains that songs which had been known to Cato were wholly lost in his times. As the Greeks to the cithara, so, says Cicero, sang the oldest Romans to the sound of the flute, the honours and the deeds of men renowned in the olden time; and, as Cato, in his historical work, the Origines, mentions, every single guest in succession sang a particular deed, or particular man, whom he held deserving of special praise, or about whom he knew a song by heart.

No one will not expect, in this earlier age, to meet with regular oratory, but the political constitution and the
In earlier times, the land-surveyors, or agrimensores, exercised a science of their own. But we cannot decide with certainty how far the geometrical science of the Etruscans, which descended to the Romans, may have gone, since the remains still extant of the writings of these agrimensores at the utmost only here and there show scattered traces of earlier science, but, as a whole, belong to the later times of the Roman empire. So much, however, we know with certainty, with regard to the so-called gromatici, that they formed a sort of engineer corps in the Roman camp and army, and that their science was carried pretty far for the exigencies of warfare. There were in every Roman camp two centuries, which understood the science, or, if the term be preferred, the art, of land-surveying, and were under the command of chosen officers. For these situations men were carefully picked from amongst the Romans themselves, and from the cavalry of the allies, and were such as had served their time and presented themselves as volunteers.

We close this sketch of the earliest Roman mental cultivation and science with the general remark, that, rude and rough as the Romans may appear, their whole life had a serious tone and an admirable unity, and that the sort of elementary instruction which alone they possessed, coincided with their mode of life admirably. Domestic occupations were shared between man and wife; the man an industrious husbandman, a stout warrior, a sound statesman, who valued only those things which had some immediate reference to these the occupations of his life, and whose virtue consisted in the ignorance of vice. The recognition of right, the science of meum and tuum in all the manifold and intricate occurrences of life, a genuine Roman branch of knowledge, was necessarily included in the circle of a culture of this sort. But of this hereafter.
BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

FIRST TRANSACTIONS OF ROME WITH GREECE. — SECOND PUNIC WAR.

Carthage, by the cession of Sicily, was placed in a highly critical position, as Rome governed the whole island, in part indirectly, in part directly, and could transport a powerful army to the African coast at any moment. A sudden descent on Africa from Sicily, which had already been twice attempted, with great injury to Carthage, was hard to prevent, even if the latter ruled the sea, as the passage is so short that from the extreme point of Sicily the African coast can almost be descried by the naked eye in clear weather. Hence, Carthage was in a dangerous situation. Her trade had suffered sensibly; she was forced to look out for new resources, and Hamilcar Barcas thought and toiled towards this object incessantly. He determined to anticipate an attack of the Romans, by first assailing them from a quarter where they did not expect him, and felt himself doubly stimulated to this adventurous policy by an affront which he considered himself to have undergone from the Romans, and by the hard conditions exacted by them from his native town in profound peace.

These provocations originated as follows: —

The Carthaginians, immediately after the end of the first Punic war, became involved in a dispute with their own soldiers, which might easily have turned out as destructive as the war with the Romans. These soldiers consisted of the dregs of the most different nations.*

* Polybius (l. i. c. 67.) says there were amongst them Iberians, Celts, Balearians, no inconsiderable number of semi-Greeks (μεσο-Ελληνες), most of
Their demands, when they had once discovered their own strength, were exorbitant. Gisco, who had been their favourite general in Sicily, sought vainly, in his solicited office of arbitrator, to accommodate the contests about military pay and prizes which the soldiers had begun with the senate. A runaway Roman slave, a Campanian by birth, Spendius, in league with an African, Mathos, contrived to frustrate all attempts at amicable arrangements. It seems the jealous government of Carthage was afraid to employ in this war their only able general, and resorted to the most extreme methods before it would replace Hamilcar Barcas at the head of the army. Hanno, whom this suspicious policy placed in the chief command, was guilty of such blunders as a general, that the mutineers, even after Hamilcar had inflicted a defeat on one division of their army, with a loss of 6000 dead and 2000 captives, were strong enough to shut him up in his camp, and drive him to such extremities, that, without the unexpected aid of the Numidians, who had been their accomplices, he would hardly have escaped destruction. Navarasus, a Numidian of rank, who had formerly served under Hamilcar, and formed an attachment for him, offered to desert, while Hamilcar, on the other hand, promised tobestow on him, on condition that he kept his word, the hand of his daughter in marriage. The Numidian accordingly deserted to Hamilcar with 2000 of his people, and the mercenaries were beaten. The contest, nevertheless, was a protracted one.

In this tottering posture of their affairs, Hiero was especially active in offices of friendship to the Carthaginians. On the other hand, the latter fell at first into disputes with the Romans, having established what we should call a blockade system, and kept it up by force against the Italians. So soon as they gave satisfaction to the Romans, the latter in like manner displayed magnanimity towards them, and carefully avoided whom were deserters and slaves, and that by far the greater number of them were Libyans.
giving a dangerous example by encouraging ferocious insurgents.*

That the Romans did not allow themselves to be led away by excessive generosity in state affairs, they proved immediately afterwards, when an occasion offered of seizing Sardinia. Probably from imperfect information, Polybius ascribes to this island greater importance than it can have possessed.† Nevertheless, its population must in those times have been more considerable than at a later period; and a glance at the map shows the importance of such a possession to Carthage. The Carthaginians, during the war in Africa, were compelled to leave this island entirely to its own fate: their garrison took independent possession of it, and the Sardinians at length rose en masse, fell on these mercenaries, and compelled them to take flight to Italy. Here they had at first in vain addressed themselves to the Romans, until the latter saw that the Carthaginians were likely to finish their wars in Africa sooner than had been anticipated. Then it was that they first made preparations to occupy the island as an abandoned estate. This was learned by the Carthaginians, who fitted out a fleet and army, to vindicate their claim to the island, which they founded upon their prior possession. The Romans denounced

* Polybius (i. 83.) has given so succinct a narration of these occurrences, that we cannot recount them better than in his own words:—

"The Romans also faithfully observed the league, and omitted the performance of no amicable office (προσφιμας ευδυ αφιλέταν). At first arose a slight misunderstanding, with regard to which matters stood as follows:—
The Carthaginians caused all vessels and crews to be made prize of, which sailed from Italy to the African coast; and had made in this manner nearly 500 captives. This occasioned reciprocal éclaircissements between them and the Romans. Ambassadors were sent on both sides: the Carthaginians made every concession; and, on the other hand, the Romans returned, without ransom, all the captives retained by them since the Sicilian war. From this time forward they did, frankly and readily, whatever was desired by the Carthaginians; and even allowed the merchants of the territories subject to them to supply the Carthaginians with necessaries, but prohibited all traffic with their enemies. Afterwards, when the mercenary troops in Sardinia revolted from Carthage, and invited them to the island, they did not listen to them. Moreover, they would not accept the offered surrender of the burghees of Utica, because they were resolved to strictly observe the alliance."
these preparations as a flagrant breach of the peace, which they compelled them to repurchase by the cession of Sardinia, and by the payment of a considerable sum of money.*

From this moment both nations were occupied, each in a different quarter, in founding altogether new dominions. We shall speak first of the Romans, as the history of the Carthaginian conquests leads us directly to the second Punic war. In the period immediately succeeding the first Punic war, the Romans reduced to subjection Upper Italy, which, being considered as Gallic land, was afterwards treated as a conquered country, while all the rest of Italy was entitled ager Romanus.

Before we come to speak of this conquest, we must notice another enterprise, which mixed the Romans up for the first time in the affairs of Greece, and gave importance to their arbitration even across the Adriatic.

When the Romans at a former period occupied Brundusium, they came into connection with three Grecian towns on the eastern coast situate amidst plundering barbarians,—Apollonia, Epidamnus, and Epidaurus; of which the first, in particular, was treated in a very friendly manner by the Romans. These towns, as well as all the coasts at the southern point of the Peloponnesus, at that time suffered from a wholly new, partly Grecian partly barbarian, power, which had arisen on the coasts of Illyria and Dalmatia, and was composed of Greeks from the island of Paros, who had formed themselves a

* About the year v. c. 515: the cession of Corsica took place two years afterwards. Polybius relates the transaction (i. 88.) as follows: — "About the time the Carthaginians had nearly finished the war in Africa, the Romans formed a determination, prompted by the mercenary troops who had gone over to them, of fitting out a fleet to make a descent on the island above mentioned. This the Carthaginians took ill; because, in their opinion, dominion over Sardinia more properly belonged to them; especially, being already on the point of pouncing on those who had deprived them of it. The Romans seized this pretext (ἡ αἱρήσεις ταῦτας λαθομένη) to declare war on the Carthaginians; maintaining that these hostile preparations had been made by the latter, not against the Sardinians, but against themselves. The Carthaginians, whose escape from the foregoing war had been quite unhoped for, and who were nowise in condition for the moment to resume hostilities with the Romans, accommodated themselves to circumstances, and not only ceded Sardinia, but paid the Romans 1900 talents, merely that they might not be compelled to make war at that moment."
settlement on the long island of Pharos on the Dalmatian coast.

The kingdom of Illyria consisted, like that of Epirus, of warrior tribes of the mountain regions, which even up to our days are possessed by rapacious and military inhabitants. From the earliest times Illyrian princes made themselves known as enterprising leaders of robber hordes. At length, under Pleuratus's son Agron, they formed so important a land and maritime power*, that the Macedonian king employed their aid against the Ætolian league. The Illyrians ventured to meet the assembled power of the Ætolians in light barks in behalf of the beleaguered Medonians; and, having been fortunate in this first expedition, no ship or tract of coast on the whole east of Greece was any longer safe from them. Polybius remarks that the death of the Illyrian king Agron, and the womanish caprice of his wife Teuta, who in the name of her son Pinnes conducted the government, contributed not a little to the unsparing ravages inflicted on the whole line of coast.† The Epirotes and Acarnanians, whose plundering propensities are equally well known with those of the Illyrians, eagerly united with them, and gave rise to a predatory system, of which the victims were the towns of the Æchaen and Æolian league. Even the allies of Rome suffered from these robberies, and the Romans had been often already solicited for assistance. At length, when the abuse became too flagrant, and the Illyrians sent whole fleets to sea, they dispatched an embassy, which, under pretence of remon-

* Polyb. ii. 2. ἔπανεν τίμημα καὶ μεγίστην μεγίστην ἑκά τον πρὸ αὐτῇ Βακριλίππων ὕπερ Ἰλλυρίων.
† King Agron (says Polyb. ii. 4), when his war-galleys returned, and he had accurately learned from the leaders what had been the real amount of danger, fell into fits of immediate pleasure on having vanquished so warlike a people as the Ætolians. On the strength of this, he began a course of such banqueting and carousing, that he caught an inflammation in the lungs, and died in a few days. His wife Teuta took up the reins of government, and entrusted to her faithful friends the several branches of administration. She, after the fashion of women (η γυναικῶν ἐποίησε), had before her eyes only the fortunate issue of the last undertaking, left all other considerations entirely out of account, first allowed pirate ships to be fitted out by private persons, then collected a fleet and army equal in force to the former, and gave its leaders orders to treat every land as an enemy's country.
strating, was sent to collect the requisite intelligence. They found the Illyrians and their queen in full preparation for new undertakings. Issa, one of the Dalmatian islands, which had hitherto repelled the Illyrians, was besieged, and great preparations were made against Corcyra and Epidamnus, or Dyrrachium. This it was which probably moved the younger of the two ambassadors (both of the family Coruncianus) to give the queen a vehement and threatening answer, which did not properly come within his commission. "We Romans," he said, "have the admirable custom of avenging with the whole force of the state offences done to private individuals, and aiding those who have undergone injustice. By the aid of the gods, therefore, we shall speedily and vigorously endeavour to constrain you to ameliorate the royal regulation of Illyria." The queen received this blunt declaration with senseless female vehemence; and was so embittered by the tone of the Roman ambassador, that she sent assassins to intercept his return.

This violation of international law gave the Romans, what they had long wished, a fair pretext for undertaking an expedition against the Illyrians. Thereby they brought Corcyra into circumstances of dependence, and attached to themselves the three Grecian towns of that coast; as they attached to themselves Hiero of Syracuse. Both consuls, Fulvius with a fleet, and Posthumi with a land army, were despatched on this undertaking, and found the more facility in the achievement of their object, as Demetrius of Pharos, who had hitherto been of the queen's councils, suddenly deserted to them, and procured them entrance every where. Teuta soon found herself abandoned on all sides. The traitor Demetrius held in possession the greater part of Illyria; the Roman army and one of the consuls went back into Italy; Posthumi only remained behind with forty ships in Illyria, and levied for himself an army of natives. Teuta was now reduced to despair: she begged for peace, and obtained it, but under the most rigorous
conditions; such as, the evacuation of great part of her territory, which Demetrius received as a reward for his treason; the payment of a yearly tribute; and total renunciation not only of plunder, but even of navigation above the Lissus with armed vessels.

The most important effect, however, of this victory over Illyria was the manner in which the success of the Romans influenced the Greeks, whose absurd flattery let the conquering state into the secret of their national weakness.* All this was the work of two years. So long as the Romans were engaged in no other war, and could keep an eye on the Illyrians, the latter abstained from robbery. So soon, however, as the Romans became involved in the war with the Gauls, of which we shall immediately speak, they began their lucrative practice anew, and no Grecian state, excepting the Rhodians, even attempted to check them. These piracies were principally carried on by Demetrius, who was intimately leagued with Macedonia. It was precisely this circumstance which induced the Romans to greater vigilance; for the connection of the Illyrians with the Macedonians was doubly dangerous, as a new war threatened to take place with Carthage. They, therefore, neglected affairs in Spain, where their armies had become requisite for the succour of their allies against Hannibal, and directed their forces first towards Illyria. The consul Æmilius, who led this expedition against Demetrius, found (as the latter had Greeks in his armies, and used Greek tactics,) a more obstinate resistance

* Polybius (ii. 12.), after setting down the articles of peace, subjoins—

"When this was executed, Posthumius sent ambassadors to the Achaian people, who, so soon as they had arrived, and obtained hearing, stated the causes of the war, and of the passage of the Romans over the Adriatic (αυτοις τι καταταξαν τους Ἀθηναίους καὶ τοὺς Ἐλλήνας). Thereafter they related what had happened, and publicly read the articles of the peace with the Illyrians. Having received the fitting tokens of honour and amity, as well from the Étolians as Achaians, they sailed back to Corfu, having relieved the Greeks from a tolerable (καταβατήσας τα ἔριδα) fright. The Illyrians had proved themselves not enemies of this or that, but equally of all states. From the time of this occurrence (κατ’ ἱστορίαν τοῦ ἐπιστάμμενον), the Romans began to send embassies to the Corinthians and Athenians; and it was then first proclaimed by the Corinthians that leave should be granted the Romans to take part in the Isthmian games."
than he had looked for. The Romans, however, at length gained the day, and soon completed the conquest of Illyricum. We are not informed what regulations they afterwards established there. It is certain that they kept a firm footing on the islands of the Illyrian coast. But on the continent the Illyrian kings seem, during the second Punic war, to have recovered their independence, and maintained it to a later period. Demetrius escaped, acquired great influence at the Macedonian court, and spirited up king Philip against the Romans.*

At the same time that the Romans came into nearer connection with the Greeks, and reduced Dalmatia and Illyricum into a state of dependence, they pushed for the first time over the Po, and founded colonies in Upper Italy. A war with the Gauls gave occasion to this movement; which deserves attention, partly on its own account, partly because Polybius on the occasion gives us a very minute description of the population of Italy before the second Punic war, and of the martial spirit of that population. Upper Italy, from the Alps as far as the Apennines, was by this time wrenched out of the sphere of earlier Tuscan civilisation. The ancient towns had vanished: the condition of the inhabitants was similar to what we find it afterwards in Gallia Proper. The description which Polybius gives of the situation of Lombardy, shortly after the second Punic war, exactly coincides with Caesar's account of the situation of France. There was much pasturage, little agriculture, no houses but huts, no artificial wants, no importations from abroad, no regular alliances, a multitude of scat-

* Polyb. iii. 19. Demetrius had vessels in readiness, in solitary places, in case of an unfortunate issue. To these he betook himself, embarked, and secretly sailed by night. Thus he escaped, quite unexpectedly, to king Philip, with whom he remained during the rest of his life. He was certainly a man of a bold and enterprising spirit, but devoid of all reflection and deliberation. His fate was, accordingly, suitable to the conduct which he had held during the whole course of his life: he fell in an injudicious and rash attack upon Messene, which he had undertaken with Philip's approbation. He then briefly adds, upon the Illyrian transaction, — "The Roman consul Aemilius, on the first attack, took the island of Pharos, and laid it waste (ανεσαγαγε). When he had afterwards taken possession of the rest of Illyria also, he arranged everything there to his own mind, returned to Rome at the close of the summer, and held a triumph with great solemnity."

tered tribes, in loose and precarious union, which
rallied round some brave and influential man, or served
him as soldiers. Silver was less valued by them than
gold, as they had no minute wants to be supplied by
aid of silver, and only desired gold as the readiest means
of conveying their riches, which consisted in herds,
from one place to another. It may well be conceived
how easily such tribes could be moved to excursions
into foreign lands, and how little they were calculated
to contend with regular troops. The fear entertained
of the Gauls by the Romans was, therefore, only in so
far justified, as it rested on the remembrance of the
battle on the Allia, and on the reflection that, in war
with rude populations, much may be lost, and little is to
be won.

A law of Flamininus, which afterwards occasioned
tumults in Rome itself, proved the proximate cause of
warfare with the Gauls.† The Picentinian territory,
from which the Romans at an earlier period had driven
the Senonian Gauls, had hitherto remained public pro-
erty of the Romans, and as such had been used by
the Gauls, on payment of certain rents. Flamininus, a
man who was resolved to achieve and did achieve his whole
public career against the will of the senate through that
of the people, procured the passing of a law, shortly
before his first consulship, that this tract of land should
be withdrawn from Gallic use, and distributed amongst
a Roman colony. The Gauls were deeply embittered
by this measure of the Romans, and by the inroad made
on their lands in time of peace. United for once, they
took up arms, and prepared for an incursion on the

* Polyb. ii. 17. They lived in unfortified hamlets, without any of the
wants of more refined life (σωματίων ευτυχοῖς στρογγυλοῖς μεταφθαντικοῖς), for
they slept upon bare straw, and the principal part of their food was flesh;
nor had they other occupation than war and agriculture. Their mode of
life was, therefore, extremely simple, because every science and art was
wholly unknown to them.

Their chief care was employed about these confederacies (μεγαύτην εὐεργε-
τικόν), since the most formidable and powerful man amongst them was
he who had most persons in service and attendance upon him (φίλαμματα
και συναρπασμένα αναλημματικά).

† The words of Polybius are as follows: — Γαλλίας Φλαμίνιος ταντρό την
Ελληνικάς ευγενείας και στοιχείως, τη γα και Ρώμαιος, ας εστιν ἔνωσις,
Φλαμίνιος τον ἀναλημματικά τα και το χέρσο το ελληνικόν καταστρέφον.
districts across the Apennines. The eighth year after
the partition of the Picentinian territory was fixed for
the attack; but the Veneti and Cenomones allowed
themselves to be lured away from the league of their
fellow-countrymen, and were drawn into one with the
Romans, through the arts of their ambassadors, whereby
these Celts, who were now obliged to leave a part of
their men for the protection of their borders, were pre-
vented from marching with their whole force over the
Apennines.

The numbers of this Gallic army are reckoned by
Polybius at 50,000 foot and 20,000 horsemen and
wagons. As they advanced, Attilius, one of the consuls,
was sent with a consular army to Sardinia. The other
encamped near Ariminum, to observe the enemy's move-
ments. With a third the consul marched to meet the
Gauls as they entered Etruria, and came upon them
amidst the hills which enclose the Val di Chiana. The
Romans were so alarmed by the approach of their old
enemies, that they put out their whole force, and en-
rolled all who could bear arms in Italy.*

The catalogue of fighting men made on the occasion
has been preserved; and we remark, with astonishment,
that, even after the dreadful wars of the Romans in
Central Italy; after all the scenes of conflagration and
slaughter; after the extirpation of the Samnites; after
the ravages of the war with Pyrrhus, after the enor-
mous losses of men by sea and land, Italy, exclusive of

* Polyb. ii. 23. in fin. The Romans (σι δὲ τῷ ματαίμονῳ) were seised with an
extraordinary terror, and believed themselves to be menaced by a great
and fearful peril. This was natural, as the dread of the Gauls lay on their
souls from of old. Since, therefore, their whole souls were exclusively bent
in that direction, they partly levied new armies, partly made a conscrip-
tion of those who were already trained to arms, and gave the allies notice to
hold themselves in readiness. They gave a general order to all subject to
them to furnish lists of men of an age fit to bear arms, as they would
gladly know the whole effective force that they could muster. They sent
the best and most select troops out with their consuls; they provided such
stores as had never before been seen, of corn, arms, and all munitions of
war. They received ready assistance, however, from all quarters; as the
inhabitants of Italy were panic-struck by the approach of the Gauls, and
did not now consider that they were summoned to the aid of the Romans,
or that the question now was, what people should hold the foremost rank
in Italy; but every one held the peril to threaten his own fields and his
own town."
Lombardy, could, in the second Punic war, place 700,000 men under arms. The praetor's army allowed itself to be entrapped by a stratagem of the Gaull, attacked them fiercely, was totally routed, and driven back on the hill above mentioned. Happily, at this critical moment, Lucius Æmilius appeared from Ariminum with his consular army, and the Gauls, on the advice of their king, resolved first to secure their spoil on the other side of the Apennines, and then return afresh to the attack. Æmilius did not dare to follow them, although he had drawn around him the remains of the praetorian army. The Gauls had arrived happily in their country, through Siena, Pisa, Val di Magna: they fell, however, amongst the maremme as they marched along the sea-coast, and, moreover, found a new enemy there, whom they had not expected.

The consul Atilius was at that moment returning from Sardinia: he learned what had just happened at the promontory of Telamon, landed his army, and marched to meet the Gauls in front, while two other armies were in their rear. Although, however, the Gauls were attacked at once in front and rear, they did, as Polybius testifies, all that could have been expected

* Pliny confirms the statement of Polybius with regard to the effective force of the populations, and Eutropius and Orosius cite the authority of Fabius Pictor. We confine ourselves, for good reasons, entirely to Polybius. He says, that four Roman legions marched out with the consul; that each of these legions then consisted of 5000 men; that the allied troops, added to each of these two consular armies, were 30,000 infantry strong, with 3000 cavalry. Of Sabines and Tyrrhenians, who could have marched in case of necessity, he reckons 4000 cavalry, and more than 50,000 foot. Of Umbrians and Tarantine, 20,000 were brought together; and these reinforced by 20,000 Veneti and Cenomones. These were destined against the Gallic hill country, to distract the attention of the Gauls by a threatened inroad into their country. The other armies were as follows:—In the Roman territory itself remained, as reserve, 20,000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, composed of Romans; of allies, 30,000 foot and 3000 cavalry. Lists of all able-bodied men were brought: of Latins, 80,000 foot, 5000 horse; of Samnites, 70,000 foot, 7000 horse; Japygians and Messapians, 50,000 foot and 16,000 horse; Lucaniens, 30,000 foot, 3000 horse; Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani, Vestini, 20,000 foot, 4000 horse. Besides these, were two other divisions, one in Sicily, the other in Tarentum, each of which was 4200 infantry, and 200 cavalry strong. Consequently, the whole number of Romans and Campanians was 250,000 foot, with 25,000 cavalry; so that the sum total of all the troops primarily destined to the defence of Rome amounted to 150,000 foot and 6000 cavalry. The whole number of Romans and allies able to bear arms exceeded 700,000 foot and 70,000 cavalry.
of the most experienced troops and leaders in such a situation. They drew up in a double order of battle, but could not make head against the Roman swords with theirs, which were merely fit for thrusting, were besides not sufficiently protected against the Roman javelins by their shields, and could not make available the most effective part of their auxiliary forces, the Gaesates. These barbarians, with their usual excess of daring, had thrown off their clothing in order to fight naked in the foremost ranks, and perceived too late that the brutal bravado, which was perfectly appropriate to their native modes of arming and fighting, was altogether misapplied against Roman armies. The Gauls suffered a total defeat, and a passage for Rome was cleared to the Po.

529. In the following year, the Bojeri submitted themselves to the consuls, Q. Fulvius and T. Manlius, who, however, did not find it advisable to pursue the war further. Flamininus penetrated into the lands on the other side of the Po, but brought the Roman army into great embarrassment: for it may be inferred from Polybius’s narrative; that neither he nor his colleagues had those military qualifications which so dangerous a war required. The senate knew this; and there was consequently no lack of unfavourable prognostics in this year, which were intended to withhold from rash enterprises a man in whom no confidence was placed. He conquered, nevertheless, in despite of the auspices of the senate (whose letter he delayed to open till after the engagement), by means of the arrangements made by his tribunes; for he himself had drawn up his order of battle badly enough.* The tribunes had remarked

* This is expressed by Plutarch (in Marcellus) in the following words: — "When Fulvius and Flamininus marched with large armies against the Insubrians, the river which flows through the Piconian district was seen flowing with blood. It was said that three moons had been seen; the priests who had inspected the birds during the consular elections maintained that they had indicated evil and adversity (κακοί εἰσίν καὶ δυσοφείς αὐτοί γιαδειμέναι τὰς τῶν ἱπποτῶν αἰείγειμαι) when the election was announced. The senate, therefore, despatched letters into the camp, and recalled the consuls. They were enjoined to hasten with all expedition to Rome, to resign their office, and by no means to give battle to the enemy as consuls."
that the Gauls made use of long swords of badly tempered steel, perhaps of brass, which became bent at every cut; so that their wearers were obliged again to straighten them by setting their foot on them. Accordingly, they ordered their men to use the sword, instead of the pilum. The Roman sword at that time was solely adapted for thrusting, and much shorter. With regard to the bad arrangements of Flaminius himself, Polybius observes, that he had drawn out his order of battle so close to the river, that the principal advantage of the Roman tactics, of re-forming the line, when it had received an impression in front, somewhat farther back, by drawing back the manipuli, or enabling the cohorts to retreat, not at once, but by slow degrees, was totally lost. If, therefore, the least disorder had taken place during the action, the Romans would have been driven into the river. The senate afterwards did what it could to disoblige the man of the people. All solemnity of reception was refused him; nay, immediately after a triumph had been procured for him by the people, he was forced to lay down the consulship.

One of the consuls of the following year, M. Claudius Marcellus, an excellent soldier and equally good general, completed the conquest of Cisalpine Gaul, although a reinforcement of an army of 30,000 Gæsates had been procured from Gallia Proper. Two places which the Gauls seem to have fortified at that time in the tract between the Ticino and the Addua, Acerra and Mediolanum, were taken, the Gauls beaten in a bloody engagement, and the Insubrians, who held possession of the Milanese, wholly reduced to subjection. On this occasion, the Romans pursued their customary policy: they placed colonies in the newly conquered land; first

Plutarch subjoins to the passage quoted a lengthy moral application, and talks a vast deal of the religious turn of the old Romans. If their manners, however, be looked at in a broad light, all is resolvable into the circumstance that the higher ranks at that time still held closely together; that the exclusive family system was still tolerably stable, and that scepticism had had not yet obtained diffusion.
at Mutina*, then at Cremona and Placentia. The two last were especially calculated to retain the land in sub-

In each was collected the large number of 6000 colonists, and an order of knighthood erected from the outset, in order to maintain a native army constantly ready to be opposed to the Gauls. Hardly were these preparations ended, and the foundations of the colony laid, when the Gauls ventured a new attempt to rid themselves of the Romans and Latins, who were settled, or appeared about to settle, in their neighbourhood. The struggle which arose on the occasion was still raging when Hannibal marched into Italy.

Precisely at the point of time when the Romans turned Sardinia and Corsica into provinces, set bounds to the Illyrian piracies, obtained a firm footing on the coasts, or, at least, on the islands, of that country, and began to treat Cisalpine Gaul as a conquered land; the Carthaginians, likewise, had acquired an augmenta-

In the present Andalusia to their empire, but were compelled, first by the adverse course of that war, and afterwards by the disturbances in Africa, to call home all the troops which remained faithful, and to leave their foreign possessions to themselves. So soon as intestine war was brought to an end, they naturally turned their views again upon Spain.

Hamilcar Barcas was sent into that country, at

* This may be inferred, I think, from Polyb. iii. 40. It does not exclude Niebuhr's opinion, that Mutina had been formerly one of the Etruscan towns on the Po.
the head of an army, in the year of the town 517, and penetrated into the interior from the neighbourhood of Cadiz, where he had landed. His march, however, rather resembled that of a band of freebooters than any regular military enterprise. The Carthaginian leaders were compelled to make war support itself: their conquests belonged to their country, but their army belonged to themselves. It is, therefore, nowise necessary to call to our assistance the internal play of parties in Carthage, in order to explain to ourselves the succession of the members of one and the same family in command of one and the same army.* Hamilcar sacked and destroyed the towns which resisted him in those provinces of Spain the possession of which seemed to him of most immediate moment to his country, in the present Andalusia, affording naval and military stores; and in Estremadura, which contained the richest mines of silver. The farther he proceeded into the north of Spain, the more obstacles attended his advance. He carried on a merciless war for nine years, and made his way into Portugal and into the kingdom of Leon. Here, however, he met with a more obstinate resistance. Several tribes combined their forces against him; and one of their leaders, called by the Greeks Orisson, contrived to lull the Carthaginian general Hamilcar into security, took advantage of his confidence, and lured him to destruction.

The circumstances of Hamilcar's defeat and death have been diversely told; but the immediate sequel

* Appian, who follows the Roman accounts which, Polybius (iii. 8.) has extremely well impugned, might be taken as authority for this assertion; but we do not presume to oppose such an authority to a solid writer, except when peculiar circumstances testify against the latter. We will briefly characterise the mode of warfare in Spain, from Appian. He says (de Reb. Hispan. c. v.), "Hamilcar crossed over to Iberia, and there acquired rich spoils at the cost of the Iberians, who had shown him no hostility whatever, because he sought an opportunity of absence at the head of an army, and, at the same time, of acquiring popularity (αυτοψίαν... δημοσιεύσαι). Whatever he robbed he distributed; part to the army, that it might follow him with more alacrity, part he despatched to Carthage, there to be divided amongst the adherents of his party (τοις ἄλλης αὐτῷ πολιτοσυνος διδίδω). Still at length a combination took place between the chiefs of the several tribes and the other powerful men in the land."
shows that the Iberians did not extract the full advantage from their hitherto successful revolt and from the rout of the Carthaginian army. Hamilcar had taken with him his son Hannibal, and his son-in-law Hasdrubal, and the army had belonged to himself. Hasdrubal had erected in Spain a sort of principality, which was nearly independent of Carthage, although he patriotically devoted his powers and revenues entirely to the benefit of his country. He was so much beloved in the army as to be chosen commander-in-chief by it, immediately upon Hamilcar's death, without waiting for orders from Carthage. He even won the affections of the Spanish people, by the mildness of his administration, and received their homage as a monarch freely elected by themselves. He vanquished Orisson, captured twelve towns in the southern part of the kingdom of Leon, and extended the new realm which he had founded to the Ebro. A capital and a port were required for the conquest of all Spain, and for keeping communication open with Africa. He chose a situation in a central part of the coast, and in the midst of some of the finest scenes in Europe, on the borders of the present Valencia and Murcia. The new town was designed to unite the qualities of fortress, emporium, arsenal, head-quarters for troops, magazine of all the stores requisite for land and sea-service. He gave it the name of New Carthage; and it rose in a short time so rapidly, as to rival Carthage itself, and give occasion to the Grecian colonists settled on the Spanish coast to foresee the ruin of their trade and their ultimate subjection to Carthage. They applied to the Romans, and courted their alliance; a boon which they might well know that Rome never refused to any weak state, as a prelude to its future subjugation. Saguntum, a colony of the Zucynthians, and the present Ampurias, at that time known by the general name of Emporium, were amongst the most considerable Greek towns across the Ebro. They obtained a promise, through Roman intervention, from the Carthaginians, that they would neither cross the Ebro with
an army, nor encroach upon the freedom and independence of the Grecian states in Spain.

Hasdrubal fell by assassination, in the eighth year of his Spanish government. At his death the army took a similar liberty to that which it had taken before, by placing at its head Hannibal, Hamilcar's son, who had already held the second command under his brother-in-law, Hasdrubal. The rulers of Carthage again found it advisable to confirm the choice. But the posture of affairs was greatly altered. The Romans had conquered the Gauls, and had just despatched a fleet to humble Illyria. A few years only of peace would be required to give security to their colonies in Upper Italy, to confirm their empire over the Adriatic, and afford them time to turn their views upon Spain. Hannibal would not wait for this: he hastened to complete what his two predecessors had begun, in order next to grapple with the Romans on their own ground. Immediately after assuming command of the army, he had shown himself to be a man of extraordinary talent, by accomplishing what his father and his brother-in-law had left imperfect. In the short space of a year and a half, he enriched his army by the plunder of the opulent Althæa, in the territory of the Olcades; marched against the Vacciæans, in the present kingdom of Leon; captured Arbucala and Elmantica, and routed in his march back to New Carthage a considerable army of Carpetanians, Olcades, and other tribes, which attempted to dispute his passage through New Castile. After he had reduced the land, as far as the Ebro, to subjection, he sought on the other side of that river also allies amongst the natives; with whom the Carthaginians, on their side the Ebro, and the Greeks on the other side, were in a constant state of discord. On this circumstance Hannibal grounded his plans against Saguntum and Rome. He stirred up a quarrel betwixt the Saguntini and the tribe of Torboletes, his allies; incited the latter to represent their grievances at Carthage; and received full powers to act in their behalf,—powers which he
forthwith employed in a manner contrary to the express terms of the last treaty with Rome. One cannot but feel astonishment at the influence which must have been held in Carthage by a family which could raise three of its members in succession to royal power in Spain, could commence a dangerous war at a wide distance from the capital, and could hurry a most circumspect state to the most precipitate measures. Astonishment, however, may cease, on reflecting that the government of Carthage was in the hands of a mixed aristocracy, consisting in part of the members of the principal old families, in part of the most opulent merchants. Amongst the former, the family of Barcas stood pre-eminent, the latter were obliged to it for a new source of opulence. They saw the Greeks excluded by its efforts from participating with themselves in a lucrative branch of trade. They had, at least, the prospect of seeing Gaul and Italy rendered equally accessible to their shipping by Hannibal, as Spain had already been rendered by his father.

The Saguntini judged of Hannibal from a close view much more justly than the Romans could from a distance. The Roman envoys, as was shown by the event, were by no means very eminent proficients in the art of divining the purposes of the man to whom they were sent. Accordingly, Hannibal fully attained his ends. He outwitted the Romans; who, indeed, sent several embassies, in compliance with the repeated importunities of the Saguntines: but Hannibal knew how to baffle all these envoys, until he had brought Saguntum to extremities, convinced as he was that his native town would not in the moment of victory abandon such a brilliant acquisition. The Saguntines, solely supported by the embassies, not by the fleets and armies, of Rome, were pressed by a military power, which Livy rates at the seemingly somewhat exaggerated account of 150,000 men. Nevertheless, they held out eight months longer; and Saguntum evinced a constancy of which we find extremely few examples, except in
Spain, where similar ability in defence, and similar contempt of death in the hour of desperation, have been displayed at Zaragoza in our own days, no less vividly than in old times at Saguntum or Numantia. The town was taken, Hannibal’s army carried off enormous booty, and all the male inhabitants were massacred.

The tidings of the terrible catastrophe of Saguntum were received as a double reproach by the Romans, since the town had long considered itself as their colony, and was even indebted to them for its last constitution. Armies and fleets were given to the consuls of the following year, Cornelius Scipio and Tiberius Sempronius, in order to take the offensive against Carthage at once in Spain and Africa. But, first of all, Rome despatched an embassy to Carthage, to demand whether Hannibal had demolished Saguntum with or without instructions from his government. That such an embassy, which, besides, had express orders to declare war, could not possibly end otherwise than with such a declaration, was foreseen at once by Hannibal, who accepted, under the circumstances, an invitation into Italy, which was given him by the Gauls. They informed him that the route over the Alps was difficult, indeed, but not impracticable, and their brothers in Gallia Proper promised him free passage. Before the Roman ambassadors had even returned home from Carthage, Hannibal had broken up his quarters at New Carthage. He resolved to invade Italy by land, as he could not hope that any harbour in Italy, or any part of the coast, would be accessible to the fleets of Carthage. Before he commenced his march, he repeatedly sent reconnoitring parties, who examined the routes and passes of the Alps, and negotiated so skilfully with the several Gallic tribes whose territories were to be crossed in his march, that Livy is forced to confess that the Roman ambassadors, who travelled, on their return from Carthage, through Spain and the south of Gaul, to gain over the Spaniards, and dissuade the Gauls from grant.
ing a passage to the enemies of Rome, were everywhere laughed to scorn in the public assemblies, in which resided the right of war, legislation, and supreme government, and found a friendly hearing at the Grecian town of Marseilles only.

The march undertaken instantly after by Hannibal, through an inhospitable tract, peopled by no less rude inhabitants, without accurate knowledge of the country through which his march lay, a march which he pursued five months, and brought to a fortunate issue, is justly numbered with the greatest undertakings ever planned or accomplished. The difficulties and dangers of a march across the Pyrenees, through the whole south of France, over the snows and rocky clefts of the Alps, may be estimated sufficiently from the simple statement, that Hannibal, without taking account of his losses on this side the Pyrenees, lost, during the march from the Pyrenees to the Rhone, 1000 horse and 12,000 foot soldiers; and that, after his passage over the Alps, little more than the half remained of the troops which he had brought with him from Spain. The whole march was performed with inconceivable celerity. He arrived in Italy five months after setting out from New Carthage, notwithstanding being detained by his battles betwixt the Ebro and the Apennines.

While Hannibal marched from the Pyrenees to the Rhone, the consul Scipio had also embarked with an army destined for Spain. He learned, in the neighbourhood of Marseilles, that Hannibal was on the point of crossing the Rhone. He hastened up; but, Hannibal having given him the slip, and gained several days' march on him, did not hold it advisable to pursue him farther, reimbarked his troops, returned to Italy, and made every preparation for attacking him, so soon as he should descend into the present Piedmontese. Hannibal spent fifteen days in the passage of the Alps, yet greatly got the start of the consul. Thus, by the time that Scipio crossed the Po, Hannibal was already on the banks of the Tesino. Both leaders had strong motives
for giving battle immediately: Scipio, that Hannibal might not profit by the invitation of the Gauls, one of whose princes had set out already to meet him; Hannibal, that he might win a decisive victory before Scipio’s army had received its expected reinforcements. Fortune favoured Hannibal. He and Scipio chanced simultaneously to set on foot a general reconnaissance with their whole cavalry. They came thus into each other’s presence: the Romans were routed, and Scipio forced to fall behind the Po.

The appearance of a Carthaginian army in Italy, at a time when the new colonies of Mutina, Cremona, and Placentia were threatened by the Gauls, diffused universal terror in Rome. The other consul was hastily recalled from his expedition to Africa. Tiberius Sempronius lay at that time off Lilybaeum, with a fleet and army. On receipt of the intelligence, he immediately assembled his troops, gave orders to the fleet to make all sail to the Italian coast, and instructed the tribunes to lead the army, in separate divisions, to Ariminum, where these divisions should all unite again on a certain day. No sooner had these several divisions, by different routes, reached their destination, than Sempronius resumed the command, and hastened up to reinforce his colleague. The latter had, at first, maintained his ground in the neighbourhood of the Po; but the Gauls of that region having given him unequivocal proofs that he was likely to be worse off with them than with declared enemies, he fell back again as far as the Trebia. Here he was met by Sempronius, who ardently longed to distinguish himself, and both, united, were beaten in a general engagement, which was attended with immense loss to the Romans, more especially as Sempronius had left in his rear the Trebia, so that the fugitives whom the enemy failed to reach were drowned in the river. It is true that the same circumstance saved the remainder of the Roman army, and Sempronius even tried to make the senate and people believe that, in point of fact, he had come off conqueror; a rhodomontade too
clearly at variance with the situation. After the battle all the Gallic tribes revolted from the Romans. One of the consuls threw himself, with the remains of the army, into Placentia; the other into Cremona. These events took place towards the close of the year.

537. During the winter Hannibal felt that he must not remain among the Gauls, if he meant to make sure of their permanent assistance. He therefore resolved to advance into Etruria early in spring. Of three regular routes from Upper Italy into Tuscany, the Aurelian way was too circuitous; the Flaminian, which led to Ariminum, was occupied by the consul Servilius; on the third and the most direct road, Flaminianus lay encamped with his army. Hannibal, therefore, chose a less frequented line of route, which detained him three days and nights in the most unwholesome region of Italy, and cost him the lives of many of his troops. Fortunately for Hannibal, Flaminianus was less able and experienced at the head of an army than in the popular assemblies of the capital. Against the will of the senate, he had a second time been elected consul, had left the city, and even defied their injunctions to return to it, and now commenced the campaign in the teeth of auguries and auspices. One of the most hot and hasty of human beings thus matched himself against the most deliberate and coolest! He allowed himself to be blocked up between the hills which enclose the Thrasymenian lake, and now bear the name of Gualandro and Passignano, and fell with his whole army a sacrifice. This fatal engagement took place in the vicinity of Rome. The rout was dreadful; but Hannibal knew the strength of Rome too well to venture an attack upon the city, which, in the happiest event, could have had no other consequence than the temporary possession of deserted walls. He hastened to regions whence he hoped to be able to maintain communications with Carthage and with Mac- edon. He marched to Spoleto, took the route up the Nar, through the defiles of the Apennines, and afterwards encamped in the neighbourhood of Arpi and Lu-
ceria, in order to pour his troops into Campania, reinforced by the Samnites.

The Romans now resorted to that measure which they were always wont to take in the last extremity. They created a dictator; and as every thing had been ruined by the precipitate proceedings of the consuls of the two last years, they elected to that office an aged, cautious, and experienced man. The new dictator, Fabius Maximus, took the best mode of annoying Hannibal, quietly permitted him to devastate Campania, but kept him out of the towns, and followed every where close on his footsteps, in order to take instant advantage of any false step he might make. Hannibal's plan was obviously to weaken Rome by repeated disasters, and thus to alienate Italy from its cause. With this view, he maintained, in all his addresses and proclamations, that he had only come to Italy to contend for it against Rome. He was forced to make war support itself; and, by pursuing this for seventeen years, has acquired, with those who judge men by their merits, not by their fortunes, a higher renown than Alexander gained by the conquest of the world.

The Romans had reached the end at which they aimed in the appointment of Fabius; and, since it went against their policy to leave a dictator long in office, they recurred to the choice of consuls for the following year. Unfortunately, one of the new consuls, Terentius Varro, was resolved not to be placed in vain at the head of a splendid army. Instead of the usual number of four legions, eight had been voted to the two consuls, in this as in other cases of extremity. According to the express words of Polybius, the number of soldiers in each legion had been brought up to 5000, and a double contingent demanded of the allies. Æmilius Paulus therefore advised his colleague in the consulship to pursue the system of Fabius a while longer, and not to expose recklessly to destruction so superb an army, the last which the allied towns and colonies, exhausted by Roman levies, and by the protracted presence of Hanni-
bal, could be expected voluntarily to afford. However, we cannot implicitly trust the narrative of Livy, when he throws on the plebeian consul all the blame of the loss at Cannæ. Polybius expressly says, that, even before the consuls had arrived with the new troops from Rome, Hannibal, by seizing the castle of Cannæ, where the Romans had their magazines, had driven Cnæus Servilius, who commanded the Roman army, into such straits, that he announced to the senate an action as inevitable. The senate had consented to the engagement, on the sole condition of waiting till the consuls had come up. That the loss of the battle was mainly caused by Varro's incapacity and imprudence is a point on which all authorities are agreed, as they likewise are on the masterly style in which Hannibal formed his order of battle, and employed the various national tactics and weapons in his army. He even knew how to make an ally of the terrible south-easterly wind of Apulia, mentioned by Pliny and Horace, as well as by Livy, and which often instantaneously dries the fruit and withers up the foliage in whole districts.

The defeat of the Romans was one of the most dreadful mentioned in history. More than 50,000 Romans found their death in the action; very many were slain afterwards; and 10,000 were made prisoners.

So soon as the intelligence became diffused in Italy, the Samnites, Bruttians, and Lucanians declared themselves in Hannibal's favour. Arpinum, and even the flourishing metropolis of Campania, called in his aid. About the same time, the prætor, who was sent into Cisalpine Gaul with a Roman army, was inveigled into an ambuscade, and perished with his whole army. Hannibal made haste to employ the victory: but he found himself in a more brilliant than advantageous position as a stranger at the head of Italians, held together by no common bond, and of Greeks, in whom he could place no sort of confidence. The Romans, on the other hand, displayed the same tranquillity and constancy which had hitherto always saved them in the greatest
dangers. They even, in order to tranquillise the populace after its own manner, betook themselves again to the cruel device of human sacrifice, which for a long time had fallen into oblivion. They buried alive in the ox-market (in locum saxo conseptum, jam antea hostias humanas, minime Romano sacro, imbutum) a male and female Gaul, and a male and female Greek. The principal means of their salvation, after the day of Cannæ, consisted in avoiding a decisive battle in Italy, and in carefully watching the movements of the enemy, whom they sought by every method to deprive of the means for carrying on the war, while they opened out for themselves new resources in Spain and Sicily.

The main point was to gain time for recovering the confidence and self-possession lost by their troops; and no one gave them more assistance towards this end than Marcellus. This officer, who afterwards reached such eminence, was in Sicily at the moment when the Romans suffered the rout at Cannæ, and was recalled, as a more spirited and enterprising general was wished for, in conjunction with Fabius, whose caution was considered excessive. On his appearance in Italy, he led into the field the Romans who were shut up in Casilinum, cut to pieces the straggling bands of Hannibal, whenever they strayed far from the main army; and restored to his troops courage to look the enemy in the face. Finally, when Hannibal took possession of Campania, he made every exertion to save such districts as allowed him to save them.

The Romans had in some degree recovered their wonted spirit, but they still fought with continued ill success. Petilia, Consentia, all Bruttium, fell into the enemy's hands; Croton and Locri were occupied by Hannibal; and the Romans were compelled to have the whole coast carefully guarded by divisions of their coasting fleet, in order to cut off his communications with Philip of Macedon. On the death of one of the consuls of the year v. c. 539, Marcellus was elected in his stead; but grounds, which Livy insinuates rather
than indicates, induced him to lay down his office in favour of Fabius. He accompanied the latter as pro-
consul; saved Naples, which was thoroughly well dis-
posed to the Romans, and Nola; where, on the other
hand, the people would have gladly received Hannibal.
There it was that Hannibal, for the first time since he
stood at the head of an army, suffered considerable loss,
was repulsed, and saw more than 12,000 men of his
best cavalry go over in a body to the enemy. It is
particularly evident on such occasions how unequal was
the effective force of Hannibal to a Roman army. The
latter obeyed its leader unconditionally, and all the allies
followed his directions. How different was the case
often with Hannibal! Thus the Bruttians and Luca-
nians, who styled themselves his allies, plundered the
Greek towns on the coast, which he himself had taken
under protection.

The consuls of the next year, Fabius, the most cau-
tious, and Marcellus, the most enterprising, of men, re-
established the power of the Romans in Italy; while in
Spain and Sicily revolutions took place which struck
all Hannibal’s victories with inevitable barrenness.

In the devastation of Samnium, by which Fabius re-
venged the revolt of the Samnites, Marcellus acted no
part; for he went over to Sicily, where he remained, in
the quality of proconsul, until he had reduced the whole
island to subjection. Hiero, the truest ally of the Romans,
had at length grown feeble with age; while his son Gelo,
in order to emancipate himself from the oppressive al-
liance of Rome, which amounted, in point of fact, to
subjection, would have espoused the Carthaginian party.
During this contest, and just as all preparations were
made for revolt from the Romans, Gelo died. The old
father died in the following year, and left his little
kingdom to his grandson Hieronymus (Gelo’s son),
who, early corrupted, took the reins of government in
his fifteenth year. Three men, among whom were An-
dranodorus and Zoippus, the two brothers-in-law of
Hieronymus, were placed at the young man’s side by
his dying grandfather. Both had Carthaginian leanings; the third, Thraso, was well inclined to the Romans. The young monarch gave himself little trouble about politics: he had things of nearer concernment to attend to, in the shape of pleasures. Accordingly, Andranodorus and Zoippus immediately established relations with Hannibal; and Carthaginian ambassadors, whom Hannibal had selected with consummate skill, appeared in Syracuse. Amongst them were two Syracusans, who had found protection in Carthage; and both of whom, particularly one of them, Hippocrates, quickly contrived to win for themselves considerable influence, in a court which contained an infinite number of counsellors, and, as usual where there are too many counsellors, very little council. Thus the thoughtless youth, even before aid from Carthage made its appearance, was plunged into a war with the Romans. He himself fell, at the commencement of the war, by the dagger of an assassin, who, after his murder, called on the Syracusans to restore the republican forms of their constitution.

Against this new republic the Romans sent Marcellus, the greatest general then in their employment. Well they knew, the artful oppressors of foreign freedom, that, if once the banner of independence were vigorously raised, all Sicily would instantly rise against them. However, there was no occasion to fear this: the Syracusans were too disunited, too corrupt, too cruel, for such a part. Andranodorus and his friends formed the design of seizing supreme power. But their plan was discovered; the popular rage was turned on the aristocracy; and a dreadful massacre followed, including innocent and guilty. Then, on the corpses of women and children, they founded an insane democracy, which here, as elsewhere, terminated in military despotism.

Epicydes and Hippocrates, two devoted adherents of Hannibal, with their military followers, now became the rulers of Syracuse; while Marcellus, on the other hand,
brought a Roman army before its walls. During a whole year he lay, without any result, before the town, till chance made him remark a weak point on the land side. Syracuse, in point of fact, consisted of five towns, the fortress Achradeina, with the island of Ortygia, the towns of Epipolae, Tycha, and Neapolis. The two last were taken during a festival of Diana, which united the defenders in festive and joyous groups around the temples, a thousand picked troops of Marcellus's army having climbed the walls at dead of night in the place above mentioned, and having opened to their countrymen the Hexapylæ, and various approaches to Tycha. Achradeina and the island of Ortygia were in the mean time stoutly defended by Epicydes. The Carthaginian fleet, under Bomilcar, received orders to hasten to the assistance of the town; but, not daring to give the Romans battle, proceeded to Agrigentum, and there landed troops, which were afterwards wholly swept away by a pestilence. Marcellus reduced Achradeina and Ortygia, through the treachery of one of the three commandants, a Spaniard. After its conquest the town was given up to plunder: the lives of the inhabitants were spared. A richer booty was made, according to Livy, than even at the subsequent conquest of Carthage itself, that emporium of the commerce of the then civilised world. An enormous number of works of art were carried off to Rome, and all Sicily was subjected to the Romans.

The same year in which Syracuse was conquered by Marcellus, the opulent Campania was attacked by the Romans in earnest, and succumbed far more deplorably, in the following year, than Syracuse. Capua, and that part of Campania, which, after the battle of Canae, had attached itself to Hannibal, at that time enjoyed a vain independence. Hannibal stationed only a few troops there, and so soon as his presence was necessary in Apulia, the Romans could turn their whole force against Samnium and Campania. This they did, in the year in which Syracuse was captured by Marcellus.
Both consuls, Q. Fulvius and Appius, took up their position in Samnium, brought agriculture to a stand in all Campania, and soon effected a close blockade of Capua. Hannibal then lay with his whole army in Bruttium and Lucania, endeavouring to replace with new levies the defection of the Thurians and Consentinians, who had again restored their allegiance to the Romans. A party in Tarentum invoked Hannibal's assistance. He gained possession of the town, and drove the Roman garrison into the citadel.

While Hannibal lingered in Lower Italy, the Roman consuls had made all the requisite preparations for the siege of Capua, which at that time contained a Carthaginian garrison. They had stopped the supplies of this great and populous city, and the Campanians, too lazy and too cowardly to help themselves, had addressed to Hannibal urgent prayers for assistance. He sent Hanno, who collected into his camp the requisite stores for the provisioning of Capua, but the indolent and thoughtless Campanians let slip the day which had been appointed for them to fetch away the provisions. Hanno bestowed the bitterest reproof upon their negligence, appointing, however, another day; but, before this arrived, the Romans had taken measures to bar all approaches. The consuls now commenced the investment of Capua, and Hannibal, who could not withdraw his presence from Lower Italy, left the Romans time to take a strong position before the town, and to fortify themselves so completely behind a double wall and trench, that his efforts to save Capua, when he appeared at last, could not but be fruitless, unless, indeed, the consuls should venture into the open field. But from this two events of recent occurrence might well deter them. Hannibal had cut to pieces shortly before 8000 Roman troops in Lucania. This detachment had been trusted with signal folly by the senate to an old major (centurio primipili), who, on the strength of being a tolerable chef de bataillon, imagined himself more than a match for Hannibal in his own arts. Moreover, Hannibal imme-
diately afterwards slaughtered 16,000 Romans, led by a prætor.

Though the consular year had come to an end, the Romans left at the head of the army before Capua the consuls of the former year, who carefully kept within their intrenchments, which Hannibal vainly attempted to storm. It was then that, repulsed from the camp, for the first time he made an attack on Rome itself; not that he hoped to surprise the town, but merely in order to draw off the two armies from before Capua. His camp was pitched three miles from the town, where the panic was extreme; yet the siege of Capua was not raised, though Fulvius was recalled with 15,000 men, and the command divided between him and the consuls. The Romans cautiously avoided an action, and Hannibal was too good a general to attempt the storm of a town like Rome, where almost every senator was an officer, and every burgher a soldier, particularly after the defensive army of both consuls had been reinforced by 15,000 picked troops, withdrawn from the army before Capua; besides which, Hannibal had only taken provisions for ten days. Accordingly, he did not find it advisable to protract his stay in the neighbourhood of Rome. He returned to Bruttium, leaving Campania to its fate. Meanwhile the distress of Capua rose to the highest pitch; an embassy which the besieged despatched to Hannibal was intercepted; and the garrison was finally compelled to surrender.

Campania was now public property: seventy Campanians of the first families in the country were executed, 300 thrown into prison, others distributed throughout the Italian towns, while the whole remaining population was dragged into slavery. It had likewise been proposed to lay the town and the whole district round Capua waste. This had been determined against, on the argument of utility. The circumjacent land being well known as the most fertile in Italy, it was thought fit to preserve the town as a market for agricultural produce, in order to keep the
land in cultivation. To this end, a rabble of freedmen, traders, and artificers were retained for the population of the town; but the whole body of free burghers, without even giving them hopes of return, were scattered into various districts. The innocent houses and walls, however, were neither pulled down nor destroyed by fire, an instance of forbearance from which the Romans not only reaped the advantage resulting from the preservation of these buildings, but gave themselves also all the airs of clemency amongst the allies.

On commencing his Italian expedition, Hannibal had left behind his whole baggage, and a not inconsiderable force, in the present Catalonia. On the coast of this district most of the Greek colonies were situate, which had been from time immemorial friendly to Rome. To the native Spaniards, Scipio, who had been sent by his brother, the consul Cneus, to Spain, with a fleet and army, announced himself as a liberator. Hanno had gained over one of the Spanish princes of these regions: others, however, coalesced with Scipio, and the latter beat and annihilated Hanno’s army near Scissis. It is true that Hasdrubal set himself in motion from the other side, but he durst not attack Scipio in earnest till, in the following year, a fleet with considerable reinforcements came in from Carthage. This fleet, which was intended to support the operations of Hasdrubal, was attacked by Scipio, who, by its annihilation, secured for himself naval superiority. Supported by the Roman fleet, he marched into the present kingdom of Valencia, made immense booty, but failed in the attempt against New Carthage, the metropolis of the Carthaginians in Spain. Meanwhile, the renown of the clemency, kindness, and magnanimity of the Romans, moved many of the innumerable little states, into which Spain seems to have been at that time divided, to unite themselves with him, while others stoutly adhered to the Carthaginians. The Celtiberians in particular fought boldly for the Romans, and inflicted two defeats on the Carthaginians,
even before Publius Scipio appeared with a fresh army of 8000 men and a fleet.

The narrative of the Roman deeds in Spain sounds so splendid, that it might have been expected all Spain would have been conquered in the course of the next year. This, however, did not by any means follow. Hasdrubal not only maintained himself in the whole tract on the other side of the Ebro, but even resolved, so soon as the Carthaginians had despatched a new army under Himilco into the south of Spain, to hasten into Italy, according to his brother's invitation and the instructions of the Carthaginian senate. How he could hope to cut his way through Catalonia, the inhabitants of which were all in alliance with the Romans, through the Pyrenees, in the teeth of a wholly unbroken Roman army, seems inexplicable; the more so, as the Romans, on the tidings of his march towards the Ebro, went to meet him south of that river with an army fully equal to his own in strength. Here they scattered his forces in a battle, which, if we give credit to Eutropius and Orosius, was amongst the most important and decisive in the whole war, and which, nevertheless, decided nothing. Hereupon the Carthaginians sent to Spain Mago, the third brother of the Barcides, and brought their Spanish army up to 60,000 men.

A series of Roman victories, during two successive years, enfeebled Carthage, owing to the efforts she was compelled to make in order to save Spain, in the same manner as Rome was exhausted by her exertions to keep possession of Italy. Yet the Scipios could as little expel the Carthaginians wholly from Spain, as Hannibal could attain his end in Italy.

In the year in which Marcellus subdued Sicily, the Romans began to repose more trust than formerly in their Spanish allies, whose unsteadfast character had not seemed to invite confidence. This reliance in the natives cost Cneus Scipio his life and his army. At the head of the Carthaginian army in Spain stood at that time Has-
dru-ral, Hannibal's brother, another Hasdrubal, Gisco's son, and Mago, Hannibal's second brother: Publius Scipio marched with a considerable army against the two latter, Cneus against the former. In the neighbour-
hood of the town of Anitorgi the two brothers parted from each other; Publius, with his whole army, was sur-
rrounded and cut off by the Carthaginians, Numidians, and the prince of the Ilergetes, (Indibilis, or Andobal,) excepting a few troops which were posted in another quarter. The victors instantly hastened from the field of battle against Cneus, even before the latter had in-
telligence of his brother's destiny. The Romans had been shortly before deserted by the Celtiberian army, in which they had placed the greatest confidence: Cneus was surrounded and despatched, with most of his men. Of the whole Roman army there was nothing now re-
main- ing but such scattered detachments as had betaken themselves to Fonteius, who, indeed, was no especially skilful general. Fonteius had been lieutenant of the Scipios; but the army did not give him credit for power to preserve it after the rout of the main body, and chose a knight, Marcius, for its leader.

This new general, who afterwards, in the brilliant bulletin which he despatched to the senate, styled him-
self proprætor, and thereby excited great disgust at his arrogance, and that of the army, well knew how to inspire the Roman soldiers. How he set about this has with great art been described by Livy, who seems, how-
ever, to have exaggerated somewhat the result of his efforts. It was assuredly sufficient, that, with the relics of the demolished army, he not only checked the Car-
thaginians in mid career of their victories, but even restored to his own men their former self-reliance, and delivered to the new commander sent by the Ro-
mans a courageous and well-disciplined army.

Claudius Nero, to whom the command was trans-
ferred, did not display in Spain the skill which he ex-
hibited a few years after as consul; but rather, by his oversights, enhanced the renown of the man whom the
senate had not held worthy of the proprætorial dignity. Marcius had attacked the Carthaginians with the relics of a routed army, and victoriously extricated himself from their superior force. Claudius, on the other hand, neglected to keep Hasdrubal fast, whom he had shut up in a narrow pass of the wood of the black stone, not far from the present Jaen. The Carthaginians extricated themselves unhurt from the difficulty, and Claudius, too late, offered them battle. It was soon found expedient by the Romans to seek a more energetic and more enterprising leader, and they found him in the son and nephew of the Scipios who had fallen in Spain.

At the age of seven-and-twenty, Publius Scipio, afterwards known by the surname of the Elder, united all the qualities of a soldier and a general with all the arts of a popular speaker, and all the address and insinuation of a man who seeks his fortune by popular favour. Accordingly the people hailed with eagerness his candidature and nomination to command in Spain. He landed with 11,000 men in the bay of Ampurias, and determined to signalise his appearance by an exploit, which, whether successful or not, was sure to earn for him great reputation. The Carthaginian army was scattered through the country; their leaders were not wholly united, and put trust in the Spanish nations, whose hostages were guarded in New Carthage. Consequently, the speedy capture of this town must inflict a double loss on the Carthaginians: they would be cut out from the whole line of coast, and it would be easy to alienate the Spaniards from them when possession had been taken of their hostages.

It was apparently on these grounds that Scipio formed his plan of commencing his career in Spain with the capture of New Carthage; a plan in which he was eminently seconded by fortune. He imparted it to no one but his friend Lælius, who commanded the fleet, made forced marches of extraordinary rapidity, and, before even the rumour of his approach could have reached a Carthaginian army, he appeared under the
walls of the surprised town, discovered on the sea side a point where, at certain times, the place was accessible, and got within the walls at the second storm. As this town contained arsenal, wharfs, magazines, and military depôts; as it was the central point of the whole trade of the Carthaginians with Spain, it may easily be conceived that an immense booty came to the share of the victor. Meantime, the point of most importance certainly was, that the Spanish hostages fell into his hands, and that he thereby gained occasion to wean the Spaniards wholly from Carthage. Therewith, it seems, he busied himself exclusively for some time, and with good success; and these his efforts to win over the Spaniards cramped his undertakings against Hasdrubal and the other Carthaginian leaders.

The grounds which induced Hasdrubal to seek his elder brother in Italy, while the younger, Mago, endeavoured to collect a new army in the more remote regions of Spain, have been brought together by Livy in an imaginary narrative of the consultations held between both brothers.

Hasdrubal performed the march through Gaul and over the Alps much quicker and more easily than Hannibal; and, if any thing could be deduced from Livy's narration, calculated solely for rhetorical effect, we would affirm that Hannibal, throughout the whole twelve years, had received succours and troops by this circuitous land route. One thing, however, appears from Livy, namely, that Italy by that time was reduced to despair; that it was only with the utmost trouble, and by aid of the harshest measures, that the Romans could recruit their army; that Etruria was ready every moment to take up arms against Rome; that the Romans had therefore been obliged to station a separate army there; and that the towns were only kept in check by the most vigorous military measures of their garrisons. In this respect Livy gives the remarkable statement respecting Arretium and the Ligurians, or inhabitants of the coast from Monaco as far as Etruria, that unless the Ro-
mans had despatched a considerable force to keep a look-out on their movements, they were ready to send 8000 men to effect a junction with Hasdrubal. But the Gauls in Upper Italy, besides, were continually on the point of taking up arms. Thence the Romans made in this year a last and important effort, and called out the forces of all the allied towns; but, that Scipio sent several thousand men from Spain into Italy, is what Livy hardly dares to maintain. Unfortunately, Hasdrubal, on his entrance into Lombardy, committed an unpardonable error. Instead of advancing immediately into Etruria, he marched first towards the Roman colony of Placentia, which he could the less hope to take at the first onset, as Hannibal, eleven years before, after the battle of Trebia, had tried his force against it in vain, and from prudence had immediately renounced a regular attack. So soon as the Romans had learned the arrival of Hasdrubal, they sent one of the consuls out against him, while the other was destined to hinder the junction of Hannibal with his brother.

The latter attempt would scarcely have succeeded, had not Hannibal, on the intelligence that his brother was besieging Placentia, postponed, for a time, his purpose of marching rapidly into Upper Italy, and moved from the Tarentine territory farther southwards. Hasdrubal had meanwhile given up the siege of Placentia; he had put himself in motion, and despatched Gauls and Numidians with letters to his brother. These messengers had penetrated successfully through all Italy; they were discovered at the end of their journey on Tarentine ground by the Romans, and robbed of their letters. By this disaster, intelligence of Hasdrubal’s approach reached the Roman consul sooner than Hannibal himself, and Claudius took occasion to pay back to the Carthaginians a like artifice for that which they had practised against him in Spain. This decided the destiny of the two belligerent powers in Italy. Hasdrubal had written that he would join his brother in Umbria: the consular army which stood opposed to him
was fully sufficient to stop him: the senate and the consul Livius were therefore also much displeased when they learned that Claudius Nero had adopted the resolu-
tion of quitting his camp near Canusium, with the choicest troops of his army, and reinforcing his col-
league, in order, in conjunction with him, to rout the one brother ere the other should have obtained any in-
telligence of his approach.

However, neither the cunning of Nero, nor the bra-
very of the Romans, was exactly what decided the re-
sult: fortune, which was bent upon exalting Rome, and
destroying Carthage, broke, to speak with Æschylus, the
beam of the balance, and made the scale of Rome to
sink. It were otherwise impossible that Hannibal should
have remained a whole fortnight quietly in his camp,
while Livius marched from Casilinus to Sena, and from
thence back to Casilinus. Nero had only taken with
him 7000 men in this march, which was quickened by
all possible methods; horses, carriages, and provisions,
being put in requisition. These troops, however, were
picked from the Roman soldiers, and from the whole
disposable force of the allies.

Hasdrubal was not deceived, however cautiously Nero
had made his nocturnal entrance into the camp of his
colleague, and how carefully soever his arrival was con-
cealed, by not a single new tent being put up, the 7000
men being distributed through the whole camp. The
Carthaginian general knew, from his Spanish experience,
that when two commanders, with equal authority, were
in a Roman camp, the evening march was twice sounded;
hence he detected Nero's arrival. Precisely this, how-
ever, was his misfortune. He might easily have de-
fended himself for several days in his camp: during
this time Hannibal would have moved to his assistance.
He could not, however, explain to himself the arrival
of the other consul in any other manner than by Han-
nibal having been beaten; and therefore was fain to
attempt to save his army by a hasty retreat. The Ro-
mans hastened after him, and it was out of his power to avoid an action.

Unfortunately, no more than an insignificant fragment has been preserved of the eleventh book of Polybius. This book gave a detailed account of Hasdrubal's arrival in Italy, of his character in general, and of the battle which he gave both the consuls at Metaurus, in the district of Sena, or, to speak after a more modern manner, on the rivulet which, near Fossombrone, not far from Fano, flows towards Sinigaglia till it falls into the Adriatic. Livy, however, as appears from the fragments, has closely followed Polybius. Both are agreed in eulogising Hasdrubal; both acknowledge that his position was an admirable one, and that the victory was in his hands till Claudius made a wholly unusual movement, withdrew to the rear of his own troops with a part of the left wing, and then turned the right flank of the enemy. Hasdrubal himself remained dead on the field, after having fulfilled all the duties of a good leader: his army was annihilated in the action, or at all events immediately afterwards.

Whatever credence be or be not given to the anecdote that Claudius sent Hasdrubal's head, in the New Zealand fashion, to Hannibal, and that the latter exclaimed, "he recognised in this head the destiny of Carthage," it will at all events be allowed that, after the loss of Spain and Sicily, the destruction of so considerable an army must ruin all the hopes of Hannibal. It is all the more astonishing, that, limited as he was to Bruttium, he knew how to maintain himself in Italy unconquered, and, what is more, kept his troops supplied with provision in a region not remarkably rich in produce. The impracticability of victualling armies in the mountainous parts of Lucania and Bruttium, appears to have kept the Romans from falling with combined force on Hannibal.

The following year was decisive, with regard to Spain. Scipio put a total termination to the war in that country, occupied the territory of Cadiz, and suppressed the movements of the natives, who, wiser than their coun-
trymen, had become aware that the Romans would es-
tablish a footing in Spain, and oppress the freedom of
the land far more than the Carthaginians had either
been able or willing to do. In Italy the Romans con-
tented themselves with observing Hannibal, but chas-
tised in the mean time all the revolted states, put the
last finish to the oppression of the wasted land, and
especially endeavoured to annihilate the Lucanians, the
last allies of Hannibal.

We shall return in a future chapter to the character
of Scipio, and show that he was already going the mo-
narchical road by way of democracy, which, after him, all
the great men of Rome tacitly followed; the same road
by which, at length, after Sylla's death, Caesar attained
absolute power. In this place the hint may suffice, that
Scipio, how praiseworthy soever he may have other-
wise been, knew no bounds to his ambition; that in
Spain, and at the court of Syphax, according to the
testimony of Livy, his most ardent admirer, he vied
with any Numidian in the arts of smooth hollow ca-
jolery; and even in the Roman senate made himself
obnoxious as a demagogue, so soon as his self-love was
offended. He now entered into negotiations with the
faithless princes of the Numidians, or native Africans,
who furnished auxiliary troops to the Carthaginians,
and who, like the Arabians, like all rude, especially all
nomadic nations, had no idea of truth and of fidelity.
On this he reared the whole plan of his military am-
bition, to which, as he well knew, the more intelligent
part of the Roman senate was altogether hostile.

Massinissa, a man equally renowned through his
implacable hostility against Carthage, and through the
part assigned him by Cicero in his little tract on Old
Age, was gained over by Scipio, when the latter sent
him back his nephew, who happened to be among the
captives, and displayed an openness, magnanimity,
bravery, similarity of character, and similar ambition,
which could not fail to fascinate a man like Massinissa.
He gained the grovelling soul of Syphax through interest and flattery.

Scipio, confiding in the right of hospitality, which even the faithless nomad never violates, ventured to cross over into Africa without attendants, and to share table and bed with his former antagonist in Spain.

On the strength of his connections with the Numidians, Scipio, on his election as consul after his return from Spain, desired of the senate the commission to cross over to Africa with an army; or, as this procedure was named, he demanded Africa as a province. In order that no impediment might be thrown in his way on the part of his colleague, his party had taken care that his colleague in the consulship should be P. Licinius, the pontifex maximus, whom his religious duties did not allow to absent himself from Italy. He meditated besides, if the senate refused him its concurrence, to apply himself next to the people, which he had wholly in his power. The older senators, without exception, opposed themselves to his inordinate ambition; he was even, by intervention of the tribunes, compelled to renounce the hope of bringing the matter before the people, yet Sicily was given him for a province, with the express condition that he might cross over to Africa on his own account, with an army which he had gathered together as consul, not in the service of the senate, but through personal and official influence. At the same time that Scipio made preparations to attack the Carthaginians in Africa, Mago had collected an army together at Minorca, and addressed himself to land on the Genoese territory, where they were ready to receive him with open arms.

In the preparations which Scipio made for his African expedition, shows itself, for the first time, the wholly altered position of Rome with regard to the Italian states, as well as the political preponderance of individual families and individual men. Scipio was well pleased that no formal levy was allowed him, which would have kept him within certain bounds; for he was thus
left at liberty to employ the splendour of his name, the
influence which a consul such as he had on the subject
states, and the anxiety of particular towns and states,
especially in Etruria, lest they should be made to pay
dearly for their former lukewarm services, as well as
their desire to secure themselves a powerful protector
in the senate. Mago landed in Liguria earlier than
Scipio in Africa; at first with only a very inconsider-
able force: he was, however, reinforced by the Carthagi-
nians, when they learned that eighty provision ships
which they had sent to Hannibal had been captured
off Sardinia, and they ordered him to make the at-
temt to effect a junction with the former. To this
determination conduced not a little the landing which
Lælius, Scipio's friend, had made in Africa. The
Carthaginians hoped to hold the enemy back in Italy.
They deceived themselves. The whole year of the
consulship, indeed, was consumed in preparations;
but the landing of Lælius, his negotiations with Massi-
nissa, the force which Scipio had collected, and the
panic which seized the Carthaginians, induced the
senate to delegate the command for the following year
also to the consul; and since the senate, at the same
time, destined Sicily for another's province, it was a
mere and empty form if it was not expressly declared
that Scipio was destined for Africa.

In the interval of time betwixt Scipio's first journey
to Africa and the landing of the Romans, the Carthagi-
nians had connected themselves more closely with the
perfidious Syphax, as being the most powerful amongst
all the Numidian princes, by giving him to wife Has-
drubal's daughter, Sophonisba, who had formerly been
betrothed to Massinissa. Massinissa, indeed, thereby
gained a pretext to justify his desertion of Carthage;
but the Roman writers vainly seek to conceal from us
that this occurrence took place much later, after he had
already concerted with Scipio the revolt from Carthage.
His desertion was the more unjustifiable, if, as Appian
records, he had been brought up and educated there
When Lælius landed in Africa he joined him. On the number of companions which he brought with him, and on his own effective force, authorities differ. Livy recounts that, expelled by Syphax from his little kingdom, he waited Lælius with sixty horse in the neighbourhood of the Syrtis. Appian will have it that he accompanied the Carthaginian army till the landing of Scipio, and deferred till then his traitorous desertion. However this may be, Massinissa and his subjects were indubitably of the greatest use to Scipio immediately after his landing, as the Carthaginians and Syphax had set on foot so numerous a force, that Scipio was in no degree a match for them in the open field. At home the Romans were not much better off with the Etruscans than the Carthaginians with the Numidians; for a Roman consul took occasion, exactly at that period, to curb their disposition to revolt, by prosecuting, with merciless legal proceedings, the most respectable inhabitants of the country.

Thus the situation of Rome and Carthage, in the last year of the war but one, was pretty equal. Mago and Hannibal occupied Italian ground; Scipio was laying siege to Utica: the hope of each of the principals in the war, however, rested on intelligence with the subjects of the other. The Romans themselves saw this, and adopted the otherwise wholly uncustomary measure that Scipio should remain at the head of the army till the war was ended. He was favoured by fortune, or rather by the heedlessness of the Carthaginians, who did not take a lesson from the destructive conflagrations which had already often destroyed their camp and their army. The Carthaginians and Numidians had no order of encampment, nor regular entrenchments nor tents; but every one of their soldiers, in particular the Numidians, built their separate dwellings of chance-collected materials. They consisted of huts covered with rushes, or penthouses of sedge and reeds. This encampment Scipio resolved to set fire to, and while it was in flames to attack both armies. The plan was formed
in winter, the execution delayed till spring; but the manner in which Scipio, according to Polybius, lulled the Carthaginians into security by negotiations, is not eminently honourable for the Roman hero. The execution succeeded beyond all expectation: the army was scattered; the leaders only, Syphax and Hasdrubal, made their escape with a few horse; and the circumjacent towns were sacked by the Romans. That great numbers perished in the action is highly credible; yet the Carthaginians, as well as Syphax, very soon collected a new army, which was reinforced by a considerable number of Celtiberians from Spain. This army also was routed in an open engagement by Scipio; but the Celtiberians made such an obstinate stand against the Romans, that, during their fight with the Carthaginians, Hasdrubal effected his retreat to Carthage, and Syphax to his own principality.

It was not until the loss of this battle, and the revolt of many towns and districts, that the Carthaginians unwillingly resolved to recall Mago and Hannibal out of Italy, and thereby transfer to Africa the seat of the whole war. At this time Massinissa, reinforced by Roman troops, first put himself in possession of his patrimonial domains, which had been torn from him by Syphax at an earlier period; then he routed Syphax in a cavalry engagement, and captured his person; lastly, he conquered Cirta. Here he sacrificed to the Romans his love and the life of Sophonisba, who, as captive, gave him her hand, in the hope of saving her life, and rendering herself useful to her country. In recompense for the murder of his wife, he received from the Romans a kingdom, which was not theirs to give, and petty badges of honour, which he needed not.

The Carthaginian state-messengers instructed to recall the two generals from Italy were received by them in a very dissimilar manner. Hannibal complied unwillingly, tardily, and with evil presentiment. Mago, who was stationed on the territory of the Insubrian Gauls, and had shortly before been attacked and
repulsed by the pretor, P. Quinctilius Varus, and the proconsul, M. Cornelius, eagerly seized the pretext for evacuating Italy before he should have suffered greater damage, but died of his wounds before he reached Africa. Hannibal’s arrival, indeed, restored the affairs of the Carthaginians; but he himself did not find it advisable to measure his force with his enemies in the field, and would willingly have treated for peace on equitable terms. Scipio seems also not to have wholly been disinclined to enter into negotiations, as it was only by appointing a dictator that the Romans had been able to hinder the consul of the former year from contesting his command with him, and it would not be possible, even by the vote of the assembled people, to hinder the next consul from crossing over into Africa, and partaking with him the dignity of general.

The wish of both commanders brought about the renowned conference, which Polybius and Livy have described each in his own manner. The first, like a philosopher and statesman, the second like a rhetorician and speechmaker, put in the mouth of both great generals such thoughts and words as each considers fitted to their character. Polybius, however, makes Scipio propose such conditions as Hannibal could by no means acquiesce in. Arms must decide; and they did decide in the fall of the year (October), in the action which is commonly, though without any foundation, distinguished as the battle of Zama. Hannibal was routed; but Polybius has justly awarded no less renown than to the valour and ability of the victor, to the admirable qualities which Hannibal, on this occasion, displayed in his masterly retreat from the field of action to Adrumetum. To the mighty debt which Hannibal imposed upon his country must especially be added, that he employed his whole influence in bringing about a speedy peace, however well he knew that he himself would be the sacrifice of that peace.

During the settlement of the terms of peace, Livy narrates a trait completely characteristic of a merca-
tile community. The Carthaginians had taken the other stipulations very easily; but when it came to payment of money, general lamentations and complaints broke out in the town. Hannibal alone is said to have burst into an ironical laugh. When reproached on the subject, he is said to have answered, that they should then have wept when surrender of their weapons was demanded, when their ships were burnt, when every war was prohibited which should not be undertaken with the concurrence of the Romans. For the rest, Hannibal looked for nothing in Africa but intestine discord: but these unhappy conditions became still more destructive from the circumstance that Massinissa, unfortunately for Carthage, lived on to extreme old age. As connected with the Scipio family by friendship and hospitality, he had acquired a very extensive domain by the peace, and was thus enabled incessantly to affront and annoy a commonwealth which he held in inextinguishable hatred.
IMMEDIATELY after the close of the second Punic war, the Romans engaged in a new quarrel with Macedon. In order to trace the progress of events of this momentous contest which was now to be waged between the destined conquerors of the civilised world and the dynasty which boasted the most recent claims to that title, we must take with us some knowledge of the state of Greece as the Romans found it at the period when they first mixed in the internal affairs of that country, and of the leading points of Greek manners and character as they appeared in the times subsequent to the conquests of Alexander—in the times of Macedonian ascendancy. Some attention seems, in the first place, due to the Macedonian tactics, as military force had become the mainspring of affairs, and the destiny of states depended on armies and their generals, as it has done in times less remote from our own. The Macedonian armies of this period were completely artificial machines, which, of course, required continual feeding and oiling, from a corresponding, and equally artificial, system of finance. This, in a great degree, accounts for the subsequent conquests of the Romans, who opposed a living force to the Greek military machinery, the springs of which had been weakened by the common decay of finance and science, attendant on the usual abuses of arbitrary power.

The military tactics of a nation, however combined and modified in practice, may, in general, be reduced in principle under one of two descriptions. They either depend on individual action, or on the action of masses. The former system takes no account of the
dead weight of the mass, the latter equally supersedes individual activity.

The tactics of half-savage nations commonly depend upon masses: the Cimbri, for example, kept their ranks together with chains. Many nations have never advanced beyond, while some, on the other hand, have reverted to, this system of tactics. It was exemplified in the highest perfection under Philip of Macedon, who lengthened the spears and added to the ranks of the Grecian phalanx. Philip required a numerous and a rapidly formed army; and naturally adopted tactics of such a kind that a raw recruit, if he had but vigorous limbs, might be made useful from the very day when he first joined, having nothing to do but perform the simplest movements, in which he could mechanically imitate his comrades. The Macedonian phalanx was drawn up in column sixteen deep. The rear ranks were regarded so completely as a mechanical mass, that, when an attack took place in the rear, evolutions were required to bring the foremost ranks again into front. They were armed with sarisæ, or spears, twenty-four, or at least twenty-one, feet in length, so that five spear heads projected before each one of the front ranks. From the sixth rank rearward the phalangites took no active part in the conflict, and their sarisæ were presented at such an angle as to form a sort of penthouse for warding off missiles from the ranks before them. This order of battle was calculated wholly to produce an overpowering mechanical force with the minimum of personal exertion and exposure: a system which, as it divests martial exploits of all heroic attributes, cannot but render the nations which use it essentially unwarlike.* A dying glory still smiled upon Macedon, from

* I cannot here refuse myself the pleasure of transcribing the remarks of Colonel Napier on the Macedonian tactics, as reproduced in our own times:—

"The rapidity with which the French soldiers rallied and recovered their order, after such a severe check (after the battle of Vimiera), was admirable; but their habitual method of attacking in column cannot be praised. Against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians, it may have been successful, but against the British it must always fail; because the English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well-disciplined, to
the yet recent exploits of Alexander; but conquest itself had exhausted the numbers and vigour of the conquerors, and the phalanx, which had comprised the élite of the Macedonian commonalty, while the cavalry represented the body of nobles, was now in a great measure composed of mercenary soldiers.

Since the time of Alexander, and partly in consequence of his expeditions, the resources of Athens had undergone material diminution; her trade had passed into other hands, her foreign possessions had been lost, and her revenues had dwindled down into absolute insignificance.* Yet, Athens was still hailed as the metropolis of art and science, and her venal panegyrics were as eagerly sought by monarchs as the victor wreaths of Olympia had ever been by freemen. Athenian poets, players, and philosophers, Athenian solemnities, and mysteries, and courtesans, better retained their old renown than Athenian citizens and soldiers. The Athenian people dealt in wit, ingenuity, and flattery, which whoever could give them largesses, games, and spectacles might command, whether he were a native rhetorician, like Demetrius Phalereus, or a foreign tyrant, like Demetrius Poliorcetes. During this period, the Athenians, in common with the other Greeks, began to play the part which they sustained under the empire of Rome.

wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet.

"The column is undoubtedly excellent for all movements short of the actual charge; but, as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to resist the open formation of the Roman legion, so will the close column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a good line, aided by artillery. The natural repugnance of men to trample on their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of the cannon shots, as they tear open the ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns; which, blinded by smoke, unstepped from footing and bewildered by words of command coming from a multitude of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the confusion. No example of courage can be useful, no moral effect can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often firm and even victorious, at the moment when the rear is flying in terror. Nevertheless, well-managed columns are the very soul of military operations; in them is the victory, and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat. The secret consists in knowing when and where to extend the front." — Hist. of the War in the Peninsula, book ii. c. 6.

* Polyb. Hist. ii. 62.
They offered their services everywhere, as talented and witty companions, as erudite professors, schoolmasters, masters of the ceremonies, buffoons, poets, and flatterers, to every one who could feast and pay them. It is a characteristic feature of the period here treated of, that in Athens, as in Antioch and Alexandria, science and art were viewed so much as a necessity of life, that even the contemptible tyrants who sprung up in their petty states, even the most abandoned debauchees in dissolute courts and cities, showed a craving no less eager for intellectual than for sensual pleasures. Even the courtesans very commonly studied polite literature, in order to acquire the frivolous wit which was distinguished by an epithet appropriated to it (σφικτροσ). A long list of courtesans has been handed down to us, many of whom enjoyed equal celebrity to that of any general or monarch, their contemporaries. Many of these ladies attended the lectures of the philosopher Stilpo. Glycera, whom Alexander and Terence have immortalised, when reproached by the philosopher with corrupting youth, aptly replied, "Then, Stilpo, we are both reproached with doing the same thing. You, it is said, corrupt all who come to you, by instituting all sorts of sophistical enquiries, and engaging them in barren and useless logomachies. I, as you say, corrupt them likewise. Since, then, they are spoiled either way, it matters not whether it be by a philosopher or a courtesan."

In Sparta, extreme inequality of fortune had produced the same effects which it is sure to produce everywhere; servility and meanness on the one hand, caprice, profuse-ness, and insolence on the other. Agis was the only one of their monarchs who aimed at effecting a radical reform in the constitution, with the pious hope of remedying and checking the abuses and usurpations of oligarchical power, and bringing about the restoration of ancient manners and usages. How visionary were these designs, became abundantly evident, so soon as the attempt was made to put them in execution. The sort
of men who must be used as instruments in accomplishing a social revolution in corrupt times are never fit for the subsequent part of citizens in a republic; and the purer and the nobler the enthusiasm of their leader, the more grossly is he sure to be betrayed by his own tools, who pursue their personal ends under the standard of the public freedom. Agis fell the sacrifice of his own uncalculating zeal; and the Spartans of the subsequent times, like their worthy descendants the Mainotes, were famous only for predatory expeditions by land and sea.

While Athens and Sparta sank into deeper and deeper degradation, two new constitutions, or, rather, federal unions, in the Peloponnesus and in Ætolia, took a compact form. These were, the Achæan and Ætolian leagues, which had long existed, but had only recently risen into importance. The object of both was, to unite under one republican head a number of states, small and feeble separately, for the purpose of national union and defence in external transactions, yet without alteration either in the internal constitution or independent station of the several members.

The Ætolian league, which had long existed in barbarous obscurity amongst the petty cantons on the northern coast of the Gulf of Corinth, claims precedence as the elder of these confederations. It seems to have arisen, like other unions of the same kind, from community of usages and dialect in the states which composed it. War was its main object: war of aggression, for the purpose of plunder; war of defence, against the pursuit and reprisals of the plundered. The title, therefore, of στρατηγος well suited their annual president. The assembly of all the Ætolian name was held annually in the autumn, at Therma, in the temple of Apollo, for the purpose of ratifying or rejecting decrees and propositions, confirming or putting an end to alliances, determining war or peace, distributing privileges, receiving embassies, and appointing the officers of the league.

The structure of the Achæan league has been thought
deserving of ampler record than that of the robber union of the Ætolians. The name of Achæans, after it had ceased to be applied, as in the Homeric age, to the Grecian tribes in general, became restricted to those on the southern coast of the Gulf of Corinth, extending from Sicyon to Elis. The confederation, celebrated in history as the Achæan league, originally consisted of twelve petty states or cantons:—Dyme, Phara, Tritæa, Rhipes, Thasium, Patrae, Pellene, Ægium, Bura, Carynia, Olenos, and Hellica. To these original members of the confederation Sicyon was afterwards added under the celebrated Aratus, together with the republics of Corinth and Megara. It is known, with more precision of the Achæan towns than of those of Ætolia, that they had each their public assemblies, councils, civil and judicial officers, but that certain general laws were valid for all. All the towns, moreover, had a common circulating medium, as well as an uniform system of weights and measures. At the general assemblies of the league, which were held in Ægium, every citizen of any of the allied states might be present, and had the right of speaking and moving resolutions. It appears, however, that, in fact, as might have been anticipated, these meetings were attended only by wealthy and powerful delegates from the several states and districts forming the league. Thus the government, though in form democratic, was not in effect an ochlocracy. As in the Ætolian league the executive power and the chief command, in time of war, were held by a strategus, who was annually elected, who also presided in the assembly, and alone was suffered to make long speeches, but to whom a military title seems to have been less appropriate than when bestowed on the chief of the Ætolians, as the Achæan league was instituted exclusively for defensive purposes.

Such was the state of the leading powers of Greece at that period when the gradual decline of the Macedonian monarchy had cleared an easy theatre of conquest for an ambition not to be slaked with the whole heritage of Alexander. That heritage of kingdoms
might even now feel itself menaced on both sides of the Hellespont, in Syria and in Egypt. In Asia Minor, Pergamus, which we shall find a stanch ally of Rome, and, of course, in the end requited with ingratitude, had risen by degrees to a considerable kingdom, having the city of the same name for its capital. The Rhodians, in these times a formidable naval power, we shall find acting the same part, and treated in the same manner. Syria, which was established as a kingdom by Seleucus Nicanor, one of Alexander's principal officers, extended from the Ionian coast to Armenia and Persia. The dynasty founded by Ptolemy also continued to rule Egypt, and possessed, besides, the island of Cyprus, as well as several provinces on the continent of Asia, and disputed, at the time which we are treating of, the possession of Cælesyria with the Syrian monarch Antiochus. All these powers, of Grecian erection, became involved, on one side or the other, in the contest, in which the only parties first engaged were their parent states, allies, or rivals, in Europe.

A struggle for ascendency on the eastern coasts of the Adriatic between Rome and Macedon, the two military powers who could alone pretend to measure themselves with each other at this period, was an event sooner or later of inevitable occurrence. Its actual approach was, however, hastened by the transactions of Philip, the reigning monarch, with Hannibal during the second Punic war, which had given Rome a fair ostensible ground of provocation, of which, when Carthage was off her hands, she did not pause to avail herself. Hannibal had made overtures of alliance to the king of Macedon immediately on entering Italy. It was not, however, till after the apparently decisive day of Canne that these overtures were accepted, and that Philip sent ambassadors into Italy with full powers to close a league offensive and defensive. These ambassadors were intercepted in Campania by the Roman praetor, from whose hands they escaped by pretending a mission to the senate, and were attended by a Roman
eschert almost to Hannibal's head-quarters. There a
rategy with Hannibal was closed; in which Philip pro-
mised his aid to the Carthaginians, and on the other
hand received the promise that the Romans should be
bound, during peace, to renounce their allies and acquis-
sitions across the Adriatic. Philip now prepared to
cross into Italy. In this enterprise, however, he was
not favoured by destiny. At the moment of the fairest
opportunity for the passage, he received the false intel-
ligence that the Romans were awaiting him with a su-
perior fleet, and therefore sat down to the siege of
Apollonia, the oldest allied town of the Romans across
the Adriatic. Meanwhile the pretor Valerius had col-
clected a considerable number of vessels, took from the
king Oricum, which he had previously conquered, at-
tacked the army with which he was besieging Apol-
lonia, and effectually forced him to renounce his passage
to Italy. About the same period the Aetolians closed a
league with the pretor Valerius, who continued still to
command the fleet off Oricum; and a war broke out
between Macedonia, the Aetolians, Eleans, Spartans,
whom the Messenians also joined. The Romans alone
extracted profit from this situation of things; they were
enabled to dispense with the army which they had pre-
viously destined for Greece: a sanguinary yet indecisive
war detained the king in the vicinity of his territory.

Having brought their war with Carthage to a conclu-
sion, and not choosing to let slip the opportunity of
humbleing so distinguished and so dangerous an enemy
as Philip, the Romans now thought fit to engage as
principals in the contest which that prince had already
drawn on Macedon by his imperious conduct towards
the other independent states of Greece and Asia Minor.
In answer to solicitations from Rhodes, Athens, and
Pergamum, to throw their decisive weight into the scale
against Philip, they returned the imperial answer, that
they would look to the affairs of Asia.* They sent,

* "Sub idem ferre tempus et ab Attalo rege et Rhodiis legati venerunt,
nunctantes Asiam quoque civitates sollicitari. His legationibus reponsum
est, cure Asianam rem senatori fore." — Liv. xxxi. 2.
moreover, an embassy to Egypt, to address the king of that country for aid in the event of war between Rome and Macedon. This embassy was farther commissioned to carry a threatening message from the senate to Philip himself. Æmilius Lepidus was pitched upon for this part of the duty, apparently expressly as being the youngest of the ambassadors. The tone in which the set about his work of mediation plainly evinced that the senate was in fact resolved upon war. When Æmilius Lepidus, says Polybius, came into the royal presence, he told the king that it had seemed good to the senate to require of him, that he should neither make war on any one of the states of Greece, nor lay hand on what belonged to Ptolemy king of Egypt; and that he should submit to arbitration (i.e. their arbitration) all matters of dispute with the king of Pergamus and the Rhodians. If he complied with these requisitions, he might preserve peace with the Romans; if he refused compliance*, the immediate consequence, for him, would be, war with the Romans.† Philip replied, as no man could avoid replying with any pretence to energy of character,—“I pardon your rude and arrogant demeanour for three reasons: first, because you are a youth but little versed in affairs; secondly, because you are a very fine young man; thirdly, because you are a Roman. With reference to the object of your mission, I wish and pray the Romans, above all things, not to break the peace, and not to commence hostilities against me. If, however, they think proper to do so, by the aid of the gods I will then stoutly withstand them.” After a conference thus conducted, they parted.

The Romans had already completed their preparations for war, which was now declared in form; but during the first two years in which their armies were led by the consuls Sulpicius and Villius, the war was brought to no decisive issue. It was, indeed, a war which could only be terminated by foreign assistance. The very keys

* πιθανῶς.  † οὕτως ἔσται ἔτι σε ὑπὲρ Ῥωμαίων πολέμου.
of the country, now its theatre, as well as the subsistence of the troops when they arrived there, depended on the zealous co-operation of the Grecian states; and the honour of concluding the war was reserved for Flamininus, who was half a Greek himself in manners and character; and who, on attaining to the consulship, in the third year of the war, hastened at once to the field of action.

Flamininus first made Thessaly the base of his operations, and drew over to him the robber hordes of Ætolia. He, moreover, succeeded in, winning the Acheans, amongst whom a powerful party was hostile to Rome from patriotic motives; and brought matters so far in the year of his consulship, that in any event he could not fail to reap the glory of terminating the war. For either the exertions of his friends and clients would procure an extension of his term of command, and in that case he would urge conditions of peace that Philip could not accede to; or a successor would be appointed to his command, and in that case he was prepared to grant peace to Philip on the terms which he himself had proposed. It turned out that his period of office was protracted to an indefinite period, and, consequently, his friends in the senate drove off all discussion of peace, while Flamininus himself sternly repulsed all overtures of that nature, confining the decision of the contest to the next campaign. That decision, under the circumstances, could not be long doubtful. Not only had Flamininus cajoled into the field against Philip the Rhodians and Attalus king of Pergamus, with the whole effective force of the Ætolian and Achean leagues, but Attalus and the Achean strategus had also induced the Boeotians to swell the grand alliance of Rome. The armies met in Thessaly, near Cynoscephalæ, and the forces of Philip were routed with immense loss. He, however, showed great generalship in effecting his retreat, and great skill in his negotiations for peace. The Roman consul, who had reasons of his own for wishing to close a treaty expeditiously, accorded to the king a
personal interview in the Vale of Tempe, and imposed on him no more rigorous conditions of peace than before. This treaty proved the source of speedy ruin to the freedom of Greece, as Flamininus made haste to declare the independence of all the states which Philip was forced to relinquish; thus purposely strewing aliment for the Grecian spirit of discord, and sowing pretexts for Roman armed intervention at no distant day.

Flamininus received universal homage as liberator of Greece, proceeded in triumph through that country, and showed himself at the Nemean games, at which he presided in royal state, as a spectacle to all the Greeks. In the following spring he erected his tribunal publicly at Elatia; and here, too, in a vast assemblage, in view of all Greece, decided the internal affairs of the Greek states. It may well be believed, on the word of the Romans themselves, that his decisions were more just than those of Greeks would have been; but, nevertheless, the sight of a Roman setting himself up in ostentatious pomp as a supreme judge over Greece was a melancholy spectacle for both nations. To the Greeks, the Roman sitting as judge, with himself at his feet as suppliants, seemed the precursor of the degradation and slavery which awaited them: the Romans, on the other hand, thereby contracted the thought and habit of capricious domination over friendly states. At the assembly which Flamininus afterwards held in Corinth, he played yet another part. An immense multitude gathered around him: he complacently figured in Greek discourse, addressed exhortations to the Greeks, who, on their part, either because they were easily moved, or because they wished to please him, wept. Flamininus wept likewise. A deplorable scene!—hypocrisy on both sides. From Corinth he proceeded through all Greece, amidst the shouts of the populace. The effect of all these scenic illusions struck the Roman people: the nimbus which he diffused around him in Greece extended to Rome; and since that time he divided popularity with the Scipios amongst the leaders of that
party which was then totally altering the inward frame of the Roman constitution.

It was not till the war of the Romans with Philip took a turn decidedly disadvantageous to the latter, that the attention of Antiochus was too late attracted to the affairs of Asia Minor and of Europe. Too late he hastened to make peace with Egypt, betrothed his daughter Cleopatra with Ptolemæus Epiphanes, and promised that he would, one day, give this daughter Phœnicia, Cœlesyria, and Palestine for a dower. Moreover, he married a second daughter to Ariarathes of Cappadocia; and offered a third to Eumenes of Pergamus. He then proceeded to occupy the towns on both sides of the Hellespont, which occasioned several embassies and unpleasant altercations to pass between him and Flamininus. Antiochus at length despatched ambassadors to Rome, who gave and received nothing but vague declarations. Nothing like vagueness, however, (nihil jam perplexe.*) could be charged on the language shortly afterwards employed by commissioners sent from the senate, at the head of whom was Flamininus; and who demanded of the Syrian monarch, in a tone of the most consummate arrogance, the cession of Cœlesyria, the evacuation of all the free Asiatic towns by his troops, and, above all, that he should neither cross into Europe in person, nor send troops thither. Antiochus dissembled his intentions, and quietly pursued the course of policy on which he had entered. At a subsequent conference, however, of which some curious circumstances have been handed down by Livy and Polybius, the admission of the ambassadors from Lampsacus and Smyrna, who had solicited the intervention of Rome against Antiochus, put the king out of patience, and provoked him to declare that his affairs required no arbitrators, and that, had it been otherwise, the Romans were the last whom he should recognise. The congress was dissolved with the highest dissatisfaction on all sides; and Antiochus ought immediately to have taken

* Liv. xxxiii. 34.
the field against Rome. Instead of this, he spent more than three years in preparations, lost time in receiving and returning embassies, and all the while took no decisive measure.

During this interval, Hannibal, who had been driven from his country by an adverse party at Carthage, of which a tool was made by the Romans, took refuge with Antiochus at Ephesus. He met with a friendly reception for his person, but with no effective pursu- ance of his counsels; and it soon appeared that a plain straightforward warrior had no chance among Græco-Syrian courtiers.

About this time the Ætolians, having received some mortal offence from the Romans, who had already ceased to value their alliance, sought that of Antiochus, and invited him to cross over to Greece. Accordingly he led his troops into Europe, made Demetrias his head- quarters, caused himself to be chosen generalissimo by the Ætolians, and endeavoured to draw the Athenians and Bœotians into league with him; an attempt which proved abortive, and of which the success would have been at best an equivocal advantage, as the policy of all the Grecian states was at that time so contemptibly faithless and imbecile, that their fickle co-operation could be of little use to any party. Antiochus and his allies the Ætolians were twice defeated at sea by the Romans (with whom Philip was now allied), while an army of the latter power made its way by land to the Hellespont. Antiochus precipitately withdrew his troops from the neighbouring towns, and was as rapidly pur- sued by the Roman army, till he was forced into action on the mountain ridges of Sipylus, and, after sustaining a total defeat, submitted, for the sake of peace, to con- ditions which were even more humiliating than those which he had shortly before spurned at. The territory taken from Antiochus by this treaty was partitioned out by the conquerors in an apparently magnanimous, but, in point of fact, exceedingly artful, manner. Every thing appeared to be done to reward the Rhodians and Eumenes king of Pergamus for their zealous adhesion
to Rome; but every thing, in reality, was done to introduce perplexity into their reciprocal relations so effectually, that matter of dispute should never be wanting; in order that perpetual pretexts might be afforded for summoning the adverse parties to plead their claims at Rome, or for sending from thence delegates to assume jurisdiction as over subjects.

About this time an army was marched, under Fulvius Nobilior, into Ætolia, for the purpose of reducing that country completely to subjection, a purpose not so easy of accomplishment as the previous undertakings in Asia; as this was a land where every village formed a sort of republic, and where the fortunes of a people did not hang by those of a single man. Nor could even the Roman consul expect any remunerating advantage from reducing to despair a people whose poverty equalled their martial spirit. His plans were, therefore, principally levelled at Ambracia. This town had once been the metropolis of Pyrrhus. A splendid building, called the Pyrrheum, consecrated his memory, and the whole town was adorned with works of art of all descriptions. When Fulvius, after a lengthened siege, in which were exhausted all the means suggested by the art of war in antiquity, compelled the town at length to a capitulation, and to the surrender of all its works of art and of all its treasures, he granted to the poor surrounding peasantry easy terms of peace, which were afterwards confirmed by the senate. This, too, was an instance of the employment of that method which contributed so much to Roman greatness. Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos was the maxim on which Rome acted with regard to the Ætolians, as to the other states which successively felt her power. Their metropolis was impoverished by heavy contributions, and the connections of the country people were henceforth confined to their separate cantons.

The conclusion of peace with Antiochus left leisure to the consul Manlius to gather the materials of a triumph by the conquest of the Galatians, or Gauls of
Asia Minor, who stood in about the same relation to the other states of Asia Minor as the Ætolians to those of European Greece. The result of a collision between hordes of rude barbarians and the best troops of the ancient world might have been anticipated; the spoil was enormous. The greater part of the fugitive Gauls escaped across the Halys, and from thence sued and obtained conditions of peace.

From henceforward we find one Roman commissioner after another appearing in Greece expressly for the purpose of perplexing the affairs of the Achæan league, as well as of Macedon. Livy traces the course of dispute with the latter power, not so much to Philip's resentment of his defeat at Cynoscephalæ, and of the hard conditions thereafter imposed on him by Flamininus, as to the manner in which he was subsequently treated by the senate. The disorders of the Thracian towns in his neighbourhood, which the Romans had thought proper to emancipate after their usual fashion, totally uncustomed as they were to freedom, and unfit for it, gave Philip opportunity to interfere in their civic arrangements, and to reduce some of their number to subjection. This was argument enough for fresh disputes with the Romans.

Three Roman senators were appointed to enquire as to these matters on the spot, before whom the king was cited as an accused party, the ambassadors of the Thessalian towns appearing as his accusers, and the Romans assuming to sit in judgment on both. They pronounced against the king; but Philip did not acquiesce so tamely as was expected of him. Perceiving on the part of the Romans a settled purpose for his abasement, he changed his tone, remonstrated, threatened, and showed the arrogant emissaries of Rome, to their amazement, that he was not to be brought to submission without having once more tried the fortune of war.

From this moment a rupture took place between the Romans and Philip; but the latter, in order to gain time before the final appeal to arms, sent his favourites
son Demetrius to Rome with pacific overtures. The prince returned the bearer of mild and equitable terms of peace; but unfortunately excited the suspicions of his father by his undissembled partial disposition towards the Romans, and pride in the marks of favour which the senate had bestowed on him. His brother Perseus, whose character deserves a place on the tragic stage between Atreus and Richard III. of England, employed every means to aggravate the fatal distrust of Philip, and wove his toils so skillfully and securely as to entangle and destroy both father and son. Philip, urged by causeless suspicion, engendered on his hatred of Rome, doomed his innocent son Demetrius to death, and himself soon after fell into a sickness rather of mind than of body, on his route from Thessalonica to Amphipolis. He was, according to Livy, consumed with sleepless anxiety, and haunted incessantly by the phantom of his innocent and murdered son, while he exhausted himself in frightful curses on Perseus. His death, however, would not have been too sudden for timely news of it to have reached his nephew Antigonus, whom he designed to succeed him, but for the arts of his physician Calligenes, who, from the moment that his case became hopeless, sent an express to Perseus through relays ready posted for that purpose; and, when the death of the monarch actually took place, kept it concealed from every one beyond the walls of the palace till the prince’s arrival.

Perseus had no sooner ascended the throne than he followed the steps of his father, without possessing either his talents or good qualities. His first act as a monarch showed hostility to the Romans; and the first occurrences of his reign, his want of judgment as of fortune. Whether he really meant to act on the aggressive against the Romans, or merely to prepare for an attack on their side, could not well be decided, such was the rapidity with which the forces of Rome took the field. Notwithstanding, however, this promptitude of attack, ten years were allowed to elapse in abortive
campaigns, disgraceful to the Roman arms and char-
cacter, before at length a general was chosen from one
of the few families who at that time possessed (and
deserved, it must be added) preponderant influence.
This was Paulus Æmilius, who was connected by mar-
riage with Scipio's family. This new leader brought
new talents and forces to the contest, and finished it
with quite unexpected celerity. The main point was,
to bring the cunning and cowardly foe to action; that
achieved, the issue of the day might safely be trusted
with a leader of such tried and approved skill as Paulus
Æmilius. Rome triumphed; and the Macedonian mon-
arch, more solicitous for his treasures than his honour,
sought safety for them and for himself in the oldest
and holiest temple of Samothrace, where, however,
he was betrayed by the Cretans; and, not having suf-
cient courage to terminate a wretched life by a volun-
tary death, submitted to the indignities of a Roman
triumph, and, after four years' captivity, died at Alba.
Deserted by their king, the Macedonians had no other
course open than that of unconditional submission to the
victor: all the towns, accordingly, opened their gates.
Four republics were formed out of the ruins of the
kingdom of Macedon, and cut off from all connection
with each other. Each of them had not only its own
metropolis and its own government, but commercial
and connubial relations with each other were prohibited
to the citizens of these several republics. They were,
moreover, debarred from keeping up any military force,
with the exception of a scanty band on their frontiers.
Metallic mines were not to be worked, and wood was
not to be felled for ship-building. It was clear that
such a regimen was a mere prelude to plain subjection,
and that the degradation of Macedon to a province
would soon portend the reduction of all Greece.

No sooner had the Romans brought their contest
with Macedon to a close, than they plainly evinced, by
their conduct towards the other states of Greece, their
resolution thenceforth to recognise not the shadow of
Grecian independence. After the overthrow of Perseus, indeed, Greece, disunited and enfeebled, could have little hope of the results of armed resistance to Rome. The ferment of the Greek population, however, rose higher and higher, and reached its utmost pitch on the appearance of commissioners from Rome, who assumed the arbitration of all disputes which arose in these petty and quarrelsome republics. It needed but a spark to explode the mass of discontent and discord; and this was supplied by an ill-timed squabble between the Achæan league and Sparta. Four-and-twenty citizens of the latter state, who had been sentenced to death by the league, escaped to Rome, and appealed to the senate, who, as usual, assumed to decide upon the matter. The Achæans, however, did not choose to admit the decision of Rome, but attacked and routed the Spartans, and pursued their advantages over them till the appearance of Aurelius Orestes with instructions from Rome, which not only decided the cause in favour of the Spartans, but prescribed, in a manner, the utter dissolution of the whole league, by which the larger and smaller states had been hitherto kept in some connection. The announcement of his mission by Orestes, at the general assembly in Corinth, threw the Achæans into such transports of indignation that they immediately elected as strategus Critolaus, a known enemy to the Roman name. At this crisis a fresh revolt broke out in Thrace and Macedon, under the conduct of an adventurer, who gave himself out for a son of Perseus. The appearance of this impostor at first excited little attention at Rome; but after he had routed a Roman army under Juventius Thalma, it seemed necessary to send against him the prætor Cæcilius Metellus, who speedily earned the title of Macedonicus, by putting an end to the war, and transforming into a Roman province the four above-mentioned Macedonian republics.

Metellus honestly wished to prevent war with the Achæan league, and to save Greece from herself and from his countrymen. But the Achæans blindly followed the rash counsels of their leaders, and met the
overtures made on the part of Rome with evasion and insult. Accordingly, Mummius, consul elect for the ensuing year, a man wholly devoid of cultivation, and destitute alike of taste and respect for art and science, received a commission to proceed to the entire subjugation of Greece. Before the inauspicious arrival of Mummius, the noble Metellus had exhausted every means which lay in his power to alienate the Achæans from their demagogues, and to win their ear to rational representations. But a fatally-timed enthusiasm for independence had seized the Achæans, who chose rather to dare the utmost extremities than accept such a peace as was offered by the forbearance of Metellus. They collected their whole force on the isthmus of Corinth, and awaited with their raw and hasty levies an unequal shock with the veteran legions of Rome. The result was the total defeat of the Achæans. Corinth was burnt. Mummius, aided by ten other Roman senators, completed the reduction of the Peloponnesus and all Greece into the state and denomination of a province. Conformably, however, with the usual method of Roman conquests, the several states and cities retained their own forms of internal polity.

The barbarous spirit manifested by Mummius in the sack of Corinth has met with its meed of historical reprobation. He, indeed, caused very many works of art to be transported to Rome, those being an indispensable adornment to a triumph; but as the general's taste for such productions was much on a par with that of his soldiers, what spirit or what principles were likely to guide the selection? We know that he caused a number of the most excellent works to be set up to auction, and was ignorant enough to seek to diminish the chances of loss which, however short the passage, attended the transport of goods by sea in those times, by imposing an obligation on the mariners to replace their value. The kings of Pergamus, who were better judges, at that time appropriated a portion of the vast deposit of treasures of art in the wealthy Corinth: part was enveloped in the flames which consumed that
splendid city, part swallowed up by the waves, and the remainder scattered among barbarians in and in the neighbourhood of Rome.

Of all the states compelled to bow beneath the Roman dominion, Athens was the most fortunate. The Roman grandees soon felt that no one flattered better, and extended his patron's renown farther, than an Athenian orator, poet, or philosopher. Athens, therefore, remained the higher institute for accomplishment in the Roman world also, as it had been in the Greek, and again acquired, through literary importance, the rank it had politically forfeited. Rhodes was oppressed in every possible manner; and the Romans, who were otherwise accustomed not to trouble themselves about trade, became all at once interested in the promotion of free trade on the Ægean sea, so soon as an opportunity occurred of annoying the Rhodians. When the latter required back from the Romans the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Delos, as old possessions, the Romans granted their prayer on condition only that they should make Delos a free port, open to all vessels, and where no harbour-duties should be levied. Thus Delos, as Strabo also remarks, again became the central point of traffic, and the depot of goods, as Rhodes had formerly been; and the Rhodians complain, in the Roman senate, that their harbour-dues and customs now bring them in only the sixth part of their former revenue. These dues had amounted formerly to nearly a million of drachmas. The same ambassadors calculate the revenues which the Rhodians had derived from two Carian towns only, Kaunos and Stratonicea, at 120 talents.

In the treaty already mentioned, between Antiochus and the Romans, one of the articles prescribed the surrender of the person of Hannibal. He fled for a last refuge to the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia, and being followed even thither by the poor vindictiveness of the enemy, terminated his own life in the sixty-fourth year of his age, in the year of Rome 685, B.C. 119.
CHAP. III.

DESTRUCTION OF CARThAGE.—ROMAN MANNERS AND POLITICS.

Carthage, in the fifty years which elapsed between the second and third Punic wars, had begun to enjoy a new flush of prosperity, in consequence of the abstinence prescribed to it from all military enterprises by its rival. It was ruled by an aristocracy of wealth, and a triple division of parties, distinguished as Roman, Numidian, and democratic, each of which had as its chief some influential head of a family had recently sprung up within its walls. Hanno and his family stood at the head of the partisans of Rome; Hannibal Psar and his friends at the head of those who were backed by Massinissa; Hannibal, surnamed the Samnite, and Carthalo, were leaders of the democratical party.

Amidst the frequent disputes arising from the above-mentioned intestine parties, Massinissa had sought to seize for himself one tract after another of the Carthaginian territory; and the Romans, in the character of arbitrators, always well knew how to secure his plunder for him, by means of decisions ostensibly grounded in equity. Finally, he stretched out his grasp even over the district of Tusca, a tract of land which we can only compare with certain tracts of Holland, or the garden-grounds in the neighbourhood of London. The Romans sent ambassadors, of whom Cato was one. That personage was astounded at the power and wealth of a trading state, which had even yet the commerce of the world in its hands; and when the Carthaginians would not refer their undoubted right to foreign arbiters, he returned to Rome with a heart swelling with rage.

After this epoch, the senate only cast about for a pretext to accomplish the destruction of Carthage; and this
was easily found, as the party contests in Carthage continued. The Carthaginians expelled from their city the friends of Massinissa, who took their part, and sent his son to Carthage. The son of the hereditary enemy of the party then predominant in the town was unfavourably received, and his life endangered—a new pretext for war. Massinissa took the field, and besieged the town of Oroscopa. The Carthaginians, who marched to his encounter with a numerous army, were beaten, and the younger Scipio, who came over by chance from Spain, in vain endeavoured to bring about a reconciliation. In the sequel, too, the war was not successfully conducted; the Romans, nevertheless, declared it a formal breach of treaty, and decreed a general levy in Italy, without, however, making known against whom these preparations were intended. The Carthaginians, in straits between Massinissa and the Romans, endeavoured to appease the storm. They sent delegates to Rome, banished the leaders of the democratic party and their followers, for having been abettors of war, and volunteered on every point the fullest satisfaction.

The Roman senate was divided: vague and equivocal answers were given; embassies hurried to and fro. At last Utica, the largest and richest town on the African coast, revolted from Carthage, and the Romans seized this moment to declare war in form, and to commit the conduct of it to their two consuls, Manilius and Marcius, with express instructions not to let themselves be misled by any negotiations or intelligence of treaties. While the consuls proceeded to action, the senate gave a gracious reception to the supplicating embassy of the Carthaginians, and promised easy conditions, if they surrendered 300 children, of their most respectable families, as hostages, into the hands of the consuls. The Carthaginians complied with the demand, and brought the children to Sicily, though they already knew beforehand that the Romans would not fulfil their promise. They even delivered up to the consuls, on their landing in Africa, all the arms and engines which
lay stored up in their city, and offered further to perform whatever should be prescribed to them. But one stipulation had not been anticipated by them; namely, that they should vacate their city, give up all their old occupations, settle again in another place, and adopt entirely different habits. This stipulation was declared immutable by the Romans. Neither the ambassadors nor the aristocratic rulers of Carthage dared to lay it before the people, and when, at length, it was laid before them, a revolt broke out. All classes and orders combined for a desperate resistance.

From this moment began a war of despair against rapacity; for the latter passion alone, according to Appian, had assembled under the Roman eagles an unusually strong army. This enormous force was, however, compelled to relinquish the siege of Carthage, and to encamp at some distance around the city, where Censorinus, as well as his colleague Manilius, particularly, indeed, the latter, suffered ignominious defeats. The whole year elapsed without the besiegers having dared to hazard a general attack, and the besieged took new courage. In the following year, under Calpurnius Piso, the Romans were not more fortunate. But in the next year, the people, that is to say, in particular, the combined family adherents of the Scipios, and of Paulus Äemilius, promoted to the consulship a man who was equal to the war and a favourite in the army. Such a man they found in the son of Äemilius, whom the son of Scipio Africanus the elder had adopted, and this man, Scipio the younger, was elected consul, at the moment he was canvassing for the ædileship. Scipio was chosen commander, not on account only of his family connections, having displayed brilliant military qualities in Spain and in Africa. He first restored discipline in the Roman camp, then blockaded the town more and more closely, and made the entrance of the harbour inaccessible by a dam. Thus he wore out the winter. Being elected for the next year generalissimo of the Roman forces, he began his undertakings
new in spring; but, like the French at Zaragoza, in our own times, he was obliged to take by storm one part of the town after another, one street after another, with great loss. The town itself became a prey to the flames. The burning of Carthage lasted seventeen days; and, during this whole time, the Roman soldiers plundered the burning houses, and carried off into slavery the unfortunates who attempted to save themselves or any part of their property. All the buildings spared by the flames were pulled down; and Carthage thenceforth remained a heap of ruins.

The new universal empire, which may be said to date from the final subversion of Rome's most active and formidable rival, was of a wholly different nature from those of the Greek or eastern conquerors which had preceded it in the history of the world. The provinces of the Roman empire were not so much incorporated with, as rather one by one annexed to it: they form, in fact, an aggregation of petty states, under wholly different laws, but over which a Roman public personage holds government. The first care of the Romans, when they erected a new province, was to separate the interests of the several parts of the former state, and create party divisions. All those who had previously betrayed their sovereign, or their fellow-citizens, received privileges: if towns, an enlargement of territory; if subjects, an independent existence, or a partial relief, or even an entire exemption from taxes. The loyal and steadfast lost their former privileges, saw Roman farmers of the revenue introduced among them, and obeyed the Roman senator who was sent to them, and the suite by whom the latter was surrounded. Thus, at a later period, were to be found in the provinces, Roman colonies, municipalities, towns of Latin right, free and allied towns, with properly so called subjects beside them. The sole advantage commonly derived from Roman conquest to the conquered nations was an ameliorated legislation or arrangement of the existing laws, but, unfortunately, as we shall see from
the oration against Verres, this advantage was most commonly lost by the mode in which law was administered.

Jurisprudence, and the study of the forms of an artificially constructed constitution, the art of war, the scientific practice of agriculture, and systematic household economy, were the only indigenous sciences of the Romans, a people wholly concerned about material and practical objects. These sciences must so much the more arrive at a high perfection, as military service and civil administration, or use of public affairs for private profit, were the sole pursuits of the higher ranks of society.

Since the moment when the north of Italy, Sicily, Spain, Sardinia, Macedonia, Greece (now denominated Achaia), had become Roman provinces, the whole frame of the state underwent a change. Rome not only became a conquering military state, but it was more and more attempted to transform the constitution from aristocratic to democratic form, in order to be able to use the people for oligarchical ends. The new Roman may be designated as a conquering military state, in contrast with the earlier, which was military, but not conquering. The maintenance of old customs, of the consciousness of manly superiority over neighbours,—glory, not wealth,—was the object of old Rome. The whole state system rested on landed property and agriculture: every one was, indeed, a soldier, but every one was dismissed so soon as the enemy was vanquished, and was obliged again to present himself when a new expedition was begun. In form, indeed, the constitution endured even to later times; but continual military expeditions, and the occupation of the provinces, incessantly demanded new armies. In consequence, the greater part of subordinate officers, and all the privates, became soldiers by trade, who only gave up their occupation when they were located somewhere as colonists; and even then very frequently again abandoned agriculture as too toilsome, sold, or let lie waste their little property, and hastened to the standards anew. As these soldiers were at the same
time citizens, and gave their votes in the town, and as these popular voices, owing to the constantly augmented efficiency of the tribunes, were of necessity highly important to the generals, who also were always at the same time civil functionaries,—they began even at this time to canvass the favour of the army. Then began the attachment of the army, or the citizens who had served in any important campaign, to some individual, with all the evil consequences which this attachment drew after it.

The public wealth of Rome, at this period, may be judged of from the statement of Pliny, that, after the subtraction of all outgoings, 726,000 pounds of gold, and 92,000 pounds of silver in ingots, were to be found in the public treasury; besides, which, also, 775,000 pounds, proceeding from extraordinary branches of revenue, were disposable. Consequently, about this time the burghers became exempt from war-taxes, and all the populace streamed into the town. Easily could the Romans now hold festivals and games which came up to those of the old hierarchical states, easily undertake the construction of edifices and labours like theirs. All the arts of the Grecian world, all the inventions of earlier times, all the sciences, even then did homage to the Romans, and already they understood the art of extorting treasures in all quarters.

Among the edifices and public works undertaken and executed in these times, we would make particular mention of the highways. It must be left undecided whether first the Flaminian and then the Æmilian road were founded, or vice versa. Certain it is, that both these roads were laid down at this period, on the pattern of the Appian Way, but with essential improvements with reference to outward embellishment. The one of these highways led from Rome to Rimini, the other from Rimini to Bologna; and, towards the end of this period, was continued from thence as far as Aquileia. About fourteen years after the first formation of these highways, the Romans began to pave the streets
of their capital with flag-stones, and to lay down excellent roads in every direction round the city. The Romans adopted these improvements from the Carthaginians and their African domains, which, like Holland in former times, and many districts of England at present, resembled a carefully irrigated garden, and to which continued lines of splendid buildings gave every where the aspect of a town. On the origin of paving, Pliny and Isidore give us the information that the Carthaginians first paved with flat stones; that the Romans imitated from them this method, which was thus diffused through all the towns of the then known world. The ways about Rome (viae rustice) were certainly easier to macadamise (for something of the sort was undertaken on them) than the roads of our northern lands, where, in no season of the year, a continuance of good weather can be reckoned upon.

In the subsequent period, none of the directors of public works (the censors) rendered themselves more renowned by their undertakings than M. Porcius Cato, till Gracchus and those who followed his steps, from political motives, sought to surpass whatever had been undertaken at any previous epoch. Cato and his colleagues caused the places within the town, where marsh and standing water were still extant, to be drained; and these hollows, as well as the Aventine Hill, which was still unpaved, to be provided with pavement: they spent about 250,000l. (Dionysius says 1000 talents) on the cleansing of the subterranean channels of the town. Flaccus caused a lofty mound to be carried over the marshes near Terracina (Aquas Neptunias); and a causeway to be formed in this manner where nothing but morass existed previously. He caused a hill near Formiae to be excavated, and the road carried through it. Cato bought two palaces on the market-place at Rome, — that of the Mænian and that of the Tatian family, four large booths and public houses, and built upon the open space thereby acquired for the state that public edifice which was named, after himself, the Ba-
silica Porcia. On this occasion Mænius reserved for himself a columnar interspace of his former family seat, that at the public games his family might retain a prescriptive place.

Already the inventions of luxury were forced into the service of rudeness; and cruelty and murder, for the amusement of the ruling people, came in place of the arts of the muses, which had animated Greece. In the times of which we are treating, gladiatorial games, whether derived from Spain, or whether standing in connection with the sanguinary funeral solemnities and human sacrifices of the Tuscans, came into use in Rome; and, so soon as these were once introduced, to naturalise the Greek drama was altogether out of the question. That portion of the Roman aristocracy which had hoped to smuggle in the legitimate drama, alternately, at least, with scenes of blood and slaughter, the woes of triumph, and the grossness of the other public amusements, was, even in these times, compelled to renounce its purpose, though the whole power of the state was in its hands. As for what concerns the gladiatorial games, Livy calls it an evidence of the veneration of the Spaniards for the noble victor of Hannibal, that, in the combats which he instituted in Spain at the grave of his father and uncle, men of the noblest families had poured out their blood to do him honour. So far as this went not even the sanguinary middle ages. With the knightly combatants, blood and murder were merely fortuitous consequences, not intentional aims for the amusement of the bystanders. The actor in Rome stood in no estimation; his trade was an illiberal one: the noblest end of dramatic representations never entered the heads of ordinary Romans. What could encourage the genius of a poet? With reference to the difference of position of the dramatic artist in Greek and Roman society, Livy remarks, that it was no rare occurrence among the Greeks, for rulers and princes to employ actors in state affairs. The son-in-
law of Gelo, in like manner, had entertained an actor for his confidant. This actor, he goes on to say, was a man of family; for, among the Greeks, no man of good family was ashamed to show himself in public in the character of an artist.

Through the games and distributions to the people, which more and more became matter of custom, not only the populace was corrupted, but the honest countryman also was attracted into the town, where he became, by habits of idleness, lazy and worthless. Part of the Roman nobility, who felt this in a lively manner, tried every means in their power to stem the deluge of corruption; and the struggle between those who insisted on the maintenance of the old national character, and those who aimed at promoting the transition to general cosmopolitan cultivation, imparts peculiar interest to the history of this period.

This struggle, indeed, is outward and political, but it is also internal and spiritual; a struggle of culture against rudeness, of Grecian refinement against barbarian energies. Taking Cato as the representative of the old Roman manner of life, the Sabino-Samnite character, we shall exemplify with most ease the alteration of manners in this period, by exhibiting him in contrast with his opponents. It was not, however, he alone who had undertaken the conflict against the new usages,—a conflict which was also that of the middle class of Roman nobility against the few families which aimed at predominant influence through popular arts and mental cultivation. Valerius Flaccus, a patrician of the old school, and the family and party of Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator, were equally active and powerful with himself; but the times, and the effect of a rapid transition to wealth from poverty, was more powerful than all three together.

If Cato's life be regarded as the life of a mere private man, it offers only acerbity and rigour: it presents, however, a wholly different aspect, if one contemplates him as the representative of the elder Italian popular
character. The whole history of this period turns upon the struggle of the two antagonist principles and their representatives; and the character of the Catonian party offers us many features of the Italian popular character in the oldest times, which strikingly resemble the more modern. Who does not in Cato's vehement bitterness retrace a leading feature of the modern Italian, who is vehement and implacable when his feelings are once irritated? Who knows not that in Italy are most frequently to be found in conjunction, the strange combination of grovelling cupidity and boundless indifference towards external goods? For what regards the first point, we need not, as in other cases, betake ourselves to Plutarch's collection of anecdotes; we can judge of it from Cato's own work on husbandry and household economy (De Re Rustica), the only one of his works which has been preserved, although in a wholly altered garb of diction.

At the very outset of the book on husbandry, he sees nothing to find fault with in a respectable man endeavouring to enrich himself by trade; for profit and gain appear to him an important object of life; only he looks upon the mercantile profession as too hazardous. On the other hand, he reprobates wealth from usury as dishonourable. The mode of life of the ancient Roman nobleman,—how he regulated his house, how he acquired wealth by the use of his property,—can nowhere be learned better than from Cato's short introduction to husbandry, which embraces the whole art of household economy.

If we could enter more into details in this place, we would gladly illustrate Roman economy with reference to buildings, from the book of a man who during his censorship built so well and so cheaply, and the terms of whose contracts drove contractors and speculators to despair; but, for that purpose, we should have to go into technical particulars, and, therefore, hasten rather to features of the old Italian character. To that character belongs a fund of cordial and sincere superstition, and Cato
is by no means lacking in this. We find sympathetic
cures, nay, even *abracadabra* is called in as an auxiliary
in cases where surgical aid is employed at the same time.
Sociability and mirth pushed even to buffoonery, traits of
the old as well as of the modern Italian character, are
ascribed to Cato as well by Plutarch as by Cicero. The
latter says he kept on foot, with equal care, the old cus-
tom on all points, hospitality and neighbourly feeling,
not only amongst the country nobles living around him,
but also, according to good old fashion, between the clients
and patrons, who, in other cases, already began to play
the princes towards their clients. Cicero gives more
precise information on the point of sociality, and the
manner in which Cato revived the old Italian practice of
taking meals in common. The orator makes Cato himself
speak with warmth of feeling of his joyous meals at the
Sabine farm*, where young and old, where every one
who was lively and conversable, where the neighbours
daily, till deep in the night, remained in company with
him; chatted with entire cordiality, chose a president
for the evening, drank with moderation from small
beakers, sat in summer in the cool of the evening, in
winter in the sun, or by the fire.

While we recognise with pleasure, even in Cato’s ge-
genration, the old Sabine discipline in the simplicity of life,
rural employments, sociality and cheerfulness of the
Roman country nobleman, yet we perceive with horror
that the treatment of slaves, even in ancient Italy, and
according to old Roman manners, was still more de-
grading to humanity than in Greece, and can be compared
only to the treatment of negro slaves in modern times.
As Cato bought slaves, like hounds or foals, young, in
order to sell them again when grown up; he treated
them exactly like hounds or foals; used them well, be-
cause they had a money value, but otherwise viewed
them merely as live stock, not as persons. This, however,
we find less surprising, as, even in his warlike under-

* De Senectute, c. xiii.
takings, Cato opposed rigour and cruelty, as genuine Roman policy, to Scipio’s mildness.

His vanity, pushed even to a comic extent, is, in like manner, a trait of the old Roman character, particularly of those men who were necessarily indebted for their first advancement to making their own merits tell; and, above all, of those who resorted to the capital from the country or the municipalities. Let us only remember how far from agreeable, amidst wholly different manners, is this characteristic feature in Cicero’s character.

As for what regards the manners of later times, to which we set the Catonian in opposition, we have shown above, that, up to a certain time, the Romans remained perfectly contented with the knowledge of law and military art; that they founded no province in Italy, consequently had no need of foreign manners and foreign political science. This state of things altered so soon as they came into possession of a Grecian province in Sicily, and into connections with Egypt and Greece. Here they could not carry matters through by open force; certain sciences, as well as arts, became necessary. Thus, for example, mildness, friendliness, gentleness of demeanour, were of more service, even in the most desolating wars, to Marcellus and the younger Scipio, than their bravery and their Roman temper. But only a few were at this time in condition to procure themselves this cultivation: thence, we see it hereditary in certain families; and, unfortunately, public functions also became the private possessions of these families. The men who were formed by this new education must, of necessity, address themselves first to the people, and take every means of courting popularity. The senate, in so far as it consisted of partisans of old Roman usages, was, at the outset, diametrically opposed to them, but could not hinder them treating the other senators as their clients.

In the case of Publius Scipio, one could understand, from his high-toned character, from the services which

* μεγαλαυχίας ὡς υπακολούθησα τις μεγαλαυχίας αὐτοῦ συνιστ.
he rendered to his country, and the gratitude which was due to him, how he won and retained a preponderant influence; but his whole family shared his consideration. To Lucius, the brother of Africanus, who carried on the war against Antiochus, no writer has ascribed even the most ordinary talents; nevertheless, he was suffered to enrich himself and his friends at the expense of the vanquished and the Romans. He was condemned; his goods were partly sold; but this did not prevent him from holding games, at the charge of the Asiatic states, which were amongst the most splendid ever given in Rome. Moreover, the renowned defiance of Publius to his accusers, when, on the anniversary of the victory over Hannibal, he summoned the people to the temples of the gods to render thanks for that victory, instead of defending himself, indicates, indeed, a noble consciousness of high merits; but in this defiance also lurks that feeling of the first men of the Roman state, which we shall henceforth often meet with, namely, that public services confer a right to look upon and use the state as property.

The practical application of this maxim was not, even then, neglected by the leading men of the period. This appears from what we have said above of the oppressions practised, to which we will here add only a few further particulars. In reliance on their relatives and friends, who knew how to prevent enquiry, or, at least, to frustrate its objects, the men of importance took possession at pleasure of the public property (ager publicus) bordering on their possessions, and that in the most fertile as in the most unfruitful regions. They formed thereby, even in these times, the princely estates which swallowed up by degrees the little possessions of the small proprietors, forming, in fact, the flower of the Italian race. Sometimes, indeed, as well with regard to similar abuses as in reference to this, strong measures were taken; but we shall presently see that these were of little avail, and that, so early as the epoch of the demolition of Carthage, the depopulation of Italy had reached
a dreadful extent through the use of the land for the purposes and profits of the great families, as well as through its cultivation by slaves. Equally vain with the measures and arrangements of the senate against the _latifundia_, or counties and principalities, as we should call them, which were acquired by degrees by the leading senators, were the exertions of a Cato, Fabius, Flaccus, and their friends, to check the oppressions exercised in the provinces, by means of indefatigable judicial accusations, as well as of their own better example. What availed it that Cato studiously exercised in Sardinia the moderation of old times, when no one followed his example? Livy himself confesses, how smoothly soever he knows how to dress it in words, and turn it to the renown of his hero, that the elder Scipio was not disinclined to the courtly manners and polished Grecian flattery, the reigning tone of this corrupt age, the refined exterior veiling inward rudeness or corruption.

In this point, also, Cato discerned, with perfect justness, a commencement of the coming dissolution. The meanness of the minor Asiatic kings and princes, who styled themselves freedmen of the Roman people, and were not ashamed publicly to appear as such in the eyes of their own subjects, who came to Rome, and applied every art of seduction, every talent of social intercourse, and the most refined corruption, to lead astray the most important personages, appeared to him even equal to the power of Carthage in mischief. He at length procured a law to be passed against all royal visits to Rome, in order at least to fence off from the Romans the immediate action of courtly manners and Asiatic corruption.

Through the manner in which even the most illustrious Romans now availed themselves of the people against the senate, as well as of the senate against the people, when their interest required it, the people itself, and along with the people its tribunes, acquired an importance which they had previously never possessed. They would even then have been more powerful than
the consuls, if they had not been too numerous to be easily united in one plan. Already, before this period, in the struggle between the consuls, not in the popular assembly alone, but in the senate itself, where originally they had hardly a place, far less a decisive influence, we find the tribunes as judges of the allotment of the provinces. Who can wonder, under such circumstances, to see the abuses arise which gave occasion to the Gracchic commotions?

It was said with perfect truth by Cato that the Roman people of his time resembled a flock of sheep all following the bell-wether, and that the mass of the people was a hungry horde, which gave such laws as were best fitted for the belly. He openly reproached the people with constantly calling the same persons to offices of honour, and thereby making masters for themselves. He maintained, with justice, that a republic like the Roman could not exist so soon as a precious fish should be valued at a higher rate than a ploughing ox. If we scrutinise Cato's acts and regulations during the term of his office, it is true that much which he did proceeded from that pugnacious bitterness which must be contracted by a man engaged in constant strife and inflictions: as, for example, that he took away his horse from L. Scipio, and expelled Manlius from the senate for kissing his wife at a wrong time. But most of his acts indicate a man who aimed, by every method, at keeping up the yielding Roman spirit and tone of sentiment. Luxury had made such rapid advances, that Cato, rigid as he was, must have felt the entire restoration of the old order wholly out of the question. How willingly soever he would have effected that restoration, he could only aim at imposing restraints, and that was what he did aim at.

The principal cause of decay in morals and discipline was unfelt even by Cato himself: even he had no perception of that which alone could save the state;

* Plut. Cat. Maj. c. 8. "Καθώς μια κατι, α πολιτις περι γαρηκα λαθαν ειτα μικ οχίσως."
namely, the increase of the free population of Italy, and diminution in the number of slaves.

So early as the middle of the second Punic war, the poorer burghers and middle class were so oppressed by war-taxes, that the great had full opportunity of purchasing many estates for themselves, and incorporating them with their previous possessions. This impoverishment of the lower and middle classes of the Italian burghers in the interminable wars, whereby the great and leading personages became enormously wealthy and all-powerful, as well as the attractions offered to emigrants to Rome by exemption from imposts and distributions of victuals, induced even then the burghers of the municipal towns to repair to Rome, in order there to creep into the lists of citizens, and caused them to be compulsorily recalled by their fellow-townsmen, as those who remained must necessarily sink under the municipal burdens if one after the other should withdraw themselves from them. This occasioned in after-years the rigorous measures, the consequence of which was the so-called Social War. Whole tracts of land were desolated, not only by the direct devastations practised by the enemy, whereby the country people were forced, through want of slaves and cattle, and also because the buildings were partly ruined, to give up agriculture, and emigrate to Rome, but more especially by the merciless proceedings of the senate against all who, during the war, had been chargeable with faults of any description.

Exactly in proportion to the decrease in the number of free citizens, was augmented the number and motley mixture of slaves; among whom, so early as the close of this period, were to be found people of all nations, of all ranks, of all possible abilities and acquirements. How they were viewed and treated we have mentioned above, where we indicated the leading error of Cato. We have shown that he treated slaves worse than we are accustomed to treat horses, which many a kind-hearted man continues to feed in their old age; while
Cato, on the other hand, used a slave so long as his strength lasted, but then sold him, in order, as he expressed himself, that he might not need to fodder him any longer. We must not, indeed, imagine, that, so early as this period, any Roman grandee was possessed of the enormous number of slaves which, according to Petronius and Pliny, were afterwards kept; but we, nevertheless, find all the essential disadvantages of the increase of slaves, in Plautus, ascribed in common to the Romans and Greeks. Plautus's Casina gives us a good image of the base ingredients brought into all the relations of life by the slave system. As in the Casina the increase of slaves, and its consequences, are shown; so, in the Bacchides, particularly in the third scene of the third act, in a dialogue between Lydus, Philoxenus, and Mnesilochus, the old Roman education is contrasted with the new one, as the old and new Athenian education are contrasted in the Clouds of Aristophanes. In the perusal of the whole piece, one is struck, even to shuddering, at the perverse mode of intrusting to a slave the discipline and education of sons. What sort of a generation must form itself, in this manner, among the aristocracy, and among the rich of the following times, when the relations between the superintendant and those consigned to his charge were such as are depicted in this piece! It must, however, already have been so in these times; and here, too, Cato seized the right point of view, and vigorously set his face against the abuses of a time which sacrificed moral and physical strength to intellectual accomplishment. Cato suffered no slave near the person of his son; he taught him what he could himself, and preferred no surveillance at all to that of a man for whom his son could feel no respect. So early as these times, domestic concerns and those of husbandry were transacted by particular descriptions of slaves, and the servants of wealthy houses were so numerous that it was necessary to place the atriienses, as a sort of overseers or housekeepers, over a vast number of slaves. We find one set of
slaves appropriated to sweeping cobwebs off the columns, another to cleaning the metal largely employed on doors and walls among the ancients. Henceforward the young Roman would necessarily learn cruelty and contempt for human nature among a herd of menials only kept in order by inhuman punishments, in that house where of yore the sons of clients had formed his youthful society, and where, even in riper years, the slave had continued the comrade of his labours.

Since Roman individuals and families had possessed themselves of enormous estates, immense wealth, and armies of slaves, the constitution and nature of the state were totally altered. Debts and usury ground down the inhabitants of the towns; imposts and the revenue farmers, the provinces.

If we consider what Cato says, in the very outset of his work upon husbandry, of the insecurity of Roman mercantile dealings, and how he himself, instead of driving any reputable trade, carried on the meanest description of usury under borrowed names, we shall easily understand the high rate of interest, the numerous laws against usury, and the mischievous effects of them. In the first times of the republic, it was notoriously the debtor laws, usury, and the rigour of usurers in high stations, which drove the people to despair. After the establishment of tribunes, and mitigation of the rigorous laws of debtors, we hear, indeed, for some time, nothing about usury, and the misery arising from it; but at the period when the plundered wealth of the world flowed together by degrees into Rome, the want of ready money pinched anew whole classes of citizens. So early as the era of the war with Antiochus, a device had been invented in Rome for evading the penal inflictions against usury, consistently with suing for and collecting the amount of debts. The Roman who lent money at interest, concealed himself under the name of a Latin, who was not bound by the laws which obliged the Roman citizen. In this manner
the practice of usury again reached such a pitch, that it was deemed necessary to take general measures against it. But these measures were rendered more than ordinarily difficult, by the impossibility of knowing the extent of the evil. The tribunes, therefore, carried through an ordinance, according to which all allies who had lent money to a Roman citizen should announce themselves; and a term should be appointed, after the lapse of which every one who lent money, if prosecuted, should be free to choose whether he would be judged according to Roman laws or those of the allies. The amount of the debts, however, was found, on enquiry, to be so enormous, that the senate, through the tribune Sempronius, caused the proposition to be brought before the people, and to be passed into a law, that all allies, and the Latins in particular, should have no other law with regard to Roman citizens, in matters of debt, than the Romans had with regard to one another. In the comedies of Plautus, we find that which the laws prohibited proclaimed from the stage as an open and allowable branch of traffic. In a passage in Curculio, where Plautus enumerates all the trades which were driven in Rome without being exactly reckoned honourable, and states the places where those who carried them on were to be found, he says that the usurers took their seats by the old booths. In another place he speaks of people who lent money by single days, and caused to be paid to them daily a denarius of interest for a mina of Grecian money.

The provinces must next feel the effects of debt and usury, just as they, also, alone felt the pressure of duties and revenue farmers, while the rabble of the town was freed from imposts, and fed in idleness. How cunningly this was set agoing appears on occasion of the burdensome salt-tax, the augmentation of which was carried through by the censor Livius (the same who had vanquished Hasdrubal on the Metaurus), for which he received the nickname Salinator from the people. Livius aimed at drawing a larger revenue from the salt-duty
than that which the state had hitherto been in receipt of, while that article, in all Italy, cost the sixth part of an as (sextans). Since, however, he durst not offend the town population by a rise on a prime necessary of life, he contrived that in Rome salt should retain its ordinary price, but in villages and places of small size should be sold dearer, and dearest of all in places uninhabited by Roman citizens. It is easy to see what oppressions must be produced by such inequality within the bounds of one and the same state; what arbitrary acts on the part of the revenue farmers.

The unfortunate system of handing over the collection of the taxes to individuals, nay, even whole classes of men of consequence, in return for a round sum, even then occasioned the most crying iniquities. Of this we shall cite a few particular instances. So early as the middle of the second Punic war, when the Roman T. Pomponius Veientanus, general of the allied troops, was taken prisoner, and the army cut to pieces by Hannibal, Livy says that the man was no great loss, as he was the cause of the imprudent commencement of the conflict, and had formerly been farmer of the revenue. As such, he had known and practised all the base arts which are exercised in political transactions; and, besides, all the faithlessness and treachery which the trading companies of farmers of the revenue were wont to exercise. Contemporary with this Pomponius shone a certain Posthumius, who was not ashamed to perpetrate towards his native state, in extreme emergency, a fraud in our days customary with none but the most abandoned class of traders and seamen, against assurance companies. Posthumius, and the knights of his trading partnership, undertook the delivery of military stores, but first obtained public guarantees that such commodities as were shipped and lost at sea, should be made good from the public treasury. Thereupon they freighted vessels with articles of no value, appraised them at a high amount, and caused them to be sunk at sea. The scheme was detected, and two tribunes proposed the imposition of a
money fine on Posthumius; but were not able to carry it through. First of all, a tribune, nearly related to the delinquent, impudently opposed himself to the motion; and no sooner was his veto set aside, than the trading company resorted to open violence. The farmers of the revenue, and their friends, while the people were voting, arrayed themselves in regular line of battle against the other citizens, and would have commenced a conflict, had not the consul closed the assembly.* At last, indeed, the senate interfered. Posthumius and the other leading authors of the fraud and revolt were forced to quit the city; but a thousand times for one the interest of the senate was identified with that of the equestrian order, who formed the bulk of capitalists. At the epoch of the second Macedonian war, abuses in farming of the revenue had already reached such a pitch, that the government was wholly at a loss for means to protect the provinces where once the knights and their satellites had fixed themselves, from their depredations. Livy, in informing us that the senate, on dividing into four parts the kingdom of Macedonia, conferred on these a republican constitution, and forbade the use of all their mines and domains, expressly declares, with reference to this point, that the Roman public revenues could not be administered without the aid of farmers of the revenue; but that, wherever a revenue farmer made his appearance, there the rights guaranteed to friendly states (jus publicum) and the liberties bestowed on them, became a mere shadow.

If, however, the Roman state, even at this time, was suffering from the wounds of which it finally bled to death, yet the two principal props of the state, the credit of the senate, and religion, or if the phrase be preferred, the superstitious dread of the gods entertained by the multitude, and the skill of the state functionaries in making use of that dread, remained still unimpaired and immovable. In this respect the want of mental activity among the Romans, and the slight share of the lower

* Liv. lib. xxi. c. i.
classes in the culture of the higher, for once shows itself in a point of view advantageous to political life; for it is remarkable how long the priestly mummeries, which were soon exploded in Athens, could be carried on in Rome. In order to show how closely, in the period which we are treating of, religion and worship still stood in connection with the state, and how thoroughly the political use of devotion was understood by the senate, we may refer to its proceedings on occasion of the war with Antiochus, when it enacted the same comedy with the priesthood of the Feciales, which already it had rehearsed at the commencement of the war with Pyrrhus, and, by virtue of a decree of the senate, caused it to be formally asked, whether a declaration of war must be made to king Antiochus himself, or whether it was enough to give notice of the commencement of hostilities at the advanced posts; whether, in this case, any special announcement of hostilities must be made to the Ætolians? Whether peace and alliance must not first be renounced with the latter, before war was commenced with them? It is easy to see that the senate would gladly commence the war by surprise, evade the customary delays, and yet avoid having the general voice against them. The Feciales helped them out with an approving judgment, and all was in order.

However strictly religion bound the individual, it was yet subjected to the senate and the people; since, in case of disputes on the usages or rights of the different priests and religious functionaries towards each other, no priestly tribunal, but the people, pronounced in the last resort. One of the most remarkable contentions of this nature, in which praetor and senate were forced to encounter a pious fraud with a pious fraud, is related to us in different ways by Livy and by Pliny. One of the Roman law officers (scriba), pretended to have found two stone coffins under the Janiculum, with an inscription according to which the one coffin purported to contain the corpse of king Numa; the other, books he was stated to have written. The one
proved to be empty; in the other were found seven 
Latin scrolls concerning the right of the superior priests, 
seven others, composed in Greek, contained a sort of 
philosophy, such as Numa might have very well held. 
When the pretor learned that these books became dif-
fused, and much read, he begged for an inspection of 
them. Even the tables of contents of the books and 
chapters proved to him that the reading of these 
books must be destructive to the whole of the estab-
lished ceremonial. He, therefore, declared he must burn 
them, but that he freely permitted the finder to try 
every possible means for their preservation. The latter 
made application to the tribunes, who, however, ab-
tained from bringing the affair before the people. They 
referred him to the senate; and that body resolved, 
solely on the conscientious oath of the pretor, that the 
perusal, nay, the existence, of the books would be ex-
tremely pernicious; that the books should be burned; 
but that the finder should receive in compensation a sum 
of money, such as the pretor and tribunes should award 
to him. The finder rejected the money with disdain; a 
regular auto-da-fé was made of his books, in which the 
sacrificial slaves performed the same functions as in later 
times were committed to the hangman on works of a dan-
gerous nature. But how skilfully, even in these times, 
the men who, according to Roman usage, combined the 
priestly character, in their own persons, with the highest 
civil dignities and functions, provided for the main-
tenance of formalities, in order to rivet in men's minds 
reverence for the gods, appears from the example of 
Publius Scipio. During the march against Antiochus, 
his whole army to halt, and himself remained 
behind in Europe, in reality because he had heard of 
the embassy of Antiochus, and formed the design to 
wait for it; but he gladly used this opportunity to call into 
remembrance the observance an of old Roman sacrifice. 
Scipio, it seems, was one of the Salians. In the begin-
ning of March was the festival and dance of the Ancilia, 
when the god of war was honoured with a general feast
of peace.* In the same manner, Cicero makes Lælius give himself credit that he coped, by aid of superstition itself, with a proposition regarding religious ceremonies, which could not but be particularly agreeable to the people.† It is evident that, in matters of religion, the oligarchical party, which in other respects favoured all innovations, saw much farther even than a Fabius Maximus, who, according to Cicero, did not even scruple to declare quite openly, that the auguries and auspices were mere political engines.

In like manner, as religion, with all its establishments and regulations, stood fast as yet among the Romans, and had an effect upon the people widely different from that which the corrupt Grecian worship had about the same time upon the Greeks, so the tone of Italian manners was, beyond comparison, better. Especially great appear the Romans and Italians in the unity of their sentiments and strivings against foreign influence; and their military rudeness shows in the most advantageous light, when we compare it with the base and grovelling temper of the Greeks, with their enmities and envies amongst one another, and their readiness to sell country and friends to the highest bidder, or to offer them up to their petty passions and grovelling desires. Of the Athenians, Polybius says expressly, that, so soon as they had nothing more to fear from the Macedonian kings, and were placed in the enjoyment of a secure peace, they were wholly under the guidance of their demagogues, and troubled themselves not at all about the general interests of Greece. They adapted themselves entirely, he says, to the will of those who stood at their head, and acted the part of the most con-

* "Principio nium promtos ad bella Quirites
Molliri placuit jure, detmque metu.
Inde daret leges; ne firmior omnia posset,
Captaque sunt pura tradita sacra coli.
Exuitur feritas, armisque potentius sequum,
Et cum cive pudet consensisse manus.
Atque aliquis, modo trux visá jam vertitur ará

† De Amicitia, c. 25.
temptible flatterers towards all kings, especially the Ptolemies. * No description of popular decrees, he adds, no sort of public proclamations, were too bad to be issued by them; for the men who stood at the head of their affairs had lost all shame. The same meanness which Polybius objects to them towards the most wretched rulers, they also exhibited towards the Romans, and even in view of all Greece. When Quinctius Flamininus had conquered Philip, and destroyed the Grecian freedom by the severance of all connection between the individual states, it was the Athenian ambassador who, in the great assembly near Corinth, surpassed all the other delegates in his creeping adulation. He not only thanked the Romans as extravagantly as possible; he not only extolled their merits towards Greece; but had the meanness to accuse of evil intentions those who dared to express themselves freely; and to forward, through the tenour of his discourse, the plans of the Romans, who aimed at subjecting Greece without exciting disturbance. "The great merits of the Romans," exclaims the wretched flatterer, "are detracted from by some among us; even what they mean to do is made matter of calumny, and that by people who had cause humbly to give thanks for the favour which the Romans had shown them." The Ætolian ambassador, who was as far, indeed, as the other from consulting the true interest of Greece, justly expatiated, in open assembly, on the depth to which Athens had sunk; that her citizens, once the founders and leaders of Greek freedom, were the same who, through their despicable flattery, for the sake of procuring petty advantages for their town, betrayed the freedom of all. † The Achaean strategus rose next, to abuse the preceding speaker terribly. How truly great Rome appears on the other hand — how superior in council as in force. The ensuing subjugation of Greece will not astonish any one who does but weigh the import of this single scene.

† Liv. I. xxxiv. c. 23.
In the first period of Roman history, terminating with the first Punic war, we made only general remarks on the intellectual progress of the people, as, in default of a complete literature coming down to us from this period, we should dread being reduced to give conjectures in lieu of history. We closed our observations with regrets at the loss of the relics of old Italian language and cultivation, and fitly, therefore, commence with the first dawning of the new illumination derived from the Greeks, which, since the subjection of Magna Græcia, but especially since the cession of the Carthaginian districts of Sicily, became a fashion in Rome, and on many accounts a necessary accomplishment of the statesman. The great world took part, though with some illustrious exceptions, in the Grecian artificial mode of life, and, in defiance of all upbraidings from those who still adhered to ancient usage, the Roman grandees, to whose protection entire Grecian towns and states already had betaken themselves, took into their houses and suite the most eminent Grecian artists and poets.

Clearly, therefore, the mental cultivation which the Romans received came to them from without, as a necessity of political life, as luxury and amusement, not as the natural result of any progressive social development. It was protégés, anxious to recommend themselves, that first diffused it: it was the little circle of educated aristocrats, that took up a matter which it regarded as its own cause, but which never became the cause of the nation. This must never be left out of sight in the study of Roman writers, if one wishes to avoid the danger of critical obliquity.
When the Greeks and their closest followers, an Ennius and others, exerted themselves to recommend the Grecian culture to their patrons, they made the first experiment with poetry. It would have been difficult to find favour for Greek philosophy with the Romans, whose sound manly understanding and sternly practical policy had raised them to the power which they now possessed. The Greek political science they then needed not, because their constitution had at length acquired a full development, and, during the protracted contentions between theburghers and nobility, a practical political wisdom had penetrated all classes, which instinctively worked better, and produced fairer fruits, than the Grecian wisdom had procured to any Grecian state. Civil law, judicial administration, religious rites, were matters of immemorial tradition, brought with them from their original abodes by the patricians, and for a long period guarded as a profound mystery. In these points, therefore, no Grecian instruction was available.

Nothing was left, except to bring into vogue the portion of literature ministering to entertainment. The men who wished to introduce amongst the Romans a taste for Greek literature, endeavoured to make themselves popular as poets in the Grecian taste; and in this succeeded, as we shall see, in so far as they acquired renown, and consideration among particular families. Their intrinsic merits were either very small, or the Italian national poetry, which was driven into oblivion through their means, was very indifferent. It almost seems as if Cicero were jesting, when he notes with perfect seriousness the tardy growth of Roman poetry, by saying that the Greeks had their earliest poet, Homer, so early as several hundred years before the building of Rome; the Romans the first of theirs, Livius, not till 510 years after that era.

Nævius, though of his labours, also, we have only fragments, is, for one reason, more important than Livius towards elucidating the nature and direction of Roman culture. He ventured the experiment of applying him-
self, not to the patrons of poor poets and Greeks who crowded to their tables, but to the people; and of making comedy, the models of which he borrowed from the Greeks, in the manner of Aristophanes, truly popular, by making it political. He brought on the stage the Scipios, Metellus, and other men of the first rank who abused their political influence, and thereby rendered himself and his pieces agreeable to the people. Unfortunately, however, he was one of those persons of no consequence, who, in Rome, did not stand under the safeguard of the laws, but under the commission of three, which presided over the execution of criminal judgments, and exercised a summary jurisdiction on insignificant persons such as Nævius. They found him guilty of ridiculing persons of respectability, and threw him into a dungeon, where he lay in a dreadful state of durance, till the tribunes of the people found two pieces which he had written in prison adapted to their purposes, and procured his liberation. One would almost believe that his poetical history of the first war with Carthage likewise contained sarcastic passages, for he was afterwards banished from the city, and died in Utica. It may easily be imagined, that after such an experiment, no one indulged the idea of becoming a popular poet, or of applying their abilities to any other employment than such as might be entertaining or flattering to the ruling class, which did not exactly coincide with what suited the people, or was fitted to awake in it the taste or impulse towards Grecian culture.

Of all using the Latin language, who busied themselves in these times with the literature of Greece, and sought to naturalise it in Rome, none have become more celebrated than Ennius, because he went diametrically the opposite way to that which had been taken by Nævius, and in this way arrived at the goal of competence and consideration. In the mean time, while we leave to learned philologists the more exact investigation of Ennius's merits with regard to Roman language and literature, we delineate him here only so far as he
presents himself in the light of an historical person, in intercourse with the most distinguished Romans, and adapts his labours more or less to these outward relations. If we may believe Silius Italicus, he recommended himself first to the leading families in Rome, as an admirable proficient in the Oscan tongue, and a warrior. Afterwards he taught the Oscan and Greek language in Rome, especially pointed out the internal connection of the three languages, and proved, to the influential Romans, with whom the entire command of their own language was a paramount object, that, without knowledge of the two other languages, a thorough learning of the Latin was impossible. Of this, even Cato allowed himself to receive conviction from Ennius, as the younger Scipio afterwards from Lucilius. That Cato, the sworn enemy of all Grecian culture, who spurned from him all manner of acquaintance with the language of fashion, so long as it appeared to him only as such, was drawn even in his old age to the study of Greek, Cicero, the admirer of Ennius, justly entitles his highest triumph — for, that he won over the Scipios will appear to us less striking, inasmuch as he wrote a heroic poem, of which this family was the subject. According to Horace, the cunning Lucilius imitated the example of Ennius, and the scholiast adds, that, as Ennius praised heroic deeds, so he the moral virtues of the high families. This, at a time when not as yet a tribe of hungry poets, as in Mecænas's days, drove a trade of versification, would infallibly make the fortune of a poem.

It is manifest, if one only considers the manner in which Ennius is cited and used by all later Roman authors, that by dint of his labours, and those of his friends, by example of a Marcellus, Flamininus, and the Scipios, but, above all, by the conversion of Cato, the tone of mind in Rome was completely changed; and the craving for Greek culture became generally predominant. Meanwhile, the result was the same which in France, and even more in Germany, took place in the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth century; the nation
itself took absolutely no part in the efforts which occasioned such agitation in the ruling houses, or families distinguished by birth and station.

Roman annals in verse, which were calculated for those by whom Ennius was patronised, appear not to have pleased the people particularly well; however, the historical field found many labourers in a generation so fertile in occurrences. Critical spirit, vigour, freedom from prejudice, are not, indeed, to be looked for. Cato's historical work, which embraced the early Italian history, discovered an energetic and investigating mind. The rest, of whom we will here name only a few, appear narrow and exaggerated in the single views and narratives which are cited of them by Polybius. The most eminent, at least the most renowned amongst them, is the senator Fabius Pictor, who wrote during the second Punic war, and would consequently pass for the best evidence concerning the events of that war, had not Polybius placed us in a condition to form an altogether different judgment of him. He cites a passage from Fabius, elucidates it, and then proceeds:—"But why do I adduce such a history as that of Fabius? Not as though I believed that any one could be misled by the efforts of which I have just given an example; for the absurdity will be discerned, at the first glance, by any one who takes the book into his hands, even without any examination. I only wished to show those who may happen to read the books of Fabius, what manner of man they have before them, that they may not merely regard the name of the writer, but the nature of the things themselves. In the scrutiny of historical accounts, many pay attention, not to the subject, but to the annalist, and allow themselves to be misled by the circumstance, that the author of the annals was a member of the senate, and contemporary of the events of which he wrote the history: they accordingly believe that whatever he says must be strictly true."

Marcus Acilius Glabrio, like Cato, who attended
him as lieutenant in the war against Antiochus, wrote
Roman chronicles, but in Greek, from which Claudius
Quadrigarius translated them into Latin; but they were
full of strange stories, such as those of Valerius Antias
and Piso. The national features, however, which we
are here tracing, continually more and more receded;
and Roman civilisation, instead of being progressively
diffused among the people, became ever more the pro-
erty of certain circles and societies in the high world.
This may be best exemplified in the history of the
drama.

The Roman stage became in a manner merely an en-
joyment, procured to themselves, through the medium
of readers, by the circles who monopolised that tone and
that refinement which were aimed at by the composers
of the pieces. Public representation, at last, was quite
out of the question. Between Plautus and Terence, in
the order of time, there lies only an interval of a few
years; but the contrast of their manner and their diction
is so immense, that one might imagine a whole century
lay betwixt them. In this interval the great mass of the
people had sunk from rusticsimplicity to barbarous
rudeness, through incessant wars, through the bloody
gladiatorial games, and baiting of wild beasts; and the
small accomplished body into whose hands the conduct
of the state came by degrees, had received so high a
culture from Greek teachers and Greek intercourse, that
it deemed itself very frequently obliged to make use of
the Greek language, because it could find no Roman
expression for its new ideas.

Plautus very well understood the course which he
must take, if he meant to make his comedy a popular
amusement, in the strict and proper sense of the word.
He openly expresses approbation of Nævius, for having
entered on the path already indicated; but gives it at
the same time to be clearly understood, that the destiny
of that poet floats before his eyes; and, therefore, seeks
to entertain the Roman public in a manner less dan-
gerous to himself. He, indeed, took his pieces from
the Greek; he, also, in the whole of them, retained Grecian manners and characters; but since he sold these pieces to the sëdiles for the popular festivals, he was also forced, in some degree, to adapt them to the popular taste. Thence the coarse jests that he is blamed for; thence the plays on words, double meanings, and obscenities. But from thence also precisely it arises, that he transmutes Grecian manners and allusions, on fit occasions, into Roman ones; and, from the midst of the real life around him, brings to light the weak points of manners, men, and customs, without exactly giving personal offence to any one. With regard to the number of pieces which he wrote, much uncertainty, it is well known, prevailed even so early as Gellius; and Varro recognised only one and twenty as indisputably genuine, of which twenty have been preserved. Ælius Verus received as genuine five and twenty. As Plautus's pieces present, in general, neither Roman manners nor characters; as his genuine humour and true talent were only employed in modelling Greek originals for the Roman stage; we can use neither his pieces, nor those of Terence, in illustration of Roman life and intercourse.

Though the main strength of Plautus lay in delineation of character, yet he nevertheless eschewed Menander as too refined for the Roman public: he selected Diphilus and Philemon, and inserted into their pieces, from which he took his materials, much additional vigour and raciness from the old comedy, or at least after its manner. The wit and diction are right Roman, and peculiarly Plautus's own; both are admired by a Cicero and a Cæsar. The life which he paints, with the exception of the individual traits above alluded to, which he inserts from Roman life, is entirely that of the later corrupt Grecian era. We will go into only a few details, in order to make this evident. In the Bacchides, the whole piece describes a pair of trumpets, who end at last by turning the head of even the old father. A trick which, in our times, would bring
a servant to the hulks, forms the nodus; and either
the Bacchis or the chorus (grex) says, at the end,
that the piece was no worse than daily life; it being
quite an ordinary occurrence for fathers to run after
the same girls who were visited by the sons in brothels.
The same thing recurs in the Asinaria, a piece belong-
ing wholly to Diphilus, and quite worthy of the world
in which Diphilus lived. A father lets himself be
squeezed out of money, in order to pass a night with his
son's paramour, and is dragged by the lawful wife,
amidst threats and scoldings, from the haunts where he
is drinking and diverting himself with the son; lastly,
a criminal fraud of the domestic slave is represented
on the public stage as a circumstance of common life.
Verily Romans, in whom there was still a spark of
the old fire, could not possibly contract a taste for
science and poetry which came to them recommended
after this fashion.

What a tissue of indecencies is depicted in the Ca-
sina! Most of the scenes of this piece might be wit-
tnessed daily in the Syrian towns, in Athens, or Alex-
andria; but matters had not yet gone so far in Rome.
In truth, says Plautus, or whoever else may be author
of the prologue, in one respect the Roman manners are
still far beneath the Greek and African: in Greece, in
Carthage, even in Apulia, the marriages of slaves are
declared legal; but in Rome, slaves are left to couple
like mere brutes. Just at the end of the prologue is
exhibited another shameful practice of the Greeks; that,
namely, of bringing on the stage public women as mute
personages, and commending them in this way to the
audience, as is here done in so many words.

In the short interval between Plautus and Terence,
the great Roman houses had more and more assumed
the character of princely or ruling families; the Scipios,
Metellus, Appius, and others, in the town and in their
country houses, formed a court around themselves. All
the arts and sciences were exercised by slaves in such
houses; all departments of service had their appropriate class of functionaries. In this manner, the upper ranks became highly accomplished through those about them; through their manner of life, and even through their ordinary business, their tone became refined in the same degree as the people retrograded, because its literature was totally neglected; while the Greek could be acquired only in great houses, or by a very long and very troublesome process. It was, therefore, of necessity, that the Greek drama was driven into the halls of those in high station. The fine tone of Terence could not be understood in the din of the multitude; and he has no right to complain, as he does, that the people desert him, because they had rather see sanguinary conflicts than a regular piece, whose refinements were beyond their comprehension. The Roman aristocracy did not even desire seriously to inspire theatrical taste into the people. Spectacles of cruel triumph; exhibitions of wailing lords and princes, who went behind the car of the generals; thousands of unfortunate captives; interminable lines of treasure-waggons, and slaves who carried the world’s spoil, in crowded procession; wild-beast batings; conflicts of gladiators, served a much better purpose to the ambitious, in whose view the people was but a machine, and war and its fruits a medium of advancement, than the arts of the Muses. The fine world, on the other hand, caused to be read to them the comedies of Terence, who took from Menander the half comic, half serious tone of morals; and learned the refinements of the Roman language from Scipio, Lælius, and their friends, who even took active part in the production of these pieces.

Terence almost servilely translated Menander and Apollodorus; from them, in a manner exclusively, he took the plot of his pieces. This sufficiently shows that he did not count on the mass of the Roman people,—wherefore, also, he is wrong to complain of deficiency of sympathy in that quarter. Of the ease of his expression, of the grammatical correctness of his diction, we have
not here to treat; it is enough for us to have indicated, that neither he, nor, after him, Pacuvius, Attius, nor Cæcilius, succeeded in giving the drama a national character, however they might be patronised by the educated Romans, especially in the higher and more refined circles.

In the unaccustomed form of an imperfect democracy, which was gradually assumed by the Roman commonwealth, rhetoric and dialectics were quite indispensable studies. This was discovered speedily: accordingly, so soon as it was perceived how much the Greeks were before the Italians in rhetoric and dialectics; how useful they might be made as instructors and models; how intimately philosophical is connected with rhetorical culture, a zeal entirely new sprung up for Grecian culture in this department, and for its transplantation to Roman soil. Direct utility, the enjoyments and the honours of public life, calculation of interest, daily and nightly occupied the Roman. To him, therefore, as to the Frenchman, the form of expression, the melody and cadence of language, must be vastly more important than to nations in which an inward life has grown along with the outward.

The first Greek rhetorician who gave regular lectures in Rome was Crates, who came in the suite of Attalus, ambassador from Pergamus. Crates was detained in Rome by the breaking of a leg, and commenced, for pastime, a course of lectures (ακροασις). Ennius was just then dead. The lectures of Crates aroused such attention, and attracted such a concourse, that Cato, who had already begun to perceive what he afterwards (his Roman dispositions notwithstanding) adopted as a principle, that agriculture was not exactly a lucrative pursuit, and was accordingly looking about him for other sources of emolument, employed his cherished slave, Chilo, to keep a sort of trivial school; or, if the phrase be preferred, a gymnasium for Greek grammar and rhetoric. About this time, two Roman knights also appear as public teachers; and this proves, more
than any thing else, a total change in the relation in which active life stood to the new studies. Ælius Lanuvinus and Servius Claudius held it nowise prejudicial to their honour to come forward in the character of public teachers; and this fell out at the time when the crafty Athenians impressed, by the selection of the ambassadors whom they sent to Rome, on the senators and the whole aristocracy, quite a new idea of the utility of that Grecian wisdom, hitherto viewed merely in the light of amusement and luxury.

The only account extant of this embassy is in Plutarch’s life of Cato, and in Gellius, so that doubt even hangs about the persons of the envoys. It is on all hands agreed that the choice had fallen on the heads of the philosophical schools, from which the orators and statesmen of Greece at that time commonly went forth. Three considerable schools existed then in Athens, for persons who devoted themselves to public affairs and life in the world; and the most celebrated speakers of their age presided in all three. Carneades conducted the Platonic school, the Academy, which had now become a school for embuing people of the world with an eloquence and philosophy such as are suited to the world. Aristotle’s school had, from its first foundation, been practical, and rhetoric and dialectics were practised by the Peripatetics with equal zeal, after their master’s example, as the natural sciences. Critolaus stood at their head. Dialectics were made by the Stoics the main branch of their study, and their eloquence was fitted to their philosophy; their aim was condensed energy. At their head stood Diogenes, known by the name of the Babylonian, because he was born at Seleucia, on the Tigris. Even before these three had obtained audience in the senate, the Romans flocked around them to learn how different from Roman was the character of Grecian eloquence. The philosophers, particularly Carneades, as before them Polus and Gorgias, in Athens, invited the dictation of a subject of discourse; and Carneades showed equal adroit-
ness one day in inculcating the exercise of strict justice, as another, in taking ordinary worldly wisdom under his patronage. Acilius Glabrio, who further proved his preference for the Greek language by composing his annals in Greek, was their interpreter in the senate; and the attention which was excited by the new wisdom and eloquence was so great, that Cato pressed for the dismissal, with all possible speed, of so dangerous an embassy, and expressed himself willing rather, without more ado, to grant their petition, than to abandon the Roman youth to further temptation.

This avidity for Grecian accomplishments will occasion less surprise, if it be called to mind that 1000 Greeks, of the most distinguished families, who had enjoyed the philosophical and rhetorical culture of their times, were at that time distributed as hostages through the most respectable families of Rome; that Polybius was one of their number, and that Panætius, whom Scipio so frequently mentions, had an equally distinguished place in the family of the Scipios. However, it cost pains to force the novelty into adoption; for the old Crassus, as censor, declared publicly, that a Grecian school of eloquence, for and against a cause, was a school of impudence. Nevertheless, instruction in eloquence proved a lucrative trade in the city, where rhetoricians multiplied, so that those who cherished old Roman sentiments, scarcely six years after the above-mentioned embassy, caused to be passed by the senate a police-regulation against the rhetoricians, the execution of which was entrusted to the prætor.* The result was, that eloquence began to take the shape of an art, and that, after the dry annals of a Fabius Pictor, Cato, Piso, Fannius, Vennonius, — Antipater began to write something more than annals, and that Rutilius ventured to open out a new course for history.†

In these times the physical sciences also found some entrance. In this respect the Romans were in general

---

* "Curarent philosophi et rhetores ut Romæ ne essent."
† Vossius de Historiciis Latinis.
greatly behind-hand, and in building, road-making, aqueducts, and other immense public works, Etruscan or Greek science could not easily be dispensed with. It was then, too, that the scientific studies of the Romans seem to have led them to the Epicurean philosophy, unfit as it otherwise was for the condition of those times, in which religion remained still so deeply rooted in the people. This school then busied itself especially with natural science. Amaffius found the knowledge of the Epicurean labours already diffused among the Romans, and devoted a work to physical things, which excited little attention, but of which, had it been extant, we should perhaps, have judged less harshly than Cicero, who appears, in point of fact, to have been no proficient in natural science, however he may here and there trick himself out with borrowed feathers. Afterwards, as is well known, Lucretius Carus introduced the whole Epicurean system into his poem on the Nature of Things.

Rhetoric became the groundwork of all the new intellectual culture; entered into all the branches of science, and even took hold of poetry; yet first through Cicero’s agency, who thus impressed a direction on the whole succeeding literature. He himself has pointed out to us the progress of eloquence up to his own times. Among the orators of earlier times, Cicero particularly magnifies Appius Claudius, of whom we have above spoken, Sergius Galba, Laelius. The author of the little work on celebrated orators, which is usually appended to Tacitus, considerably limits this eulogium. He says, “with regard to Sergius and Laelius, and the other elder orators by Cicero distinguished with perpetual panegyric, I need not any apology if I venture to acknowledge that much was yet wanting to their eloquence, which was merely a growing one, which had not hitherto reached to any perfection.” This is not the judgment of that later author from whom the passage is taken, but of Brutus, who is acknowledged by that author as the only unsus- picious and entirely competent judge. Nature would
appear to have refused the gift of oratorical excellence to
Metellus, Scipio, Lælius; for we find that, though,
they could help out Terence with language and wit for
his dialogue, neither Polybius, nor Panætius, nor all the
other Greeks, whose intercourse and instructions they
affected with such ardour, could form them into orators
deserving the name. The art was carried farther by
Æmilius Lepidus, whom Cicero also cites under his
nickname of Porcina. Cicero commends his exemption
from that roughness which as yet had stuck to the elder
speakers, and his happy choice of expressions.*

The renowned Cornelia, the mother of the two Gracchi,
is not only known as having conducted the education of
her sons, and through those sons, but also as an authoress;
and two of her letters have even been preserved to our
own times. She set the tone which, according to
Cicero's testimony, afterwards became the prevailing
one. As the French language was formed in Paris in
the circles of certain ladies, where the littérateurs who
frequented them received that touch of refinement and of
delicacy, only appreciated by a select few, so like quali-
ties of wit and expression to those recognised by the
Frenchman as the tone of particular salons, are by Cicero
distinguished as a certain indefinable Roman something
in expression.† He goes so far as to trace this Roman
something and its influence on oratory, society, and
language, to the distinguished females of the age, just
as philosophy is traced to certain schools.‡ He con-
siders the antique tone, admired in Plautus and Nævius,
with its unexhausted energy and natural independence,
its liveliness without licence, to emanate from Lælia;
refers the newer, more refined, tender, and finished tone
of social intercourse, to a whole series of other ladies.§

* Brutus, c. 25.
† "Quare cum sit quaedam certa vox Romani generis urbisque propria,
in quâ nihil offendi, nihil displièere, nihil animadverteri possit, nihil sonare
aut olere peregrinum, hanc sequamur; neque solam rusticam asperitatem,
sest etiam peregrinam insolentiam agere discamus."—De Oratore, i. iii.
c. 11.
‡ Ibid.
§ Brut. c. 58.
BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

SPANISH WARS.—SIEGE OF NUMANTIA.

After the second Punic war Spain was partitioned into two Roman provinces, to which two praetors were annually sent to find pretexts for plunder and a triumph. Pretexts for these objects were abundantly supplied by the turbulent and restless dispositions of all the Iberian tribes, from Catalonia to Lusitania. The Lusitanians, in particular, found it easier to rob their neighbours than to labour for themselves; and as they did not abandon their predatory habits, even after the lands in their neighbourhood had become subject to Rome, the praetor soon repelled their aggressions, and made severe reprisals on the Lusitanian territory. The consul Lucullus carried desolation through their fields and valleys, while the praetor Galba made demonstrations of occupying the mountain passes. Several districts offered to give hostages for their good behaviour, and Galba appeared to entertain their suit. He pretended to compassionate their condition, to ascribe their depredations to the poverty of their country, and to offer them richer places of abode, if they felt disposed to quit their sterile fastnesses. In this way he inveigled many thousands from their mountains, and made a wholesale massacre of all who came in on the strength of his promise. This unheard-of act of atrocity had the results which ever attend such measures. A war of vengeance was commenced by the countrymen of the slain, which, in any event, was likely to be equally destructive to the Romans as to the native populations.

* Appian says, quod παρεξηγηθη. — *De Bell. Hispan.* c. 53.
The Lusitanians found in Viriathus, one of their countrymen, a leader well acquainted with the country, and who knew how to employ his local knowledge. To the Roman mode of fighting he opposed an original system of tactics, well suited to the nature of the ground, as well as to the Spanish mode of arming and national character. Not the Lusitanians alone, but all the mountain tribes from Gallicia to Catalonia, were now in motion against the Romans. Amongst the mountain tribes, the Celtiberians were eminently formidable, especially the natives of the present Old Castile. They possessed a strongly fortified place, Numantia, near the sources of the Douro, and towards the borders of Navarre, capable of containing a force of many thousand men, and very difficult of access.

During five years the Roman allies and subjects were molested and plundered by the predatory hordes of Lusitanians. The occasion seemed of such urgency, that two consuls, with consular armies, were successively sent to Spain. One of them, Fabius, forced Viriathus to evacuate the Roman province; but instantly on his departure the war broke out with redoubled fury. In the sixth year of the Lusitanian war the Romans found themselves still engaged in irregular and obscure hostilities, which lost them men and treasure, without offering hope of advantage from victory. The rage of warfare by this time had extended throughout the whole hill country into Navarre: the praetor Pompey, who stood at the head of an army despatched against Viriathus, allowed himself to be wiled into the mountains, and was routed with considerable loss. The consul Cecilius Metellus, who had as praetor reduced Macedonia to a province, and had been graced for that achievement with an honorary surname, though he attacked the Celtiberian tribes with some advantage, could not succeed in disarming the rude warriors of the hill country. The above-mentioned victory over the praetor gained by Viriathus made it necessary to concentrate against him the whole force of the two armies. Quin-
CHAP. I. SUCCESSES OF VIRIATHUS. 265

tus Fabius Maximus took the command as consul, and retained it as proconsul in the following year. In this year Viriathus succeeded in blocking the whole Roman army up in a mountain pass, as the Samnites of old in the Furca Caudine. He had them now completely in his power; but used his fortune with unwonted moderation. He offered the Romans a free passage, on the single condition that they would leave his countrymen in peace in their own territory, while, on their part, he promised the cessation of predatory excursions. The proconsul acceded to these terms; the Roman people confirmed them; and this sanguinary war, which had continued now for eleven years, seemed concluded to the satisfaction of both nations.

This peace, however, displeased one of the members of the new oligarchy, which now had the ascendant in Rome. Q. Servilius Cæpio found himself baffled in the cherished hope of succeeding his brother Fabius at the head of an army in Spain, and accordingly plied the senate with the most urgent representations, to persuade them to confer on him full powers for recommencing hostilities. The senate refused to commit such a direct breach of its recent engagements, and refused to sanction a formal renewal of war; granting, however, secret permission to Cæpio to make war on the Lusitanians on his own account. It is not known whether this appeared too serious an undertaking to Cæpio, or whether he failed in lashing the Lusitanians into hostilities; nor is it known how he finally moulded the senate to his purpose.* What is certain is, that a

* The account of these transactions is to be found only in Appian, whose narrative is so summary and naked, that it is vain to look for any internal connection in it. His facts are strung together without natural consecutiveness, and with no regard to geography or topography. His statements with regard to Cæpio (c. 70.) are as follows: — “When Cæpio succeeded Servilius in the command of the army, he disparaged, in his reports (ὡς Σωλαί), the peace which had been just closed, and affirmed it to be in the highest degree dishonourable. Accordingly, the senate at first gave him leave to give Viriathus any underhand annoyance he could. On his pressing the senate further (ὡς δὲν ἐγέλη τοις Σωλαί), and, incessantly sending fresh reports, the senate permitted an open breach of the peace, and a formal commencement of war with Viriathus.”
breach of the peace was at length sanctioned by that body.

Caepio now took the field against Viriathus; but soon found that he was not to be reduced in open warfare. Viriathus made conciliatory overtures, which Caepio encouraged, and invited the Lusitanian general to accredit three ambassadors to conduct negotiations in the Roman camp. These he induced by magnificent offers to murder their brave leader. After the deed the assassins found protection in the Roman camp, but the reward which had been promised was flatly refused them; and the Romans unreservedly avowed their satisfaction in having excelled even traitors in their treachery. The bond of union maintained by Viriathus between the several populations was now broken; and the Romans succeeded in confining the Lusitanians within their mountain fastnesses. On the other hand, a new war broke out in the north-eastern division of Old Castile.

This war with tribes, whose principal fortress and place of arms was Numantia, soon engaged the whole attention of the Romans. A town possessing some 8000 defenders set the power of the republic at defiance. Consuls and proconsuls, with armies of 30,000 and 40,000 men, suffered the most ignominious reverses, and saved themselves by treaties, to which the senate refused its sanction, without, however, punishing their authors, or indemnifying those who had placed reliance in Roman faith. That state which aspired to subjugate the world could not subdue a single town without placing itself under Scipio's conduct, who had already founded far too great an influence on the ruins of Carthage.

Meanwhile Pompeius continued the contest with some advantage as consul, and even refused the most reasonable conditions when the Numantines themselves proposed to capitulate. The Numantines and Termantines, according to Appian, offered in concert to throw open the gates of their towns to the Romans, to furnish
clothing for 9000 men, 3000 ox-hides for shoes, and 800 horses for the cavalry service; and, moreover, to give 300 hostages. But, as the war took a less favourable turn in his proconsulship, he meditated bringing it to a close by double treachery towards Rome and towards Numantia. A verbal treaty was closed with the Spaniards; a written one, of different tenour, drawn up to be laid before the senate. The Numantines performed their part of the treaty; but Popilius Lænas, who was appointed as a successor to Pompey, refused to fulfil the terms of the treaty in favour of the opposite party, and referred them to the decision of the senate. In that assembly Pompey disowned the unwritten negotiations, in impudent defiance of all evidence; the senate annulled them, and war began anew.

Popilius Lænas cautiously abstained from all attempts on Numantia; and his successor, Mancinus, who kept the town in a state of blockade for some time, durst hardly venture a movement beyond the trenches of his fortified camp. Whenever the Romans ventured out, they were cut off in detail by the natives; and Mancinus at length set his army in motion with so little precaution, that a few thousand Spanish troops, who followed close at his heels, contrived to pen up the Roman troops in a narrow pass, and to bar their issue. Recourse was had to negotiation, under the conduct of one of the most considerable persons in Rome, the quaestor Tiberius Gracchus, son of the famous Cornelia. The Spaniards, who confided more in him than in the proconsul, only demanded, as before, to be left in peace and quiet*; and allowed the Roman army a free passage. The senate no sooner learned this termination of the affair, than it declared it would not hold itself bound to the treaty, and prepared to despatch the consul of the following year against Numantia.

New disasters, but no decisive result, took place in

* Περισχέσθω αὐτῷ τὸν Νομαντῖνην, καὶ πάντας ἅπακτινου ἀπελάσσων εἰ μὴ συνθηκὲς ἑβὴν συνίβασιτο εἰς τὸν καὶ ἱματια Ῥωμαίους καὶ Νομαντῖνοι. — App. i. vi. c. 90.
the following year, under the consulship of Lepidus and
Calpurnius Piso.

But at length the war was placed under new auspices. Scipio, the popular idol, seemed the only leader who
could wash out the long dishonours of the contest. A
man who had such influence as Scipio, no less in the
allied states than in Rome; who, in the war with Car-
thage, had raised and maintained an army from his
private resources*; who combined all the great qua-
lities of a general, with all the highest attainments of a
statesman, had, of course, very superior means of con-
cluding the contest to those which had been possessed
by his precursors; yet even he was detained three years
before this insignificant fortress, and, when he took it at
last, was forced to behold a yet more horrible spectacle
than he witnessed in the agony of Carthage. Those
women and children sought their death in the flames
who escaped the sword; and Scipio held his bloody
triumph in Rome without exhibition of spoil, the van-
quished having destroyed their arms—they possessed
no other treasure.†

About this time a revolt took place amongst the slaves
in Sicily, now reduced to a province of Rome, and, like
Italy itself, divided into vast private estates. Under
their leader, Eunus, a slave like themselves, of Syrian
origin, they withstood the force of successive prætors
during four campaigns, till at length Perperna suc-
cceeded in enclosing them in the fortress of Enna, and
taking the place by storm with the slaughter of 20,000 of
the insurgents. The rest of their number were nailed
to crosses along the highways throughout the island.

* "Jugurtha joined the army in Spain from Africa, not in the character
of ally of the Romans, but in that of a friend of Scipio, and brought with
him twelve elephants, and a good number of archers and slingers."—App.
de Reb. Hisp. c. 89.
† Florus's description of the last hours of Numantia does not exactly
agree with that of Appian, which was probably derived from the work of
Rutilius Rufus, an eye-witness. The passage of Florus is, however, of
such beauty as may excuse its insertion: — "Itaque deplorato exitu in ul-
timam rabiem furoremque conversi, postremo mori hoc genere destinatum.
Duces suos, sequae patriamque ferro et veneno, subjectoque undique igne
peremerunt. Macte fortissimam et, meo judicio, beatissimam in igne
civitatem asseruit cum sise socios, populum orbis terrarum viribus
futum sunt manu, state tam longa, sustinuit. Novissime maximo duce
oppressa civibus, nullum de se gaudium hosti reliquit."—Lib. xi. c. 18. § 15.
CHAP. II.  AGITATIONS OF THE GRACCHI.

While Scipio was in Spain, there arose in Rome itself a series of revolutions, which continued for a century, and ended in the establishment of absolute military power.

The first occasion of disturbance was, that Roman public functionaries, or even simple senators, or members of great families, were in the habit of committing the most flagrant acts of violence, and of making the most extravagant and oppressive demands throughout the allied towns of Italy. The inhabitants of these towns (part of whom possessed the right of suffrage at Rome) only, therefore, waited for an occasion of revenging themselves on their arrogant lords and masters; and this made every tribunitial movement in Rome doubly terrible, because it might so easily extend itself to the rest of Italy.

The second capital grievance throughout Italy was the depopulation of the land and disappearance of the free population, while the multitude of slaves ever increased. Agriculture, it is true, was admirably conducted, but in the manner of a wholesale manufacture. The hands employed in its processes were merely used as machines. The city became filled with Roman citizens who had sold their patrimonial heritage, or with colonists and disbanded soldiers, who had not thought it worth their while to cultivate the allotments of land which fell to their share from the public domains, and had parted with them to some grandee who possessed estates in their neighbourhood. The effect of the increase of slaves, and their employment instead of free day labourers, struck Tiberius Gracchus so much in a journey through Italy, that, as he afterwards expressly
declared, he was led by this observation alone to entertain the thought of a new division of the public property. *

This led at once to the main ground of debate. We have seen that the Licinian law was expressly enacted to hinder the rich, who had in their hands all the public offices, and consequently all the means of appropriating state property, from converting the ager publicus, or demesne lands, into private estates. The practice thus prohibited had, nevertheless, become general. The cultivated land had been converted into pasture, and the herds, it was found, could be more cheaply tended by slaves than by freemen. This process was productive of effects extensively mischievous, as the greater part of Italy, at one time or another, had been converted into Roman public property. Men the most enlightened and the farthest removed from demagogues, the princeps senatūs, Appius Claudius, the great jurist, Mucius Scaevola, and the pontifex maximus, Crassus, acknowledged the universal empire of Rome to depend on the race of free Italian husbandmen. They united with Gracchus, so soon as he came forward with his proposal for the re-enactment of an agrarian law, or, at least (as was the case with Scaevola), took no part against him. By the turning of vast tracts into pasture, the public revenues also suffered, as the grazing-money and other dues reserved on lands thus employed were in practice found so difficult to be levied, that they were finally abolished altogether by the Thorian law. The amount of the dues was likewise often disputed with the revenue-farmers, by the influential families who possessed themselves of the public estates. When Tiberius Gracchus, on taking the office of tribune of the people, openly declared his design of renewing the agrarian law, he was, of course, regarded by one party as author of seditious movements and dangerous disturbances, by the

* One of Caesar's wisest laws was enacted against the ever-increasing employment of slave-labour: — "Neve hi qui rem pecuariam facerent minus tertīā parte puberum ingenuorum intra pastores haberent." — (Suet. Ces. c. 42.) See also Mitford's History of Greece, vol. v. p. 401.
other as assertor of the old Roman immunities. At first, he sought to reconcile the maximum of improvement in the condition of the poorer burghers with the minimum loss to the rich, by not insisting on the entire re-enactment or enforcement of the Licinian law in all its original strictness; but proposing compensation to the occupants for the buildings and improvements on the lands which came within its provisions. His proposal went to divide among the poor so much of the common lands in the occupation of the rich as exceeded a certain extent. The father of a family might possess 500 jugera in his own right, half that extent in the right of his son. Pasturage was to be allowed for 100 head of oxen and 500 sheep. Employment was to be given to a certain proportion of freemen, as herdsmen and herdsmen, as well as husbandmen. Three commissioners should annually be appointed to superintend the division of the public lands, and take care that the Licinian law respecting them should not again fall into desuetude, like every other regulation displeasing to the richer class. Appian and Plutarch have delivered down to us fragments of the speeches held by Gracchus, in order to obtain the suffrage of rich as well as poor in favour of these proposals. He addressed the former, very inappropriately, with appeals to their magnanimity and patriotism; the latter with the more persuasive inducement of deliverance from a state of contempt and misery. These fragments clearly show that his views were excellent at the outset, however the abstract merits of his scheme might seduce him into forgetting to weigh the means of its realisation. On the part of the senate (i.e. of the present possessors of public property), he encountered, of course, the most vehement opposition. Repulsed by the senate, he threw himself on the people. His colleague Octavius steadily forbade the slave whose duty it was to read the laws (which no tribune could read to the people in person) from promulgating the motion of his colleague. Gracchus, on the other hand, vehemently
insisted that his bill should be read. And now commenced the long reign of disorder.

The people were furious. Octavius persevered in his opposition. Hereupon his antagonist stopped the whole machine of government, by proclaiming a *justitium*, or cessation of public business. So long as this interdict continued, the sittings of the pretor were suspended, and all the public offices closed. Tiberius took the further measure of sealing up the treasury, and thus stopping payments in every branch of the public service. To reduce Gracchus to submission, the rich called out their freedmen and clients. A regular tumult took place in the open forum. Even when Tiberius had at length carried his first point of getting his rogation read to the people, and had proceeded to erect booths for the voters, and caused the balloting-boxes to be placed in readiness, these boxes or urns, in which the votes were deposited, were removed by force by the partisans of the senatorial faction. From this moment the tribune also became head of a faction. To all the porticoes, walls, and monuments, tablets or placards were affixed, in which he was called on to carry through the good work he had entered upon in favour of the poorer class of citizens; and, according to Sempronius Asellio, in Gellius, he never left his house without an escort of three or four thousand men.

The senate might still have compromised, and given up something to save much. This was desired by Manlius and Fulvius, who would willingly have been friends both of the senate and of Tiberius. Tiberius, too, allowed them to persuade him to try a last appeal to that body; but the insuperable obstinacy of men who would not yield up even the smallest part of the public plunder, so long their undisputed possession, drove him back to the people. There Octavius stood again in his way. An ordinance of Sylla put it afterwards in the power of the senate to set aside the veto of a pertinacious tribune. When a tribune maintained obstinate resistance to any public measure, the question was re-
ferred to the senate, whether his intercession appeared to rest on private or on public grounds: *referebatur ad senatum, e republica essetne intercessio necne*. If the senate declared no public grounds to exist (*non esse*), he was next, in a friendly manner, advised to desist from his opposition — *agebat senatus cum eo ut tolleret intercessionem*. From that moment the resolution of the senate was considered valid against the tribunitial intercession; but only as *senatus auctoritas*, not as *senatus consultum*. No such constitutional power was, however, possessed by the people at this, or, indeed, at any subsequent period. Tiberius, therefore, sought his remedy beyond the pale of the constitution. He declared, that either he or his colleague must quit office, if they continued to stand opposed to each other in a matter of such vital importance; and that it was for the people to judge which of the two was their real friend. The tribes were thereupon summoned to the vote; and so soon as the first, whose suffrage commonly drew after it that of the others, had declared itself against Octavius, Tiberius conjured him to yield. Octavius, notwithstanding, persisted. Seventeen tribes already having given their voices against him, Tiberius renewed his intreaties before he took the vote of the eighteenth, whose suffrage would decide the majority. Octavius persisted in his veto, and was formally deposed from his functions.

The rage evinced by the people against Octavius on his deposition deterred others from following his example; and Tiberius not only passed his law, *Lex Sempronia*, but procured his own nomination, with that of his father-in-law Appius Claudius, and his young brother Caius, as commissioners for carrying the new Agrarian act into effect. Hereupon his friends, for the most part country people, returned to their harvest-work; while his enemies, on the other hand, remained at their posts in the capital, and the senate sought, by every possible artifice, to delay the execution of the new law. The injudicious friends of established usages and regulations, according
to their usual practice, exasperated the opposite party by petty indignities aimed against its leaders. In this spirit, the senate refused the usual outfit to the commissioners appointed under the new Agrarian law, and voted them a contemptible sum (six sesterces, or somewhat less than a shilling apiece) for their daily allowances. The consequence was, that they appeared as martyrs in the public cause, and were amply indemnified in their circuit for the meanness of the government, by the liberal reception of individuals. Tiberius now thought himself obliged to strengthen his party. He studied popularity with the rabble of the city, to whom he had not at first deigned to address himself: he betrayed the greatest anxiety about his personal safety, and made known a long list of new reforms in his contemplation.

The extreme measures now proposed by Tiberius, who was compelled to fly to the multitude from the rancour of the senate, justified the anxiety displayed by the landed interest with regard to his views, though not the means of which they availed themselves to prevent his re-election for the subsequent year. The electoral assembly was held: Rubrius, the friend and fellow tribune of Gracchus, presided: two tribes voted for Gracchus, but the opposite party got up a regular fray in the forum. Rubrius was either frightened, or pretended to be so; in brief, he gave up the presidency to Memmius, whom the opposite party had brought, in place of Octavius, into the college of tribunes. The other tribunes, indeed, made opposition, but the voting proceeded, and Memmius took good care that it should go against Gracchus. The latter dismissed the assembly; and, in his official capacity, adjourned the election to the following day. The evening passed in preparations on both sides for the morrow's conflict. Gracchus, says Appian, made as though he had given up all for lost: he stayed out in the forum the whole evening, attired in mourning; presented his son to the people, and commended him to their guardianship, as if he were himself about to sink under his
enemies.* The poorer citizens, not only feeling sympathy with Gracchus, but apprehending that his destruction would be followed by their own servitude; revolving, moreover, that Gracchus was exposed to such dangers on their account, accompanied him home with loud lamentations, and bade him be of good heart for the morrow. These demonstrations restored his courage; he assembled his friends during the night, and concerted with them a signal for the fray, should force be necessary.

On the morrow the senate was assembled at the capitol, in the temple of the Goddess of Public Faith. Gracchus wished to hold the electoral assembly also at the capitol: his followers occupied the posts from whence, in case it came to blows, they could assail the opposite faction to advantage. These facts being learned by the senates, it declared that the moment was come when the state must be preserved by forcible means; and that the consul must stop the course of legal proceedings, and appeal to arms. In other words, it was resolved to entrust dictatorial power to the consul by the usual formula,—Caveant consules ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat.

But Mutius Scaevola, who had supported the proposals of Gracchus at the outset, refusing to be employed as a tool by the enemies of improvement, another instrument was sought for putting their plans in execution. Nasica, whose ancestors had acquired a name in the public service, did not hesitate to take the place of the consul, on his refusal to act. He declared that, since the consul, out of too solicitous care for the laws, was allowing the Roman empire, and, along with it, all its laws to perish, he himself, as a private man, took upon him the care of the republic. In order to do equal justice to both sides, we must not here forget the statement of Appian, that the tumult in the popular assembly, where the election of the tribune was to be held, had already reached such a pitch of violence, that

the senatorial party and their clients had been driven
from it by force, in order to carry the election entirely
by the votes of the poorer class; and that Fulvius
Flaccus, who brought Tiberius information from time
to time of what was going on in the senate, of which
he was a member, did his best to heighten the commo-
tion. From the upper steps of the temple, where the
senate was assembled, Nasica addressed the senatorial
band around its entrance, drew his toga over his head,
and led them to charge the adherents of Gracchus.
The latter, unprepared for such an attack, took flight,
were pursued by the senators, their clients and servants,
knights and other citizens, and Gracchus himself was
slain, with a considerable number of his followers, in
their flight from the capitol.

The senate sanctioned this proceeding as one of ne-
cessary rigour; and even the consul defended an act
which he had not chosen to execute. The slaughter of
Gracchus and his friends was declared pro justâ cæde;
while, on the other hand, the people were exasperated
to such a degree against Scipio Nasica, that it was ne-
cessary to find a decent pretext for sending him out of
the city. He went to Asia under a pro formâ com-
mission from the senate. The friends of Gracchus were
hunted down without mercy. The senate, indeed, durst
not directly recall the commission for dividing the
public lands, especially as Papirius Carbo, a member of
the popular party, succeeded Gracchus as tribune; and,
in the year after his tribuneship, obtained a place in
that commission with the friend of Tiberius, Fulvius
Flaccus, and Caius Gracchus, his younger brother. But
the oligarchical party had by that time gained a new
prop in Scipio Æmilianus, who had returned from his
Spanish victories with the honorary title of Numantinus.
The commissioners for division of land not only met an
obstacle to their proceedings in the resistance of the
senate, and that of all persons in the magistracy; but so
many litigious difficulties arose in the assignments of
land, that even the soldiers who had served under Scipio
could not obtain their allotments. They applied to their
former general; and Scipio employed this pretext to
wrest the whole affair out of the hands of the commis-
sioners. He caused instructions to be given to the con-
sul, Sempronius Tuditanus, to give summary judgment
in all cases arising under the recent enactments. The
latter extricated himself from the business, under the
pretext of putting an end, by force of arms, to the
robberies of the tribes of Istria. Thus a total stop, for
the present, was put to the promised division of land.
Scipio died suddenly soon afterwards; and the circum-
stance of his death was turned into matter of suspicion
against the still subsisting party of Gracchus, who were
naturally embittered by his conduct in the recent trans-
actions.

Caius Gracchus, the brother of Tiberius, was only
twenty years old when his brother, the tribune, procured
his nomination as a commissioner for the division of
public lands. His share in this commission, of course,
contributed to the discredit into which it fell after the
death of Tiberius. Caius, however, early displayed such
elocution and ability, that the senate sought a pretext
for removing him and his friend, Fulvius Flaccus, from
the city. The senate conferred on Fulvius a commission
in the south of France, and kept Caius three years as
questor in Sardinia. This mode of conferring offices
amounted to a disguised exile; and the popular party,
not without reason, viewed the removal of both their
defenders as a sort of declaration of war: they accord-
ingly held secret meetings in Rome, and throughout
Italy, to lay down plans of future proceeding. The
Roman laws were rigid enough against political unions
of all kinds, and the senate only needed a man daring
enough to enforce these laws with equal disregard of
reason and justice. Such a man was Opimius, as we
learn from the following history, in which his name
occurs only too often. To this man, therefore, the
senate entrusted the criminal investigation concerning
the existing conspiracy, in which the mass of Italian
allies were implicated; whose assemblies were held in Fregellæ, a place so near Rome, that the city precincts (pomerium) extended in later times over the former domains of this town. The prætor fell on the focus of conspiracy with fire and sword, and even destroyed the town of Fregellæ, by way of a warning example. Numitorius, the first citizen of Fregellæ, who, to secure his own impunity, had betrayed his fellow citizens, although he alone had enabled Opimius to discover the conspiracy, narrowly escaped condemnation, and afterwards lived in Rome abhorred by all honourable men, but not the less courted by those who valued opulence far above honour.

The ferment which inevitably followed the severities and cruelties of the now unchecked oligarchy, favoured the schemes of Caius Gracchus and Fulvius. The latter returned a conqueror from Gaul, where he had repulsed the tribe of Silians from the Grecian town of Marseilles, which had long been in alliance with Rome. Caius Gracchus left his proconsul, Aurelius Cotta, behind in Sardinia, when he found his stay prolonged without necessity, and returned to Rome without being recalled. The censors, indeed, instituted proceedings against him on this account; but, as he presented himself in the character of a candidate for the tribuneship, and the people crowded furiously round the court, the judges durst not sentence him, and the senate could not prevent his election. His tribuneship, under the circumstances, could not but be a stormy one; and Gracchus himself felt that violent means alone could bring about the sweeping organic changes which he meditated. This was felt with the still surer presentiment of affection by his mother, the illustrious Cornelia, who had already dearly purchased the success of her maternal aims at distinction as the mother of the Gracchi. The fragments of her letters to Caius, preserved by Cornelius Nepos, forebode the issue of that course in which her younger son was now treading the footsteps of his brother, though not with equal singleness of purpose:—“You will say,” she writes,
"that to be revenged of our enemies is glorious; to none can that vengeance appear more glorious than it does to me, — if, however, it be attainable with safety to the republic. But if not, let our enemies escape, and remain our enemies, rather than that the republic should suffer ruin and dissolution." In another epistolary fragment, probably addressed to him on the intelligence of his standing for the tribuneship, she thus adjures him: — "I can swear by the gods, that, saving those who slew Tiberius Gracchus, no enemy ever gave me such trouble and affliction as you do in this matter; — you, whom it behoved to supply the place of the children whom I have lost, and to diminish, to the utmost, my anxieties in old age. Do not embitter the short remnant of life which is now left me. Cannot that consideration give pause to your eagerness to precipitate your mother's dissolution with that of the state? When will the madness of our race have an end? When shall we cease for shame to perturb and trouble the republic? If nothing else will do, compete for the tribunate, do what you will, when I shall feel it no longer. In that day you will honour me with the rites due to a parent; — in that day you will lavish vain ceremonial on the memory of her whom, alive and in presence, you have left abandoned and derelict. But Jove forefend that you should persist in this career of madness; which if you do, I fear you will store up for yourself such lifelong misery, that never again can you feel self-approbation."

These warnings were thrown away upon Caius, who, unlike his brother Tiberius, seems ever to have acted on personal rather than public considerations. The very first measures which were proposed by him bear the stamp of private vindictiveness, and of love for low popularity. One of those measures was a special law against an individual, which in Rome was no less odious under the name of privilegium in aliquem, than prosecution by bill of pains and penalties commonly is in
this country. Octavius was the object of this motion, and the purport of it was, that no magistrate once deposed by the people should be eligible to office ever after. This *privilegium in Octavium*, however, was afterwards withdrawn.

Another law, proposed and carried by Caius*, provided that monthly sales of corn from the public granaries should be made to the people at five sixths of the market price. He farther procured to be passed a law to abridge the term of military service†, by which no one was obliged to enter the army before seventeen years of age, and the legionaries were to receive clothing as well as pay. These laws exposed their author to the merited reproach of providing for the idle mob of the capital at the expense of the provinces, and of giving gratifications to the soldiery for the sake of securing their votes in the public assemblies.

Gracchus appeared to aim at subverting the whole system of government. The highest classes of citizens had hitherto given their votes first in the assemblies of the centuries; and their vote, in most cases, had drawn that of the others after it. But Gracchus introduced a law that the order of voting should in future be decided by lot. To make it clear that the sovereign power was not in the senate, but in the people, he caused the hustings (rostra), from which orators addressed the people, to be so disposed that the speaker no longer faced towards the place where the senators sat, but towards the thickest concourse of the multitude. — "Even in the form of these assemblies," observes Ferguson, "all appearances of respect to the senate was laid aside. The rostra, or platform on which the presiding magistrate stood, was placed in the middle of an area, of which one part was the market-place, surrounded with stalls and booths for merchandise, and the courts of justice; the other part, called the comitium, was open to receive the people in their public assemblies; and on one side of it, fronting

* Lex Nomentaria.  † De militia commodia.
the rostra, or bench of the magistrates, stood the curia, or senate-house. The people, when any one was speaking, stood partly in the market-place and partly in the comitium. The speakers directed their voice to the comitium, so as to be heard in the senate. This disposition Gracchus reversed; and, directing his voice to the forum, or market-place, seemed to displace the senate, and to deprive that body of their offices as watchmen and guardians of the public order in matters that came before the popular assemblies."

When he had gained complete mastery over the people, he first succeeded in carrying the point, that not Opimius, but C. Fannius, should be elected as consul. He then again sought for himself the tribuneship, and had no sooner obtained it, than he proceeded to attack the senate in a more sensitive point than ever. The decuries of the judges had been hitherto filled by senators only. Tiberius had passed a law appointing them to be chosen from the senators and equestrians indiscriminately. Caius now introduced a regulation*, that the judges should be chosen from the equestrian order exclusively.†

Caius aimed at extending the right of suffrage in Rome to all Italians, by procuring the repeal of a law which prevented their reception into the register of citizens at Rome, when they had not previously been erased from that of their native town. This proposal was distasteful to the city population, and to Fannius the consul, backed by Caius. Accordingly they took the part of the senate, and drove out the Italians, who flocked in

---

* Lex Semproniana judiciaria.
† This regulation of Caius was again amended by Livius Drusus, who procured a law that the judges should be chosen from knights and senators jointly. The subsequent changes of regulation on this point may be summarily indicated as follows: — In the year B.C. 90 (B.C. 694), the praetor, M. Plautius Silanus, brought forward the Lex Plotia, according to which every tribe had the privilege of appointing to the judicial functions, fifteen citizens, senators, or equestrians. This regulation was repealed by Sylla, who constructed the courts of justice solely from the ranks of the senate. About the year 70 B.C., the praetor, Aurelius Cotta, opened the courts to senators, tribunis curiis, and equestrians. When Pompey, in his second consulate (B.C. 55), again regulated this matter, he annexed the following condition to the provisions of the Lex Aurelia; that wealthy persons only should be appointed.
numbers to the city. On this occasion, Caius lost the reputation of energy, and the favourable prepossession that every thing must yield to him, as he quietly saw strangers of respectability, who had been summoned by him to Rome to aid in the passing of his law, dragged from the forum before his eyes by the consul’s order, as vagrants and disturbers of the public repose. In order to freshen up his popularity, he proposed the construction of new roads, edifices, and public works, that he might have at his command a tribe of contractors, capitalists, money-brokers, and labourers. He had already proposed the foundation of new colonies at an earlier period. Supported by him, his colleague, Rubrius, now made the proposal to extend colonisation beyond Italy.

It was always with reluctance the senate sanctioned the formation of colonies beyond the bounds of Italy: all the colonies out of Italy belong to a later period. It is evident how especially odious must have been the proposition of a colony in Africa, by the restoration of Carthage under the name of the Junonian colony. The senate, however, acceded to every thing, appointed ten commissioners for the establishment of this colony, and Caius Gracchus received permission to travel about with Fulvius Flaccus in order to collect their colonists. Meanwhile the senate availed themselves of this absence of the tribune totally to eclipse him in esteem, by means of his colleague, M. Livius Drusus. Livius, backed by the senate, systematically opposed Gracchus, and laid his veto on all the measures proposed by him;—in order to outbid him with the citizens and allies, not only proposing to establish for the burghers a great number of colonies, and amongst these three very considerable Italian ones,—Squilacium, Tarentum, and Neptunia,—but to pass a law for the allies, which placed them on a perfectly equal footing with the Romans with regard to military punishments.* The senate gave its support to these proposals, while it thwarted Gracchus in all his undertakings. The love of those whom Caius had won

* Lex de tergo sociorum.
by offering and affording the most, soon passed to him who could give more, and the senate succeeded in carrying the election of the merciless Opimius to the consulship.

Gracchus now stood a third time for the tribuneship, by virtue of a provision contained in one of his own laws, that a tribune, who had introduced a project advantageous to the people, might be successively re-elected a sufficient number of times to carry it through for the benefit of the commonwealth. This time, however, Caius was not elected; it is not easy to say whether, as Plutarch thinks, because his own colleagues had been gained by the aristocracy to give a false return of the votes, or because he had the majority really against him. Meanwhile, he and Fulvius remained members of the commission which was sitting for the partition of the lands, and which was especially empowered to settle 6000 Roman citizens in the new Junonian colony, on the former site of Carthage. While the two friends of the people were absent, first to collect their colonists, and then to found the colonies, a string of prodigies were announced, which signified the displeasure of the gods at the rebuilding of Carthage; and the tribune, M. Minutius, called on the people to repeal the law which established this new colony.

Caius and Fulvius returned, and endeavoured to maintain their law; their friends streamed to Rome; disturbance, noise, and violence filled the forum. This had been expected by the senatorial party; and it seems to have been inferred by them, from the former demeanour of Caius, when he quietly allowed his Italian friends to be driven out of the city, that he had not courage to face a civil war. Nor were they mistaken. On the decisive day, the consul, Opimius, occupied, with his armed force, the most advantageous positions on the Capitoline hill, and awaited the signal for attack in the temple of Castor and Pollux. Caius would not hear of open conflict, yet the next morning he entered the assembly attended
by armed men. A struggle was inevitable; the senate only waited a pretext for authorising the consul to commence active hostilities, for which they had made ample preparation. They had armed themselves, their clients and partisans, who were ready to act at the word of command against Caius's party. The equestrians were also arrayed for service, and every knight had brought two armed slaves with him. The accidental murder of a consular lictor furnished the desired pretext, and the senate passed a decree to meet force with force. The rest was the affair of the consul, who had his own vengeance to gratify, as well as that of his order. Driven by force from the forum, Gracchus and Fulvius turned their houses to fortresses, and were summoned to give account of their proceedings. At this moment, when all were in arms, Fulvius would have occupied the Aventine; but Gracchus wished to negotiate, and sent a delegate to the consul. Opimius threw this delegate into prison, and marched with an armed force against the adherents of Caius, who fled; he himself escaping across the Tiber, where, in order to avoid the rage of his enemies, he caused himself to be slain by his confidential slave, Philocrates. Flaccus was betrayed by a friend with whom he had concealed himself. Several hundred citizens, it is said, were slain on the spot; the number of the judicially murdered is computed by the documents quoted by Plutarch at some thousands. This cruelty of the conquering party bred the bitterest enmity between the aristocracy and the people, the rich and the poor. The conquerors, and most of the grandees, were confirmed in their arrogance, and concealed their pride and profligacy so little, that the corruption and unblushing abandonment of the sovereign oligarchy in Rome, can be fitly compared with no other phenomenon in history, but the shamelessness of the ruling order in the age of Louis XV. Men like Opimius, Scaurus, Calpurnius, abused the highest dignities in a manner the most scandalous, for their private ends, as was evi-
enced by the scenes unveiled to the popular indignation shortly after in the course of the Jugurthine war.

It is one of those perpetual contradictions in the nature of man, which so frequently salute the student of history, that in these times, when the most important forms of the constitution were transgressed without hesitation by all parties, the most rigid adherence was enforced to the veriest trifles of ancient observance. The amusement of the people had become a matter of public charge; gladiators and wild beasts were provided by the state, and frequent accidents took place from the falling in of the scaffolding erected for the temporary use of spectators at public shows. Nevertheless, the erection of a theatre built of stone was denounced as a Grecian innovation. The work, when advanced nearly to completion, was pulled down by order of Scipio the consul; and an edict passed, that no permanent structure of the kind should be in future undertaken in Rome, or within a mile of its walls.*

* Val. Max. 1. ii. c. 4.
CHAPTER III.

JUGURTHINE WAR.

The course of events in the Jugurthine war is of more moment with reference to the internal relations of Rome, than on account of the extension thereby received by the Roman province of Africa; and Sallust has very judiciously commenced the general history of his own times with the narrative of this contest.*

605. Massinissa, the ally of Rome, died in extreme old age. His three sons at first divided the kingdom of their father amongst them. Two, however, died in the same year, which had witnessed his death, and the whole of Numidia fell to Micipsa alone. The latter adopted Jugurtha, a son of his deceased brother Mastanabal; and perceiving that Jugurtha had won the friendship of Scipio Aemilianus, constituted him, after his death, heir of equal parts of his kingdom with his own sons, Adherbal and Hiempsal.

Jugurtha was an African prince. It is needless, therefore, to express so much astonishment as Sallust, that he sought to deprive his kinsmen, the sons of his benefactor, of power and life. We know from later sources the nature of rulers in these regions and climates. It might rather excite surprise, that in his violent designs he neither dreaded the protection which the Romans had promised Massinissa’s descendants, nor the guarantee they had given Micipsa, that his sons should not be subjected to any territorial encroachments. But Jugurtha knew the Roman aristocracy and men in general. He had served with the Roman legions at Numantia, could calculate the weight of money and influ-

* Sallust states, as his inducements to write an account of this war,—

"Primum, quia magnum et atroc, variae victoria fuit; dein, quia tum

primum superbiae nobilitatis obviam itum est, quae contentio divina et hu-

ma cuncta permiscuit." — (c. 5.)
ence on their leaders; and, accordingly, did not hesitate to put Hiempsal to death, and to seize the share which the latter had possessed in the realm of Numidia. Adherbal escaped Jugurtha's hands, fled to Rome, and solicited the senate for protection and vengeance. But Jugurtha had a stronger party than justice. The consul Scaurus, indeed, urged rigorous measures; but the majority of the senate resolved that Adherbal and Jugurtha had equally a claim on their protection, and appointed ten commissioners to make equal division of the realm of Massinissa, between the brother and murderer of his grandson. At the head of the commission stood the merciless Opimius, who, with his fellow commissioners, sold Jugurtha the better part of the land in debate, in utter disregard of the rights of Adherbal and the precepts of equity.

So early as the following year, a new war broke out between these two near relations and mortal enemies: Adherbal was defeated near Cirta, but had time to take refuge in that place, where he hoped to maintain himself long enough to be rescued by the armed intervention of Rome. His ambassadors appeared there; and his letter moved the senate to despatch a Roman embassy to Africa. Jugurtha, however, put them off with excuses, and pursued the siege of Cirta with redoubled activity. On the reiterated prayers of Adherbal, a new embassy came from Rome, with Scaurus, princeps senatus, at its head. His first step was to summon Jugurtha before his provincial tribunal. On this, a body of Roman troops, who had aided in the defence of Cirta, supposing their exertions no longer necessary, and relying on Scaurus and the Roman commission, capitulated with Jugurtha, and forced Adherbal to follow their example. Jugurtha, without any regard to the declarations and threats of Scaurus, put Adherbal to death, and took possession of his territories.

* Sallust thus characterises this eminent man:—"Æmilius Scaurus, homo nobilis, impiger, factiosus, avidus potentiae, honoris, divitiarum; ceterum vitia sua callidè occultans."
When this intelligence reached Rome, the senate appeared irresolute. It was only when informed that a tribune elect had begun to agitate the matter among the people, that Calpurnius received a commission to vindicate the honour of the Roman name by the punishment of Jugurtha. Jugurtha sent ambassadors to the senate, who refused to received them unless he should first deliver himself up to the Romans in person. Calpurnius, whom the Numidian had corrupted by his presents, assured Jugurtha of pardon, and possession of his throne, on condition of his making a sham surrender of himself and of his military power into the hands of the Romans.

Unfortunately, Memmius, who was then tribune, stirred up the people, by unveiling the disgraceful traffic of these magnates with Jugurtha, and proposed and carried the mission of the prætor Cassius to Africa, to investigate the matter on the spot. As Jugurtha had ostensibly surrendered himself to the Romans, he was invited to come to Rome under assurance of safe-conduct, in order to be questioned in the open assembly of the people with regard to the whole course of the late occurrences. Jugurtha appeared: Memmius proceeded to examine him before the people, but he was interdicted from answering by a corrupted tribune, Bæbius, and even had the audacity, during his short sojourn at Rome, to cause a Numidian prince, who was there at the time, to be assassinated. After this new atrocity, the Numidian was forced to decamp. Albinus recommenced hostilities, and the former scenes of corrupt traffic were reproduced on the same theatre.

In the following year, Albinus left his brother Aulus as his substitute at the head of the army. The latter was beaten, and thereupon closed the most disgraceful treaty which had been ever contracted by Romans.* Violent disturbances broke out at Rome on

* Sallust (c. 38.) gives the terms dictated by Jugurtha:—“Si secum fœdus faceret, incolis omnes sub jugum miserum, præterea ut diebus decem Numidia decederet.” The Roman leader accepts these terms, “quia mortis metu milités mutabant.”
this intelligence. The consular election was postponed by the tribunes, and the business of the state brought to a stand, till the popular mind was calmed by the election of Metellus as consul, who instantly proceeded to Africa, to supersede Albinus at the head of the army. Metellus found he must first place the army on another footing, before he could hope for a fortunate termination of the contest. Having restored discipline, he soon retrieved the honour of the Roman name; continued during the following year in Africa as proconsul; and, if he did not wholly end the war, he was nevertheless honoured with the surname of Numidicus, as an acknowledgment that he had only been recalled, because the people chose to make him atone for the transgressions of the whole body of nobles.

The odium into which that body was brought by the exposed transactions of Scaurus and his colleagues with Jugurtha, was most unjustly made to involve the proud but noble Metellus, by whom the Numidian was driven out of his kingdom in the first campaign. Metellus would even have captured the king, and put an end to the war, if the Mauritanian sovereign, Bocchus, had not taken the part of the latter. Meanwhile every possible step had been taken by Metellus to drive his new ally to extremities, when Marius, whose public career will presently have to be noticed, rendered his purposes suspected to the people, and accused him of protracting the war, in order to remain at the head of an army, to retain the rule of a rich domain, and provide for numerous friends and relatives. The people listened to Marius, elected him consul, and gave him the conduct of a war in which the senate had so lately intrusted the whole command to Metellus.

During all this time Jugurtha showed a malignity of character, combined with a consummate and sustained policy, military talent, and contempt of all laws, divine and human, that cannot without astonishment be contemplated. Metellus had taken Marius and Rutilius with him as lieutenants, to whom he could, without scruple,
intrust the second place to himself in the army, because they had so distinguished themselves under Scipio at Numantia, that there was only one voice in the Roman army with regard to their merits. Sylla was attached as quaestor to Marius; and though they belonged to different parties in politics, yet Marius made use of him, because he had no turn himself for diplomatic intrigues and strokes of finesse, and yet perceived that the issue of this contest would depend on such practices. The event sanctioned his choice of Sylla, who cleared his way successfully through the labyrinth of African cunning and treachery. Jugurtha was reduced to extremities. Bocchus discovered that no advantage was likely to accrue to him from continued hostilities with the Romans; and Sylla, who was sent to his court, knew how to work on his hopes and fears. Bocchus was at length induced to give up the person of his ally, by the prospect of obtaining a grant from the Romans of part of his dominions. Marius thus concluded the war in his third year of supreme command; but, to his great disgust, he had to share the renown of its termination with Sylla, and to find that the aristocracy, though they could not dispense with his own services, yet on all occasions sought to give his quaestor an invidious preference.

In the regulation of Africa, after the overthrow of Jugurtha, the Romans pursued their usual course of conduct. They inured the people by degrees to foreign domination, and familiarised them with the prospect of one day becoming subjects of Rome. One division of Numidia, bordering on Mauritania, was granted to Bocchus as a reward for his services in betraying Jugurtha. Another division, adjoining the Roman province, was annexed to it. A third was bestowed on Hiempsal H. a grandson of Massinissa.
MARIUS, who soon proved himself so eminently fitted to ride the waves of military democracy, combined with many qualities of the good old Roman character the coarse and earthy soul of a peasant struggling into eminence; and exhibited, from the entrance of his career, the low and grovelling cunning, as well as the stubborn remorselessness of nature, which seem instinctive properties of the mean yet energetic spirit, exclusively intent on self-aggrandisement. He was a protégé of the family of Metellus; his father, a sturdy peasant of the old breed in a village of the neighbourhood of Arpi, having been one among the clients of that family. But he soon perceived that the patron only contemplated raising his client up to a point where he might feel the full weight of his own superiority. The times were unpropitious to the pride of Metellus and his compeers; Marius, even as tribune, proved to his patron and to the whole senate that the days were past when patrician pride was patiently endured, because it was linked with merit and celebrity. Marius, during his tribuneship, made regulations against the influence of the nobility at elections, entitled the Lex Maria de Suffragiis. It was usual for the citizens, in going up to give their votes, to pass between railings which fenced them off from the multitude without. The aristocrats had made use of this circumstance, by causing the space between the rails to be made sufficiently wide for their partisans and dependants to stand ranged in the inside, in order to ply the voters with solicitations or menaces. The law of Marius limited this space, so that only the voters should have room to pass. The popularity which Marius...
might have acquired by this reform of elections, was for the moment effaced by another measure passed during his tribuneship, and which seems to show that he did not at the outset deal in all the low expedients of a demagogue. He abolished the pernicious regulation of Caius Gracchus, for distributing corn at a low price to the multitude from the public granaries, failed, accordingly, in his canvass for the ædileship; and, when he became a candidate for the office of prætor, was forced to adopt the usual ignoble means of popularity. From this time forth he became the man of the people, and, by consequence, the sworn foe to the nobles. It has been mentioned, in the history of the Jugurthine war, how he was raised on the shoulders of the people to the command in Africa. He was elevated to the consulship in the year in which he conquered Jugurtha; and in the following year he received the command in chief against the barbarian tribes of the Cimbri and Teutones, who at this time threatened Rome with destruction. But, to his great disgust, the senate contrived again to attach Sylla to him, that he might, as in the preceding war, be a sharer in his glory.

The most erudite enquiries as to the origin and causes of the popular migration which has received the name of the Cimbrian war have led to no definite result, owing to the almost entire ignorance of the Greeks and Romans of the nature of the northern populations and languages. That the migration was neither purely Scandinavian or German, nor purely Celtic or Gallic, clearly appears from the accounts of the order of march of the Cimbri and Teutones, as well as of their bodily stature and mode of fighting. The barbarian torrent seems to have originally been loosed from the farther side of the Elbe; from whence a mingled horde of Germans and Scandinavians, of gigantic stature, savage valour, and singular accoutrements, descended southwards. On their route, a number of Celtic tribes, of which the inhabitants of the north of Switzerland and the neighbourhood of Toulouse, or the Tigurini and Tectosages,
are distinguished by name above the others, joined them; and in conjunction with them threatened to pour upon the Romans, who just then were pressing farther and farther on the side of Carinthia towards Austria, and on the west from Provence towards Toulouse.

On the side of Carinthia, the Romans took the whole of Noricum under protection; and Carbo was destroyed with his army, in endeavouring to keep off the Teutones from that territory. On the other, they had extended their province from the Alps and the Genoese frontier to the Pyrenees; and had forced the native tribes as far as Lyons to accept their protection. The barbarians, instead of pouring on Italy after defeating Carbo, turned back and spread desolation in Gaul; and the Romans despatched an army against them under Spurius Cassius. This army was annihilated by the Celtic hordes, who had associated themselves with the Cimbri and Teutones. The barbarians terrified the Romans by their enormous stature, by their firmness in order of battle, and by their mode of fighting, of which the peculiarity consisted in extending their lines so as to enclose tracts of a league or more, and in forming barriers around them with their war-chariots.

The danger to the Romans from the combined German and Celtic populations seemed the greater, as the Jugurthine war in the beginning of the contest engaged their best generals. They therefore sent into Gaul, L. Servilius Cæpio, a consul, with a consular army. Cæpio, quite in the spirit of the senatorial party of his times, plundered the Gauls, and seized their sacred treasures, instead of preserving discipline. He retained his command and his army during the following year also, though Manlius, the consul for that year, made his appearance in the province with a new consular army. Negligence, vanity, and jealousy, seem to be imputable to both commanders: they quarrelled, kept their armies asunder, and were utterly routed in succession. But the barbarians had no idea of following up their vic-


u 3
tories; and, instead of concentrating their force for a
descent upon Italy, they wasted Spain, and scoured the
Gallic territories.

While the barbarians plundered Spain and Gaul, Mar-
rius was actively employed in exercising and disciplining
his army. He busied the legions not only in military
exercises and camp fortifications, but in digging canals
and draining the unhealthy marshes near the Rhone.
In Rome, his presence in Gaul was acknowledged so ne-
necessary, that, according to Cicero's testimony, even his
enemies gave their votes for his continuance four succes-
sive years in the province, and at the head of the army,
which, in a manner, had been formed by himself for the
v.c.
651.
conflict with the Teutones. At length, in the third year
of his command in Gaul, in his fourth consulship, the
Teutones and Ambrones made their appearance in the
south of France; while the Cimbrians, and all the
tribes united with them, attempted to break into Italy
from the north-east. Marius held his soldiers back for
a long time from a general action, and inured them to
the impression which the aspect of the barbarians and
their terrible mode of fighting was apt to make. At
length, in a pitched battle near Aix, he destroyed the
whole power of the Teutones and Ambrones. While
yet engaged in solemnising his victory, and burning, in
honour of the gods, the useless waggons and martial spoils,
he received the news of his re-election as consul for the
next year. Lutatius Catulus, his colleague of the
former year, remained, indeed, in this year, also, as pro-
consul, opposed to the Cimbrians; his talent, however,
was not confided in, and the command in chief was
given to Marius, though Catulus at the same time re-
mained at the head of his own army. Catulus himself
was no great general, but he had made use of the quarrel
between Marius and Sylla to procure to himself, as
lieutenant and subordinate officer, the latter, who had
been in the army of Marius, and who had roused his
commander's jealousy in Gaul, through valour and mi-
ilitary skill, even more intensely than previously, as
quästor in Africa, through his dexterity in diplomatic transactions. Marius had taken Sylla, at first, as lieutenant with him to Gaul; afterwards the people had made him military tribune, and he had continued in the army of Marius; but the one circumstance, that the two men belonged to different parties in the state, whose violent animosity was just about this time renewed with double rage, was enough as a substantive cause of enmity; the consul's jealousy of the talents of his subordinate was another. They parted; and the Roman world ascribed the victory won by Catulus over the Cimbrians on the Etsch to the judicious arrangements and movements planned and executed by Sylla: that Marius had no further part in the affair than as he finished the destruction of the enemy with his army, he himself confessed.

It was highly prejudicial to Rome, that after this battle more than 60,000 of these terrible barbarians, and in the whole war more than 150,000, were made slaves, and distributed, for the most part, throughout Italy, Sicily, and Africa, at a time when Sicily had already been laid waste by successive servile wars, and similar wars daily threatened explosion in the other lands.

The intestine commotions of Rome, the renewed strife between nobles and people, the interposition of the Italians in that strife, and the beginning of the civil war between Marius and Sylla, claim from this moment our principal attention. The year in which Marius held his second consulship, and the next following, are especially remarkable for the inveteracy exhibited by four tribunes against the senate collectively, or against its individual members. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the great great grandfather of the subsequent emperor Nero, summoned the most considerable senator before his tribunal, deprived the college of priests of the right of filling its own vacancies, and assigned the right of election to the people. Cassius Longinus framed the terrible enactment, that no man who should once have been sentenced...
to penalties by the people could ever be restored to honour and office by the senate; and C. Servilius Glaucia, who had been infamous as prætor, as tribune not only restored the courts of justice to the knights, which had recently, by Servilius Ĉæpio, been divided between them and the senators, but also, by a law which Cicero designates as a terrible one*, encouraged the allies to the accusation of senators, by promising them the Roman right of citizenship whenever they should prosecute a public officer to conviction. The fourth, M. Acilius, even made the attempt to agitate afresh the affair of agrarian division. All this was but a prelude to the disturbances occasioned by Saturninus after the victory over the Cimbrians.

Saturninus had conducted himself in such a manner as prætor in Ostia, that it was out of the question for him to expect any further curule dignity. He therefore threw himself at once into the line of a demagogue, excited the most violent disturbances as tribune, and endeavoured to draw Marius into his party by holding out allurements to his capacity and ambition. Saturninus had been tribune twice in succession, and had during that time persecuted Metellus and the whole senatorial party with the utmost rancour. He now wished to be chosen a third time; and promised, in return, to help Marius to a sixth consulship. Marius, indeed, through Saturninus’s efforts, obtained the consulship; but that consulship was the grave of his reputation. He was a poor speaker; lost all self-possession at the moment when he needed it most; and was jealous to a frantic extreme of talent and eloquence in others. Saturninus, however, could not carry through his own election as tribune: after a long contest, another was elected. This last elected tribune, Annius or Nonnius, was despatched by Saturninus’s myrmidons on the

* Cic. pro L. Corn. Balbo, c. 24. “Quod si acerbissimâ lege Serviliā principes viri ac gravissimi et sapientissimi cives hanc Latinis, i.e. fede- ratis viam ad civitatem populi jussu pater episcopas sunt — præsumptum quod nemo assequi posset, nisi ex senatori calamitate, neque senatori, neque bono culquâm nimis jucundum esse posset.”
evening of the same day on which he had been installed in his office, while the capitol was occupied by Glaucia during the night; and early on the next day a tumultuary election established Saturninus in the place of the murdered.

A tribune chosen in this disorderly manner could only hope to maintain himself by disorderly proceedings. A series of laws providing for the distribution of food to the populace, for an increase in the pay of the soldiers, and for the aggrandisement of the power and influence already conferred on Marius, were brought forward, and in part carried. In order to annoy the senate, the old regulation was renewed, that every decree of the people should take effect without its concurrence; and, moreover, it was on pain of death prohibited to interrupt a tribune in his motions before the senate. What was more, an obligation was laid on the senate to sanction within five days every act of the people. Through these regulations in favour of democracy, Saturninus hoped to maintain himself in the tribuneship; to make Glaucia, for the next year, consul; the quæstor Saurælius, prætor. At all times ready to repel force by force, he kept a band of armed freedmen constantly about him. The consular elections, also, were held under constant dread of violence; yet Glaucia, after all, was not chosen. The first choice fell on Antonius; the second on Memmius, whom the senate supported against Glaucia, but of whom the latter rid himself as Saturninus had done of his rival as tribune. This murderous act, coupled with the purpose avowed by the three leading demagogues and their followers, of occupying the capitol and maintaining their measures by main force, afforded the senate a fair pretext for giving the consuls authority in the usual terms to save the state by extraordinary measures. Accordingly, Marius, as consul, was under the necessity of putting himself at the head of the aristocratical party, to crush his friends. He would willingly have saved them, but could not. One was despatched in the conflict; the two others were
stoned to death from the outside of the Curia Hostilia, where Marius had shut them up for safety from the conquering party.

Having made himself contemptible to both parties in the state, Marius quitted for a season Rome and Italy: on the other hand, Sylla began his career just at the same point of time, by canvassing for the higher public offices. He became pretor without having been ædile; and immediately afterwards found an opportunity in the Social War to show his martial qualifications in the most brilliant light, and to win the favour of an army, which afterwards, in the Mithridatic war, he made entirely his own by virtue of the spoils of Greece and Asia.

The disturbances in Rome, which gave occasion to the Social War, had their origin in the rigorous laws through which it was sought to prevent the introduction of the Italians into the Roman civic register,—a measure which was equally obnoxious to the mass of the poor citizens, who did not choose to share with others their right of suffrage, from which profit might be extracted, and to the aristocracy. In reliance on the city population, the consuls, Licinius Crassus and Mucius Scaevola, at length ventured to revive the law of Pennus passed u.c. 627, which prohibited a concourse of aliens to Rome on days of public assembly, and required all the Italian towns from time to time to recall their denizens. This measure set all Italy in commotion; the burghers of the different towns held assemblies, and formed close combinations with each other. It transpired, that the allies meant to take advantage of the festival of Jupiter Latialis, in order to revenge themselves on the Romans, or to extort the right of citizenship by violence. In the year of Rome 662, Livius Drusus, favoured at first by the senate, came forward with a series of proposals, whereby he hoped to please all parties equally; and as commonly is the case in such attempts at mediation, enlisted all alike among his enemies. He aimed at winning the poorer class of citizens
by allotments of land, and the wholly indigent by distribution of corn; to diminish the restless city populace by sending out colonies; to restore the courts of justice to the senators, and to compensate the knights for the lost tribunals, by making 300 knightly families senatorial. In behalf of the Italian allies, he proposed their admission on the rolls of Roman citizens.* The Livian laws (excepting the last) were carried; but their execution was difficult, if not impossible; the senate either procured the assassination of Drusus, or sanctioned it at least, inasmuch as it prohibited any proceedings against the murderers; and declared null and void all the Livian enactments, on the motion of the consul Philippus. Immediately thereafter, Varius made it a treasonable offence for any one to propose to confer the right of citizenship on the allies. On this the Marsians instantly took up arms, but were withheld from further advances by fair promises. Shortly afterwards, however, the war broke out in earnest. The Italians agreed to form an independent confederation; to compose a senate of deputies from the allied towns and states; and to elect questors, prætors, and consuls, from those states in rotation.

The number of Italian tribes which took part in the social war has been variously stated. It is conjectured by Micali, from a rare Samnite coin, on which eight men of different nations appear to be represented in the attitude of taking an oath, that the league was composed by eight principal nations. That the Samnites were amongst the most embittered against Rome at this epoch, he infers from another coin, on which the Samnite bull is represented in the act of setting his hoof on the Roman she-wolf.

The struggle which now began was tremendous; for the troops which had been furnished by the allies had formed, in general, the most effective part of the Roman army, and now confronted Rome with her own weapons. The only means of escaping from destruction, was to

* Lex de civitate sociis danda.
detach from the alliance some considerable number of states, and rather to confer the right of citizenship upon them, than to set at stake the existence and supremacy of the capital. This was done: the senate declared at the outset, on the motion of L. J. Cæsar, the consul, through the Julian law, that all the allied states which had not entered into the combination should receive the right of citizenship. In the following year, the jus Latinum was conferred upon the colonies across the Po. But the senate firmly refused terms to such of the allies as had openly commenced hostilities, and levied forces to meet those of the rebels, partly in Rome and Latium, in the Sabine district, in Etruria, and Umbria, where the people wavered, and were only retained in allegiance by the opportune concession of the civic rights, partly from Liguria and Lombardy (Gallia Cisalpina), both which latter districts of Italy vigorously supported the Romans. They were, however, compelled, in the course of the war, to arm the freedmen, and to form from among them twelve cohorts, in order to defend the coast from Cumæ to Ostia. Finally, after many defeats and victories, and after the fall of 300,000 brave men, the Romans were obliged to concede what they should have conceded at first, on the motion of Plautius Silvanus, who proposed that all the Italian allied states, which should have laid down their arms within sixty days, should receive the right of citizenship. But the states which had once taken up arms, now showed themselves obstinate; and the effusion of blood, and the desolation of Italy, continued for some time longer. The narrative of this inglorious struggle is obscure and imperfect. Its final termination will be presently found due to Sylla, the thread of whose achievements it is now time to resume.

The treatment shown by Sylla towards his soldiers; his adroitness, now in the application, now in the forgetfulness, of strict Roman discipline; his extortions in behalf of the soldiers; his humour, and his own propensity to those amusements and pleasures which he
permitted to those who toiled in his service; made him the idol of the army. His merits were so fully recognised, that, according to Velleius, he was chosen, almost unanimously, consul, in his forty-ninth year B.C. and appointed to the command of an expedition against Mithridates of Pontus. His army lay at that time in the neighbourhood of Nola: he had destined it to go with him to Asia, as he meant to leave with his colleague the troops which had been levied to finish the war in Italy.

He had travelled to Rome for investiture in his consularship, and proceeded into Campania for the completion of his levies, when intelligence reached him that violent popular tumults had broken out in the city, and that Marius was again there, endeavouring to obtain, by means of the people, command of the army against Mithridates, which the senate had conferred upon himself. The tribune Sulpicius paraded the streets, surrounded by armed bands, and a set of ruffians whom he called his anti-senate; and the Italians, who chimed to be inserted in the civic register, streamed in extraordinary numbers to the city, on the promise of Sulpicius to bring forward a law which should confer on them a greater share in the government.*

The law was proposed; thousands of the new citizens were in the town: both parties, the old citizens and the Italians, fought with sticks and clubs in the streets and on the forum; and the law was near being passed by force, when Sylla was summoned out of Campania to the aid of the senatorial party. The senate was assembled in the temple of Castor, and regularly blockaded by the people, because it had caused to be announced the measure, usual in extreme confusion, of an interruption of all public business. In the clamour which arose for the removal of this interdict, Sylla's

* He urged their distribution through all the tribes; whereas, in their first insertion into the register, they had either been thrown into the eight insignificant ones, or eight new tribes had been erected for them, whose suffrages had only then been demanded, when the old five and thirty gave no decision.
son-in-law was slain; his colleague escaped the hands of the mob with difficulty; and Sylla himself, to save his life, was compelled to take off the restriction of business, merely to be let out of the city. He betook himself to his army, while Sulpicius carried his law, and the appointment of Marius in Sylla’s stead, as commander-in-chief against Mithridates.

u.c. 655. This was the signal for military government in Rome, which henceforward began to be treated in the same manner by its own generals, as the whole world had already long been treated by the Romans. Sylla declared to the army, that might prevailed in the place of right at Rome; that the authority of the consuls was defied, and the old citizens oppressed by the new. He marched immediately on the city, without, however, communicating his ultimate intentions to the soldiery. The senate was kept under duress by Sulpicius and Marius; Sylla, consequently, despised the delegates nominally sent by it, but made use of the time spent in negotiation to occupy the Cælian gate, and the walls in the neighbourhood of the Esquiline. Pompey had occupied the Colline gate, with a legion; and another had gained possession of the wooden bridge; while a fourth remained in the neighbourhood as a reserve. Sylla himself hallooed on his troops to murder and plunder, and Rome was instantly stormed like a hostile town. The opposite party resisted long and bravely: when they were driven back, Marius vainly attempted to arm the slaves.* Rome now offered the aspect of a conquered city. Sylla’s route was tracked with burning streets and streams of blood. A price was set on the head of the tribune Sulpicius; but when the same extreme measure was proposed to be extended to Marius, the venerable augur, Q. Scævola, loudly expressed his dissent, and replied to Sylla,—“Thou mayest point in vain to the bands of soldiers with whom thou hast beset the court; thou mayest vainly reiterate menaces of death; thou never shalt bring me, for the sake of the

* Plut. Sylla, c. 9.
few drops of blood that creep in my old veins, to declare
Marius an enemy of his country, who has rescued this
city and Italy from destruction." Marius, by a sort of
miracle, escaped pursuit, after romantic adventures, and
made good his retreat at last to an island on the African
cost. The slaughter in Rome, on entrance of the
troops, did not extend to the heads, properly so called,
of the popular party; and accordingly, without new
scenes of bloodshed, or a formal proscription, Sylla could
not at present effect the complete revolution desired by
him.* But for this there was no time, as the expedition
against Mithridates required his instant departure from
Italy. He extorted a solemn oath from Cinna, consul
elect for the following year, that he would attempt no
alteration in his recent arrangements in the city; the
object of which was to curb the popular power, by re-
storing the mode of voting by centuries, instead of by
tribes; and to strengthen the authority of the senate,
while he increased its numbers. Cinna took the oath
without hesitation; but did not even wait for Sylla's
departure out of Italy, in order to commence new dis-
turbances.

Plutarch, in the life of Sertorius, reckons at 6000
the number of the slain in the party struggles before
Sylla's departure. This may, probably, be exaggerated;
but even Cicero names this contest a war, in a place
where he is treating of the bloodiest scenes of civil con-
tention.†

* Sylla's mode of proceeding is thus pithily stated by Cicero:—"Legionibus in urbem adductis, quos voluit expulit, quos potuit occidit."—
Philipp. xiv. c. 8.
† Philipp. xiv. c. 8.
CHAP. V.

WAR WITH MITHRIDATES. — SYLLA'S DICTATORSHIP.

MITHRIDATES VI., the reigning monarch of Pontus, a kingdom which had risen on the ruins of the Macedonian dynasties of Asia Minor, was a prince endowed with unerring tact in availing himself of circumstances, and extremely little scrupulous in the choice of means to his ends. He continued true to this character through his whole life. His first plans were not levelled against Rome: his aim was to unite under his sceptre all the barbarous nations round the Black Sea, the regions on the Maeotis and the Tanais, and, placing himself at the head of all the coast towns, to raise by their aid the barbarian tribes in their vicinage to the importance of a first-rate power. All the Greek towns on the Euxine, which had much to endure from the plundering Sarmatians and Scythians of Southern Russia, and the savage tribes of Caucasus, and were often entirely ruined by them, saw with pleasure the rise of a Greek empire of which they were destined to form integral parts.

When the king of Pontus had firmly established his power in a northern direction, prospects opened of rendering Asia Minor wholly dependent on him. But this was not so easy as his previous undertakings, in regions of which the Romans had no knowledge, and whither their arms had never as yet penetrated. Cappadocia and Bithynia now were in question,—two kingdoms which the Romans had long regarded as their tributaries—where the rapacity of their delegates found emolument, and the ambition of their great men employment. Bithynia was wholly in dependence on the Romans. Over Cappadocia, also, they had long assumed the guardianship.

Athens was the bulwark and head-quarters of Arche-
laus, who led over to Greece a division of Mithridates's army at the time when Sylla, attended by Lucullus and Muræna, crossed the sea, and marched on the above-named city. Sylla in the attack spared neither divine nor human property: he scrupled not to annihilate the most glorious works of art, and to despoil the region around Athens, the pleasure-groves and monument which, since the time of Plato and Aristotle, the whole world had regarded as things sacred and inviolable. Six times was the town stormed. The last time it was taken, and wasted with fire and sword: the monuments indeed, were spared; but the inhabitants were hunted down without mercy. Cruelties still greater would have been exercised, had not Meidias and Calliphon, and the other Athenians previously banished from the town on account of their Roman sentiments, thrown themselves in supplication at Sylla's feet. Afterwards, when he captured the Piræus, he destroyed by fire the monuments and buildings there. Among them was the masterpiece of Philo, the Athenian arsenal. Archelaus was well aware that he, with his barbarian horde, was no match for a Roman army, and therefore did not wish to come to a general action; but his fellow leader, Taxiles, had other views, and involved him in an engagement with the Romans. Archelaus was twice beaten, at Chæronea and Orchomenos. But Sylla had conceived so good an opinion of his military qualities, that on many occasions he testified his esteem for him in a manner which rendered him suspected to his king. Meanwhile Archelaus took advantage of Sylla's good dispositions, and the altered state of things in Rome, where Marius now again ruled, and Sylla's friends were mercilessly persecuted, to propose a peace on favourable terms to his master. Though Rome was in the hands of his enemies, and these had sent Valerius Flaccus, with a consular army, straight to Asia, to carry on the war which Sylla was waging in Attica and Bœotia, yet the latter rejected, with Roman pride, the proposal to cede Asia Minor to Mithridates, and in return to receive aid from him in
the imminent civil war. In Delium, near the strait which separates Euboea from Boeotia, Sylla and Archelaus held negotiations, the latter having full powers to finish the war on any conditions; since it was well foreseen by the crafty monarch that Sylla would soon be called away by intestine discords, and that a favourable occasion would then offer itself to him for retrieving all that any treaty could take from him.

In Asia, a new struggle seemed prepared for the army of Sylla, with another led by a chief of the Marian party. Cinna, in the preceding year, had raised Valerius Flaccus to the consulship along with himself; and the latter had crossed over to Greece with two legions, in order to take the command away from Sylla. He had not dared to seek out Sylla himself, but had carefully gone out of his way into Asia, in order to finish the war there, before Sylla had done his work in Greece. Flaccus, being no general, had gladly accepted Fimbria's offer to attend him in the quality of lieutenant, but the latter combined with first-rate talents as an officer, all the corruption of his age, and took advantage of the unskilfulness of his general for his own ends. Even in the march through Thessaly, Flaccus had excited such discontent by his severity in the army, that a part deserted to Sylla, and the rest were only diverted by Fimbria from following their example. Not long afterwards, Flaccus quarrelled with his lieutenant; and the latter employed his influence in the army, fell on the consul by surprise, slew him, and assumed the command, without commission from the state, and without any official character. How superior in these times was a Roman army to any other, and how intrinsically feeble the whole artificial power of Mithridates, was abundantly clear in this instance; for Fimbria chased the king, without the slightest trouble, from Pergamus, shut him up in Pitane, and would there have taken him captive, if Lucullus, to whom he sent a message, had aided him with his ships. But Lucullus would receive no communication from Fimbria, who had no right to
apply to him; still less would he assist him to conclude the war without Sylla. Mithridates, therefore, escaped to Mitylene, and from thence to his states.

Sylla must before have commenced negotiations with Fimbria's legions; for at Thyatira he set himself down at once at a very small distance from his camp, had friendly intercourse with his soldiers, and called upon Fimbria himself to lay down an unauthorised command. Fimbria answered, that Sylla had as little right to command as he. But, however firm his deportment, however earnestly he summoned the soldiers and officers to resist Sylla's authority, he could not move them to take up arms against their fellow citizens. The steadiness and self-possession shown by Fimbria, even when he found himself deserted by his truest friends and his whole army, and the death which he voluntarily chose in preference to Sylla's offers of safe-conduct homewards, would have been worthy of a better cause and a nobler-minded man.

While Sylla was concluding, for the present, the Mithridatic war, and plundering all treasures, sacred and secular, in Greece and Asia Minor, civil discord was raging in Italy, and victims were offered up by thousands to the restored ascendancy of Cinna and Marius. The former, having been declared by the senate to have forfeited the consulship by his factious motions in favour of the Italian allies and the exiled Marius, had maintained his place at the head of a consular army, whose numbers were swelled by deserters from that of his colleague, as well as by recruits from the country, and now brought Marius back to the very gates of Rome in triumph, in spite of the feeble resistance of his fellow consul Octavius, and of Metellus, whom the senate summoned in haste from service against the revolted allies who were still under arms. In this emergency it seemed better to capitulate with Cinna and Marius, than to expose Rome to the horrors of a storm. The senate accordingly offered to reinstate Cinna in the consulship, and rescind the sentence of Marius and the
other exiles, providing that, on their part, they would
spare the blood of their enemies, or, at all events, pro-
ceed against them according to the laws of the common-
wealth. Marius kept up a sinister reserve as to the
terms of the senate; pretending, first, that he was out-
lawed, and, consequently, could not, without a formal
decree of the people, re-enter the city; next, he
would not wait till all the tribes had given their votes
on the motion for his recall, which was laid before
them by the tribunes, but marched in as an enemy,
closed the gates, and put to death the most highly
respected, honourable, and eloquent men in Rome.
Merula, who was invested with the most sacred priestly
office, that of flamen dialis, died on the altar of Jupiter,
whose servant he was. Octavius was slain on the con-
sular chair in his robes of office. Catulus, who had
once been Marius's colleague in the Cimbrian war, was
driven to self-murder by the rigour of the unfeeling
old man. The rage of slaughter lasted five days and
nights in succession. All who could save themselves
fled to Sylla, or to Metellus and others who still com-
manded troops in Italy, who would not acknowledge
the newly restored faction and the tyranny of Marius and
Cinna. A senate assembled around Sylla, in opposition
to the senate of Marius. On the wild rage of his ene-
mies Sylla rested a firm confidence of introducing a new
order of things in Rome, and remodelling the whole
state so soon as he should have obtained possession of
Italy by force of arms, on which every thing now de-
pended. His opponents were in no slight consternation
at the intelligence of his victories in Greece. Old
Marius, the only man who competed with him and
his friends as a general, died on the seventieth day
of his seventh consulship. Valerius Flaccus, whom
Cinna took as colleague in the place of Marius, it has
been seen, was in no condition to snatch from Sylla the
Mithridatic laurels.

In the city, military measures, which Cinna had never
approved, ceased to be executed, but arbitrary govern-
ment went on. Cinna was a third time chosen as consul and took Papirius Carbo for his colleague. In the following year he was consul for a fourth time, and Carbo for a second time with him. This Carbo, who descended from a family perfectly odious to the aristocratic party, was, besides, an extremely incapable person; and his incapacity was of necessity doubly destructive to his party, when he came to stand alone at its head. Sylla brought his army to Dyrrachium,—all the efforts of the well-intentioned to reconcile parties had failed; Cinna, on his part, had assembled an army, and was resolved to seek out Sylla on the other side the Adriatic, when he was murdered by his own troops in Ancona. Carbo was not the man likely to execute what Cinna had failed in: the troops were untrustworthy, all the arrangements unskilful; the year was allowed to expire amidst preparations: When Sylla appeared in the neighbourhood of Tarentum, Scipio and Norbanus, men without talent, and as it should seem even without courage, had undertaken the consular office, and stood at the head of two separate armies, which were by no means very ardent devoted to them. Lucullus, Metellus, Crassus joined Sylla with their armies, and Cn. Pompeius, afterwards surnamed the Great, came forward for the first time so prominently about this epoch, that Sylla postponed even senators of consular rank to this young man who had never held any office of trust or dignity.

The preponderance of military talent was wholly on Sylla's side—the majority of the senate was in his camp—yet he could not march immediately upon Rome; and this year too elapsed without a decisive action. In Italy, meanwhile, murder, conflagration, and plunder went on, as the revolted Italians were the principal prop and strength of the opposite party to Sylla's. In the following year, Papirius Carbo was a third time consul, and adopted the young Marius as his colleague. The latter was beaten by Sylla, not far from Rome, at Sacripontus, and the first result of this defeat was a new scene of
slaughter at Rome, where all the friends of Sylla were murdered before he made his appearance; the second result was the blockade of the young Marius in Preneste. Before Preneste fell, Sylla had once more to contend before the gates of Rome with the Samnites, Campanians, and Lucanians, led by Lamponius, Telesinus, and Gutta, who had made themselves known as chiefs of the insurgents in the Social War. Sylla’s wing was overthrown; but Crassus, who led the other wing, with this obtained the victory, which Sylla abused remorselessly. Blood flowed in torrents; even the prisoners of war were cut to pieces, and that at the same moment when Sylla had assembled the senate before the town in the temple of Bellona. Immediately afterwards, Preneste was taken; and on this occasion, also, many thousand Samnites and Prenestines were slaughtered in cold blood. All this, however, was merely a prelude to what Sylla committed afterwards as dictator, in order completely to carry through his proposed reformations in the state. Never before, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus has well remarked, had the name of dictator been understood in the sense it was now taken by Sylla. Cæsar alone afterwards used the dictatorship in the same sense, but, according to his nature, less cruelly. In order to give some semblance of right to the despotic power which Sylla intended to exercise, he procured his nomination as dictator to be performed in an extraordinary manner. There was only a single example in Roman history of a dictator being elected by the people, namely, Fabius Maximus, after the battle of Thrasyrnene. This example was followed. The senate chose an interrex, who assembled the people, when it was ordained that a dictator should be elected in the person of Sylla for such time as might be necessary to remodel the government, and should be empowered to give the state such form and laws as he deemed most suitable.

A man who, like Sylla, combined in his own person all the accomplishments and all the corruption of his
times—who seemed to stand on a solitary eminence, whence all things human and divine, as well as the lives of thousands, and all human opinion, faith, and knowledge, appeared insignificant trifles; a man who had seen, suffered, and enjoyed whatever the world could afford, and was tired of it all,—who stood at the head of three and twenty legions, or 120,000 men (according to others, a double number), was more capable than Robespierre and St. Just, who had something of the sort in contemplation, of bestowing through the extirpation of one generation a wholly new constitution on another. He aimed at exterminating all that could offer resistance to his plans—at modelling a new constitution out of the forms of the old, with more extensive powers to the aristocracy—and putting an end to the malversations of persons in authority, as well as to the abuses of the tribunitian influence. He was as far, however, from finding in the upper classes, to whom he gave preponderance through massacre and proscription, as Robespierre and St. Just had been from finding in the populace, such a generation as would have been necessary to impart to the new system any stability and duration. However wise are the laws which have been named after him the Cornelian, and great part of which have been preserved by Justinian up to our own days; yet the measures which he took for giving rewards to his adherents and security to his new constitution were merciless. To set himself up as king or despot in Rome, formed no part of his plan; probably, because the honours of tyranny did not seem to him an equivalent for its troubles and anxieties. Meanwhile, to be ready in case of necessity to enforce his commands by voies de fait, he formed a sort of body-guard of the slaves of proscribed and murdered grandees, to whom he gave freedom and property, and who composed, under the name of Cornelians, a clientage of 10,000 men, indissolubly attached to Sylla’s fortunes. In like manner he made provision in Italy for the army which had served him in that country and in Asia, and
planted his true legionaries in the place of the extirpated population of whole districts. During two years Sylla retained the extraordinary powers which had been committed to him. In the first year he caused two consuls to be chosen as his subordinate officers—in the second he was consul and dictator at once in person, and took Metellus Pius for his colleague. In the third year, he not only declined the consulship, but quite unexpectedly laid down the dictatorship, convinced that he could resume his former dignity at any moment when it might be necessary.

To explain the multitude of victims offered to his rapacity, his plan of reformation, or his personal safety by Sylla, would lead too far into detail. Appian gives the number of the slaughtered at 100,000 Roman citizens, 2600 knights, 90 senators, and 15 men of consular rank.

It may be sufficient here to touch upon those regulations of which the object was to establish an aristocratic government, at a period when Sylla might have learned from his own experience, that a well-organised monarchy was the only form of government corresponding with the wants of the people, as well as those of his grandees. The senate, not the people, was in future to be ranked as the highest authority of the realm: thence the tribunes were deprived of their influence. It was decreed that senators only should be capable of that dignity, but should be excluded by acceptance of the tribuneship from every other magisterial function. The right of appeal to the people was taken away from them; that of intercession limited to certain defined cases, and subjected to the decision of the senate (as was already observed in narrating the agitations of the Gracchi). That body, greatly weakened by his proscriptions, and by the persecution under Cinna and Marius, was strengthened by Sylla, through the infusion of 300 knights, whom he caused to pass a regular election through the tribes. He increased the number of quaeors to twenty, that of praetors to eight, and ordained that offices should only be sought
by regular gradations. The high priests should again, as formerly, fill vacancies in their numbers by their own election, instead of being chosen by the people; their number was fixed at fifteen, like that of the augurs and the guardians of the Sibylline books. For all offices up to the consulship, he abolished the regulation, that a certain number of years must elapse before ascending from one to another; but ten years were to intervene betwixt every consulship. He restored to the senate the tribunals, withdrawn from it since the time of the Gracchi, and endeavoured to set limits, by severe regulations, to the abuses of judicial and administrative functions.

The principle followed by Sylla in his endeavours to establish a firm basis for his new institutions, lies in the answer given by him, in perfectly cold blood, on being asked when the executions should terminate. In the same style in which Robespierre, St. Just, and Couthon declared that all the enemies of the people must die, he openly pronounced that all his enemies must die; and in the execution of this threat he remained as little behind his word as did the above-mentioned heroes of the reign of terror in France.

While Sylla exercised sovereignty in Rome, Pompey raised himself to a height of reputation which involved him in an error with regard to the force of his own talents. Sylla, who regarded himself not as a great man, but as a man favoured by fortune, fancied he saw in the first occurrences of Pompey's life tokens of the same favour of fortune which had formerly thrown Jugurtha into his own hands, and procured him a share in the conquest of the Cimbrians.

Pompeius Strabo, the father, had, in the course of the Social War, laid waste, and repeopled with his dependants, the district of Picenum, and had consequently established there that species of influence which was required in order to fix the place for his family amongst the ruling houses of Rome in these times. In like manner, Syracuse was under the patronage of the Mar-
celli, Lacedæmon of the Claudii, the Allobroges of Fabius Sarga, Bononia of Antonius, &c. The enormous wealth amassed in the most disgraceful ways by his father enabled young Pompey still more to extend his family influence; so that, on Cinna’s death, without having held any public office, and without any legal commission or authority whatever, he assumed the functions of prætor at Auximum, and gathered round him the host of his Picenian dependants, and the relics of his father’s old army. Putting himself at the head of these volunteers, he joined Sylla, after gaining important advantages over the troops of the opposite faction; and Sylla was so delighted with his lawless vigour of conduct, that he saluted him, on meeting, with the name of Imperator; or, in Plutarch’s expression, he shared with a man who had no right even to sit in the senate, a title for which he was then contending with Marius and the Scipios. The same independent mode of proceeding, which Sylla at first received with applause, could not fail in the end to make him jealous of his youthful adherent. He did not, however, consider it advisable to give any provocation to a young man whose popularity with the troops already rivalled his own; and, on his retirement to his country estates in Campania, and death, in the course of the same year, Pompey came to be generally regarded as chief of the aristocratic party, and as heir of the influence exercised by Sylla on the soldiery. This appears on occasion of the quarrels which, immediately after Sylla’s death, broke out between the two consuls, Lepidus and Catullus. Æmilius Lepidus, the only one of the rapacious grandees of this period who seems to Cicero comparable with Verres, wished to avail himself of Sylla’s death and his own consulship to elevate himself to the head of a party: with these views, he proposed the recall of the exiles, the restoration of their property, and the abolition of all the Cornelian laws.

This proposal, in fact, amounted to nothing less than a new revolution, which could only be effected in the same
manner as the preceding one*; consequently, Catulus, and the senate with him, opposed it; but Lepidus, before even the time of his consulate was elapsed, betook himself to his province, Cisalpine Gaul, and here, and in Etruria, all the exiles who were robbed of their property, all who were unsteady and rambling, flocked to him in multitudes. He approached the city; but Pompey, by authority from the senate, who had renewed the Plautian law, declaring it capital to surround the senate with an armed force, and Catulus with him as consul, had occupied the Janiculum and the Milvian bridge, and drove Lepidus back: his army was scattered. However, the disturbances were not therefore appeased as yet. Lepidus kept his footing in Etruria, where he took a strong position on the promontory near Cosa; and his comrade, too, the praetor Brutus, seemed resolved to remain in Modena. Pompey was sent against both though he could not be said to have any other right to this command than his hereditary succession to the military dominion of Sylla, and the senate's apprehension of a new revolution. Pompey put a speedy termination to the business, and now took a station in Rome such as no one had ever attained before him.

* "Nam cum jure belli Sulla dictator proscripsisset inimicos; qui superabant, revocans Lepidum, quid alius quam ad bellum vocabantur? quomque damnatorum civium bona addicente Sullam quamvis male captam, jure tamen repetentur, repetitio eorum procul dubio labefactabant compositam civitatem." — Florus, I. iii. c. 23. s. 3.
CHAP. VI.

LUCULLUS, POMPEY, SERTORIUS.—SERVILE WAR.—PIRATE WAR.

The wars in Spain, in Dalmatia, on the Macedonian frontiers, the undertakings of the pirates, the servile wars in Italy and Sicily, occupied a considerable number of legions during this period, and gave the friends of Sylla opportunity enough to assert their position by force of arms. But their disunion among themselves rendered it easy for a man far superior to them all in spirit and talent to exalt himself, by unobserved steps, above them. Julius Caesar alone, among all the great men of the period, had rightly judged from the first that neither adhesion to the detested party of Marius, nor attempts to shine in the new aristocracy introduced by Sylla, could raise him to the height at which he aspired, as he felt himself worthy of it. He waited quietly till his time came, and encouraged, meanwhile, every alteration in the state which went to restore to the tribunes the power of which Sylla had despoiled them.

It has already been seen that Lepidus and Brutus were unlucky in their attempt at overthrowing the whole Syllan constitution; Turpilius, a tribune of the people, was bent, at least, on restoring the rights of the tribunes, even if he could not hope to effect a total revolution; he was, however, too insignificant to carry through such a project. Sicinius, who repeated some time afterwards the experiment of Turpilius, and even summoned before the tribunal of the people the consul Curio, who sturdily opposed him, is said to have atoned, with his life, the biting jests which he heaped upon Curio’s gesticulations and the gouty unwieldiness of his colleague. In all probability Curio had him murdered. This, however, did not prevent the affair again being agitated; this time,
indeed, with assent of one of the consuls. The tribune Opimius, supported by the consul Aurelius Cotta, carried through the restitution of the character of inviolability to the tribunate, the right of intercession, of proposing laws, and haranguing the people.

Four men of Sylla’s school, or, in other words, of the confidants and partners of his policy, stood at this time at the head of affairs, and attracted around them a court composed of all the other senators. Of these the most powerful was Pompey, Crassus the richest, Lucullus the most splendid, and Metellus the noblest, till he yielded, in Spain, to the vices of his age. All four appeared either together or in succession at the head of the affairs of the state, or as leaders of the armies which were levied in Spain against the native inhabitants and the relics of the party of Marius, in Italy against the slaves, in Asia against Mithridates and the pirates.

Sertorius, who had held command in Spain under the Marian party, and had served that party actively in Italy, on its ruin in the latter country hastened back to Spain, and found no difficulty in resuming possession of the province, but by Sylla’s command was soon again expelled from it by Annius, who was sent thither by the dictator with not inconsiderable forces. He was compelled to fly to Tingis on the Mauritanian coast, where he soon gathered around him all the Romans, Italians, Spaniards, and others, who either fled from the dread of Sylla’s system of terror, or had actually escaped the general massacre; and among these so great a number of eminent senators of the Marian party, that he was borne out in affirming that Rome’s legitimate government consisted not in the new senate of Sylla at Rome, but in the old one which he had brought together in Africa.

Sertorius combined with all the talents of a Roman general the qualities of a second Viriathus, and his manner of life to the last was completely adapted to that of the Spanish tribes, who attached themselves with the greatest ardour to him. He was in the neighbourhood of the Ebro when Metellus was sent against
him. The latter, indeed, drove him from the Ebro, and advanced to the sea coast; but neither he nor his soldiers could endure the hardships and privations of a war which was sometimes wholly left to the conduct of the native Spaniards, and waged by them in their own peculiar manner, sometimes again conducted in the Roman mode by Sertorius. The war was drawn out into length. Sertorius formed a regular government, and an army of Spaniards, disciplined in the Roman fashion, and at length entered into alliance with Mithridates, the latter having recommenced the war, and having offered a place of refuge, at his court, to the adherents of Marius.

From various causes, vehement apprehension was excited by the movements in Spain; a wish was also perhaps felt to remove Pompey from Italy. He was therefore sent to Spain with a second army. His destination there was to partake the command with Metellus, with the title of proconsul, though up to this time he had held none of the higher administrative functions.

In the following year, Metellus, as well as Pompey, were successful in an attack on certain Spanish towns, and in desultory actions with Sertorius's subordinate officers. But in the battle between Pompey and Sertorius on the Sucro (Xucar), the advantage was on both sides so exactly equal, that Sertorius would have renewed the action the next day, had not Metellus, come up to Pompey's aid with his whole army. From thenceforward the Roman generals combined all their movements; though each remained at the head of his own army. Sertorius, however, never showed himself in a light more brilliant than at that epoch, and this year also elapsed without any incident of importance in Spain. In the following year, Metellus and Pompey again divided their forces, in order each to carry on the war in separate districts.

The nature of the ground in Spain, and the manner in which the war was carried on by Sertorius, and especially by his bands of native Spaniards, made the pro-
visioning of the Roman army a matter of great difficulty. Metellus had, therefore, applied to Rome, but a terrible dearth in that town obliged the senate to yield to the urgent petitions of the people, and to apply the sums intended for Spain to the purchase of grain for the capital. Pompey, who had employed on the Spanish war a large part of his own fortune, was on the point of returning with his army to Italy, and that at a time highly inconvenient to Lucullus, who therefore gave himself all possible trouble to procure the transmission of the requisite reinforcements and supplies in money. Sertorius, nevertheless, maintained his footing during the whole following year against the combined Roman armies; and if he sunk in the succeeding year, his fall was effected solely by the senseless ambition and ludicrous conceit which urged his lieutenant Perpenna to spirit up the insurgent army against their heroic leader. Many of the Spaniards fell off; many Romans deserted to Metellus; Sertorius himself became embittered, harsh, unmerciful, and Perpenna had him finally removed by assassination, but found himself very much mistaken in his calculations of an advantageous peace, or a continuance in the chief command. The Spaniards shrank with horror from the murderer of their general, and with his Romans alone he was no match for Pompey: he was accordingly beaten, captured, and, on Pompey's command, despatched without more ceremony.

The honour of the victory and consequent subjugation of Spain was, indeed, divided between Metellus and Pompey, as both obtained a triumph; but the favour of the people was bestowed on Pompey exclusively; for it was he whom fortune had crowned in all his enterprises, and who understood so to use her favours as to grace middling abilities with the show of innate greatness of mind. While Pompey was in Spain, Crassus had done highly important service to the state by putting an end to a servile war in Italy, which was doubly dangerous to Rome, as her armies were already engaged in three different quarters, and agriculture and
pasturage in Italy were exposed to the risk of ruin, not only through the revolt itself, but even through the victory, and the massacre among the slaves inevitably consequent on it.

The oligarchy, who pushed aside and extirpated the free population of Italy, to supply its place with slaves, may well be deemed the authors of the Servile War. Chance, it is said, prompted some of those unfortunate beings, who were selected from the strongest and most agile of the slaves for gladiators, to betake themselves to flight, in the hope of either reaching a place of refuge, or, in the worst event, of dying with arms in their hands on a nobler arena than that of the amphitheatre. Chance provided them with arms, procured them a leader in the Thracian Spartacus, and in a short time the number of slaves and poor mountaineers who made common cause with them increased so much, that they took and plundered several towns in Campania, and made an attempt on Capua, which failed, indeed, but, however, proved their numerical strength and daring. Soon afterwards they formed communications as far as Lucania with the shepherds who kept the numerous herds of the oligarchs. These shepherds and mountaineers were rendered hardy by their occupation; they were admirably fitted for mountain warfare, and had acquired the art of riding in the plain. They united themselves with the Thracians, Cimbrians, and Germans, who were led by Spartacus. Among the gladiators who were let loose from the various fighting-schools, the Gauls were exceedingly numerous, and formed an army apart, under Ænomaus and Crixus. These last hordes attempted to hinder the praetor, Vatinius Glaber, who was sent with a Roman army against them, from falling behind the Apennines, and atoned for their audacity by a defeat. The Gallic division was beaten, Ænomaus left dead on the field; while Spartacus, on the other hand, entered Lucania at the head of more than forty thousand men. Here he cut to pieces the whole Roman army with which the praetor had attempted to enclose him;
arrayed his men in the arms seized from the enemy; Metapontum became the spoil of the slaves; they endeavoured to establish themselves in Thurium, and Spartacus seemed intent on establishing order, obedience, discipline, and some degree of regular organisation. It should seem that this attempt was not successful, and that he could not even set any sort of limit to the wild waste of the hordes at whose head he stood. However, at the close of the first year's campaign he had brought matters so far, that the prætor to whom the conduct of the war was committed, was obliged to abandon to him the whole district from Acerenza to Reggio (i.e. Basilicata and Calabria), where he also maintained his footing during the following year.

Spartacus had meanwhile time to become convinced that in the long run nothing was to be done with his undisciplined hordes. He called on his army to use the opportunity to decamp with the spoils of the towns and districts wasted by them, to disperse themselves across the Alps, and return to their respective countries. As, however, Crixus and his men opposed this proposition, the army divided in two; Crixus, with his Gauls, pursued his devastating march through Apulia, and along the coast of the Adriatic sea; while those who came from Thrace and the neighbouring regions, and with them the Lucanians, followed Spartacus, who meant to move along the line of the Apennines to the Alps.

The Romans at length took up the matter seriously; u.c. the consuls of the year were sent to meet the slave armies. The consul Gellius marched with the prætor Arrius against Crixus, who had penetrated up to Monte Gargaro, and after having won an insignificant advantage, gave himself up to a besotted security. He was cut off with his whole army. Spartacus, on the other hand, sufficiently proved to the Roman leaders, that in prudence and in judgment he was far their superior. The Roman general wished, as his army stood in the enemy's presence, to attack the slaves in concert with
his colleague, but was utterly routed before the eyes of that colleague, to whom Spartacus had barred up the way. Gellius suffered, in like manner, a defeat on the same day. The prætor Manlius, and the proconsul Cassius, had collected several thousand men in Upper Italy, but they fixed themselves in separate encampments, and the number of their troops was insignificant: these also were routed, and Cassius lost his life.

From this moment nothing could have hindered Spartacus from pursuing his route across the Alps. The Po was, indeed, swollen, and all the vessels moored on the opposite shore. It would, however, have been easy to effect a passage over the river. It was now that, to his misfortune, he formed the determination to march upon Rome. Athwart this march the prætor Arrius threw himself, having assembled a regular force in the Picenian district. Here he gave battle to the insurgents, who advanced in great numerical force, and the Romans were again beaten.

This action was the climax of the fortune, and at the same time the goal of the career of these insurgents, against whom an experienced, if not eminently able general, Crassus, a leading oligarch, was now sent as prætor. Crassus had acquired some fame as a general from the circumstance, that Sylla had been indebted to him for his last and most important victory. He now led into the field all that was left of the consular army, and six complete newly levied legions. He called, moreover, the veterans of Sylla's campaigns to arms; and Spartacus soon perceived that he was now in presence of an enemy very different from any whom he had hitherto encountered. He was forced to renounce his attack on Rome, and, even when he withdrew towards Lucania, Crassus followed him closely. Both leaders avoided with equal adroitness a general engagement, but Crassus cut to pieces in detail all the divisions which ventured to any distance from the main army of Spartacus, and drove it at last into the farthest corner of the Abruzzo. Here Spartacus opened negotiations with
the pirates, in order to obtain a passage to Sicily. The project failed; the slave army consequently encamped in the Sila forest, where Crassus shut it up with a wall and trench. Nothing else remained for the slaves than either to perish by sheer hunger, or to storm the Roman entrenchments. They chose the latter alternative, surprised the Romans, scaled their walls, and found themselves happily liberated.

The first consternation at Rome was such, that, perhaps on Crassus’s own suggestion, the idea was entertained of recalling Pompey out of Spain. The senators, however, recovered their self-possession, on learning that the hitherto united slaves had fallen out among themselves, and that their several divisions had formed separate encampments. It was now that Crassus himself apprehended Pompey being sent to his side, and thus enabled to reap where he had sown; he, therefore, sought to bring the whole affair to a speedy decision. As, formerly, under Crixus, so now, the Gauls had isolated themselves from the rest of the army; they had formed a separate camp, and accordingly they first were cut off. Immediately afterwards, Spartacus was reduced to a situation so desperate, the only choice remaining to him was, either to begin the engagement under the most unfavourable circumstances, or to surrender himself and his army at discretion into the enemy’s hands. He chose the former alternative, and found what he sought—a heroic death.

While Crassus chased the separate scattered members of the army, and cut them down on the spot, or consigned them to execution in cold blood, one division of some thousand men escaped his observation, and reached Upper Italy just at the moment when Pompey had arrived there on his return from Spain. The latter had the good fortune to capture this remnant, and was mean enough publicly to claim a share in the glory of Crassus on the strength of this achievement. This of itself was enough to have produced a quarrel, even if both had not been already at bitter variance; as Crassus had been

v 2
long in the habit of ridiculing the surname of Great, which Pompey had received so prematurely. Pompey, however, possessed in such a distinguished degree the public favour, that Crassus durst not attempt to obtain the consulship without being assured of his concurrence. Pompey was raised to the consulship simultaneously with Crassus, without having been previously invested with any of the other magisterial functions, which, according to old usage and recent law, were not to be overleaped. As Metellus, Crassus, Lucullus, had their adherents in the aristocracy, Pompey could only humble them through the favour of the multitude; consequently, even during his consulship, he showed himself in the character of a man of the people, and thus, in effect, undermined the establishments of Sylla, which he had helped to base in bloodshed and proscription. Since this epoch, we find Pompey fairly established as the popular idol, and invested with an undisputed autocracy. Amidst the loud applauses of the people, the tribune Gabinius moved for his appointment as commander-in-chief by land and sea, from Spain as far as Syria; and delivered to him a military power which had hitherto been entirely without precedent. This took place on occasion of the protracted war with the pirates;—a maritime contest no less strange in its character than the Servile War. Of this contest, previously to the share in it now taken by Pompey, we proceed to recount the more important particulars.

The Rhodians, so long as they had a considerable land force and fleet, maintained a very efficient maritime police; and even if they could not wholly prevent the depredation of the numerous coast towns on the south coast of Asia Minor, and the islands, set, however, certain limits to it. Since the jealousy of the Romans, who had at that time no naval power whatever in those regions, no longer allowed Rhodes the possession of a fleet of war, and especially since the subjection of Carthage and Corinth, piracy became a lucrative trade. Already had the towns and islands exercising this trade entered into regular alliances, supported by the kings of Egypt and
Cyprus, against those of Syria, with whom they were in a state of constant hostility. They had established a slave-market in Phaselis and Delos, where several thousand slaves were often disposed of at a single sale.

The Romans tolerated this nuisance as long as they were not immediate sufferers; they even received, through the agency of these pirates, the requisite supplies of slaves of Syrian, Minor Asiatic, and Greek descent and education. They connived at the abuse the rather, as Scipio Numantinus, after a visit of observation to the Asiatic courts, acquainted them that the Syrian kings, like those of Egypt before them, from reasons of state and finance, protected the pirates.

When the Romans gained the mastery of almost the whole of Asia Minor, the matter touched them somewhat more nearly. But by this time these marauders had whole fleets on the high seas, and either beat those which were sent against them, or, if they themselves were occasionally beaten, soon showed themselves again in threefold strength. The islanders of the Egean sea, the inhabitants of the coasts of Pontus, Pamphylia, Rhodes, Crete, Cyprus, found the traffic lucrative, and equipped privateers—families of consequence embarked on the same bottom with them; and even Roman delegates made formal contracts with the pirates, and partook their profits. After the first Mithridatic war, as Mithridates protected them, and Sylla had neither time nor inclination to pursue them, they not only plundered mariners, but towns and temples, ravaged the coasts, landed in Italy, carried off travellers, magistrates, women and children, extorted from them exorbitant ransoms, and rendered communication with Rome insecure, and the provisioning of the metropolis often difficult, sometimes wholly impossible. Thereby the Romans were driven at last to serious measures against them, and determined to attack them at their head-quarters. This employment was entrusted to the proconsul Publius Servilius Vatia, who took with him as lieutenants, Labienus,
Caesar, who entertained a personal spite to the pirates, in whose custody he had been, and Valerius Flaccus.

This expedition, to all outward appearance, had the most brilliant result; but the number of towns and states was so considerable, which exercised this predatory traffic, that immediately after the triumph of Servilius the seas were as unsafe again as before. It certainly seems as if the issue would have been more decisive, if the command for the subsequent year had been left to Servilius, in order to seek the robbers out in the skulking holes which remained to them. Instead of this, one of the consuls, the year in which Servilius had finished his undertaking, was destined to succeed him. The consuls of the year were Lucius Cotta and Octavius; of these the first received another employment, the second fell ill, and Cethegus and Præcia, who distributed at that time public functions in Rome, procured the delegation of this weighty affair to their worthy associate, M. Antonius, son of the famous orator. Him we know from Cicero's discourse, as a worthy precursor of Verres. Without talent, without principle, as his history evinced; he was misled by those around him, negotiated with the pirates, and even shared their spoil with them. The Cretans alone were destined to be punished for having associated with Mithridates, and taken part in the piracies; but Antonius conducted himself very injudiciously. He was beaten in a sea fight, but fortunately died immediately afterwards of a fever.

The Cretans now in vain attempted to conjure down the storm which threatened them from Rome; a manifest defeat must of necessity be avenged by the senate, unless the Cretans voluntarily accepted such conditions as left no pretext remaining to Hortensius and others who insisted on war. And truly the Cretan nobility would have acquiesced in any demand. But the people were unmanageable, and the Romans sent the consul of the previous year, L. Metellus, to Crete. The war was now waged on both sides with unheard-of fury and cruelty. Metellus seemed bent on the utter extirpation
of the Cretans; the latter made a desperate defence: victory, indeed, remained finally with Metellus, who received the surname of Creticus, but he was disabled from taking any farther measures against the pirates; and while he was carrying on the war with Crete, the latter gained continual accessions of power and numbers. How much they had increased is clear from the circumstance that when Metellus went to Crete, they laid regular siege to Syracuse; and that from fear of privateers, the transport of goods to Rome was almost stopped.

The consequent rise of prices rendered the motion of Gabinius to give Pompey unlimited powers over the sea and sea-coast, as far as thirteen miles inland, in order to be able to attack the pirates on every point at once, so acceptable, and public confidence in Pompey was so absolute, that Cicero cannot paint in colours lively enough the noisy jubilation of the people. The dearth of bread in the town was instantly mitigated, as the confidence of the corn contractors in Pompey's measures was boundless. Pompey, indeed, made as if he did not at all desire the enormous powers, the immense army, and influence thereto annexed, over the numerous senators holding commissions under him. Nevertheless, he took good care to bring together a multitude of his country friends into town, who filled the forum and temples, and struck terror by their threats into all who offered any opposition to Gabinius, as was vainly attempted by both consuls, and even by two of the tribunes. The motion of Gabinius passed amidst loud acclamations, and Pompey, when he entered the city, and deigned to accept the enormous power conferred on him, demanded and accepted, in addition, almost as much again as Gabinius had proposed, although even this had already appeared exorbitant. The event corresponded entirely with the anticipations. Forty-nine days after Pompey's departure from Italy, which took place in the autumn, the war was ended, the pirates had surrendered themselves, were transplanted from their skulking holes into other regions, and the sea and the sea coasts restored
to security. The Cretans had recourse to Pompey for
refuge from the exterminating warfare of Metellus, and
found him well disposed to put in force against Metellus
his commission, in which Crete was included. This,
however, he did not succeed in doing. But on the other
hand he received, through another tribune, command in
chief in the war against Mithridates, and exercised im-
perial power, from thenceforwards, as far as Mesopo-
tamia and Arabia. ¶
CHAP. VII.

ASIATIC CONQUESTS OF POMPEY.

While the Romans had enough to do with Sertorius, the Servile War, and the pirates, Tigranes of Armenia, whose new monarchy also comprised the last portions of Syria held by the dynasty of Seleucus, and Mithridates; became the principal powers of Asia, and entered into a closer alliance. Tigranes (B.C. 76.) overran Cappadocia, and Mithridates fell upon Bithynia, which the Romans claimed as a heritage left them by Nicomedes III. To conquer Cappadocia was not the object of Tigranes; he only wished to accomplish a scheme in which he had previously been thwarted by the Romans, i.e. to transplant the population of this territory into his own states. He is said to have dragged away more than 300,000 men, but the numbers do not admit of precise calculation. Before Mithridates this time invaded the Roman provinces, he sought to secure himself, by improvements in discipline, against the superiority of the Roman tactics, which he had sufficiently experienced in the course of the last war.

When Mithridates recommenced hostilities, both consuls, Cotta and Lucullus, sought and received the v. c. command of the armies against him. Mithridates had overrun Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, and Bithynia; but Lucullus occupied Phrygia with nearly 40,000 veteran troops, and Cotta had likewise under him a considerable body of troops. Mithridates could, therefore, easily be attacked on two sides; but Cotta dreaded the necessity of sharing the honour of victory, and ventured an engagement while Lucullus yet remained at a considerable distance from Bithynia. This battle was lost, and Cotta compelled to throw himself into the neighbouring town of Chalcedon. Mithridates immediately closely invested Chalcedon; but, Lucullus making his appearance and impeding his communications, could not maintain himself
in his position with the enormous multitude which he had brought with him. He raised the siege and fell back upon Troas, but immediately after began the siege of Cyzicus.

After lengthened and fruitless operations against Cyzicus, at the most inclement season of the year; after the surprisal and destruction of the greater part of his army by the consuls, and the destruction of almost his whole fleet by that of Rome and by tempest, Mithridates still proceeded to form new fleets and new armies from the remotest part of his empire, while Lucullus sought to obtain possession of the fortified towns on the coast, in order to close against him the maritime ports of his own territory. He gladly received the capitulation of such towns as voluntarily opened their gates; granted them freedom from military burdens, and allowed them to retain their old constitutions, to the great discontent of the legions, as well as the jobbers and usurers in their train, who found themselves deprived of their accustomed and various sources of plunder.

Meanwhile, the farther Lucullus forced his way the more arduous became his undertaking; for he not only arrived at unknown and impervious regions, but had also to engage in harassing sieges, and to contend with a foe exhaustless in expedients. It is not, therefore, surprising, that in the third year of the war (u.c. 683.) Lucullus still held Amisus in a state of siege, and was forced to struggle in earnest near Cabira with Mithridates, who had returned from the remoter parts of his kingdom. Fortune at length favoured the Romans; a panic terror spread itself through Mithridates's army: when he attempted to lead them out of a region where provisions failed, his soldiers disbanded, his generals either perished or were taken prisoners; he himself only escaped the pursuit of the Romans with difficulty, and betook himself to Tigranes of Armenia.

Plutarch gives us an account of an embassy despatched to Tigranes, by Lucullus. He had chosen for this office the proudest member of the proudest family in Rome, his brother-in-law Appius Claudius, who, with-
out experience in life and affairs, on his first audience summoned the king either to deliver up Mithridates, or prepare himself for war with the Romans. Accosted in this manner in the presence of his own court, an oriental prince could reply no otherwise than Tigranes did:—He should know how to defend himself. Lucullus was thus plunged into new difficulties. Pompey lay on the coast with an immense force, and with yet more imposing titles of authority. He himself received no reinforcement, was at variance with his knights, and remained some time quietly at Sardes. But regarding the Armenian war as a trifle, he commenced his march, with only two legions, against the distant metropolis of Tigranocerta. His expedition was prosperous: he climbed the Taurus, crossed the Euphrates, reached the coast of the Tigris, beat a detachment of troops sent against him, and invested Tigranocerta.

The disorder of oriental hosts, and presumption of their leaders, gave an inevitable victory to the few thousands whom Lucullus led against myriads into the field. Tigranes was beaten, the new capital Tigranocerta taken, even the ancient royal seat of the Armenian kings, Artaxata, menaced, and all Armenia would have come along with this town into the hands of the Romans, had it not happened, as it often does, that the highest point of Lucullus's fortune was also the beginning of his reverses.

The rough climate in northern Armenia, the snow-topped mountains, the shocking roads, the rudeness of the inhabitants, gave the soldiers, long excited against Lucullus, a pretext for sturdily refusing to march further, or persist in the siege of Artaxata. He endeavoured in vain to win them by the conquest of Nisibis, and by the plunder of that opulent town. The soldiers were discontented with having passed at the outset two winters encamped before Cyzicus and Amisus, with never having been under a roof since, and, last of all, with having been compelled, even in summer, to carry on a wintry campaign in Upper Armenia. The demagogues
in Rome, who could not endure the aristocratic Lucullus, (while they worshipped as a god the ambitious Pompey although he had been Sylla's sword and poniard), caused his command to be taken from him. Lucius Quintius, one of the prætors, especially urged the recall of Lucullus, on the ground, that though in possession of Cilicia, the coasts of Asia Minor, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, Pontus, Armenia, and the whole country as far as the Phasis, even after he had taken the royal residence, from motives of self-interest he prolonged the war, as though his mission had been, not to conquer kings, but utterly to strip them of their possessions.

To complete the evil fortune of Lucullus, Mithridates chose the moment while he loitered with his legions in the enervating climate of Mesopotamia, to take advantage of his absence, and make an attempt on his old kingdom. He was received with exultation: all flocked around him. Pontus renewed its allegiance to him: he took possession of Cappadocia; and Fabius, the commander of the Roman troops which had been left behind, escaped, not without trouble, to Cabira, where he was closely blockaded by Tigranes, so soon as the latter had obtained some advantages over Fannius in Armenia. Fabius was superseded, indeed, by Triarius, and the latter gained at the outset some insignificant advantages; but Mithridates afterwards beat him completely at Dadasa. Here the whole Roman army would have been swept away, if a severe wound had not held the king back from following up the already acquired victory. The whole of Pontus was reconquered, all the Romans expelled, when Lucullus, being at length informed, marched from Mesopotamia, where he had hitherto remained in hopes of inducing his army to make an expedition against the Parthians. It was his own brother-in-law, Appius Claudius, who stirred up the army against him, and openly sanctioned the mutiny of the soldiers. They had already long been at variance with each other, and he now announced quite openly to the legions, which had become completely
corrupted in Mesopotamia, that they no longer owed Lucullus any military obedience, that his province had been transferred by the senate to Glabrio, and that in Rome they thought of subordinating Glabrio's command to Pompey, as well as that of the army against Pontus. It was in vain for Lucullus to expel his brother-in-law from the army; it was in vain for him to direct his march against Pontus, in order to reconquer it ere Glabrio, who had already landed in Asia, should have assumed the command. His legions refused to render him any military service, as a decree of the senate had taken the command from him. Glabrio promulgated this decree through all the provinces, and summoned all the troops away from Lucullus. Glabrio, however, durst not show himself in the army, having learned with what audacity the legions had refused to obey Lucullus's orders for marching against Tigranes, and how perilous the state of affairs had become in Pontus and Cappadocia.

Considering that Glabrio kept aloof in Bithynia, that Lucullus was deserted by his troops, that the two allied kings had recovered their territory, and were more powerful than ever, it may be conceived how even men who deserve credit for true patriotism, such as Cicero, for example, even without private ends, might sanction the proposal of the tribune Manilius, whereby the even now enormous power of Pompey was still farther increased by dominion over the whole of the eastern world. Pompey had distributed his lieutenants, all consulars or pretorians, from the Straits of Gibraltar to those of Constantinople, in such a manner, that the pirates only here and there ventured to offer resistance, and for the most part made a voluntary surrender: 368 galleys were either captured or sunk by him, 120 harbours rendered unserviceable, 10,000 pirates slain, and 20,000 taken prisoners, towards whom he conducted himself with signal wisdom and clemency. With such of them as had not grown old in the predatory trade, he repeopled those districts of Cilicia which Tigranes had depopulated, particularly the region of Mallos, Abana, and Epiphania: Soli was
made entirely a new town of, and denominated thenceforth Pompeiopolis. Even Dyne in Peloponnesus, received a new population from Cilicia, and was converted anew from a desolate spot to a highly populous town. From whom could a termination to the long and harassing war with Mithridates and Tigranes be more rationally expected, than from a man to whom so boundless a power had previously been given? Boundless, indeed, was the power which Pompey received through the Manilian law. But at that time he was the idol of the people; and Cæsar, as well as Cicero, spoke in favour of the motion, because they hoped in this manner best to flatter the people, and appropriate a share of the favour lavished upon Pompey. Catulus and Hortensius, however, raised their voices against a proposal, by virtue of which the whole aristocracy was made dependent on one man. The law passed notwithstanding, and the issue corresponded with the expectation of both parties, the friends of Pompey and those of the old constitution. The war was ended gloriously; the friends of the all-powerful general acquired treasures and dignities, the people largesses, spectacles, games; but none believed any longer in the republic. All that was now asked was, whether Pompey was to remain in tranquil possession of understood supremacy, or whether another would find means to appropriate his power, and gain mastery over the state and over the citizens.

The ill feeling exhibited by Pompey towards Lucullus on taking his command from him, the petty jealousy prompting him immediately to alter whatever had been done or arranged by the other, engendered the bitter hostility which afterwards produced a threefold schism in the Roman aristocracy, at a time when it should have united its whole force against a man who, unobserved, alienated from Pompey, and attracted to himself the popular favour. For the rest, the event of the operations which Pompey now undertook against Mithridates and Tigranes could not possibly be doubtful, as he had not only command of a tenfold greater power
than his predecessor, but had succeeded in forming negotiations with Phraates of Parthia, concerning a treaty which Lucullus had never seriously intended. Unconditional surrender of his kingdom and his person into the hands of the Romans, and surrender of all deserters, were the only terms of peace offered by Pompey to Mithridates. Mithridates, however, thought that he might still accept a peace which threw himself and his territory entirely into the hands of his enemies, after he had ventured his utmost. Accordingly he encamped over against Pompey, and took up such an excellent position, that the latter did not consider it advisable to attack him. Instead of venturing an engagement, Pompey surrounded the adverse army, enveloped it at length entirely, and kept it six weeks in a state of siege. But Mithridates knew the ground better than the Romans; he slipped with his army through the Roman posts, and reached the mountain pass which led to the Euphrates. Here, however, Pompey had anticipated him; near the place where he afterwards built his triumphal town (Nicopolis), he had occupied the sides of the valley through the middle of which Mithridates must pass, and finally attacked him to advantage. The liberal accounts of the Romans reckon at 20,000 the number of the enemy slain in this attack; the army of Mithridates was dispersed, and only single divisions made their escape to Armenia. Mithridates himself, after this overthrow, at first sought refuge with Tigranes, but the latter was at variance with his own family; that is to say, with the grandsons of Mithridates. He had caused two of his sons to be put to death, and was engaged in such a quarrel with the third, that the latter afterwards leagued himself against him with Pompey. His court was, therefore, no place of abode for the king of Pontus, who fled to Dioscurias in Colchis, and from thence into his Bosporan kingdom, or the territory betwixt the Don and the Dnieper.

Pompey, now in possession of all the states of the fugitive monarch, was in no haste to pursue him, but,
like an oriental despot, founded a large city near the Araxes and Euphrates, Nicopolis, for peopling which he provided in the same manner as Nebuchadnezzar and Tigranes had done for theirs. Crowds of men were removed, by his orders, from other towns and regions, and, moreover, a considerable number of Romans, especially invalids and poor, whom he wished to provide for, were located along with the natives. At this time Pompey was in treaty with the young Tigranes, to be spared the necessity of a troublesome campaign, and to obtain with ease, through the schism in the royal family, what he would otherwise have had to obtain, with much more difficulty, through warfare. The son of the king of Armenia had married the daughter of the Parthian monarch, and, by aid of his father-in-law, had robbed his father of most part of Armenia. He was already laying siege to him in his capital of Artaxata, when the inroad of Tartarian hordes forced the Parthian king to draw off his forces, and to leave his son-in-law to his fate; on which the latter, pursued by his father's vengeance, threw himself into the arms of Pompey, and marched with the Roman army against Artaxata. The old tyrant, as mean in misfortune as arrogant in prosperity, sent a supplicating embassy to Pompey, nay, even came in person out of his stronghold as a humble petitioner, and abandoned himself, and all he possessed, to the discretion of the Roman general. Pompey had no idea of keeping Armenia, its retention being attended with great difficulty and slight advantage, nor did he wish to make the young Tigranes great and powerful at the expense of the old. He, therefore, guaranteed to the latter possession of Armenia Proper, on condition of leaving Sophene to his son, and all the lands on this side the Euphrates to the Romans. The expectations of the young Tigranes were wholly deceived by the treaty; he considered himself overreached by Pompey, withdrew himself secretly, and possessed himself, in the province of Sophene, which was destined to him, of a little fortress, which had expressly been excepted from
his allotment, on account of his father's treasures being deposited there. But as Pompey feared lest the resolute youth might league himself with his father-in-law, he attacked him, and had him laid in chains. He was afterwards led in triumph at Rome.

After the war with the young Tigranes, Pompey remained in Armenia during the whole winter, and when, at last, he broke up his quarters, pushed northwards as far as the Kur. However, the wary Roman did not consider it advisable to contend with the wild inhabitants of Georgia, Mingrelia, and Imiretta, in their own impassable mountains and savage defiles, so that he speedily retraced his route to Armenia. He occupied all the forts and towns of Pontus, carried off the treasures and collections of Mithridates, arbitrarily gave the priestly principality of Comana to the sons of the traitor Archeclus, shared Sophene betwixt the Galatian prince Deiotarus, who had done him good service, and the king of Cappadocia, who abdicated his government in favour of his son, Ariobarzanes II., if the name of government can be given to a slavery under the Romans, at whose discretion and pleasure he was forced to oppress his own subjects. The adroitness which distinguished Pompey on all occasions, he also displayed in his treaty with the Parthian king. Instead of provoking him, and entangling himself in 'ticklish undertakings in the remote East, he proceeded by way of negotiation. We do not know precisely what was the issue of the first transactions; but when the Romans had conquered Syria, Tigranes fell out with the Parthian king, and Pompey, who was applied to for aid by both parties, seized the opportunity of coming forward as mediator, and of accrediting this mediation in Rome as the solemn award of an umpire.

Pompey marched towards Syria, as the prospect of an easy conquest and great booty invited him from that quarter. He was especially urged, according to Plutarch, by meditation on Alexander's deeds, which haunted him perpetually; but circumstances had certainly, at least, as much to do with his movements as the mere desire
of imitating Alexander. The part of Syria which Tigranes had ruled, was formally ceded by him to the Romans; for another part the princes of the Asmonæan or Maccabean house contended; to a third, or rather to all Syria, claims were advanced by the last offspring of the Seleucidae, Antiochus Asiaticus. As for what regards the Asmonæans, the one, Johannes Hyrcanus II., was in open war with his brother Aristobulus II., and gave Pompey an invitation to Palestine. Antiochus Asiaticus had been formerly acknowledged by Lucullus as the only rightful heir of the Seleucidae: this was sufficient for Pompey to sternly refuse his recognition. It must, however, be acknowledged, for the sake of justice, that Pompey, to help Antiochus to the possession of a throne, which he claimed as heir to his father, must have first conquered his kingdom for him, as petty rulers had started up in every town and district. Pompey expelled all these tyrants, and subjected the whole land to the Romans.

All the territories and nations, even the Arabian emirs, to whom Pompey extended his arrangements, quietly acquiesced in his decisions. In Palestine only Aristobulus, who had occupied and fortified Jerusalem, refused to obey Pompey's command, and yield the succession to his brother Hyrcanus. Even he did not at first dare to resist the will of Pompey, but showed himself equally indisposed to compliance with it: he negotiated and hesitated, remained a short time about Pompey, then took refuge again in a fortress, and finally made his escape to Jerusalem, with the view of maintaining his footing there. About this time Pompey received the intelligence that destiny had spared him the necessity of any further struggle with Mithridates, since his son Pharnaces, after despatching his father, volunteered unconditional submission to his will, and surrender of whatever could embellish Pompey's triumph, or evidence to the Romans that the war with which he was charged was completely ended. In recompense for his self-prostration, Pharnaces retained the Bosporan kingdom.
The greatest sensation would seem to have been excited in Rome by the enterprises against the Arabs and Jews; and people were doomed to hear so much about them, that persons of good taste at last ridiculed Pompey's vapouring, like Cicero's perpetually recurring mention of Catiline.
CHAP. VIII.

EVENTS IN ROME.—CONSULSHIP OF CICERO.

We left Pompey revelling in the East in the plenitude of uncontrolled dominion, deciding on the destiny of kings and empires, founding new cities, and remodelling old ones. The Grecian states were lavish of princely honours to his slaves and freedmen; even in Rome, every one who aimed at acquiring consideration was forced to enlist in the legion of his flatterers. How was he astonished, on his return, to find the state of affairs materially altered,—the aristocratical party of Cato, supported by Crassus, Lucullus, and others, arrayed in opposition to his influence! Cicero, who in the interim had become consul, found it necessary to attach himself to this party, to which he gave great weight by his talents, by his eloquence, and by the fame he had acquired in suppressing the Catilinarian conspiracy.

This conspiracy was not so much a project to change the form of the constitution, and to introduce a new order of things, as an attempt of the most profligate of the Roman aristocracy to re-enact the horrors of the Syllan times, in which they had been busy performers, in order to get rid of their debts, to enrich themselves at the cost of their country, crush their enemies, and save themselves from the infamy which awaited or attached to their vices. Catiline, the author of the plot, had been praetor (u. c. 685.), had administered the province of Africa, and contested the consulship with Cicero, not without hope of success. He had already at an earlier period perpetrated the most horrible acts of murder with his own hand, and leagued himself now with the most corrupt and abandoned rabble in Rome and Italy, for the purposes of incendiariism, murder, and plunder. These traits of one of the first men in Rome sufficiently indicate how deplorable must have been the internal
state of that aristocracy which externally presented such a brilliant aspect. Other circumstances, however, coincide to make it abundantly evident how absolutely necessary a monarchy had become to the Romans. Eleven Roman senators, and even Cornelius Lentulus Sura, who stood at the head of the college of prætors, were leagued with Catiline: among the number of his fellow conspirators were, of one year's tribunes, Servilius Rullus, Attius Labienus, and L. Cæcilius; of those of the subsequent year, Metellus Nepos, Calpurnius Bestia; of the quæstors, P. Vatinius and Sextus Attilius Serranus. Even Cicero's colleague, C. Antonius Hybrida, though afterwards he hunted down the conspirators sword in hand, was suspected of having been not unwilling to see the success of the project; and C. Julius Cæsar, who became pontifex maximus in the year in which the conspiracy was to break out, was, to say the least, not signally active, either in preventing its outbreak or punishing its authors.

For more than a year's space this peril hung over the city. For more than a year it was known that a part of the highest public functionaries had entered into a league with the most desperate of the rabble; that they held their cut-throat conclaves in the city, and that Catiline even aspired to become consul. It was therefore resolved that Cicero should be raised to the consulship, precisely because he was known to be Catiline's enemy. Crassus was suspected, as also was Cæsar; and Pompey's creatures quietly looked on for the most part, hoping at the worst to find for their patron a new occasion to make himself of importance.

Already had the conspirators commenced negotiations for armed assistance from the Allobroges, whose ambassadors were now in the city. They had gained Sylla's old soldiers, who were settled in Etruria and in other parts of Italy, and had dissipated their ill-won possessions; and they held their meetings in the capital without its being possible to obtain any direct and positive evidence against them. But without evidence neither
could the ringleaders be brought to account, nor the progress of the enterprise prevented. This evidence Cicero took a cunning mode of procuring. Through the agency of a lady of easy virtue, who happened to be an acquaintance of his own, he managed to induce one of the plotters to betray his accomplices, and thus procured such accurate intelligence with regard to the particulars of the whole project, that he could openly charge Catiline in the senate, and convict him. Thereupon he procured for himself and his colleague a commission in the ordinary terms to take every possible means for saving the state.

The affair was one of difficulty, even after this vote of the senate; for Catiline set the consul at defiance, while Sylla's soldiers, and other desperate men who had joined them, took arms in Etruria, and the conspirators in Rome concerted measures for the murder of Cicero. Under these circumstances, his eloquence worked wonders. One discourse drove Catiline out of the city; and the Allobrogic embassy being stopped on their departure, and the signatures and seals of the most eminent conspirators being found in their portfolios, Cicero, backed by Cato's authority, obtained a vote for the execution of the heads of the conspiracy, without allowing them any appeal to the people. From the 19th of October to the 6th of December, he was incessantly active in following up this affair within its focus and centre in the capital; while others were employed, during this and the following year, in reducing the armed bodies of conspirators elsewhere. In the following year, Cicero, who had meanwhile laid down the consulship, exerted himself with his whole force in the city against the proposal to delegate to Pompey, who was then on his return from Asia, the military command against Catiline and his accomplices. Catiline, at the head of an army partly consisting of old soldiers, fought heroically, and fell after an obstinate resistance, and after inflicting considerable losses on the troops of the republic sent against him. Pompey was at that time on
his homeward journey; Lucullus stood at the head of the aristocracy, which set itself to undermine the basis of the popular idol. Cato inspired all the Roman souls surviving in the senate with the spirit of a more exalted era, and opposed himself with such courage as well to Crassus and Pompey as to Caesar, whose star was then ascendant in the political horizon, that he formed in the senate, without intrigue, a party of his own. Cicero exerted himself in every way to maintain the reputation he had already acquired. Caesar and Crassus had loudly condemned the rigorous measures taken during his consulship against the leading conspirators; and Clodius, who was then beginning his profligate course of faction, was Cicero's declared enemy. Pompey found a sensible diminution in the number of votes which he had formerly been used to command in the senate. A disturbance had taken place in the city just before his arrival. Metellus Nepos, one of the tribunes, in conjunction with C. Julius Caesar, openly charged as a crime upon Cicero the execution of the prætor Lentulus; and proposed to summon Pompey and his army into the town, to restore the public order disturbed by Cicero. Two other tribunes, Cato and Quintus Minutius, opposed themselves to this motion. It came to a pitched battle in the forum. The senate, at last, empowered the consuls to meet force with force; and Metellus was forced to flee to Pompey, who was just then on his homeward route.

It had been expected that Pompey would march his army into the city. He now, however, remained true to his character: he disbanded his army in Italy; and only requested the soldiers to present themselves again at his triumph. All Italy, flocked to see him and attend his route; an innumerable multitude surrounded him when he entered Rome. His triumph was most splendid; and he even obtained the nomination, as consuls for the following year, of two men whom he believed to be absolutely devoted to his interests. But the main affair, an unqualified confirmation
of all his regulations made in the East, met unexpected obstacles. Of his consuls, the one, Afranius, could not aid him; the other, Metellus Celer, became his enemy on personal grounds: the senate, instead of passing an unqualified sanction to all his acts, required that every separate regulation and arrangement should be approved or rejected after a special scrutiny; and he was weak enough to make an appeal from the senate to the people.

Catiline's was not the only conspiracy in these times projected to bring wealth and power into the hands of a few, at the expense of the whole civilised world. Nearly at the same period, and not without connivance of the three men, Pompey, Cæsar, and Crassus, who afterwards conspired, by other methods, to possess themselves of sovereign power in the commonwealth, the tribune Rullus brought before the senate and the people the plan of a commission for the division of public lands, which must soon have become a commission of general government. He proposed that all state property, of every description, should be sold; comprising all the landed estates belonging to the republic, all acquisitions of territory which had recently been made, and all spoil taken from any enemy; that the money arising from such sales should be employed in purchasing land, to be apportioned out in lots to necessitous citizens; that, for the purpose of these sales and distributions, ten commissioners should be appointed, in the manner in which pontiffs were named, not by the whole people, but by seventeen tribes selected by lot; that these commissioners should be judges, without appeal, of what was or was not public property, and should receive and examine the accounts of every consul or other officer, in whose province any capture had been made or territories acquired. Five years were fixed to be the term of this commission, which aimed to invest ten men with powers even more extensive than were soon afterwards grasped by three, the members of the first triumvirate.

On this occasion we learn from Cicero's speeches,
contra Rullum de lege agraria, the extent of domain which the Roman people still had to bestow. The lands in question were the Scantian forest in Italy, which Cicero rates at a high value; the sometime Cordonian estates in Macedonia, which had partly been confiscated by Flamininus, partly by Æmilius Paulus; the highly productive estates of the Corinthian domain, incorporated by Mummius with the demesne lands of the commonwealth; the territory about New Carthage in Spain; the Stellatian and Campanian fields, and all that remained of the Carthaginian territory in Africa undivided by Gracchus and other popular leaders. These districts were now to be placed in the hands of the proposed commission, as was also the inheritance of Ptolemy Apion, king of Cyrene. A peculiar and extraordinary provision of the proposed law was, that the territory of which Mithridates had possessed himself in Paphlagonia, Pontus, and Cappadocia, should be included in the general scheme of sale. It was further proposed that the commissioners should have powers, perfectly arbitrary, of raising money in all quarters by every means, for the purchase of land, which was afterwards again to be distributed at their discretion. They should be empowered to select new settlers every where, and assign them habitations where they thought fit.

"What a frightful commission!" Cicero might well exclaim. "See you not that this decemviral plague will be dreadfully oppressive for provinces, for empires, for free nations!" He appeals to the example of the so-called free embassies (liberas legationes), which have been spoken of in a former place. "These people," he says, notwithstanding the ostensible charge you have given them, continue private persons; they have no such mighty powers, and, indeed, no specific public function; and yet you know how burdensome and oppressive their appearance commonly is to your allies and to the provinces. How then will it be with the decemvirs?" He goes on to predict plainly, that plunder, and a regular trade in the rights and possessions of citizens and sub-
jects, would be the consequence of granting such a com-
mission. He proceeds to state, that the very gold and
silver which had been carried in triumphs, the sums
which should have been paid into the treasury, had been
swindled by the first men in the commonwealth; he,
therefore, treats as merely absurd the provision in the
proposed law, that the decemvirs should institute en-
quiries as to the spoils acquired in warfare. "If the
courts of justice," he exclaims, "cannot elicit these
facts, how should they be unveiled by the decemvirs?"
On the whole, he gave so just an apprehension of the
danger of intrusting to ten men absolute power over the
treasury, the provinces, and allied states of the Roman
world, that the senate and people, although, in the
case of Pompey, they had overstepped all constitutional
limits in the delegation of authority, and although they
were soon about to submit to further usurpations on the
part of the men who composed the first triumvirate,
had yet sufficient judgment to reject a scheme of private
rapacity, so thinly veiled by the plea of public advantage
as the plan of Rullus.

If it were possible to give implicit credence to the
picture drawn by Sallust of the Roman aristocracy, it
would hardly be conceivable how the state, under such
guidance, could continue to exist at all. But individual
ergies, and a certain common sense not so easily ex-
tinguished in the mass of the people, have a marvellous
conservative force in free states. Unfortunately, the
greatest talents of the time were combined, in Cato and
Cicero, with defects and foibles which often placed the
one in an obnoxious, and the other in a ridiculous point
of view. Cato, according to his principles, neither could
nor would proceed in his public steps with the requisite
cautions and foresight; while Cicero gave abundant proof
that love of praise was even more his ruling motive
than patriotism.
CHAP. IX. ROMAN COMMERCIAL SYSTEM.

CHAP. IX.

STATE OF THE TIMES.—SOURCES OF WEALTH.—OPPRESSION AND CORRUPTION.

The Roman aristocracy of these times had a character entirely its own. Birth might inspire pride, but could not impart power or influence. The only road to these objects, in civil pursuits, was either by the reputed knowledge of law, which attracted consultation and clientship, or by eloquence, which rendered its possessor either formidable as an accuser, or indispensable as an advocate. The condemnation or acquittal of an eminent state criminal established the reputation of the orator who had brought about one event or the other: permanent and predominant influence hardly could be reached except by standing at the head of an army, or by possessing immense wealth; for, in all periods of advanced refinement, the main-spring of affairs is command of money.

In considering the influence of wealth, in the times we are now treating of, we are first led to review the system of commerce, as it had grown up since the simpler ages of Rome. Neither Greeks nor Romans ever regarded the operations of commerce any otherwise than as necessary evils, or ever seized the modern and more enlightened view of the subject, which contemplates those operations as the natural correctives of those extreme irregularities in social ranks and conditions which the ancients sought to remedy by agrarian laws and remissions of debt. The degree of disrepute which attached to mercantile occupations in Rome accounts for the fact, that most departments of trade were in foreign hands.

Commercial intercourse with the East was regularly maintained by means of the coasting vessels of Asia Minor and Syria. Sylla was unable to collect a fleet in Greece and the Greek islands, and was obliged to send
Lucullus to Phœnicia, Egypt, and Cyrene, for that purpose. Mithridates, too, when he wished to man a fleet, or wanted good naval officers, engaged them in Phœnicia and the adjacent regions. These trading vessels kept up the communications between Mithridates and Sertorius. It cannot, therefore, surprise us, that the pirates of Asia Minor were, in point of fact, more powerful than the king of Pontus himself. The number of these freebooters gave activity to the slave-trade, emphatically the occupation of pirates. Delos, of which the flourishing trade passed into a proverb, was the main depot and emporium of this species of merchandise. Here the Romans supplied themselves with those Asiatics and Syrians, who introduced into their private houses all the refinements of eastern courts. That, in this slave-market, thousands of freeborn and educated men were brought daily to market, may well excite astonishment in our milder era, even if we suppose the statement exaggerated, that 10,000 civilised human beings were often sold in the slave-market of Delos in one day. Hence were imported those Grecian readers and professors of belles lettres, so strongly and briefly characterised by Cicero's father, who was wont to say, "Our countrymen are now-a-days like the Syrian slaves,—the more Greek they know, the less they are good for."

The most important wholesale trade in Rome was, doubtless, the corn trade; and as this was carried on in the smallest vessels, an enormous number of them was of course required. Thus the commerce of grain, which, under any circumstances, is well known to be one of the most hazardous, became yet more precarious through the want of an insurance system, the craziness of the ships, and the unskilfulness of the seamen. What a multitude of little vessels were needed to supply Rome may be inferred from the fact, that from every known region, from the Crimea to Lombardy, 700,000 tonnage freight of grain were annually imported into Rome.*

a guild of their own. Their craft appear hardly to have been larger than our canal boats, or rather to have resembled Indian canoes; for the name by which they were designated, caudex, denotes, properly, the scooped trunk of a tree. These corn ships entered every port duty free. For the rest, we find from Pliny, that, even in his times, the art of baking still remained in a very low state among the Romans; that their wheaten bread was heavy and indigestible; that good bakers were only to be found in Gaul and Spain. The reason of this he explains simply enough. "In Spain and Gaul," he says, "beer being made of grain (Gallicia et Hispianiae frumento in potum resoluto), they make use of the yeast to leaven the bread (spuma ita concreta pro fermento utuntur);" whence, he concludes, "quâ de causâ levior illis quam ceteris panis est."

According to the data presented by Cicero on the price of grain in Sicily at the time of Verres, the provisioning of Rome would have demanded a yearly sum of about 2,500,000l. sterling. So early as the last year of the second Punic war, the state, by its advances, reduced the price of the Roman modius (somewhat more than a peck English) of wheat to four asses, or one sesterce; afterwards the people were allowed to have grain at a half sesterce. As the as and the half sesterce became continually smaller in process of time, it is clear that the senate and ediles systematically and continually reduced the price of bread with the increase of population. The case was the same with flesh. Thus the people (that is to say, those who had a corn ticket, tessera), got 35 pounds of coarse, or 25 pounds of fine bread for 2½d. to 3d. Caius Gracchus proposed to go even farther; he would have sold the modius for three quarters of an as, so that the state would have had to supply the people, for not quite 2d., with the grain which cost it 3 sesterces, or about 8½d. If, out of the 70,000,000 modii imported, one supposes only the third part distributed at a lower price against tickets for corn, it is still easy to see that the state could not stand the
expense. The regulation was of necessity repealed, and afterwards entirely done away with by Sylla.

What immense sums were required for the provisioning of the capital may be inferred from the fact, that the distribution of corn alone, which Cato caused to be granted by the senate to the people at the time of the Catilinarian conspiracy, in order to prevent disturbance at that critical moment, cost the state annually 4,000,000 sesterces. Gracchus's law was afterwards revived; and at length corn was distributed gratuitously by Clodius to a stated number of burghers. The charge of purchase and distribution was left to the lower order of seidiles. That the governors of the provinces from whence corn was imported speculated on the price, and practised very arbitrary methods in order to draw profit from the speculation, may be learned from Cicero's speeches against Verres.

The old Carthaginian territory, under the name of the province of Africa, acquired a degree of importance to the empire which would be inexplicable, but for the consideration that agriculture in Italy had sustained a mortal shock by the extinction of the Samnite and Etruscan confederations. Pasturage, vine cultivation, and timber-growing supplanted tillage, as being more lucrative, and of easier superintendence. Sicily and Africa followed agriculture in a systematic and scientific manner. The property of the soil was grasped by the great families of Rome; its cultivation was carried on by multitudes of slaves, and the export trade to the capital was established with complete regularity.

The ordinary method of acquiring wealth was to enter into one of those societies which supported great undertakings with their capital: it was this which rendered the equites so powerful as an order, and procured for them that eminent position in society which was recognised by the motion of Otho, assigning them separate places in the theatre, between those of the nobles and the citizens.

The revenues of the state and private capitals were
alike absorbed into the hands of this gigantic monied interest, which exercised, in those times, a tyranny the more galling the less it could be grappled with, or even ascertained distinctly. The revenue of the state had been every where farmed by the equestrian order; which, moreover, contracted to execute all extensive public works, formed various money-lending or stock-jobbing associations, and made advances on mortgage at an usurious rate of interest, to foreign states or private individuals. Owing to the constant oppression of governors in the provinces, the borrowers were seldom in condition to repay these loans; and the landed estates, nay, even public edifices and temples, became the property of these companies or individual capitalists.

The oppressions of these companies of revenue farmers and money-lenders had reached a crying pitch before the Mithridatic war, and the usurers were ordinarily favoured by the provincial governors. Rare, indeed, was conduct such as that of the quœstor Rutilius, who leagued himself with his prætor to check these abuses, as far as in him lay. The bloodsuckers became his accusers, — their friends came forward as witnesses against him; and Rutilius, a man distinguished as an historian and a philosopher, as lieutenant of Metellus in the Numidian war, in short, as the ablest and most upright man of his time, succumbed to the most infamous of cabals.* On his banishment from Rome, however, the Asiatic towns rewarded his noble interference in their favour; they received him with extraordinary honours: Smyrna bestowed the right of citizenship on him; he remained there, and never returned to his native city, not even after his persecutors had lost their judicial powers under Sylla.

When Lucullus came to Asia†, he found the condition of the province so desperate, that he thought

* "Scævola quœstor Rutilius Rufus damnatus est, quod cum præstore consenserit suo, ne publicam aliquid agerent in provinciâ suâ, quo cognito equites Romani (nam tum ante Sullana tempora judicabant) damnarunt eum."

† Plut. Lucull. c. 32.
himself obliged to make express regulations; and these regulations best prove how dreadful were the oppressions of those people whom Cicero calls the flower of the equestrian order, the ornament of the Roman state, the bulwark of the commonwealth. * The exactions of the equestrians in Asia had brought the social machine to a full stop. † Lucullus ordained, that in all cases where the accumulated interests were greater than the capital, the excess should be remitted to the debtor; he forbade the exaction of more than one per cent. monthly; that is to say, twelve per cent. annually. The creditor should be allowed to distrain only on a fourth part of the debtor's goods; but any one who should exact interest of interest, should lose both capital and interest. In this manner all debts were cleared off within four years, and the lands of the province restored to their owners free of all incumbrance. It appears from Cicero's speech on the Manilian law, that a cry, sufficient to overthrow Lucullus, was set up by the capitalists against his equitable adjustment.

The provinces were not only drained by the capitalists and revenue farmers, but by the governors, who ought to have protected them. Even ordinary senators, when they went on pleasure excursions, procured a commission (liberam legationem) from the senate, which not only entitled them to accommodation on their route, but enabled them to enrich themselves and all whom they took in their suite. Cicero, in his speeches against Verres, which he afterwards committed to writing, has left a record of this provincial tyranny, which does not contain, probably, so much exaggeration as Burke's speeches against Warren Hastings. Yet Cicero has borne as hard on the Roman nabob as Burke on the English. The Turkish or those Persian governors whom

† This involvement of cities and states proceeded from the fine of 20,000 talents, exacted by Sulla in Asia, and advanced by the knights. Up to the time of Lucullus's arrival, this capital had swollen, by exorbitant interests, to twenty myriad talents.
Morier, in his second travels in Persia, has depicted in such fearful colours, might have taken lessons from those of Rome, who knew much better how to secure their plunder than the Turk or the Persian. The Eastern oppressor has daily to dread punishment; the Roman, on the other hand, was certain of impunity. What enormous wealth a governor of that kind might accumulate by extortion, may be guessed from the sum which Cicero demands as compensation to the Sicilians from Verres. We would not build much upon this document, as the demand of an advocate cannot furnish statistical data of much weight. Yet his estimate might, perhaps, not be exaggerated; as Verres, to the misfortune of his province, continued governor three years in succession. Cicero calculates the amount of compensation due to the province at 100,000,000 sesterces*; it is evident, from this one instance, how little efficacious were the Cornelian laws for the better administration of the provinces. This is evidenced, still more clearly, by Cicero's Epistles, as deeds are recorded there which make us shudder; and recorded, not of robbers and murderers, amongst whom may be reckoned Verres, but of men otherwise wholly unexceptionable. From a letter to Appius, his predecessor in his province †, we find that the inhabitants of the towns were not only annoyed in every possible way by the revenue farmers; that they were not only ground down to the earth by the interests of borrowed capitals; but were compelled besides to tax themselves according to the caprice of the governor, or according to the rapacity of his creatures. The case was the same in other provinces, especially in Sicily. There, shortly before Verres's time, Lepidus had behaved in such a manner, that Cicero says, Verres could be compared

* "All Sicily," he says, "cries out to Verres, "Quod aurii, quod argentii, quod ornamentorum in meis urbibus, sedibus, delubris fuit quod in unamque re beneficio senatus populi Romani juris habui, id mihi tu, C. Verres, eripuisti atque abutuli, quo nomine abe te sestertium millies ex lego repetor.""—C. D. vitat. in Q. Caecilium, c. v.
† Cic. Epist. ad Divers. I. iii. ep. 8.
with himself only, and with Lepidus. Lepidus was not ashamed to bring the plunder of the province, in a singularly striking manner, before the eyes of men. He built a magnificent palace in Rome, on which the yellow Numidian marble was laid out with extraordinary profusion.* The example of extravagance, as of extortion, was infectious. Lucullus, who was consul four years after Lepidus, was resolved to build more splendidly than he had done: accordingly, he procured black marble from Egypt, which, if not more beautiful, at all events was dearer than the Numidian.† In five-and-thirty years there were more than a hundred palaces in Rome, amongst which that of Lepidus was the humblest. How rapidly the times changed in dwelling houses, eating, and clothing, is evident from Lepidus’s example, as a scale of expense was made matter of public accusation against him, which, ten years later, was not at all remarkable. Velleius Paterculus relates, that the censor Cassius reprimanded Lepidus (apparently before the latter had built his house), for paying so extravagant a house-rent as 6000 sesterces. At the present day, subjoins Velleius, no senator could with decency inhabit any dwelling at so low a rate; and yet hardly more than 150 years have elapsed since that period. Lucullus’s expenditure was on such a scale, that the writers of the imperial period celebrate his gardens even compared with the colossal plans of later times; and his ordinary meals, not to mention his banquets, remained precedents for later prodigality. Lucullus had so regulated his house, that he could always bring three of his friends to supper with him, and, without any previous notice, set before them a banquet of which the expense was reckoned at about 650 drachmae. Even those men of the aristocracy, who, like Cicero, had neither any particular taste for expense, nor any extraordinary facilities for indulging

† Id. c. 24. 1 & 4.
it, were obliged to make an absurd display of luxury for the sake of appearances. Would they invite their friends to table, they must at least possess a proper table; and this could not well, in any respectable house, be of any other wood than, first of the root of certain trees, and afterwards of the wood of a sort of cedar. To such a table a necessary appendage was a foot of Delian bronze, manufactured in Delos. Pliny has devoted a whole chapter to the subject, and brings us acquainted on the occasion with two branches of ancient industry.

The one is the culture of that description of trees, the wood and roots of which fetched so high a price; the other is the art of cabinet-making; since the difference in costliness depended chiefly on the workmanship. Yet even Pliny regards it as incredible, that Cicero should have paid 650L for such a table. We have mentioned the manufacture at Delos, because we can here give new proofs that this island attracted to itself the trade of the world. It has been mentioned above, that the Roman slave-trade, and an active trade in goods, had their emporium there; nay, that Rome granted peculiar favours to Delos, and endeavoured to transfer thither the commerce of the Rhodians. In this place we shall only add, that Pliny also ascribes the whole manufacturing system to the Delians. He speaks of various kinds of ore, and the works executed in each; he distinguishes the Corinthian, the Æginetan, the Delian, and maintains that the fame of the latter would be preserved and promoted by means of the legs of tables and couches, fabricated at Delos.*

In passing to the topic of public amusements, we have first to remark, that the Servile War caused no diminution in combats and wild beast baitings; nay, that speculators in the cruel training and feeding of the combatants increased daily in numbers, and found people enough ready to pay an exorbitant price for their gla-

* "Antiquissima eris gloria Delicani sui, mercatus in Delo concelebrante toto orbe, et ideo cura officina tricliniorum pedibus fulcrisque!"
diators, not only at wild beast hunts, but also at public games, and more especially on occasions of intestine disturbance. Catiline and his friends had collected no small number of fighters about them; Clodius and Milo, we shall presently find, both formed a kind of bodyguard of them. The most impudent and abandoned slaves, so they had but sufficient bodily powers, were bought for the purpose; men were even found to hire themselves out for the employment, sure of good keep, generous diet, and of making themselves a dear bargain. As they could not have bread weighed to them, nor be let starve like other slaves, the speculators in human flesh kept fighting schools in Ravenna, where the air was healthy, and meat cheap, and in Capua, where the other necessaries of life were to be had at an easier rate than in Rome. In earlier times these establishments were carried on by people who were content to engage in a trade that was deemed dishonourable. But, in these times, even freemen were not ashamed to let themselves out; nay, senators themselves did not disdain to conduct their training; and, in Caesar's life, the circumstance is mentioned with especial praise, that he never gave way to the cruelty of the populace when a gladiator's life was in question. The case was the same with races, which were not, at first, as in Greece, conducted by the men of highest station in the country, but consigned to the management of hirelings. Since Sylla's time, senators engaged in them; and, at the public games held by him as dictator, C. Antonius Hybrida, afterwards the colleague of Cicero, and other nobles, took part in the course, though the ordinary charioteers also engaged in it.

The outlay on games, races, gladiatorial combats, &c., was raised to the highest pitch by the part taken by many distinguished men in the training and keep of the people who were employed in them; and enormous sums were requisite to enable any edile to surpass his predecessors in splendour. Caesar attempted this, and thereby incurred a load of debt which would seem i-
credible, if we only possessed the testimony of Appian, who gives a sum of nearly 2,000,000l.; but Plutarch says, in like manner, that when Caesar wished to go to Spain, and was hindered by his debts from doing so, Crassus, in order to satisfy a single urgent creditor, was obliged to give security for 830 talents.

Crassus, like all avaricious and rapacious people of sharp intellect, knew how to show disregard of expense whenever it seemed requisite for displaying himself, or accommodating his friends, whom he supplied with loans to a large amount without demanding interest, and thus contrived to keep a part of the senate in dependence on him.

Crassus's whole property was self-acquired, and his life affords materials for elucidating the manner in which wealth might be acquired and augmented at this period. Crassus made his great speculations at the time of the Syllan proscriptions, when he not only bought up, to a large extent, the lots of confiscated property, but had wealthy persons, in different parts of Italy, placed on the list of proscribed, in order to possess himself of their estates. Cicero taunts him constantly with transactions of this nature. He next determined to take advantage of ruin and conflagration, as he had taken advantage of spoliation and massacre; and combined this speculation with the slave-trade, which, we have seen before, from Cato's example, was the most lucrative branch of business in Rome, to those who knew how to carry it on, like the elder Cato and Crassus. He began by buying up slaves in every direction who understood building, and all the arts connected with it. When he had brought together 500 able builders and workmen, he purchased sites for building, which were then extremely low in the market, as few ventured to buy what none could hope to possess in security, and many fled out of the city in dread of being proscribed and murdered. He also contrived to possess himself, at a cheap rate, of houses in Rome. In this manner whole streets became his property. He carefully avoided, however,
building on his own account, but sold his ground, and hired out the services of his workmen, which thus brought him a clear and certain profit. Moreover, he bought and educated slaves for all employments; readers, scribes, people skilled in trying gold and silver, stewards, waiters, chamberlains, and valets. The education of these slaves he conducted in person. Agriculture and mining he also conducted on a grand scale; but his traffic in slaves he still found the most lucrative branch of business.

The Asiatic triumph of Pompey must have glutted the Roman market with slaves, after all deductions are made for the numbers left to repopulate the conquered countries, of those 2,083,000 captives whom he is said to have made. Pliny, though a great admirer of Pompey, states, with disapprobation, that his victories in Asia had introduced the luxury of precious stones and pearls in Rome, in the same manner as the triumph of C. Manlius and of Scipio had before brought in the use of finely-worked silver plate, Pergamenian tapestries and tables, and sofas adorned with bronze; that of Mummius, the taste of exhibiting Corinthian vessels and paintings.

Here it may be remarked, that Graeco-Asiatic fashions and usages began to supersede in Rome the arts and manners of Europe. Precious stones, pearl, porcelain, or oriental stone-ware, came instead of those earthen vessels, to the painting of which the Etruscans and Campanians owed their renown: herds of slaves employed to rouse, with voluptuous arts, the torpid senses, or to amuse the languid mind with verbal subtilities, instead of the familiar associates of the rustic hearth; and instead of the simple table of the olden times, came banquets such as those of Lucullus.

What reverence was paid abroad to the mere name of a noble Roman, and with what disdain the Roman oligarchs treated the most polished and civilised foreigners under their empire, is evidenced by an anecdote in Cicero's letters, which deserves to be inserted in this
place, though the incident belongs to the period subsequent to Caesar’s consulsip. C. Memmius was charged with illegal canvass and intrigue (crimine ambitus), and escaped his probable sentence, as the Roman law allowed, by means of voluntary exile to Athens. A banished man, it might be thought, would live as quietly as possible. Not at all. Memmius chose to build, and selected a spot to build on in the neighbourhood of one of the most venerable sites of antiquity, the rival of the Academy and Lyceum—the garden of Epicurus. The place, of course, was not to be sold; and the Areopagus was forced to pass a decree, consigning it to Memmius, though Phaedrus, who then stood at the head of the sect of Epicureans, had legal claims on the situation in question. Memmius afterwards gave up his plan of building, and Cicero was entreated to intercede with him, that he should waive his claim to the property of the Epicureans. With this view, Cicero writes* in a style of the most consummate indifference, assuring Memmius, that so long as he had retained his intention of building, he (Cicero) would not for the world have meddled in the matter; but that now, perhaps, he might as well humour the poor people, even though he regarded them with no particular favour, by letting them have their garden ground back again.

With all the ostentation and magnificence of a few families, Rome and its environs were as yet far from the pitch of splendour which Strabo describes as existing in his own days. Cicero compares Rome and Capua, and hesitates not a moment to give preference to the latter town over the metropolis of the world, in its general appearance, streets, and architectural beauties. Rome, he says, is built on uneven ground, with portions of it buried in a valley; has enormously lofty houses, wretched pavements, and narrow streets. On the other

---

* "Patro cum ad me Romam literas misisset ut te sibi placarem pateremque, ut nescio quid illud Epicuri parietinarum sibi concederos, nihil scripsit ad te ob eam rem, quod amationem tuae consilium mea commendationem nobisam impediuri Idem ut veni Athenas, cum idem ut ad te scriberem rogasset, ob eam causam impetravit, quod te abjectisse illum amationem constabat inter omnes amicos tuos." — *Epist. ad Divers.* xiii. 1.
hand, Capua occupies a plain, and laughs to scorn, with her wide streets, our narrow alleys. And then her environs! Who will compare a Vatican and Pupinian field with the exuberant and rich soil about Capua? Only in scorn and derision can the vast number of places in the vicinity of Capua be compared with those about Rome. What are Labici, Fidenae, Collatia, or even Lanuvium, Aricia, Tusculum, beside Cales, Teanum, Neapolis, Puteoli, Cumae, Pompeii, Nuceria?

* "Coracullis sublatam atque suspensam, non optimis viis, angustissimis semitiae."
CHAP. X.

INTELLECTUAL AND LITERARY CHARACTER OF THE TIMES.

No deliberative body, with perhaps one exception, the constituent assembly of France, seems to have ever so completely brought together in its members the highest abilities and attainments of the nation represented by it, as the senate of Rome, from the end of the third Punic war to the death of Cæsar. The writings of a Cicero, Cæsar, and Sallust, the epistles of Brutus and Cassius, and the replies addressed by Cicero to a host of correspondents, whose communications have not been handed down to us, evince such fulness of knowledge, such facility of expression, so familiar an acquaintance with the various branches of art and science, as to evince how high a place was given to general acquirements in the estimation of men of rank and station, and how requisite a condition were those acquirements to the attainment of eminence.

This direction of mind in his contemporaries to those studies which were naturalised in Rome by the lessons of Greek captives or fugitives, was early perceived and turned to advantage by Cicero, whose influence, by precept or example, in all branches of study, on the mental frame of his own and of succeeding times, must now claim our principal attention. It is a spectacle quite unique in Roman history, that a man like Cicero, without military fame, without aristocratic connection, without the command of wealth, without the management of a party, simply and solely by the exertion of his talents and his eloquence, could raise himself to the first place in the conduct of affairs.

Cicero was born for an orator. He early felt that his only chance of advancement in the state, and the gratification of a vanity which never entirely left him, and which he himself never pretends to disclaim, lay in the cultivation of his native and peculiar talent. Perhaps
he also felt that the only mode in which the higher pursuits of philosophy and literature could be really popularised in Rome was by clothing them in rhetorical forms and colours. Accordingly, his efforts took that direction from youth upwards. The poet Archias, Philo, Molon, had great part in his education, and the stoic Diodotus thoroughly exercised him in dialectics.* He next sought Grecian culture at its source, and did not return from Greece till he had mastered all the secrets of its oratory. He visited the renowned schools of political science and eloquence which then flourished in Athens, Rhodes, and many towns of Asia Minor. His own writings afford abundant evidence of his proficiency in geometry, philology, music, and every other liberal branch of scientific and literary attainment. He was conversant with all the refinements of dialectic subtlety, and with the whole ideal or practical range of ethics. For he well knew that the power and effect of oratory does not depend, like success in other arts, on any single study, but that he alone deserves the name of an orator who can speak on any subject (de omni questione) appropriately and persuasively to his audience.

Cicero has himself portrayed the character of the true orator, and his right to be regarded as a director of the public mind; and the author of the Dialogue on the causes of the decline of eloquence has treated the subject with special reference to Cicero himself.† The degree of influence exercised by Cicero over his age and country by means of his extended research in history and philosophy, may partly be collected from his own statements. He says of himself, with justice, that it was he first among all the Romans, who showed himself conversant in the

* "Doctisimorum hominum familiaritates, quibus domus nostra semper floruit, et principes illi Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus, Posidonius, a quibus instituti sumus." — De Nat. Deor. i. i. c 3.
† "Exeo hanc primam et precipuam causam arbitror cur tantum ab eloquentia antiquorum Romanorum recesserimus. Si testes desiderantur, quos potiores nominabo, quam apud Graecos Demosthenem quem studio-sissimum Platonis audirem fuisse memoris proditum est. Et Cicero, ut opinor, verilia, quidquid in eloquentia effecerit, id se non rhetorum, sed Academiam spatulis consecutum." — Dialogus de Oratoribus, c. 32.
books which contained the genuine sources of wisdom, who first had brought the Roman people acquainted with the leading features and principles of the Greek schools of philosophy. Civil law, the sole science quite congenial to the Romans, lost, in his hands, part of the dryness of its distinctions and definitions. He popularised even history, the importance of which had been little understood up to his times, by exciting the attention of his countrymen to its high importance in daily transactions and politics.*

Dramatic spectacles and actors never could obtain in Rome the rank which they had held in Greece. Cicero taught respect for art even in the persons of actors. He showed a degree of honour to the great actor of his times, Roscius, such as had usually been paid in Rome only to statesmen and generals, and, in all his speeches and writings, made so excellent an use of native dramatic works, as well comic as tragic, that his encouragement must have brought forward new labourers in the field of the drama, had it been possible to naturalise that branch of art among the Romans.

Cicero shows himself greatest in political discourses, when these have no premeditated, self-regarding purpose. If the limits of our work admitted of illustrating in detail the degree in which his speeches promoted that political knowledge which was then a prime necessity of his era, we should say, that in his speeches against Verres he not only displays a thorough insight into the prevalent corruption of the aristocracy, which regarded public functions as its property, and the administration of the provinces as a means for its enrichment, but that he also understood how to set forth before the people the true and stable principles of political administration. He describes the nobler lines of policy, the better modes of provincial government, and contrasts them with the perverted and pernicious system followed by such men as Verres and others. With reference to Catiline, his

* "Ut ex ea (the orator) quando opus esset, ab inferis locupletissimos testes excitaret."
accomplices, and all the people, to whom the state was a secondary matter, and their own advantage the main object in life, the discourse held by Cicero as candidate for the consulship (in toga candida), from separate, and, in part, very imperfect fragments, shows us the contrast between the two parties who then devoted themselves to politics—the old Roman, and the new senatorial party,—and historically illustrates the two descriptions of men, one of which sought the greatness of Rome, and the other only its own interest, careless of the ruin of the state. Through his discourses against Catiline, Cicero’s eloquence rekindled, even in hearts where it seemed utterly extinct, some feeling for the honour of their country, so that even those who privately favoured Catiline deserted him from dread of appearing partakers in his crime.*

In philosophy, so far as exciting interest in its study, and diffusing its results are claims to honour, more has, perhaps, been done for the world by Cicero than by all the greatest philosophers taken together; since, not only did the whole subsequent Roman era follow his guidance, but even in the scholastic gloom of the middle ages the effect of his writings is strikingly perceptible; and, in the first dawn of philosophy in modern times, the earliest unsophisticated knowledge of the great schools of antiquity was derived from the same source. If we would properly appreciate the influence of Cicero’s philosophy on his countrymen, we must constantly keep before our eyes his own declaration with regard to the species of philosophical instruction which was the scope of his efforts.† However little the philosopher, properly so called, can sanction the selection and adaptation of different systems to the necessities of men and of the times, however strange it seem to him that a man, who

† "Si omnia philosophiae praecepta referuntur ad vitam, arbitramur nos et publicis et privatis in rebus ea praestissime que ratio et doctrina præscripsit."
of all the Romans of his time was best, perhaps exclusively, acquainted with Aristotle, as he himself boasts in his Logic, should yet appear to oscillate between the elder Platonism, strict Stoicism, and a better sort of Cyrenaean doctrine, according as life either exalts or depresses him, and as he, therefore, either basks in enjoyment, or requires solace and sedatives; yet to him who views Cicero's philosophical writings historically, without reference to the furtherance of philosophy as a science, it is precisely this eclectic character which makes them of the highest importance. By converting Greek speculation into Roman practical wisdom, he brought philosophy into some esteem amongst a people addicted to warfare, inventive of legal subtleties, and only intent on material utility. He showed what use might be made of Greek philosophy in legal and political discourses, in common intercourse, in the vicissitudes of life to which all are liable in republics, and which Cicero, like Lucullus and others, so frequently experienced.

Were we asked to compare the influence of his several writings on active life, we should assign less importance to books, like that on the Republic, only recently introduced to our acquaintance, or to the book on the Being of the Gods, on Destiny, on Divination, than to those either designed for the public in general, or, at least, for people in Cicero's situation. The books on Age, on Friendship, on Duties, were not only important, at the time of their publication, in the promotion of a more refined and noble mode of thought and life, but became of more especial importance in the middle ages, in the days of the first revival of the study of antiquity. The middle ages were guided by the fathers of the church and by the Latin schools to these books, and excitable minds, which were in danger of being stifled by the prevalent philosophy, its barbarous formulas, locutions, and scholastic disputations, were retrieved by Cicero's works to the contemplation of the outward and inward aims and ends of humanity. So long as Latin was the sole lan-
guage of books, the writings of Cicero served as a manual for all those who would learn, in the easiest manner, the results of ancient philosophy for their own amusement, instruction, or solace.

As a rhetorician, as a teacher of eloquence, or the art of persuasion, Cicero had merit no less eminent than as an orator. In this department his excellence was the greater, as he combined with the knowledge of rules the knowledge how to put them in practice. If we have Cicero to thank for the preservation of whole schools and systems of the old Grecian philosophy, we are even more indebted to him in rhetoric, for not only preserving all that was taught in the Greek schools of his time, but for having enriched the whole with constant reference to the Romans, and with examples from the history of their native eloquence. Cicero's Epistles are precious, not only as models of style, but as opening to our view the living features of familiar intercourse, and enabling us to estimate the treasures of thought and of various knowledge which were then in circulation among the Roman aristocracy. From the fragments belonging to other writers interspersed among those Epistles, it appears that at this period, even in crises the most perilous, the class which composed the refined circles of Rome, took equally vivid interest in intellectual as in political subjects. It is exclusively characteristic of the times which we are treating of, that the talent of speaking, ease of expression, and general cultivation of intellect, were acquirements universally made by persons of consideration. With the utmost elegance of address, with the most flattering forms of politeness, all these eminent personages combine a certain straightforward openness, springing out of the habits of public life and extended intercourse. A state of society fraught with these accomplishments, and exhibiting high individual examples of political eminence, could not lack a tribe of memoirs, biographies, and commentaries. Works of this description were unknown to the Greek literature, as were also (till the
Alexandrian era) works of ponderous erudition, such as those of Varro. Q. Lutatius Catulus, Rutilius, Æmilius Scaurus, composed memoirs of their life and times; but we know as little of these as of some others, who, in like manner, have written their own lives. Nor is it known whether Sylla can be said to have written his own memoirs. He employed Lucullus to stuff them out with rhetoric, and his freedman Cornelius Epicaides also worked at them. To judge from the passages left us, Sylla was far removed from Cæsar’s simplicity: he rather sought to colour things and acts than to let them speak for themselves, and made pretensions to style and regularity, which are not at all compatible with this description of authorship. Lucullus, too, as he patronised men of letters, and took up literary pursuits as a pleasant pastime, wrote memoirs, from which Plutarch has, perhaps, adopted passages here and there in his Life. Next to Brutus’s memoirs, which have unfortunately been lost to us, those of Atticus merit especial mention, as hardly any private man can be named who exercised equal influence in public affairs, and so much enjoyed the confidence of the leading men of his time. The complicated money concerns of Atticus, his incessant studies, his familiar acquaintance with the whole Roman and Grecian literature, his complete impartiality and independence of character, made him equally sought and courted by all parties.* He was on friendly terms with Sylla, yet assisted the younger Marius with money; he was intimate with Cicero, yet withal not ill-disposed to Clodius; the friend of Cæsar, familiar with Brutus and Cassius. His historical writings seem to be merely the amusements of a man of rank. They are notices, genealogical and historical, of the most eminent families

* "Omnia Catonis, Ciceronum, Marli, Q. Hortensii, Aului Torquatii, multorum præterea equitum Romanorum negotia procurabant, ex quo judicari poterat, non inertia sed judicio fugisse reipublicæ procurationem. Humanitatis vero nullum sibi erat magis testimonium possum, quam quod adolescentes idem sensi, Sullam fuerit juventissimus senex, adolescens M. Brutum; cum equilibrus autem suis Q. Hortensio et M. Cicerone, sic vixerit, ut judicaretur difficile sit, cui ætati fuerit aptissimus, quamquam ehm praecipue dilexit Ciceron, ut ne frater quidem ei Quintus carior fuit aut familiarior." — C. Nep. Atticus, c. iv.
of Rome, and other such fruits of research directed on points of mere curiosity.

Of Cæsar, as is well known, we have no complete memoirs, but only an account of his campaigns, in which he could not avoid touching upon other matters concerning himself. Xenophon's campaign against Cyrus, the history of his own times by Frederick the Great, and the history of the Seven Years' War, afford some data for comparison betwixt their respective ages and authors. The Greek has in view much rather the matter in hand, the real occurrences, than his own person and personal achievements. The Roman, on the other hands, gives the latter point especial prominence; but in so doing he is straightforward, open, and totally free from all pretensions to a morality and delicacy of feeling which he does not possess. Cæsar speaks bluntly out of acts of oppression, plunder, and cruelty, which, he says, he found politically necessary, and speaks of them with edifying composure. Nor did he, like Sylla and Frederick, get his own journals elaborated and polished by foreign littérateurs and professors of fine writing. He gave himself out as he was; and is more pleasing in his easy negligence than all the Syllan sophists, and all the French phrasemongers and philosophs whom Frederick invoked to his aid. It is remarkable that Cicero and Cæsar should each, at the same time, have furnished examples,—the one how excellence might be reached by the most consummate art; the other by utter renunciation of all art whatsoever.

Sallust was another true-born son of this refined and corrupt aristocratical era. In his histories he imitated the manner of Thucydides; or, in other words, he made an artificial copy of what, in the Greek original, was a natural production. Sallust dwells exclusively on the darker side of life and experience; it would seem that he himself had seen and practised nothing but evil. Like the fashionable French school of the time of Louis XV., he erects into ruling springs of action ego-
tism and love of pleasure, speaks of geniality in corruption, honours talent disjoined from virtue, which he refines into a mere ideal shadow, setting up all the while extremely high pretensions to it, and overstraining the whole scope of philosophy. He regards the life of all men with whom he himself has lived as far apart from his sphere of being, and far beneath his sphere of thought. Thucydides strains his requirements of mankind to a less exalted pitch; recognises an inward life besides that which he sees with his eyes; believes in love, in friendship, in disinterested patriotism; and consequently never becomes bitter and sarcastic. With respect to the philosophy of both, it is at once observable that the views of the world and men entertained by the latter spring from the inmost depths of his soul, and have become his intellectual property. Sallust, on the other hand, betrays at every word that he has learned his by rote, or has manufactured them for the market, for display in conversation, speaking, or writing, not for practical use. Accordingly the brevity and obscurity of Thucydides result from his purpose only to write for a highly educated circle, not for the multitude. Sallust is resolved to write with striking effect, in such a manner that his sayings shall have all the effect of epigrams; and that the exercise of unravelling his intricacies shall furnish the reader with the sort of amusement derived from solving charades or riddles.

It coincided exactly with Sallust's whole turn of thought, and with his whole conception of human pursuits and character, to select for the subjects of his narrative two sets of occurrences, of which the whole tissue was corruption and betrayal of the commonweal for the sake of sheer self-interest; and in recounting which, hardly any occasion was presented of bringing into view the nobler features of the times. Even when Sallust resolved to join together the two portions of the history of his own times by a connecting thread of narration, he prudently did not stray beyond the times of corruption.
LONDON:
Printed by A. SPOTTENWODE,
New-Street-Square.
This book is under no circumstances to be taken from the Building